Segregation and Apartheid in Belgian Congo, Rhodesia and South Africa

Rhodesia
Introduction note by Victor E. Rosez:
Already in 1958/59 Sir Roy Welensky had on several occasions contacts

with the governments of France, Portugal and especially Belgium to
discuss an eventual integration of Katanga in the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland as since Leopold II the rich Katanga mine province
was in fact not a part of the Congo but a separate identity.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40109400?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
Wikipedia says:
After Congo-Léopoldville gained independence in 1960, it collapsed into a
state of anarchy within a fortnight. The large Belgian population of the
Congo fled from the violence into neighbouring states, including the
federation. Welensky dispatched the Royal Rhodesian Air Force (RRAF) to
assist in their evacuation, but was prevented by the British government
from entering the Congo itself. Refugees fled by foot to Ndola in Northern
Rhodesia, where RRAF planes picked them up and flew them to camps in
Salisbury. More than 6,000 people were evacuated by the RRAF.
The leader of the Congolese province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe,

requested British and Rhodesian forces to enter the country to restore
order. Welensky was sympathetic to the situation but unable to act; the
British government, which had ultimate jurisdiction over the federation,
disallowed him from mobilising the armed forces. Tshombe declared
Katanga unilaterally independent on 11 July, one day after requesting
British and Rhodesian assistance. Welensky pleaded with Macmillan to
deploy the Rhodesian forces but Macmillan rebuffed him, telling Welensky
their hopes were pinned on the United Nations being able to restore order,
and hoping for a wholly neutral or anti-communist Congo. United Nations
Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld, hoping to negotiate a solution to
Katanga's secession, agreed to meet Tshombe at Ndola. However,
Hammarskjöld's plane crashed close to Ndola, and he was killed.
Welensky was subsequently blamed for the accident throughout the
communist and Afro-Asian world, becoming a hated figure and a lingering
symbol of colonialism. Welensky's attitude towards Katanga and the Congo
would strain relations between the federation and the British until its
dissolution
Racism and apartheid
in southern Africa
Rhodesia
A book of data
by Reginald Austin
I I
The Unesco Press Paris 1975

Published by The Unesco Press,
7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris
Printed by Imprimeries Réunies, Lausanne
ISBN 92-3-1 O 1270-3

French edition:92-3-201270-7
oUnesco 1975
Cover photograph: Picou. Printed ~ r rSwrlrrrlurid
Preface
#
This book on Rhodesia is a companion volume to Racism and Apartheid in ~~ i9
3c,+c
Southern Africa: South Africa and Namibia,published by Unesco in October 1974.
The book is intended for the general public and,more particularly,for teachers.
It seeks to give the background to the present situation in Rhodesia and to the
newspaper reports on it, and to assist those who wish to inform students and
pupils more fully about Rhodesia.Suggestions for further reading are included
in the text and in the bibliography.
The views expressed are not necessarily those of Unesco.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this
publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part
of the Unesco Secretariatconcerning the legal status of any country or territory,
or of its authorities,or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.
August 1975
Contents
Introduction,9
SignEficantdates, 1 1
I. Conquest,2 1
The white invasion, 21; The first armed conflict, 24; Resistance to conquest, 25;
‘Theestablishment of Rhodesia,26 ; Consolidation,30
2. Land, 31
The Tangwena case, 32; The physical division, 33; The qualitative division, 34;
Economic subjugation,35
3. Education,43
Discrimination,43 ; Some educational statistics.45 ; The quality of African education,
45 ; Primary and secondary education,46;Technical education and apprenticeship,48;
University education,51
4. Basic economic data,5 3

5. Labour, 59
Agriculture. 59; Africans forced into a money economy, 60; Racialism and labour
unity,61 ; Industrial Conciliation Act (1934),63 ; Labour relations between Africans
and whites, 63 ; Negotiating structures, 64; Employment of Africans by economic
sector, 64; First- and second-class trade unionists, 65; Employment and freedom
of movement,66
6. White politicalpower at any price,67

Non-representative rule, 67; Virtual exclusion of blacks from the vote, 69; The
Federation (1953-63),70; ‘Federated brethren’, 71 ; Symbolic desegregation, 72;
Intransigence or transition,74
7. Soft constitution and hard government,75

The soft constitution. 75 ; Hard government,76;Government and African leadership,
80;Clarification of the conflict,81
8. Civil war, 83
Landmarks,83;The full circle, 87
9. The liberation struggle, 89
IO. The liberation campaigns 1966-74,91

Il. Sanctions,95
Appendixes
1. The 1961 constitution,101
2. 1971 settlement proposals,1103
3. Rhodesian Front, 104
4. ZAPU : the party's ideologicalconcept, 106
5. Constitution of ZANU,109
6. The African National Council,1 I 1
7. The constitution of FROLIZI,115
8. Zimbabwe declaration of unity,Lusaka,Republic ofZambia,7 December 1974, 116
Bibliograph-y,1 i 7
Introduction
As any white Rhodesian will inform you-to the amazement of his black
countrymen-apartheid has no place in the Rhodesian social, economic or
political system and never has been part of it. Indeed apologists and even
informed critics frequently urge moderation in judgement upon and dealings
with it, to avoid ‘forcing’white Rhodesia to turn to apartheid.
Depending on their colour, the inhabitants often refer, either proudly or
sardonically,to the ‘Rhodesianway of life’; this book attempts to explain why.
Apartheid is an Afrikaans word meaning separateness.As the political
ideology practised in South Africa,it means territorial separation and separate
administrative and social structures for whites and the various racial and tribal
groups,but all under white control.As white society and its economy depend
on black labour, however, separation has to be selectively applied. Racial
discrimination and separation are essential features of apartheid but, as the
Rhodesian example shows,can be achieved by less formal social and economic
structures of domination,and bolstered by social custom and legislation.
The settler-dominated country created largely by the efforts of Cecil
Rhodes and his followers is now called Rhodesia,and its present white inhabi-
tants are called Rhodesians. Legally, however, it continues to be ‘Southern
Rhodesia’,being still regarded by the United Nations and all its Member States
as a colony of the United Kingdom,which is internationally responsible for the
territory.
The vast majority of the African population now refer to the territory as
Zimbabwe,after one of the political systems which formerly flourished there.
Rhodesia and Zimbabwe represent opposing ideals. This book is primarily
concerned with the former.
Significant dates
1200-1500 Settlement of various Shona-speakinggroups in the area.

1400-1500 Establishment of the Mwene Mutapa dynasty after Korekore con-
quest of the Tavara,an area of present north-west Mashonaland.
1511 António Fernandesvisits Mwene Mutapa.
1500-1 600 Growth of the Ronvi confederation in what is now Matabeleland
and western Mashonaland,Mwene Mutapa, and based at Zimba-
bwe. Regular contacts with Portuguese,Arab and Swahili traders.
1561 Portuguese Jesuit missionary Fr Gonzalo da Silveira killed in
north-eastMashonaland.
1570 Portuguese punitive expedition sent against Mwene Mutapa.
1600-1700 Decline of Mwene Mutapa, increasing power of Portugal and the
Rozwi empire.
1700-1 800 Supremacy of the Rozwi and period of prosperity and peace.
1819 Shoshangane leads an Ngoni group to settle in the Limpopo
valley.
183&31 Ngoni invasion under Zwangendaba, sacking of Zimbabwe and
death of the Mambo (king) at Taba Z i K a Mambo. Zwangendaba
go north to present-dayTanzania.
1838 Ndebele invasion and settlement under Mzilikazi Kumalo. Tribute
imposed on surrounding Shona-speakinggroups.
1859 Robert Moffat establishes the first mission station at Inyati by
permission of Mzilikazi.
1861 Mzila succeeds Shoshongane as Paramount of the Shangana, and
penetrates into Manyikaland,imposing tribute.
1870 Lobengula Kumalo succeeds Mzilikazi as king of the Ndebele.
1888 Moffat negotiates treaty of peace and amity between Lobengula
and Britain (ratified April).
Rudd concession agreed with Lobengula (for C.J. Rhodes).
1889 Royal Charter granted to British South African Company (BSAC)
to enable it to exploit the concession.
1890 Pioneer column recruited,enters the territory and establishes Fort
Salisbury (12September).
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa 12
1891 Britain establishes protectorate over Mashonaland.

