SECOND DIVISION Petitioner argues that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, which the Court promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect
on 3 August 1988.
FACTS:
Petitioner Cynthia Bolos(Cynthia)filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family
Code. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment. A copy
of said decision was received by respondent Danilo and he thereafter timely filed
the Notice of Appeal.
The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure to file the required
motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages. Thereafter, the RTC issued the order declaring its decision declaring
the marriage null and void as final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry
of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
forcertiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to
render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty
of abandoning him, the family home and their children.
The CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC declaring the nullity of marriage as final and executory. The appellate court
stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage
between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the
Family Code took effect.
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to petitioner, the
phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word
“petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.” Such that petitions filed after the
effectivity of the Family Code are governed by the A.M. No. even if the marriage
was solemnized before the same. Danilo, in his Comment, counters that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized
on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled “Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,” is applicable to
the case at bench.
HELD:
No, it does not.
RATIO:
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court
promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in
fact, reads:
“Section 1. Scope.—This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family
Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.”
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The
coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation
line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under
the Civil Code.8 The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioner’s
interpretation that the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
refers to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages.”
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision
which denied due course to respondent’s appeal and denying petitioner’s motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England.
After that, she lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his
seaman's contract has expired, he brought her to his hometown in San
Jose, Antique. They got married in January 1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and
left the province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his
mother that 15 days after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut
short his contract to find Janet. He returned home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port
calls. He wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met,
but all were returned to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends
but they too had no news about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the
RTC of Antique a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General,
appealed to the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet presumptively dead because Nolasco had failed to show that
there existed a well-founded belief for such declaration. CA affirmed the
trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is
already dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third
requirement under the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a
"well-founded belief" that Janet is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has
been shortened to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial
declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present to
marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter standard before
declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "well-founded
belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration
of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to
ascertain about Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help
of local authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract
to London. Janet's alleged refusal to give any information about her was
too convenient an excuse to justify his failure to locate her. He did not
explain why he took him 9 months to finally reached San Jose after he
asked leave from his captain. He refused to identify his friends whom
he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the returned
letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London, he
did not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent
behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet
was dead a well-founded one.
 HELD:

FIRST DIVISION
Any decision in the civil case the fact that respondent entered into a
[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000] second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision
in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.
BOBIS, respondent. is therefore not a prejudicial question. Respondent cannot be permitted to use
his malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.
DECISION
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved
therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon
FACTS: which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the civil
On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage
case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately
with Ma. Dulce Javier. With said marriage not yet annulled, nullified nor
related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
terminated, he contracted a second marriage with herein petitioner Imelda
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential
Marbella (on Jan. 25, 1996), and a third marriage with certain Julia Hernandez,
elements are (a) the civil action involves an issue raised in the criminal action;
thereafter.
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
Petitioner then filed a case of bigamy against respondent on Feb. 25, 1998, at
In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial
the RTC of Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage license. He then filed a
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his
motion to suspend the criminal proceeding for bigamy invoking the civil case
cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
case. The RTC granted the motion, while petitioner’s motion for
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and
reconsideration was denied.
the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration
of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal
case for bigamy.
of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the
absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on
the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render
nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova, The elements of bigamy are (1) the offender has been legally
22 SCRA 731(1968): married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
themselves its nullity, [as] only competent courts have such authority. Prior to presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; and (4) the
such declaration of nullity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence
contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for of the first. The exceptions to prosecution for bigamy are those covered by
bigamy. Article 41 of the Family Code and by PD 1083 otherwise known as the Code
of Muslim Personal Laws
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or
innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in
the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal
case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have
hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been
adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not
yet presented single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge
through a non-criminal suit.

Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot

be successfully invoked as an excuse. The contracting of a marriage knowing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code. The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every
person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial
declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should
he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the
law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a
matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the
criminal case.
EN BANC motion for declaration of heirs and further alleged in substance
that the deceased, was suffering from senile dementia from the
G.R. No. L-1967 May 28, 1951 year which became worse from September 9, 1944. They also
claimed that the marriage between said deceased and Matilde
Probate of the will of the late Faustino Neri San Jose. PAZ Menciano, was in violation of the legal provisions and requisites,
NERI SAN JOSE, petitioner. for the deceased was deprived of his free will due to his age,
MATILDE MENCIANO, in her behalf and in behalf of the sickness, and bombardment, and Menciano, taking advantage of
minors CARLO MAGNO NERI and FAUSTINO NERI, the deceased's condition, by intrigue and threat of abandoning
Jr., plaintiffs-appellees, him, forced Neri by means of deceit (dolo) and threat to marry
vs. her; and that the deceased was sterile, unable to procreate, and
PAZ NERI SAN JOSE and RODOLFO PELAEZ, defendants- was impotent and congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers
appellants. Anastasio, Filomeno, Pedro, and his sister Conchita, who had no
children. The defendants also filed a counterclaim for the sum of
JUGO, J.: P286,000 in cash, and for jewels and certain properties, which,
as alleged, were retained and illegally disposed of by Matilde
Menciano.

Facts: Issues:

Matilde Menciano, in her behalf and in behalf of the minors 1. Was the marriage between the deceased Faustino Neri San
Carlo Magno Neri and Faustino Neri, Jr., filed a motion for Jose and Matilde Menciano valid?
declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the
deceased Faustino Neri San Jose to whom she was married on
September 28, 1944, before Rev. Father Isaias Edralin, S. J. She
claims that before the marriage the deceased and she lived 2. Are, the children Faustino Neri, Jr. and Carlo Magno Neri the
together as husband and wife, there having been no impediment legitimate children of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose and
to their marriage. She further claims that as a result of their Matilde Menciano?
cohabitation before the marriage the child Carlo Magno Neri was
born on March 9, 1940 and was later baptized, said child having
enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child and that their
second child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945; and 3. Did Matilde Menciano have in her possession and illegally
that Carlo Magno Neri was legitimized by the subsequent disposed of the cash, jewels, and certain properties above
matrimony of his parents and Faustino Neri, Jr., is a legitimate mentioned?
child born in lawful wedlock.

On an amended answer, Paz Neri San Jose, the executrix

of the estate of the deceased and Rodolfo Pelaez, the designated Held:
universal heir in the will of the deceased dated December 19,
1940, denied the substantial allegations of the abovementioned
1. Yes. The marriage between the two is evidenced by: the 2
applications for a marriage
license, dated September 28, 1944, the first one, signed by the
deceased to marry Menciano and the other one, signed by
Menciano to marry the deceased; the certificate
wedlock. Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940, that is,
before the marriage. Both the deceased Faustino and Matilde
Menciano free to marry without any legal impediment. However,
the court declared that Carlo Magno Neri has not been
acknowledged as a natural child and, consequently, cannot be
legitimized by the subsequent marriage of his parents.

for immediate issuance of marriage license applied for, signed by

the Acting Local Civil
3. No. the trial court correctly reached the conclusion that such
Registrar and the deceased and Menciano; the marriage contract allegation has not been substantiated. The testimonies of mother
signed by the deceased and Menciano as contracting parties, and son- Paz Neri San Jose and Rodolfo Pelaez regarding the
Rev. Isaias Edralin as solemnizing officer, and the witnesses L. sum of money are contradictory. With regard to the jewels, no
B. Castaños and Samson Pañgan. The 4 documents are official satisfactory evidence was presented to prove that Menciano
and public; there validity can be successfully assailed only by misappropriated them.
strong, clear, and convincing oral testimony. In this case, the oral
evidence presented by the defendants is not convincing so as to
declare the said marriage invalid. A mere glance at the signatures
of the deceased in the aforesaid documents will convince anyone
that they could not have been written by a man who is almost
unconscious and physically and intellectually incapacitated, as
the defendants witnesses represent him to have been. Also, the
tests pertaining to testamentary capacity were applied to show
the capacity to contract marriage of the deceased. Although the
said doctrine relates to testamentary capacity, there is no reason
why it should not be applied to the capacity to contract marriage,
which requires the same mental condition. Thus, the court did not
err in declaring valid the marriage of the deceased and Menciano.

2. Yes. Faustino Neri, Jr. is a legitimate child of the deceased and

Menciano. The requisite

for potency being met, the necessary conclusion is that the child
Faustino Neri, Jr., is

conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased

with Menciano in lawful