Adlawan vs.

Adlawan
G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan, the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador Adlawan filed an
ejejctment suit against the siblings of his father, respondents Narcisa 75 and Emeterio Adlawan.
Being the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating the house and lot owned
by his father. However, he alleged that out of respect and generosity to respondents, he granted
their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for
the property arise. Later, when he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, they
refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title. He then also filed a complaint for ejectment.
In answer, the respondents, 70 and 59 years of age respectively denied that they begged petitioner
to allow them to say on the property since they have been staying there since birth. They claimed
that the said lot was originally registered in the name of their deceased parents, Ramon and Oligia
Adlawan. Spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the renovation of their house. Since
they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they transferred ownership of the lot to Dominador who
was the only one in the family who had a college education. Dominador and his wife, Graciana
did not disturb respondents’ possession of the property until they died. They also argued that even
if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful
because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner can validly maintain the instant case of ejectment.
HELD:
No. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador.
However, the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would
end up proving that he is not the sole owner of the subject lot. This so because Dominador was
survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the
death of Dominador. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the
subject lot and house. Petitioner then contended that even granting that he is a co-owner, he can
file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. This article covers all kinds of
actions for the recovery of possession. It includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de
reinvindicacion). A co-owner may bring such action without the necessity of joining all the other
co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners.
It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the petitioner alone who
claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should
be dismissed. According to the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, he explained
that “a co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other coowners
as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for
the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-
ownership, the action will not prosper. In this case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the
suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of
Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear
therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not
recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of
his father, Dominador.

Oesmer v. Paraiso Development Corporation

G.R. NO. 157493, February 5, 2007
FACTS:
Petitioners together with Adolfo Oesmer and Jesus Oesmer, are brothers and sisters, and the co-
owners of undivided shares of two parcels of agricultural and tenanted land which were acquired
by right of succession. Respondent Paraiso Development Corporation is known to be engaged in
the real estatebusiness.This case originated when Ernesto Oesmer, one of the co-owners of the
subject land, met with the President of respondent corporation for the purpose of brokering the
sale of petitioners’ properties to respondent corporation. Pursuant to the said meeting, a Contract
to Sell was drafted wherebypetitioners Ernesto and Enriqueta subsequently signed the aforesaid
Contract to Sell. A check in the amount of P100, 000.00, payable to Ernesto, was given as option
money. Sometime thereafter, Rizalino,Leonora, Bibiano, Jr., and Librado also signed the said
Contract to Sell. However, two of the brothers,Adolfo and Jesus, did not sign the document.
Later on, petitioners informed the respondent, through a letter, of their intention to rescind the
Contract to Sell and to return the amount of P100,000.00 given by respondent as option money.
Respondent did not respond to the aforesaid letter. Afterwards, herein petitioners, together with
Adolfo and Jesus, filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity or for Annulment of Option
Agreement or Contract to Sell with Damages before the RTC.
The trial court held that the assailed Contract to Sell is valid and binding only to the undivided
proportionate share of Ernesto who signed the document and received the check. Ernesto was
ordered to execute the Contract of Absolute Sale concerning his 1/8 share over the subject two
parcels of land in favor of respondent
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of RTC whereby it declared that the
Contract to Sell is valid and binding with respect to the undivided proportionate share of the six
signatories of the document.

iSSUE: Whether or not the contract to sell binds the co-owners of Ernesto.

HELD:
Yes. The contract to sell was valid and binding. In contrast to the contention of the five co-owners
who affixed their signatures in the contract to sell that their signatures do not confer authority to
Ernesto as an agent to sell their shares, the Court held that they were selling the same directly and
in their own right. Hence, written authority is no longer necessary since they were selling their
shares in their own capacity as owners.
IN addition, the petitioners, being owners of their respective undivided shares in the subject
properties, can dispose of their shares even without the consent of all the co-heirs. Article 493 of
the Civil Code provides that, “Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.”
Consequently, even without the consent of the two co-heirs, Adolfo and Jesus, the Contract to Sell
was valid and binding with respect to the 6/8 proportionate shares of the petitioners.

AGUIRRE, ET AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 122249 January 29, 2004

FACTS:
Leocadio Medrano and his first wife Emilia owned a piece of land. After the death of
Emilia, Leocadio married his second wife Miguela. When Leocadio died, all his heirs agreed that
Sixto Medrano, a child of the first marriage, should manage and administer the said property. After
Sixto died, his heirs learned that he had executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property in
which he falsely stated that he was the only heir of Leocadio. It turned out that while Sixto were
still alive, he sold a portion of the subject land tp Tiburcio Balitaan and another portion to Maria
Bacong, Maria Bacong later sold the said portion to Rosendo Bacong. Petitioners, all heirs of
Leocadio who were affected by the sale demanded reconveyance of the portions sold by Sixto but
the 3 vendees refused. Resultantly, petitioners filed a suit against them seeking the nullity of the
documents and partition thereof. The vendees contended that they acquired the property under the
valid deed of sale and petitioners’ cause of action was barred by laches and prescription. Tiburcio
also contended that he is an innocent purchaser for value.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not there was a valid sale between Sixto Medrano and the three purchases
considering the fact that it was made without the consent of the co-owners.

HELD:
Under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, a sale by a co-owner of the whole property as
his will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale). The provision clearly provides that the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share,
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor’s share in the partition of the property
owned in common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owner is not null and void; only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
It is clear therefore that the deed of sale executed by Sixto in favor of Tiburcio Balitaan is a valid
conveyance only insofar as the share of Sixto in the co-ownership is concerned. Acts which may
be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse in so far as co-owners are
concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipts of rentals, fruits or profits from
the property, the erection of buildings and fences and planting of trees thereon, and the payment
of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and
convincing evidence that he exercised such acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an
ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.

Thus, in order that a co-owner’s possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the
other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners;
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been known to the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.

Tested against these guidelines, the respondents failed to present competent evidence that the acts
of Sixto adversely and clearly repudiate the existing co-ownership among the heirs of Leocadio
Medrano. Respondent’s reliance on the tax declaration in the name of Sixto Medrano is unworthy
of credit since we have held on several occasions that tax declarations by themselves do not
conclusively prove title to land. Further, respondents failed to show that the Affidavit executed by
Sixto to the effect that he is the sole owner of the subject property was known or made known to
the other co-heirs of Leocadio Medrano.
Robles vs. CA
328 SCRA 97
GR no. 123509
March 14, 2000
Topic: Property; Quieting of title
Facts
Leon Robles primitively owned a land in Morong Rizal. When Leon died, his son Silvino Robles
inherited the land. Both of them declared the property under their name for taxation purposes.
Upon the death of Silvino, his widow Maria dela Cruz and his children inherited the property.
They took adverse possession of it and paid the taxes thereon. The task of cultivating the land was
assigned to one of Silvino’s son, Lucio Roles while the payment of the taxes was entrusted to their
half brother, Hilario Robles.
In 1962, for unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in the name of Silvino
Robles was canceled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father of Andrea Robles who is the
wife of defendant Hilario Robles. Thereafter, Exequiel Ballena secured a loan from the Antipolo
Rural Bank, using the tax declaration as security. Somehow, the tax declaration was transferred to
the name of Antipolo Rural Bank and later on, was transferred to the name of defendant Hilario
Robles and his wife. In 1996, Andrea Robles secured a loan from the Cadona Rural Bank, Inc.,
using the tax declaration as security. For failure to pay the mortgage debt, foreclosure proceedings
were had and defendant Rural Bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale in
October 1968.
The spouses Hilario Robles failed to redeem the property and so the tax declaration was transferred
in the name of defendant Rural Bank. On September 25, 1987, defendant Rural Bank sold the same
to the Spouses Vergel Santos and Ruth Santos who took possession of the property and was able
to secure Free Patent No. IV-1-010021 in their names.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have the appropriate title that is essential for them to avail
themselves of the remedy of quieting of title.
Held:
Yes. The land had previously been occupied by Leon and later by Silvino Robles, petitioners’
predecessor-in-interest, as evidenced by the different tax declarations issued in their names. Also,
the petitioners continued occupying and possessing the land from the death of Silvino in 1942 until
they were allegedly ousted therefrom in 1988.
The title of the petitioners over the land in dispute is superior to the title of the registered owner
which is a total nullity. The long and continued possession of petitioners under a valid claim of
title cannot be defeated by the claim of a registered owner whose title is defective from the
beginning since Hilario mortgaged the disputed property to the Rural Bank of Cardona in his
capacity as a mere co-owner thereof. Clearly, the said transaction did not divest them of title to the
property at the time of the institution of the Complaint for quieting of title
GALVEZ vs CA
Facts:
Ulpiano and Paz Galvez are children of Timotea F. Galvez, who died intestate. However, Ulpiano
predeceased Timotea and was survived by his son, Porfirio Galvez. Timotea left a parcel of land
which passed by succession, both to Timotea’s daughter, Paz Galvez, and to the former’s grandson,
Porfirio, the latter succeeding by right of representation as the son of Ulpiano. Paz Galvez executed
an affidavit of adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful owner of the said property, which
said property was sold to Carlos Tam without the knowledge and consent of Porfirio Galvez.
Subsequently, Carlos Tam sold the same to Tycoon Properties, Inc.
Issues:
Won respondent's claim over the subject property, which is based on an implied trust, has already
prescribed because the action was filed 24 years after petitioner repudiated the said trust.
Held:
No, prescription will not lie. This case is governed by the rules on co-ownership23 since both Paz
Galvez and Porfirio Galvez are obviously co-owners of the disputed property having inherited the
same from a common ancestor. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] prescription shall
not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."

