INIEGO vs HONORABLE PURGANAN – DELA CRUZ

(Artemio Iniego vs Judge Guillermo Purganan of RTC Br. 42,

City of Manila and Fokker Santos; March 24, 2006; J. Chico –
Nazario)

CASE DOCTRINE:
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are actions that
are capable of pecuniary estimation. As such, they fall within the
jurisdiction of either the RTC or the municipal courts, depending on
the amount of damages claimed. In this case, the amount of
damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is the
claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining the
jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise from
the same or from different causes of action.

FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Private respondent Santos filed a complaint for quasi-delict
and damages against Jimmy T. Pinion, the driver of a truck
involved in a traffic accident, and against petitioner Artemio Iniego,
as owner of the said truck and employer of Pinion. The complaint
stemmed from a vehicular accident when a freight truck allegedly
being driven by Pinion hit private respondent’s jitney which private
respondent was driving at the time of the accident. Santos filed a
Motion to Declare defendant in Default allegedly for failure of the
latter to file his answer within the final extended period. Petitioner
Iniego filed a Motion to Admit and a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
on the ground, among other things, that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the cause of action of the case. Public respondent J.
Purganan issued the assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion
to Dismiss of the petitioner and the Motion to Declare Defendant in
Default of the private respondent.

First Issue: [whether] actions for damages based on quasi-delict

are actions that are capable of pecuniary estimation, and
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therefore would fall under the jurisdiction of the municipal courts
if the claim does not exceed the jurisdictional amount
of P400,000.00 in Metro Manila.
PETITIONER RESPONDENT JUDGE
Petitioner claims that actions for According to respondent Judge,
damages based on quasi-delict what he referred to in his
are actions that are capable of assailed Order as not capable
pecuniary estimation; hence, of pecuniary estimation is the
the jurisdiction in such cases cause of action, which is a
falls upon either the municipal quasi-delict, and not the
courts, or the RTC, depending amount of damage prayed
on the value of the damages for. From this, respondent
claimed. Judge concluded that since
fault or negligence in quasi-
delicts cannot be the subject of
pecuniary estimation, the RTC
has jurisdiction. The Court of
Appeals affirmed respondent
Judge in this respect.
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
Actions for damages based on quasi-delicts are primarily and
effectively actions for the recovery of a sum of money for the
damages suffered because of the defendant’s alleged tortious
acts, and are therefore capable of pecuniary estimation. It is
crystal clear from B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, that what must be determined to be capable or incapable
of pecuniary estimation is not the cause of action, but the subject
matter of the action. A cause of action is "the delict or wrongful
act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary rights of the plaintiff." On the other hand, the "subject
matter of the action" is "the physical facts, the thing real or
personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like, in relation to
which the suit is prosecuted, and not the delict or wrong
committed by the defendant." In Lapitan v. Scandia, Inc., et al.,
JBL Reyes said that:
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 In determining whether an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court
has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the
recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance [now
Regional Trial Courts] would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought like suits to have the defendant
perform his part of the contract (specific performance) and
in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this court has considered such
actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not
be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable
exclusively by courts of first instance [now Regional Trial
Courts].
Fault or negligence, which the Court of Appeals claims is not
capable of pecuniary estimation, is not actionable by itself. For
such fault or negligence to be actionable, there must be a
resulting damage to a third person. The relief available to the
offended party in such cases is for the reparation, restitution, or
payment of such damage, without which any alleged offended
party has no cause of action or relief. The fault or negligence of
the defendant, therefore, is inextricably intertwined with the claim
for damages, and there can be no action based on quasi-delict
without a claim for damages.
Second Issue: [whether] the moral and exemplary damages
claimed by the private respondent should be excluded from the
computation of the above-mentioned jurisdictional amount
because they arose from a cause of action other than the
negligent act of the defendant.
PETITIONER:
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If it the action is cognizable by the RTC, petitioner asserts that the
moral and exemplary damages claimed by private respondent be
excluded from the computation of the total amount of damages
for jurisdictional purposes because the said moral and exemplary
damages arose, not from the quasi-delict, but from the petitioner’s
refusal to pay the actual damages. Petitioner argues that in
actions for damages based on quasi-delict, claims for damages
arising from a different cause of action (i.e., other than the fault
or negligence of the defendant) should not be included in the
computation of the jurisdictional amount.
THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: The amount of
damages claimed is within the jurisdiction of the RTC, since it is
the claim for all kinds of damages that is the basis of determining
the jurisdiction of courts, whether the claims for damages arise
from the same or from different causes of action.

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CASUPANAN VS LAROYA CASE DIGEST G.R. No. 145391
August 26, 2002

Topic: Criminal Procedure: Rule 111, Rules of Court

FACTS: As a result of a vehicular accident between two vehicles,
one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by
Roberto Capitulo and driven by Avelino Casupanan, two cases
were filed before the MCTC of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property. This case was on its preliminary
investigation stage when Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil
case against Laroya for quasi-delict. However, upon motion of
Laroya on the ground of forum-shopping, the MCTC dismissed
the civil case. On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which
can proceed independently of the criminal case. Casupanan and
Capitulo then filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Capas, Tarlac. But the RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of
the case and therefore, the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. Hence, Casupanan and Capitulo filed this petition.
Casupanan and Capitulo’s contention: that if the accused in a
criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant,
he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the
proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is
different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless
imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an
aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.
They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action.
Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who
filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party
in the criminal case.
Laroya’s contention: that the petition is fatally defective as it does
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not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that
Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order
of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of
appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition
for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.

ISSUE/HELD: WON an accused in a pending criminal case for

reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. AFFIRMATIVE

RATIO DICIDENDI:
The Court held that the MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-
delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its
order of dismissal that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states that it is with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC's dismissal, being
silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice. Section 1 of
Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is
to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTC's
order dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based
on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose
from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action.
The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the
Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa
aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code. And par 6, sec 1 of Rule 111.
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Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to
file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no
forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the
option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto
by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make
such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the
criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is
filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action
may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule
that the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto,
is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the
present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of
the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages
ex-delicto.
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the
amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to
bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111,
this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action
can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the
accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that
the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers
to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
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Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same
act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other
a civil case for quasi-delict — without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution
of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second
civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused
may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case against
his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is
expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be
litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in
the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The
accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since
the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is
filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to
invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.Thus,

Page 8 of 30
the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper.

Page 9 of 30
 HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING JR., plaintiff vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, defendant
G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997
FACTS:
On November 7, 1987, the car driven by Teodoro Guaring Jr.
collided with the Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Angelo Cuevas
and wth a Toyota Cressida Car driven by Eligio Enriquez, along
the North Luzon Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico Pampanga..
As a consequence, Guaring died.
The trial court ruled in favor of herein petitioners, but lost in the
Court of Appeals where the accused was acquitted based on
reasonable doubt. This was because it was found out that the
deceased was the one who acted negligently. The accused the
claimed appealed in the court that the civil case filed against him
be extinguished since the extinguishment of his criminal liability
necessarily follows the extinguishment of his civil liability, since
his civil liability aroused from his criminal liability. The petitioners
disagreed on this ground, claiming that the civil case should
pursue. This was then appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the civil case must be terminated as a
consequence of the termination of the criminal case based on
reasonable doubt.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the bus driver was
based on reasonable doubt, which means that the civil case for
damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs
was based on quasi delict. Even if damages are sought on the
basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver
will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based
not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held:
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused
for damages only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability
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is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature as, for
instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability;
and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based
upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.
Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the proceedings for the
civil case of the said incident must continue for the recovery of
damages of the victim’s heirs. The case was remanded to the trial
court to determine the civil liability of the accused.

Page 11 of 30
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. vs Tangco

Safeguard Security Agency, Inc vs Tangco

G.R. No.165732
December 14, 2006

Facts:

On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco

(Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon
City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as
she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed
firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same
outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who
was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from
her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo
shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor

children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to
Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil
action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000. On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was
affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision dated
July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC,

Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint for damages against
Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a
Page 12 of 30
family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the material allegations in the

complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's
negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set
up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's
fees.

Issues:

(a) Whether respondent can file civil liability ex delito under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code?

(b) Whether independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not

arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g.,
culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code?

(c) Whether the injured party is granted a right to file an action

independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33
of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission or under both causes?

Held:

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected

Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no
credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen
Page 13 of 30
roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since
Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the
police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on
duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised
proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for
him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that
Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case
No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating
liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be
jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may
be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the
selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no
sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that
Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to
attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision
contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the
protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their
servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such
regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held

that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions
on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal
Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a
final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in
Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the
provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense
charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with
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a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might
proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from
quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family
in the employment and supervision of employees is inapplicable
and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of
an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only
subsidiary, not joint or solidary.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision

dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.

Page 15 of 30
CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., represented by
its General Manager and Chief Executive Officer, GABRIEL A.
TORDESILLAS
vs.
ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE TANGONAN
G.R. No. 199886; December 3, 2014

Facts:

On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with

three passengers figured in a mishap along the National Highway
of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. It was driven by its owner Camilo
Tangonan who died from the accident, while his companions
respondent Rapanan and one Erwin. Coloma suffered injuries.

On March 29, 2000, Rapanan and Camilo’s common law wife,

respondent Mary GineTangonan, filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Aparri, Cagayan a complaint for damages against
petitioner. They alleged that while the victims were traversing the
national highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live
tension wire from one of the electric posts owned by petitioner.
They contended that the mishap was due to petitioner’s negligence
when it failed to fix and change said live tension wire despite being
immediately informed by residents in the area that it might pose an
immediate danger to persons, animals and vehicles passing along
the national highway. Mary Gine prayed that she be awarded
P50,000 civil indemnity, P25,000 burial expenses, P1,584,000
indemnity for loss of earning capacity and P100,000 moral and
exemplary damages. Rapanan, on the other hand, prayed for
P10,000 for his medical treatment and P50,000 moral and
exemplary damages. Both Mary Gine and Rapanan prayed for 30%
of the total award representing attorney’s fees.

In its Answer, petitioner alleged that the typhoons that struck

its areas of responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall
and high tension wires to snap or cut-off which caused brownouts
Page 16 of 30
in said areas. It claimed that they cannot be faulted for negligence
if there were electric wires dangling along the national road since
they were caused by typhoons which are fortuitous events. It also
alleged that it was able to clear the said areas of fallen electric
poles and dangling or hanging high tension wires immediately after
the typhoons, to secure the safety of persons and vehicles traveling
in said areas. It likewise contended that the proximate cause of the
mishap was the victims’ negligence and imprudence in operating
and driving the motorcycle they were riding on.

During the trial, respondents testified and also presented Dr.

Triffany C. Hasim as witness. Mary Gine testified that she is not
married to Camilo but they are living together and that they have
one child. She also testified that she spent P20,776 for the funeral
expenses of Camilo. She herself prepared an itemized list and
computation of said expenses. She also claimed that Camilo
worked as a jeepney driver earning P150 per day and that as a
result of Camilo’s death, she suffered sleepless nights and lost
weight. Rapanan testified that he, Camilo and one Erwin Coloma
were riding a motorcycle along the National Highway of Maddalero,
Buguey, Cagayan on October 31, 1998, around 9:00 in the
evening. He claimed that they saw a wire dangling from an electric
post and because of a strong wind that blew, they got wound by
said dangling wire. He suffered physical injuries and electric burns
and was hospitalized for seven days. He claimed to have spent
around P10,000 for his medicines, and also complained of
sleepless nights because of the mishap.

Dr. Triffany C. Hasim, the physician who attended to the

victims when they were rushed to the Alfonso Ponce Enrile
Memorial District Hospital, also testified for the respondents.
According to Dr. Hasim, the abrasions of Rapanan were caused by
pressure when the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but
she is uncertain as towhether a live electric wire could have caused
them. She further said that she did not find any electrical burns on

Page 17 of 30
Rapanan. As with Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma on
his body and that the cause of death was due to "cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to strangulation." She also opined that the
strangulation could have been caused by an electric wire entangled
around Camilo’s neck.

Petitioner, for its part, presented four witnesses among whom

were SPO2 Pedro Tactac, TranquilinoRasosand Rodolfo Adviento.
SPO2 Tactac, who investigated the incident, testified that there
was a skid mark on the cemented portion of the road caused by the
motorycle’s foot rest which was about 30 meters long. According to
him, it appears that the motorcycle was overspeeding because of
said skid mark. Rasos and Adviento, employees of petitioner, both
testified that as a result of the onslaught of typhoons Iliang and
Loleng in Buguey and Sta. Ana, Cagayan, the power lines were cut
off because the electric wires snapped and the electric poles were
destroyed. After the said typhoons, petitioner’s employees
inspected the affected areas. The dangling wires were then
removed from the electric poles and were placed at the foot of the
poles which were located four to five meters from the road.

On December 9, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor

of petitioner and dismissed the complaint for damages of
respondents. It held that the proximate cause of the incident is the
negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the motorcycle. It
further held that respondent Mary Gine has no legal personality to
institute the action since such right is only given to the legal heir of
the deceased. Mary Gine is not a legal heir of Camilo since she is
only his common law wife. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC
and held petitioner liable for quasi-delict.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s negligence in maintenance of

its facilities the proximate cause of the death of Camilo and the
injuries of Rapanan.
Page 18 of 30
 (2) Whether or not damages should be awarded in favor of
Camilo’s heirs even if they were not impleaded in the event that
petitioner’s negligence is found to be the proximate cause of the
accident.

Ruling:

(1)The Supreme Court ruled that there is no negligence on the

part of petitioner that was allegedly the proximate cause of
Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the

protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. Article 2176 of the Civil
Code provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under
this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict
case are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or
omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the
defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of
cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.

The presence of the first element is undisputed because the

unfortunate incident brought about the death of Camilo and
physical injuries to Rapanan. The Court, however, finds that the
second and third elements are lacking thus precluding the award
of damages in favor of respondents. Adviento, petitioner’s
employee testified that their electric poles along the highways,
including the one where the mishap took place, were erected about
four to five meters from the shoulder of the road. Another employee
of petitioner, Rasos, testified that after the typhoons hit Cagayan,
he together with his co-employees, after checking the damage to
the electric lines, rolled the fallen electric wires and placed them at
Page 19 of 30
the foot of the electric poles so as to prevent mishaps to
pedestrians and vehicles passing by. Their testimonies were
corroborated by whatwas recorded in the Police Blotter of the
Buguey Police Station, Buguey, Cagayan after SPO2 Tactac
investigated on the incident.

From the testimonies of petitioner’s employees and the

excerpt from the police blotter, the Court can reasonably conclude
that, at the time of that fatal mishap, said wires were quietly sitting
on the shoulder of the road, far enough from the concrete portion
so as not to pose any threat to passing motor vehicles and even
pedestrians. Hence, if the victims of the mishap were strangled by
said wires, it can only mean that either the motorcycle careened
towards the shoulder or even more likely, since the police found
the motorcycle not on the shoulder but still on the road, that the
three passengers were thrown off from the motorcycle to the
shoulder of the road and caught up with the wires. As to how that
happened cannot be blamed on petitioner but should be attributed
to Camilo’s over speeding as concluded by the police after it
investigated the mishap. The foregoing shows that the motorcycle
was probably running too fast that it lost control and started tilting
and sliding eventually which made its foot rest cause the skid mark
on the road. Therefore, the mishap already occurred even while
they were on the road and away from petitioner's electric wires and
was not caused by the latter as alleged by respondents. It just so
happened that after the motorcycle tilted and slid, the passengers
were thrown off to the shoulder where the electric wires were.

The Court hence agrees with the trial court that the proximate
cause of the mishap was the negligence of Camilo. Had Camilo
driven the motorcycle at an average speed, the three passengers
would not have been thrown off from the vehicle towards the
shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric wires sitting
thereon. Moreover, it was also negligent of Camilo to have allowed
two persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride with them

Page 20 of 30
when the maximum number of passengers of a motorcycle is two
including the driver. This most likely even aggravated the situation
because the motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to
drive and control. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover
damages.

(2) As to the second issue, assuming arguendo that petitioner

was indeed negligent, the appellate court erred in awarding
damages in favor of Camilo' s legal heirs since they were not
impleaded in the case. It should be noted that it was Mary Gine,
the common law wife of Camilo, who is the complainant in the
case. As a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not
considered a legal heir of the latter, and hence, has no legal
personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilo' s
death.

Page 21 of 30
1. Smith Bell vs. Borja
(G.R. No. 143008, June 10, 2002)
SMITH BELL DODWELL SHIPPING AGENCY
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. CATALINO BORJA and
INTERNATIONAL TO WAGE AND TRANSPORT
CORPORATION, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:
 On September 23, 1987, Smith Bell (petitioner) requested the
Bureau of Customs to inspect vessel M/T King Family which was
due to arrive at the port of Manila on September 24, 1987.
 Customs Inspector Borja was instructed to inspect said vessel.
 At about 11 o'clock in the morning on September 24, while M/T
King Family was unloading chemicals unto two (2) barges owned
by ITTC (respondent), a sudden explosion occurred setting the
vessels afire. Seeing the fire and fearing for his life, Borja
hurriedly jumped over board to save himself.
 Borja survived but he became permanently disabled due to the
incident. He made demands against Smith Bell and ITTC for the
damages caused by the explosion but both denied liabilities and
attributed to each other negligence.
 RTC ruled in Borja’s favor and held Smith Bell liable for damages
and loss of income, and ordered the latter to pay actual damages
for loss of earning capacity, moral damages and attorney’s fees.
 CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Who, if any, is liable for Borja’s injuries? SMITH BELL

