G.R. No. L-43195 August 23, 1935 the writ.

35 the writ. This can hardly be expected from the variety of restraints for which
it is used to give relief. Confinement under civil and criminal process may be
FELIPE GONZALES, petitioner-appellant, so relieved. Wives restrained by husbands, children withheld from the proper
vs. parent or guardian, persons held under arbitrary custody by private individuals,
FLORENTINO C. VIOLA and VALENTIN MANIQUIS, respondents- as in a mad-house, as well as those under military control, may all become
appellees. proper subjects of relief by the writ of habeas corpus. Obviously, the extent
and character of the restraint which justifies the writ must vary according to
Juan S. Rustia, for appellant. the nature of the control which is asserted over the party in whose behalf the
Payawal, Osorio and Mendoza for appellees. writ is prayed. ... Something more than moral restraint is necessary to make a
case for habeas corpus. There must be actual confinement or the present means
ABAD SANTOS, J.: of enforcing it." (Wales vs. Whitney, supra.)

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Under the circumstances of the present case, the court below would have been
denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the appellant. The justified in refusing the writ solely on the ground that the appellant was not,
order of denial was entered by the court below after due hearing, on the ground within the meaning of section 525 of the Code of Civil Procedure, deprived or
that the appellant was legally detained. restrained of his liberty; and upon that very ground the order appealed from is
affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
The facts which gave rise to this case are fully set forth in the order appealed
from. In deciding this appeal, it is sufficient to observe that the record shows Hull, Vickers, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.
that on January 18, 1935, at about 11:30 a.m., appellant was placed under arrest
by order of the appellees and detained in the municipal jail of San Miguel,
Province of Bulacan; that a few hours later a criminal complaint was filed by
the appellee Maniquis against the appellant in the justice of the peace court of
the aforesaid municipality; and that on the same day, at about 8 p.m., he was
released on bail. When the hearing on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
was had in the court below the appellant was already out on bail.

In passing upon a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, a court of judge must
first inquire whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the
writ will be refused. Only where such restraint obtains is the court required to
inquire into the cause of the detention, and if the alleged cause is found to be
unlawful then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. (Code
of Civil Procedure, sections 525, 541; Wales vs. Whitney, 114 U.S., 564; 29
Law. ed., 277.)

The law is well settled that a person out on bail is not so restrained of his liberty
as to be entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. The restraint of liberty which would
justify the issuance of the writ must be more than a mere moral restraint; it
must be actual or physical. "There is no very satisfactory definition to be found
in the adjudged cases, of the character of the restraint or imprisonment suffered
by a party applying for the writ of habeas corpus, which is necessary to sustain

