Sie sind auf Seite 1von 44

MI6 Section V in WW2

By Keith Ellison ©2017


(Revised 2018)

The following article provides some additional information regarding the use of Double
Agents by the Allies in WW2, and how MI6(V) developed a military unit to capture and control
enemy agents in Europe. My ebook (Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe, BAM!
Publishing, 2017), gives a fuller description of the guiding section in London, the origins and
reasons for the establishment of these units, plus background on other efforts to do similar work
in the Middle East and in North Africa. I use the designation MI6 rather than SIS as the latter
designation was also used by several other intelligence organizations in WW2.
Following the publication of my ebook I managed to recover several files which had been
damaged in a computer crash. They provided some further information which adds to the story
of the evolution of the Special Counter Intelligence Units (SCIUs) created by MI6(V), both in
their early development and in their use towards the end of the war as the British and Americans
sought to use Military Missions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans to gain intelligence and
influence in these newly liberated countries. Some new personalities within the SCI units are
also identified.
In my ebook I stated that I had found no information on the use of SCIUs in the Balkans
and Greece. As these regions were regarded as territories watched by SIME in Cairo, there was
likely to be some conflict of interest if the decision was made to deploy MI6 intelligence and
counter-intelligence assets. The recovered files do in fact provide some evidence of this. I am
also referring to some other publications which add to my initial work. My apologies if the text
seems to jump abruptly to different topics, as I am attempting to follow the chronology of my
ebook and to fill in some gaps in that narrative. If you want more information on the work of
SI(b)-SCI Units in Italy and NW Europe, please buy the ebook, which provides a much more
comprehensive account, including details of some of the major cases.
I have provided an Appendix at the end to briefly explain most of the abbreviations used
in the article.

Internal Politics
In Chapter 1 of my ebook I described the wartime expansion of MI6’s Counter Espionage
department, Section V – hereafter MI6(V) - under Lt Col Valentine Vivian and later Lt Col Felix
Cowgill. Robert Cecil, who served as the Foreign Office (FO) representative within MI6 from
1943 to 1945, wrote an article to correct what he described as the somewhat one-sided narrative
regarding the effectiveness of MI6(V) during the war. He, to some extent, relied upon
information given to him by Lt Col Cowgill, head of the Section from 1941 to 1944.

1
He pointed out that in 1938 the strength of the section was four – Valentine Vivian, his
assistant S H Mills, and their secretaries. In my ebook I stated that when Cowgill joined in
February 1939 the number was three. In February 1943 Lt Col “Dick” White, the Assistant
Director of B1, MI5, informed a meeting of SIME officers in Beirut that “the counter-espionage
staff of MI6 in London had grown from 3 to over 100”.1
The MI6 official history stated that a counter espionage station of MI6 was established in
Holland in the autumn of 1938, and in 1939 there were two MI6(V) officers posted abroad, in
Brussels and in The Hague2 (in neutral countries counter-espionage matters were handled by
MI6(V) officers based in British Embassies and Consulates; MI6 often used the post of Passport
Control Officer as cover). Rodney Dennys was the officer posted in April 1939 as Section V
officer at PCO The Hague, as reinforcement to the MI6 counter espionage station, and he was
later to serve in Cairo as the MI6(V) officer under ISLD cover (see below).

Felix Cowgill joined MI6(V) “and at once saw that overseas staff would be needed to
supplement the efforts of PCOs [Passport Control Officers] in the coming struggle”.3 Soon after
his arrival, “Section V urged the appointment of counter intelligence officers at each of the
overseas stations”.4 Dennys claimed that it was due to Cowgill that

“ Section V not only grew rapidly in size and efficiency, but also was the one H.O.
section that really had a finger on the pulse of its sub-organisations in the various
theatres of war”. 5

According to the official SIS website, in December 1939 the whole Service consisted of
42 officers and 55 secretaries. By 1944, the MI6 headquarters staff alone had expanded to 837
people.6
By May 1940 MI6(V) had become “by far the largest of the SIS Circulating Sections”.
As circulating sections were responsible for issuing intelligence to Whitehall customers, this was
an indication of the section’s growing importance even before the first ISOS decrypts were
issued to MI6 customers. ISOS was an abbreviation for Abwehr signals decrypted and
disseminated as “Intelligence Service, Oliver Strachey” material. Strachey was a leading
cryptanalyst at the Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) at Bletchley Park, working
on Abwehr ciphers. Hand ciphers used by the Abwehr for communications with its agents were
first broken in March 1940, thanks to access to the code given by the Abwehr to the MI5-
controlled double agent SNOW, and ISOS was issued to MI6 customers from July 1940 (MI6
was the parent organization for GC&CS). This intelligence flow increased significantly from late
December 1940, when the hand cipher of the main Abwehr group was broken.
MI6(V) in 1941 had a strength of about 20 officers and 20 to 25 secretaries and cardists,
but in mid-1941 began to expand with an infusion of MI5 staff. Prior to D-Day in June 1944
MI6(V) personnel had risen to 250 officers. 7 With secretaries, this would have equated to well
over a quarter of the MI6 Headquarters staff (though this figure for MI6(V) staff probably
included staff abroad as well). By 1945, however, the Official MI6 history gives the number of
officers in Section V as 163, with an additional 32 working in Section IX, the anti-communist
section.8 Again, this figure would not include secretarial and clerical staff, but it is unclear if this
covered Headquarters staff only.

2
British Permanent Undersecretary Alexander Cadogan (a top-level civil servant)
complained that secret agents reported “somewhat indiscriminately”, but admitted that it was
Whitehall’s job ‘to weigh up the information... and try to draw more or less reasonable
conclusions from it’.” 9 Between the wars, the Foreign Office insisted on doing its own
interpretation and analysis of political intelligence, despite the lack of an internal intelligence
branch. The service departments also insisted that any intelligence passed by MI6 would be
interpreted and analysed only by their own (separate) intelligence branches. While the Joint
Intelligence Committee was created in 1936, it did not become effective as a co-ordinator of
intelligence until well after the start of hostilities. 10 Under Vivian therefore, MI6(V) circulated to
MI5 and other customers “intelligence gathered in the field without much effort to assess it or
even to stimulate the inflow”. Within the Whitehall bureaucracy, it fell to MI5 and to MI14 in the
Ministry of War to do their own analysis. MI14 had a division which focused on analysis of the
German Intelligence Services (GIS).
At the end of 1940 Felix Cowgill was made responsible for the security of ISOS
material,11 and in January 1941 he became head of Section V. The Radio Analysis Bureau (RAB)
and its parent organization the Radio Security Service (RSS) were transferred from MI5 to MI6
in May 1941 (though one source says the decision was made to transfer RSS in March). 12 As the
war progressed, some analysis was produced on the GIS by MI6(Vw), aka the Radio Analysis
Bureau. In 1943 MI6(Vw) became the Radio Intelligence Section and was transferred out of
Section V because of personality clashes between Cowgill and Hugh Trevor-Roper, the dissident
and very disruptive leading analyst in the Section.
In mid-1941 MI6 asked for MI5 help in expanding Section V, requesting that MI5 release
staff to them, which was approved, as MI5 considered the work of MI6(V) essential to their own
efforts. On 12 September 1942 Liddell mentioned in his diaries that Philby was having to visit
Lisbon, while Tim Milne of MI6(V) was ill with blood poisoning, indicating the closeness
between the two organisations. In April 1942 the MI5 Director General, Sir David Petrie, even
sought to take over MI6(V), claiming that there was “an immense duplication of effort…most
particularly apparent with respect to ISOS”. He claimed that MI5 should be responsible for
Counter Espionage as they were “the executive body responsible for arresting and prosecuting
enemy agents”. Additionally, the DG wanted MI5 to have direct access to GC&CS and all ISOS
counter intelligence material, as well as direction of the RSS, which MI5 had only recently
passed to MI6 control.
The Chief of MI6, Sir Stewart Menzies, rejected the proposal in May, calling into doubt
the ability of MI5 “to carry out delicate counter-intelligence operations in foreign territories of
which they had no experience”. He pointed out that the intelligence circulated by MI6(V) was
“of far wider than simply security significance”. Menzies also refused to relinquish “any
measure of control over XX agents abroad”, where MI6 had a far better understanding of the
operational risks and conditions than MI5. Another, non-trivial point was that the Foreign Office
would reject the proposal.
The DG responded in June, pointing out that in 1941 MI6(V) had consisted of only a
“handful of officers”, requiring the transfer of MI5 staff to help, and their ability to understand
the problems of CE and CI operations abroad was obviously deemed sufficient for the task (this
ignored the fact that most of the operational work done in the field was performed by MI6
officers, not transferees from MI5). He also pointed to recent concerns about penetration of both
MI6 and SOE networks by the GIS, which MI6(V) had failed to successfully address. This was
possibly a sore point for MI6, as Menzies countered the MI5 move with a proposal for a joint
section, and the ensuing bureaucratic battle over location and other essential but mundane
3
minutiae ensured this never came to fruition. 13 (Five MI6(V) officers had, in fact been appointed
honorary members of MI5 from 1 August 1940. Guy Liddell, MI5 B Division Director, had
suggested that this be done so that the officers might deal directly with other services and
organisations in the UK, thereby relieving MI5 of the administrative burden – see below for
more on this - while maintaining the restriction on MI6 from working in the UK. Section B26 of
MI5 was created, consisting of Lt Col Vivian; his assistant SHH Mills; Felix Cowgill; Blake-
Budden, the head of MI6(Vc) in charge of transportation; and RGE Jarvis, a new arrival to
MI6(V) in July from the British Expeditionary Force evacuated from Europe.)14
Liddell and Dick White were still unhappy about the separation of MI6(V) and MI5 in
September 1942. Liddell was unhappy about MI6(V) recruiting MI5 staff. While White was in
favour of an amalgamation with MI6(V), Liddell wanted any amalgamation to come under the
control of MI5.15
Cecil pointed out that the official historians who wrote “British Intelligence in the Second
World War” had reported on MI5 complaints “that it was given only restricted access to the
ISOS decrypts, with the result that full advantage was not being taken of the intelligence”. He
contended, however, that there was “first-hand evidence” that “MI5 had full access to all
relevant ISOS from the very beginning”, and “when ISK began [in December 1941], it was
immediately made available to MI5”. This is confirmed by the testimony of a member of
MI6(V), Tim Milne, who reported that material from the intercepts was disseminated directly to
a number of government and service departments, including MI5. The only restrictions on ISOS
dissemination had been made by Lt Col Cowgill on material which made reference to possible
MI6 agents, which he considered a security risk to disseminate more widely. Trevor-Roper in the
RAB learned of the withheld material in April 1942 and informed MI5. The reporting was issued
to MI5 on a limited access basis from June 1942, 16 when the fighting between the heads of MI5
and MI6 for control of MI6(V) was at its height, and was probably seen by Menzies as being one
measure MI6 could take which would help ease the tension between the services.
Cecil contended that MI5 sought the transfer of Section V to MI5; that this “would have
been the first step towards the creation of a single Secret Service”; and that “such an
amalgamation would have resulted in the dominance of MI5, which was by far the larger”. A
proposal in March 1943 by the Chairman of the Home Defence Security Executive for just such
an amalgamation was described to the Prime Minster by his private secretary, Desmond Morton,
as “largely inspired by Sir David Petrie”, the head of MI5.
Cecil described Section V in 1943 as “a fulcrum for the application of political
leverage”.17 The loss of the section would have gutted MI6 of its best and most prolific
intelligence producer, and the subsequent loss of status within the British government and
services would surely have resulted in MI6 being subsumed into MI5.
When the attempted take-over failed, MI5 expanded its influence by deploying officers to
fill posts in the security staffs of military formations, beginning with SIME in the Middle East,
later including SHAEF, down to the Special Counter Intelligence Units (SCIUs) created by
MI6(V), knowing that their control of important military positions would allow them at the end
of the war to influence the control of British intelligence and security in occupied Germany, i.e.
in areas outside their formal remit.
By 1943 MI6(V) was divided into six main territorial sections and four specialist
sections. The specialist sections were Vw, devoted to processing and analyzing ISOS material;
Vx, for double agent operations; Vh, for liaison with other agencies on censorship; and a section
for vetting and facilitating travel to and from the UK by agents. Section Vw helped prepare the
4
information used to assemble the Purple Primers (see below). Double agent operations at home
and abroad were a joint MI5-MI6 effort under the various Committees formed to control true and
false information passed to the enemy by Controlled Enemy Agents (CEAs).18

Kim Philby
Harold ‘Kim’ Philby was first recruited about July 1940 to Section D of MI6, with the
help of a fellow Soviet spy Guy Burgess, who was already employed in the section.
According to Philby, he had put out hints to associates that he wanted to join MI6, but he
also had contact with a fellow journalist during his war correspondent role in Europe in 1940. A
couple of different accounts name Hester Harriet Marsden-Smedley as this journalist, a Daily
Express correspondent in Belgium and Luxembourg. One account claimed she worked for
Section D, and alleged it was she who personally recommended Philby to Marjorie Maxse, “the
head of recruitment at MI6”. The other account merely claimed Marsden-Smedley was a part-
time intelligence source, with Maxse as Chief of Staff in Section D. Neither account offers
evidence of Marsden-Smedley’s intelligence role.19
Burgess himself had been hired on the recommendation of MI6 officer David Footman
and British Member of Parliament Harold Nicholson. A month after Philby’s recruitment Section
D was absorbed by the new Special Operations Executive (SOE), and Philby began looking for
ways to move back to MI6. Around August 1941 he transferred to MI6(V)’s Iberian Sub-section,
despite the fact that Vivian had been aware of Philby’s communist leanings at the time of his
initial recruitment.
I commented in my ebook about the recruitment of Kim Philby to MI6 and the failure of
MI5 to produce adverse traces against him, despite his known history at university of supporting
communism (indeed, even being married to a known foreign communist at the time of his
recruitment) and a subsequent association with the pro-Nazi British Anglo-German Fellowship in
1936. I demonstrated that the lack of traces (it was reported that there were “No Adverse
Traces”) could not have been the result of bomb damage on the MI5 registry, but Cecil quoted
Cowgill as defending the recruitment of Philby by Vivian, saying
“Philby was recruited at a time when MI5 records were still in chaos. An MI5
trace was therefore of little value and Vivian may be excused for relying on his
own judgement”.20
It is hard to understand why Cowgill would be offering this defence for Vivian. As a
senior CE Officer, Cowgill must have been informed at the time the MI5 Registry was damaged
by the German bombing - after Philby’s initial recruitment to Section D of MI6. According to
former MI5 officer Sir Roger Fulford, the MI5 offices in Wormwood Scrubs Prison were bombed
in September 1940. Fulford added:
“Although my memory may desert me here, I know that the MI5 records – though
never severely bombed – were in some disorder as a result of the bombing”.21
A second source reported that the MI5 Registry was moved to Oxford from Wormwood
Scrubs in September 1940 after an incendiary bomb forced the evacuation of the MI5 offices. 22
Anthony Cave Brown, in his book “Treason in the Blood”, dates the bombing to the third week
in September – and also recorded that Philby quit his job with The Times in August 1940 prior to
starting with Section D.23 This meant that his security check would have been conducted in June
or July, at the time of his two job interviews. (This seems at odds with the fact that SOE was
formally constituted on 22 July, and Philby was reported to have been employed by Section D
5
for at least a month before it was absorbed by SOE. Perhaps the time difference can be explained
by Section D being transferred to SOE control only after the SOE HQ was organized. It was
apparently housed temporarily in offices in London before moving to its permanent location in
Baker Street, London in November.)
Another source claimed there was greater damage done to the MI5 records by the
bombing, but the origin of the claim is not properly sourced and the dating appears inaccurate.
Anthony Masters reported in his book, “The Man Who was M” (Grafton Books, London 1986,
p142) that
“Although the invaluable card indexes had been microfilmed and taken to a safe
place, an incendiary bomb in November 1940 destroyed many of the originals.”
There was, however, another reason besides bombing for MI5 records to be “in chaos”.
According to Calder Walton’s “Empire of Secrets”, MI5’s internal bureaucracy had broken down
in July 1940 under the strain of investigating overwhelming reports of suspicious activity and
enemy spies, causing the Registry to grind to a halt, and then to collapse. Also, in June MI5 had
recommended the mass internment of all “enemy aliens” in Britain, which lead over the course
of the war to over 27,000 arrests. As there were a total of 36 officers in MI5 in 1939, even with
wartime expansion the staff was overwhelmed – especially as many staff members were only
recently recruited.24 Philby’s tracing was therefore done presumably when the Registry’s
workload was close to maximum, but the organization had not yet completely collapsed. As
Philby was married to an Austrian-born communist at this time, it seems odd that he did not
come to attention over her possible internment, besides his own history. It is also remarkable that
MI5, an organization in such trouble in 1940, was able to push for control of its sister service by
1942-43, and had sufficient staff by 1941 to loan to other services such as MI6, SIME and the
military GSI(b) staffs.
Cowgill’s involvement in Philby’s move to MI6(V) in September 1941 would appear to
have been minimal, but he proved to be as blind and naïve in respect to Philby’s past as Vivian,
since he must have had a say in appointing Philby to run the section in his absence on trips
abroad, which he seems to have done from late 1941. Also, when there was a move in March
1943 to transfer Philby out of MI6 to the Foreign Office, the Head of MI6 wrote
“after consulting those immediately responsible for Philby’s work, I have come to
the conclusion that the Allied cause will best be served by leaving Philby where
he is”.25
This would indicate that Cowgill had the utmost confidence in Philby at that time. Philby
did indeed prove to be an efficient officer, commanding MI6(V)’s sub-section (Vd), which was
responsible for the Iberian peninsula, one of the busiest areas for German Intelligence Service
(GIS) activity in neutral countries. His knowledge of Spanish and of the country itself no doubt
came in useful – he had been sent there by his Soviet handlers three times, the last under
journalist cover during the Spanish Civil War.
Philby’s machinations eventually caused Cowgill to resign from MI6,
after discovering that he had been passed over for a prime new post as head
of a section previously promised to him. Section IX of MI6 was to be
responsible for anti-communist activities post-war. In Kim Philby’s memoirs,
he set out the story of how he was able to become head of Section IX, which
was created in 1943, insinuating that MI6 diverted resources to fight an ally
in the ongoing war against Hitler (totally ignoring the fact that a number of

