JUSTIFYING

Saturday, May 24, 2014

Landmark Case: People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004 (Digested Case)
People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004
Case Digest / Digested Case Version
The wife had suffered maltreatment from her husband for over eight years. She was 8 months pregnant when, one
evening, her husband came home drunk and started to batter her. Shouting that his wife "might as well be killed so there
will be nobody to nag" him, he dragged her towards a drawer where he kept a gun, but was not able to open the drawer
because it was locked. So he got out a cutter from his wallet, but dropped it. She was able to hit his arm with a pipe and
escape into another room. The wife, thinking of all the suffering that her husband had been inflicting on her, and thinking
that he might really kill her and her unborn child, distorted the drawer and got the gun. She shot her husband, who was
by then asleep on the bed. She was tried and convicted for parricide, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua (20 years
and 1 day to 40 years) to death. On appeal, she alleged "battered woman syndrome" as a form of self-defense.

FACTS:

That Marivic Genosa, the Appellant on the 15November1995, attacked and wounded his husband, which ultimately led to his
death. According to the appellant she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night it was her husband who began
the provocation. The Appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would
deliver her baby safely. In fact, The Appelant had to be admitted later at the Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from
eclampsia and hypertension, and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995.

The Appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five (5) times, but that Ben would
always follow her and they would reconcile. The Apellant said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her
that night was because 'he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos.

The Appellant after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self defense admitted the killing of her husband, she was then found guilty of Parricide, with the
aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the husband was attacked while asleep.

ISSUES:

Can Marivic Genosa be granted the Justifying circumstance of Self-defense, and can she be held liable for the aggravating
circumstance of treachery?

No, Since self- defense since the existence of Battered woman syndrome, which the appellant has been shown to be suffering in
the relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered
in the context of self-defense.
In the present case, however, according to the testimony of the appellant there was a sufficient time interval between the
unlawful aggression of the husband and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent
behavior and escape to their children's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality
or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.

Without continuous aggression there can be no self-defense. And absence of aggression does not warrant complete or
incomplete self-defense.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.[63] It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or
an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person.[64] In the present case, however, according to the testimony of
Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She
had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he
apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether.
He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
Had Ben still been awaiting Marivic when she came out of their childrens bedroom -- and based on past violent incidents, there
was a great probability that he would still have pursued her and inflicted graver harm -- then, the imminence of the real threat
upon her life would not have ceased yet. Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual
physical assault at the time of the killing is not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To
require the battered person to await an obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life would amount to sentencing her
to murder by installment. Still, impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to
the defendants use of deadly force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence
of danger. Considering such circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.
We reiterate the principle that aggression, if not continuous, does not warrant self-defense.[67] In the absence of such aggression,
there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of the victim.[68] Thus, Marivics killing of Ben was not
completely justified under the circumstances.

No, There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense that the offended party might make.

The circumstances must be shown as indubitably as the killing itself; they cannot be deduced from mere inferences, or
conjectures, which have no place in the appreciation of evidence. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

In the present case, however it was not conclusively shown, that the appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might make. To the contrary, it appears that the
thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same moment when she decided to kill her spouse. In the absence of
any convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she committed the crime in order to
ensure its execution, the doubt should be resolved in her favor.

HELD:

The conviction of Appellant Marivic Genosa for parricide is hereby AFFIRMED. However, there being two (2) mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attending her commission of the offense, her penalty is REDUCED to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

ADDENDUM:

When can BWS (Battered Woman Syndrome) as self defense be appreciated?

Where the brutalized person is already suffering from BWS, further evidence of actual physical assault at the time of the killing is
not required. Incidents of domestic battery usually have a predictable pattern. To require the battered person to await an
obvious, deadly attack before she can defend her life "would amount to sentencing her to 'murder by installment.' Still,
impending danger (based on the conduct of the victim in previous battering episodes) prior to the defendant's use of deadly
force must be shown. Threatening behavior or communication can satisfy the required imminence of danger. Considering such
circumstances and the existence of BWS, self-defense may be appreciated.