HELD:

Page 22 of 30
Smith Bell is liable. Both RTC and CA ruled that the fire and
explosion originated from Smith Bell’s vessel. (As supported by the
testimonies of the eyewitnesses and the investigation conducted
by the Special Board of Marine Inquiry and affirmed by the
secretary of the Dept. of National Defense.)

Negligence is conduct that creates undue risk of harm to another.

It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby that
other person suffers injury. Smith Bell's vessel was carrying
chemical cargo. While knowing that their vessel was carrying
dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to
take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident. Smith
Bell was, therefore, negligent.

The three elements of quasi-delict are:

(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff,
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damages inflicted on the
plaintiff.

All these elements were established in this case. Knowing fully

well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, Smith Bell was
negligent in not taking all the necessary precautions in transporting
the cargo.

As a result of the fire and the explosion during the unloading of the
chemicals from the vessel, Borja suffered damages and injuries.
Hence, the owner or the person in possession and control of
a vessel and the vessel are liable for all natural and proximate

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damage caused to persons and property by reason of
negligent management or navigation.

SC awarded: loss of earning capacity; moral damages and

attorney’s fees under the Civil Code’s Article 2219, par. 2, and
Article 2208, par. 11, respectively.

Page 24 of 30
Eddie Cortel y Carna and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. Vs. Cecile
Gepaya-Lim; G.R. No. 218014; December 7, 2016
.entry-header
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioners Eddie Cortel y Carna (Cortel) and Yellow Bus Line,
Inc. (Yellow Bus Line) assail the 16 October 2014 Decision[1] and
21 April 2015 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals Cagayan de
Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 02980. The Court of Appeals affirmed
with modification the Judgment,[3] dated 27 April 2012, of the
Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 18 (trial
court), finding petitioners jointly and severally liable to the heirs of
SP03 Robert C. Lim (Lim) for the latter’s death.

The Antecedent Facts

The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:

On 29 October 2004, Cartel was driving a bus, operated by Yellow

Bus Line, which was on its way from Marbel, Koronadal to Davao
City. At around 9:45 in the evening, as the bus was traversing
Crossing Rubber in the Municipality of Tupi, South Cotabato, Cortel
noticed two trucks with glaring headlights coming from the opposite
direction. Cortel stated that he was driving at a speed of 40 to 50
kilometers per hour. He claimed that upon noticing the trucks, he
reduced his speed to 20 kilometers per hour. However, the bus hit
a black motorcycle which allegedly had no tail light reflectors. The
impact dragged the motorcycle at a distance of three meters before
it came to a full stop. Lim, who was riding the motorcycle, was
thrown upward and then slammed into the bus, hitting the base of
its right windshield wiper. The motorcycle got entangled with the
broken bumper of the bus. According to Cortel, Lim was wearing a
black jacket and was riding without a helmet at the time of the
accident.
Page 25 of 30
Felix Larang (Larang), the bus conductor, alighted from the bus to
aid Lim. Larang gave instructions to Cortel to move back to release
Lim and the motorcycle from the front bumper of the bus. Two
bystanders proceeded to the scene to assist Lim. After reversing
the bus and freeing Lim and the motorcycle, Cortel drove the bus
away and went to a nearby bus station where he surrendered to
authorities. Cortel claimed that he left the scene of the incident
because he feared for his life.
Respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim, Lim’s widow, filed a complaint for
damages against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil Case
No. 05-010.
During trial, SPO4 Eddie S. Orencio (SPO4 Orencio), the officer
who investigated the incident, testified that Lim was driving a DT
Yamaha 125 black motorcycle when the accident took place.
Cortel’s bus and the motorcycle were going in the same direction.
SPO4 Orencio testified that that the bus bumped the motorcycle
from behind. The motorcycle’s engine and chassis were severely
damaged, while its rear rim was totally damaged by the accident.
Yellow Bus Line presented and offered in evidence photographs
showing that the bus’ right front windshield and wiper were
damaged. The bus’ lower right side bumper was also perforated.
During the preliminary conference, Yellow Bus Line also presented
Cortel’s certificates showing that he attended the following
seminars: (1) Basic Tire Care Seminar; (2) Basic Tire Knowledge
and Understanding Retreading; and (3) Traffic Rules and
Regulations, Defensive Driving and Road Courtesy Seminar.
However, the certificates were not offered in evidence during trial.
The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error m
affirming with modifications the decision of the trial court.