Roque v. Intermediate Appellate Court

165 SCRA 118
Facts:
Isabela Roque (Roque of Isabela Roque Timber Enterprises) hired the Manila Bay Lighterage
Corp. (Manila Bay) to load and carry its logs from Palawan to North Harbor, Manila. The logs
were insured with Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. (Pioneer). The logs never reached Manila
due to certain circumstances (as alleged by Roque and found by the appellate court), such as the
fact that the barge was not seaworthy that it developed a leak, that one of the hatches were left
open causing water to enter, and the absence of the necessary cover of tarpaulin causing more
water to enter the barge. When Roque demanded payment from Pioneer, but the latter refused on
the
ground that its liability depended upon the “Total Loss by Total Loss of Vessel Only.” The trial
court ruled in favor
of Roque in the civil complaint filed by the latter against Pioneer, but the decision was reversed
by the appellate court.
Issue:
WON in cases of marine insurance, there is a warranty of seaworthiness by the cargo owner; WON
the loss of the cargo was due to perils of the sea, not perils of the ship.

Held:
Yes, there is. The liability of the insurance company is governed by law. Section 113 of the
Insurance Code
provides that “
In every marine insurance upon a ship or freight, or freightage, or upon anything which is the
subject of marine insurance, a warranty is implied that the ship is seaworthy.
” Hence,
there can be no mistaking the fact that the term "cargo" can be the subject of marine insurance and
that once it is so made, the implied warranty of seaworthiness immediately attaches to whoever is
insuring the cargo whether he be the shipowner or not. Moreover, the fact that the unseaworthiness
of the ship was unknown to the insured is immaterial in ordinary marine insurance and may not be
used by him as a defense in order to recover on the marine insurance policy. As to the second issue,
by applying Sec. 113 of the Insurance Code, there is no doubt that the term 'perils of the sea'
extends only to losses caused by sea damage, or by the violence of the elements, and does not
embrace all losses happening at sea; it is said to include only such losses as are of
extraordinary
nature, or
arise from some overwhelming power
, which cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertion of human skill and prudence. t is also
the general rule that everything which happens thru the inherent vice of the thing, or by the act of
the owners, master or shipper, shall not be reputed a peril, if not otherwise borne in the policy. It
must be considered to be settled, furthermore, that a loss which, in the ordinary course of events,
results from the natural and inevitable action of the sea, from the ordinary wear and tear of the
ship, or from the negligent failure of the ship's owner to provide the vessel with proper equipment
to convey the cargo under ordinary conditions, is not a peril of the sea. Such a loss is rather due to
what has been aptly called the "peril of the ship." The insurer undertakes to insure against perils
of the sea and similar perils, not against perils of the ship. Neither barratry can be used as a ground
by Roque. Barratry as defined in American Insurance Law is "any willful misconduct on the part
of master or crew in pursuance of some unlawful or fraudulent purpose without the consent of the
owners, and to the prejudice of the owner's interest." Barratry necessarily requires a willful and
intentional act in its commission. No honest error of judgment or mere negligence, unless
criminally gross, can be barratry. In the case at bar, there is no finding that the loss was occasioned
by the willful or fraudulent acts of the vessel's crew. There was only simple negligence or lack of
skill.
DELIMA V. CA

Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation of the
trust or co-ownership which would start the running of prescription.

FACTS:
This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited from their parent who
had acquired said land from the Government. When the parents died, Respondent Galileo allegedly
paid the remaining balance of the purchase price, and the estate tax. Later on, he executed an
affidavit declaring himself as sole owner and acquired TCT over it. 10 years after the TCT was
issued, the other heirs instituted this action for reconveyance claiming their part as co-owners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by prescription.

RULING:
The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove the 4
requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to the other
owners (3) adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.

AGUILAR v. CA

Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot
object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to
their respective interests.

FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraňaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that
Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left
in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilio’s family was in Cebu. After their father’s
death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the
property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then
filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding
the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his
wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding. CFI denied the
motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus
they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the
property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in
addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed
this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in
default; the case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-
trial was dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?

RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear
that the appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial
conference may be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to grant
the motion if it sees that the reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found
that the reason for the cancelation of the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not
in grave abuse of discretion when they denied it.
B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and
lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and
the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally
according to their respective interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that
whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to
one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed.

SC held that ½ of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent
(1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the
trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the
property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed
terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.
124262 October 12, 1999. FACTS:
Mariano de Castro sold a parcel of land to the petitioner represented him self as the sole heir of
the property. The private respondents contended that the sale was affected only to his share
inequivalent of 1/5 of the property. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss contending
prescription/laches and lack of jurisdiction but denied by the trial court. Petitioner filed with Court
of appeals a special civil action for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a. the RTC has
no jurisdiction to try and take cognizance of the case as the causes of action have been decided
with finality by the Supreme Court. b. the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority
in taking cognizance of the case. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in a decision dated
August 14, 1995.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mariano's sale affects the the shares of his co-owners.
RULING:
No. The Court ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect
only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Under
Art. 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller's share pro indiviso
and the transferee gets only what corresponds to his grantor's share in the partition of the property
owned in common. Thus, in the case at bar, the sale made by Mariano while representing as "sole
heir" will not affect the shares of his co-owners which are the private respondents.

ROBLES v. CA

FACTS
Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon
and Silvino, their grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvino’s death in 1942, said
petitioners inherited the property and started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent
and half-brother of the petitioners, was entrusted with the payment of land taxes due on the
property. In 1962, Hilario caused both the cancellation of the tax declaration covering the property
and its transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law). Ballane mortgaged the property and, for some reason,
the tax declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The latter then mortgaged the
property to private respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed and said bank
acquired by public bidding the property which was then sold by it to the spouses Santos. Petitioners
learned of the mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as
parties-defendant the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free
patent in favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour of petitioners, declaring null the
patent, declaring the heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on the
ground that petitioners no longer had title to the property.

ISSUES
(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant
issue) and whether title claimed by respondents is valid
(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid
(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid
HELD
(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as
owners of the subject property.
In this case, the cloud on petitioners’ title emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent
issued and the tax declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading to
the transfer of the property to spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed
invalid/inoperative insofar as it is rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not
have prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs as co-owners of the real estate. He must have first
repudiated the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed to consider the irregularities in the
transactions involving the property. No instrument/deed of conveyance was presented to show any
transaction between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.

(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilario’s undivided interest is concerned there being co-
ownership between the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith
on part of bank by not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering
such was unregistered.
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso jure to private land
by virtue of the adverse possession in the concept of owners since.

(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands or Bureau of Lands.

Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid
but the patent issued was null.
Rizal Cement Co. Inc. v. Villareal
G.R. No. L- 30272
February 28,1985.
FACTS: Respondents are applicants for the registration of 2 agricultural lands located in Rizal.
They presented testimonial and documentary evidence appearing that the property applied for,
designated as Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-147662, have a total area of 26,015 sq.m.; that these
lots originally belonged to one Maria Certeza; that upon her death, the property was involved in a
litigation between her grandchildren and Gonzalo Certeza and that the lots were given by the latter
to former Justice de Joya as the latter's attorney's fees; that the lots were then sold by de Joya to
Filomeno Sta. Ana who, in turn sold the same to spouses Victoriano Cervo and Ignacia Guillermo
in 1939; that sometime in November 1955, the said spouses sold the said lots to the herein
applicants as shown by a duly notarized deed of sale. The spouses Cervo declared the property for
taxation purposes in the name of the wife, Ignacia Guillermo, and paid for the realty taxes due
thereon; that prior to the sale, the spouses Cervo had the two parcels surveyed first in 1950 and
then in 1955. On the other hand, oppositor, (now petitioner) Rizal Cement Company, claims to be
the owner of the subject lots, having bought the same from Maria Certeza, and to have been in
continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1911. To substantiate its claim, Rizal
Cement Co. submitted documentary evidence.
After trial, the CFI denied the application for registration of respondents and ordered the issuance
of a decree of registration in the name of Rizal Cement Co, after finality of said decision.
Respondents appealed to the CA, which reversed and set aside the CFI’s decision in favour of the
respondents. The CA denied Rizal’s MR, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents had been in actual possession of the land in question.
HELD: YES. As to who had been in actual possession of the land in question, the CA gave
credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents applicants. The right to possess flows
from ownership. No person will suffer adverse possession by another of what belongs to him.
Were the Rizal Cement Co. the rightful owner of the land in question, it would not have allowed
the tenants to cultivate the land and give the owner's share to appellants and/or their predecessors.
Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right or by the fact
it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for
acquiring such right. Petitioner's evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and survey
plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of one's ownership of the property in question.
Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership
of the property upon the declarant. Settled is the rule that neither tax receipts nor declaration of
ownership for taxation purposes alone constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right
to possess realty. They must be supported by other effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan
or technical descriptions prepared at the instance of the party concerned be considered in his favor,
the same being self-serving.
DOCTRINE: Neither tax receipts nor declaration of ownership for taxation purposes alone
constitutes sufficient evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty. They must be
supported by other effective proofs. Neither can the survey plan or technical descriptions prepared
at the instance of the party concerned be considered in his favour, the same being self-serving.
Wong v. Carpio
G.R. No. 50264
October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118
FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de recto sale to Manuel Mercado.
Mercado only began to harvest the coconut fruits but he never placed anyone over the land to
watch it. Neither did he reside in the land nor was there any hut constructed thereon to show
possession. Thereafter, Ignacio Wong inspected the land to see if whether there was anyone
claiming the land. After finding there was none, he bought the land from Giger. He placed workers
on the land, constructed a farmhouse, and fenced the boundaries. He couldn't register the sale due
to some technicalities.
ISSUE: Whether the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD: It is clear that possession passed from vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel
Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the later sale a retro in favor of
petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an impediment — the
possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same
time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two
possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
DOCTRINE: Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a
right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities for acquiring such right - and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall
be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are
opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
Somodio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 82680
August 15, 1994, 235 SCRA 307

FACTS: Wilfredo Mabugat and Nicanor Somodio bought a residential lot situated at Rajah Muda,
Bula, General Santos. Petitioner and Mabugat partitioned the property into two portions, with
petitioner taking the western part. Immediately after the partition, petitioner took possession of his
portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees and other fruit-bearing trees. In 1976,
petitioner began construction of a structure with a dimension of 22-by-18 feet on his lot. His
employment, however, took him to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and he left the unfinished
structure to the case of his uncle. He would visit the property every three months or on weekened
when he had time. Sometime in October 1977, petitioner allowed respondent Felomino Ayco, to
transfer his hut to petitioner's lot. About six years later, petitioner demanded that Ayco vacate the
premises but such demand proved futile. Hence, on August 23, 1983, petitioner filed an action for
unlawful detainer with damages against respondent Ayco. Meanwhile, on June 26, 1983,
respondent Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon. Four days later,
petitioner filed against respondent Purisima a complaint for forcible entry before the same court
docketed as Civil Case No. 2013-I. Said case was later consolidated with Civil Case No. 2032-II.

ISSUE: Whether Somodio has actual possession of the property.

HELD: Yes. Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that possession is acquired
by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to
the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such
right. Petitioner took possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property
to coconut trees, ipil- ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on
the property. It is immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for
employment reasons and visited the property only intermittently.

DOCTRINE: Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession (Ramos v. Director of
Lands, 39 Phil. 175 [1918]). It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the
action of his will.

Maglucot – Aw v. Maglucot
G.R. No. 132518
March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78

FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639.
By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It
was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-
owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided
and have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this
case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot
No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a
portion of the subject lot. Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented
portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of
P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot,
petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying
rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging they had a right over the land because such
was not partitioned and they were co-owners. Manglucot-Aw thus filed a complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against Manglucot.

ISSUE: Whether Manglucot-Aw may recover possession by virtue of a valid partition.

HELD: Yes. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it
decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. In this case, both the order of partition
and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object
to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot
thereafter question the decree, especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense
has been incurred in the execution of the commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their
respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to
the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof. Under
the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are
not binding upon the parties. However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves
actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is
to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition
by actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the
present until this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This
statement is not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed
with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of
ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
Cequeña v. Bolante
G.R. No. 137944
April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 216
FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequeña and Eduarda Apiado sought for the
ownership and possession of the land occupied by the respondent Honorata Bolante. Prior to 1954,
the land in Binangonan, Rizal was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso
Mendoza, the father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently
declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza, the father of the petitioners. Margarito and Sinforoso
are brothers. During the cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the present occupant of the land
together with Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court rendered the
petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of the land. However, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit. It was said to be
insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother. Moreover, the probative value
of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of
ownership of the disputed parcel. The actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
respondent since 1985 gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The petitioners
contended otherwise that she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article
536 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical, exclusive and continuous
possession of the land.

2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence of ownership or
possession.

HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive, as the respondent
also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners’ father and brother, as well as
the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Based on
Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefitting from
her father’s tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a
longer period. On the other hand, petitioners’ father acquired joint possession only in 1952.

2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have
been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for
tax purposes does not prove ownership. The petitioners’ claim of ownership of the whole parcel
has no legal basis.
G.R. No. L-6019 March 25, 1911
JUAN N. ARAGON, petitioner-appellee, vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, oppositor-
appellant.

Facts:
The Court of Land Registration adjudicated title to a parcel of land in Manila in favor of the
appellees and ordered it to be registered.
The Government of the Philippine Islands, however, through its agents contended that the land is
part of the public domain.
Issue:
Whether the parcel of land is part of the public domain
Ruling:
The ruling of the lower court was sustained. The right of possession and ownership of the
applicants was established as provided under Article 446 of the Civil Code: law library
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein,
he must be protected or possession must be restored to him by the means established in the laws
of procedure.
The owners of the property may lose possession on their property as provided under Article 460
of the Civil Code:
ART. 460. The possessor may lose his possession -
1. By the abandonment of the thing.
2. By transfer to another for a good or valuable consideration.
3. By the destruction or total loss of the thing or by the thing becoming unmarketable.
4. By the possession of another, even against the will of the former possessor, if the new possession
has lasted more than one year.
Since the owners of the land have never abandoned it, and that its location and actual condition is
not totally destroyed so as to have become a part of the playa (shore) of the Bay of Manila, it is
proper for the land to be registered.
G.R. No. 80294-95 September 21, 1988
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF EGMIDIO OCTAVIANO AND JUAN
VALDEZ, respondents.
Facts:
The VICAR filed an application for registration of title with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio Benguet on 1962 over Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 at Poblacion Central, La Trinidad, Benguet. On
1963 the Heirs of Juan Valdez and Egmidio Octaviano filed their Opposition on Lots Nos. 2 and
3. The land registration court confirmed the registrable title of VICAR to Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4.
The Heirs of Juan Valdez and the Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano appealed the decision to
CA. The CA reversed the decision of the land registration court and dismissed the VICAR's
application as to Lots 2 and 3.
VICAR filed a petition for review on certiorari with the SC on the decision of the CA. The
SC denied the petition.
The Heirs of Octaviano filed a Motion For Execution of Judgment with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and was denied because the decision of the CA did not grant the Heirs of
Octaviano any affirmative relief.
The Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed a civil case for recovery of possession of Lot 3; and
the Heirs of Juan Valdez likewise filed for the recovery of possession of Lot 2. The CA ruled in
favor of the heirs of Valdez and Octaviano.
Issue:
Whether VICAR is entitled to the ownership of Lots 2 and 3 and that the application of the
principle res judicata is erroneous.
Ruling:
The petition is denied.
Petitioner was in possession as borrower in commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated
the trust by declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes. When petitioner applied for
registration of Lots 2 and 3 in 1962, it had been in possession in concept of owner only for eleven
years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession for ten years, but always with just title.
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years.
The Court sees no error in CA’s ruling that said findings are res judicata between the
parties. They can no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because those issues were
resolved with finality a long time ago. To ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the
door to endless litigations by continuous determination of issues without end.
 Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house was borrowed by
petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return
of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the
petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor
did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property
subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it
declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could
not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.

G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990

EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP., petitioner,
vs.
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO SANTOS, doing business under the name and
style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Tomas de la Peña represented himself as Professor Jose Cruz, dean of De la Salle College and
ordered 406 books from EDCA. He issued a check covering the purchase. He then sold 120 books
to Santos. Without clearing his first order, he placed another order with EDCA which prompted
EDCA to investigate. They found that De la Pena is not employed in De la Salle, has no account
with Philippine Amanah Bank, against which he had drawn the payment check and that he sold
120 books to Santos.
With the help of the police, EDCA forcedly seized the books from the store of Santos. Santos sued
for the recovery of the books. The lower court and CA ruled in favor of Santos.
Issue: Whether the EDCA has been unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by
the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored.
Ruling:
No, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of its property. The first sentence of Article 559 provides
that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title,"
Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover
it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired
it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor.
Additionally, ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase only if there is a stipulation to that effect as provided under the Civil Code:
Art. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the
thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of
the law governing the form of contracts.
Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or
constructive delivery thereof.
Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the purchaser
until he has fully paid the price.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the
thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which
he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them
to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private
respondents to the books.
G.R. No. L-20264 January 30, 1971
CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO GARCIA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. GUEVARA and JUAN B.
GUEVARA, respondents.
Facts:
Guevara saw her stolen ring being worn by De Garcia so she asked where De Garcia bought it, De
Garcia told her that she bought the ring from a comadre. Guevara asked to try the ring and it fit
her finger. After 2 or 3 days, Guevara asked De Garcia to have the ring checked by Mr.
Rebullidawho concluded that it was the very ring that Guevara bought from him in 1947. The ring
was returned to De Garcia and she refused to return it despite a written request and writ of seizure,
claiming that the ring was lost.
Guevara lost in the lower court and elevated the matter to the CA. The CA reversed the lower
court’s judgment.
Issue: Whether the possession of De Garcia of the movable property acquired in good faith is
equivalent to a title.
Ruling:
No, De Garcia did not acquire ownership of the ring. There is no merit to De Garcia’s contention
that her possession in good faith is equivalent to title.
Article 559 of the Civil Code reads: "The possession of movable property acquired in good faith
is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable
lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale,
the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor." Respondent
Angelina D. Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was
entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the
same. The only exception the law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor
at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes in Sotto vs. Enage: `Article 559 in fact assumes that possessor
is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to acquire indefeasible
title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal
deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no longer be entitled to recover
it under any condition.' "
G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972
DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under the firm name "Pawnshop of
DominadorDizon", petitioner,
vs.
LOURDES G. SUNTAY, respondent.
Facts:
Suntay and Clarita R. Sison entered into a transaction wherein Suntay’sring was delivered to
Clarita R. Sison for sale on commission. Three days later, unknown to Suntay, the ring was pledged
by Melia Sison, niece of the husband of Clarita R. Sison, in connivance with the latter, with
Dizon’s pawnshop. After some time, Suntay demanded Sison to return her ring. When she learned
that her ring was pawned, she filed an estafa case against Sison and wrote to a letter to Dizon to
return her ring. When Dizon refused, Suntay filed a case with the lower court which issued the
writ of replevin and rendered a judgement that Suntay had the right of possession of the ring. Dizon
brought the case to the CA where the CA affirmed the lower court’s judgement.
Issue:Whether the possession of Dizon of the movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent
to a title.
Ruling:
No, Dizon has no right of possession of the ring. In De Gracia v. Court of Appeals.Thus: "The
controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads thus: 'The possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable
or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired
it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price
paid therefor.'
There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in this regard
that the right of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith by another, is based
on his being dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle that were one of two
innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the
party who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied
in a case which is covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this
jurisdiction."
The principle of estoppel cannot be invoked in the case.Neither the promptings of equity
nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to Dizon’s rescue. He is engaged in a
business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain whether or not an
individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care be
taken, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he should be the last to
complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be recognized.
LEDESMA v. CA- Perfected Unconditional Contract of Sale

FACTS:
Citiwide sold 2 cars to a certain Jojo Consunji evidenced by 2 invoices. Upon delivery of the cars,
Jojo paid with a Manager’s Check (PhP101,000.00). When Citiwide deposited the check, it was
dishonored for being tampered. Amount was changed from 101.00 to 101,000.00.

Citiwide reported the crime to the Phil. Constabulary where he found that Consunji was actually
Armando Suarez, a professional criminal.

One car was found abandoned, while the other was discovered to be in the possession of Jaime
Ledesma, who claims to have purchased the car in good faith from the registered owner, evidenced
by the LTO Registration.

RTC ordered the car to remain in the possession of Ledesma.

CA overruled RTC, stating that Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of property through false
pretenses amounting to fraud.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD:
No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale. Failure to pay by Suarez through the
subsequent dishonor of the check did not render the contract of sale void. Ownership was already
transferred by the delivery of the cars to Suarez.
AZARCON V. EUSEBIO
105 PHIL 569
FACTS:
Eusebio filed for a lease application over a parcel of land, Azarcon occupied a portion thereof
under a homestead application. This caused a dispute between the two. While their dispute was
pending, Eusebio filed a case against Azarcon alleging that he acquired the parcel of land by lease
from the Director of Lands and that Azarcon had been occupying a portion thereof. He prayed for
Azarcon to vacate the premises.
Azarcon on the other hand, alleged that he had been occupying the land by virtue of a homestead
application prior to the lease application of Eusebio, with interruptions during the war and until
the time of filing of the action.
The trial court ruled in favor of Eusebio and while pending appeal, a writ of execution was issued
ordering Azarcon to leave the premises without expressly ordering Azarcon to desist from
gathering pending fruits. Azarcon moved for the setting aside of the order and posted bond as he
was required by the court. The court eventually set aside the order but reinstated it under the wrong
premise that Azarcon failed to post the required bond. Despite the reinstatement of the order,
Azarcon continued to gather the pending fruits on the land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azarcon has the right to gather the pending harvest

HELD:
Evidence showed that despite the writ of execution ordering Azarcon to remove from the premises
and let Eusebio to have restitution of the same, Azarcon continued to enter the premises and gather
the palay, which was then pending harvest. It is found out that the palay had been planted and
cultivated by Azarcon who had been in possession of the land. The court didn't prohibit Azarcon
in its order from gathering the crops then existing thereon. Under the law, a person who is in
possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending
harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest. As the order didn't expressly prohibited Azarcon
to gather pending fruits, there has been no violation of the court’s order.
This is even bolstered by the fact that the writ of execution has been set aside and Azarcon posted
the required bond as required by the court. If the order was then reinstated it was because of the
wrong premise that the bond wasn't posted by Azarcon as required.
ROBLES v. HERMANOS
G.R. No. L-26173 July 13, 1927
Street, J.
Doctrine:
• The lessee may prove an independent verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to put the
leased premises in a safe condition.
• The appraised value of the property may be used to determine the price.
Facts:
A parcel of land was originally owned by the parents of the present plaintiff, Zacarias Robles.
Upon the death of his father, plaintiff leased the parcel of land from the administrator with the
stipulation that any permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the
hacienda should be made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the
term. As the place was in a run-down state, and it was foreseen that the lessee would be put to
much expense in bringing the property to its productive capacity, the annual rent was fixed at the
moderate amount of P2,000 per annum.
The plaintiff made various improvements and additions to the plant. The firm of Lizarraga
Hermanos was well aware of the nature and extent of these improvements.
When the plaintiff’s mother died, defendant came forward with a proposal to buy the heirs’ portion
of the property. In consideration that the plaintiff should shorten the term of his lease to the extent
stated, the defendant agreed to pay him the value of all betterments that he had made on the land
and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to him personally on the land. The plaintiff
agreed to this.
On the ensuing instrument made, no reference was made to the surrender of the plaintiff’s rights
as lessee, except in fixing the date when the lease should end; nor is anything said concerning the
improvements which the plaintiff had placed. At the same time the promise of the defendant to
compensate for him for the improvements was wanting. Accordingly, the representative of the
defendant explained that this was unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between the
parties.
On the part of the defendant it was claimed that the agreement with respect to compensating the
plaintiff for improvements and other things was never in fact made.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the lessee may contest the validity of a written contract with oral evidence
2. Whether or not the appreciation value can be used to determine the price
Held:
1. Yes. In case of a written contract of lease, the lessee may prove an independent verbal agreement
on the part of the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe condition. The verbal contract which
the plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of
conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated. In
the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in
itself, and it is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related
matters.
2. Yes. The stipulation with respect to the appraisal of the property did not create a suspensive
condition. The true sense of the contract evidently was that the defendant would take over the
movables and the improvements at an appraised valuation, and the defendant obligated itself to
promote the appraisal in good faith. As the defendant partially frustrated the appraisal, it violated
a term of the contract and made itself liable for the true value of the things contracted about, as
such value may be established in the usual course of proof. Furthermore, an unjust enrichment of
the defendant would result from allowing it to appropriate the movables without compensating the
plaintiff thereof.

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals

143 SCRA 623
FACTS:
The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS), for recovery of the ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System.
NAWASA interposed as one of its special defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership,
possession and control of all waterworks systems throughout the Philippines and as one of its
counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had incurred for necessary and useful
improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of the
CITY on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a possessor in
bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a possessor in bad faith has the right to remove useful improvements
HELD:
No. Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants or sows
in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity."
As a builder in bad faith, NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right
to indemnity. Moreover, under Article 546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be
refunded for useful expenses with the right of retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547
thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful improvements if this can be done
without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the possession does not
exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in bad faith is
to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure, provided
the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying
the value they have at the time he enters into possession (Article 549).

Bachrach v. Seifert and Elianoff

87 Phil. 483
FACTS:
The will of E. M. Bachrach provided for the distribution of the considerable property which he
had left. The sixth and eighth paragraphs of the provisions of the will provide as follows:
Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise to my beloved wife Mary McDonald
Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all my estate after payment of the
legacies, bequests and gifts provided for above; and she may enjoy such usufruct and use or spend
such fruits as she may in any manner wish.
Eighth: It is my wish that upon the death of my beloved wife, Mary McDonald Bachrach, all my
estate, personal, real and otherwise, and all the fruits and usufruct thereof which during her life
pertained to her, shall be divided as follows:
One-half thereof shall be given to such charitable hospitals in the Philippines as she may designate;
in case she fails to designate, then said sum shall be given to the Chief Executive of these Islands
who shall distribute it, share
andshare alike to all charitable hospitals in the Philippines excluding thosebelonging to the
governments of the Philippines or of the United States;
One-half thereof shall be divided, share and share alike by and between my legal heirs, to the
exclusion of my brothers.
The estate of E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining
Co., Inc., received from the latter 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said
108,000 shares. Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned
the lower court to authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company as administrator of the estate of
E. M. Bachrach, to her the said54,000 share of stock dividend by endorsing and delivering to her
the corresponding certificate of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form
of stock, is fruit or income and therefore belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie
Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the ground that the
stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and therefore belonged
not to the usufructuary but to the remainder.
They have appealed from the order granting the petition and overruling their objection.
ISSUE:
Whether a stock dividend, fruits or income, which belongs to usufructuary is capital or part
of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainder?
RULINGS:
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000shares of stock
dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares
may be sold independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may
be sold independently of its mother.
Hemedes v. Court of Appeals
316 SCRA 347
FACTS:
Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled “Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions”
conveying ownership a parcel of land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third
wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the resolutory condition that upon the latter’s death or remarriage,
the title to the property donated shall revert to any of the children, or heirs, of the DONOR
expressly designated by the DONEE. Pursuant to said condition, Justa Kausapin executed a “Deed
of Conveyance of Unregistered Real Property by Reversion” conveying to Maxima Hemedes the
subject property. Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate
mortgage over the subject property in favor of R & B Insurance to serve as security for a loan
which they obtained. R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima
Hemedes failed to pay the loan even. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B Insurance
as the highest bidder. A new title was subsequently issued in favor the R&B. The annotation of
usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was maintained in the new title. Despite the earlier conveyance
of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin executed a “Kasunduan” whereby
she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to the resolutory
condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose Hemedes. Enrique
D. Hemedes obtained two declarations of real property, when the assessed value of the property
was raised. Also, he has been paying the realty taxes on the property from the time Justa Kausapin
conveyed the property to him. In the cadastral survey, the property was assigned in the name of
Enrique Hemedes. Enrique Hemedes is also the named owner of the property in the records of the
Ministry of Agrarian Reform office at Calamba, Laguna.
Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction Corporation
(Dominium). Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery, Inc. (Asia
Brewery) who made constructions therein. Upon learning of Asia Brewery’s constructions, R &
B Insurance sent it a letter informing the former of its ownership of the property. A conference
was held between R & B Insurance and Asia Brewery but they failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Maxima Hemedes also wrote a letter addressed to Asia Brewery asserting that she is
the rightful owner of the subject property and denying the execution of any real estate mortgage
in favor of R&B. Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the CFI for the
annulment of TCT issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the reconveyance to Dominium of
the subject property alleging that Dominion was the absolute owner of the land. The trial court
ruled in favor of Dominium and Enrique Hemedes.
ISSUE:
 Whether the donation in favor of Enrique Hemedes was valid?
RULINGS:
NO. Enrique D. Hemedes and his transferee, Dominium, did not acquire any rights over the subject
property. Justa Kausapin sought to transfer to her stepson exactly what she had earlier transferred
to Maxima Hemedes – the ownership of the subject property pursuant to the first condition
stipulated in the deed of donation executed by her husband. Thus, the donation in favor of Enrique
D. Hemedes is null and void for the purported object thereof did not exist at the time of the transfer,
having already been transferred to his sister. Similarly, the sale of the subject property by Enrique
D. Hemedes to Dominium is also a nullity for the latter cannot acquire more rights than its
predecessor-in-interest and is definitely not an innocent purchaser for value since Enrique D.
Hemedes did not present any certificate of title upon which it relied.
The declarations of real property by Enrique D. Hemedes, his payment of realty taxes, and his
being designated as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey of Cabuyao, Laguna and
in the records of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform office in Calamba, Laguna cannot defeat a
certificate of title, which is an absolute and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein. Particularly, with regard to tax declarations and
tax receipts, this Court has held on several occasions that the same do not by themselves
conclusively prove title to land.

Fabie v. Guiterrez David

75 Phil. 536
FACTS:
Josefa Fabie is the usufructuary of the income of certain houses located at 372-376 Santo Cristo,
Binondo, and 950-956 Ongpin, Santa Cruz, Manila, under the ninth clause of the will of the
deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey. The owner of Santo Cristo property abovementioned is the
respondent Juan Grey, while those of the Ongpin property are other person not concern
herein. Litigation arose between Josefa Fabie as plaintiff and Juan Grey as defendant and the owner
of the Ongpin property as intervenors, involving the administration of the houses mentioned in
clause 9 of the will.
Josefa Fabie commenced an action of unlawful detainer against the herein respondent Ngo
Boo Soo, alleging in her amended complaint that the defendant is occupying the premises located
at 372-376 Santo Cristo on a month-to month rental payable in advance not latter than the 5th of
each month; that she is the administratrix and usufructuary of said premises; "that the defendant
offered to pay P300 monthly rent payable in advance not later than the 5th of every month,
beginning the month of April 1945, for the said of premises including the one door which said
defendant, without plaintiff's consent and contrary to their agreement, had subleased to another
Chinese, but plaintiff refused, based on the fact that the herein plaintiff very badly needs the said
house to live in, as her house was burned by the Japanese on the occasion of the entry of the
American liberators in the City and which was located then at No. 38 Flores, Dominga, Pasay; that
defendant was duly notified on March 24 and April 14, 1945, to leave the said premises, but he
refused"; and she prayed for judgment of eviction and for unpaid rentals.
The defendant answered alleging that he was and since 1908 had been a tenant of the
premises in question, which he was using and had always used principally as a store and
secondarily for living quarters; that he was renting it from its owner and administrator Juan Grey;
"that plaintiff is merely the usufructuary of the income therefrom, and by agreement between her
and said owner, which is embodied in a final judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
her only right as usufructuary of the income is to receive the whole of such income; that she has
no right or authority to eject tenants, such right being in the owner and administrator of the house,
the aforesaid Juan Grey, who has heretofore petitioned this Court for permission to intervene in
this action; that plaintiff herein has never had possession of said property; that defendant's lease
contract with the owner of the house is for 5-year period, with renewal option at the end of each
period, and that his present lease due to expire; that the defendant made a written offer to plaintiff
to compromise and settle the question of the amount of rent to be paid by defendant, but said
plaintiff rejected the same for no valid reason whatever and instituted the present action; that the
reason plaintiff desires to eject defendant from the property is that she wishes to lease the same to
other persons for a higher rent, ignoring the fact that as usufructuary of the income of the property
she has no right to lease the property; that the defendant has subleased no part of the house to any
person whomsoever.
Juan Grey intervened in the unlawful detainer suit, alleging in his complaint in intervention
that he is the sole and absolute owner of the premises in question; that the plaintiff Josefa Fabie is
the usufructuary of the income of said premises; by virtue of a contract between him and the
intervenor which will expire with the option to renew it for another period of five years from and
after said date; that under the agreement between the intervenor and plaintiff Josefa Fabie which
was approved by the court and incorporated in its decision and the only right recognized in favor
of Josefa Fabie as usufructuary of the income of said premises is to receive the rents therefrom
when due; and that as usufructuary she has no right nor authority to administer the said premises
nor to lease them nor to evict tenants, which right and authority are vested in the intervenor as
owner of the premises.
ISSUE: Who is entitled to administer the property subject matter of this case and who should be
the tenant?
HELD: The usufructuary has the right to administer the property in question. All the acts
of administration — to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the property by making all
necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums
thereon — were by court judgment vested in the usufructuary. The pretension of therespondent
Juan Grey that he is the administrator of the property with the right to choose the tenants and to
dictate the conditions of the lease is contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the said clause of
the will, the stipulation of the parties, and the judgment of the court. He cannot manage or
administer the property after all the acts of management and administration have been vested by
the court, with his consent, in the usufructuary. He admitted that before
said judgment he had been collecting the rents
as agent of theusufructuary under an agreement with the latter. As long as the property is properl
yconserved and insured he can have no cause for complaint, and his right in that regard is
fully protected by the terms of the stipulation and the judgment of the court abovementioned. To
permit him to arrogate to himself the privilege to choose the tenant, to dictate the conditions of the
lease, and to sue when the lessee fails to comply therewith, would be to place the usufructuary
entirely at his mercy. It would place her in the absurd situation of having a certain indisputable
right without the power to protect, enforce, and fully enjoy
Vda. de Aranas v. Aranas
150 SCRA 415
FACTS:
Fr. Teodoro Aranas, a priest of the Roman Catholic Church, died. He had executed his Last Will
and Testament which was admitted to probate. In said Last Will and Testament, Fr. Teodoro
Aranas stipulated the following:
A. The return to Aniceto Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr.Aranas from his
brother Aniceto Aranas and ten (10) parcels of land described in the Will inherited by the testator
from his parents.
B. The return to Carmelo Aranas or his heirs of all properties acquired by Fr.
Aranas from his brother Carmelo Aranas and ten (10) parcels of landdescribed in the Will
inherited by the testator from his parents.
C. The special administration of the remainder of the estate of the testator by Vicente Aranas, a
faithful and serviceable nephew and designating him also as recipient of 1/2 of the produce of said
properties after deducting the expenses for the administration and the other 1/2 of the produce to
be given to the Catholic Church for the eternal repose of the testator’s soul. Said pertinent
provision reads as follows:
Fourth. It is my will that the lands I had bought from other persons should be converged and placed
under a “special administrator.” The special administrator of these lands, for his office, should
receive one half of all the produce from which shall be deducted the expenses
forthe administration, and the other half of the produce should bereceived by the Roman Catholic
Church and should be spent for
mysoul, Vicente B. Aranas (Tingting), because he is a faithful andserviceable nephew, should be
the first special administrator of said properties, without bond, until his death or until he should
not want tohold the said office anymore. Anyone of the sons of my brotherCarmelo Aranas can
hold the said office of special administrator, and none other than they. Their father, my brother
Carmelo Aranas shall be the one to decide who among them shall hold the said office, but upon
the death of my said brother Carmelo Aranas, his said sons will
havepower to select the one among them ourselves. The specialadministration is perpetual.
ISSUE:
Whether the properties under Group C of the testate estate of the late Fr. Teodoro Aranas are
subject to remunerative legacies by way of usufruct of the net proceeds of 1/2 of the estate after
deducting expenses for administration in favor of Vicente Aranas, during his lifetime and shall
continue an administrator of the estate, and, who, upon his death or refusal to continue such
usufruct, may be succeeded by any of the brothers of the administrator as selected by their father,
Carmelo Aranas, if still alive or one selected by his sons if, he, Carmelo, is dead
HELD:
Yes. It was the sincere intention and desire of the testator to reward his nephew Vicente Aranas
for his faithful and unselfish services by allowing him to enjoy one-half of the fruits of the
testator’s third group of properties until Vicente’s death and/or refusal to act as administrator in
which case, the administration shall pass to anyone chosen by Carmelo Aranas among his sons
and upon Carmelo’s death, his sons will have the power to select one among themselves. Vicente
Aranas therefore as a usufructuary has the right to enjoy the property of his
uncle with all the benefits which result from the normal enjoyment (orexploitation) of another’s
property, with the obligation to return, at the designated time, either the same thing, or in special
cases its equivalent. This right of Vicente to enjoy the fruits of the properties is temporary and
therefore not perpetual as there is a limitation namely his death or his refusal. Likewise, his
designation as administrator of these properties is limited by his refusal and/or death and therefore
it does not run counter to Art. 870 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioners. Be it noted
that Vicente Aranas is not prohibited to dispose of the fruits and other benefits arising from the
usufruct. Neither are the naked owners (the other heirs) of the properties, the usufruct of which has
been given to Vicente Aranas prohibited from disposing of said naked ownership without prejudice
of course to Vicente’s continuing usufruct.

Locsin v. Valenzuela
173 SCRA 454
FACTS:
 Petitioner Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita Guanzon, Celia R. Sibug, Maria Rosa R. Perez,
Editha Ylanan and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land
known as "Hacienda Villa Regalado" located in Barrio Panubigan Canlaon City, Negros
Occidental. A portion of this land consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was subject to the
lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. When Presidential Decree 27 was
promulgated, decreeing the "Emancipation of Tenants." The tract of land owned in common by
petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights, fell within
the scope of the "Operation Land Transfer". In consequence, staff members of the Department of
Agrarian Relations advised the tenants-tillers of said land, and the necessary parcellary map sketch
was made and submitted to the Bureau of Land Office in Dumaguete City. Petitioners through
counsel sought the opinion of the DAR as to who should be entitled to receive the rental payments
which continued to be made by the respondent tenants to Helen Schon. The DAR District Officer
rendered an opinion that the rental payments were properly considered as amortization payments
for the land and as such should pertain to the landowners and not to the usufructuary.
ISSUE:
Whether Helen Schon retained as a usufructuary after the promulgation of P.D. 27?
HELD:
No. After the the effectivity of Presidential Decree No. 27. The court believes that the
usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favor of Helen Schon was effectively
extinguished by Presidential Decree No. 27. To hold, as private respondent Helen Schon
apparently urges, that her usufruct was not extinguished but rather remained impressed upon the
land passing on to the new owners, would obviously defeat the very purpose of the land reform
statute. Presidential Decree No. 27 was enacted to "emancipate" the tenants from the "bondage of
the soil" by giving to tenants-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating upon the
assumption that they would work harder to improve their lot in life if they became landowners
rather than mere tillers of somebody else's land. To hold Helen Schon as entitled to continue
enjoying, as usufructuary, the natural or civil fruits of Lot No. 2-C-A-3, would be to set at naught
the major purpose projected by Presidential Decree No. 27 and maintained by Executive Order
No. 228.
Valisno v. Adriano
161 SCRA 398
FACTS:

Plaintiff Valisno file against the Defendant Adriano an action for damages. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija.
Plaintiff bought the land from the defendant’s sister, Honorata. Both parcels of land had been
inherited by defendant and her sister from their father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno,
the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River through a canal about 70 meters long,
traversing the appellee's land.

Adriano levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation
water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land. Plaintiff Adriano filed in the Bureau of
Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights. A decision was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant asked for a reinvestigation of the case and was granted.
Meanwhile, plaintiff Valisno rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because of urgency.
He also filed a complaint for damages in the CFI against respondent.

Defendant Adriano claims that he merely allowed his sister to use his water rights when she still
owned the adjacent land. According to the appellant, the water right was the primary consideration
for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.

ISSUE:

Whether the water rights pass with the conveyance of the land?

HELD:

Yes. Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are
appurtenant to a parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance. The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running
across the grantor's land cannot be defeated even if the water is supplied by a third person. The
fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as an easement of necessity does detract
from its permanency as property right, which survives the determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the plaintiff has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it
free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference such as the appellee's act of levelling
the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

102. Case v. Heirs of Tuason, 14 Phil. 521

FACTS:
The counsel for the heirs of Pablo Tuason and Leocadia Santibañez alleged that
the parties whom he represents are owners in common of the property adjoining
that of the petitioner Edwin Case on the southwest. The latter, extended his
southwest boundary line to a portion of the lot of the said heirs of Tuason and
Santibañez. They alleged that the true dividing line between the property of the
petitioner and that of the said heirs is a belonging to the respondents, and that
about two years ago, when Case made alterations in the buildings erected on
his land, he improperly caused a portion of them to rest on the wall owned by
the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the wall is the property of the heirs of the late Tuason and
Santibañez.

HELD:
The wall in controversy belongs to the heirs of the late Tuason and Santibañez for
the reason, among others, that in the public document by which one of their
original ancestors acquired on the 19th of April, 1796, the property now
possessed by them, it appears that property was then already inclosed by a
stone wall.
The wall supports only the property of the respondents and not that of the
petitioner, cannot be a party wall, one-half of which along its entire length
would belong to the adjoining building owned by Mr. Case. There is not
sufficient proof to sustain such claim, and besides, the building erected thereon
disproves the pretension of the petitioner.

Under article 572 of the Civil Code the easement of party walls is presumed,
unless there is a title or exterior sign, or proof to the contrary, among others, in
dividing walls adjoining buildings up to the common point of elevation.

The legal presumption as to party walls is limited to the three cases dealt with in
the said article of the code, and is that of juris tantum unless the contrary
appear from the title of ownership of the adjoining properties, that is to say, that
the entire wall in controversy belongs to one of the property owners, or where
there is no exterior sign to destroy such presumption and support a presumption
against the party wall. (Art. 573, Civil Code.)

The intermediate portion of the walls in question, lying between numbers 6 and
13 on the defendants' plan, equivalent to a little more than numbers 30 to 25 on
the plan of the petitioner, is the portion against which no other wall appears to
have been erected on the land owned by Mr. Case. In spite of this it can not be
presumed that the aforesaid portion was a party wall, and that it was not
exclusively owned by the defendants, inasmuch as the latter have proven by
means of a good title that has not been impugned by the petitioner, that when
one of their ancestors and principals acquired the property the lot was already
inclosed by the wall on which the building was erected; it must therefore be
understood that in the purchase of the property the wall by which the land was
inclosed was necessarily included.
It therefore appears from the proceedings that, with the exception of the small
portion of the wall in question occupied by the latrine on the property of the
petitioner, and which the opponents admit that he has acquired by
prescription, the whole of said wall from the Escolta to the River Pasig can not
be presumed to be a party wall; the evidence to the contrary conclusively
proves that it belonged exclusively to the defendants, and it has been further
shown in the case that at one time an old building belonging to the opponents
used to rest on a portion of the wall near the river.

103. Choco v. Santamaria, 21 Phil. 132

FACTS:
The defendant in the building of his house, has made several openings and
windows in the walls of the house on both sides overlooking then property of the
plaintiff; that at the time the defendant was building his house, and the windows
and the openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in
the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the defendant, and the
defendant received the written protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from
the evidence, appears to have suggested an amicable and adjustment of the
matter, but the adjustment was not made, and this action was brought.

The Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora
Choco, and against the defendant, Isidro Santamaria, forever prohibiting the
opening of the window stated, which must be closed, and forever prohibiting
the opening of the windows and openings marked, which must be closed or
made to conform to the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an
iron grate embedded in the wall, with the costs of the action.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final
and perpetual closing of the large window opened in the balcony of the back
part of the appellee's house and that, though the appellant's lot can be seen
through the window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property.

HELD:
To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between
the said lot and that the appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part
of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is corroborated by the
testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far as
he said that "a part of the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property,
and a person approaching the window may clearly see the said lot." And
certainly if it is in front of this lot, it is unquestionable that it directly overlooks the
same; but even though it did not and only a side or oblique view of the lot could
be obtained from it, it could not be kept open, since between it and the
plaintiffs' property there does not intervene the distance required by law — that
of two meters in the first case, and 60 centimeters in the second. In reality, there
is no distance at all between the said window and the plaintiffs' lot, because, as
we have said, this window is perpendicular to the boundary line of the said lot;
therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows:
Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings
projecting over the estate of the neighbor, can not be made if there is not
a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the wall in which they are built
and said estate.
Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property,
unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters.
Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window in question
must be closed, and consequently the judgment appealed from should be
modified in this sense, as regards this window.

Thus, the defendant is ordered to close finally and forever the window

104. Solid Manila Corp. v. Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc., 195 SCRA 748
FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. (petitioner) owns a parcel of land located in Ermita, Manila.
The same lies in the vicinity of another parcel owned by Bio Hong Trading
(respondent). The latter’s title came from a prior owner, and in their deed of
sale, the parties thereto reserved as an easement of way approx. 914sqm
converted as a private alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. As a
consequence, an annotation was entered in the respondent’s title. The
petitioners and its neighbors made use of the private alley and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep. Thereafter, respondent constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use. Respondent filed a case to remove said gates and
to allow full access to the easement, which was granted. In the Court of
Appeals, it was held that since respondent has acquired title to the property,
“merger” brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

ISSUE: Whether the easement still exists or had been extinguished by merger?

HELD:
The easement still exists on the property of Bio Hong Trading.

It is true that the sale did include the alley. On this score, the Court rejects the
petitioner's contention that the deed of sale "excluded" it, because as a mere
right-of-way, it cannot be separated from the tenement and maintains an
independent existence. Thus: Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the
estate to which they actively or passively belong.

Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form part.
Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they cannot, however, be alienated from the tenement, or
mortgaged separately.

The fact, however, that the alley in question, as an easement, is inseparable

from the main lot is no argument to defeat the petitioner's claims, because as
an easement precisely, it operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the
servient estate, specifically, his right to use (jus utendi). As the petitioner indeed
hastens to point out, the deed itself stipulated that "a portion thereof [of the
tenement] measuring 914sqm, more or less, had been converted into a private
alley for the benefit of the neighboring estates. . ." and precisely, the former
owner, in conveying the property, gave the private owner a discount on
account of the easement.

Hence, and so we reiterate, albeit the private respondent did acquire

ownership over the property –– including the disputed alley –– as a result of the
conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up
obstructions thereon and thus prevent the public from using it, because as a
servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

The Court is furthermore of the opinion, contrary to that of the Court of Appeals,
that no genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the
private respondent corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists
when ownership of the dominant and servient estates is consolidated in the
same person. Merger then, as can be seen, requires full ownership of both
estates. One thing ought to be noted here, however. The servitude in question is
a personal servitude, that is to say, one constituted not in favor of a particular
tenement (a real servitude) but rather, for the benefit of the general public.

Personal servitudes are referred to in the following article of the Civil Code: Art.
614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of
one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong.

In a personal servitude, there is therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to

speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in
this case, the public at large. Merger, as we said, presupposes the existence of a
prior servient-dominant owner relationship, and the termination of that relation
leaves the easement of no use. Unless the owner conveys the property in favor
of the public –– if that is possible –– no genuine merger can take place that
would terminate a personal easement.

105. Floro v. Llenado, 244 SCRA 713

FACTS:
Floro is the owner of the Floro Park Subdivision in Bulacan. The subdivision has
access roads from MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Llenado is the owner
of the Llenado Homes Subdivision, formerly known as Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision prior to his purchase of the project. This subdivision is bounded on the
south and separated from Floro Park Subdivision by Planas Creek. To its west lies
a parcel of land owned by Marcial Ipapo. Llenado Homes does not have any
existing access to MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access road
traversing the property of Ipapo had been provided for in the subdivision plan of
Emmanuel Homes which was approved by the HLURB. Llenado sought and was
granted the (oral and provisional, as they were still drafting a formal contract)
permission of Floro to use lots 4 and 5 of Floro Park Subdivision as a passage to
and from MacArthur Highway. Several months later, Floro barricaded road lot 5
to prevent Llenado from further using the property on account of the damage
done to the property due to the passage of heavy equipment. Llenado filed an
easement claim with the RTC but was denied. The CA ruled in favor of Llenado
and ordered Floro to remove the barricade.

ISSUE: Whether Llenado can demand a compulsory easement of right of way

over the existing roads of an adjacent subdivision instead of developing his
subdivision's proposed access road as provided in his duly approved subdivision
plan.

HELD:
No. A compulsory easement of right of way may be granted only upon the
acquisitions of the conditions required by Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code.
To wit, these conditions are:
1. That the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway;
2. That proper indemnity has been paid
3. That the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate
4. That the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient
estate and, in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

In this case, the elements are incomplete. The original subdivision development
plan presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement which
creates a right of way through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long
agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently thought it too much work and
cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the
Floro property.

Jurisprudence has dictated that one may not claim a legal easement merely
out of convenience. It was convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the
Ipapo access road development and pursue an access road through the Floro
estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of his
neighbor.

106. QUIMEN V. CA 257 SCRA 163 - Easement

LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE

When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as
elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will
cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

FACTS:

Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of property in Bulacan.
They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3 other
siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the extreme left of the road while the lots
on the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacia’s were
sold by her (as her brother’s adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.

Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to the public road.
Anastacia prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining
property (which was in front) for p200 per square meter.

Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a
portion of anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway
anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing
through her property.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother), located directly behind
the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house,
extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and Anastacia’s
perimeter fence.

In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s
property. The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property facing the public
highway, starting from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by 1m to her property and
turning left for about 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was
unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way
through the brother’s property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacia’s
property would no longer make the path straight. They held that it was more practical to extend the
existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was
the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing
through Anastacia’s property.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacia’s property. The court,
however, did not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad faith when she resisted
the claim.

Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient estate despite the fact
that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She denies ever promising Yolonda a
right of way.

Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement of right of way she
provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the
servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private
respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.

She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road
because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net
income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an
avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.
ISSUE:

1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement

2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the
parties

HELD: YES to both

1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or

class of persons to pass over another’s property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging
to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can
demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the
beneficial use of his property.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:

(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private
respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered
to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did
not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient
estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the
trial court itself declared that “[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by
plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an
imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.”

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on any of
several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause
the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not
concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will
not be the shortest.

TC’s findings:
> Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her father’s property and held that there existed an
available space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the
boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father
> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1)
meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.

CA’s finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right of
Anastacia’s property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested
passage through the property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made
of strong materials.

Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or
are so glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would
demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way
which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should
be preferred

107. De Jesus et al v Howmart Corp. et al 12 CA REP 831 FACTS:

De Jesus and Luz Miranda de Jesus are owners of the building located in Tondo,Manila. They brought an
action for damages against Homart Corporation and Howmill Manufacturing Corporation, owners of the
land adjoining the plaintiff on the same street where a sixty story concrete building was constructed.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to observe the necessary care and precautions to protect the
construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent support, thereby causing it
to sink in some parts; its walls, ceilings, and floorings to crack in some places; and by the careless
manner of handling the cement used the roofing’s of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the
accumulated debris piled thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing the building in
question so as to prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff.

HELD:

No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides “No property shall make such excavations upon his land
as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent support”. A reading of Article
684 shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient
lateral or subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution
made by the proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land.

Plaintiffs’ house which adjoins the seven story concrete building constructed by the defendants had
sunk by about eight inches. The sinking of the left side of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the
weakening of subjacent support and to the weight of the seven story concrete building constructed by
the defendant, as the excavation made necessarily disturbed the subjacent soil of the plaintiff’s land.
Defendants having failed to provide the plaintiff’s land and house with sufficient lateral and subjacent

support are liable for damages.

108. LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.

FACTS:

The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide
road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north
and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally
owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such
sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the
consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo
later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now
known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a
Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their half portion of the Manyan
road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo
auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the
highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road.
However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical
concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint
against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet
to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the
easement.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

RULING: YES.

There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the
Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can find
the details regarding it in the case… I just saw the one regarding “acknowledgement” between admu
and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met. And like any
other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the
contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar,
all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there
was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by
the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there no
such thing as a judicial easement)

109. Alcantara v Reta Jr Petition

DOCTRINE:

Construction of a house on the land of another to facilitate the gathering of fruits would constitute a
personal easement under article 614 of the CC.

FACTS:

1. Alcantara filed a case for the exercise of right of first refusal under PD 1517 in RTC with Reta Jr as
defendant.
2. He contends that they were tenants in the land and that it has been converted to a commercial
center. They said that they were threatened to be ejected and asserts their right to first refusal in
accordance with the said PD as legitimate tenants.

3. They said that the amicable settlement of Reta and Roble was void in violation of PD 1517. However
Reta contends that the land is beyond the reach of PD 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an
Urban Land reform zone.

4. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiffs to pay Reta. Thus the appeals.

ISSUE:

1. WON petitioners have a right of first refusal under PD 1517

PROVISIONS: Article 614, CC

Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more persons to whom
the encumbered estate does not belong

RULING + RATIO:

1. NO. The area has been proved not to be proclaimed an ULRZ. In fact, petitioners requested that
the land they are occupying be declared as such. The request was referred to the General
manager of the National Housing Authority and then to the mayor of Davao City. The request
would not have been necessary if it was already an ULRZ. Given this, they cannot claim any right
over it.
The three requisites to be able to avail of these rights are:
1. A legitimate tenant for 10 years or more
2. Must have built his home on the land by contract and
3. has resided continuously for the last 10 years.

Those not complying with the said requisites cannot be deemed legitimate tenants and are
therefore not entitled to the right of first refusal. Reta allowed Roble to use 62 coconut trees for
gathering Tuba. This arrangement is in the nature of a usufruct which gives a right to enjoy the
property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance. Roble was also
allowed to construct his house to facilitate the gathering of the tuba and this is in the nature of
a personal easement under article 614 of the CC. Regardless of the validity of the amicable
settlement, the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was of a usufruct. Roble
thus is not a legitimate tenant under PD 1517.
FALLO:

The court denies this petition and affirms the decision of the CA and the resolution denying
reconsideration.