In the instant case, we meticulously scoured the records for specific evidence establishing that appellant, due to the
repeated abuse she had suffered from her spouse over a long period of time, became afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome. We, however, failed to find sufficient evidence that would support such a conclusion. More
specifically, we failed to find ample evidence that would confirm the presence of the essential characteristics of
BWS.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence supposedly characterizing the relationship
of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents. In relating to the court a quo how the
fatal incident that led to the death of Ben started, Marivic perfectly described the tension-building phase of the
cycle. She was able to explain in adequate detail the typical characteristics of this stage. However, that single
incident does not prove the existence of the syndrome. In other words, she failed to prove that in at least another
battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern.
How did the tension between the partners usually arise or build up prior to acute battering? How did Marivic
normally respond to Bens relatively minor abuses? What means did she employ to try to prevent the situation from
developing into the next (more violent) stage?
Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle. She simply mentioned
that she would usually run away to her mothers or fathers house;[58] that Ben would seek her out, ask for her
forgiveness and promise to change; and that believing his words, she would return to their common abode.
Did she ever feel that she provoked the violent incidents between her and her spouse? Did she believe that she was
the only hope for Ben to reform? And that she was the sole support of his emotional stability and well-being?
Conversely, how dependent was she on him? Did she feel helpless and trapped in their relationship? Did both of
them regard death as preferable to separation?
In sum, the defense failed to elicit from appellant herself her factual experiences and thoughts that would clearly and
fully demonstrate the essential characteristics of the syndrome.
The Court appreciates the ratiocinations given by the expert witnesses for the defense. Indeed, they were able to
explain fully, albeit merely theoretically and scientifically, how the personality of the battered woman usually
evolved or deteriorated as a result of repeated and severe beatings inflicted upon her by her partner or spouse.
They corroborated each others testimonies, which were culled from their numerous studies of hundreds of actual
cases. However, they failed to present in court the factual experiences and thoughts that appellant had related to
them -- if at all -- based on which they concluded that she had BWS.
We emphasize that in criminal cases, all the elements of a modifying circumstance must be proven in order to be
appreciated. To repeat, the records lack supporting evidence that would establish all the essentials of the battered
woman syndrome as manifested specifically in the case of the Genosas.
People of the Philippines vs. Jesus Retubado
Facts:
Someone played a joke on Edwin Retubado, the appellant’s younger brother who was mentally ill. Someone
inserted a lighted firecracker in a cigarette pack and gave it to Edwin. While Edwin and his father were having dinner, it
exploded. The suspect was their neighbor Emmanuel Caon, Jr. The matter was brought to the attention of the barangay
captain who conducted an investigation. It turned out that Emmanuel Caon, Jr. was NOT the culprit. The appellant, however,
was bent on confronting Emmanuel Caon, Jr. Thereafter, the father of Emmanuel Jr., 50 y.o. Emmanuel Caon, Sr., (pedicab
driver) was confronted by Jesus when the former was on his way home. Emmanuel Sr. ignored Jesus so the latter pushed
the pedicab which nearly fell into a canal. Jesus followed Emmanuel Sr. to his house. His wife, Norberta Caon was in the
balcony of their house, above the porch waiting for him to arrive. Emmanuel, Jr., meanwhile, was already asleep. Emmanuel
Sr. demanded to know why he was being followed. Jesus told Emmanuel that he just wanted to talk to Emmanuel Jr., but
Emmanuel Sr. told the appellant that his son was already asleep. Norberta went down from the balcony and placed her
hand on her husbands shoulder to pacify him. Jesus forthwith pulled out a handgun from under his T-shirt and shot
Emmanuel on the forehead. The latter fell to the floor as the appellant walked away from the scene. Emmanuel was brought
to the Tuburan District Hospital, but he died shortly thereafter. Jesus surrendered to the police but failed to surrender the
firearm he used to kill the victim.

Jesus admitted shooting the victim but claimed that he was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence,
cannot be held criminally liable for the victims death. He testified that when he insisted that Emmanuel wake up his son,
Emmanuel went to his room and emerged therefrom holding a handgun. Jesus grabbed Emmanuel’s hand, they struggled
for the gun but eventually, Emmanuel fell on his knees. Jesus pulled the gun to the level of Emmanuel’s forehead, and the
gun suddenly went off. Jesus then rushed to his house to change clothes. He placed the gun on the dining table. When he
went back to the dining room his sister told him that their brother Edwin had taken the gun and thrown it into the sea.

Trial court convicted Jesus of murder, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

Issue:
1. WON Jesus was merely performing a lawful act with due care hence, cannot be held criminally liable for the victims
death - No!
2. WON Jesus is liable for murder - No! Homicide only

Ruling:
The phrase state of necessity is of German origin. Countries which have embraced the classical theory of criminal
law, like Italy, do not use the phrase. The justification refers to a situation of grave peril (un mal), actual or imminent (actual
o imminente). The word propiedad covers diverse juridical rights (bienes juridicos) such as right to life, honor, the integrity
of ones body, and property (la vida, la integridad corporal, el pudor, el honor, bienes patrimoniales) belonging to another. It
is indispensable that the state of necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party
invoking the same.

The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 11, paragraph 4 of the RPC. It is
an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. By admitting causing
the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the prosecution. Whether the accused acted under a state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court.

There is no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful
aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting the victim at close range on the forehead.
The court came to this conclusion based on:
1. Norberta Caon’s testimony.
2. There is no evidence that the appellant informed the police authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity
and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun into the sea.
3. The appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim.

There is no treachery in the present case to qualify the crime to murder. To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions
must be present, namely, (a) the employment of the means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The prosecution
failed to adduce an iota of evidence to support the confluence of the abovementioned conditions.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

PEOPLE v. CATBAGAN
(G.R. Nos. 149430-32. February 23, 2004)
FACTS:
After receiving complaints about the gunshots coming from the residence of Danilo Lapidante, who was then was
celebrating his birthday, appellant Carmelo Catbagan, an investigator of the Criminal Investigation Service,
Philippine National Police, went to the latter’s house to verify who among their group had been firing the Armalite
rifle. Suddenly, a piece of stone was hurled from the direction of the celebrant’s house, hitting Catbagan. Irritated,
he ordered his companion, Zosimo Pavabier, to look for the one who threw the stone. At that moment, Sgt. Celso
Suico of the Philippine Air Force and of the Presidential Security Group, the one responsible for firing the shots,
approached and extended his hand towards Catbagan as he introduced himself. Completely ignoring the gesture of
the latter, Catbagan drew out his .9mm automatic pistol and fired successively at Suico. Ernesto Lacaden,
companion of Suico, who was abruptly awakened as the shots were fired, disembarked from the parked owner-type
jeep where he was sleeping. Unexpectedly, two shots were also fired at him by Catbagan. Almost simultaneously,
Catbagan directed his attention to Lapidante who was then inside their compound and running towards the main
door of their house upon the prompting of his wife to evade the assailant. But before he could reach the safety of
their abode, two rapid shots were fired by Catbagan, one of which hit him in the upper part of his body. As a
consequence of the injuries they sustained, Suico and Lapidante died, whereas Lacaden had to be treated and
confined in the hospital.
In his defense, Catbagan argued that he was justified in shooting the victims, as he was merely defending himself and
fulfilling his sworn duties. He claimed that the victims were rushing and encircling him, Lacaden toting an ice-pick
while Suico drew a gun from his waist and aimed the pistol at him. Simultaneously, he heard Lapidante shouting,
which he believed was asking for a long gun. Threatened of his safety, he drew his own gun fired at the aggressors.
He then surrendered himself and his firearms to his superior officer at the CIDG Office. The lower court, nonetheless,
convicted him with the crime of homicide, murder, and frustrated murder.
ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the appellant was justified in shooting the victims as a direct result of his fulfillment of a duty.
2) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a justifying circumstance of self-defense.
3) Whether or not the appellant was entitled to a mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
4) Whether or not the characterization of the crimes charged by the trial court was correct.
HELD:
1) No. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability, provided that the following requisites
must concur:
1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and
2) the injury caused or the offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of such lawful
exercise. In the instant case, the above mentioned requisites were absent.
 The appellant was not performing his duties at the time of the shooting as there was no proof that he had
personal knowledge on who had been firing the Armalite, nor he was there to effect an arrest. The fatal injuries that
he inflicted on the victims were not a necessary consequence of the performance of his duty as a police officer.
2) No. Article 11 of the RPC provides that anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights do not incur criminal
liability, provided that the following circumstances concur:
1) unlawful aggression;
2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In the circumstances
surrounding the shooting of Suico, only a majority of the elements of self-defense were present.
However, he may still be credited with a mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 13 of the RPC.
With regard to the circumstances surrounding the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden, no unlawful aggression was
shown. Thus, the justifying circumstance of self-defense will not apply.
In self-defense, proof by clear and convincing evidence is incumbent upon the accused. [35] Appellant cannot
rely on the weakness of the evidence for the prosecution, which can hardly be disbelieved after he himself admitted
that he had shot the victims.[36] A judicial confession constitutes evidence of a high order, on the presumption that
no sane person would deliberately confess to the commission of an act unless moved by the desire to reveal the
truth.[37] As the RTC correctly did, we should look at the circumstances of the shooting in the case of each victim.
Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Suico
The first requisite of self-defense is unlawful aggression by the person who is eventually injured or killed by
the accused.
This Court is convinced that the RTCs finding of unlawful aggression on the part of Suico is supported by the
records, and we see no reason to disturb those findings. Ruled the lower court:
Under the given situation wherein the Sergeant cocking the pistol was one who was trained, and skilled in
the handling of guns, plus the fact that he was drunk, the Court cannot blame accused Catbagan to believe and fear
that Suico would attack him in that mock introduction.
The prosecution presented, in fact, conflicting accounts of how Suico had been shot. The shooting allegedly
happened after he had offered a handshake to appellant,[39] according to Rosita Lapidante, the wife of another
victim. On the other hand, Charlie Lacaden, the brother of still another victim, gave testimony that conflicted with
hers. Suico was allegedly shot by appellant when the former turned his back to the latter.
On the other hand, appellant and Defense Witness Zosimo Pavabier positively and consistently testified that
it was Suico who had first drawn and aimed his gun at appellant. This assertion was confirmed by the physical
evidence that the victims gun had a live bullet sandwiched between its breechblock and chamber. This fact proves
that the gun was cocked and fired, but that the bullet was jammed in the process.
Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a
person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury -- as
in this case. Thus, Suicos act of aiming a cocked gun at appellant is sufficient unlawful aggression.
The second element of self-defense -- reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it --
requires the following:
1) a necessity of the course of action taken by the person making the defense and
2) a necessity of the means used. Both the course of action taken and the means used must be reasonable.
The means employed by the person invoking self-defense is reasonable if equivalent to the means of attack
used by the original aggressor. Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or
quality of the weapon, the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as
well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and also the place and the occasion of the assault.
The RTC made a definitive finding on the unreasonableness of the means employed by appellant as follows:
However, what followed, as testified by witnesses was that Catbagan continued firing even while Suico
was pleading Huwag pare! with outstretched hand and open palm of his right hand. While the accused asserted
that he had to fire his gun and hit Suico with more shots to totally disable him, the same cannot be believed by
the Court, if we take stock of Dr. Agudas testimony that with the injured arm and that on the chest being
inflicted with the first double tap shots; the victim would have had much difficulty to retaliate. In fact,
Catbagan himself stated on clarification questions that the .45 caliber gun of the victim fell already so that
the threat of continued aggression was no longer present.
On this point, the Court entertains serious doubts on the right of the accused to continue firing at Suico after
the latter was dispossessed of his gun due to the injuries received from the gunfire of the assailant.
Finally, as to the element of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense,
appellant has sufficiently established that he went to the house of the Lapidantes to find out who had fired the
gunshots earlier that day. There was therefore absolutely no provocation from him, either by unjust conduct or by
incitement, that would justify Suicos acts of cocking and aiming a gun at him.
Not having proven all the elements of self-defense, appellant cannot use it to justify sufficiently his fatal
shooting of Suico. Having proven a majority of the elements, however, the former may still be credited with a
mitigating circumstance in accordance with Article 13 of the RPC.
Circumstances Surrounding the Shooting of Lapidante
With respect to Lapidante, he allegedly rushed towards his house to get hold of the mahaba, so appellant had
no other recourse but to shoot him. The purpose of the victim in rushing towards his house was supposedly to
recover the advantage he had previously enjoyed. Hence, it is argued that unlawful aggression was present.
(NO UNLAWFUL AGRESSION) We disagree with appellants averments. Unlawful aggression presupposes
an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof. Such aggression refers to an attack that
has actually broken out or materialized or is at the very least clearly imminent; it cannot consist merely of any oral
threat or intimidating stance or posture.
In this case, the RTC was categorical in ruling that the perceived danger was more in the mind of
appellant than in reality. The circumstances did not point to any actual or imminent peril to his life, limb or
right. On the part of Lapidante, the act of running towards his house can hardly be characterized as unlawful
aggression. It could not have imperiled appellants life.
In a previous case, this Court ruled that a threat even if made with a weapon or the belief that a person [is]
about to be attacked, is not sufficient, but that it is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of
aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. [55] We
agree with the RTCs ratiocination, which we quote:
With respect to the incident involving the victim Lapidante, it is not disputed that he was unarmed as he was
inside his own premises within the fenced area in front of his house. What acts of aggression against Catbagan which
he did are not apparent to us. To this Court, the belief on the part of Catbagan that the victim was about to retrieve a
rifle from the doorside of the house, existed only in his imagination.
Neither do we accept the contention that unlawful aggression by Lapidante was shown by his act of rushing
towards his house for the purpose of taking a more advantageous position. Referred to here is the rule that if it is
clear that the purpose of the aggressor in retreating -- or, as in this case, Lapidantes rushing towards his house -- is
to take a more advantageous position to ensure the success of the attack already begun, the unlawful aggression is
considered still continuing; and the one resorting to self-defense has a right to pursue and disable the former.
Obviously, this rule does not apply to Lapidante, because 1) there was no clear purpose in his act of retreating
to take a more advantageous position; and 2) since he never attacked appellant in the first place, the former could
not have begun any unlawful aggression and, hence, would not have had any reason to take a more advantageous
position. How could there have been a continuation of something that had never been started? If any aggression was
begun in this case, it was by Suico, not by Lapidante.
Hence, no unlawful aggression by Lapidante was shown. Because the presence thereof is a statutory and
doctrinal conditio sine qua non of the justifying circumstance of self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- we need
not examine the presence of the other requisites.
Circumstances Surrounding the Shooting of Lacaden
Appellant asserts that Lacaden attacked him with an ice pick from the side. Allegedly, this act clearly showed
unlawful aggression on the latters part. All the pieces of evidence on record, however, point to the absence thereof.
Most crucial is the position of the gunshot wound. As testified to by the doctor who had treated the victim,
its point of entry was on the right side of the back, just below the scapula. This incontestable fact belies the claim of
appellant that he was attacked by Lacaden with an ice pick. Such attack would have required the latter to face him;
and, logically, a gunshot entry wound would have been in the front -- not in the back -- portion of Lacadens body. The
wound in the back of the victim clearly shows that he was shot while his back was turned to appellant. Hence, there
was no unlawful aggression on the part of the former.
Neither was any ice pick presented in the proceedings before the RTC. Appellant maintains that his
testimony, coupled with that of Pavabier, is sufficient to establish the existence of the weapon. But the prosecution
witnesses, including the victim himself, testified otherwise -- that there was no unlawful aggression during the
incident, much less with the use of an ice pick. The RTC held thus:
In the case of Jun Lacaden, he was shot in the back which could only corroborate the evidence to the effect
that he was also in the act of fleeing from the fury of gunfire from Catbagan. As to the allegation of the latter that Jun
Lacaden had an icepick, that claim is rather nebulous. Firstly, as veteran criminal investigator, he should have taken,
kept and presented that said instrument to augment his legal excuse. Secondly, if really there was one, it is rather
surprising why he did not demand Jun Lacaden for its surrender initially as he passed thru the pedestrian steel door
and subsequently while the latter had positioned himself near the owner-type jeep.

3) Yes. In order for voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and 3) the
surrender was voluntary. It is sufficient that that act be spontaneous and clearly indicative of the intent of the
accused to surrender unconditionally. At the time of his surrender, appellant had not actually been arrested. He
surrendered himself and his firearm to a person in authority, the chief of the Assistant Directorate for Intelligence of
the Philippine National Police. Finally, the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; it thus showed intent to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities. Thus, he was credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
4) No. The crimes were not properly characterized except with the case of Suico. Treachery was alleged in the case,
thus qualifying the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden as murder and frustrated murder respectively. In order to
establish treachery, the following must be proven: 1) the employment of such means of execution as would give the
person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and 2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the
means of execution. With regard to the shooting of Lapidante and Lacaden, the Court held that even if the positions
of the victims were vulnerable, there was still no treachery, as the appellant did not deliberately adopt such mode of
attack. His decision to shoot them was clearly sudden. Thus, in the case of Lapidante, the Court modified the crime
from murder to homicide; while in the case of Lacaden, the crime was modified from frustrated murder to less
serious physical injuries.
TABUENA v. SANDIGANBAYAN [121 SCRA 389 (1983)]
November 10, 2010
Facts:
In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated Jan. 6, 1986, President Marcos allegedly
commanded petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority
(MIAA), “to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the
President), the sum P55M in cash as partial payment of MIAA’s account with said company mentioned in a
Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this Office dated Jan. 7,1985…” Tabuena withdrew
the sum of 55M on three separate occasions (25M, 25M, 5M – with Adolfo Peralta) and delivered them to Gimenez,
Marcos’s private secretary.
It is without dispute that Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money
(no disbursement slips and paid in cold cash).
Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the third delivery and it did not mention anything about the purpose of the
receipt or the money being used to pay PNCC, but merely acknowledged that Gimenez had received the sum of 55M
from Tabuena on three occasions. Furthermore, there was no receipt from the PNCC recognizing payment of debt.
Prosecution: there were no standing obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M. PNCC said
themselves that they didn’t receive the P55M.
Tabuena claimed that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus the Marcos memorandum
which contained same order) to immediately forward to the office of the President, 55M in cash, as partial
payment of MIAA’s obligations to PNCC and that he believed that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC.
In short, that Tabuena acted in good faith.
Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuena’s claim of good faith and found him guilty of malversation by negligence, hence this
case.
Issue: WON Tabuena, in following the orders of his superior, was guilty of malversation (or if because of the
justifying circumstance of following the orders of his superior, in good faith, he would not be criminally liable, but
merely civilly liable)?
Held: Tabuena is merely civilly liable. The very fact that he was merely following the orders of his superior is a
justifying circumstance.
Ratio:
1. On the point raised by Tabuena that he cannot be charged with intentional malversation and be convicted by
malversation by negligence, the Court ruled that the dolo and culpa of the offense is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. The same felony is still there and conviction thereof is proper.
2. On the defense of good faith: it is a valid defense against malversation because it would negate criminal intent.
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes…be accompanied by criminal intent or such negligence
or indifference to duty or to consequences as is equivalent to criminal intent The maxim actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea – a crime is not commited if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent
(malversation cases: US v. Catolico, US v. Elvina).
3. The Court, based on the evidence presented, found that Tabuena had no other choice but to actually follow the
order stated in the Marcos Memorandum, because, as president of the Philippines, indubitably the head of
governmental agencies such as the MIAA and PNCC, Marcos is undeniably the superior of Tabuena.
4. Tabuena entitled to the justifying circumstance of “any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by
a superior for some lawful purpose” because he is only acting in good faith, faithfully and efficiently carrying out
orders from the highest official in the land. Moreover, there was nothing in the Marcos Memorandum that may
invite suspicion – there was no question about the lawfulness of the order contained in such a memorandum.
Tabuena had reason to believe that the 55M was indeed part of a due and demandable debt, a portion of a
bigger liability to PNCC (existence of such debts determined from testimonies). So even if the order was illegal
and Tabuena was not aware of the illegality, he would not be liable because there would only be a mistake of
fact committed in good faith.
5. Tabuena followed the memorandum to the letter, paying immediately the PNCC, through this office (office of
the president) the sum of 55M. Tabuena had reasonable ground to believe that the President was entitled to receive
the money because as Chief Executive, Marcos exercised supervision and control over governmental agencies (good
faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation).
6. While even Tabuena admitted that procedures were ignored and that the disbursement was unusual, he is
found to be excused from such because the Marcos Memorandum enjoined his IMMEDIATE COMPLIANCE. On the
other hand, while this allows for the negation of criminal intent, as Tabuena acted in good faith, he would still be
civilly liable (but he’s not criminally liable anymore, escaping the harsher penalties) (see page 362).
7. There is no showing that Tabuena had anything to do with the creation of the Marcos Memorandum – that
even if the real purpose behind the memorandum was to get 55M from public funds, it is clear that he did and would
not profit from such and that he did not have anything to do with the creation of the memorandum.
8. Tabuena case is a case concerning obedience in good faith of a duly executed order. The order/memorandum
came from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the president himself, in effect allowing for the
presumption that such order was regularly issued and patently legal. Furthermore, the wording of the memorandum
expressed a certain urgency to its execution—Obedienta est legis essential (act swiftly without question).
9. Main Ratio: Furthermore, the Court itself raises the contention that the case involves a violation of the
accused’s right to due process in the sense that it was obvious that the Sandiganbayan was overzealous in its attempt
to convict parties involved – as seen in the volume of questions asked, and the manner the same were posed (cross
examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation). To quote Justice Cruz, “Respect for the
Constitution is more important that securing a conviction based on a violation of the rights of the accused.”
Sandiganbayan was obviously biased, denying Tabuena and parties involves the requirement of the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge. As a consequence of such violation of due process, the order of Sandiganbayan was found void.
Note that this defense was not raised by Tabuena.
Implication of pro hac vice: Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan is not precedent for the proposition that any public official
who blindly follows orders of their superior. Thus, this case is not authoritative on Art. 11(6).
Decision: Tabuena and Peralta acquitted.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v. BELONIO
429 scra 579
Facts: Rammy Tamayo who bought a cigarette from a store a few meters from their house was bumped by the
accused Randy Belonio in trying to force his way in the small opening of the store, Jennifer Ramy’s first cousin saw
that Randy gave Ramy a long and hard look. The accused left but after few minutes he returned and stabbed Ramy
with a dagger in his right chest which causes his death, then fled but was arrested from one of the houses near the
barangay hall. The accused raise the defense of insanity for his mental sickness that he was not in his right mind
when the killing took place. Dr. Gauzon,certifies that he was suffering from schizophrenia. The accused was found
guilty of murder and sentenced to death

Issue:Whether or not the accused defense of insanity exempt him from his criminal offense of murder

Ruling: The Supreme Court responds to the defense of the accused in negative, the defense utterly failed in proving
that the accused was insane. They found the evidence to be insufficient; there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the act, to establish his claim that he was insane. And the crime of murder was
affirmed and sentenced him with death penalty Belonio, after giving the victim a hard and resentful look, sat near
the latter and conversed with him. Afterwards he stabbed Tamayo then escaped and went into hiding; these acts
tend to establish that the accused was well aware of what he had just committed. Philippine courts have established
a more stringent criterion for acceptance of insanity as an exempting circumstance. A mere abnormality of mental
faculties is not enough; there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. The
appellants past does not discredit the facts that he did not act with complete absence of power to discern, he was not
deprived of reason and he was not totally deprived of his will. (thus at the time of the commission of the offense)

PEOPLE v. ESTEPANTO
FACTS:
ENRIQUE BALINAS was stabbed and hacked to death for which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben, Rodney,
Dante and Rene, all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Only Ruben, Rodney and Rene were found
guilty.
The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio Tayco. He narrated that on 16
April 1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, he was on his way home Lopito Gaudia and the vicitm. Enroute,
they met Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound. At this juncture, according to Florencio, Lopito
started to talk to Dominador while he and Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and without any
provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a guinunting. Ruben who was armed with a cane cutter and
Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit in hacking Enrique. While this was happening,
Dominador told his companions, You better kill him!
Lopito Gaudia confirmed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, while he was walking
home with Enrique Balinas and Florencio Tayco, they saw Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound
near the house of Junior Vasquez. While he was talking to Dominador he saw two (2) persons, both naked from
the waist up, pass by. He recognized one of them to be Rodrigo Estepano. Soon after, he heard a couple of
splashing sounds and a ring, which made him turn around. As he did, he saw Rodrigo withdrawing his bolo from
the neck of Enrique. He also saw another person, who was armed with a cane cutter, standing near the fallen
Enrique. He asked Dominador why Rodrigo hacked Enrique and Dominador replied that that was the result of
intense hatred. He then hurriedly left for home. On the way he met some military men and told them about the
incident. The military men assured him that they would report the matter to the police authorities.
 Dominador Estepano (ACCUSED) gave his own version of the incident. According to him, on 16 April
1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They were about to eat
supper when he heard Enrique Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped through the window
and saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground Rodrigo hastily fled. There was no other
person in the vicinity. He then went down his house where the victim was and saw the latters firearm. He picked
it up and when Chief of Police Balquin arrived, he turned over the firearm to him. Robert Hautea and Luz Cuepas,
both residents of Barangay IV, corroborated the testimony of Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten
oclock in the evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City attending to his wife who earlier
underwent a caesarian operation. Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they were at home sleeping
when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only thirteen (13) years of age then, testified that he came to know
about the incident that same night when his mother awakened him to inform him about it. Rodney, on the other
hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed Enrique Balinas.
ISSUE: WON RENE (13 years of age at the time the crime happened) is exempt from criminal liability under
Article 12 paragraph 3 of the RPC? Did the minor in this case act with discernment to incur criminal liabity?