G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE
VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court. Petitioner Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-
relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent Director of
Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa;
and second, that petitioner be granted a new trial.1 These reliefs are sought on
the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence, gathered after performing
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the
petitioner and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v.
Reynaldo de Villa,2 we found petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza,
his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua;
and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages,
costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child
born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza
charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with rape in an information dated January
9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on
January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."3
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of
April 1994, at about 10:00 in the morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her
family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on top
of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout
for help because petitioner covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to
kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner succeeded in inserting
his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body,
petitioner ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy,
which was noticed by her mother, Leonila Mendoza, sometime in November
1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped
her. Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they
lodged a criminal complaint against petitioner.4
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight
months pregnant and found in her hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and
8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl whom
she named Leahlyn Mendoza.5
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was
already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of
having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had been holding a
grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he
interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was
in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas.6
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the
amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza.7
On automatic review,8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was
medically consistent with the time of the rape. Since it was never alleged that
Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to the
prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old
baby by normal delivery.9 Thus, we affirmed petitioner's conviction for rape,
in a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusión perpetua and ordered to pay the
offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral
damages; costs of the suit and to provide support for the child Leahlyn
Corales Mendoza.
SO ORDERED.10
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced
with the question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges
that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test
that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's
child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of
the automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the
issue of paternity.11 This information was apparently furnished by the Free
Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took
over as counsel for petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type
test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child allegedly
conceived as a result of the rape.12 This relief was implicitly denied in our
Decision of February 21, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed that DNA tests
be conducted.13 The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated
November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision became final and executory on
January 16, 2002.15
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed
that DNA tests required a sample that could be extracted from saliva,
petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa
and a classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile
cup.16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and
gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as "Container
A."
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo
de Villa. These samples were placed in separate containers with distinguishing
labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).17
During transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on
ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample
given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de
Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors
of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made
known to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.18
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21,
2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the
children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between
the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the
other samples, including Leahlyn's.19
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY
THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF
LEAHLYN MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED
ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF
THE ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET
ASIDE.20
xxx xxx xxx
A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS
COURT IN VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS
CONDUCTED.21
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the
trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn
Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his
conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said child.
Since this paternity is now conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001
conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to
collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for
new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be
newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to release an individual
already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory
judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial under the same
factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for
those seeking liberty from any unwarranted denial of freedom of movement.
Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto".22
Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally deprived of his
liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,23 we stated that
"[a]ny restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."24
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of
movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's
liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal
which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this
jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ
of habeas corpus has very limited availability as a post-conviction remedy. In
the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence
of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess.26
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final
judgment of conviction, without, however, providing a legal ground on which
to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the
review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. This relief is far
outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case of Abriol v.
Homeres,27 for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of
habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used. The writ of
habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of
the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is
deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere
errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction.28 The reason for
this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals:29 a
habeas corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. 30 A
record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised, modified,
altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus
proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the defendant,
are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus; if
at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and
manner prescribed by law.31 In the past, this Court has disallowed the review
of a court's appreciation of the evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ.32 A survey of our
decisions in habeas corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of
habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an extraordinary
remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.33 We
have been categorical in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is
not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper remedy. Resort to the
writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a
judgment is rendered by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for
instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of a constitutional
right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a
sentence by final judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus
was held to be available where an accused was deprived of the constitutional
right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of an
accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused.
That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack,
which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v.
Director of the Bureau of Prisons,36 this Court ruled that, once a deprivation
of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment
is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy
to assail the legality of the detention.37 Although in Feria v. Court of
Appeals38 this Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new evidence
in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional
situation. In that case, we laid down the general rule, which states that the
burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who
attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is,
where it sets forth a process which, on its face, shows good ground for the
detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.39
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,40 we summarized the scope
of review allowable in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to interrupt the
orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special
circumstance that requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on
a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to errors committed by a court
within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or
judgment under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The
probe may thus proceed to check on the power and authority, itself an
equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that
so serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention.41 It is the nullity of an
assailed judgment of conviction which makes it susceptible to collateral attack
through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa,
we find that the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As
such, this Court is hard-pressed to find legal basis on which to anchor the grant
of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with petitioner's
plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right
of which the petitioner was unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas
corpus in order to test claims that a defendant was denied effective aid of
counsel.42 In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors
committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial,
denied the effective aid of counsel. The United States Supreme Court requires
a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney's
performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to
show that the outcome of the trial would have been different with competent
counsel.43 The purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.44
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, one must examine whether counsel's conduct
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent
that the trial did not produce a fair and just result.45 The proper measure of
attorney performance is "reasonable" under the prevailing professional norms,
and the defendant must show that the representation received fell below the
objective standard of reasonableness.46 For the petition to succeed, the strong
presumption that the counsel's conduct falls within the wide range or
reasonable professional assistance must be overcome.47
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's
counsel of record, a certain Atty. Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and
inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation
that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by
virtue of a petition filed in his favor."48 In the face of this abandonment,
petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from this
withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and
Opposition of Counsel's Withdrawal of Appearance with Leave of Court"
received by this Court on September 14, 1999.49 Petitioner alleged that his
counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and heartbreaking event", considering
that he had placed "all [his] trust and confidence on [his counsel's]
unquestionable integrity and dignity."50
While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that
there was such negligence committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to
a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing that the
proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to seek a re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa,
without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and purposes,
petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We
are being asked to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this
case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner
seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus
petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
seeks a new trial to re-litigate the issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn
Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central
to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen
Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the
question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio,51
we ruled that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth
are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not
an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim
bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is
of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn
Mendoza indicates that our Decision was based, at least in small measure, on
the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This claim was given
credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court
on automatic review.
The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil
award of child support. It is only tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's
guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the petitioner did not
sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and
allow the acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous
legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion
for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is available only
for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1,
Rule 121, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial
may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, that
is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of
the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available
remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on
any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial
rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would
probably change the judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly
"newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test subsequently conducted,
allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result
of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus has long attained finality, and entry of judgment was made as
far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within
the statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered
after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced
at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material,
not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence
is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably change the
judgment.52 It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable
diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but
nonetheless failed to secure it.53
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after
the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the criteria for "newly-
discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise
of reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA
testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of
knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the
part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance,
however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a
party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of
neglect.54 A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter's
mistakes and negligence.55 It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted
to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the judgment when the
loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode
of procedure.56
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented
by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is
entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of
Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases.57 The Solicitor
General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never
been an element of the crime of rape.58 Therefore, the DNA evidence has
failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a
finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction
was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim,
which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus
and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 117568 January 4, 1995
ROLANDO ANGELES y BOMBITA, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISON, respondent.
VITUG, J.:
In People v. Angeles,1 this Court affirmed the trial court's decision convicting
accused Rolando Angeles y Bombita of the offense he was charged with, i.e.,
sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as "shabu," punishable
under Section 15,2 Article III, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No.
6425) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay
a fine of P20,000.00.
Rolando Angeles y Bombita has now lodged with us this petition for habeas
corpus, invoking (a) Republic Act No. 7659, which has reduced the penalties
prescribed under the original provisions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, and (b)
the recent ruling of this Court in People vs. Martin Simon y Sunga,3 which has
confirmed the retroactive application of the above-numbered amendatory law.
Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, selling and delivering 0.13
grams of shabu. Conformably with the second paragraph of Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of Republic Act No. 7659
and as construed and applied in People v. Simon, the newly prescribed penalty
for his offense would now only be prison correccional. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of indeterminate penalty on petitioner,
modified accordingly, should thereby be from six (6) months of arresto mayor
as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.
The foregoing notwithstanding, Angeles' petition for habeas corpus cannot be
granted. Petitioner, it appears, has only served the minimum of his sentence;
