G.R. No.
217296 OCTOBER 11, 2017 NKI violated the terms of said contract, causing the
SPOUSES ERWIN C. SANTIAGO and MARINELA
A. SANTIAGO; SPOUSES GAUDENCIO A.
MANIMTIM, JR. and EDITHA P. MANIMTIM;
SPOUSES RAMIRO C. ALBARAN and ELVA C.
ALBARAN; and CESAR F. ODAN,Petitioners
vs.
NORTHBAY KNITTING, INC., Respondent
PERALTA, J.:
Facts:
Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. (NKI) filed a
Complaint for Ejectment before the MeTC of
Navotas City against petitioners.
NKI alleged that it owns the subject property, a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. M-38092. All
petitioners were simply allowed to occupy said
property by NKI and they were not paying any rent.
On Mar 5, 2009, NKI sent demand letters to
petitioners asking them to vacate the property w/in
5 days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that
they refuse to vacate w/in the grace period given.
However, despite receipt of said letters, petitioners
refused to vacate or pay the necessary rent. Thus, on
Apr 14, 2009, NKI filed an ejectment complaint
against petitioners.
For their part, petitioners averred that NKI merely
exists on paper as its certificate of registration had
already been revoked by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) for failure to operate.
NKI only became the registered owner of the subject
property on Jun 16, 2008, while petitioners came
into possession of said property through their
predecessor-in-interest, Hermeginildo Odan, and
have been continuously in possession since 1970.
Odan had leased the property from the family of the
late Francisco Felipe Gonzales. Later, he subleased
the property to petitioners. The gov’t likewise
expropriated the subject property and declared it as
an Area for Priority Development or Urban Land
Reform Zone under Proclamation No. 3384 dated
Apr 13, 1983. Being tenants and actual occupants of
the place, petitioners could not be evicted. Then a
Conditional Contract to Sell was entered into
between NKI and National Housing Authority (NHA).
automatic cancellation of the same. Sometime in
2008, the NHA sold the property to NKI w/o giving
petitioners, as the actual occupants, the right of first
refusal granted under the law. Thus, petitioners filed
a case questioning said sale which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 06-11-MN. Petitioners contended that
this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is
a prejudicial question that must be resolved first
before the MeTC can take cognizance of the
ejectment case.
The Navotas MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
the NKI.
However, the Malabon RTC set aside the MeTC
Decision for lack of jurisdiction, since NKI failed to
show a case of Unlawful Detainer, pursuant to Sec. 8
par. 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, this Com1
hereby assumes jurisdiction over this case.
Upon appeal before the CA, the latter reversed and
set aside the decision of the lower court.
Issue:
WON the complaint filed by NKI sufficiently alleges
a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
Ruling:
Yes. The following were alleged in the complaint, to
wit:
1) possession of property by the defendant was
initially by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff;
2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by plaintiff to defendant of the termination of
the latter's right of possession;
3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession
of the property and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment of the same; and
4) within one (1) year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
The statements in the complaint that petitioners'
possession of the property in question was by
mere tolerance of NKI clearly make out a case for
unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer involves
the person's withholding from another of the
possession of the real property to which the
latter is entitled, after the expiration or
termination of the former's right to hold
possession under the contract, either expressed
or implied. A requisite for a valid cause of action
in an unlawful detainer case is that possession
must be originally lawful, and such possession
must have turned unlawful only upon the
expiration of the right to possess. It must be
shown that the possession was initially lawful;
hence, the basis of such lawful possession must
be established. If, as in the instant case, the claim
is that such possession is by mere tolerance of
the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be
proved.
It has been held time and again that the only
issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case
is physical or material possession of the
premises, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party litigants.
Possession refers to possession de facto, and not
possession de Jure. It does not even matter if a
party's title to the property is questionable.
Where the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
that issue to determine who between the parties
has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is
inseparably linked to that of possession, as 'n this
case, adjudication of the ownership issue is not
final and binding, but merely for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership is only
provisional, and not a bar to an action between
the same parties involving title to the property.
G.R. No. 196795 March 7, 2018
INTRAMUROS ADMINISTRATION, Petitioner
vs.
OFFSHORE CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, Respondent
LEONEN, J.:
Facts:
In 1998, Intramuros leased certain real properties of
the national government, which it administered to
Offshore Construction. Three properties were
subjects of Contracts of Lease: (1) Baluarte De San
Andres; (2) Baluarte De San Francisco De Dilao; and
(3) Revellin De Recoletos. All three properties were
leased for five (5) years, from Sept 1, 1998 to Aug
31, 2003.
All their lease contracts also made reference to an
Aug 20, 1998 memorandum of stipulations, which
included a provision for lease renewals every five
years upon the parties' mutual agreement.