6
Soviet spies had been identified and arrested within the British military and
Government in the same period). Robert Cecil attempted to refute the story,
showing that the personnel mentioned in Philby’s story were not in MI6
headquarters at the time. He also quoted Cowgill as stating:
“I persistently advocated that the build-up of Section IX be
deferred till Section V’s commitments to the Army (Special
Counter-Intelligence Units) could be completed and those units
could be left to finish off in the field”.
Unfortunately for Cecil’s efforts, the MI6 official history confirmed the
creation of Section IX in May 1943. 26 Section IX was, however, kept virtually
unstaffed until 1944 (consisting of JC ‘Jack’ Curry, a seconded MI5 officer),
and was “nominally reconstituted in March 1944”. Curry complained to MI5
about the poor record keeping in MI6(V) and about the fact that Cowgill
consistently refused to let him task stations abroad on matters concerning
communist actvity, which served to prove the falsity of Philby’s claims in his
book.
Cowgill learned on 23 October 1944, on his return from a trip to Cairo,
that Philby had been appointed the new head of the section, and he
subsequently transferred to an intelligence post in Germany. When Cowgill
left Section V in December 1944 “staff at home and overseas numbered 250,
including the SCI Units”.27 In my ebook, I gave Tim Milne’s estimate as 200
officers and secretaries at home and abroad in December 1944. There was a
significant reduction in personnel when the war ended, but Philby was able to
take his pick from remaining MI6 staff for his new section, and within a year
had taken MI6(V) under control as well.
There was in fact a resurgence in British interest in communist
activities from 1942, but the organisation behind this was MI5, who were
critical of MI6(V)’s lack of interest in Communists worldwide while MI5 was
investigating communist spy rings in British government, the military and the
arms industries. As MI6 had been banned from decoding Soviet radio traffic
on 22 June 1941 by Churchill 28, this made collecting intelligence on their new
allies even more difficult for a personnel-strapped organisation at war. Roger
Hollis was Head of F2 in MI5 and therefore responsible for monitoring
Communism and other left-wing subversion. Christopher Andrew in the
authorised history of MI5 quoted Hollis (presumably around April 1942), as
saying
“I can think of no document produced by SIS which makes it
appear that international communism has been seriously studied
by them since the outbreak of war. We, on the other hand, have
started, rather belatedly, to follow the activities of the
Comintern wherever it appears… It may be said that our job is
internal security, and that we are going outside our charter”. 29
Once the threat of German invasion receded (at the end of 1940) MI5
was under far less pressure than MI6, and the personnel recruited by the
organisation were available to look at other threats, in other areas. MI6 did
not have that freedom. As Hollis hinted, MI5 was looking to expand its
7
influence into areas outside its remit of Home and Empire. The work of
MI6(V) was obviously important enough to the Allied counter-espionage
efforts for MI5 to want control of it. But this was only one area where MI5
sought to exert its influence, if not control.
Later in the war, MI5 was able to obtain control of the field operations
of the MI6’s military units (the Special Counter intelligence Units, or SCIUs)
by placing senior MI5 officers in staff positions with SHAEF and HQ 21 Army
Group, as well as putting their own staff into what were seen as the more
influential of those units, intended to control the deception agents who would
take over from the Double Cross Committee’s stable of agents in the UK:
“2. Those [agents] considered by Army SCI units to be suitable
for deception or counter-espionage would be transferred to Army
Group, where a further selection would be made.
“3. Agents selected for special interrogation would be sent back
to ENGLAND, those required for penetration would remain under
the control of SCI, while those used for deception would come
under the control of the GSO 2 (MI5), who would be attached to
Army Group from a special pool of officers made available to
SHAEF by MI5….
“4. Lt Col WILD said that at Army Group the further employment
of the agent would be decided by the GSO 2 (MI5), in
consultation with GSO 2 (SCI).
“In the event of disagreement as to the employment of an
agent, the BGS(I) would give a ruling.”30
An amendment to these minutes changed Minute 2 above to
read:
“Those considered by Army SCI units to be enemy agents will be
passed back to the Army Group SCI unit.” .31

MIDDLE EAST ORGANISATIONS


[My ebook devoted a chapter to the creation of A Force and its influence on the
work of SIME’s Counter-Espionage Section. I outlined various DA cases and
the A Force channel CHEESE in particular, and explained how the power of A
Force in Cairo was extended through the Forty Committees (controlling
deception channels) when Controlled Enemy Agents (CEAs – a term normally
reserved for DAs who have W/T communications with the enemy) were
developed in North Africa and Italy. The following paragraphs help to explain
how A Force consolidated its influence over SIME and ISLD in the Middle
East, and intruded into the work of GSI(b) AFHQ in Italy.]

In the Middle East, MI5 work was conducted by the network of Defence Security
Officers (DSOs) and by Security Intelligence Middle East (SIME), while MI6 operated under the
cover name Inter Services Liaison Department (ISLD). The work of MI6(V) was done through B
8
Sec ISLD. Deception operations were the responsibility of A Force, a military unit commanded
by Lt Col Dudley W Clarke and assigned great importance by General Sir Archibald Wavell
(Commander in Chief Middle East), who placed him in charge of deception in late 1940. By
Autumn 1941 Clarke had been called to London to pitch for a centralized deception controller
for all theatres, and had set out his own organization’s strategies and successes. The decision was
made to set up the London Controlling Section, and he had been offered the job as its head – and
rejected it. His influence at this point in military circles was therefore at a high point. He had the
opportunity during this visit to speak with Major TAR Robertson of MI5 about the use of DAs in
Britain for deception, which was possibly a trigger for Robertson’s visit to Cairo in early 1942.

Special Section SIME


Before the formation of the SIME Special Section for running DAs in Spring 1942, a
meeting was convened at ISLD on 30 March to “consider the best method of handling Special
Agents in the Middle East, the most efficient machinery for the purpose, and co-ordination of the
work of ISLD, SIME and Adv. HQ “A” Force in these matters”. Attending the March meeting
were:
Lt Col RJ Maunsell, head of SIME;
Two ISLD captains [names redacted];
Lt Col DW Clarke (Comd, A Force) and Major P de Salis (Adv HQ “A” Force);
Major Thomas Argyll ‘TAR’ Robertson (Head of MI5’s DA Section).
Maunsell announced his wish to expand his staff and proposed a special section in SIME
to “deal with all DA and special counter-intelligence matters” [author’s emphasis]. As this
would cover ground of interest to both MI5 and MI6, he also proposed that the section would be
run by a captain from ISLD [name redacted, but given in an MI5 document – based on SIME
information - as MI6(V)’s representative Capt Rodney Dennys 32]. He finally noted that in view
of the importance of Lt Col Clarke’s interests, his organization “should either be represented in
the section or should have close touch with it”.
Special Agents were subsequently defined by the Thirty Committee Charter a year later
in 1943 as
“a real or notional agent who is either a member of or in touch with a foreign
Intelligence Service or Organisation, and is used for the purpose of deceiving the
enemy about our intentions, Order of Battle, supplies etc. A Special Agent differs
from a Penetration Agent by reason of the fact that once an agent is graded as a
Special Agent his primary use is to deceive the enemy and not to penetrate their
Intelligence Organisation”.33
This definition was important, as it clearly divided into two groups all those DAs who
had been the responsibility of the Special Section from its creation in 1942. A separate
Penetration Committee was also created in 1943 to manage the second group. Until this point
“Special Agents” appears to have been a term applied by SIME to Double Agents generally.
The subsequent recommendations made to Col Maunsell in 1942 by the participants of
this meeting incorrectly stated that “MI5 have just been authorised to direct and control special
agents throughout the world”; in fact, the minutes of the meeting clearly noted that Major TAR
Robertson informed the other participating officers that “MI5, in the person of himself, were

9
entirely responsible for the executive management, planning, etc of double agents at home,
subject to higher direction on the operational deception side”. This apparent expansion of MI5’s
role resulted in ISLD requesting that MI6 send “relevant verbatim extracts from the MI5
Charter defining its contre-espionage and security duties and scope in the Middle East”. Lt Col
Vivian, deputy head of MI6, raised the issue with the Director General of MI5, Brigadier Sir
David Petrie, in a letter dated 13 April 1942.34 In his response, Petrie reported
“I had a reply to the cable I sent Maunsell about Robertson’s alleged statement
that C and I had agreed to MI5 operating agents in foreign countries. Maunsell
said that he was quite sure that Robertson (who had by then left Cairo) had
spoken in perfectly good faith”.35
Despite this apparent crossed wire, the meeting’s participants recommended the
implementation of Lt Col Maunsell’s proposal for a Special Section of SIME, run by a Captain
from ISLD (but with a local rank of Major) and provided with staff from SIME, or, where
necessary, from ISLD; that “the decision as to whether any MI5 or SIS agent should be operated
as a double agent and handed over to the Special Section should be made by [redacted,
presumably the ISLD captain in charge of the section], Lieut. Colonel Maunsell and Lieut.
Colonel Dudley-Clarke”. These arrangements would help ensure
“that SIS interests and Agents would be safeguarded, and that due regard should
be paid by Capt [redacted] to the operational intelligence side of Special Agent
activity; such information to be transmitted to ISLD for circulation”.
The section was to have the MI6 officer as OC, but still paid by ISLD, with a personal
assistant from MI5 on SIME’s payroll; at least one secretary (from ISLD); a Special Agent sub-
section run by an MI5 officer with rank of Captain, GSO III, and four assistant IOs, one of them
having expertise on W/T matters; and Major de Salis would be the A Force Liaison Officer.
Another sub-section would be manned by ISLD and would handle ISOSME material
(Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey/Middle East – the decrypted Axis intelligence intercepts
related to the Middle East), collating and analyzing all ISOSME and other Most Secret Source
material “as at present” under the control of an ISLD captain [name redacted] who was
responsible for distribution of ISOSME and for authorizing any action to be taken on it. This
subsection would be under SIME and would undertake the work for the whole section, its
analyses at all times available to SIME Research Section “as heretofore”.
In other words, SIME would ensure that MI6(V) did not withhold ISOS material from
SIME for its own reasons, as had been suggested previously by MI5. Capt Rodney Dennys had
been sent in December 1941 to become the MI6(V) officer in ISLD responsible for distribution
of ISOS for the Middle East. MI6(V) had, prior to the arrival in Cairo of Capt Dennys, provided
only sporadic, paraphrased ISOS to ISLD. MI5 had complained that this was dangerous as the
paraphrased information was open to misinterpretation. MI5 thought that the disguising of the
material for security reasons resulted in SIME being unable to adequately understand it.
“The circumstances were even considered by B Division officers to constitute a
danger of misdirection as well as causing SIME to be badly informed”.36
It was also proposed that ISLD’s complete analytical index of all ISOSME reports so far
received, and including other Most Secret information, should be amalgamated with a central
registry set up in the Special Section. A large number of records from the SIS Station in Athens
were being held by SIME, and were also to be considered for inclusion in this central index.37
The control of this registry in the new SIME Special Section was not defined.

10
Following the arrival of Dennys in Cairo, Nicholas Elliott was sent as MI6(V)’s CE
officer to Istanbul in May 1942, again under ISLD cover. He was working alongside the SIME
DSO there, Lt Col Guy Thompson, described (by MI5’s Dick White) as being an excellent
linguist but over-dramatic and of unstable judgement. Thompson had inherited from the previous
DSO the Anglo-Turkish Kutchuk Bureau, an office created at the end of 1940 in Istanbul where
the DSO and Turkish Secret Service staff sat together on Axis CE work. Relations were
described as very close. Turkish CE policy was to penetrate and control enemy organisations,
and they claimed almost all GIS agents engaged in Turkey were supplied by them. In view of this
penetration policy, SIME and A Force agreed the Turkish IS would not be told, or allowed to
suspect, that the Allies were engaged in deception activities.
Thompson claimed that he had extremely good relations with the MI6(V) representative
in Istanbul (Elliott) and the head of SIS in Turkey (Harold Gibson). It had been agreed that the
DSO would handle liaison with the Turkish IS while Nicholas Elliott handled ISOS relevant to
the area, and “Special Agents”.38 This was an important factor for the control of British-run DAs
in Turkey when the Thirty Committee was created (as will be seen below). An MI5 document
based on SIME files stated that Istanbul “was a very active centre for the recruitment and
handling of D/As used for penetration purposes”.39

Thirty Committee
On 31 Dec 1942 Lt Col Clarke sought to revise the existing arrangement with a proposal
for a committee on the lines of the UK’s XX Committee, a suggestion which had been rejected at
the original meeting in March. He also successfully re-wrote history, ascribing the reason for the
formation of the Special Section as being to “handle double agents with a view to affording ‘A’
Force as many channels as possible for passing false information to the enemy”. The substance
of this phrasing appeared in subsequent documents referring to the creation of the Special
Section. Clarke claimed the Section had “no formal constitution” and “some more definite
constitution is required to regulate the degree of control to be exercised over the Special Section
by any one of the Departments concerned in its working”.
Clarke admitted he was putting forward his proposals as he thought it was primarily for
the benefit of his deception work that the Special Section was created. As he was the one who
decided the nature and form of information transmitted to the enemy, he also wanted the right to
decide how far any channel should be risked, “either in the cause of Deception or of Counter-
Espionage”. He recognized that the clashing of interests was ever more likely, and “in such an
event it is clearly undesirable that any one interested Department should be entitled to make a
unilateral decision” [author’s emphasis]. Yet, in the same document, he proposed a higher
degree of control by the commander of A Force (himself), while admitting he presided daily over
the meetings which decided the Special Section’s activities, thus already having an equal say (if
not more so, being the senior officer present, and chairing the meetings) in any decision made. 40
It is unclear whether the A Force officer designated to liaise with the Special Section (Major de
Salis) was also present at the meetings.
Clarke put forward a possible charter for consideration, and obviously achieved most of
what he wanted, as a Thirty Committee was indeed formed in early 1943 to co-ordinate the
activities of A Force, SIME Special Section and ISLD B Sec “for the purposes of GALVESTON”
(i.e. Clarke’s deception operations). The chair would be an A Force officer, with an ISLD officer
as secretary.41

11
MI5’s Influence over SIME
Lt Col Dick White of MI5’s B Division was sent out in early 1943 to consult with SIME
and see what MI5 might do to assist in the Middle East. In a note dated 8 February 1943, White
set out his views for discussing with Maunsell.
“The distinction between SIME and ISLD is functional rather than territorial.
Both organizations having representatives in the same areas which are mostly
areas under British civil or military control….in these circumstances ISLD have
much the major part of CE work on their side”.
He went on to state that SIME should logically have total control of CE work in the
Middle East, but to push the point would endanger a working system. Capt Robertson’s work
running the Special Agent Section depended largely upon ISLD, to whom he must go cap-in-
hand for ISOS information. White advocated that SIME develop CE work to match that done by
ISLD, thus becoming a more equal partner. He also suggested that ISLD had been restraining
certain counter-espionage investigations because the information came from “Triangle” (ISOS),
and SIME should insist on investigation being their responsibility and have the staff and
organization to do it.

“I realise that in the creation of a CE section in SIME a certain amount of


duplication of work between SIME and ISLD will become inevitable. This is
inherent in the whole illogical position whereby two Services are interested in
what is virtually the same problem. Having failed to secure unity at home we have
faced the inevitable end of duplication of work; because of this MI5 finds itself
certainly the equal, and probably the stronger, partner in CE work all over the
world. It is up to SIME so to develop its CE work that it may occupy a similar
position vis a vis ISLD by cultivating its own legitimate garden rather than
attempting to rival or interfere with work already done by ISLD”. 42

The above recommendation would seem to indicate that the Special Section suggested in
1942 had not met up to expectations, perhaps due to the lack of an investigation section to
develop ISOS leads; it was certainly an attempt by White to encourage SIME to expand its
authority in areas common to SIME and ISLD, despite the potential waste in duplicated
casework which MI5’s Director had previously raised with the Head of MI6. It also reflects
MI5’s views that they were better at CE work than MI6(V) at home and abroad, despite the fact
that they had only created their own DA Section in 1939, and had little hands-on experience in
neutral and hostile countries.

White later wrote a report on his visit which stated:

“Hitherto the special section work has been of scarcely any CE value at all, being
regarded as a subordinate section of A-Force of the General Staff, with the
primary function of providing channels for the deception of the enemy.”

“Double agents are under the control of A-Force, while ‘penetration agents’ are
intended primarily for CE work. Development of the latter class is therefore of
considerable importance to SIME and I have discussed both with SIME and ISLD
an extensive development of this work”.43

12
At a meeting in Beirut on February 1943, White informed the collected DSOs that many
of them were not representatives of MI5, as they had been claiming, but rather representatives of
SIME, an organization under the control of C-in-C Middle East. There were ongoing discussions
regarding a possible switch of control to MI5 (which finally happened in December 1946), and
meanwhile SIME was doing work in the ME similar to that of MI5 at home, such that a close
collaboration between the organizations was clearly necessary. Their mandate from the C-in-C
allowed them to have DSOs in areas which were denied to MI5, but which also brought them
into competition with B Sec ISLD.
Regarding relations with ISLD, Lt Col Maunsell, the head of SIME, clearly reflecting
the views earlier expressed to him by Lt Col White, warned:
“that MI6 were taking more active measures to establish themselves in counter-
intelligence in the Middle East. It was, however, the duty of DSOs to direct
counter-intelligence in their areas. While the necessity for collaboration with B
Sec ISLD was recognised, it must be understood that the final responsibility for
counter-intelligence in the ME is SIME’s and it is the duty of DSOs while doing
their utmost to avoid friction, to make that clear”.
Col White allowed that, while SIME was responsible for neutralising enemy intelligence
activity throughout the ME, “B Sec ISLD had a most important contribution to make” to this
end. They controlled ISOS, had their own safe radio channels and were less restricted by military
red tape and establishment rules. However, they were “essentially collectors of intelligence
rather than investigators”, and SIME should not only “secure that the fullest possible use was
made of the intelligence so collected”, but should require “that the activities of B Sec ISLD
representatives in ME territories should be fully known to the respective DSOs”.

A Force Influence over DA Operations


Maunsell informed the DSOs of the new Thirty Committee charter and said that, while
DSOs had the power to decide whether a given channel should be handed over to A Force, where
there was disagreement with the local A Force representative, the question would go to the head
of SIME, and “Where a source is of more value for operational (i.e. Galveston) purposes the
counter-intelligence aspect must be relinquished”.44

The head of any other department (e.g. ISLD) had sole responsibility for deciding if any
agents controlled by them might be used for A Force purposes – but they had a duty “to consult
the Head of SIME on the Security and Counter-Espionage implications of any such case”. Once
a “channel” was passed to A Force for deception, it would come under full A Force control.

The functions of the Committee were to


“establish and maintain channels for passing false information to the enemy
through the medium of ‘Special Agents’”, and to
“transmit information to the enemy on the instructions of Comd, ‘A’ Force or his
representative”.
“Should the Head of SIME or ISLD wish to influence the work of the Committee
in any way, they will do so by reference to Comd. ‘A’ Force. In the event of any
disagreement, the matter to be referred to the JIC in whose hands shall lie the
final decision”. (The JIC was the Joint Intelligence Committee, GHQ, MEF).45
In 1948, a former controller of Double Agents stated in a MI5 memo,:
13
“There is a major point of principle on which I disagree with the Middle East set
up. It appears that the Head of the Deception Organisation in the Middle East
had the last word in what was to be transmitted to the enemy over the network.
This is most dangerous and should not be tolerated. It worked in the Middle East
because the Head of the Deception organisation was a man of exceptional
qualities. It would have led to early destruction of the network in the theatre in
which I worked as the Deception Head was an irresponsible, ambitious and
irrational man who was always trying to persuade us to pass messages which we
believed would ‘blow’ the channels. The last word must be with the Special
Section. Everything depends on the ‘means’ or channels. If you destroy the
‘means’ you can’t pass the deception material to the enemy, and only the Special
Section can judge the capacity of the ‘means’. The Special Section must also
directly control all the case officers”.46
(The author of the above memo was Brigadier Bill Magan, who had worked in India and
Iraq during the war. He refused to give a view on whether it was better for MI5 or MI6 to control
such a Special Section. Magan succeeded Alex Kellar as Head of SIME in 1947.)
The dominance of A Force over how Special Agents operated was also disliked by
AFHQ’s security intelligence staff (see below). In the Middle East, one result of the surrender to
the needs of GALVESTON was the decision by B Sec ISLD to change its tactics regarding
Special Agents. This was explained in a draft document dated 4 October 1943 from ISLD to
SIME. This acknowledged that there was a divergence of policy between SIME and ISLD, as
SIME’s priority lay with security of the Middle East, while ISLD had to devote more resources
to penetrating stay-behind organizations in the Balkans before the occupation of these areas by
the Allies.
While B Sec had a duty to give SIME as much assistance as possible in play-back
operations, future requirements meant less resources to further “those d/a operations which
extend back from Europe in to the MIDDLE EAST”. The joint aim of SIME/ISLD in future, as
agreed at a meeting between Rodney Dennys and Lt Col Kirk of SIME, would be to continue to
seize
“any available opportunities of controlling enemy agents and networks, but to
adopt delaying tactics. Up to the present we have aimed at accelerating the
pace….It has been agreed that we should now approach new operation[s] of this
kind from a diametrically opposite direction. We must retard the pace instead of
accelerating it”.
This policy was based on the assumption that it would meet SIME’s security
requirements while reducing the burden on ISLD’s resources. It was open to revision, based on
results, and not a total ban on the development of special operations. 47 B Sec ISLD – the
representative of MI6(V) - was, however, determined to devote its resources to penetration rather
than deception.
Notes on DA work in the Middle East, based on SIME files, stated that
“The scope and extent of our major D/A activities in the MIDDLE EAST have
naturally been governed very largely by the operational situation in the
MEDITERRANEAN theatre; our most important task has been to develop and
maintain a number of channels through which ‘A’ FORCE could feed deception
material to the enemy. The second most important factor in determining policy

14
has been the geographical position of the MIDDLE EAST in relation to neutral
TURKEY, until recently a most important base for enemy offensive intelligence.
Because of this, a number of secondary D/A channels were developed with the
object of penetrating enemy Intelligence organizations operating against the
MIDDLE EAST (including IRAQ and PERSIA) from TURKEY.
“With the decline in the operational importance of the MIDDLE EAST,
culminating in the British occupation of GREECE, ‘A’ FORCE requirements in
the EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN have correspondingly diminished. It has thus
been possible to close down certain channels hitherto used for operational
purposes.
“Similarly, with the rupture of diplomatic relations between TURKEY on
the one hand and GERMANY and JAPAN on the other, the extent of our D/A
penetration activities has dwindled to small proportions”.
The Notes, while being to some extent self-praising of the work of SIME, did mention
the work of ISLD:
“There has never been any question of excluding ISLD from the work of running
the W/T cases; they have never had enough officers to do it. At the same time it is
clear that such successes as have attended our D/A efforts, particularly in the
field of penetration agents, has been to a very large extent due to the friendly
relation existing between SIME and ISLD, and their respective out-stations”.
While attributing “the lion’s share” of the agent running for A Force cases to SIME, the
Notes acknowledged that for two major cases (the PESSIMISTS and QUICKSILVER), ISLD
“played the major part in the original development of these cases”. The author of the Notes then
immediately minimizes the “actual contribution” of ISLD as being “mainly limited” to guiding
policy in the early stages when SIME lacked experienced officers; distributing ISOS material;
providing secure communications; running “certain relatively minor agents of the traveler or
letter-writing type”; providing “foodstuff” (i.e. chickenfeed) for agents, and accommodation and
clerical staff for 30 Committee work; and provision of funds for expenses in running cases – in
other words, every aspect except the personal control of the double agents and the provision of
deception material.
The Notes also repeat Dudley Clarkes’s invention of why the Special Section of SIME
was created, saying it was started “to handle double-agents, with a view to affording ‘A’
FORCE as many channels as possible for passing their material to the enemy”.
The Notes provide details on a number of cases, both the deception and penetration types.
One deception case (mentioned in my ebook) has an interesting result. LLAMA was an Italian-
run Arab W/T agent, part of a network left in Transpolitania in early 1943. The network was
broken up by SIME, who used LLAMA to pass low-grade A Force material until the Allies
invaded Italy. Then the link was
“put to a very novel use. We sent a message informing the Italians that we had
captured their agent and that the British General Staff offered the Italian Staff
this opportunity of direct and secret communication, without the knowledge of the
Germans. The Italians swallowed this bait and several messages were exchanged;
the Italians proposed sending us by plane a high-grade cipher to avoid the
danger of German interception. Shortly after this AFHQ took over control of the
link”.48
15
Thaddeus Holt, in his book “The Deceivers” (Scribner, New York 2004), says that this
intended covert communication with the Italians was vetoed by London.49
Some Penetration Agents were handled by SIME, but its main concern was providing
deception channels. Where DSO Turkey was working with the Turks, who were kept
uninformed about SIME’s deception operations, he was restricted in many cases to penetration
operations. ISLD preferred those kinds of operation, but sometimes also ran deception work in
Turkey because the DSO’s links with the Turks made it harder for him to work on such cases.
Agents controlled by ISLD included the following:
 BLACKGUARD – a Persian used by the Abwehr for agent recruitment and
delivery of W/T sets to agents in Persia, Egypt and India, he was controlled from autumn
1943 by DSO Turkey and SIME. He provided leads on several cases, one of which
(KISS) was run in cooperation with the Soviets in Persia, while another involved a DA
being run in Bombay. He was passed to ISLD in mid-1944 when he left for Switzerland.
 CRUDE – a Turkish businessman recruited by the GIS in July 1942, he travelled
between Istanbul, Syria and Iraq and was run as a DA from February 1944 to pass low-
grade A Force information. In December 1944 ISLD directed him to approach the
Japanese Military Attache in Istanbul, but the case closed when diplomatic relations were
cut with Japan and CRUDE was hospitalized with “acute piles”. (In his book, “The
Deceivers”, Thaddeus Holt claimed that CRUDE/MARQUIS had been resident in Iraq
and communicated by Secret Writing (SW) and personal visits to Istanbul, operating from
January 1943.)
 INFAMOUS – an Armenian carpet merchant of Turkish nationality, based in
Istanbul, he was involved in the Black Market and was recruited by the Abwehr, who
believed he had a network of couriers travelling to Allied territory. He was in touch with
ISLD from May 1943, who learned that the Germans were considering INFAMOUS as a
channel to provide money to the W/T operator of the CHEESE channel (which did not
happen) and, in June 1944, to QUICKSILVER. After the Germans in Turkey were
interned, ISLD had INFAMOUS approach the Japanese in October 1944. The Japanese
Intelligence Service (JIS) proposed to use him to pay agents in various Allied territories,
offering the potential for considerable penetration of their spy networks. This was put on
hold following the internment of the Japanese in January 1945, but INFAMOUS was
awaiting further communication via a Japanese contact as of February 1945.
 ODDITY – a Greek ISLD agent who was in touch with the JIS from December
1944. He provided them with two contact addresses (under SIME control) to help JIS
agents in Cairo, but JIS plans were interrupted by the Turco-Japanese rupture in January
1945.
 ODIOUS – a Swiss national named Max Brandli was sent to Istanbul by the GIS
on an agent recruiting mission, and was approached and recruited in 1942 by ISLD, who
were unaware of his GIS links. He returned from Enemy Occupied Territory (EOT) after
his ISLD mission with a W/T mission for Syria, and was allowed to visit Syria and report
his observations. He also reported details on the British Intelligence Officers in contact
with him. After a second trip to Syria he confessed his true allegiance and was arrested
and interned in November 1943.50
 SMOOTH - a Turk in Antioch recruited in September 1942 by the GIS, he
provided information supplied by A Force, which came notionally from smugglers on the
16
Turkish-Syrian border and a notional network of agents in Syria. The case closed in
October 1944 when the agent moved for business reasons. Thaddeus Holt stated that he
was a customs official.51
 SPOT – a Czech agent of the ISLD employed at the Persian Consulate in Istanbul,
he was recruited by the Abwehr in October 1943. It was proposed that he take a W/T set
to Iran for the Abwehr in May 1944, but this fell through. Contact was maintained after
the Germans were interned though a Swiss Abwehr agent, and when this man lost contact
with the GIS, ISLD instructed SPOT to meet with the JIS in Istanbul to re-establish their
link. The Japanese claimed to be still working on this even after they were themselves
interned.
 TWIST – a Christian Arab with an Italian passport, who was directed by ISLD to
work with the JIS in Turkey. In October 1944 the JIS sought the help of TWIST to
establish W/T links to Cairo, Basra and Teheran. The case was interrupted and possibly
closed with the internment of the Japanese, without any concrete developments in the
case. (Thaddeus Holt stated that he was an employee of the Italian Consulate in Istanbul,
recruited by MI6, the Abwehr and the SD. He was used to pass A Force deception to the
GIS about Allied plans in the Balkans in the summer of 1944.) 52

NORTH AFRICA AND ITALY


[While I have devoted several chapters in my ebook to the work of the Allies in
North Africa and the campaigns in Sicily and Italy, most of the following
information adds to that narrative.]

In preparation for Operation Torch (the invasion of North Africa), MI5 had pressed for
control of the counter intelligence side of the General Staff, Intelligence at AFHQ, claiming MI6
lacked the expertise needed for counter intelligence work, “particularly the examination of
suspects, control of the civilian population, counter-sabotage and protective security measures”.
AFHQ and MI6 had rejected the offer on the ground that North Africa was foreign territory,
where MI5 “had no standing”. It was more successful in the summer of 1943, when the War
Office was persuaded to post three MI5 officers to AFHQ.53
MI5 was also successful in having officers appointed to the COSSAC staff, and two
officers “played a large part in drawing up the directives for the field units that were set out in
SHAEF Intelligence Directive No 7 on Counter-Intelligence”, issued in February 1944. It defined
the relationship between Field Security units and the SI(b) Units supplied by MI6, by then re-
designated as Special Counter Intelligence Units (SCIUs). There was no reference in the
directive to deception and obtaining CI from double agents in the operational zones. MI5 had
instigated a meeting in January between interested parties, at which it was agreed that an MI5
officer would be appointed to HQ 21 AG “to be responsible for selecting double agents in
consultation with its SCIU, and that case officers for handling them should be trained and held
in readiness by MI5”. It was later agreed that these officers would form two SCIUs, to be staffed
by MI5, and an American unit formed by OSS/X2. Additionally, “numerous MI5 officers were
transferred to counter-intelligence appointments”.
MI5 also proposed the establishment of the nucleus for a Central CI Bureau in SHAEF, to
collate and distribute CI data needed in the occupation of Germany by the Allies. While the Chief
17
of MI6 vetoed this, on the grounds that CI in Germany was an MI6 responsibility, MI5 did
indeed succeed in placing an officer in SHAEF, responsible for collection of intelligence on the
Nazi Party and the German Police, as well as getting representation within the joint MI6/OSS
War Room, created to service the SCIUs. 54

SI(b) Personnel and Activities


For Operation Torch, MI6 had provided a
“mobile Special Intelligence (b) Unit to carry out covert counter-espionage
operations and to be responsible for communicating ISOS information to the Ib
sections and supervising the exploitation of it, and this unit was supported by a
static SIS station staffed from SIS’s Section V”.55
After the invasion, Cowgill visited North Africa in January 1943 to meet with his SI(b)
staff and their French counterparts in the DSM and TR. Cecil in his article attributed to Cowgill
the idea to produce around this time what were vaguely titled “Purple Primers”. Each primer
covered a specific geographical area, e.g. Spain and Portugal, and contained all available
information on known active members of the German Intelligence Services (GIS) in those
regions, and were issued to MI6(V) stations and SI(b) units. The primers used ISOS and other,
less sensitive material as sources.56 Cowgill may have been inspired by the DSM work in North
Africa to create similar indices.57
A Memo on the work of the SI(b) Unit in the North African Theatre reported that the
SI(b) Unit with AFHQ was “most useful in all stages of operations in this country, both when
acting with forward troops and under more static conditions.” An important note on this
importance was the fact that the small unit was made directly responsible to GHQ, as this
“prevents them being diverted from their role”,58 as was often the case with other CI units such
as the British Field Security Sections (FSS) and the American Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)
Detachments.
A report dated 2 Feb 1943 from the OC of No 1 SI(b) Unit entitled “The Work of SI(b)
Units with an Assault Force” set out the lessons learned from the assault on Algiers and other
North African towns. The major two points were that, firstly, in deploying SI(b) Units the time
factor was all important to prevent destruction of codes and the escape of agents and other
personnel targets. In Casablanca, the SI(b) officer only disembarked five days after the original
assault, while in Oran the officer was at least 48hrs late. Secondly, the SI(b) officer or unit
needed to disembark with the FS Section and use their local language knowledge to maximum
benefit. The FS Section should remain in situ at least until the sorting of captured documents was
completed. Also, the SI(b) and FS officers should meet with the assault commanders ahead of the
attack to coordinate the capture of targets of interest.59
SI(b) officers were assigned after the invasion of North Africa to work as Allied Forces
CI Liaison Officers in various cities. AFHQ were keen to upgrade the SI(b) Unit with more
officers, and MI6(V) suggested that, as the unit sponsor, they should propose this with AFHQ
support. In late Feb 1943 AFHQ was asked by MI6 to withdraw the LOs from Casablanca and
Oran to Algiers and the officers concerned, Captains Park and Barclay, would be posted at no
charge to the army to “special employment”. Once substitutes had been found for MI6(V)
officers Bristow and Gatty, it was intended that they would in turn be posted to fill the SI(b)
vacancies (though this may not have happened). Park was the officer in Casablanca, 60 and as
mentioned above, he was still in North Africa in 1944.
18
An undated, partial document [the remainder being redacted] which was probably dated
around early 1943 provided the details of four SI(b) officers, all listed as members of the
Intelligence Corps:
Capt Arthur Geoffrey Trevor-Wilson [name redacted in the original], No 117023;
Capt Frank Buchanan Park, No 149092;
Capt Stanley Wyndam Woodward, No 210668; and
Capt Robert Charles Sanford Barclay, No 126828.61
This list shows that both Park and Woodward were connected with the SI(b) units much
earlier than indicated in previous documentation (they were mentioned more significantly in SCI
operations in France, Belgium and Germany). Woodward is definitely mentioned in a letter dated
2 Feb 1943, which discussed a proposition to send him with a French officer, Laroche, to visit
Tripoli in order “to interrogate Laroche’s agent there”.62 A letter from First Army dated 20 Feb
1943 has Woodward acting as liaison between the French and HQ 18 AG at Constantine. 63
Laroche was identified in my ebook as an officer of the French TR, in charge of TR 121 in North
Africa in 1941. Park is mentioned as being in SCI in Algiers in 1944 before joining No 6 SCIU
with 7th Army in Marseilles.

Preparing for SI(b) Work in Italy


Two of the most important figures in the Allied Security Intelligence efforts in the
Mediterranean theatre were Col SS Hill-Dillon at GSI(b) AFHQ and Lt Col Gibson, GSI(b) in
Force 141, later 15 AG and then HQ AAI (Allied Armies in Italy). For most of the campaign
AFHQ was based in North Africa, so day-to-day operations were mainly supervised by Gibson.
Much of the correspondence on file concerning the work of Special Counter Intelligence
involved one or both of these men.
A letter from Force 141 to its subordinate 12th Army on 6 June 1943 explained the role of
No 2 SI(b) Unit, comprising MI6 officers with a good knowledge of the enemy intelligence
services and having received “special training in Counter-espionage work”. Among the tasks of
this new organisation were
to examine documents and personnel at an Abwehr Headquarters;
to organise counter-espionage agents and informers;
to act as a channel and editor for Most Secret Source material; and
to “carry out certain special measures in respect of captured enemy agents” (i.e.
to turn them and play them back against their former organisation).
It was “desirable” that the SI(b) officer assigned to accompany 12 th Army remained at
HQ 141 Force until 20 June, so that he be in possession of all available security intelligence. He
would be able to provide his own transportation (a motorcycle) if he embarked in Tunisia.
Should he be forced to join 12th Army in the Middle East, it was requested that a motorcycle be
provided for him.64 On 14 Jun 1943 HQ 141 Force wrote to 51 Division, informing them that
12th Army had decided that Capt Aubrey Jones of No 2 SI(b) Unit would be attached to 51
Division in the initial phase of the operation. After his early disembarkation, he would make his
own way North as soon as the situation permitted.65

19
A similar letter dated 8 Jun 1943 to HQ 1 Armd Corps emphasised that their assigned
officer from No 2 SI(b) should arrive close behind the forward troops as “the value of his work
will be largely dependent on his early arrival in the theatre of operations”.66
On 11 June 1943 MI6 informed Col Hill Dillon of AFHQ that (Captain) Malcolm Smith
was leaving London by air, travelling via Lisbon to AFHQ in Algiers. Establishment problems
meant that Smith would be paid by MI6 rather than the Army, but MI6 gave assurances that
Smith would be under the control of Lt Col Gibson of Force 141. The only difference was that
MI6 would want Smith to return to their command once “the operation” was concluded.67 The
operation concerned was the invasion of Sicily and Italy. This decision was obviously later
amended, as Smith remained in the Italian theatre as an important member of SI(b)/SCI until the
end of the war.
On 29 June 1943 Hill Dillon at AFHQ wrote to Gibson with Force 141, giving advice on
how to handle the SI(b) officers, who were not, for the most part, trained staff officers. He
warned that SI(b) staff tended to do things affecting policy without prior consultation. The unit
under Malcolm Smith came fully under the orders of the commander, Force 141, and thus under
Gibson. The CE activities of the various SI(b) units formed a network, and AFHQ would need
copies of all their reports to Force 141 in order to stay informed. The French DSM would be
seeking to penetrate Italy with or without Allied help, and while the Allies might agree to
temporary attachments to Force 141 of French CE officers,
“in no case should any such arrangements be made by members of the SI(b) units
on their own initiative. You will find that members of the SI(b) unit require careful
control. They know their normal business of penetrating the enemy’s espionage
but they are not staff officers and few of them have any idea of collating their
intelligence and presenting a comprehensive picture of the enemy’s espionage
system.”68
Gibson replied the next day, saying the French CE officers would not be in the initial
attack, but would go “as attached members of SI(b) unit working primarily for us and entirely
under our direction.” The SI(b) officers were divided up, with Major Smith joining 1 Inf Div
(US); Bruce-Lockhart would hopefully join HQ II Corps (US); Jones was in Tunis with
Woodward, and had visited 51 Div and contacted 30 Corps. He would join 51 Div on 4 July, and
Capt Cooper was at Force 141, working mostly with Woodward. 69 Major Bruce-Lockhart had
been assigned to HQ II Corps under I Armd Corps on 15 June, and Capt Malcolm H Smith had
also been assigned to I Armd Corps for transportation. It was requested that he be “attached to
the Dime assault so that he can land, not with the first assault troops, but within ten hours after
H hour. This officer should be given every latitude in movement, to the end that he may make his
way inland to the more important cities”.70 A letter to 12th Army dated 17 June informed 12th
Army that Smith and Jones were instructed to head North East after disembarkation, to enter
FUSTIAN (the codename for Catania) as soon as possible after its capture. They would keep in
touch using special cipher procedures through HQ 13 Corps.71 This division of SI(b) section
personnel was later criticised by SI(b) officers because it reduced the effectiveness of the unit.
The head of the DSM, Commandant Paillole, created Mission 130, which was attached to
the SI(b) bound for Sicily. The leader was Capt Parisot, his deputy was Lt Guillaume, and they
had a radio operator, Adjutant Raoul Buccafuyri or Buccafurri. When Paillole ordered Parisot,
Gillaume and two NCOs to go to Sicily, Gibson sought to have their lines of control established,
having the Mission detached from DSM and attached to Smith of SI(b), with reports going to
Paillole, SI(b) and GSI AFHQ. There was to be no direct radio communication to DSM.72

20
It was also planned for part of the SI(b) contingent to travel by private yacht, the
Prodigal. This contingent would be commanded by Capt Fairweather until the arrival of
Malcolm Smith, and include Mission 130. Another passenger was a “Mr Del Curto” – in fact a
former Italian PoW Major working with the SI(b). 73 The yacht was due to leave on 24 July, with
another party of MI6 personnel under Major Whelpton for intelligence duties. Cooper was due to
accompany GSI I(b) of Force 141 (now 15 AG) when they embarked on 30 July.74
On 20 July Capt Jones of No 2 SI(b) Unit, working with Eighth Army, sent back notes
from Syracuse to Force 141 HQ by the hand of Major Bruce-Lockhart. This confirms that Bruce-
Lockhart did in fact accompany the initial assault force, which was mentioned in my ebook as
being somewhat in doubt, as the only mention of him previously was that he was an expert from
the Middle East and was earmarked for embarkation. Another puzzling aspect regarding Bruce-
Lockhart is the fact that his rank changed over time in official communications, from major to
captain. While this might indicate the presence of two different officers with the same surname
working in SI(b) Italy, this seems highly unlikely – although Capt (later Major) Malcolm Smith
and his civilian brother both were in SI(b) Italy at the same time.
This Bruce Lockhart may be identical with John Macgregor Bruce Lockhart, reported to
have joined MI6 in 1942 and to have subsequently risen to the rank of Deputy Director of the
Service.75 In the official history of MI6, it is stated that “[b]efore becoming involved with
counter-intelligence and double-agent operations in the Middle East, he had spent some time in
Cairo working on the German order of battle” and setting up stay-behind networks in the
Caucasus.76
The material carried by Bruce-Lockhart for Jones provided information on the OVRA,
SIM, Carabinieri and a combined services organisation called the Centro Contro Spionaggio
(CCS) which directed its CE work entirely through the Carabinieri 77 (the national military police
of Italy, policing both military and civilian populations). HQ 15 AG, when re-issuing this
information on 23 July, reported that CCS was a part of the SIM, which also made considerable
use of the Carabinieri, and both used local Carabinieri stations as cover addresses. The
Carabinieri were therefore identified as a “serious potential threat” to Allied security.78 This
was an important point for consideration in the following months, since No 3 SI(b) unit “was
receiving a wealth of information from the (now-friendly) Italian CE service, SIM/CS (Contro-
Spionaggio) following the Armistice on 25 July 1943”.79 It soon became clear that these doubts
were held by others, too (see below).
On 8 Aug 1943 15 AG issued a letter explaining the role of the SI(b) Unit operating in
their area to 7th and 8th Armies. “The responsibility for counter-espionage, and generally for the
neutralisation and penetration of the enemy Intelligence Services, will be undertaken by the
SI(b) Unit, working under the general direction of this HQ”. While the Army security staffs
were entitled to take any immediate action deemed necessary to safeguard military security, “all
matters affecting the enemy Intelligence Services should be referred by Armies to the appropriate
SI(b) officer (or to this HQ)”. The SI(b) Unit consisted of three officers – Capt M Smith, Capt A
Jones, and Capt J Cooper – “reinforced by certain additional personnel trained in counter-
espionage, and these will assist in its tasks”.
Smith had his HQ in Palermo and was assisted by Capt Fairweather, a codist and three CI
agents (Lucien Sauvage, Armand Davit and del Curto). Jones was based at Catania, assisted by
four CI agents (Henri Prevost, Jacques Gardi, Pierre Marmier and Rene Bartoli). Cooper was
based in Syracuse, covering the SE corner of Sicily and acting as the SI(b) link to HQ 15 AG.
These officers and GSI(b) of 15AG would be helped by 16 FS Section, attached to the HQ.

21
The letter also mentioned that Major Whelpton, Capt Harrison and Lt Quail plus four
NCOs formed No 1 I(U) Section, based at Syracuse, which was “concerned with the infiltration
of our agents behind the enemy’s positions and into the Italian mainland”.80 By October 1943 the
unit was based in Bari, on the East coast of Italy, and was in poor shape when Bruce Lockhart
was appointed its new commanding officer. The unit in Bari became the MI6 base for operations
into Northern Italy, and later into the Balkans and central Europe.81

Working with the Italians


On 20 Jan 1944 Dudley Clarke wrote to the Head of SIME concerning his recent visit to
Italy. He mentions a Mr ‘X’ and stated “I am quite certain that the great chances which are open
through him will only be seized if we can place him in really experienced hands”. Clarke was
writing to ask SIME for a list of staff in SIME who might be suitable.82
This letter included a memo from Major Freeman Thomas of A Force, entitled
“Information on CE Organisations in North Africa and Italy”, which mentioned the re-formation
under the Italian Badoglio government of the intelligence organisation called SIM. The memo
stated
“There was no reason why the Allies should have trusted SIM…. And so an
officer from MI6 was attached to them to penetrate their organisation and to act
as a liaison officer between SIM and Col Hill-Dillon [AFHQ] and his MI6
advisor in Algiers”.
This liaison officer would have been Sqn Ldr Johnstone. 83 An AFHQ letter dated 1
November 1943 designated Johnstone as “Special Intelligence (b) representative of G-2 AFHQ
at Allied Military Mission”, with the job of obtaining all information possible on “the
reorganisation of the counter-intelligence branch of SIM and furnish this information to
AFHQ”. The AFHQ letter continued:
“As the proposal for the institution of Italian CE Sections has been approved in
principle and as time is important you will give any assistance that is required to
Section II of the Bonsignore Group (CE of SIM) in the preliminary preparations
of these units. The necessary measures have been taken by this Section to trace
and collect the personnel requested by SIM”.84
This letter is therefore confirmation of the memo from Freeman Thomas regarding Allied
security concerns about their new comrades. This memo, sent with Clarke’s letter of 20 Jan 1944,
also recorded that:
“Later still a man (whom we call Mr X) who, with two others used to run all
double agents for the fascist regime and with their approval, apart from SIM,
contacted the MI6 officer with SIM and asked permission to work with the Allies.
His two colleagues are in hiding in Rome awaiting the Allied entry and he refused
to work with the present SIM stating that he didn’t trust the lower stratum of that
organisation.
“This man, therefore, must be counted as a separate counter-espionage
organisation controlled by Col Hill-Dillon through the MI6 officer liaising with
SIM.”
The handling of such an asset would require a man of similar intelligence and experience.
The memo recorded that any SI(b) case officers in Italy would “very probably” be
22
inexperienced. Until experienced case officers were available (and it was thought unlikely they
could be provided from England), Col Hill-Dillon considered that neither SIM nor Mr X could
be trusted to be involved in A Force work, and neither could they be informed of A Force, ISOS,
or be put in a position to penetrate British counter-intelligence.85
Regarding the identity of Mr X, there may – or may not - be a connection with a
“Captain del Porto, a SIM officer sent to the unit by Col Hill-Dillon of AFHQ and by Sqn Ldr
Johnstone to provide local liaison” for No 3 SI(b) unit in Naples in early October 1943. No 3
SI(b) was preparing for the expected occupation of Rome, which was subsequently delayed until
the following June.86 There was a large SIM/CS group extant in Naples who were listed in a
report dated of 5 Nov 1943.87 The two colleagues in Rome are also unidentified, but one of these
might have been Lt Col Luigi Alessi, a SIM/CS penetration of the GIS who ran a number of
agents.88 (The other major penetration agent who worked with Alessi in Rome was Emilio
Capellaro, a professional agent who had been recruited by MI6. 89 Both are dealt with extensively
in my ebook.)
A possible candidate for Mr X is the former Counter Intelligence chief, Col Bertacchi.
Bertacchi seemed to have served in SIM/CS for some time, as he had knowledge of pre-war
operations against diplomatic targets in Rome as well as wartime CE operations. Bertacchi ran
several successful DA operations against the British and Americans, and had provided the Allies
with the names of Allied agents who had been ‘turned’ by the Italians. However, he apparently
underwent a detailed interrogation by the Allies, which would have probably been deemed
counter-productive when dealing with a willing agent, and this must raise a doubt as to his
connection with Mr X.90

MID PHASE IN ITALY


Running Agents
AFHQ issued on 17 Jan 1944 a “Directive for SI(b) Units in Italy” which imposed a
restriction upon the work of the units that required them to get prior approval from AFHQ,
submitting fullest possible detail by bag, or by telegram when time was insufficient, for any
operation involving sending a DA to enemy territory for CE purposes or using a Controlled
Enemy Agent (CEA – normally a W/T agent). After objections from HQ ACMF (Allied Central
Mediterranean Forces, a redesignation of Allied Armies in Italy, AAI), AFHQ issued a new
directive on 31 Jan 1944 which backed away from their earlier demand, citing the number of
recent captured enemy agents and the distance between AFHQ and subordinate formations as
factors. Where time was an essential factor in a case, permission to continue could be provided
by ACMF (and Tac HQ A Force, if concerned), but AFHQ would still need to be kept informed
as soon as possible, and “deception generally must be co-ordinated at AFHQ in accordance with
the general plan”. The directive also stated:
“It is not the policy of this headquarters to make use of triple agents except in the
most exceptional circumstances and agents will only be used for deception
purposes when their general background appears to make them really favourable
subjects. It must be remembered that the rapid trial and execution, if convicted, of
their agents is likely to have a strong deterrant [sic] effect on the enlistment by
the enemy of further agents”.91
The first enemy agent, a line crosser, was not detained until late
October 1943 92. In December the number of agents captured monthly rose
23
to 56, and in January to 58, but dropped in February to only 42. 93 In January
1944 the first potential CEAs were captured (the ALPHA/TAU/PRIMO group, of which PRIMO
became the CEA used). A summary of captured enemy agents from HQ AAI listed a group of
three Abwehr W/T agents, captured in 10 Corps area on 15 January 1944, who were “being used
for ‘A’ Force purposes”. As the ALPHA/TAU/PRIMO group were the first such group in Italy
used by A Force, this makes their identification fairly solid. However, the poor quality of the
document’s printing makes deciphering some names difficult. The names were Gastone
Ilbvereso, or possibly Elbereso; Giovanni Giliberto; and Alfredo Tirassa.
The same list gave the names of two Abwehr agents sent back as penetration agents by
the French DSM and by SI(b) – Sergio Aloisi, captured on 7 Jan, and a Juras Mankovic (possibly
- poorly printed document), who surrendered to 8th Army on 1 Feb 1944.94
PRIMO was the radio operator for his team and became one of the major A Force
channels in Italy. His control was immediately the subject of discussion, and it was decided to
extend the 40 Committee system from North Africa. On 16 Feb 1944 the formation of a 44
Committee in Italy was announced, to consist of -
Major Max Niven, or an A Force representative nominated by him;
Major John Hooton, or an SI(b) officer nominated by him;
Capt Keith Francis, the Case Officer supervisor (provided by SIME).95
Francis, and later another SIME officer, Russell Eadie, were case officers sent “(at the
express request of Commander, ‘A’ FORCE) to supervise the development of high-grade ‘A’
FORCE channels in ITALY and to train other personnel for that type of work”.96
In a letter dated 21 Feb 1944 from Lt Col Ken Jones, the SIME representative at AFHQ,
to the OC of the SIME Special Section, he stated that he was trying to convince Col Hill-Dillon
that
“the establishment of an organisation similar to our Special Section is necessary
if GALVESTON channels are to be properly developed and managed. He accepts
this responsibility with some reluctance, since apparently when his organisation
was originally constituted before the invasion, GALVESTON work was discussed
and it was decided that no provision should be made for it.”
Jones pointed out that the duties of the SI(b) representative on the 44 Committee as set
down in its charter
“appear at first sight to be those which would normally be the job of Special
Section. It is to be remembered, however that when agents of any sort are caught
in Italy they are the responsibility of SI(b). The 44 Committee does not have any
control over them until they are handed over for GALVESTON purposes by SI(b)
…..In practice, I expect that most D/A cases will be discussed at the 44
Committee and GALVESTON needs will be given a somewhat higher priority
than they so far have”.97
This view is clearly correct, as was shown when that same month AFHQ issued directives
regarding penetration agents (PAs) and the selection of DAs for A Force purposes. The directive
of 22 Feb 1944 stated:
“4. Short-range agents are normally unsuitable for ‘A’ Force purposes, since
control over them has to be relinquished during the period that they are again in

24
contact with the enemy. ‘A’ Force agents will normally be recruited only from
captured agents who have W/T sets, and over whom control is continuous and
complete.
“5. It is important, however, that we should not loose sight of the fact that
among short-range agents who are caught there may be some who might be
turned to good account as penetration agents.”
The potential PA needed to have the following qualities:
a. Possess reasonable courage;
b. Preferably will have voluntarily surrendered and disclosed his mission;
c. Have been determined by his interrogating officer to not be an enemy penetration
agent and to still have the confidence of his enemy controllers;
d. Be willing to undertake the DA role and be well disposed towards the Allies; and
e. Be reasonably intelligent, able to observe and memorise without displaying his
interest, and refrain from over-eagerness to return through the lines to Allied
territory.98
Another directive, dated 24 Feb 1944, added that
“It may occasionally be possible to work up a penetration agent to the point
where he can be trusted with ‘A’ Force material, but this will be exceptional and
should not be attempted until an agent has been proved reliable over a period of
some months”.
On the selection of DAs for A Force use, the following conditions were to be fulfilled as
nearly as possible:
a. His communication method should be under complete control;
b. The enemy must have confidence in him;
c. His interrogators must be sure that the agent has told them the whole truth;
d. The agent must have a psychologically stable character.99
At least one CEA used for A Force deception in Rome, a Dutchwoman called Helene
Louise Ten Cate Brouwer, codename ADULT, failed to meet this criteria, and the case had to be
closed after being run for only a short period.100
The PRIMO case was discussed by Capt Malcolm Smith, the OC of N0 3 SCIU, and he
was not complimentary regarding the security of the case:
“The first group of three high-class agents was split up, as, once contact with the
enemy was established, and personal questions which may have been checks
answered, the one essential person for maintaining the link was obviously the
W/T operator.… the whole scheme may well have been ruined as the two
unnecessary members of the team were sent to a concentration camp in North
AFRICA where they talked freely to other inmates.”
One of these German inmates was subsequently repatriated and reported the case to
German authorities, but thankfully this occurred late in the war and the repercussions were not
catastrophic for the deception planners.101

25
From AFHQ directives it appears that A Force and the 44 Committee were given a much
higher priority than that assigned to straight penetration cases. This is at odds with the position
claimed by Col Hill-Dillon of AFHQ the following month at a meeting in London with MI6.
“[Hill-Dillon] held the emphatic view that all double agent work should be under
the control of I. Staff (American G-2) and that any arrangement by which
DOWAGER’s officers” [i.e. A Force deception staff] “were allowed to pick and
choose in the field rather than be given such agents that the I Staff should have,
was bound to cause confusion, friction and difficulty”.
Regarding Penetration Agents, his policy was to use DAs for both penetration and
deception, “but this policy had to be exercised with caution, particularly at time of operational
movement”.102
Two documents, one from HQ AAI dated 12 October 1944, the other a draft from AFHQ
ACOS G2 dated about October 1944, have the same passage with regard to the functions of the
SCI Units, which indicate that the responsibility for deception agents, or “special agents”,
continued to rest with them:
“They are responsible for undertaking the penetration of the enemy intelligence
services, and, when occasion arises, for the special exploitation of captured
enemy agents”.103

Plans for the Balkans in 1944


MI6 was unhappy with the extension of SIME into operational intelligence and counter-
espionage work in Italy and the Balkans. In February 1943 at a meeting of regional DSOs in
Beirut, it was reported that
“The sending of detachments to Greece for security duties in the event of our
invading that country was mentioned, and reference was made to the instructions
received by B Sec ISLD to organize an ‘intelligence commando’ to be sent to
Greece at an early stage of the invasion; this is now being considered by the
Penetration Committee”.
The Penetration Committee was set up when the Thirty Committee was formed to control
deception channels, and as its name suggests, it was intended to control agents used for
penetration of enemy intelligence services. The instructions to B Sec ISLD would suggest that
some kind of SI(b) Unit was being contemplated to control any DAs used by the “intelligence
commando”, while the title itself is suggestive of an S Force-type organisation, intended for
wider intelligence activities.
S Forces were based on an idea stolen from the Abwehr. The “Abwehr Kommando” was
used to good effect in the Balkans and Western Europe particularly, using dedicated intelligence
officers and supporting combat troops to locate, secure and develop targets of intelligence
interest immediately behind frontline troops. The British had used their first S Force in the
capture of Tunis and Bizerta in Tunisia, and developed the idea further in the Italian campaign in
1943 and 1944.104
Once it had been decided in 1943 that there would be an invasion of Southern France in
1944, the option of a Balkan invasion was no longer on the table. Designed as part of
BODYGUARD (deception for the Normandy Invasion in June 1944), the Allied Deception
planners prepared Operation ZEPPELIN to draw vital German units from France and Italy to
26
defend the Adriatic coast from an expected Allied amphibious invasion of the Balkans.
Organised by A Force, ZEPPELIN ran from February to July 1944 and was judged to have kept
21 German divisions tied down in Southern Europe during the invasion.
According to an article on the CIA’s website (not supported by the official history
“British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol 5 – Strategic Deception”, by Michael
Howard, HMSO 1990), the deception planners employed existing intelligence missions in the
region to suggest an additional threat of Hungarian withdrawal from the Axis alliance.
Responding to official Hungarian overtures, a British team of two supposedly escaped from
German PoW camps with instructions to engage the Hungarian government in peace talks, while
the SPARROW Mission sent by the OSS to make similar contacts was known to the GIS in
Istanbul. This fact became known to the Allies, but once MI6 pointed out that the mission was
compromised, the deception planners supposedly used this and the other missions to sell their
deception. The contacts with the Hungarian government were continued for the purposes of
deception (though the personnel on these missions was not informed of this). The SPARROW
Mission was dropped on 13 March 1944 into Hungary, and the Germans invaded the territory of
their Axis ally several days later, “employing over 100,000 troops, including several armored
divisions, that were desperately needed elsewhere”. 105
Despite the decision to invade via Southern France, the Allies were still hoping to occupy
the Balkans eventually, or at the last have official military representation there if the territory was
under Soviet control. At the meeting in March 1944, Hill-Dillon assured MI6 that any SIME
officer working in the Balkans would be under his command. As DSOs they would report to him,
but they would have control over any SCIUs (the re-designated SI(b) Units) in the country of
operation. Where there was only an Allied Military Mission rather than an occupying force, one
of the mission’s objectives would be to provide the Allied C-in-C with intelligence. Lt Col
Cowgill pointed out that the provision of secret intelligence to any organisation from occupied
territory was the role of MI6 and not SIME, which was a security organisation.
At this time, MI6 envisaged the following SCI Units as necessary for the Balkans:
Country Type A Type B