The Ruling of this Court

We deny the petition.

Page 26 of 30
Petitioners want this Court to review the factual findings of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioners allege that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the bus
driven by Cortel was running fast when the accident occurred and
in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case.
The rule is that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this
Court.[9] It is also settled that questions regarding the cause of
vehicular accident and the persons responsible for it are factual
questions which this Court cannot pass upon, particularly when the
findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are completely
in accord.[10] While there are exceptions to this rule, the Court
finds no justification that would make the present case fall under
the exceptions.
As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the result of the collision
speaks for itself. If, indeed, the speed of the bus was only 20
kilometers per hour as Cortel claimed, it would not bump the
motorcycle traveling in the same direction with such impact that it
threw its rider upward before hitting the base of its right windshield
wiper. If Cortel was driving at 20 kilometers per hour, the bus would
not drag the motorcycle for three meters after the impact. The Court
of Appeals likewise considered the damages sustained by both the
motorcycle and the bus which indicated that Cortel was driving fast
at the time of the accident. As regards petitioners’ allegation that
Lim was equally negligent because he was riding without a helmet
and the motorcycle had no tail lights, the Court of Appeals correctly
found that it was self-serving because petitioner did not present any
evidence to prove this allegation.
We agree that res ipsa loquitur applies m this case. The Court
explained this doctrine as follows:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while
the mere happening of an accident or injury will not generally give
rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence
on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
Page 27 of 30
means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one
jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to
raise a presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence
on the part of the defendant, or some other person who is charged
with negligence.
x x x [W]here it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which
caused the injury complained of was under the control or
management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not
happen if those who had its control or management used proper
care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the injury arose from or was caused by the
defendant’s want of care.
xxxx
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that
the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the
injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best
opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in
general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the
accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the
doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence
of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically
accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured
person.[11]
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident is of such
character as to warrant an inference that it would not have
happened except for the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident
must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the
negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured.[12]
Page 28 of 30
In this case, Cortel had the exclusive control of the bus, including
its speed. The bus and the motorcycle were running in the same
traffic direction and as such, the collision would not have happened
without negligence on the part of Cortel. It was established that the
collision between the bus and the motorcycle caused Lim’s death.
Aside from bare allegations that petitioners failed to prove, there
was nothing to show that Lim had contributory negligence to the
accident.
The rule is when an employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises a
presumption that his employer is negligent.[13] This presumption
can be rebutted only by proof of observance by the employer of the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. In this case, we agree with the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that Yellow Bus Line failed to prove
that it exercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Cortel’s certificates of
attendance to seminars, which Yellow Bus Line did not even
present as evidence in the trial court, are not enough to prove
otherwise.
We sustain the Court of Appeals in its award of loss of earning
capacity and damages to respondent. The increase in the award
for loss of earning capacity is proper due to the computation of the
award in accordance with the following formula:
Net earning capacity Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-
Living Expenses (50% of gross annual income)], where life
expectancy 2/3 (80 – the age of the deceased).[14]
We note that the Court of Appeals clearly intended to award to
respondent temperate damages amounting to P25,000 for burial
and funeral expenses, instead of the P15,000 representing the
actual damage to the motorcycle awarded by the trial court,
because no evidence was presented to prove the same. However,
the term “temperate damages” was inadvertently omitted in the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision although it was
stated that the amount was for funeral and burial expenses. We
Page 29 of 30
reduce the interest rate to 6% per annum on all damages awarded
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 16 October 2014 Decision
and 21 April 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals Cagayan de
Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 02980. We ORDER petitioners Eddie
Cortel y Carna and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. to pay jointly and severally
respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim the following:
(1) Award for loss of earning capacity amounting to P2,139,540;
(2) Temperate damages amounting to P25,000;
(3) Death indemnity amounting to P50,000;
(4) Moral damages amounting to P100,000; and
(5) Attorney’s fees amounting to P15,000
We impose an interest rate of 6% per annum on all damages
awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Page 30 of 30