Offshore Construction occupied and introduced
improvements in the leased premises. However,
Intramuros and the Department of Tourism halted
the projects due to Offshore Construction's non-
conformity with PD No. 1616, which required 16th
to 19th centuries' Philippine-Spanish architecture in
the area. Consequently, Offshore Construction filed
a complaint with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order against them
before the RTC Manila. Eventually, the parties
executed a Compromise Agreement which was
approved by RTC.
In the Compromise Agreement, the parties affirmed
the validity of the two (2) lease contracts but
terminated the one over Revellin de Recoletos. The
Compromise Agreement retained the five (5)-year
period of the existing lease contracts and stated the
areas that may be occupied by Offshore
Construction.
During the lease period, Offshore Construction
failed to pay its utility bills and rental fees, despite
several demand letters. Intramuros tolerated the
continuing occupation, hoping that Offshore
Construction would pay its arrears. As of Jul 31,
2004, these arrears allegedly totaled
P6,762,153.70.16. To settle its arrears, Offshore
Construction proposed to pay the DOT’s monthly
operational expenses for lights and sound
equipment, electricity, and performers at the
Baluarte Plano Luneta de Sta. Isabel.
Intramuros and the DOT accepted the offer, and the
parties executed a Memorandum of Agreement
covering the period of Aug 15, 2004 to Aug 25, 2005.
However, Offshore Construction continued to fail to
pay its arrears, which amounted to ₱13,448,867.45
as of Dec 31, 2009. On Mar 26, 2010, Offshore
Construction received Intramuros' latest demand
letter.
Intramuros filed a Complaint for Ejectment before
the Manila MTC. Offshore Construction filed its
Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses and
Compulsory Counterclaim. Offshore Construction
filed a Very Urgent Motion, praying that Intramuros'
complaint be dismissed on the grounds of violation
of the rule on non-forum shopping, lack of
jurisdiction over the case, and litis pendentia.
First, it claimed that Intramuros failed to inform the
Metropolitan Trial Court that there were two (2)
pending cases with the Manila Regional Trial Court
over Puerta de Isabel II. Second, it argued that the
Metropolitan Trial Court did not acquire jurisdiction
over the case since the relationship between the
parties was not one of lessor-lessee but governed
by a concession agreement. Finally, it contended
that Intramuros' cause of action was barred by litis
pendentia, since the pending Regional Trial Court
cases were over the same rights, claims, and
interests of the parties.
MTC granted Motion and Dismissed. Found
Intramuros committing forum shopping and that it
had no jurisdiction over the case.
RTC affirmed MTC in toto. Hence it appealed the
same to the SC and argued that the RTC erred in
upholding MTC findings had no jurisdiction over
Intramuros' ejectment complaint.
Issue:
WON the MTC had jurisdiction over the ejectment
complaint filed by Intramuros Administration.
Ruling:
Yes.
To determine the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of the court, the allegations in the
complaint must be examined. The jurisdictional facts
must be evident on the face of the complaint. There
is a case for unlawful detainer if the complaint states
the following:
1. Initially, possession of property by the
defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
First, petitioner alleges that respondent is its lessee
by virtue of three (3) Contracts of Lease. The validity
of these contracts was later affirmed in a
Compromise Agreement, which modified certain
provisions of the previous leases but retained the
original lease period. Respondent does not dispute
these contracts' existence or their validity.
2. Eventually, such possession became illegal
upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
Second, following respondent's failure to pay
rentals, petitioner alleges that it has demanded that
respondent vacate the leased premises.
3. Thereafter, the defendant remained in
possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
Third, respondent continues to occupy and possess
the leased premises despite petitioner's demand.
This is admitted by respondent, which seeks to
retain possession and use of the properties to
"recoup its multimillion pesos worth of investment."
4. Within one year from the last demand on
defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment.
Fourth, petitioner filed its Complaint for Ejectment
on Apr 28, 2010, within one (1) year of its last written
demand to respondent, made on Mar 18, 2010 and
received by respondent on Mar 26, 2010. Contrary
to respondent's claim, the one (1)-year period to file
the complaint must be reckoned from the date of
last demand, in instances when there has been more In 1945, Coprada was able to persuade the
than one (1) demand to vacate. petitioners to allow her and her family to use and
occupy the land for their residence, under the
A review of petitioner's Complaint for Ejectment
condition that they will vacate the premises should
shows that all of these allegations were made.
petitioners need to use the same.