Yugoslavia 1 1
Greece 1 1
Roumania 1 0
Bulgaria 1 0
Hungary 1 0
Albania 0 1
The units would be manned by MI6 officers, and they had some staff for the Yugoslav
Type A unit already. Type A units had four officers, while Type B had only two, with supporting
staff to match.
Capt Crofts of No 2 SCIU had been given extra work after Hill-Dillon had visited ISLD
officer Michael Ionides in January 1944 in Cairo and had found him “a bit wooley”. There were
no SI(b) Units ready in the ME to task, and he had therefore assigned Crofts to provide “a bird’s
eye view of the HUN organisation in the Balkans including Greece, HUNGARY and TURKEY”.
He had regarded the lack of SI(b) Units in this region as being not of urgent interest due to the

27
unlikelihood of any “big invasion plans for the BALKANS” (as at January 1944).106 Capt Crofts
was relieved of his Yugoslav duties (which Hill-Dillon had assigned him additional to his SCI
work) and remained with No 2 SCIU.
These plans seem to have been trimmed back shortly afterwards, as on 24 June 1944 Col
Hill-Dillon sought the establishment of only two new SCI Units, one Type A and the other Type
B. In his proposal he mentions that the other three SCIUs in theatre were already fully
committed, and there was a requirement for a Type A unit for the Balkans and the Type B unit
“for operations in other areas”. “These units are charged with the most secret side of counter
intelligence, ie penetration of the enemy’s espionage organisation. They were first used
experimentally in operation ‘TORCH’. In that and all subsequent operations they have been an
outstanding success, and the security of our amphibious and land operations has in a great
measure been due to them.” 107
According to the official history of MI6, with regards to Roumania, the Service was
refused permission by the Foreign Office to send personnel into the zone of Soviet military
operations without Moscow’s explicit agreement. In August 1944 this was amended to allow MI6
to operate in all liberated countries, but in Roumania they could not operate in advance of the
official mission being sent there.108 A British Military Mission entered Bulgaria from Turkey in
September, but were almost immediately expelled by the Soviet authorities. The Mission was
given permission to return the following month, without the presence of MI6 officer Harold
Gibson, formerly head of the MI6 station in Istanbul. Gibson was posted in August of the
following year to be head of the MI6 station in Prague, working under diplomatic cover.109
The OSS were quicker off the mark, according to the War Report of the OSS.
“City teams reached Athens, Sofia, Bucharest and Tirana ahead of Allied forces,
and Belgrade on the same day. There they uncovered enemy agents, documents
and equipment, reported political and economic developments…and passed on
battle order intelligence from local liaisons. Considerable opposition was
encountered, however, in Communist-controlled countries, and, by September,
1945, city teams in the Balkans had been de-activated.”
Due to the military progress of the Russians in the Balkans, by December 1944 OSS had
been forced to formalise the position of their city teams, which they did by attaching the units to
the US delegations of the Allied Control Commissions in the countries of Southeast Europe.
Except for Sofia, OSS had bases in all the Balkan countries by VE-Day. The Sofia team had been
withdrawn at Russian insistence, and this was soon the fate of the other teams. In May 1945 the
Budapest City Team was thrown out, while the Prague team was forced to move to Pilsen in the
American-occupied zone. The other three Balkans city teams in Belgrade, Bucharest, and Tirana
were closed down by September.110

Changes in Designations, Units and Personnel


On 23 Mar 1944 HQ AAI announced the designation change of the SI(b) Units to SCIUs
– Special Counter Intelligence Units. An AFHQ Memo dated 1 Apr 1944 to HQ AAI confirmed
the appointments of the following as Intelligence Officers (IOs) to Nos 1 and 2 SCIU:
T/Capt JG Dawson (203160) Int Corps (Dawson had in fact been posted to No 1 SI(b) the
previous November).

28
T/Capt J V Cooper (91655) KRRC.111 (Cooper had been previously working with SI(b) as
an “attached” officer).
On 11 Apr 1944 AFHQ assigned Major HRM (Russell) Eadie to SCI Italy
under Major John Hooton, to act as case officer for the management of
double agents allotted for A Force use.112 Eadie was a SIME officer.
On 17 May 1944 AFHQ wrote to Major John Hooton of No 1 SCIU on
handling PRIMO when the SCIU moved with S Force into Rome. Major Max
Niven of A Force would remain in Naples, and it was suggested that Capt
Diamant (of No 1 SCIU) and Major Eadie act as the other members of the 44
Committee. In the event a suitable DA became available for A Force work in
Rome, a new 45 Committee would be formed, consisting of Major Hooton,
Capt Francis as case officer and an A Force officer who would be chosen
without delay. Suitable short-term agents found in Rome were to be offered
to Tac HQ A Force, who would arrange for a representative to be sent with
the necessary instructions and material.113
Several candidates for double agent work were found in Rome and in
Northern Italy, and their operational control was shared with the French and
with OSS/X2. The first X2 case was actually run by them before they were
formed into a Special Counter Intelligence Unit, and the case was
deliberately run to be ‘blown’, in order to increase the GIS’s confidence in the
information provided by PRIMO. A Force decided to either not use some of
these candidates, or to close them down soon after becoming operational,
preferring to have a couple of good channels rather than many who would be
difficult to control.
On 18 May 1944 John Hooton provided HQ AAI with a list of SCI Unit
personnel in Italy, showing that by this stage all of the SCI Units had been
converted to Type A units (i.e. with four officers) though they were lacking in
support staff:

No 1 SCIU
Major Hooton, JC 202975 The Gold Coast Regt, RWAFF
Captain Young, GR 129977 The KOSB
Captain Jones, A 180367
Lieutenant Diamant, W East Africa I. Corps

Sgt Worrall, ES 4620749 I. Corps


Driver Hughes, R 3315273 The Black Watch

No 2 SCIU
Major Crofts, RMH 91476 RA
Captain Cooper, JV 91655 The KRRC
29
Captain Ker, KRW 186007 The Buffs
Captain Dawson, JG 203160 I. Corps

Sgt Mathers 10350590 I. Corps


Sgt Brown RASC
Driver Ranger RASC

No 3 SCIU
Major Smith, MH 279848 I. Corps
Captain Fairweather, JG 143453 I. Corps
Captain Rolo, CE 1183990 The Oxf. Bucks L.I.
Captain Watt, AS 162733 I. Corps

WO Anderson, AW 2568515 Kings Own Royal Regt


Sgt Waller, AVC 282618 RASC
Sgt Naylor, JH 3248592 Cameronian Scottish Rifles
Sgt Ross, A 2760115 The Black Watch
Driver Barnes, N 1067966 RASC 114

OSS and Creation of SCI/Z


In early July 1944 the X2 unit working in Italy under Major Berding was
the subject of some tension between OSS and the local GSI(b) staff. Lt Col
Torrielli, Chief Intelligence Officer to Col Carter (OC, OSS, AAI), tried to
relocate the X2 office to the main OSS offices in Rome while Major Andrew
Berding was absent in Algiers. Major Hooton, as the senior officer for SCIUs
refused to permit SCI records held in the X2 office to be moved, and was
supported by HQ AAI. The situation was discussed at AFHQ in Algiers with
Berding, who thought it was probably an attempt by Gen Donovan to pull all
OSS departments together. He was against the move and was supported by
Murphy, chief of OSS/X2, resulting in the order being suspended, but not
cancelled.
HQ AAI feared the move would result in greater control of Berding’s
work by Torrielli and affect X2’s cooperation with SCI. According to AAI,
Torrielli “knows nothing about counter-intelligence; [and] he has a grudge
against this HQ and the British as a result of the PIGNATELLI Case”. (The
Pignatellis were the subjects of much investigation by the British as they
were known from ISOS to be cooperating with the GIS, while at the same
time Princess Pignatelli had been employed as an OSS agent. As few OSS in
Italy, even X2 staff, were cleared for ISOS or other ULTRA material, the British

30
position was hard to properly explain to the OSS.) This confrontation with
Torrielli brought to a head the matter of Berding’s chain of command. Both
AFHQ and HQ AAI thought his operational direction needed to come from HQ
AAI and he needed to work closely with SCI.
As a result of this tension between the Allies, GSI AFHQ’s order of 6 Jul
1944 for the establishment of SCIU/Z from Berding’s X2 staff was likely to be
questioned by Cols Carter and Torrielli. Murphy, Chief of OSS/X2, travelled
from Algiers to Rome to discuss the issue, and Torrielli accepted the change
while Carter, the OC of OSS Italy, departed. SCI Unit Z was created on 18 Jul
1944.115
An article on OSS/X2 work quoted a report written by MI6(V) on CEAs in Italy, which
noted that SCI/Z successfully ran a CEA operation after the Allies occupied Rome in June 1944
(as my ebook relates, this was in fact the second SCI/Z DA Case, the first being a CEA
deliberately blown to the enemy in order to bolster the British-run PRIMO).

“ARBITER ran well for three months, but was closed down in September when a
courier with money visited him and was arrested.”

The same report gave an assessment of the six Allied double agent operations in Italy:

“Overall, double agents in Italy have paid good dividends…Most of them have
made some CE [counterespionage] contribution during their DA careers and all
the Abwehr agents have played a large part in the implementation of strategic
deception to the success of which Field Marshall Alexander paid tribute.” 116

SCIU Operations Expand


On 22 August 1944, AFHQ announced the formation of two new
(British) units, Nos 5 and 6 SCIU. No 5 SCIU was ordered to be formed on 13
Dec 1944 under the supervision of HQ No 3 District, as a Type A unit (i.e. with
four officers and six support staff). No 6 SCIU had already been formed (as a Type B
unit, with 2 officers and three support staff) and was attached to 7 th Army to
provide “MSS material” to the French during Operation ANVIL/DRAGOON, the
invasion of southern France. This unit consisted of
Capt Frank Buchanan Park (149092, I Corps),
Capt Read-Davis (137937, Royal Irish),
Lcpls Winstone and Dykes (I Corps) and
Driver Savage RASC.117
This SCIU was tasked to provide Most Secret Sources information (i.e.
ISOS) in camouflaged form to the French CI staffs. 118 This caused problems
later with the OSS/X2’s 69 SCIU, which had also been created and deployed
in support of 7th Army. The OC of 69 SCIU, Capt Goiran, took exception to the
fact that Capt Park was passing information to the French directly (and not
31
keeping the Americans updated). The (incorrect) OSS/SCI view was that Park
had been assigned to act as LO to 69 SCIU and provide them with ISOS, and
his work caused friction between the Americans and French, as well as
between No 6 SCIU and the X2/SCI personnel in Southern France.119
In the preparations for the Normandy invasion, COSSAC had considered
plans for the eventuality of a rapid German collapse. Under Plan RANKIN C, it
was foreseen that several additional SCIUs would be needed to combat
German subversive activity and sabotage both within Germany and in newly
liberated countries. ACOS G2 of COSSAC urged that these units be prepared
in any case for the latter stages of OVERLORD, as they would probably be
needed even if Germany did not fall quickly. The plans called for one Type A
unit for Norway, and separate Type B units to cover Denmark, Holland, 21 AG
area and another as a floater within Germany. These were all apparently to
be British units, though COSSAC suggested that 15 members of the COSSAC
Theatre Intelligence Section could be used. They would be additional to the
initial three units under 21 AG, of which the Type A unit at 21 AG would be
used for a Central CI Bureau in Germany, Second Army’s SCIU would be
based in Hamburg and the Canadian Army’s SCIU would cover Belgium. (As
mentioned previously, MI6 rejected having MI5/SHAEF set up a Central CI
Bureau, claiming this post-war activity came under MI6’s responsibilities.) 120
Capt Charles Arnold-Baker, who had served with 102 SCIU in Belgium under
Capt Richard Gatty, was reported to have later been transferred to the
Norwegian-Swedish border, presumably to serve in the Type A unit. He took part
in the liberation of Norway (for which he was awarded the King Haakon VII Medal of Freedom),
capturing the complete Gestapo archive, which enabled his arrest of Karl Fritzsch, the Deputy
Commandant of Auschwitz, and other fugitive Nazis. 121
There are several chapters in my ebook covering the
work of British and American SCI Units in France, Belgium
and Germany, giving much more detail on the actual
casework undertaken by these units.]

Changing of the Guard


In May 1945 No 2 SCIU was moved to Austria to work with 8 th Army and 5 Corps,
operationally remaining under 15 AG but administratively now falling under 5 Corps. In due
course the unit would assume its new function (agreed between London and Col Hill-Dillon of
AFHQ), “namely recruiting and running penetration agents”.122 This new emphasis reflected
the changing conditions, as deception was no longer required, but knowledge of post-war
clandestine opposition to Allied occupation was a priority. Lt James Angleton and Capt Paul
Paterni of SCI/Z had expressed their wish to use double agents for penetration rather than
deception in December 1944, presumably aimed at Italian fascists and remnant GIS networks in
Northern Italy, and Col Gibson of 15 AG agreed.123

32
In June 1945 Major John Hooton was posted out from No 1 SCIU, being replaced by
Capt (Acting Major) Cyril F Rolo (153990, I Corps), posted in from No 3 SCIU (Rolo’s Army
number differs in this source document from that given in John Hooton’s report in May 1944.)
Other staff changes were:
Capt GI (or GL) Howarth (203161, I Corps) moved from No 1 SCIU to No 3 SCIU
Capt GRC Davies/Davis (117934, I Corps) moved from No 5 SCIU to No 2 SCIU
Capt JA Seymour [sic] (229287, I Corps) moved from No 2 SCIU to No 3 SCIU
Capt KRW Ker moved from No 2 SCIU to No 1 SCIU.124
By July 1945 the personnel of the main SCI Units had changed significantly as the units
moved into North Italy, Trieste and Austria:

No 1 SCIU Austria Major Cyril Rolo


Capt Bruce-Lockhart
Merano Capt Keith Ker
No 2 SCIU Klagenfurt Major John Cooper
Capt Davies
Capt Lister
No 3 SCIU Milan Major Malcolm Smith
Miss Bowden
Rome Capt Howarth
Miss Barnes
Genoa Capt JG Fairweather
Capt P Seymour (given elsewhere as JA Seymour)
No 5 SCIU Trieste Major Ransome
Capt Milne
Venice Capt GM Burdon. 125

At this time Nos 1 and 2 SCIU were redesignated as Nos 1 and 2 CCU (Civil Control
Unit) in line with similar changes happening to British SCIUs in Germany. 126 In September,
Major Smith moved back to Rome with Capt Howarth; Capt Fairweather was demobbed and
replaced by a Capt Perkins, who moved to Merano; and Capt Ker was promoted and moved from
Merano.127
By May 1946 Major Burdon was OC of No 5 SCI Unit in Trieste. Burdon tried to have
the designation of No 5 SCIU changed to No 5 CCU, but this was rejected (this designation was
already being used by an MI6 intelligence unit in Germany). Major Parratt, formerly the FSO of
427 FSS, had become OC of No 3 SCIU after initially replacing Capt Howarth in Rome.128
The role of No 5 SCIU in Trieste was chiefly to round up remnant GIS and Italian
networks. Capt Burdon had been intended to join the Portree Mission to Slovenia, but the fact
33
that he was known to the Yugoslavs as a CI officer lead to his recall to No 5 SCIU and posting to
Venice, where his detachment remained until December. The OC of No 5 SCIU reported in May
1945 that, while there was no sign of an active GIS stay-behind network,
“1. From the first it became clear that there was a problem of JUGOSLAV
intelligence activities to be dealt with. Having faithfully adhered to the principle
of refraining from offensive intelligence against the Jugoslavs during the war we
were in a weak position when faced with this situation. We know something of the
organisation of the Jugoslav I.S. and a little of its senior officers but were a
broken read where agents on the round were concerned. In this sphere SCI has
been playing a passive role until now, rather learning from FSS than instructing.
“2. In a number of instances it has been learned from reliable sources that
persons originally employed by the GIS have been ‘turned around’ by the
Jugoslavs….. a number of persons known to us as connected to the GIS, SS, etc,
and therefore liable to arrest by us on those grounds, are now employed by the
Jugoslav I.S. It is hoped that this may prove tactically helpful to us”.
The Jugoslavs were also using death threats to help recruit agents, and Major Ransome
thought such agents might be recruitable as double agents, though in small numbers due to the
manpower requirements of such operations. He reported that while much work remained to clear
the area of GIS, “a considerable part of CI work within the line of communication area will have
to be directed against Intelligence Services other than German”. Meantime, the unit was
building up its sources and watching for opportunities of penetration.129
Lt Col Gibson of HQ 15 AG noted that “the question of playing controlled Jugoslav
agents is clearly one of extreme delicacy, and any such activity must be subject to strict
limitations, safeguards and higher direction”.130
By this stage in Germany the British CCUs were already turning their focus on the
growing Soviet threat, while the OSS/X2 in Europe were, from a lack of direction, still looking
at the threat of post-war underground Nazi organisations. The SCI Headquarters in Wiesbaden
had seven stations throughout Germany.
“From the end of hostilities in Europe until 1 October 1945, activities of the X-2
field units were directed toward establishment of an underground network of
German agents to penetrate any resistance movements which might arise, and,
secondly, toward continued assistance to the Army Counter-Intelligence staffs in
their respective areas.”131
Suffering from the loss of trained personnel as the troops were returned to the USA, the
OSS was soon to be closed down entirely by the President in October 1945. All that remained
was the X2 rump which became the US War Department’s Strategic Services Unit (SSU), and
the Research and Analysis Department which was absorbed by the State Department. It was only
in 1946 that the SSU really began to address the Soviet threat in Europe, though the OSS in the
Middle East seems to have been more focused on post-war politics, looking at both British and
Russian activity as well as local issues.

OSS, MI6(V) and ISLD in Persia


In November 1941 the British and Russian Allies had invaded Persia, securing the
oilfields and a rail-link which proved important to US Lend-Lease operations. The US
34
subsequently sent a mission to Persia to coordinate and supervise the Lend-Lease supply route,
and after August 1942 deployed CIC detachments to “secure their strategic project by
safeguarding the vital lines of communication and supply between the Persian Gulf and the
Soviet Union”. OSS also deployed both SI and X2 agents to Persia (Secret Intelligence Branch
was responsible for positive intelligence gathering), despite there being an agreement between
the British and the Russians that there would be a moratorium on positive intelligence operations
in the region. OSS did not inform the local British security authorities (CICI) of this deployment,
which they discovered for themselves after identifying American agents in Teheran. By the end
of the war OSS/SI had nine agents in Persia with no remit to investigate German intentions
locally, instead having three priorities:
 The interpretation of internal politics and attempts to forecast future
developments;
 The study of Soviet activities within Persia, attempting to define their ultimate
aims; and
 The study of what the Americans perceived to be British interference in Persian
politics and their attempts to dominate postwar markets in Persia. 132
By the summer of 1943 Anglo-Soviet rivalries regarding control of Persia began to re-
emerge. DSO Persia and CICI maintained good official relations with their Soviet counterparts
(while at the same time gathering information on Soviet Security personnel and organisations),
while MI6(V) was operating under ISLD cover to “obtain information about Soviet intelligence
by undercover methods”.133
DSO Persia complained that the ISLD representative in Teheran was plagiarizing CICI
reports, seeming to lack local sources and agents to obtain his own information. The DG of MI5
informed the head of CICI Teheran that the head of MI6 was aware of the restrictions faced by
ISLD in Teheran – it had been forced to destroy most of its records during an attempted coup,
forcing DSO Persia to help ISLD rebuild its database. But the DG also told CICI that the MI6
representative “must create and build up his position to meet long-term requirements” (i.e. the
threat to British interests posed by the occupying Soviet forces in Persia). 134 His attention was
therefore not on local issues, but on Soviet-occupied Persia and the border with the Soviet
Union.
This MI6(V) man was probably Robert Charles “Robin” Zaehner, who operated under
diplomatic cover in Teheran as Assistant Press Attache at the British Legation. MI5 officer Peter
Wright interviewed Zaehner post-war as a suspected Soviet agent, and later described him as
being responsible for MI6 counterintelligence in Persia during the war. He said Zaehner did
counter-intelligence and counter-sabotage against the Germans, and later had to work behind
Soviet lines, continuously at risk of betrayal and murder, as the Soviets sought to take control of
the rail line in Persia.135 He remained in Persia until 1947 as Assistant Press Secretary, then as
Press Secretary, and returned in 1951 to organise the overthrow of the Iranian government.

Post-War Germany
The activities of the SCI Units of MI6(V) and OSS/X2 in NW Europe are dealt with
extensively in my ebook. However, it is worthwhile to finish with a report by an American SSU
officer describing how MI6(V) changed its targeting priorities at the end of the war, and how
MI5 expanded its remit to Germany.

35
While the SSU may have been slow to address the soviet threat, it seems they had some
concerns about the intelligence services of other allies. The Commanding General of the SSU
ordered the X2 Branch to expand its CE and CI files, to include the intelligence officers of their
British and French intelligence allies by 1 Dec 1945. The MI6 organisation was described by the
former SSU/X2 Liaison Officer to the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR), who served in that
post from June to November 1945. The author pointed out that MI6 was in a period of transition
back to peacetime staffing levels, with “as few as 10% of the wartime establishment” expected
to become career MI6 officers.
GSI(b) was described as being “under the able direction” of Lt Col Niel McDermott
during hostilities. After the war, however, “GSI(b) was taken over by MI5 in the person of
Brigadier White”, who moved on in October 1945 after re-organising the branch, handing over
to another MI5 officer, Brigadier Haler.
MI6 created a sub-headquarters for Germany using the cover name War Office Liaison
Group (WOLG). The various sections of MI6 in Germany were supposed to be controlled and
supervised by this HQ, but the MI6(V) unit (No 7 CCU) was administered from London by Lt
Col Tim Milne and had “complete independence from the rest of MI6 in Germany”, giving
“scant courtesy attention to WOLG” and reporting on military matters to GSI(b).
The unit, organised in June 1945 by Lt Col George K Young, was made up of personnel
from the 21AG SCI Units. While intended to penetrate any residual GIS service or arising from
German resistance, the unit
“had extended its activities to the handling of French and Russian agents
captured in the British Zone, and to the placing of agents at propitious levels of
German society to detect any nascent movements of an intelligence nature”.
In November Young was demobilised and replaced by Lt Col Wyndham Woodward, who
had served in SI(b) in North Africa. The unit was reported to have several out-stations and a
number of promising agents.
Working alongside No 7 CCU, “in the greatest secrecy”, was “MI6, Sect. 9”. Headed by
Mr Philby in London and Major John Evans in Germany, Lt Col Rodney Dennys was expected
to shortly “take over the direction and expansion of the German efforts of Section 9”. The
section mission was the
“penetration of the Russian Intelligence Service, especially that part of it
promoting communist ideals and philosophy in the countries of Western Europe,
Britain’s ‘Sphere of Influence.’ It is certain that this section will be greatly
expanded, and may well absorb the part of No 7 CCU operating in Berlin, where
most of the work is really Section 9 in character.”
Regarding MI5, the report stated that
“At the conclusion of the war, it was felt that CI and CE work in Occupied
Germany should be put on the same basis as similar work had been on during the
war in Great Britain. Accordingly, the wartime chief of GSI(b) was replaced by
Brigadier White of MI5, London. A large number of MI5 officers accompanied
him to take over the Case Work involved in the interning of members of the GIS
and Nazi Party members falling into the automatic arrest categories.
“A move on the London level to incorporate MI6, Sect. 5, into MI5 was blocked
successfully by the Chief, MI6. Accordingly, MI5’s mission in Germany is limited
36
to the passive administration of Counter-Intelligence through control of the
activities of GSI(b).”136

CONCLUSION
The information given above adds more detail to the narrative of my ebook. The
explanation of the work of ISLD and SIME using Double Agents in the Middle East gives more
depth to my coverage of the operations of MI6(V) abroad, which was somewhat peripheral to the
subject of the ebook, the development and usage of Special Counter Intelligence Units in the
field.
The work of A Force and SIME in developing deception agents helps to explain how they
usurped some of the responsibilities of the SI(b)/SCI Units in Italy. The idea of deploying special
officers by SIME to help run CEAs was adopted by MI5, which placed its officers in two special
British SCIUs, intended to control CEAs for deception in NW Europe. The decision by SHAEF
to use local CEAs only for tactical deception resulted in the staff of these two units being
employed in broader roles.
The new information given here further confirms the view set down in the ebook, that
MI5 tried throughout the war to expand its areas of operation and its influence in the operational
control and usage of ISOS. By the end of 1944 it had succeeded in placing MI5 officers in the
Middle East and in Europe into powerful positions which allowed much more influence in
security and intelligence work outside the areas set out in MI5’s original charter.

APPENDIX - ABBREVIATIONS

AAI Allied Armies in Italy - The 15th Army Group was renamed the
Allied Forces in Italy on 11 January 1944, then Allied Central
Mediterranean Force on 18 January 1944 and finally the Allied
Armies in Italy on 9 March 1944. From December 1944, in the
later stages of the campaign the title reverted to the 15th Army
Group. It consisted of the US Fifth Army and the British Eighth
Amy, and reported to the Joint Allied command Allied Forces
Headquarters (AFHQ), the command for the Mediterranean
theatre.

37
Abwehrkommando Also AK and later redesignated as FrontAufklaerungsKommando,
or FAK. Mobile Abwehr field units attached to army groups or
armies.

ACMF Allied Central Mediterranean Forces, a redesignation of Allied


Armies in Italy, AAI Jan-Mar 1944.

AFHQ Allied Force Headquarters - Allied command covering the


central and western Mediterranean theatre, based in Algiers.

A Force Military deception organization created in 1941 under Dudley


Clarke at the request of General Waverley.

CCU Civil Control Unit, redesignation of British SCIUs in Germany and


Austria.

Chicken Feed True information passed to the enemy in an effort to build up the
credibility of a double agent.

CIC US Counter Intelligence Corps, equivalent to British Intelligence


Corps Field Security Sections.

CICI Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia

Circulating Section At the start of WW2 MI6 divided its HQ organization into two
main parts, production and dissemination. The Circulating Sections
passed secret intelligence to customers and obtained feedback and
tasking from them in return.

COSSAC Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander.

DOWAGER Codename used by MI6(V) for Dudley Clarke/A Force deception.

DSM Direction de Securite Militaire, French Military Security


Directorate formed 1943 by Gen Giraud in North Africa.

DSO Defence Security Office / Officer, representatives of


MI5 in British overseas possessions, and some neutral
states.

Foodstuff See Chicken Feed.

Force 141 Task Force for the Invasion of Sicily.

Forty Committees See Thirty Committees.

GALVESTON Codename for Dudley Clarke and for deception operations run by
A Force.

38
GC&CS Government Code and Cipher School, aka Bletchley Park.

GIS German Intelligence Services (Abwehr and SD).

GSI(b) General Staff Intelligence – British equivalent of American G2,


with a responsibility for CI and security issues.

I Corps British Army Intelligence Corps.

ISLD Inter-Service Liaison Department, Middle East cover name for


MI6.

ISOS Intelligence Service Oliver Strachey, decrypts of Abwehr ciphers


which became available from GC&CS in mid-1940. Control of
distribution of these decrypts was the responsibility of Lt Col Felix
Cowgill, head of MI6(V) from 1941 to 1944. Known by several
codenames, e.g. TRIANGLE and PAIR.

MI5 British Security Service, responsible for security in the UK and in


British Territories.

MI6 WW2 designation used by SIS for contact with military


departments. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) was responsible
for foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence. MI6(V) was the
organisation’s Counter-Espionage arm, and as the war progressed it
was divided into sub-sections responsible for covering particular
regions or subjects, e.g. MI6(Vd) covered the Iberian countries,
while MI6(Vw) was responsible for analysis of radio intercepts.

Notional Activities, persons, units, etc. presented to the enemy as being real
but which were, in fact, fake.

OSS Office of Strategic Services. American wartime intelligence


agency.

OSS/X2 The Counter Intelligence Branch of OSS, formed in 1943.

OVRA Opera Vigilanza Per Repressione Anti-Fascismo, Fascist Italian


Secret Police.

PCO Passport Control Officer, a common cover used by MI6 before


WW2 at British Consulates abroad, since the British Foreign
Office disliked providing proper diplomatic cover to spies.

Penetration Agent A double agent run for counter-intelligence rather than deception
purposes.

S Force Allied formation formed to coordinate intelligence gathering


within a major target city.

39
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

SI(b) Unit/SCI Unit Special Counter Intelligence Units created by MI6(V) to pass ISOS
information to GSI(b) staffs in military headquarters, advise on the
usage of the material, and capture and play back enemy agents for
penetration or deception purposes. OSS/X2 later formed their own
units, with handlers of DAs used for deception receiving special
training by MI5 and MI6.

SIM Servizio Informazioni Militari. Italian Military Intelligence.


SIM/CS was the Italian Military Intelligence/Counter Espionage
branch.

SIME Security Intelligence Middle East, Responsible for security and


counter-intelligence in the zone under the command of General
Headquarters, Middle East. Worked under MEIC, answerable to
the Defence Council.

Thirty Committees Joint committees responsible for managing double agents in a


specified geographical area of the Mediterranean theatre. Each
committee was given a number, and they were drawn from the
range between 30 and 60.

TR Travaux Ruraux, French covert CE organization in France and


North Africa.

W/T Wireless Transmitter, device used by stay-behind radio agents to


communicate with their handlers.

XB Designation used in cable traffic for MI6(V).

XX Committee aka Double Cross or Twenty Committee, responsible for clearing


information and controlling the use of double agents in the UK.

40
1
ENDNOTES

“Minutes and Notes on the Meeting of SIME Representatives held at Beirut 12-13 Feb 43”, Appendix III to Lt Col White’s
“Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, KV4/240, NAK.
2
“British Intelligence in the Second World War: security and counter-intelligence, Vol 4”, F.H. Hinsley, C.A.G. Simkins,
p11, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 1990.
3
“Five of six at war: Section V of MI6”, by Robert Cecil (1994), Intelligence and National Security, 9:2, 345-353.
4
“Bill Hooper and Secret Service”, by FAC Kluiters, p17, http://www.nisa-intelligence.nl/PDF-
bestanden/Kluiters_Hooper2XV_voorwebsite.pdf.
5
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 486, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
6
SIS website at https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-history.html (as at August 2017).
7
“MI6 – 50 Years of Special Operations”, by Stephen Dorril, p 11, Fourth Estate Ltd, 2000.
8
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 486, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
9
“The Unseen War in Europe”, by John H Waller, pp 59, Random House NY, 1996.
10
“Hidden Weapons”, by Basil Collier, pp 8-11, Pen & Sword Military Classics, Barnsley, UK, 2006.
11
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 486, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
12
“British Intelligence in the Second World War, Vol 1”, by FH Hinsley, p277, HMSO London, 1979; and “Gentleman
Spymaster”, by Geoffrey Elliott, p132, Methuen 2011.
13
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, pp 487-489, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
14
“Bill Hooper and Secret Service”, by FAC Kluiters, p18, http://www.nisa-intelligence.nl/PDF-
bestanden/Kluiters_Hooper2XV_voorwebsite.pdf.
15
“The Guy Liddell Diaries; Vol 1: 1939-1942”, Ed. Nigel West, p299, Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.
16
“Defend the Realm”, pp 254-255, p 281, by Christopher Andrew, Alfred A Knopf, 2009.
17
“Five of six at war: Section V of MI6”, by Robert Cecil (1994), Intelligence and National Security, 9:2, 345-353.
18
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 491, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
19
“Near and Distant Neighbors”, by Jonathan Haslam, p81, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 2015; “A Spy Among
Friends”, by Ben Macintyre, p 20, Crown Publishers New York, 2014.
20
“Five of six at war: Section V of MI6”, by Robert Cecil (1994), Intelligence and National Security, 9:2, 345-353.
21
“The Greatest Treason”, by Richard Deacon, p30, Century, London, 1990, quoting a letter from Fulford to author in Feb
1982.
22
“Mask of Treachery”, by John Costello, p336, Warner Books paperback, Feb 1990.
23
“Treason in the Blood”, by Anthony Cave Brown, pp 238-239, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston/New York, 1994.
24
“Empire of Secrets”, by Calder Walton, pp32-34, The Overlook Press, New York 2013.
25
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 490, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
26
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 486, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
27
“Five of six at war: Section V of MI6”, by Robert Cecil (1994), Intelligence and National Security, 9:2, 345-353.
28
“The Greatest Treason”, by Richard Deacon, p34, Century, London, 1990.
29
“Defend the Realm”, by Christopher Andrew, p 281, Alfred A Knopf , New York, 2009.
30
“Minutes of a Meeting held on 2nd February 1944 at 58 St James St”, WO 219/1665, NA Kew.
31
SHAEF G3 Div letter “Special Means” dated 15 February 1944, WO 219/1665, NA Kew.
32
MI5 Internal Memorandum Tabulating SIME Replies to MI5 Questionnaire, Pt III (v), dated 25 May 1942, KV4/306,
NAK.
33
Lt Col DG White (MI5) “Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, Appendix XX,
KV4/240, NAK.
34
Letter from Lt Col V Vivian MI6 to Brig Sir David Petrie, DG of MI5, dated 13 Apr 1942, KV4/306, NAK.
35
Minute Drafting letter from MI5 DG Petrie to Lt Col V Vivian MI6, dated 21 Apr 1942, KV4/306, NAK.
36 “
The Security Service 1908-1945: The Official History”, by Christopher Andrew, p 272, Public
Records Office, Kew, 1999.
37
Notes and Recommendations based on a Meeting at ISLD held 30 Mar 1942, KV4/197, NAK.
38
Lt Col DG White (MI5) “Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, Pt 1, KV4/240,
NAK.
39
“Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle East”, based on SIME Files to 11 Feb 1945, KV4/197, NAK.
40
Advanced HQ “A” Force, “SIME Special Section”, 31 Dec 1942, KV4/197, NAK.
41
SIME “Special Section Policy” dated 6 Feb 1943, KV4/197, NAK
42
Lt Col DG White (MI5) “Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, Appendix XIII,
KV4/240, NAK.
43
Lt Col DG White (MI5) “Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, Pt 2, KV4/240,
NAK.
44
Lt Col DG White (MI5) “Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, Appendix III,
KV4/240, NAK.
45
Lt Col DG White (MI5) “Report on Visit to the Middle East (January 26th to February 28th, 1943)”, Appendix XX,
KV4/240, NAK.
46
MI5 Memo from Brig WMT Magan, dated 18 May 1948, KV4/197, NAK.
47
B Section ISLD Letter “Penetration Policy”, to SIME, dated 4 Oct 1943, KV4/197, NAK
48
“Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle East”, based on SIME Files to 11 Feb 1945, KV4/197, NAK.
49
“The Deceivers”, pp382-383, by Thaddeus Holt, Scribner, New York 2004; and “Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle
East”, based on SIME Files to 11 Feb 1945, KV4/197, NAK.
50
“The Deceivers”, p879, by Thaddeus Holt, Scribner, New York 2004; and “Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle East”,
based on SIME Files to 11 Feb 1945, KV4/197, NAK.
51
“The Deceivers”, p889, by Thaddeus Holt, Scribner, New York 2004; and “Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle East”,
based on SIME Files to 11 Feb 1945, KV4/197, NAK.
52
“The Deceivers”, p893, by Thaddeus Holt, Scribner, New York 2004; and “Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle East”,
based on SIME Files to 11 Feb 1945, KV4/197, NAK.
53
“British Intelligence in the Second World War: security and counter-intelligence, Vol 4”, F.H. Hinsley, C.A.G. Simkins,
pp261-262, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 1990.
54
“British Intelligence in the Second World War: security and counter-intelligence, Vol 4”, F.H. Hinsley, C.A.G. Simkins,
pp263-264, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 1990.
55
“British Intelligence in the Second World War: security and counter-intelligence, Vol 4”, F.H. Hinsley, C.A.G. Simkins,
p261, Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office, London, 1990.
56
“Five of six at war: Section V of MI6”, by Robert Cecil (1994), Intelligence and National Security, 9: 2, 345-353.
57
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 3, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
58
“Memorandum on the Work of SI(b) Unit in North African Theatre”, undated (probably early Feb 1943), WO 204/12918,
NAK.
59
Note from OC No1 SI(b) Unit in the Field, “The Work of SI(b) Units with an Assault Force”, dated 2 Feb 1943, WO
204/12918, NAK.
60
MI6(V) signals to TAPWATER Nos 181 and 182, dated 23 Feb 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
61
Redacted document, probably dated around Jan 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
62
MI6(V) (Algiers) letter dated 2 Feb 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
63
G(Int) HQ First Army letter to AFHQ dated 20 Feb 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
64
HQ 141 Force letter to 12th Army, subject “Special I(b) Unit”, dated 6 Jun 1943, WO 204/11978, NAK.
65
HQ 141 Force letter to 51 Div, subject “Special SI(b) Officer”, dated 14 June 1943, WO 204/11978, NAK.
66
HQ 141 Force letter to HQ 1 Armd Corps, subject “Special I(b) Unit”, dated 8 June 1943, WO 204/11978, NAK.
67
MI6(V) signal to TAPWATER No 668, dated 11 Jun 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
68
AFHQ letter to HQ Force 141 dated 29 Jun 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
69
HQ 141 Force letter to AFHQ, dated 30 Jun 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
70
HQ 141 Force letter to ACOS, G2, I Armd Corps, subject “SI(b) Officers”, dated 15 June 1943, WO 204/11978, NAK.
71
HQ 141 Force letter to 12th Army, subject “SI(b) Unit”, dated 17 June 1943, WO 204/11978, NAK.
72
HQ 15 AG letter to AFHQ dated 12 Jul 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
73
Letter from Capt J Cooper of No 1 SI(b) Unit in the Field requesting clarification of PoW Status of Del Curto, dated 10
Jul 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
74
GSI(b) 15 AG letter to AFHQ dated 23 Jul 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
75
Wikispooks entry https://wikispooks.com/wiki/John_Macgregor_Bruce_Lockhart.
76
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 498, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
77
Report from Capt Aubrey Jones No 2 SI(b) Unit, “A Preliminary Note on the Italian Secret Police Services”, dated 16 Jul
1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
78
HQ 15 AG report, subject “Carabinieri”, dated 23 Jul 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
79
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 4, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
80
HQ 15 AG letter to 7 and 8 Army, subject “Security Organisation in SICILY”, dated 8 Aug 1943, WO 204/11978, NAK.
81
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, pp 500-501, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
82
Adv HQ A Force letter to Head of SIME dated 20 January 1944, KV4/197, NAK.
83
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, by Keith Ellison, Ch 4, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
84
AFHQ letter from Col SS Hill-Dillon, “Duties of G-2 Representative at Allied Military Mission”, 1 Nov 1943, WO
204/11978, NAK.
85
Memo “Information on CE Organisations in North Africa and Italy” attached to Adv HQ A Force letter to Head of SIME
dated 20 January 1944, KV4/197, NAK.
86
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 4, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
87
OC No 3 SI(b) report “No 3 SI(b) Unit” date 5 Nov 1943, WO 204/12918, NAK.
88
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 5, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
89
HQ AAI signal “Main Features Counter Intelligence Situation Rome”, 11 Jun 1944, WO 204/11971, NAK.
90
"Recent Intelligence Highlights Revealed in X-2 Italian Operations," October 12, 1944, Memo by James
Angleton to James R. Murphy, Chief of X-2, RG 226, Entry 214, Box 1, WN 21070, NARA; and “Special Counter
Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 5, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
91
AFHQ letters, “Directive for SI(b) Units in Italy” dated 17 Jan 1944, and “Directive for SI(b) Units in Italy” dated 31 Jan
1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
92
No 3 SCIU letter dated 4 October 1945, covering “Notes on SCI Work”, WO 204/12919, NAK.
93
15AG “Notes on Counter Intelligence in Italy No 7”, 8 Mar 44, WO 204/822, NAK.
94
HQ AAI Memorandum for AFHQ, “Enemy Agents”, dated 19 Mar 1944, WO 204/11971, NAK.
95
AFHQ letter to GSI(b) ACMF, subject “Establishment of a 44 Committee in Italy”, dated 16 Feb 1944, WO 204/11978,
NAK.
96
“Notes on D/A Activities in the Middle East” (based on SIME Files up to 11 Feb 1945), KV4/197, NAK.
97
Letter from Lt Col KW Jones, SIME Representative AFHQ to SIME Special Section dated 21 Feb 1944, K4/197, NAK.
98
AFHQ “Directive for SI(b) Units Regarding Penetration Agents”, dated 22 Feb 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
99
AFHQ “Directive for SI(b) Units: Selection of a D/A for ‘A’ Force Purposes”, dated 24 Feb 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
100
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 5, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
101
“Notes on SCI Work” from OC 3 SCIU 4 October 1945, WO 204/12919, NA Kew.
102
War Office letter to Col Hill-Dillon re the Meeting on 29 Mar 1943 MI6(V)-Col Hill-Dillon, AFHQ, dated 30 Mar 1944,
WO 204/12918, NAK.
103
HQ AAI letter “SCI, I(b)/CI Interrogations, and Handling of Enemy Agents” dated 12 October 1944; and AFHQ ACOS
G2 draft document “Organisation, Equipment and Control in the Field of SCI Units, Type ‘A’ and ‘B’” dated about October
1944, both in WO 204/12919, NA Kew.
104
“Frontline Intelligence in WW2: (I) German Intelligence Collection”, by Keith Ellison, 2012; and “Frontline
Intelligence in WW2: (II) The Development of Allied Intelligence Collection Units”, by Keith Ellison, 2012, both available
on Academia.edu.
105
“The Tangled Web – Allied Deception Operations in Hungary”, pp28-33, Studies in Intelligence Vol 31, Issue Spring,
Year 1987, CIA website.
106
AFHQ letter to Lt Col Cowgill dated 5 Jan 1944, WO 204/12918, NAK.
107
“War Establishment Proposal”, Col Hill-Dillon AFHQ dated 24 June 1944, WO 204/12919, NA Kew.
108
“The Secret History of MI6 1909-1949”, by Keith Jeffrey, p 567-568, The Penguin Press, New York, 2010.
109
“Researching MI6 and Roumania, 1940-49”, by Dennis Deletant, p 665, Seer Vol 89, No 4, October 2011.
110
“The Secret War Report of the OSS”, by Anthony Cave Brown, pp 560-561, Berkley Publishing Corp, June 1976.
111
AFHQ Memo, Subject “Appointments – Officers”, dated 1 Apr 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
112
AFHQ letter, “Instructions to Major HRM EADIE”, dated 11 Apr 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
113
AFHQ letter “Future Plans Regarding Handling of Double Agents”, dated 17 May 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
114
No 1 SCIU letter, List of SCI Unit Personnel in Italy, dated 18 May 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
115
Adv HQ AAI letter, “Redesignation of OSS X-2 Detachment”, dated 18 Jul 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
116
“OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II”, by Robert Cowden, Studies in Intelligence Vol 58, No. 2 (Extracts,
June 2014), CIA website https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol-58-no-2/pdfs/.
117
AFHQ letter “Operation ANVIL”, dated 25 Jul 1944, WO 204/12918, NAK.
118
Note for inclusion in SHAEF cable SX 55940 of 21 Jul 1944, WO 204/12918, NAK.
119
“Special Counter Intelligence in WW2 Europe”, Ch 7, by Keith Ellison, BaM Publishing eBook, 2017.
120
“Provision of SI(b) Units”, HQ COSSAC G2 (Int) Div, dated 20 Dec 1943, WO 219/1665, NA Kew.
121
“For He Is an Englishman”, by Charles Arnold-Baker, p 268, Jeremy Mills Publishing. 2007.
122
ACOS G2, HQ 15 AG, Letter “Move to Austria”, dated 31 May 1945, WO 204/11978, NAK.
123
HQ 15 AG Letter, Lt Col WD Gibson to Lt Col A Blom, 5 Army, dated 22 Dec 1944, WO 204/11978, NAK.
124
No 1 SCIU Letter “Postings and Appointments”, dated 10 Jun 1945, WO 204/11978, NAK.
125
Redacted Filenote, 4 Jul 1945, WO 204/12918, NAK.
126
G3 Org, AFHQ signal to London, 2 Jul 1945, WO 204/12918, NAK.
127
HQ 2 District, GSI, CMF Letter “Future of SCI Units”, dated 20 Sep 1945, WO 204/12918, NAK.
128
No 5 SCI Unit Letter, “Change of Title of 5 SCI Unit”, dated 29 May 1946; ACOS G2, AFHQ Letter, dated 23 May
1946; both WO 204/12918, NAK.
129
No 5 SCIU “Interim Report on Activities of No 5 SCI Unit – period 9 May 45 – 22 Jun 45”, dated 23 Jun 1945, WO
204/12918, NAK.
130
HQ 15 AG letter “5 SCI Unit”, dated 27 Jun 1945, WO 204/12918, NAK.
131
“The Secret War Report of the OSS”, by Anthony Cave Brown, pp 564, Berkley Publishing Corp, June 1976.
132
“German Covert Initiatives and British Intelligence in Persia (Iran), 1939-1945”, pp259-260, by ADW O’Sullivan,
(Doctorate Thesis University of South Africa, 2012).
133
“German Covert Initiatives and British Intelligence in Persia (Iran), 1939-1945”, p 254, by ADW O’Sullivan,
(Doctorate Thesis University of South Africa, 2012).
134
“German Covert Initiatives and British Intelligence in Persia (Iran), 1939-1945”, p274, by ADW O’Sullivan,
(Doctorate Thesis University of South Africa, 2012).
135
“Spycatcher”, by Peter Wright, pp 244-245, Viking Penguin, New Yok, 1987.
136
“Commentary on the Structure and Members of the British Intelligence Service in Germany”, dated 25 Nov 1945, under
cover of “Report on French Counter-Intelligence Service, Germany; Report on British Intelligence Service, Germany” dated
3 January 1946, from USFET, SSU/War Dept Mission to Germany RG226, Entry 213, Box 2, WN 20695, NARA.

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen