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G.R. No.

147703, April 14, 2004

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, INC., petitioner
v. People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Panganiban

This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the rules of court assailing resolutions of CA.
Petitioner's appeal from the judgment of the RTC of San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case
No. 2535 was dismissed.
On July 1994 accused Macadangdang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and
was sentenced to suffer the penalty. The court ruled that rabbit bus lines shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused in the event of the accused insolvency. Evidently, the judgment against
the accused had become final and executory.
Then the accused jumped bail, worth mentioning that rule 8, rule 124 of the rules of court
authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. The counsel for accused hired by
rabbit bus lines filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court.
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arising from the offense. Making the subsidiary civil liability of the bus line becomes conclusive
and enforceable.
Issues: (1) Whether or an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused?
Ruling: Petition has no merit.
Appeal in Criminal Cases: Section 1 of rule 122 of the 2000 revised rules of criminal procedures
states "any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy"
Appeal by the accused who jumps bail:
Section 8 of rule 124 provides: "the court appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee dismiss
the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during pendency of the appeal" The accused cannot be accroded right to apeal unless they
voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the court or are otherwise arrested within 15days from
notice of the judgment against them. They cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to
have waived the appeal.
Finality of a decision in a criminal case:
Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal,
or has applied for probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against
him has become final and executory.
Civil Actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. but rabbit bus line is not a direct
party to the criminal case. While they may assist their employees, the employer cannot act
independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy:
an appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver and throws the whole case open to
a review by the appellate court.
Effect of absconding on the appeal process: the accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping
bail and he is deemed to have his right to appeal waived, Thus conviction is now final and
Subsidiary Liability upon finality of judgment: employers liability in a finding of guilt against its
employee is subsidiary.
No deprivation of due process: employer became subsidiary liable only upon proof of the
employee's insolvency and the right to appeal was lost due to the bail of the accused employee not
the court.
Petition denied.
G.R. No. 169467
February 25, 2010
FACTS: petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales.
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident
inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the
gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and
caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun
owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a
drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers.
It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted
by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the
gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young
Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the
charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of “accident” under Art. 12, par. 4 of
the RPC.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against
Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs
indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses
incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF.
Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent
from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision reinstated.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161
of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil
action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages
in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their
claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the
employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct,
based on a person’s own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular
No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in
the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security
and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be
suspended or canceled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to
take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs
of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons
requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm
or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not
needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair
should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge
such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun
for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first
place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for
repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident.
Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action
is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure
that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in
this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective
firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of
a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as
would exempt him from liability in this case.
Air France v Carrascoso
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket from Manila - Rome.
During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class
seat because there was a "white man" who had better right to the seat.
As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him moral and
exemplary damages.

Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently, whether or not he
was entitled to the damages awarded.

Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket issued
is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a reputable firm like Air France could
have the indiscretion to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding
amount in payment of the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its
employees. It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should
know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."

Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the Carrascoso. In the case,
it could have been easy for Air France to present its manager to testify at the trial or secure his
deposition but defendant did neither. There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior
reservation was made by the white man.

The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st class seat, worse he
imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation
of having to go to tourist class just to give way to another passenger whose right was not
established. Certainly, this is bad faith.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal is conduct, injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against the carrier.

Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the condition for
exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.

*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-
interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose.
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.

Ponente: Kapunan

Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los Santos
Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good anesthesiologist. But
the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra.
Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to
go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for
damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused
by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses
heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient, the
surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours
late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation
after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all
held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision of the
Trial Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the comatose
condition of Ramos.
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with
an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over
her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the
procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on their
part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition. One need
not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa
loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda
for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient and
which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as the
“captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols. Also,
because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since
they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants
are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of
doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus,
the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
Castilex v Vasquez
At dawn, Vasquez was driving his motorcycle at a rotonda when Abad, manager of petitioner
Castilex Industrial Corporation, with a company pickup, driving against the flow of traffic,
collided with him. Vasquez eventually died. An action for damages was filed by his parents. Trial
court and CA found Vasquez and his employer CASTILEX liable, the latter under Art. 2180 par.5.
CASTILEX appealed to SC on the ground that Vasquez was not acting within the scope of his
employment when the collision occurred but for personal reasons.
absolved the company from liability, ruling that Abad was not acting within the scope of the
functions entrusted to him when the incident happened. As such, its burden to prove that it was
diligent did not arise.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed
neither in the service of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions.
Circumstances surrounding the incident were considered to determine whether Abad was acting
within his assigned tasks at thetime of the incident. These include the fact that the area was a
"lively place," and a woman shouting "daddy, daddy," when Abad wasonly 29. Steps: 1) Establish
EE; 2) Establish negligence; 3) Establish WON employee was acting within scope (burden on
plaintiff); 4)Defense of employer of due diligence in selection and supervision