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Topic Persons and Family Relations / Void and Voidable

Marriages / Void Marriages / Lack of Requisites ISSUE/S

Case No. G.R. No. L-53703 | August 19, 1986
Case Wiegel vs. Sempio-Dy 1. WON her marriage with respondent Karl is VOID
Full Case LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, YES. Assuming that the first marriage was vitiated by force, it will
Name Petitioner, not be void but merely voidable, and therefore still valid until
vs. annulled. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is VOID.
presiding judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Furthermore, regardless if the first husband had a prior marriage at
Court of Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, the time Lilia married him, that latter marriage would still need a
Respondents. judicial decision. Thus, she would still be regarded as a married
Ponente PARAS, J. woman at the time she contracted her marriage with Karl.
Doctrine Void and voidable marriages remain to be so until the issuance Accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be
of a judicial decision regarded as VOID under the law.
Nature Petition for certiorari assailing Orders of respondent judge

Karl Heinz Wiegel filed for a Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of merit, and
Lilia Oliva Wiegel (celebrated on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic the Orders complained of are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against
Apostolic Christian Church in Makati City) on ground of the latter’s petitioner.
previous existing marriage to a certain Eduardo A. Maxion, whose
ceremony was performed on June 25, 1972 at the Our Lady of Lourdes SO ORDERED.
Church in Quezon City.

While Lilia admitted said marriage, she also claimed it to be null and
void as they had been “forced” to enter the union. Contesting the
validity of the pre-trial order, Lilia then asked to present evidence 1)
that the first marriage was vitiated by force upon both parties and 2)
that the first husband was already married to someone else at the time
of his marriage with Lilia in 1972.

Respondent judge then ruled against the presentation of evidence

because the existence of force exerted on the parties in the first
marriage had already been agreed upon.