MANUEL LAGUNZAD vs. MARIA SOTO VDA.

DE GONZALES and THE COURT OF

APPEALS
G.R. No. L-32066, August 6, 1979
Melencio-Herrera, J.

FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1961, petitioner Manuel Lagunzad, began the production of
a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla Story". It was based mainly on the copyrighted but
unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in
Negros" subtitled "The Moises Padilla Story". The book narrates the events which
culminated in the murder of Moises Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the
Nacionalista Party for the Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the
November, 1951 elections. Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then
in power and his men were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises
Padilla is portrayed as "a martyr in contemporary political history." Although the
emphasis of the movie was on the public life of Moises Padilla, there were portions which
dealt with his private and family life including the portrayal in some scenes, of his
mother, Maria Soto Vda. de Gonzales, private respondent herein, and of one "Auring" as
his girlfriend.

On October 5, 1961, Mrs. Nelly Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and in
behalf of her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. On the same date, after some bargaining, the
petitioner and private respondent executed a “Licensing Agreement” where the
petitioner agreed to pay the private respondent the sum of P20,000.00 payable without
need of further demand, as follows: P5,000.00 on or before Oct. 10, 1961; P10,000.00 on or
before Oct. 31, 1961; and P5,000.00 on or before November 30, 1961. Also the Licensor,
private respondent, grants authority and permission to Licensee, petitioner, to exploit,
use, and develop the life story of Moises Padilla for purposes of producing the picture,
and in connection with matters incidental to said production, such as advertising and the
like, as well as authority and permission for the use of licensor’s name in the picture and
have herself portrayed therein, the authority and permission hereby granted, to retroact
to the date when licensee first committed any of the acts herein authorized. After its
premier showing on October 16, 1961, the movie was shown in different theaters all over
the country.

The petitioner refused to pay any additional amounts pursuant to the Agreement,
on December 22, 1961, private respondent instituted the present suit against him praying
for judgment in her favor ordering petitioner 1) to pay her the amount of P15,000.00, with
legal interest from the filing of the Complaint; 2) to render an accounting of the proceeds
from the picture and to pay the corresponding 2-1/2% royalty therefrom; 3) to pay
attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the amounts claimed; and 4) to pay the costs.
Petitioner contended in his answer that the episodes in the life of Moises Padilla depicted
in the movie were matters of public knowledge and was a public figure; that private
respondent has no property right over those incidents; that the Licensing Agreement was
without valid cause or consideration and that he signed the same only because of the
coercion and threat employed upon him. As a counterclaim, petitioner sought for the
nullification of the Licensing Agreement as it constitutes an infringement on the
constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the private respondent.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the Licensing Agreement infringes on the constitutional right of
freedom of speech and of the press.

RULING:

No. From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the
freedom of speech and of the press. It would be too much to insist that at all times and
under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other
societal values that press for recognition. The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and
present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible limitation on
freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of the mass media as
radio, television and the movies, is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle
requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interest
observable in a given situation or type of situation."

In the case at bar, the interest observable is the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into
account the interplay of those interests, the court held that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be
upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern.