Case Topic: Meaning of words varied wen required by context or intention

Case Title: RAMON DIOKNO-Plaintiff-Appellant

Rehabilitation Finance Corporation -Defendant-appellee

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the holder of a backpay certificate of indebtedness issued by the Treasurer of the
Philippines under the provisions of Republic Act No. 304 of a face value of P75,857.14 dated August 30,
1948. On or about November 10, 1950, when the action was brought, he had an outstanding loan with
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, contracted therewith on January 27, 1950, in the total sum of
P50,000, covered by a mortgage on his property, with interest at 4 per cent per annum, of which
P47,355.28 was still unpaid. In this action he seeks to compel the defendant corporation to accept
payment of the balance of his indebted with his backpay certificate. The defendant resists the suit on the
ground that plaintiffs' demand is not only not authorized by section 2 of Republic Act No. 304 but contrary
to the provisions thereof, and furthermore because plaintiff's loan was obtain on January 27, 1950, much
after the passage of Republic Act No. 304, and because the law permits only "acceptance or discount of
backpay certificates," not the repayment of loans.

The appeal involves the interpretation of section 2 of Republic Act No. 302, which provides:

. . . And provided, also, That investment funds or banks or other financial institutions owned or
controlled by the Government shall, subject to the availability of loanable funds, and any
provision of the their charters, articles of incorporation's, by-laws, or rules and regulations to the
contrary notwithstanding, accept or discount at not more than two per centum per annum for ten
years such certificate for the following purposes only: (1) the acquisition of real property for use
as the applicant's home, or (2) the building or construction of the residential house of the payee
of said certificate: . . .

The appellant contends that the above provision is mandatory, not only because it employs the word
"shall", which in its ordinary signification is mandatory, not permissive, but also because the provision is
applicable to institutions of credit under the control of the Government, and because otherwise the
phrases "subject to availability of loanable funds" and "any provisions of this charter, . . . and regulations
to the contrary notwithstanding" would be superfluous.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant corporation should accept the backpay certificate in payment for the
balance of his indebtedness.

HELD:
The supreme court dismissed the appeal
Case Title: Manikad v. Tanodbayan Hon. Benjamin T. Vianzon
G.R. No. 65097 (February 20, 1984) Chapter II, Page 63, Footnote No.65

FACTS: Petitioners were members of the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) Police Force and were
charged with crimes of smuggling, theft and violations of AntiGraft Law and Anti-Fencing Law before the
Respondent. Petitioners argue that the power to investigate complaints of this nature are lodged
exclusively upon the EPZA and is not in the Respondent’s jurisdiction. Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A states: “The
EPZA in the exercise of its sole police authority over the export processing zones shall have the power to
receive and investigate complaints relative to violation of penal laws committed inside the zones owned
and administered by the Authority…”

ISSUE: W/N Section 7 of P.D. 1716-A precludes the Respondent from investigating complaints within the
Export Processing Zone.

HELD: No, the use of “sole” in P.D. 1716-A refers to police authority. Although the EPZA Police Force is
the only police authority within the Zone, it is not the only authority that may investigate complaints,
especially those which fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.