however, he may, if qualified, be released on parole pursuant to Section 5 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which reads:
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence to look into the physical, mental and moral record of
the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and to determine
the proper time of release of such prisoners. Whenever any
prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty imposed on
him, and it shall appear to the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, from the reports of the prisoner's work and conduct
which may be received in accordance with the rules and
regulations prescribed, and from the study and investigation
made by the Board itself, that such prisoner is fitted by his
training for release, that there is a reasonable probability that
such prisoner will live and remain at liberty without violating
the law and that such release will not be incompatible with the
welfare of society, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may,
in its discretion, and in accordance with the rules and
regulations adopted hereunder, authorize the release of such
prisoner on parole, upon such terms and conditions as are
herein prescribed and as may be prescribed by the Board.
While the instant petition for habeas corpus should be DISMISSED for its
prematurity, the Court, nonetheless, expresses its concern over the plight of
persons convicted for drug-related offenses prior to the enactment and
effectivity of Republic Act No. 7659 who, like herein petitioner, could be
entitled to parole for having served their minimum sentences, or who, indeed,
may due for release from confinement after having served their maximum
sentences conformably with the applicable penalties newly prescribed by
republic Act No. 7659 and our decision, construing this law, in the Simon case.
Aware of the need to have this matter attended to with great dispatch, the Court
sees it fit to take the opportunity, by way of extraordinary measures, to
pronounce thusly:
All courts of competent jurisdiction mat entertain petitions for habeas corpus
to consider the release of prisoners convicted for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act who have served the maximum of the applicable penalties newly
prescribed by Republic Act No. 7659. In this regard, the formalities required
for petitions for habeas corpus shall be construed liberally, and such petitions,
although deficient in form (e.g. in letter-petition forms), may be entertained so
long as they are sufficient in substance. In the negative, the courts to which the
petitions are filed may refer the matter to the Commission on Human Rights
or to the Public Attorney's Office for possible assistance to the prisoners
concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus, being still premature,
is DISMISSED. LET, however, a copy of this resolution be furnished to the
Commission on Human Rights and the Public Attorney's Office for their
information and guidance. No costs.
G.R. No. 125901 March 8, 2001
EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA
DIAMANTE, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in
a petition for habeas corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of
petitioners.
Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife
and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner
Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita
Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch
her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some
marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-
month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let
Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila,
but did not find them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer
went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to
Angelita's house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to
another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also
to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her
spouse would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made
her problem even more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her
husband reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing son
in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they saw no traces of his
whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the
death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and
whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.
Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly
saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the
boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late
Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez.1 She avers that
Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial
court in order to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners
presented two witnesses, namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The
first witness, Vasquez, testified that she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo
Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported
her testimony with her clinical records.2 The second witness, Benjamin Lopez,
declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not have possibly
fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas
met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca
causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity.
Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas
Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with
children.3
For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She
asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989,
at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added,
though, that she has two other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez.4
She said the birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband,
Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her
common-law husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopez is an impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and
Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the
natural child of petitioners. The trial court decreed:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby
rendered GRANTING the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such,
respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to immediately release from
her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over
 and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing
and Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.
Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to
implement the decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in
the recovery of the person of their minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the
same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.
SO ORDERED.6
Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3,
1994, the sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of
the minor. In his report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered
the minor and he turned over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo
Tijing.8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered
by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of
the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not
sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor. It ruled that the
lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez
are one and the same person,9 and disposed of the case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court
dated March 10, 1995 is hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered
dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc. No. 94-71606, and directing the
custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned to respondent
Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said
respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.
SO ORDERED.10
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was
denied. Hence, the instant petition alleging:
I writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
A GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE
PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS MERELY
SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE
PETITIONERS HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR "HABEAS CORPUS"
AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN
THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR
AS EDGARDO R. TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT.11
In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:
(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?
(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person and is the son of petitioners?
We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. 12
Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free
will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose
of determining the right of custody over a child.13 It must be stressed too that
in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the
claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas
Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who
between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minor's biological mother. Evidence
must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to
be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same.14
Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful
custody. If there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the
application for the writ is made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their
right of custody over the said minor.
True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative
value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the
basis of its impugned decision, resolution or order.15 But since the conclusions
of the Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may
scrutinize the evidence on the record to determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts.
A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented
by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her
missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her
very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent
ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez
without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation
removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth to a
child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records,
log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no
longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his
brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted
to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas
Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no children after almost
fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with private respondent
for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.
Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez
was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four
months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending
physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the registration of
such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent register
the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local civil registrar
within thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of the
child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on
October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts
to doubt the other data in said birth certificate.
Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces,
eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his
alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.18
Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should be given high respect, it
having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor
and petitioner concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth
to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented
clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of
petitioners. All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor
is indeed the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain
custody of said child.
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we
have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test19 for identification and
parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis
is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother,
the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage.20 Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not
hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that
courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.22 Though it
is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be
useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity
issues.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of
the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court
is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167193 April 19, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING, Petitioner.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police
Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin,1
Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf
Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained.
The antecedents are as follows:
On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation
of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian
Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and
Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan, Branch 2, Ninth Judicial Region.
Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious
Illegal Detention with the RTC under separate Amended Informations,
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-1164, and 3611-
1165.
Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-
IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation.
In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G. Danipog, Jr., Police
Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the
Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of
the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the
PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved
and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez, Acting Clerk of Court of the
RTC, replied to the request of Atty. Danipog, thus:
xxx
The undersigned referred the matter to Hon. Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge
of this Court, who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the herein mentioned
case (Criminal Case No. 3674-1187) and per his instruction, accused As[h]raf
Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained thereat by virtue of the Alias
Warrant of Arrest issued in this case, however considering that the accused is
a high security risk, he should be brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the
necessary security escort can be provided for his transfer, where the proper
commitment order can be issued as the herein mentioned case is about to be
submitted by the prosecution.
Thank you ever so much for your usual cooperation extended to the Court.2
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately
turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for
Reinvestigation.
On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C. Lomibao wrote a letter to
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño, Department of Justice (DOJ),
requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the
venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following
reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG
stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to
recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to
the ASG; and (2) there is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by
the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in
the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-
accused in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-
1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who were tried, guilty of the
crime/s charged.
On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to
Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over
Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003,
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.1avvphil.net
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R.
Rafanan reiterated the request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño to
facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case, citing the same
grounds in the previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been transferred
to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break
that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go
scot-free.
On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L. Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other
grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the
trial of Criminal Case No. 3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly
filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the
Order of the RTC dated February 11, 2005, directing the turnover of Kunting
to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved.
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his
liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by Police Chief Superintendent
Ismael Rafanan and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert
Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him
until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered
in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused
who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June
2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he
promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003.
He was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R.
Zuño for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of
venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further
information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action
was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to
his illegal detention classified in the records as "for safekeeping purposes
only."
The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus
extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has
one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person,3 and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee.4 If, however, the detention
is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.5
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not
allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed;
or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or
order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.6
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by
the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest
issued by Judge Danilo M. Bucoy, RTC, Branch 2, Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus
authorized by the trial court.1avvphil.net
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom
and Serious Illegal Detention in Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129,
3674-1187, and 3611-1165. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4
above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he
has been charged with a criminal offense. Bernarte v. Court of Appeals7 holds
that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer
question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
Nevertheless, this Court notes that the RTC in its Order dated February 11,
2005 reiterated its Order dated September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, to turn over Kunting to the court. TThe trial court has been
waiting for two years for the PNP-IG to turn over the person of Kunting for
the trial of his case. The PNP-IG has delayed the turn over because it is waiting
for the DOJ to request for the transfer of venue of the trial of the case from
Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. In the absence of evidence that the DOJ
has indeed filed a motion for the transfer of venue, In its Comment, the Office
of the Solicitor General stated that the PNP-IG is presently awaiting the
resolution of the Motion for Transfer of Venue it requested from the DOJ. In
this regard, t the Police Chief Superintendent is, therefore, directed to take
positive steps towards action on said motion.comply with the Order of the trial
court, dated February 11, 2005, to turn over the body of petitioner Kunting to
the trial court..

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby

DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 118644 July 7, 1995
DIRECTOR EPIMACO A. VELASCO, as Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP (SOG), SPECIAL
INVESTIGATORS III FLOR L. RESURRECCION and ANTONIO M.
ERUM, JR., and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FELICITAS S. CUYAG, for and in behalf of
LAWRENCE A. LARKINS, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is lost in antiquity,1
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.2 More specifically, its vital purposes are to obtain immediate relief
from illegal confinement, to liberate those who may be imprisoned without
sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful custody. It is then
essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which a person
is detained.3
Under our Constitution, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it.4 Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, it extends,
except as otherwise provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. It
is not available, however, under the instances enumerated in Section 4 of the
said Rule which reads:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty
is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court
or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of
record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge
of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In this petition for review, the petitioners want us to set aside and reverse the
decision of 1 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
36273,5 a petition for habeas corpus and certiorari with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order, ordering the herein petitioners to immediately
release Lawrence A. Larkins from their custody and declaring moot the
alternative relief of certiorari.
The antecedent facts of the case as culled from the challenged decision and the
pleadings of the parties are neither complicated nor disputed.
On 16 September 1993, a warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Manuel
Padolina of Branch 162 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Metro
Manila, against accused Lawrence Larkins in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92
for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
On 20 November 1994, a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins
of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her on 19 November 1994 at
2:00 a.m. in Victoria Valley Subdivision, Valley Golf, Antipolo, Rizal.6
Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special
Investigators Flor L. Resurreccion and Antonio M. Erum, Jr. proceeded to the
office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, on 21 November 1994 and arrested
the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. 7
Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue,
Manila.
On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases
Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting
aside the warrant of arrest issued on 16 September 1993 and directing the Jail
Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless
otherwise detained for some other cause."
Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins
because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of
rape for which he would be held for inquest.
On 23 November 1994, a complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by
Alinea.8 It contains a certification by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Paz
Reyes Yson that it is "filed pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of
his right to preliminary investigation and not having executed a waiver
pursuant to Article 125 of the RPC. . . ." The complaint was filed with the RTC
of Antipolo on 2 December 1994, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 94-
11794, and assigned to Branch 71 of the court, presided by Judge Felix S.
Caballes.
On 2 December 1994, Larkins, through his counsel Mauricio C. Ulep, filed an
Urgent Motion for Bail9 wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of
guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of the
complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither
lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that
he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law.
On 6 December 1994, Larkins, through his new counsel, Atty. Theodore O.
Te, filed in Criminal Case No. 94-11794 an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the
Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release,10 principally based
on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. This motion met vigorous
opposition from the private complainant.11
In the order of 5 January 1995,12 the trial court denied the aforesaid motions,
thus:
After a careful appreciation of the arguments of the
prosecution and the defense, the Court finds no legal or valid
grounds to dismiss the complaint or release the accused, or to
grant him bail. The filing of this case against the accused,
which is [a] very serious offense, justifies the grant of the
motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a hold departure
order.
WHEREFORE, the motions of the accused are hereby denied
for lack of merit, and as prayed for by the prosecution the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to
include the name of the accused, Lawrence A. Larkins, in its
hold order departure list until further order from this Court.
Unable to accept the ruling, Larkins' common-law wife, Felicitas S. Cuyag,
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for habeas corpus with certiorari.
Impleaded as respondents were the herein petitioners and Judge Felix S.
Caballes.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution13 ordering the
respondents therein to appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the
court on 31 January 1995 at 10:30 a.m. and to show cause why Larkins' liberty
is being restrained.
On the said date, Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum appeared and
produced Larkins at the hearing. Atty. Orlando Dizon of the NBI acted as their
counsel. 14 The Office of the Solicitor General representing the People of the
Philippines made no appearance.15 Neither did Judge Caballes, for he had not
received a copy of the resolution. On the other hand, the petitioner therein,
Felicitas S. Cuyag, appeared with her counsel, who manifested that should the
court order the release of Larkins the alternative prayer for certiorari would
be deemed abandoned. 16
After hearing the arguments of the parties, the Court of Appeals rendered the
challenged decision, holding that:
From the arguments presented by the parties, we resolve to
order the immediate release of Larkins from his present
confinement on the ground that the complaint presented to the
NBI by complainant Desiree Alinea on the basis of which
Larkins was detained without a warrant of arrest for rape did
not meet the legal requirements provided for in Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, on the day the detention of Larkins commenced,
i.e., immediately after the NBI was served with the Order of
the Pasig RTC for his release on bail in connection with the
BP 22 cases, no other criminal complaint or information had
been filed or pending in any court. It was only sometime
between November 25, 1994 (when filing of the complaint
was approved by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor) and
November 29, 1994 (the date appearing on the Urgent Motion
for Bail filed by Larkins's former counsel, said Atty. Ulep)
that the complaint for rape was filed with the Antipolo RTC.
The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition
for habeas corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the crime
of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They further
claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under
Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
On the other hand, the private respondent contends that habeas corpus is
rendered unavailing not by the mere filing of an information, but by the
issuance of a warrant of arrest or warrant of commitment, which are the only
two processes recognized by law to justify deprivation of liberty, and the order
of Judge Caballes of 5 January 1995 denying the petition for bail does not
qualify as such. She asserts that the petitioners have miscomprehended
Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan17 because that case did not rule that the writ is no
longer available after an information (or criminal complaint for rape as in this
case) is filed against the person detained; what it stated is that the writ of
habeas corpus will not issue when the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
has jurisdiction to do so. She submits that the controlling doctrine is that
enunciated in Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile,18 adverted to in Sanchez vs.
Demetriou,19 that "[t]he filing of charges, and the issuance of the
corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure
the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because
of such defect."
We find for the petitioners.
But, before we take up the substantive merits of this petition, we shall first
delve into the propriety of the petition for habeas corpus and certiorari filed
by private respondent Cuyag with the Court of Appeals.
Concededly, the private respondent has the personality to institute on behalf
of her common-law spouse, Lawrence Larkins, the habeas corpus aspect of
the petition, as she falls within the purview of the term "some person" under
Section 3, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, which means any person who has a
legally justified interest in the freedom of the person whose liberty is restrained
or who shows some authorization to make the application.20 She is not,
however, the real party in interest in the certiorari aspect of the petition. Only
Larkins could institute a petition for certiorari to set aside the order denying
his motions for bail and for the dismissal of the complaint against him.
It does not, however, follow that if certiorari is available to Larkins, an
application for a writ of habeas corpus will absolutely be barred. While
ordinarily, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when there is an
adequate remedy by writ of error or appeal or by writ of certiorari, it may,
nevertheless, be available in exceptional cases, for the writ should not be
considered subservient to procedural limitations which glorify form over
substance.21 It must be kept in mind that although the question most often
considered in both habeas corpus and certiorari proceedings is whether an
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, the former involves a collateral
attack on the judgment and "reaches the body but not the record," while the
latter assails directly the judgment and "reaches the record but not the body."22
And now on the merits of the petition.
The Court of Appeals granted the writ of habeas corpus because it found that
the warrantless arrest of Larkins for the crime of rape "did not meet the legal
requirements provided for in Rule 113 of the Rules of Court." It could have in
mind Section 5 thereof on lawful warrantless arrest.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release
or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his
detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas
corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of
some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule
102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among
such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the
discharge of the detained person. Thus, in Sayo vs. Chief of Police of
Manila,23 this Court held:
[W]e hold that petitioners are being illegally restrained of
their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they
are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
court of justice. (emphasis supplied)
Another is the filing of a complaint or information for the offense for which
the accused is detained, as in the instant case. By then, the restraint of liberty
is already by virtue of the complaint or information and, therefore, the writ of
habeas corpus is no longer available. Section 4 of Rule 102 reads in part as
follows: "Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of
a person charged with . . . an offense in the Philippines."
Thus, in Matsura vs. Director of Prisons,24 where petitioners Macario Herce
and Celso Almadovar claimed to have been illegally detained for more than
one year without any complaint or information filed against them, this Court
denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, for at the time they filed the
petition they had already been charged with the crime of treason and confined
by reason thereof. Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago25 reiterates Matsura.
In Cruz vs. Montoya,26 this Court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus for
having become academic because the information for estafa against the party
whose liberty was allegedly illegally restrained had already been filed and a
warrant for his arrest had been issued, and whatever illegality might have
originally infected his detention had been cured.
In Umil vs. Ramos27 this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule
102, held that the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released had been charged before any court. Thus:
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered,
criminal charges have been filed in the proper courts against
the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, or if
such person is charged before any court, the writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. . . . Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize
the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering from
imprisonment under lawful judgment.28 (emphasis supplied)
It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail, Larkins admitted that he
was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its
jurisdiction. In De Asis vs. Romero,29 this Court stated:
De Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the
regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in question.
Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower
court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his
person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the
information filed against him. (emphasis supplied)
The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is
recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in
cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail
by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court. In the case of Carrington vs. Peterson,30 this Court declared:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise,
in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction
of the court he must raise the question of the court's
jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If
he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory
plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court
jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
In United States vs. Grant,31 this Court held:
Conceding again that the warrant issued in this case was void
for the reason that no probable cause was found by the court
before issuing it, the defendant waived all his rights to object
to the same by appearing and giving bond.
While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of
the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release
based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a
mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had
firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person.
Moreover, the trial court's order of 5 January 1995 denying the urgent motion
for bail was an unequivocal assertion of its authority to keep in custody the
person of Larkins. This order comes under the purview of the word order under
the first sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102 reading: "If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer . . .
by virtue of [an] order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to . . . make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. . . ."
The foregoing renders untenable the private respondent's claim that it is the
rule in Ilagan vs. Enrile32 which must govern, that the writ may not be allowed
only where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by the court or judge, and that there are only
two recognized processes which justify deprivation of liberty, viz., (1)
commitment order and (2) warrant of arrest. The contention is not only a
deliberate misreading of Section 4 of Rule 102 limiting its application to the
first part of the first sentence and disregarding the rest, but is also an undue
and unwarranted restriction of the term process. A commitment order and a
warrant of arrest are but species of judicial process.
In Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals,33 this Court stated:
Invariably a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law;
also, the means of accomplishing an end, including judicial
proceedings, or all writs, warrants, summonses and orders of
courts of justice or judicial officers. It is likewise held to
include a writ, summons or order issued in a judicial
proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property,
to expedite the cause or enforce the judgment, or a writ,
warrant, mandate or other process issuing from a court of
justice.
In Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe,34 this Court quoted Corpus Juris'
definition of the term "process," to wit:
As a legal term, process is a generic word of very
comprehensive signification and many meanings. In its
broadest sense, it is equivalent to, or synonymous with
"proceedings" or procedure and embraces all the steps and
proceedings in a cause from its commencement to its
conclusion. Sometimes the term is also broadly defined as the
means whereby a court compels a compliance with its
demands. (50 C.J. 441)
We thus rule that the order of 5 January 1995 of the trial court also qualifies
as a process within the meaning of Section 4 of Rule 102.
Hence, even granting that Larkins was illegally arrested, still the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus will not prosper because his detention has become legal
by virtue of the filing before the trial court of the complaint against him and
by the issuance of the 5 January 1995 order.
Even as we thus decide in favor of the petitioners, we are, nevertheless,
disturbed by certain incidents relative to the warrantless arrest of Larkins.
Firstly, assuming that it was lawful, the facts before us disclose that the
arresting officers failed to strictly comply with (1) the last paragraph of Section
5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requiring that the person lawfully arrested
without a warrant shall forthwith be delivered to the nearest police station or
jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7, Rule 112; and
(2) Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, providing that he be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities within thirty-six hours, the crime
with which Larkins was charged being punishable by an afflictive penalty.
Although the arrest was made in Makati where there is a police station and a
municipal (now city) jail, Larkins was brought to the NBI Detention Cell at
Taft Avenue, Manila, and though the complaint of the offended party was
executed on 23 November 1994, it was not until 2 December 1994 that the said
complaint was actually filed in court.
Unless satisfactorily explained, the non-compliance by the arresting officers
with the said provisions merits nothing but disapproval from the Court. In the
performance of their duty and in their commendable pursuit to stamp out
crimes and bring criminals to the bar of justice, law enforcement authorities
should make no shortcuts, but must comply with all procedures to safeguard
the constitutional and statutory rights of accused persons. The rule of law must
always be upheld. What this Court said in Beltran vs. Garcia35 needs to be
repeated:
It certainly does not speak well of officialdom, whether
civilian or military, if a person deprived of his liberty had to
go to court before his rights are respected. The good name of
the administration is jeopardized, without any fault on its part,
by such inefficiency or inattention to duty. Every precaution
should be taken against its repetition. Otherwise, the parties
responsible for this state of affairs would justly lay themselves
open to the accusation that the greatest danger to
constitutional rights comes from public officials, men of zeal,
concededly well-meaning, but without sufficient
understanding of the implication of the rule of law.
We also note that the trial court did not conduct a hearing of the urgent motion
for bail, as required under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. The grant
or denial of bail must be based upon the court's determination as to whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may only be exercised after
evidence is submitted at the hearing conducted for that
purpose.36 The court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary
of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong; otherwise, the order would be defective and
voidable. 37 In fact, even if the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in
opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the State's
evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail.38 It was thus incumbent
upon the trial court to receive the evidence for the prosecution on the urgent
motion for bail. For this procedural shortcoming, Larkins should also be partly
blamed. He did not press for a hearing after the scheduled hearing on 5
December 1994 was cancelled because, as he claimed, the presiding Judge was
out of the country.39

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the

Court of Appeals of 1 February 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36273 is hereby SET
ASIDE and ANNULLED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163108 February 23, 2005
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA, HON.
BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court filed by the petitioner for the nullification of the Resolution of the Court
of Appeals1 which dismissed his petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus for his release from detention despite the pendency of People of the
Philippines v. Glenn Caballes2 for rape, and its resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration thereof.
The antecedents are as follows:
On November 19, 2001, petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape
of a minor in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25756-MN and raffled to Branch 169, presided
by Judge Emmanuel D. Laurea. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-
bailable offense, he was detained.
The petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002 and pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Venice
Vera Pio, the private complainant, and her mother. The petitioner, through
counsel, commenced his cross-examination of Pio, but failed to complete the
same. In January 2003, the petitioner engaged the services of a new counsel,
Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, who entered his appearance as defense counsel.3
During the trial of February 26, 2003, the petitioner continued his cross-
examination of Pio but still failed to terminate the same. The trial was set on
March 6, 2003 for the petitioner to terminate his cross-examination of Pio.
However, due to the illness of the private prosecutor, the trial on the said date
did not proceed. The trial was further reset to March 17, 2003 during which
the petitioner continued with his cross-examination of the private complainant.
Thereafter, the continuation of trial was set on April 3, 21, and 30, 2003. On
April 3, 2003, the petitioner concluded his cross-examination of Pio. The
prosecution declared that its next witness would be Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez,
the Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, who had conducted a medico-legal examination of the private
complainant, but stated that he had not been subpoenad. The prosecution
prayed for the cancellation of the trial scheduled on April 21, 2003 to give the
prosecution time to secure and cause the service of a subpoena duces tecum on
him. The petitioner conformed to the motion of the prosecution.
On April 28, 2003, the petitioner filed a petition for bail.4
The trial of April 30, 2003 did not proceed because the petitioner’s counsel
filed a Manifestation5 that his presence was required in an execution sale in
Cavite. The said counsel manifested that he reserved his right to cross-examine
any witness the prosecution would present in case trial would proceed on that
date; on the other hand, in the event that the trial court would cancel the trial,
he would be available in May 2003 and during the first half of June 2003.
The trial court reset the hearing of the case to 8:30 a.m. of June 19, 2003 and
gave the prosecution ten (10) days to file its opposition6 to the petitioner’s
petition for bail. It likewise ordered the issuance of a subpoena to Dr. Jose
Arnel Marquez to require him to attend the trial on the said date.
On May 5, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion7 seeking an earlier trial date,
invoking his right to speedy trial under the Speedy Trial Act of 1998. He also
filed a motion for the urgent resolution of his petition for bail.8
On May 12, 2003, the petitioner filed another motion9 praying that the hearing
scheduled on June 19, 2003 be moved to an earlier date, preferably on May
26, 28 or 29, 2003. In the meantime, the prosecution filed its
comment/opposition10 to the petitioner’s petition for bail.
On May 13, 2003, the court issued an Order11 declaring that the petition for
bail was submitted for its resolution and denying the petitioner’s motion for an
earlier trial date. On June 16, 2003, the trial court issued its Order12 denying
the petition for bail, on its finding that the evidence of guilt against the
petitioner was strong.
During the trial of June 19, 2003, Dr. Marquez failed to appear before the court
because, in the meantime, he had been assigned to the Eastern Police District
and failed to receive the subpoena issued to him by the court. The prosecution
prayed for continuance, but the petitioner objected and invoked his right to
speedy trial. The court, nevertheless, granted the motion and reset the trial to
July 17, 2003.
On June 27, 2003, the court issued a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum
to Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez requiring him to appear for the trial set on July 17,
2003.13
On July 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
court’s Order dated June 16, 2003 denying his petition for bail. His motion
was set for hearing, also on July 17, 2003. However, the petitioner preempted
the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a Motion to
Dismiss14 the case on July 11, 2003 on the ground that his right to speedy trial
had been violated. He made the following allegations:
1. The hearings in the instant case have more often than not been
scheduled more than one month apart;
2. In the hearing on April 30, 2003, in particular, the day before
undersigned counsel had filed a Manifestation stating inter alia that
his available dates for the next hearing may be "any Monday,
Wednesday or Thursday for the whole of May 2003 and the first half
of June 2003, except on May 14 and 21" – yet Atty. Manalaysay asked
for the next hearing on June 19 which is already outside or beyond the
dates mentioned in the manifestation, and which was more than 1-1/2
months away, but which the Honorable Court nonetheless granted;
3. Atty. Manalaysay has never been able to present any "good cause"
as to how come he was not able to present Dr. Marquez on April 30,
2003, and then again on June 19, 2003; and as aforesaid, his absence
on March 6, 2003 has not been supported by any medical certificate;
4. The first hearing in the instant case was held on June 13, 2002, thus
it has now been more than one year, or close to 400 days ago since
trial started; neither has there been any authorization from the
Supreme Court that the trial period may exceed 180 days;
5. There has been no statement by the Honorable Court in any of its
orders granting continuance that "the ends of justice served by taking
such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the accused in
a speedy trial;"
6. As above stated, it appears that the prosecution made a false
statement before the Honorable Court in claiming they had asked Dr.
Marquez to testify in the June 19, 2003 hearing, when in fact they had
not.15
Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez had apparently still not received the subpoena issued
by the trial court, because of which the prosecution again failed to present him
as a witness during the trial of July 17, 2003. The prosecution prayed for
continuance, to which the petitioner vigorously objected. The court, however,
granted the motion and reset the trial to August 11, 2003.16
On July 24, 2003, Judge Laurea issued an Order17 inhibiting himself from
hearing the case "to avoid being misunderstood, to preserve his reputation for
probity and objectivity and to live up to the ideal impartial administration of
justice." The case was re-raffled to Branch 170, presided by Judge Benjamin
T. Antonio, who calendared the case for trial on September 8, 2003.
Nevertheless, on August 11, 2003, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration18 of Judge Laurea’s Order dated July 24, 2003, which the
latter denied, on the finding that no cogent reason was presented to reconsider
the same.19
During the hearing on September 8, 2003, Judge Antonio granted the private
prosecutor’s motion to be given five (5) days within which to oppose the
petitioner’s motion to dismiss. Judge Antonio also set the trial on September
18, 2003.20 On the latter date, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order21
denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss. The trial court reasoned that there
was no violation of the petitioner’s right to speedy trial, considering that the
apparent delays could not be attributed to the fault of the prosecution alone.
The trial court noted that the petitioner also sought Postponements of the trials.
Anent the motion for reconsideration of the court’s Order dated June 16, 2003
which denied the petition for bail, the trial court considered the same as having
been abandoned by the petitioner upon the filing of his motion to dismiss the
case without waiting for the resolution of his motion for reconsideration on his
petition for bail.
The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a "Petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition."22 On October 2, 2003, the CA
issued a Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the court of his choice of
remedy within five (5) days from notice thereof. In compliance therewith, the
petitioner filed a manifestation with the appellate court that he had chosen his
petition to be treated as a petition for habeas corpus without prejudice "to the
concomitant application of certiorari if the court considered the same
necessary or appropriate to give effect to the writ of habeas corpus."
The petitioner averred that (a) he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial
and his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case; (b) Judge
Laurea erred in inhibiting himself from the case; (c) the trial court committed
grave abuse of its discretion in denying his petition for bail; and (d) Judge
Antonio had prejudged the case against him.
On December 9, 2003, the CA issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the
petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, for being the wrong or improper remedy, the PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.23
According to the appellate court, while the petitioner manifested his preference
that his petition be treated as a petition for habeas corpus, the same was not
the proper remedy to review and examine the proceedings before the trial court
and as a relief from the petitioner’s perceived oppressive situation in the trial
court. The CA further emphasized that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of
error; that it could not exercise its certiorari jurisdiction over the acts or
omission of the respondent judge as a concomitant remedy; and that the
remedy for habeas corpus and certiorari are different in nature, scope and
purpose. The appellate court declared that the petitioner failed to present any
evidence to prove that there was any intentional or deliberate delay caused to
prejudice him; nor was there any malice in the failure of the prosecution to
promptly serve the subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum to its witnesses.
The court also noted that the resetting of petitioner’s case may also be
attributed to the voluminous work of the RTC involved.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision
contending that (a) the congestion of the trial court’s calendar is not a valid
ground for continuance of the trial; (b) the trial court failed to secure an
extension of time of the trial period from the Supreme Court; (c) the trial court
should have given a precedence to the case, the charge therein being a heinous
crime; (d) his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was proper because his
continued detention had become illegal, following the prosecutor and the trial
court’s violation of his right to a speedy trial, and the trial court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss the case and his petition for bail which was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion; and (e) a writ of habeas corpus may be issued with
the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, the CA denied the
petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court reiterating the grounds contained in his motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision. The petitioner averred that the appellate
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in rendering its resolution, as well as the resolution denying his
motion for reconsideration thereof.
In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial
court’s order denying his petition for bail, motion to dismiss the case, and
Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. The OSG posits that the petitioner was not
deprived of his constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case as well
as under the Speedy Trial Act.
The issues for resolution are the following: (a) whether or not the decision of
the CA is already final and executory; (b) whether the proper remedy from the
appellate court’s denial of a petitioner for a writ if habeas corpus is a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and (c) if in the affirmative,
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ.
On the first issue, we find and so rule that the petitioner’s recourse to this Court
via a petition for certiorari from the decision of the CA dismissing his petition
for a writ of habeas corpus is inappropriate. Section 39 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 provides that the period for appeal from the judgment of any court in
habeas corpus cases shall be forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the
judgment appealed from. While the said provision was not incorporated in the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court approved Administrative Matter No.
01-1-03-SC amending Section 3, Rule 41of the said Rules, which took effect
on July 15, 2001, thus:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases.—The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from
notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus
cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Following the rule, the petitioner should have appealed to this Court from the
CA decision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as well as the
denial of his motion for reconsideration thereof; instead, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The
well-settled rule is that certiorari is not available where the aggrieved party’s
remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the
reason being that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other
adequate remedy. The existence and availability of the right to appeal are
antithetical to the availment of the special civil action for certiorari. These two
remedies are mutually exclusive.24 An appeal in this case would still have
been a speedy and adequate remedy. Consequently, when the petitioner filed
his petition in this Court, the decision of the CA was already final and
executory.
It bears stressing that a decision in a habeas corpus action stands in no different
position than with any other proceeding and if the appealed decision is to be
reviewed by an appellate court, the remedy is by writ of error because the error
committed by the court is an error of judgment and not an error of
jurisdiction.25
Besides, as correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas corpus is not the proper
remedy to assail the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s motion to dismiss
the case, the denial of the petition for bail, as well as the voluntary inhibition
of Judge Laurea.
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte
Billings,26 it was held that habeas corpus is that of a civil proceeding in
character. It seeks the enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not
to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint is made, but into the
right of liberty, notwithstanding the act and the immediate purpose to be served
is relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even when instituted to arrest a
criminal prosecution and secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ
of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and prosecutes a case in that
court.27
Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute
for the trial court’s function.28 It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or
writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of
error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry
in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the
proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void.29 The
writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the
regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover,
habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial.30 The orderly course
of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to
the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was
held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of
reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of
jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that
constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not
destroyed.31 It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process,
mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are
not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is
not illegal.32
Habeas corpus is a summary remedy. It is analogous to a proceeding in rem
when instituted for the sole purpose of having the person of restraint presented
before the judge in order that the cause of his detention may be inquired into
and his statements final.33 The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the
prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds him in what is alleged
to be the unlawful authority.34 Hence, the only parties before the court are the
petitioner (prisoner) and the person holding the petitioner in custody, and the
only question to be resolved is whether the custodian has authority to deprive
the petitioner of his liberty.35 The writ may be denied if the petitioner fails to
show facts that he is entitled thereto ex merito justicias.36
A writ of habeas corpus, which is regarded as a "palladium of liberty" is a
prerogative writ which does not issue as a matter of right but in the sound
discretion of the court or judge. It, is, however, a writ of right on proper
formalities being made by proof.37 Resort to the writ is to inquire into the
criminal act of which a complaint is made but unto the right of liberty,
notwithstanding the act, and the immediate purpose to be served is relief from
illegal restraint.38 The primary, if not the only object of the writ of habeas
corpus ad subjuciendum is to determine the legality of the restraint under
which a person is held.39
Our review of the petitioner’s material averments in his petition before the CA
reveals that it was a "petition for habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a petition
for a writ of certiorari" The petitioner assailed therein the orders of the trial
court denying his petition for bail and his motion to dismiss on the ground that
he was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case against him,
and questioned Judge Laurea’s order of inhibition. We agree with the CA that
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus cannot be joined with the special civil
action for certiorari because the two remedies are governed by a different set
of rules. Rule 2, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court mandates that the joinder
of causes of action shall not include special actions or actions governed by
special rules, thus proscribing the joinder of a special proceeding with a special
civil action.
We also agree with the ruling of the CA that a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The writ of habeas corpus is a
collateral attack on the processes, orders, or judgment of the trial court, while
certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders, or judgment on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches only jurisdictional errors. It has no
other use, except to bring before the court a record material to be considered
in exercising jurisdiction. A writ of certiorari reaches the record. On the other
hand, a writ of habeas corpus reaches the body but not the record; it also
reaches jurisdictional matters but does not reach the record. However, when
jurisdiction is obtained by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, to bring the
body of the person whose liberty is involved into court, and if it is necessary,
to provide the record upon which the detention is based, that may be
accomplished by using a writ of certiorari as an ancillary proceeding, i.e., it is
subordinate to or in aid of the primary action for the purpose of impeaching
the record. When a writ of certiorari is issued as the foundation of jurisdiction
to bring it and direct upon the validity of a judicial determination by any body
or officer, jurisdictional questions only are reached, and such questions
pertaining to the detention made by the officer or body particularly complained
of.40
The petitioner manifested to the appellate court that his petition should be
treated as a petition for habeas corpus. Even then, the CA rightly dismissed
the petition because the petitioner failed to establish his right to the writ. The
records show that the petitioner was charged with rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua and was detained based on the said charge; hence, if the evidence of
his guilt is strong, he shall not be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.41 There is no question that the trial court had jurisdiction
over the offense charged and over the person of the petitioner. The jail warden
has the authority and, in fact, is mandated to detain the petitioner until granted
bail by the court, or the case against him dismissed, or until he is acquitted
after trial. The petitioner failed to establish that his incarceration pendente lite
was illegal, and likewise failed to establish exceptional circumstances
warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus by the appellate
court.1a\^/phi1.net
In Galvez v. Court of Appeals,42 the Court ruled that a petition for habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the denial thereof:
… The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a
petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by
the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked,
and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate
relief was also available there.43
The remedy of the petitioner from the Order of the trial court denying his
petition for bail was to file a petition for certiorari in the CA if the trial court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the said order.44 If the petitioner had done so, his
petition would have been granted because as gleaned from the assailed order
of the trial court, it failed to summarize the testimonies of the private
complainant and that of her mother. Hence, such order is invalid.45 The trial
court would have had to issue another order containing the summary of the
testimonies of the private complainant and her mother, including its findings
and conclusions. However, the petitioner would still not be entitled to be
released from detention in the meantime.
It bears stressing that under the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 13746 of
the Rules of Court, the voluntary inhibition of a Judge is addressed to his sound
discretion for just or valid reasons, the primary consideration being that the
people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired.47 The petitioner should
have thus filed a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition in the CA, instead of
a petition for habeas corpus.
In cases where the right of the accused to a speedy trial is violated by the
prosecution, the remedy lies in the procedure provided for under Republic Act
No. 8493, as implemented by Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Section 8 of the said Rule provides:
SEC. 8. Sanctions.— In any case in which private counsel for the accused, the
public attorney, or the prosecutor:
 (a) Knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing that
a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) Files a motion solely for delay which he knows is totally frivolous
and without merit;
(c) Makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which
he knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or
(d) Willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification consistent
with the provisions hereof, the court may punish such counsel,
attorney, or prosecutor, as follows:
(1) By imposing on a counsel privately retained in connection
with the defense of an accused, a fine not exceeding twenty
thousand pesos (₱20,000.00);
(2) By imposing on any appointed counsel de oficio, public
attorney, or prosecutor a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos (₱5,000.00); and
(3) By denying any defense counsel or prosecutor the right to
practice before the court trying the case for a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days. The punishment provided for by
this section shall be without prejudice to any appropriate
criminal action or other sanction authorized under these
Rules.
If the trial court acted with grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess
of lack of jurisdiction in granting the prosecution’s motion for the resetting of
the trial over the petitioner’s objections, the more appropriate remedy would
have been to file a petition for certiorari and/or a petition for mandamus to
compel the trial court to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rule
for trial and termination of the case.
It was inappropriate for the petitioner to file a petition for habeas corpus
assailing the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss the case for
failure to comply with the timeline provided for by the said Rules. Reading
and evaluating the assailed Order of the trial court dated September 18, 2000,
it cannot be gainsaid that the court violated the right of the petitioner to speedy
trial. Thus:
The instant motion is anchored on the alleged violation of and/or to enforce
the right of the accused to speedy trial. In invoking such right, the accused
contends that the failure of the prosecution to present the medico-legal officer
who examined the victim on two (2) occasions, and the non-appearance of the
private prosecutor on one occasion caused undue delay in the proceedings of
this case.
The prosecution vigorously opposed the Motion to Dismiss and claimed that
since the prosecution has not yet rested its case, the Court may not be able to
appreciate the merits of the instant motion in the light of the unfinished
presentation of evidence for the prosecution and that the grounds relied by the
defense do not touch on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but rather on the alleged
delay and failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.
After due consideration, the Court finds the instant motion
untenable.l^vvphi1.net The alleged delay and failure to present the medico-
legal officer cannot be attributed to the fault of the prosecution and/or the
Court. The prosecution and the Court cannot encroach on the right of the
medico-legal officer to appear inasmuch as his schedule conflicted with the
hearings set for his appearance. Moreover, delays assailed by defense counsel
that violated accused’ right to speedy trial are not all at the instance of the
prosecution. In fact, the defense, contributed to the delay since the former
defense counsel and even the present defense counsel sought postponements
of the hearings.
Be that as it may, despite the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer, the
Court (Branch 169) proceeded in resolving the Petition for Bail of the accused
(albeit unfavorable to the cause of the accused) on the basis of the sole
testimony of the complainant, which is backed up by several jurisprudence to
this effect. The defense, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of said denial after
he has filed a Motion to Dismiss. The filing of these pleadings adds to the
delay until the Presiding Judge who denied the Petition for Bail voluntarily
inhibited himself from this case. Then when the Motion to Dismiss was set for
hearing, the Court, in an attempt to expedite the proceedings, suggested for the
parties to stipulate on the medical findings of the medico-legal officer so as to
dispense with his presentation. Defense counsel, however, would not want to
enter into such a stipulation. Hence, another delay.48
We agree with the petitioner that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus may be filed if one is deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of
the case under Article IV, Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution and of his right
to due process.49 However, the petitioner never invoked in the trial court his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the case against him. What he
invoked was his right to a speedy trial under Rule 119 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure. He invoked his constitutional right to a speedy disposition
of the case against him, for the first time, only in the Court of Appeals when
he filed his petition for habeas corpus.
Even then, the petitioner failed to establish his claim that he was deprived of
his right to a speedy disposition of the case. In Marilyn Corpuz, et al., v.
Sandiganbayan,50 the Court had the occasion to state –
The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the
case against him was designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by
holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and
to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to
proceed with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of a case is violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. The
inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a
relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.
While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,
expeditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too
long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift, but deliberate. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be
borne in mind that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the
Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to give meaning to
that intent.
The Court emphasized in the same case that:
A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused
necessarily compels the court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered:
(a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendant’s assertion
of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed
in the light of the interest of the defendant that the speedy trial was designed
to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize
anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the Possibility that his
defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system. There is also prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable
to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Even if the accused is not
imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty
and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His
financial resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is
subjected to public obloquy.
Delay is a two-edged sword. It is the government that bears the burden of
proving its case beyond reasonable doubt. The passage of time may make it
difficult or impossible for the government to carry its burden. The Constitution
and the Rules do not require impossibilities or extraordinary efforts, diligence
or exertion from courts or the prosecutor, nor contemplate that such right shall
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals.
As held in Williams v. United States, for the government to sustain its right to
try the accused despite a delay, it must show two things: (a) that the accused
suffered no serious prejudice beyond that which ensued from the ordinary and
inevitable delay; and (b) that there was no more delay than is reasonably
attributable to the ordinary processes of justice.
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State
for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State. For instance, a deliberate attempt to delay
the trial in order to hamper or prejudice the defense should be weighted heavily
against the State. Also, it is improper for the prosecutor to intentionally delay
to gain some tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass or prejudice
him. On the other hand, the heavy case load of the prosecution or a missing
witness should be weighted less heavily against the State.
In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on February 7, 2002. In the meantime,
he was able to present only two witnesses. The petitioner failed to terminate
the cross-examination of the private complainant by the year 2002. The Court
cannot determine the reason for the delay because the records of the RTC are
not before it. Neither of the parties made any explanation for the delay; nor is
there any showing that the counsel of the petitioner complained about the
delay. Aside from the petitioner’s claim that the private prosecutor failed to
give good cause for his failure to present Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez during the
trial dates April 30, 2003 and June 19, 2003, as well as to substantiate his
absence during the trial of March 6, 2003 with a medical certificate, the
petitioner failed to support his claim in his pleadings before the CA and in this
Court. On the other hand, the counsel of the petitioner was absent during the
trial on April 30, 2003 because he had to attend an execution sale in Cavite.
The petitioner’s counsel gave priority to the execution sale and asked for a
resetting despite the fact that his client, the petitioner, was detained for a quasi-
heinous crime. While it is true that the trial was reset to June 19, 2003, or more
than one month from April 30, 2003, the petitioner’s counsel himself
manifested that he was available for trial during the first half of June 2003.
There was a difference of only four (4) days from the trial date set by the court
and the available dates suggested by the petitioner’s counsel. It bears stressing
that trial dates cannot be set solely at the convenience of the petitioner’s
counsel. The trial dates available in the calendar of the court and of the
prosecutor must also be taken into account.1ªvvphi1.nét

Hence, it cannot be said that the petitioner was deprived of his right to a speedy
disposition of the case simply because the private prosecutor failed to submit
a medical certificate for his absence during the trial of March 6, 2003. The
petitioner could have asked the court to cite the private prosecutor in contempt
of court for his failure to submit the said certificate; he failed to do so.
Moreover, the petitioner failed to establish any serious prejudice by the delay
of the trial, and that the State deliberately delayed the trial to prejudice him.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack

of merit. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 139789. May 12, 2000
ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER and
SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, respondents. Mesm
G.R. No. 139808. May 12, 2000
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I. BILDNER, and SYLVIA
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with
her in conjugal bliss? The answer is no. Marital rights including coverture and
living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of
habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention,1 or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the
one entitled thereto.2 Slx
"Habeas corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding
him to produce the body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with
the day and cause of his capture and detention, to do, submit to, and receive
whatsoever the court or judge awarding the writ shall consider in that behalf."3
It is a high prerogative, common-law writ, of ancient origin, the great object
of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient
cause.4 It is issued when one is deprived of liberty or is wrongfully prevented
from exercising legal custody over another person.5
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio6 is to reverse the decision7 of the Court of
Appeals and its resolution8 dismissing the application for habeas corpus to
have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce
consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio9 is to annul that portion
of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation
rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from
enforcing the visitation rights.
The undisputed facts are as follows: Scslx
Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio.
Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years of age possessed of extensive property
valued at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio was
Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club.
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted
matrimony and lived together for a period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they
separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at
Urdaneta Condominium, Ayala Ave., Makati City when he was in Manila and
at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, Erlinda lived in Antipolo City.
Out of their marriage, the spouses had six (6) children, namely: Ramon Ilusorio
(age 55); Erlinda Ilusorio Bildner (age 52); Maximo (age 50); Sylvia (age 49);
Marietta (age 48); and Shereen (age 39).
On December 30, 1997, upon Potenciano’s arrival from the United States, he
stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. The children,
Sylvia and Erlinda (Lin), alleged that during this time, their mother gave
Potenciano an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant
drug prescribed by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence,
Potenciano’s health deteriorated.
On February 25, 1998, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court, Antipolo
City a petition10 for guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano
Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City,
Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. Slxsc
On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged
that respondents11 refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
After due hearing, on April 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered decision
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, judgment is hereby
rendered:
"(1) Ordering, for humanitarian consideration and upon petitioner’s
manifestation, respondents Erlinda K. Ilusorio Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio-
Yap, the administrator of Cleveland Condominium or anywhere in its place,
his guards and Potenciano Ilusorio’s staff especially Ms. Aurora Montemayor
to allow visitation rights to Potenciano Ilusorio’s wife, Erlinda Ilusorio and all
her children, notwithstanding any list limiting visitors thereof, under penalty
of contempt in case of violation of refusal thereof; xxx
"(2) ORDERING that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be recalled
and the herein petition for habeas corpus be DENIED DUE COURSE, as it is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject
of the petition.
"SO ORDERED."12
Hence, the two petitions, which were consolidated and are herein jointly
decided.
As heretofore stated, a writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention,13 or by which the rightful custody of a person is
withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues
to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary
but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has
later become arbitrary.14 It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom.15 Jksmä â Ó
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into
all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.16
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal
and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.17 The illegal restraint of
liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.18
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or
deprivation of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio is about 86 years
of age, or under medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on age or medical condition
but on the capacity of the individual to discern his actions.
After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful
restraint on his liberty.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not
request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife
and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not
object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio’s mental state, the Court of Appeals observed
that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions
to the satisfaction of the court.
Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices.
In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts
to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family
members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He
made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from
leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true
restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano
Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice.
Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this
will run against his fundamental constitutional right. Esä m
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights
in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
The ruling is not consistent with the finding of subject’s sanity.

When the court ordered the grant of visitation rights, it also emphasized that
the same shall be enforced under penalty of contempt in case of violation or
refusal to comply. Such assertion of raw, naked power is unnecessary.

The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case did not involve the right of
a parent to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so
without threat of any penalty attached to the exercise of his right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with

his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne process. That is a matter
beyond judicial authority and is best left to the man and woman’s free choice.

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 139789, the Court DISMISSES the petition for

lack of merit. No costs.

In G. R. No. 139808, the Court GRANTS the petition and nullifies the decision
of the Court of Appeals insofar as it gives visitation rights to respondent
Erlinda K. Ilusorio. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122954 February 15, 2000
NORBERTO FERIA Y PACQUING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF
CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA, METRO MANILA (IN PLACE OF
THE JAIL WARDEN OF THE MANILA CITY JAIL), THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH II, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANILA, and THE CITY PROSECUTOR, CITY OF MANILA,
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
The mere loss or destruction of the records of a criminal case subsequent to
conviction of the accused will not render the judgment of conviction void, nor
will it warrant the release of the convict by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus.
The proper remedy is the reconstitution of judicial records which is as much a
duty of the prosecution as of the defense.
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are (1) the Decision dated April
28, 1995, of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the
dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus filed by petitioner, and (2) the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1995, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration. As hereafter elucidated, we sustain the judgment
of respondent appellate court.
Based on the available records and the admissions of the parties, the
antecedents of the present petition are as follows:
Petitioner Norberto Feria y Pacquing has been under detention since May 21,
1981, up to present1 by reason of his conviction of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, in Criminal Case No. 60677, by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 2, for the jeepney hold-up and killing of United States Peace Corps
Volunteer Margaret Viviene Carmona.
Some twelve (12) years later, or on June 9, 1993, petitioner sought to be
transferred from the Manila City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections in
Muntinlupa City,2 but the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail informed the
Presiding Judge of the RTC-Manila, Branch 2, that the transfer cannot be
effected without the submission of the requirements, namely, the Commitment
Order or Mittimus, Decision, and Information.3 It was then discovered that the
entire records of the case, including the copy of the judgment, were missing.
In response to the inquiries made by counsel of petitioner, both the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Manila and the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 2 attested to the fact that the records of Criminal Case No.
60677 could not be found in their respective offices. Upon further inquiries,
the entire records appear to have been lost or destroyed in the fire which
occurred at the second and third floor of the Manila City Hall on November 3,
1986.4
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Habeas Corpus5 with the Supreme Court against the Jail Warden of the Manila
City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and
the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on
the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal
and violative of his constitutional right to due process.
In its Resolution dated October 10, 1994,6 the Second Division of this Court
resolved —
. . . (a) to ISSUE the Writ of Habeas Corpus; (b) to ORDER the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to conduct an
immediate RAFFLE of this case among the incumbent judges thereof;
and (c) to REQUIRE [1] the Judge to whom this case is raffled to SET
the case for HEARING on Thursday, October 13, 1994 at 8:30 A.M.,
try and decide the same on the merits and thereafter FURNISH this
Court with a copy of his decision thereon; [2] the respondents to make
a RETURN of the Writ on or before the close of office hours on
Wednesday, October 12, 1994 and APPEAR PERSONALLY and
PRODUCE the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing on the aforesaid
date and time of hearing to the Judge to whom this case is raffled, and
[3] the Director General, Philippine National Police, through his duly
authorized representative(s) to SERVE the Writ and Petition, and
make a RETURN thereof as provided by law and, specifically, his
duly authorized representative(s) to APPEAR PERSONALLY and
ESCORT the person of Norberto Feria y Pa[c]quing at the aforesaid
date and time of hearing.
The case was then raffled to Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
which on November 15, 1994, after hearing, issued an Order7 dismissing the
case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not
invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the
petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records
of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.
Petitioner duly appealed said Order to the Court of Appeals, which on April
28, 1995, rendered the assailed Decisions8 affirming the decision of the trial
court with the modification that "in the interest of orderly administration of
justice" and "under the peculiar facts of the case" petitioner may be transferred
to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City without submission of the
requirements (Mittimus, Decision and Information) but without prejudice to
the reconstitution of the original records.
The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order having been denied for
lack of merit,9 petitioner is now before us on certiorari, assigning the
following errors of law:10
I. WHETHER OR NOT, UNDER THE PECULIAR
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE, WHERE THE RECORDS OF
CONVICTION WERE LOST, THE PETITIONER'S CONTINUED
INCARCERATION IS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE LAW.
COROLLARY TO THIS, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS' RESOLUTION, AFFIRMING THE DENIAL OF
HEREIN APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS, IN
CONTEMPLATION OF LAW, A JUDGMENT OR A
SUBSTITUTE JUDGMENT, WHICH CAN BE UTILIZED AS A
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR HIS INCARCERATION.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RECONSTITUTION OF OFFICIAL
RECORDS LOST/DESTROYED SHOULD BE INITIATED BY
THE GOVERNMENT AND ITS ORGANS, WHO ARE IN
CUSTODY OF SUCH, OR BY THE PRISONER, WHOSE
LIBERTY IS RESTRAINED.
Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a
valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court,11 and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of
Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of
such judgment. Petitioner further contends that our ruling in Gunabe v.
Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 993, 995 (1947), that "reconstitution is as much
the duty of the prosecution as of the defense" has been modified or abandoned
in the subsequent case of Ordonez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152, 155
(1994), wherein we held that "[i]t is not the fault of the prisoners that the
records cannot now be found. If anyone is to be blamed, it surely cannot be the
prisoners, who were not the custodians of those records."
In its Comment,12 the Office of the Solicitor General contends that the sole
inquiry in this habeas corpus proceeding is whether or not there is legal basis
to detain petitioner. The OSG maintains that public respondents have more
than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner's
continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under
Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized. Petitioner's remedy,
therefore, is not a petition for habeas corpus but a proceeding for the
reconstitution of judicial records.1âwphi1.nêt
The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus, whose origin is traced to antiquity,
was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.13 It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention
examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue
ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority.14 Consequently,
the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is
void as to such excess.15 Petitioner's claim is anchored on the first ground
considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the
lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his
constitutional right to due process.
Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is
sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner
which serves as the legal basis for his detention. Petitioner made judicial
admissions, both verbal and written, that he was charged with and convicted
of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to suffer imprisonment
"habang buhay".
In its Order dated October 17, 1994, the RTC-Manila, Branch 9, made the
finding that —16
During the trial and on manifestation and arguments made by the
accused, his learned counsel and Solicitor Alexander G. Gesmundo
who appeared for the respondents, it appears clear and indubitable
that:
 (A) Petitioner had been charged with Robbery with Homicide in
Criminal Case No. 60677, Illegal Possession of Firearm in Criminal
Case No. 60678 and Robbery in Band in Criminal Case No. 60867. . .
. In Criminal Case No. 60677 (Robbery with Homicide) the accused
admitted in open Court that a decision was read to him in open Court
by a personnel of the respondent Court (RTC Branch II) sentencing
him to Life Imprisonment (Habang buhay). . . (emphasis supplied).
Further, in the Urgent Motion for the Issuance of Commitment Order of the
Above Entitled Criminal Case dated June 8, 1993,17 petitioner himself stated
that —
COMES NOW, the undersigned accused in the above entitled criminal
case and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully move:
1. That in 1981 the accused was charge of (sic) Robbery with
Homicide;
2. That after four years of trial, the court found the accused guilty and
given a Life Sentence in a promulgation handed down in 1985;
(emphasis supplied).
3. That after the sentence was promulgated, the Presiding Judge told
the councel (sic) that accused has the right to appeal the decision;
4. That whether the de oficio counsel appealed the decision is beyond
the accused comprehension (sic) because the last time he saw the
counsel was when the decision was promulgated.
5. That everytime there is change of Warden at the Manila City Jail
attempts were made to get the Commitment Order so that transfer of
the accused to the Bureau of Corrections can be affected, but all in
vain;
Petitioner's declarations as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him under Section 23 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. This rule is based
upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself,
unless such declaration were true,18 particularly with respect to such grave
matter as his conviction for the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Further,
under Section 4 of Rule 129, "[a]n admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof.
The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made
through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." Petitioner does
not claim any mistake nor does he deny making such admissions.
The records also contain a certified true copy of the Monthly Report dated
January 198519 of then Judge Rosalio A. De Leon, attesting to the fact that
petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide on January
11, 1985. Such Monthly Report constitutes an entry in official records under
Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, which is prima facie
evidence of facts therein stated.
Public respondents likewise presented a certified hue copy of People's Journal
dated January 18, 1985, page 2,20 issued by the National Library, containing a
short news article that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and was sentenced to "life imprisonment." However, newspaper
articles amount to "hearsay evidence, twice removed"21 and are therefore not
only inadmissible but without any probative value at all whether objected to
or not,22 unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted. In this case, the news article is admissible only as evidence that such
publication does exist with the tenor of the news therein stated.
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests
on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return
is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face
shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on
petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent
effect of such process.23 If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful
public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity
of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the
restraint is illegal. Thus, Section 13 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 13. When the return evidence, and when only a plea. — If it
appears that the prisoner is in custody under a warrant of commitment
in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie
evidence of the cause of restraint, but if he is restrained of his liberty
by any alleged private authority, the return shall be considered only as
a plea of the facts therein set forth, and the party claiming the custody
must prove such facts.
Public respondents having sufficiently shown good ground for the detention,
petitioner's release from confinement is not warranted under Section 4 of Rule
102 of the Rules of Court which provides that —
 Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears
that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after
the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a
person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In the case of Gomez v. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil. 458 (1946), accused was
convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape, and was committed to the New
Bilibid Prison. Pending appeal with the Court of Appeals, the records of the
case were, for reasons undisclosed, completely destroyed or lost. Accused then
filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme
Court. The Court denied the petition, ruling thus:
The petition does not make out a case. The Director of Prisons is
holding the prisoner under process issued by a competent court in
pursuance of a lawful, subsisting judgment. The prisoner himself
admits the legality of his detention. The mere loss or destruction of the
record of the case does not invalidate the judgment or the commitment,
or authorize the prisoner's release.
Note further that, in the present case, there is also no showing that petitioner
duly appealed his conviction of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, hence
for all intents and purposes, such judgment has already become final and
executory. When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the
party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to
collateral attack by habeas corpus.24 Put another way, in order that a judgment
may be subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, it must be void for lack
of jurisdiction.25 Thus, petitioner's invocation of our ruling in Reyes v. Director
of Prisons, supra, is misplaced. In the Reyes case, we granted the writ and
ordered the release of the prisoner on the ground that "[i]t does not appear that
the prisoner has been sentenced by any tribunal duly established by a
competent authority during the enemy occupation" and not because there were
no copies of the decision and information. Here, a copy of the mittimus is
available. And, indeed, petitioner does not raise any jurisdictional issue.
The proper remedy in this case is for either petitioner or public respondents to
initiate the reconstitution of the judgment of the case under either Act No.
3110,26 the general law governing reconstitution of judicial records, or under
the inherent power of courts to reconstitute at any time the records of their
finished cases in accordance with Section 5 (h) of Rule 135 of the Rules of
Court.27 Judicial records are subject to reconstitution without exception,
whether they refer to pending cases or finished cases.28 There is no sense in
limiting reconstitution to pending cases; finished cases are just as important as
pending ones, as evidence of rights and obligations finally adjudicated.29
Petitioner belabors the fact that no initiative was taken by the Government to
reconstitute the missing records of the trial court. We reiterate, however, that
"reconstitution is as much the duty of the prosecution as of the defense." 30
Petitioner's invocation of Ordoñez v. Director of Prisons, 235 SCRA 152
(1994), is misplaced since the grant of the petition for habeas corpus therein
was premised on the loss of records prior to the filing of Informations against
the prisoners, and therefore "[t]he government has failed to show that their
continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of
charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever." In this case, the
records were lost after petitioner, by his own admission, was already convicted
by the trial court of the offense charged. Further, the same incident which gave
rise to the filing of the Information for Robbery with Homicide also gave rise
to another case for Illegal Possession of Firearm,31 the records of which could
be of assistance in the reconstitution of the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.