The MeTC seriously erred in finding that it did not
Coprada and her family were allowed to construct
have jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint
their residential house. Since then, the petitioners
because the parties' situation has allegedly become
never made an attempt to drive them away out of
"more complicated" than one of lease. Respondent's
pity, knowing that respondent and her eight
defense that its relationship with petitioner is one of
children have no other place to live in. A few years
concession rather than lease does not determine
later the financial condition of Copradas family
whether or not the MeTC has jurisdiction over
reached stability resulting to acquire their own
petitioner’s complaint. The pleas or theories set up
residential house.
by a defendant in its answer or motion to dismiss do
not affect the court’s jurisdiction. This prompted petitioners to institute an ejectment
case against Coprada. Respondent avers that she
Not even the claim that there is an implied new lease
had already acquired ownership over the contested
or tacita reconduccion will remove the MeTC's
lot when she orally purchased it. And further avers
jurisdiction over the complaint. To emphasize,
that the claim has already prescribed and thus
physical possession, or de facto possession, is the
barred by laches.
sole issue to be resolved in ejectment proceedings.
Regardless of the claims or defenses raised by a
MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case was
defendant, a MeTC has jurisdiction over an
dismissed. On appeal to the RTC, the ruling of the
ejectment complaint once it has been shown that
MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the RTCs
the requisite jurisdictional facts have been alleged,
decision and reinstated the MCTCs ruling.
such as in this case. Courts are reminded not to
abdicate their jurisdiction to resolve the issue of
physical possession, as there is a public need to Issue:
prevent a breach of the peace by requiring parties
WON petitioners have a valid ground to evict
to resort to legal means to recover possession of
respondent from the subject property.
real property.

Ruling:
G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010
Yes.
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and VICTORIA
SORDEVILLA, Petitioners, In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of the
vs. defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
MARIA COPRADA, Respondent. permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express
or implied contract between them. However,
PERALTA, J.:
defendant's possession became illegal when the
Facts: plaintiff demanded that defendant vacate the
subject property due to the expiration or
On Feb 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed an termination of the right to possess under their
ejectment case against Coprada before the 2nd contract, and defendant refused to heed such
MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that they are the demand.10
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in San
Miguel, Majayjay.
The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer certificate of title, and her payment of the real
case is physical or material possession of the property taxes in the name of the petitioners were
property involved, independent of any claim of due to the close relationship between the parties
ownership by any of the parties. Where the issue of and the existing practice of palabra de honor in their
ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts day to day transactions. Respondent further alleged
may pass upon the same in order to determine who that she is not guilty of laches; rather, it is the
has the right to possess the property. The registered owners' right to recover possession of
adjudication is, however, merely provisional and their property which is barred by laches.
would not bar or prejudice an action between the
In the present case, respondent failed to present
same parties involving title to the property.11 Since
evidence to substantiate her allegation that a
the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful
portion of the land was sold to her in 1962. In fact,
detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of
when petitioners sent a letter12 to the respondent,
the parties' respective evidence deserves more
demanding her to vacate the subject property, the
weight.
respondent, in reply13 to the said letter, never
In the case at bar, petitioners' cause of action for mentioned that she purchased the subject land in
unlawful detainer is based on their ownership of the 1962. If the sale really took place, the respondent
land covered by TCT No. T-93542 and on their claim should have immediately and categorically claimed
that they merely tolerated respondent's stay thereat. that in her letter response. Clearly therefore,
Respondent's possession, as well as those persons respondent's submission that there was an oral sale
claiming right under her, became unlawful upon her is a mere afterthought.
refusal to vacate the premises. Petitioners contend
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the subject
that since they are the registered owners of the
property is covered by TCT No. T-93542, registered
subject land, they are entitled to the possession
in the name of the petitioners. As against the
thereof and their right to recover possession over it
respondent's unproven claim that she acquired a
is never barred by laches. They maintain that
portion of the property from the petitioners by
respondent's claim of ownership is based on an
virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of petitioners
unproven oral sale, which does not exist. Further,
must prevail. Petitioners' title over the subject
respondent cannot rely on the Tax Declarations as
property is evidence of their ownership thereof. It is
she was paying taxes in the petitioners' name, as the
a fundamental principle in land registration that the
declared owners of the property. Moreover, she
certificate of title serves as evidence of an
started paying the taxes only in 1984 despite her
indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
claim that the property was sold to her in 1962. Even
property in favor of the person whose name appears
assuming that the sale took place in 1962,
therein. Moreover, the age-old rule is that the
respondent is guilty of laches as she failed to take
person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled
any positive action for the delivery and conveyance
to possession thereof.14
to her of the portion of the property she is
occupying. Finally, respondent cannot collaterally
attack the title of the petitioners to the subject land.

On her part, respondent, although admitting that

the property is registered in petitioners' name,
claimed that the 100-square-meters portion of the
property, where her house was erected, was already
sold to her by petitioner Victoria. Thus, by virtue of
the sale, she and her family have the right to possess
the said property. The non-presentation of receipt
and deed of sale, non-delivery of the owner's