HELD: With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen (13) years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under Art. 12, par. (3), of The Revised Penal Code, a person over
nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) is exempt from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with
discernment. The minor referred to here is presumed to have acted without discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon
the prosecution to prove that such minor acted otherwise.
A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant Rene Estepano
acted with discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco only attempted to establish, as it did,
Renes presence at the crime scene and his supposed participation in the killing of Enrique Balinas. Thus Clearly, the
prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful
act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not in any way attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked
about what he knew of the incident that transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein. Accordingly,
even if he was indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut
the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age. The cross-examination of Rene could have provided
the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the
government miserably squandered the opportunity to incriminate him.

PEOPLE v. AGLIDAY
FACTS: The accused quarreled with his wife over her working as a laundrywoman and his drinking habits. The son,
Richard, interfered and and for that reason, the father got his shotgun and shot his son. ◦ The medico-legal officer found
a gunshot wound in the buttock of the victim (richard). The son died in the emergency room. ◦ Father interposed the
defense that he was cleaning his gun at the time and he accidentally squeezed the trigger and the gun fired. Because of
the freak accident, his son was hit while he was about to go upstairs. ◦ The lower court gave credence to the prosecution's
version and convicted the father with parricide. Prosecution witness Rey Agliday, another son of appellant, testified that
he was in their house resting on a wooden bed at the time of the incident in question (p. 3, tsn, June 18, 1999). Rey saw
his father-appellant shoot his brother Richard with a shotgun, as he was about four (4) meters from them (p. 4, id.).
Before the shooting incident, Rey recounted [that] his mother and his father-appellant had a quarrel, but he did not
interfere. His brother Richard, on the other hand, intervened and for that reason appellant got his shotgun and shot
Richard. Appellant surrendered to the barangay captain who accompanied him to the police authorities. Rey executed a
sworn statement (Exhibit A) on the shooting incident (p. 5, id.).

ISSUE: WON ACCCUED IS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABLITY DUE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCE OF ACCIDENT
UNDER ARTICLE 12 of the RPC
HELD: NO. The court was not persuaded. Both the trial court and the solicitor general rejected this defense on the
basis of the eyewitness testimonies of Conchita and Rey. Under Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the Code, criminal liability
does not arise in case a crime is committed by any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. The exemption from criminal liability
under the circumstance showing accident is based on the lack of criminal intent. The declarations of innocence by
appellant are contradicted by the testimonies of his wife and son. Before the accused may be exempted from criminal
liability by reason of Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act
(2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of
causing it.For an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful. The act of firing a shotgun at
another is not a lawful act.
An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it comes about through some act of
our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. It connotes the absence of criminal intent. Intent
is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons overt acts. In the case at bar, appellant got his shotgun and
returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in the quarrel between the former and Conchita. It must
also be pointed out that the firearm was a shotgun that would not have fired off without first being cocked. Undoubtedly,
appellant cocked the shotgun before discharging it, showing a clear intent to fire it at someone.

US v. CABALLERO
FACTS: The defendants have been sentenced by the CFI of Cebu to the penalty of seven years of presidio mayor as accessories
after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers
Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France, John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said
crime as principals or as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal
the crime. Robert Baculi and Apolonio Caballeros were convicted as accessories to the crime of assassination or
murder of four American school-teachers, having buried the corpses of the victims to conceal the crime. They were
allegedly coerced.

compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm this, but he is corroborated
by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he
was present when the Americans were killed; that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans,
but that he was in a banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began to
run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter called to him and striking him
the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.

ISSUE: WON WON the defense under Art12(5) is tenable

HELD: YES. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force. The Penal Code exempts from liability
any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such
circumstances when he executed the acts which are charged against him.

As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any way in the
execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the contrary, since Baculi, as well
as on of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any
part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he even in the place of occurrence when the burial took place. The
confession of his supposed liability and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the
Constabulary, Enrique Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a confession to him
voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that
the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the promise made to him and to the other defendants that
nothing would be done to them. Confessions which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without
force, intimidation, or promise of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4 Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission.)

The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems to be one of
the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his judgment, is not punished
by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants criminally liable according to law.

PEOPLE vs JESUS QUILLOY

FACTS: Jesus alias Ernesto Quilloy was charged with treason and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
During the Japanese occupation, the appellant joined the Japanese Imperial Army and served as a guide of the Japanese in arresting
guerillas. He was often seen with the Makapili; he carried arms, wore Japanese uniform and was in charge of the Makapili garrison in
Los Banos, Laguna. On January 14, 1945, the appellant along with five other Filipinos and several Japanese soldiers, all armed,
surrounded the house of Isabelo Alviar in barrio San Antonio, Los Banos , while the Alviars were having lunch. Then one of the Filipinos,
ordered all the people out of the house. Therein, the appellant identified Isabelo Alviar as a guerilla. Immediately, the group took
Alviar to town for investigation. The victim’s wife, Simplicia Barcalla, followed closely but was warned by one of the Makapilis not to
follow. When the group arrived at the bridge leading to the town, Barcalla head multiple gunshots. She was later informed by one
Pablo Villanueva at the municipal headquarters that husband was dead and his corpse could be found near the railroad track in Barrio
San Antonio. The next morning, she went to the place and found the dead body of her husband with two mortal bullet wounds.

The defendant claimed that he was himself a guerilla but in February 1945, he was taken prisoner by the Japanese in Los Banos. He
further claimed that he joined the Japanese forces on account of duress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant acted on the account of duress

HELD: Duress as a valid defense should be used based on a real, imminent, or reasonable fear for one’s life or limb. It should not be
a inspired by a speculative, fanciful or remote fear. If the appellant was captured by the Japanese for being a guerilla as he claimed,
it is hardly believable that they would place so much confidence and trust in him that they would arm him and dress him in the
Japanese uniform. More unbelievable would be to entrust him with the mission of helping the Japanese capture other guerillas
without any fear that he might rejoin his guerilla comrades.

The theory of the defense is untenable. If he was captured by the Japanese for being a guerrilla, it is unbelievable that they came to
have so much confidence in him as to arm him and dress him in the Japanese uniform, entrusting him with the mission of helping
them in the capture of other guerrillas, without any fear that he might rejoin his guerrilla comrades, who had then become very strong
on account of the direct help given them by the American troops who had then landed in the Philippines.

The appellant claims that he joined the Japanese forces on account of duress. Duress as a valid defense should be based on real,
imminent, or reasonable fear for one's life or limb. It should not be inspired by speculative, fanciful, or remote fear. A person should
not commit a very serious crime on account of a flimsy fear. Furthermore, the acts of the appellant were incompatible with duress
because he remained with the jap for a long time.

US v. VICENTILLIO

FACTS: FACTS: The defendant Isidro Vicentillo, who was a municipal president at the time of the incident, was charged by the lower
court of illegal and arbitrary detention. Complainant claimed to have been unlawfully detained for a period of three days.

ISSUE: Whether Article 12 paragraph 7 applies to the case at bar

HELD: No. The SC ruled that the alleged unlawful detention of the complainant was within the lawful authority of the defendant, who
was performing his functions as municipal president. Based on the evidence presented, the alleged offense with which the
complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the presence of the municipal president, who must be held to
have had all the usual powers of a police officer for making the arrest without warrant.

Under the Law, the person arrested must be delivered to the nearest judicial authority at most within 18 hours otherwise, the arresting
officer will be liable for arbitrary detention. Because there was no judicial authority at the municipality during that time, they
journeyed for three days by boat to the nearest justice of peace as there was no other means of transportation. The distance which
required a journey of 3 days was considered an insuperable cause. Hence, he was exempt from criminal liability.

It may be that the defendant was not friendly to the arrested man, and that he was not sorry to see him exposed to considerable
inconvenience and delay in the proceedings incident to his trial, but there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that
his defendant caused the arrest and the subsequent detention of the prisoner otherwise than in the due performance of his official
duties; and there can be no doubt of his lawfully authority in the premises. The trial judge lays great stress upon the trivial nature of
the offense for which the arrest was made, but keeping in mind the fact that there was no judicial officer in the remote community
where the incident occurred at the time of the arrest, and no certainty of the early return of the absent justice of the peace, or his
auxiliary, we are not prepared to hold, in the absence of all the evidence on this point that in a particular case of a defiance of local
authority by the willful violation of a local ordinance, it was not necessary, or at least expedient, to make an arrest and send the
offender forthwith to the justice of the peace of a neighboring municipality, if only to convince all would-be offenders that the forces
of law and order were supreme, even in the absence of the local municipal judicial officers.