1893 Invasion of Matabeleland authorized (3 October).
Bulawayo occupied (4November).
Allan Wilson patrol, pursuing Lobengula,annihilated on Shanga-
ni River (4December).
1894 Probable death of Lobengula.
Establishment of African reserves in north and north-eastMatabe-
leland.
Hut tax imposed.
Matabeleland Order in Council.
1895 Rhodesia so named by proclamation (23 April).
Jameson raid on Transvaal (29 December).
1896 Jameson raiders captured.
Ndebele rebellion starts in Umzingwani district (24 March).
Mashona rebellion starts with the Mangwende attack under
Mchemwa on the Mrewa Native Commissioners’camp (20 June).
Storming and capture of Mkwati’s stronghold at Taba Z i Ka
Mambo (5 July).
Rhodes’ first of five idubus with Ndebele leaders in Matopo hills
(21 August).
Attacks on Chief Makoni’s fortress in caves at Gwindingwi,using
dynamite to blow the defenders out (1-3 September).
Makoni surrenders and is shot after a summary trial ordered by
Lieut.-Col.Alderson (3 September).
1897 Kunzwi Nyandoro’skraal stormed (June).
Mashiangombi’s kraal attacked and Mashiangombi killed
(23 July).
Railway reaches Bulawayo from south (November).
1898 Two mediums,Kagubi and Nehenda,tried for murder (2March).
Nehenda and Kagubi executed together with Chief Mashanganyi-
ka.
Kagubi received into the Catholic Church in the death cell, given
the name Dismas;Nehenda refuses baptism, insisting she wanted
to die in her home in Mazoe.
BSAC promises and starts payment of £360,000compensation to
settlers.
Imperial Order in Council establishes new constitution.
Railway reaches Umtali from Beira.
1899 First meeting of Legislative Council under new constitution.
Railway reaches Salisbury from Beira.
Boer War commences,cutting Rhodesia off from the Cape.
1900 Mapondera rising in Mazoe.
Estimated total of African-ownedcattle :55,000.
1901 Mapondera defeated by Mashonaland native police (March).
Last battle until 1960s:Mapondera continues guerilla raids, and
to support chiefs Makombe and Chioco in their unsuccessful
resistance to Portuguese authority.
1902 Rhodes dies.
Rhodesia 13
Railway joins Bulawayo and Salisbury.

All male Africans over 14 required by law to register and carry the
situp pass at all times.
Boer War ends.
1904 Mapondera captured, tried, imprisoned, but dies after hunger
strike.
Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act passed,making sexual
intercourse between black man and white woman a criminal of-
fence.
1905 Railway completed across Zambezi at Victoria Falls.
1906 Africans in urban areas prohibited by law to live outside ‘loca-
tions’except as domestic servants.
1911 African Labour (Identification) Act-to control recruitment of
African labour-essentially to prevent unskilled labour going to
South Africa.
1914 Commission recommends changes in reserves by reducing them in
both extent and quality. Long series of protests, especially in
Matabeleland, organized by Nyamanda and the Matabele
National Home Movement.
1919 Privy Council decisions rejects case for African and Company
ownership of the land,and held it belonged to the Crown.
1920 BSAC compensated for assets taken over by the Crown.
Native reserves totalling 21 million acres established.
Legislative Council approves plan for ‘responsiblegovernment’.
1922 Referendum on closer association with South Africa, or ‘respon-
sible government’;majority for latter.
A Zulu Anglican teacher,Abraham Twala,wrote: ‘...experience
has taught us that our salvation does not lie in Downing
Street.. .’.
923 Formation by Abraham Twala of the Rhodesian Bantu Voters’
Association, the first African organization to urge Africans to
depend on themselves rather than on the British Government.
Rhodesia annexed to Britain as a colony (September).
‘Responsiblegovernment’established (10October).
924 First elections for Legislative Assembly, Sir Charles Coghlan first
prime minister. Beginning of Rhodesia party government which
continued (witha break in 1936-37) until 1962.
1925 Morris Carter Land Commission appointed to consider setting
apart defined areas outside reserves for exclusive acquisition by
Africans and exclusive acquisitions by Europeans. Forty-fiveper
cent of land still unalienated. Europeans held 31 million acres,
including nearly all land over 3,000 feet and within 25 miles of
railways.
1926 Carter report recommends land apportionment.
1927 Under Native Affairs Act,administrative,judicial and legislative
powers in relation to Africans vested in Native Commissioners.
1929 Land Apportionment Bill published.African opposition.
1930 Land Apportionment Act passed,after approval by Britain.
Divides Rhodesia into African and European areas.

Compulsory education for Europeans under 1930 Education Act.
1934 Industrial Conciliation Act provides structure for industrial bar-
gaining in Rhodesia, excludes Africans by excluding them from
the definition of ‘employee’.
1936 Native Registration Act requires Africans in town to carry another
pass (in addition to his situp).
1938 Compulsory education of Asian and Coloured children.
Bledisloe Commission in principle accepts amalgamation of
Northern and Southern Rhodesia.
1939 Second World War commences. Empire Training School brings
thousands of Britons into contact with Rhodesia during Royal
Air Force training.
1945 End of Second World War. Strike of African railway workers.
1946 Native (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration Act
requires employers and local government authorities to provide
minimum housing for African workers and families. Empowers
removal of unemployed from towns.Total control of local govern-
ment in white hands, ‘Advisory Boards’deal with African affairs
in towns.
1947 Native Labour Board Act empowers non-representativebodies to
settle wages for African workers.
1950 Subversive Activities Act.
1951 Native Land Husbandry Act introduces stringent conservation
measures to force African farmers to de-stock and modify land
tenure practices. Introduced and implemented without consulta-
tion with Africans,it was strongly resisted by African rural popu-
lation,two-thirdsof whom it would have made landless as they
sought temporary employment in towns.
British Labour government agrees to re-opendiscussions on closer
association. March conference of officials unanimously recom-
mends closer association by federation.
Following Labour defeat, Lyttelton (Conservative Colonial
Secretary) announces British approval of federation in principal.
1952 Federal constitutional conferences boycotted by African delegates
from northern territories.
1953 Referendum of Rhodesian voters approved federation by 25,570to
14,729;only 429 Africans eligible to vote (April).
Federation Act becomes law. Sir Godfrey Huggins became the
first prime minister of the federation,succeeded by Garfield Todd
as prime minister of Southern Rhodesia (July).
1954 Inter-territorialMovement of Persons Control Act.
1955 Youth League formed by Nyandoro, Chikerema, Chisiza, Edson
Sithole.
Public Order Act gives power to detain and restrict without trial.
1956 Youth League organizes successful bus boycott in Salisbury, bro-
ken by police.Over 200 detained.
Tredgold Franchise Commission to consider a ‘system for just
Rhodesia 15
representation of the people . . . under which government is

placed, and remains in the hands of civilized and responsible
persons’.
1957 African (Registration and Identification) Act passed by Todd’s
government,entitles ‘advanced’Africans to an identity card in
place of a situp.
Winston Field,president of the Dominion Party (a predecessor of
the Rhodesian Front), elected to federal parliament.
Britain allows federation right to join international organizations
and receive diplomatic representation.
Native Councils Act passed ; introduces ‘community development’
into African local government.
New Franchise Act introduced by the United Federal Party (UFP)
to ‘ensure that political power remains in responsible hands’,
introduces a lower ‘Special Roll’, which could count for a maxi-
m u m of 20 per cent of the white roll.
Federal constitutional amendment effectively increases white elec-
toral control.
Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (ANC)(based on
an organization started in 1934), founded as an African nationalist
party demanding ‘oneman, one vote’;President:Joshua Nkomo;
Vice-president: J. Chikerema; General Secretary: G.Nyandoro
(12 September).
1958 Garfield Todd ousted by cabinet revolt, replaced by Sir Edgar
Whitehead,who is defeated by Dominion Party in a ‘safe’seat.
All meetings of ANC in rural areas banned.
Whitehead and UFP win general election, but Dominion Party
receives majority of first preference votes.
Plewman Commission reports only 34.5 per cent of African fami-
lies in urban areas living above poverty datum line.
1959 Federation-wideemergency declared ; Southern Rhodesian African
National Congress banned,500 members arrested,300 detained.
Devlin Commission reports that federation is main cause of Afri-
can discontent.
Unlawful OrganizationsAct passed.
Preventive Detention (Temporary Provisions) Act provides for
detention without trial.
Public Order Act amended.
Native Affairs Act amended.
New Industrial Conciliation Act gives Africans limited rights in
white-dominated unions.
1960 National Democratic Party (NDP)formed by former leaders of
ANC.
Southern Rhodesian public service opened to Africans.
British Prime Minister Macmillan makes ‘wind of change’ speech
in Cape Town.
Law and Order (Maintenance)Act passed.
Emergency Powers Act replaced the Public Order Act.
Vagrancy Act passed.

Monckton Commission report concludes that there is racial ani-
mosity in federation;demands its end or radical franchise changes.
Constitutional conference in London ; African nationalists led by
Nkomo,invited to attend after initial exclusion.
Pass Laws repealed,but Africans still required to carry registra-
tion certificates (situpas).
1961 Immorality and Indecency Suppression Act (1904)repealed.
Liquor Amendment Act entitles Africans to buy ‘European’
liquor.
Constitutional conference recommends new constitution.
After rank and file insistance,NDP announces refusal to recognize
new constitution.
Further conferencemeetings boycotted by NDP.
NDP banned,reconstituted as Zimbabwe African People’sUnion
(ZAPU).
1962 Rhodesian Front Party formed, merging Dominion Party and
other white opponentsof 1961 constitution (March).
ZAPU banned (September).
Whitehead speaks to United Nations Trusteeship Committee,sug-
gests 1961 constitution would bring majority rule in fifteen years
(October).
Political meetings on Sundays or holidays banned (the only times
when Africans in urban areas could meet).
Rhodesian Front defeats Whitehead and UFP in general elections
held under 1961 constitution.
1963 Former ZAPU executive goes to Dar es Salaam.
Conference on dissolution of the federation (June).
Prime Minister Field discusses Southern Rhodesian independence
with Britain.
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) formed,led by Rev.
Ndabaningi Sithole (August).
Nkomo forms Peoples’Caretake Council (PCC)(August).
Britain vetoes United Nations Security Council resolution calling
upon her not to transfer Royal Rhodesian Air Force (Federal)
aircraft to Rhodesia (September).
1964 Major-GeneralAnderson appointed General Officer Commanding
Rhodesian Army after Field promised no attempt at illegal inde-
pendence would be made (January).
Field, reluctant to consider illegal declaration of independence,
forced to resign as prime minister,succeeded by Ian Smith (April).
Smith states: ‘If in m y lifetime we have an African nationalist
government in power in Southern Rhodesia, then we will have
failed in the policy that 1 believe in’(May).
African Daily News,owned by Thompson Organization,sole Afri-
can mass circulation paper, banned under Printed Publications
Act.Emergency declared in Highfield (Salisbury’s African town-
ship) (August).
Rhodesia 17
Labour government elected in Britain (October).

Major-General Anderson relieved as GOC Rhodesian Army
(October).
Smith,under strict security holds indubu of 600 chiefs to obtain
approval of ‘independence’(October).
Referendum among voters: ‘Areyou in favour of independence
based on the 1961 constitution?’;58,091 voted Yes, 6,096 voted
N o (November).
ZANU ‘CrocodileCommando’kills white farmer (November).
1965 Bottomley,British Commonwealth Secretary,visits Salisbury and
detained African leaders.Privately stated to Rhodesian Front the
‘fiveprinciples’on which Britain would consider granting indepen-
dence (March).
ZANU raiders rounded up (April).
Prime Minister Ian Smith holds general election stating the main
issue to be independence. Rhodesian Front wins all fifty A roll
(white)seats.Election almost totally boycotted by Africans (May).
ZAPU guerillas enter Rhodesia (May).
British Prime Minister Wilson visits Rhodesia, talks with Smith
and detained Africans (October).
Wilson states the ‘demand for Britain to attempt to settle all
Rhodesia’sconstitutionalproblems with a military invasion is out’
(31 October).
BSAC police given a pay rise (October).
Emergency declared under Emergency Powers Act ; uninterrupted
to date.After assuring Southern Rhodesian Governor Gibbs that
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)would not take
place (5 November), Rhodesian Front declares independence and
promulgates the ‘Constitution of Rhodesia 1965’ to end British
rule in Rhodesia. Governor dismisses Smith and his cabinet,Bri-
tain passes the Southern Rhodesia Act,reaffirming that Southern
Rhodesia is part of British Dominions and empowering the British
Government to make any necessary Orders in Council. Southern
Rhodesia (Constitution) Order invalidates Smith’s constitution
and prohibits the legislature from making laws. Wilson calls on
Rhodesian citizens ‘to refrain from all acts which would further
the objects of the illegal authorities.Subject to that,it is the duty
of all citizens to maintain law and order in the country and to
carry on with their normal tasks. This applies equally to the
judiciary,the armed services, the police, and the public services’
(November).
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions call on United
Nations Member States not to recognize the Smith régime
(November).
Security Council resolution 217 (1965) calls United Nations Mem-
ber States to do utmost to break economic relationswith Rhodesia
(November).
1966 Security Council resolution 221 (1966) permits the United
Kingdom to use force to blockade illegal unloading of oil for

Rhodesia at Beira (blockade never extended to Lourenço Marques
or South African ports) (April).
ZANU in intermittent clashes with Rhodesian forces (April).
White farmer and wife killed near Hartley (May).
ZAPU activity discovered in urban areas (May).
Wilson has talks with Smith on H M S Tiger. Fails (December).
Security Council resolution 232 (1966) extends sanctions on im-
ports and exports to and from Rhodesia (December).
1967 Rhodesian Front sets up Whaley Commission to advise on a
constitution to ‘ensurethe harmonious development of Rhodesia’s
plural society,having regard to the social and cultural differences
among the peoples of Rhodesia, to the different systems of land
tenure . . .’ (April).
ZAPU-SAANCmilitary alliance (August).
Heavy clashes between Z A P U - S A A N C groups and Rhodesian
and South African security forces in Wankie area (August-Septem-
ber).
1968 In a series of engagements,fifty-eightguerrillas (ZAPU-SAANC)
claimed killed by Rhodesian and South African forces near Sipoli-
lo (March).
Rhodesia Appelate Division (Chief Justice Beadle) decides in
Madzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke that Rhodesian Front is the
legal government,rejecting Privy Council decision to the contrary
(March).
Smith régime hangs several Africans sentenced to death for mur-
der in connexion with guerrilla war (March).
Mandatory economic sanctions imposed by Security Council reso-
lution (May).
Z A P U - S A A N Cgroups enter north-westRhodesia and clash with
security forces.South African police suffer first admitted casualty
(July).
Further talks on HMS Fearless between Prime Minister Wilson
and Smith (October).
1969 Rhodesian Front constitution approved by referendum.
Provides for eventual maximum African representation in Legisla-
ture of 50 per cent. Virtually guarantees perpetual white rule
(June).
Land Tenure Act replaced Land Apportionment Act dividing land
in equal portions between the whites (minority) and Africans
(majority) (June).
(No insurgent clashes reported in 1969.)
1970 ZAPU attacks South African police camp near Victoria Falls
(January).
Britain and United States veto Security Council resolution seeking
to condemn Britain for not using force against the rebellion
(March).
Rhodesia proclaimed a republic by Smith (March).
Rhodesia 19
Intermittent clashes between ZAPU and Rhodesian forces

(March).
First Rhodesia general election since rebellion, Rhodesian Front
wins all fifty white seats (April).
Conservative government elected in Britain (June).
Lord Goodman re-commencessecret negotiations with Smith on
basis of 1969 constitution (June).
1971 ZAPU and ZANU establish Joint Military Council (March).
Three Rhodesian soldiers killed by land-mine(April).
Proposed settlement agreed by British Government with Smith
after Sir Alec Douglas-Home(Foreign Secretary) visits Salisbury
(November).
African National Council formed as a movement ‘torepresent the
overwhelming number of people in the country who rejected the
proposals’,under the chairmanship of Bishop Abel T.Muzorewa
(December).
1972 Pearce Commission arrives in Rhodesia to ‘testthe acceptability of
the 1971 proposals’.First attempt by Britain to assess attitude of
African masses to its agreements with the minority (January).
Britain vetoes Security Council resolution calling for rejection of
1971 settlement proposals and recall of Pearce Commission
(February).
Pearce Commission reports the rejection of the proposals by the
African majority (March). ANC manifesto published.
Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)formed in exile
(October).
ZANU guerrilla attacks re-open with greater intensity in rural
north-eastRhodesia (December).
1973 Some 200 ANC officials in north-eastarrested.
Smith creates ‘nogo’areas,and protected villages in north-east.
Guerrilla incursions and attacks increase.
Smith closes Zambianborder to stop guerrilla incursions (January).
Demands guarantee from President Kaunda that guerrillas will be
stopped. Refused. Smith re-opensborder, Zambia refused to do
the same,lost $(R)16.1 million annual revenue.
1974 Smith warns of more guerrilla action ahead,launches campaign to
attract 1 million white settlers (January).
After coup d’Etatin Lisbon,Portugal announces that Mozambique,
under FRELIMO,will become independent in June 1975.Guerrilla
activity continues (April). Moto, only African mass-circulation
bi-weekly paper, banned. Smiths representatives (E. A.T.Smith
and Gaylard) have private discussions with presidents of Botswana,
Tanzania,Zambia and FRELIMO.Smith releases some leading
detainees including Joshua Nkomo and Rev.Sithole.After meeting
with presidents Machel, Kaunda Khama and Nyerere, a ‘unity
agreement’is reached.ANC FROLIZI,ZANU and ZAPU merge
into the ANC ‘asthe unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe’
(December 7).
Ceasefire declared (December 1 i).

South African police and BSAP unit ambushed near Mazoe,
five killed (December 23).
1975 Lardner-Burkedeclared no further releases of detainees until ‘a
cessation of terrorist activities’.
ANC leaders refused permission by Smith to visit Lusaka to meet
British Foreign Secretary.
Incidents continue in north-east province including landmine
fatalities.ANC and Smith régime accuse one another of breaches
of ceasefire-Smith alleging ANC failure to stop killings, ANC
alleging that the régime had wrongly dropped leaflets in the area
demanding that guerrillas ‘abandon their arms and surrender or
return to their bases’,and were attempting to disarm guerrillas they
made contact with (February). Three guerrillas convicted of
terrorism hanged. Rev.Sithole re-detainedafter Smith alleges he
plotted assassination of ‘certainopponents he considered to be a
challenge in his bid for the leadership of the ANC’-a list of
thirty potential victims is mentioned without details,and a hearing
in camera arranged (March). Two weeks later additional allegations
made that ‘heis the President of ZANU.. . and Commander-in-
Chief of ZANLA’.
ANC leaders reject the allegation. Herbert Chitepo (ZANU
chairman) assassinated by a bomb in Lusaka (March is). Zambian
authorities arrest members of ZANU supreme council.
Reports of killings arising from internal conflicts within ZANLA
(February/March).
In Rhodesia the Special Court to consider the re-detention of
Sithole,declines to consider the assassination allegations and deals
only with the allegation that as Commander-in-Chiefof ZANLA
‘hehad .. .been responsible for the death, since the ceasefire...
of terrorist victims in the north-eastarea’.After hearings in public
on this charge alone,in which Rev.Sithole refused to participate,
the court found his re-detention‘fullywarranted’.The court stated
that since 1972, 53 members of the Rhodesian security forces,
13 European civilians and 220 African civilians had been killed by
guerrillas.
ANC delegation,including the re-released Rev. Sithole, attends
the Organization of African Unity (OAU)Council of Ministers,
discussion on southern Africa in Dar es Salaam.Bishop Muzorewa
attends Commonwealth Prime Minister’s conference (Jamaica),
obtaining assurances of assistance for Mozambique to enable it to
close its railways to Rhodesian sanctions-breaking activities.
June 1, Rhodesian police,breaking up a demonstration outside an
ANC National Executive meeting in Salisbury (Highfield), shot
and killed thirteen and wounded others.
1 Conquest
The white invasion

Like the rest of southern Africa the territory at present known as Rhodesia has
experienced successive political systems, and a succession of peoples and cul-
tures. Most of these changes involved the growth and decay of essentially
African systems,or the intrusion and absorption (or rejection) of other African
groups. European colonial penetration commenced in the sixteenth century,
when the Portuguese came into contact with the Shona people of what is now
north-easternMashonaland in the thriving Mwene Mutapa confederation.The
latter’s strength was as much spiritual as economic and military, hence the
continuity of its influence well after its subjection to strong Portuguese pres-
sures in the area which is now Mozambique.
Until the 1830s there Co-existed,in what is now Matabeleland and western
Mashonaland,another centralized system whose influence and strength during
the eighteenth century exceeded that of the Mwene Mutapa-the Rozwi confed-
eration,centred on the massive stone edifices of Great Zimbabwe,and stretch-
ing almost to the core of the Mutapa realms of the Korekore. The Rozwi
Mambos (kings) of Zimbabwe successfully resisted Portuguese pressures, and
governed an organized,peaceful and very prosperous people. The Rozwi con-
federation,at least in its outward political form,was shattered in the 1830s by
the invading Ngoni impis (regiments) moving from the south under Zwangenda-
ba,who destroyed the Mambo and his court before moving north.
In 1838 the following wave of the Ndebele, lead by Mzilikazi, quickly
established a new military state in the south-west of what was the Rozwi
empire, and it was with this community that the precursors of European
settlement negotiated their penetration into the territory.
This chapter will be largely concerned with the consequences of the Euro-
pean invasion which here, as elsewhere in Africa and in the world, had pro-
found results;but it is important to remember that it is only an episode in the
history of the area.The ‘Rhodesianway of life’ which its present white benefi-
ciaries and champions strive to maintain at almost any cost is only a phase in
the continuing chronicle of the peoples who have come, gone or remained
between the Limpopo,the Zambezi,the eastern mountains of Inyanga and the

western swamp and desert plains of Makarikari. As Obed Mutezo, the African
hero of Ndabaningi Sithole’snovel-come-contemporarypolitical manual says:
‘Foreignerscome and go,but they leave us here in Zimbabwe.’
Europeans had to negotiate with, and perhaps conquer, established com-
munities which were often powerful. As early as 1836 Britain, through the
Governor of the Cape Colony,had concluded a treaty of friendship with the
Ndebele king Mzilikazi who,in 1870,was succeeded by his son Lobengula.The
Privy Council,in a famous decision in 1919 (Ni re Southern Rhodesia) consider-
ing the legal basis of the European presence in the territory. took as their
starting point Lobengula’s sovereignty, and were of the opinion that ‘after a
fashion [his] was a regular government’,which involved his autocratic power
assisted by a senate and popular assembly whose ‘consentlent authority to his
public acts’.In the management of his external affairs Lobengula is described
by Professor Alexandrowicz in The European-Africutz Confrontutiotz as ‘one of
the most skilled African rulers’.The Privy Council confirmed that when the
British South Africa Company (BSAC) entered and sought to exercise control
in the territory in 1891 ‘the source of its actual administration [was] in the
governing Sovereign of the country,king Lobengula’. Southern Rhodesia was
thus one of the very few cases in Africa of colonial acquisition by undisguised
conquest.This gives added significance to the circumstances in which Rhodes,
the BSAC and the settlers, granted permission only to exploit minerals by the
king, manipulated the situation and the British Government into a violent
confrontation in order to take complete control.The fruits of that conflict are
still being reaped.
The Berlin Act of 1885 provided a fresh stimulus to the European coloniza-
tion of Africa. Britain was ready to extend its influence, but reluctant to
undertake the effective occupation and jurisdiction needed to establish such
influence beyond challenge.In part this explains why Rhodesia is uniquely the
creation of the wealthy, ambitious, imperial expansionist Cecil John Rhodes.
Having made an immense fortune in the diamond mines,he saw the opportuni-
ty of fulfilling his imperialist dream of a British Africa and the prospect of the
further mineral wealth which all hoped would be found acrbss the Limpopo.
Britain’s readiness to allow such private initiative to extend her influence
was increased by the threatened extension, inherent in an agreement made in
1887 with Lobengula by President Kruger’semissary Grobler,of Boer influence
beyond the Transvaal. The missionary J. S. Moffat, acting on behalf of the
British Government, persuaded the king to abrogate the Grobler treaty and
enter into a treaty establishing a British sphere of influence,and agreeing not to
cede any of his territory without British sanction.A n immediate rush of conces-
sion hunters to Lobengula followed.Rudd’s success was partly the result of the
support given to Rhodes’agent by the British representative.In return for £lo0
per month, 1,000rifles, 100,000cartridges,plus an armed steamboat promised
(but never delivered) by the concessionaries, Lobengula gave them the right to
‘winand procure all metals and minerals in m y kingdoms’.
O n this basis Rhodes persuaded the British Government to grant a charter
to the BSAC-including powers of government and administration-which, as
British officials made clear,he would need Lobengula’s permission to execute.
Rhodesia 23
In fact the most significant powers arrogated by the company to itself,especially

the right to administer the settlers and their problems and to have a British
Resident appointed,were not disclosed to the king,while his opposition to them
was kept from the British Government. Equally his efforts to abrogate the
concession on the advice of his council (fully within his sovereign rights) were
not revealed to the British authorities until after the grant of the charter in
October 1889. Deception, collusion and confusion of company and Crown
interests thus played a significant part in the establishment of European pres-
ence in the territory. It was replaced in time by violence when they felt powerful
enough to change their status from guests to overlords.
The occupation of Mashonaland on 12 September 1890 was surrounded by
similar hypocrisy.The British Government was aware of Lobengula’s objections
to it, yet maintained the pretence that the pioneer column was moving with the
legally required consent of Lobengula.At Fort Salisbury,as Palley points out, a
fraudulent annexation ceremony was enacted by the settlers (it is re-enacted
annually by them, and until recently was called ‘Occupation Day’). It was
without legal basis in the concession or charter, and was not ratified by the
British Government. Thereafter the company proceeded to do precisely what
the Colonial Secretary, Lord Knutsford, had warned it against-’to govern
[Lobengula’s]country without his permission’.It appointed an ‘Administrator’,
a political supervisor (DrJameson) and an officer-in-commandof the police. It
was not until May 1891,to deal with a threatened Boer trek into Mashonaland,
and in spite of Lobengula’sopposition,that Britain declared a protectorate over
the whole of Mashonaland.
There is an additional point of less legal significance to those above (since
Britain recognized Lobengula as the sovereign of the whole of Mashonaland),
but important in human terms to the inhabitants of the area. As Lawrence
Vambe’s book indicates,the Shona people living outside the areas within easy
reach of Matabele raiding parties did not consider themselves subject to Loben-
gula. Consequently their friendly attitude to the small pioneer group, who
appeared no different from other purely temporary incursions of white hunters
and traders, turned to resentment when they found themselves being evicted
from their ancestral homes and forced into labouring for them.This resentment
can in part be measured by the events of their violent resistance to settler
occupation-usually referred to as the ‘rebellion’of 1897.
Company administration,which has been correctly described as ‘politically
irresponsible’,thus achieved effective control over the whole of Mashonaland
by early 1892,largely as a result of a consistent refusal of the British Govern-
ment to assert authority to prevent it and an equally consistent readiness to
agree to the demands of the settlers. The pattern of imperial weakness was thus
early established, and the following years served only to emphasize the supre-
macy of settler interests. Company legislation and administration, apparently
beyond the concern or control of Britain, effectively turned local African
attitudes from surprise, through resentment, to a determination to resist the
uninvited Europeans. The provocation included extraordinary harshness by
company officials,often part-timers,in their dealings with the African popula-
tion,especially the Shonas,who did not have the protection of Lobengula.In
addition,the existence of two apparently sovereign authorities (Lobengula de
jure and the company de facto) within the same kingdom made a clash inevit-
able. European settlers would not tolerate the dislocation caused by raiding
impis, and the Matabele resented company seizure of their cattle even if it was
mistaken. The settlers, confident then, as now, of their links with the more
powerful south, ‘presented the implications of colonial rule and of a settler
economy to the Africans with no concessions at all’.
As a particularly bad example of this attitude the extraordinary case, in
March 1892, of a dawn police attack on Ngome’s village (a headman of
Chief Mangwende) in Mashonaland may be cited. Maxim guns and a seven-
pounder were used by Captain Lendy to puiiish the kraal for having struck a
settler who demanded to search the kraal,having accused men from the kraal of
theft. N o evidence was produced,nor was arrest and trial considered.Twenty-
one men were killed, forty-seven head of cattle taken. This was the new
administration of Dr Jameson,which Rhodes commended for ‘maintainingthe
dignity of the law’.A n equally striking illustration was the summary punish-
ment by fifty lashes in public and a fine of six goats and three head of cattle,in
March 1893,on a headman at Amanda‘s kraal for rejecting a demand ‘to send
some of his boys to work’and saying his men were ‘notgoing to work for white
men’,and that he would ‘fire on the police if they came’.
Yet the eventually violent Shona reaction to the occupation surprised the
settlers-partly because they misunderstood the people and their culture,and
partly because of their self-deceptionregarding the gratitude they expected the
Shona to show for their ‘liberation’from the Ndebele. This propensity to
believe their own propaganda has repeated itself in the history of Rhodesia-
most recently in the total shock suffered by the settlers when the Pearce
Commission discovered that Africans did not approve a constitutional plan
which they had no part in making, which left power in the hands of an illegal
minority government and promised little change in their lot.
The first armed conflict

African rebellion,however,was not the start of violent confrontation between
the communities.The contradiction inherent in the status of the company and
Lobengula had first to be settled.This became all the more vital when it was
realized that Ndebele raids killed Shonas,who had now become essential labour
for farms and mines, and thus an asset to be protected. This,of course,was not
what the company said in defending its actions,but it laid the stress,rather,on
its missionary and humanitarian concern.By September 1893,Dr Jameson was
confident that with the aid of a strong group of volunteers his police force could
defeat the king. Company doubts over the expense of the operation were
assuaged by Rhodes’personal promise of &50,000 to meet the initial costs,and
the expectation that the booty of Matabele land,gold claims and cattle would
provide sufficient reward for the volunteers.
The Matabele were suddenly represented as a severe threat in the Cape and
British press,and an excuse for war was sought.It proved in the event that the
Matabele were not prepared for war, and within a month of the invasion,as
Selous colourfully proclaimed, ‘the fair-haired descendants of the northern
Rhodesia 25
pirates are in possession of the great king’skraal and the calf of the black cow
has fled into the wilderness’. The Matabele kingdom was destroyed by a
brilliant if ruthless pre-emptive strike,executed by the combined forces of the
settlers and the Imperial Bechuanaland Border Police. Britain chose not to
annex the territory, but appointed the company to administer it, to avoid
expense to Britain and offence to Rhodes and white feelings in South Africa.As
Palley points out,‘onlywhere Rhodes’wishes cut across imperial policy was the
British Government firm’.Even the extraordinary debacle of the Jameson raid,
highlighting the company’s lack of responsibility, failed to shake the govern-
ment out of its neglectful attitude. The bitterness caused by the raid and the
treacherous actions while Lobengula was seeking peace provided a Matabele
parallel to the feelings of the Shona and led to a mighty effort to end the
colonial penetration.
In terms of its agreement with the Victoria volunteers,and despite the legal
prohibitions of the Matabele Order in Council, the company encouraged ‘a
veritable land rush’.Immigration was encouraged and the permanent settlement
of the land,which was supposed to await the decision of an imperial-controlled
land commission,proceeded with haste. The technique of the settler-managed
fait accompli (cf. the ‘Unilateral’Declaration of Independence in 1965) was
already well established. Jameson’s ‘provisional’acts of government were not
challenged,and the Matabele were dispossessed of their lands,to be allocated
reserves in areas strange to them and, in the opinion of the British Deputy
Commissioner in 1897,‘badlywatered,sandy and unfit for settlement’.For the
Matabele,the possession of cattle had a spiritual as well as a material value. They
were equally ruthlessly deprived of both in the face of equally ineffective
safeguards (cf. Mason’s Birth of a Dilemma). The Matabele lost four-fifthsof
their cattle,and those remaining were put into the hands of company-favoured
individuals instead of being returned to the people. Further losses were caused
by an outbreak of rinderpest.As Mason says: ‘Matabelesociety was disrupted
by tearing out one of the most binding strands in the whole fabric.’Government
in Matabeleland,during the post-1891 war period, amounted to ‘frankmilitary
despotism by Jameson’s white police’ (cf. Ranger). This, combined with the
licence (especially with regard to labour recruiting) granted to Matabele
native police, themselves recruited from former impis and much resented by
their fellow Ndebele,produced fertile soil for rebellion.
Resistance to conquest
The opportunity to act was provided by the Boer capture of the Jameson
raiders, which deprived the settlers of their immediate military protection.
Whites were generally convinced that ‘the natives are happy’, under the
same self-delusion which makes the ‘Rhodesian way of life’ acceptable to
otherwise reasonably humane people. So on 24 March 1896, ‘the Ndebele
abandoned soft words . . . and came to Bulawayo with assegais in their hands’.
By the evening of 30 March not a white man was left alive in the outlying
districts of Matabeleland, and by mid-April Bulawayo was almost entirely
surrounded. Ranger’sRevolt in Southern Rhodesia provides the most complete
explanation and description to date of this rising and the parallel moves by the
Shona.It also brings out the full tragedy of the situation-‘the rationality from
their point of view’of the slaughter of white men and women by the Ndebele,
and the consequent violence of white revenge and reaction-concluding that
‘therewas little to choose between the savagery with which both sides conduct-
ed the fighting’.The same work explains the great significance and relevance of
the African past to this era of physical resistance (whichwas by far the strongest
and bloodiest in the history of early African resistance to nineteenth-century
colonialism).
The Matabele leadership included military leaders (Mkwati,Mtini, Nya-
manda,Nkomo, Umlugulu,Sikombo,Mpotshwana and Somabulana) and such
spiritual leaders as Siganyamatshe and Mwabani of Matojeni. In Mashonaland
the leaders included Chiquaqua, Makoni, Mangwende, Mchemwa, Mashan-
ganyika,Mashiangombi and Nyandoro on the military side and Bonde Tshiwa,
Manyanga Wamponga, Nianda (Nehanda) Gumporeshumba (the Kagubi
medium, often synonymously referred to as ‘Murenga’),the major spiritual
leaders and organizers. Particularly important was the organization and co-
ordination of the rebellion by the priests of the Mwari and the Mlimo cults,
whose roots lay deep in the former greatness of Zimbabwe and had penetrated
Matabele society.The contemporary significance of this feature of resistance is
eloquently expressed in Sithole’snovel Obed Mutezo.
The company and settlers eventually suppressed the rebellion,with consid-
erable imperial military aid.The Matabele (in part) accepted a negotiated peace
with Rhodes at the famous Motopo Indaba,and of ten new Indunas appointed
after the peace, six were ex-rebelleaders,including Umlugulu, one of the chief
adversaries of the whites. The Shona rebellion took at least a further year to
suppress and was by comparison ferociously dealt with, little quarter being
given to rebel leaders or their followers.The leadership was either hunted down
and killed, or tried (as in the case of Nahenda and the much-feared Kagubi
medium) and executed. Political compromise then as now was not seriously
contemplated by the settlers.
It is interesting to note the continuing spiritual and cultural aspect of
African resistance, so obvious in the 1890s, including the constant references
back to ancestral spirits. As a guerrilla fighter on trial in Rhodesia in 1968
explained himself: ‘ W e are going to fulfil the aims of the war we abandoned in
1897.’Although Rhodesian Europeans count themselves as the upholders of
Western civilization above all else, it is interesting to note that they have found
it acceptable and useful to try to enlist the spirit mediums in their fight against
the recent resurgence of African culture and independence.
The establishment of Rhodesia

It is ironic that these rebellions,whose ‘challenge to the whites was the most
formidable,and the scale of organization the greatest of any of the east,central
and southern African resistance’were so unsuccessful in achieving either their
major objective (the removal of the settlers) or their subsidiary unstated objec-
tives (the replacement of company with imperial rule,and the improvement of
the status of the indigenous population). For despite the uprising and the
[Phuiii 4 4 A Photo 'Picou ]
An ancient civilization-the Zimbabwe ruins.

serious defects revealed in company administration,Britain retained the BSAC

as its delegated government, ensuring the pattern of white settler domination
which still characterizesthe territory.
By 1897,despite the Jameson raid, the rebellions and the criticism they
brought upon him,Rhodes’ name was officially adopted and used to describe
the imperial venture which still constitutes Rhodesia.
One question is dramatically raised by the events outlined above. How
could the company and the settlers, regarding themselves then, as their succes-
sors do now, as not only technologically and militarily superior,but morally
superior to the African civilization they confronted, indulge in such obvious
dishonesty and brutality? African resistance killed almost a tenth of their
number,including women and children;and the great mineral wealth which they
had been expecting did not materialize-the company failed to pay a dividend
until the administration was finally handed over to the settlers. Yet they main-
tained their grip,and whenever they felt it was threatened took whatever steps
seemed necessary to retain it.
Part of the answer may lie in the nineteenth-century spirit of European
adventure, part in the very strong feelings of racial supremacy. But equally
important may be their extraordinary life style.This was an immediate product
of the toughness of their pacification of the African population and the total
dislocation wrought by the taking of African land. It gave a sense of relative
wealth and security,in contrast to the Africans’ poverty and total insecurity.
A partial illustration of this are the words of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, speaking
at a conference in Oxford in 1972.when he said :
As I speak to you, I wish I had some chains around m y hands,because this is how I feel.
Whether I am in the best hotel of Oxford or London or New York or anywhere in the world,
whether I sit on the desk of a graduate school. whether I have £5,000in m y bank, I feel a
slave in the country of m y birth.
Throughout the history of the settler occupation it has been possible for whites
to impose this humiliation upon blacks, apparently with pride, and certainly
without regret.
The sense of the unquestioned right to do this can be demonstrated by
some quotations from white leaders at important stages of Rhodesian history.
Rhodes admired Anglo-Saxonculture and believed that : ‘ W e are the finest race
in the world . . . and . . . the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the
human race.’Sir Godfrey Huggins,who led white Rhodesians through their
most secure and prosperous years (1933-53), expressed what may be regarded as
the classic description of the Rhodesian ideal for the relationship between the
races :1
The Europeans in this country can be likened to an island of white in a sea of black, with
the artisan and the tradesmen forming the shores and the professional classes the highlands
in the centre.Is the native to be allowed to erode away the shores and gradually attack the
highlands? To permit this would mean that the leaven of civilization would be removed
from the country,and the black man would inevitably revert to a barbarian worse than
before.
1. Quotation from Bulawayo Chronicle,p. 15, of 31 March 1938,reproduced by Bowman

Rhodesia 29
And finally, the illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UD1)-the

ultimate rationalization of the ‘Rhodesianway of life’-in November 1965 was
eulogized by Ian Smith as follows:
To us has been given the privilege of being the first Western nation in the past two decades
to have the determination to say ‘sofar and no further’ . . . we have struck a blow for the
preservation of justice,civilization and Christianity.
These attitudes are well described in the Rhodesian novels of Doris Lessing and
in her introduction to L.Vambe’s book; in books written by white supporters
of UDI;and are most unambiguously expressed in the Hansard reports of the
Rhodesian legislature over many years.
W e have observed the somewhat dubious foundations of Rhodesia. W e
must now examine the government of the territory in relation to Ian Smith’s
description.
Having assisted in the destruction of African political power in the war
against Lobengula and the suppression of the revolts in 1896-97,Britain en-
sured that power was transferred to the company and the settlers.The Constitu-
tional Law and History of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 by Palley sets this out
clearly,and explains (p.155) that
By the end of 1898 therefore the future structure of government had been laid down. The
major institutions,instruments of administration,and legislative policies,most of which
were to endure until the present day,were aireddy in existence.The representativeprinciple
had been introduced by the creation of a Legislative Council with a minority of elected
members and, although the Legislative Council had no executive responsibilities,it was
acknowledged that this was but the first step towards responsible government. A franchise
couched in non-discriminatory language, but with property and monetary qualifications
and the additional requirement of literacy that would, in effect, exclude the majority of
Africans, was laid down. A Native Affairs Department responsible for governmental
relations with Africans was established.ln urbm areas municipalities had been created and
legislation providing for the control of Africans in such areas had been enacted.In so far as
land was concerned,the Reserve system had been introduced.All this was done at a time
when Britain had complete control of legislation: indeed the major legislative measures
providing the framework for future administration and policy had been enacted by Order
in Council and High Commissioner’sProclamation.These provisions had been made since
Britain had decided that Southern Rhodesia should follow the general pattern set by the
South African colonies and would eventually become part of a white self-governingSouth
African federation.
Every step of Rhodesian history since then has been shaped by the decision
mentioned in the last sentence above. For almost sixty years the white settlers
have entrenched and strengthened the structure with little regard to the protests
of the powerless majority.African opposition was articulate,as is described in
Mlambo’s Struggle ,for ci Birtlzriglzt, Ranger’s The African Voice in Soutlzern
Rhodesiu, Shamuyarira’sCrisis in Rhodesia and Sithole’sAfrica11 Nationalism.It
was based however,on two assumptions which have proved increasingly false,
i.e.that the settler government would fairly consider African opinion,and that
Britain,the responsible authority,would exercise effective control in the interest
of Africans.
Consolidation
The basic themes in the process by which white power was consolidated were as
follows:
1. White land control through unequal tenure and allocation of land.
2. White executive and administrative (as opposed to representative) govern-
ment of the African majority,combined with government responsibility to an
exclusively white electorate.
3. White control over the potential economic power of labour.This was ensured
by white monopoly of skills by restricting training and education to whites,
combined with control and over bargaining power through trade union
legislation which discriminated against the organization of black workers.
4.White retention of political power (referred to as 'responsible' by white
Rhodesian politicians) to ensure the continuity of (1) to (3).
The benefits this system brings to whites,plus the fact that they inhabit,as they
largely do, the highland areas of a country with an almost perfect climate,
makes it easier to explain, if not to understand, why their actions deny the
Christian ethic they purport to uphold and reject the democratic ideals of
government of the civilization they claim to defend. It also explains how they
can commit treason against the Crown and country they emotionally admire
and whence the majority of them originate.The process of maintaining political
power has inevitably produced an additional but now very characteristic feature
of the 'Rhodesian way of life'-a system of authoritarian government as
inhumane if not as savage as any dictatorship existing.
Rhodesia shares with South Africa, and until recently the Portuguese
African territories, the further evil that its oppression is directed almost
exclusively against the black majority.This limits and stunts the lives even of
the whites who believe they are its beneficiaries and who, like others who
have tolerated inhumane government, are apparently blinded and desensitized
by the system they help to perpetuate. Since inhumanity inevitably produces an
energetic human reaction (no matter how long delayed)-the 'Rhodesian era'
has added a new feature to the history of Zimbabwe:the efforts and ideals of
those struggling to liberate themselves and the country of a political system
whose deliberate perpetuation constitutes a serious twentieth-century relapse
from human progress.
2 Land
The political and economic subservience of the African population is directly

linked with their dispossession of the land. Wealth in Rhodesia was not to be
found in a mineral bonanza of gold or diamonds, but in land. For some time
after the wholesale land-grabbingby the Pioneer Column and the war of 1893,
the situation remained unclear. The BSAC hoped to recover its costs, and to
profit from the sale of land.Settlers resented being asked to pay for what they
believed they had fought for and won from the Africans.
It was this issue which was at stake in the case brought before the British
Privy Council for decision in 1919.’Thecourt having held that the land belonged
to the Crown, the exclusive,uninhabited and independent control of govern-
ment, which would ensure control of the land, became the prime aim of the
settlers. Indeed Rhodesians still see formal international recognition of their
exclusive control of government as their ‘first prize’,despite the fact that they
have enjoyed effective settler government since 1923,and unilaterally sought to
legalize it in 1965.Africans naturally resented the Privy Council’s confirmation
of the expropriation of their lands,as Mlambo explains fully in his chapter on
the land question. The reserves, seen by some as a minimal protection of
African land rights,merely provided the legitimization ofthe process of removing
Africans forcibly from good to poor land. This appropriation did not end in
the nineteenth century.Whenever it became desirable to adjust in the white
interest, whether for mineral exploitation or some form of ‘rationalization’,
Africans were moved. Indeed a Rhodesian Select Parliamentary Committee on
Resettlement revealed in 1960 that between 1936 and 1959,11 3,000Africans had
been compulsorily moved from European farming areas,at the cost of ‘millions
of pounds of badly needed money being spent for ideological rather than
productive purposes’.
Many thousands of landless Africans continue to live on what became
white land,providing a basic income in rent,and a cheap labour supply to the
white farmer. This is possible because the often huge estates are largely
uncultivated by white owners,and the presence of Africans is vital. One of the
earliest legislative acts (1894) was to impose a hut tax on Africans,to force them
to enter the money economy, to work for whites in home, factory, farm and
mine. Yet many Africans were not made aware (as for example by being given
compensation) of the fact that they had lost their ancestral land.
The Tangwena case

Since 1964,at Gaeresi Ranch,the Rhodesian Front authorities have been trying
to remove the Tangwena people and their chief Rekayi.The Tangewena coun-
try;in the mountains of Inyanga,is rich agricultural land,and not surprisingly
250,000acres of it was ‘sold’in 1905 (without the knowledge of the inhabitants)
by the BSAC to the Anglo-French Matabeleland Company. The latter ceded
part to the Gaeresi Ranch Company.The Tangwena were not made aware of
this alienation until 1965,when the manager of the ranch decided in the interests
of economic farming to extend his fencing to encompass them. This coincided
with the death of the Tangwena chief and the election of Rekayi as his successor.
The white farmer wished to ‘rationalize’by reducing the African population now
included,and offered labour contracts to some Tangwena,expecting the rest to
move to whichever ‘reserve’ the District Commissioner prescribed. Here,
however, something exceptional happened : Rekayi and his people would not
move. Many Africans have protested at similar moves, none with such dignity
and determination.
After legitimate but vigorous protest to the authorities-even as far as
the Secretary for Internal Affairs-Rekayi was given the standard treatment
afforded to African chiefs who assert their people’s rights: he was dismissed.
Neither he nor his people accepted this.They physically resisted eviction.They
challenged its legality successfully in the law courts on the grounds that,under
the Land Apportionment Act,Africans who had lived upon Crown land before
its alienation are protected ‘squatters’, and could be removed only by a govern-
mental decision in the form of a proclamation.The Rhodesian Appelate Divi-
sion underlined that the Crown’sargument on the law ‘would lead not only to
absurdity but to manifest injustice’.The case had by then (June 1968) become
notorious and even the white press (the Rhodesian Herakl) pleaded that the
authorities (by now the illegal Smith régime) should follow ‘the humane
course . . . and accept a suggestion’(made originally by Rekayi) that they buy
the land and incorporate it into the adjacent Tribal Trust lands-giving the
tribe its land and the company its money.
Following instead the tradition of white governmental dealings with Afri-
can land,the authorities issued a proclamation in 1969 ordering the Tangwena
to leave.Legal action was followed by bulldozers, and eventually by police and
soldiers.In a quite extraordinary manner the Tangwena have,however,main-
tained their stand and,when moved, return. By every peaceful means, Rekayi
and his people continue to confront the authorities on this absolutely basic
issue. It is a historic episode in the greater process of liberation.This may be
confirmed by the unaccustomed degree of restraint exercised by the régime.
There is still no compromise on the supremacy of white economic interest,
whatever the consequences may be in terms of human misery, but the régime
hesitates to use the full panoply of its destructive and restrictive powers. This
may be due to its awareness of world attention focused upon it, or partly
perhaps to a grudging admiration of the overwhelming moral effect produced
by this African leader in rags.Equally,however,it may be attributed to a more
Machiavellian and merely tactical move to deal relatively mildly (if the eviction
of over 250 families,the destruction of their houses and crops,and the virtual
Rhodesia 33
kidnapping of their children can be so described) with this symbolic yet periph-
eral opposition,at a time when Rhodesian leaders are seeking a settlement with
Britain and internationalrecognition by the Western world at least.
The confrontation is fully described in The Ousting of the Tangwena,
published by the International Defence and Aid Fund. If the statistics of
distribution are the bones of the land problem in Rhodesia,the Tangwena may
be seen as illustrating its flesh-and-bloodreality.
The physical division

The purely statistical picture of land distribution starkly illustrates the relative
status of black and white.In 1969,land segregation as between white and black
was written into the new constitution and so given the fundamental legal status
it had always emotionally enjoyed in Rhodesia as a ‘whiteman’s country’.The
land was divided almost exactly between Africans (44.94million acres) and
Europeans (44.95million acres). The Rhodesian Front congratulated itself on
its absolute fairness, for it had increased the area of the Tribal Trust land
allocated to Africans. However, almost 5 million Africans would share the
African land (theoretically 67.9persons per square mile), while less than a
quarter of a million Europeans would share the European land (theoretically
3.2persons per square mile). The new arrangement increased the pre-1969
European share of land, and reduced the global amount of African land by
reducing the African Purchase Area (where blacks could own land) and abolish-
ing and redistributing on strictly racial lines the unreserved land formerly open
to all races. Even compared with the earliest period of white land hunger, the
1969 distribution is a gross injustice.In 1904,the Land Commission had set
aside African reserves which were to be inalienable.The area of these reserves
was 38,871square miles,the African population 268,618,that is 6.8persons per
square mile,ten times as much space per person as was allotted in 1969.
It is possible to argue that although land policies prior to 1969 were
intended to protect European vested interests,the purpose was economic rather
than racist. When the ‘native reserves’ were first established, the Africans
practised subsistence agriculture and did not require access to markets. Espe-
cially in Mashonaland, they preferred light soils near their traditional hill
refuges,to the heavy loams and clay soils that could be mechanically cultivated.
The Native Commissioners who recommended that the reserves be created no
doubt miscalculated the rapid increase in the African population,from around
200,000in 1890 to over 4.5million in 1969.Kay suggests that by 1925, ‘The
lion’sshare of the better parts of the country had been secured for Europeans
before political criteria assumed a prominent role in land apportionment.’Even
if that be true,and one accepts the myth that Africans did not protest,the harsh
truth is that,by the late 1950s (cf.Yudelman’sstudy in 1964),and even more so
by the late 1960s,it was clear that the division was unfair and outdated, and
that it was retarding not only African but national progress.Yet the fact that
Land Tenure Act was passed in 1969 and defended by the Rhodesian Front partly
on the basis the Carter report of 1925 (see below) demonstrates perfectly that it
exists to protect white interests.
The reserves were originally intended to protect Africans against the whole-
sale alienation of their land. When the settlers were given political control in
1923 and instituted what they call ‘responsiblegovernment’,the reserves were
about 21 million acres. According to the 1923 constitution, alienation of
reserved land required British consent. Outside the reserves, Africans theoreti-
cally enjoyed the right to hold land on the same terms as whites. Their econo-
mic position largely precluded this.By 1925,Europeans had bought 31 million
acres,Africans only 45,000acresdespite their anxiety to increase their hold-
ing.But the mere possibility that blacks might buy worried whites.In 1925 the
Carter Commission set up by the British Government submitted its report
approving the division of the land and stating inter alia that ‘it is better that the
points of contact in this respect between the races should be reduced’.This view
was supported by missionaries who were concerned by the African’s economic
weakness,and the combination of argumentspersuaded the British Government
to allow the enactment of the Land Apportionment Act (1930).
This law may rightly be regarded as the foundation stone of the ‘Rhodesian
way of life’. Its retention was basic to the electoral success of the Rhodesian
Front Party in 1962,and it is entrenched as the Land Tenure Act in the 1969
constitution.It is ironic to note that,although the initial negotiations had been
undertaken with a Conservative government,the final approval of this legisla-
tion was given by the Labour colonial secretary,Sidney Webb (or Lord Pass-
field as he then was), who assured the Rhodesian prime minister of the time that
‘hefully recognizes the sincerity of your aim,namely,to improve the condition
of the native’.In The Africun Voice N i Southern Rhodesia, Ranger shows how in
this,as other major decisions affectingthem,black views were largely ignored.
The qualitative division

The Land Apportionment Act did not initiate the division of land into black
and white (that after all had come with the reserves); what it did do was to
consolidate the division and impose a fundamentally inferior status upon the
black ‘semi-citizens’of this free enterprise economy. Under the Act, Africans
were allocated part of the land of Rhodesia, but only land in the ‘Purchase
Area’(now about 10 per cent) can be bought. Such purchase provided Africans
with the only possibility of competing with whites in the capitalist economy.
The remaining land, now referred to as the Tribal Trust lands, is occupied
communally. Its only source of funds for development is the Rhodesian
Government,whose economic philosophy is free enterprise and whose political
future does not depend upon votes of the inhabitantsofthe Tribal Trust lands.In
the ‘white’area,on the contrary,all land can be purchased and owned individu-
ally,sold,and used to raise capital or for any of the other purposes that land
can serve.Africans cannot own property or live in white areas,except on special
terms, and whites are similarly precluded from living in black areas.1
Inequality is not confined to the legal tenure of land. The country was
divided up, not haphazardly, but with care over a long period, to ensure the
1. M.Yudelman,Africans on the Move, Oxford.Oxford UniversityPress.1964,provides a very
full analysis of the land question,and Arrighi relates it to the Rhodesian situation as a whole.See
also the Rhodesian Joiirnal of Econoiizics.
Rhodesia 35
best possible conditions to whites who are born in Rhodesia or are ignorant or
selfish enough to immigrate there. O n numerous occasions Africans were
removed in circumstances similar to those in the Tangwend case.Mining rights
held by Europeans may lead to the displacement of Africans even in what are
nominally their own areas.
Apart from tenure and scale,Africans suffer other disadvantages:
The main roads and railway lines were planned only in relation to white
areas.
Urban centres,and hence industry and associated activities are concentrated
in white areas.
In relation to soil fertility and rainfall,the better agricultural land is predo-
minantly in white areas. By and large whites have almost as much 'good'
land as 'bad' land, while African land is three-quarters'bad' and only a
quarter 'good'.
Economic subjugation
The African majority has been placed in an economically weak position from
which it is virtually impossible to recover unless fundamental changes are made.
It has been cut off from the economic power which goes with land ownership,
and its ability to compete and achieve power by other means has been further
lessened by a deliberate policy of restricting opportunities for education,
training,enterprise and collective bargaining.
The minority pursues this policy not only because of a direct desire to
ensure a mass of semi-skilled labour but also because of a real awareness that
experience, self-confidenceand self-respect in any field is inextricably linked
with the danger of a concerted African demand for political power. The
corollary of deliberately fostered African inferiority is the perpetuation of white
superiority.There is a vicious circle in which white oppression of the African
produces a depressed condition among Africans,which in turn is used to justify
the majority's continued oppression.The spiritual depression,mental coloniza-
tion,mutual suspicion and apathy, which results have not been without their
political effect upon the African.The physiological effects have been buttressed
by action to prevent any consistent politization and consolidation of the
majority. This explains in part the scale and brutality of the suppression of
the 1890s, as well as the destruction of traditional structures,and their replace-
ment by dependent and compliant institutions. It has helped to ensure that
African reaction to minority rule has been slower and less vigorous than might
be expected. It helps to explain the remarkable fact that a handful of whites
maintain control over 5 million Africans. Equally it shows why the themes of
self-respect,self-relianceand a harkening back to pre-occupation traditions is
increasingly important to both the political and military resistance of the
nationalist movement.
Apportionment of land under the Land Tenure Act (1969).
Korkore
Shona
Zezuru
Shona
Ndebele
Karanga
African peoples.
u
a
Semi-extensive livestock farming
Extensive livestock farming
Unsuitable for farming
Natural farming regions.

Humid and sub-arid
1-L Miid sub-arid
- 10Sub-arid
Mild sub-arid, sub-arid
1 - 1lllllllir[m Arid
Sub-arid, arid
f
e] Arid, sub-desert
Bio-climaticregions.
Railways (1974).
Salisbury 0
0 Bulawayo
Tsetse fly infested areas (1964).

3 Education
Discrimination
Education in Rhodesia typifies a combination of deliberate discrimination and
subtle management, political ruthlessness and professional diligence, which
confuses both the practitioners and the victims of minority government, and
outside observers of the phenomenon. White Rhodesians and their apologists
will claim that they provide one of the best educational systems in Africa and
the developing world.This claim may be defensible if it is limited to Rhodesian
African primary education and if the existence of a parallel and completely
separated Rhodesian education department for Europeans is ignored.The situa-
tion is differentif secondary education is considered. It is at this level that a
deliberately discriminatory educational system becomes most apparent. It
should be remembered that the franchise is linked to educational qualifica-
tions which increases the importance of education. The educational system
trains Africans to provide efficient service at lower levels while ensuring for
Europeans a superiority designed to confirm a racial mythology in which they
are cast as a perpetual leadership élite who alone can ensure continued
‘standardsof civilization’.
The factsare as follows.There are two separate education departments,the
African and the European, which includes Asian and coloureds. Government
spending on the education of a European child is ten times that on an African
child. Over 75 per cent of government spending in the African sector is on
primary schooling. (In 1972 about $15.5 million, out of about $20 million.)
Secondary schooling only became available to Africans in 1940. Education for
Europeans has been compulsory since the 1930 Education Act,but it is still only
voluntary for Africans. Only a fraction of teachers in African education
(in 1972,1,137out of 18,537)have equivalent qualifications to those required
for all teachers in European education. For Africans, but not for Europeans,
as the 1974 Lewis report on African primary education makes clear ‘formany
years to come primary education must be terminal for a majority, albeit a de-
creasing majority ofpupils’.Only 50 per cent of the African children who manage
to complete primary school will be found places in the secondary sectors,and
most (37.5 per cent) of them will have to make do with only two years of
‘vocational’education,which is not the case for European children.
By a more indirect device another basic characteristic of the Rhodesian
system supplements this discrimination and plurality in education. The
compulsory segregation of the races by the Land Apportionment (now Land
Tenure) Act,which has become axiomatic and accepted,by Europeans at least,
as the ‘natural’Rhodesian order of things,means that African children cannot
in any case attend schools in European areas without express government per-
mission.The majority of secondary schools are in the urban areas which are all
designated European,The achievements in African education have been made
as a result of professionalism and subtle management in an area which never
raised the ‘bogey’of skilled or highly educated Africans, and which was never
seen as clashing with government interests. Ironically it makes the Rhodesian
majority more ‘educated’than were Africans in the former colonial territories of
east and central Africa on the eve of their independence.
Discrimination is more clearly revealed when it is realized that while
European education is almost exclusively a government responsibility (in 1967
83 per cent of white children went to government schools), African education
by contrast is even now essentially subsidized by government. Although
Rhodesian Front policy has been to reduce mission education, which has
become politically less acceptable to white government,churches still play a
considerable role,and where mission schools have been taken from church they
have generally been made the responsibility not of the government,but of the
local African rural councils.In 1967,90 per cent of African children were in
mission and non-governmentschools.The rural areas are poor and the councils
not only inexperienced in education but by their nature subordinate and
dependent upon the minority government. Thus an African rural community
needing a school must first find the money to build the school before they can
expect assistance from the State. N o similar situation prevails for Europeans.
The standard white Rhodesian response and justification for this situation would
be to point to the fact that total government spending on African education is
as much as,if not more than,that on European schooling,and would add that
the Europeans contribute by far the largest share of income-taxrevenue.Thus
African education problems might be seen as a logical result of the fact that
the government is responsible only to the white electorate.
The same attitude must account for the Rhodesian Front’s new policy for
African education announced in 1966. This ‘pegged’government spending
arbitrarily at 2 per cent of the GNP.All excess costs,capital and running,must
be borne by the Africans or charities directly. No similar policy exists for
European education. Placing responsibility for education directly upon the
African rural community-where most African children live-is also,of course,
a feature of the South African Bantu education system.
To illustrate the fact that the Rhodesian Government is fully aware of the
grossly discriminatory nature of education in the country, reference can be
made to the answer given by the Rhodesian Front Minister of Education in
1967, to the suggestion that all children should receive equal educational
opportunity. To give African children equal compulsory education it was
estimated that the immediate capital cost would have been E250 million, with
Rhodesia 45
running costs at E154 million per year. The discrimination and distortion
inherent in this system is brought home when it is pointed out that in 1967 the
gross domestic product (GDP)was only E366.4million !
The minister defended his rejection of another call for an equal share of
the educational budget in 1969,by pointing out that this would mean that E98
less per year would be spent on each European child, and only E9 extra on
each African child. He concluded: ‘The benefit to the African would not be
great but the effect on the European would be disasterous.’Here again an
essential link with policy in other areas must be noted. European education of
such a superior nature is regarded as essential if white immigrants are to be
attracted and retained. Thus, not only are African children subjected to a
distorted system,African workers are also excluded from moving up into skilled
jobs reserved for white immigrants.
S o m e educational statistics
In 1964 only 60 per cent of African children between 7 and 16 were attending
school.In 1962,47 per cent of all African males over 16,and 59 per cent of all
African females over 16 had never been to school.In 1967 the figures on school
leavers showed that 88.8per cent of the Europeans had had over ten years of
schooling,but only 0.48per cent of Africans; 97.7per cent of Africans had
between one and seven years of schooling (78.13per cent between one and five
years) while there were no European children in this category. The African
educational pyramid,consisting of a considerable base of primary pupils and
reducing at the secondary level to a very narrow peak, is almost identical with
that in South Africa. This and other parallels are illustrated in the Defence and
Aid pamphlet Rhodesi+South Ajrica ’s Sixth Province by John Sprack. In
1971-72 Ian Smith told the world how happy his Africans were, and his
government sought world approval under the proposals agreed upon between
him and Sir Alec Douglas-Home.Educational expenditure was then as shown
in Table 1.
TABLE
1. Government estimates of total spent on primary and secondary education 1971/72
Amount spent
Number Rhodesian Pounds sterling per student in
dollars pounds sterling
African 747,537 21,400,000 12,412,000 L16.60

European
58’503 18,732,000 10,864.560 f160.70
Indian and coloured 8,994
The quality of African education

African education not only receives less money but has always been qualitative-
ly inferior.Expenditure is concentrated on primary and vocational schooling.
The very earliest statement of policy (1 899) spoke of providing Africans with ‘a
systematic training in household work or agriculture’; Rhodesian Front policy

is ‘to gear the African educational output to the job opportunities which
Europeans are willing to offer to Africans’.
Reference was made above to the new policy for education adopted in 1966
as it affected mission schools, and arbitrarily pegged spending on African
education at 2 per cent of the GNP.It also explicitly indicated that African
education should concentrate on basic education and not on giving opportuni-
ties for higher education.
Operated on a non-racialbasis,such a policy might well win the approval
of many concerned with education in developing countries; indeed, looked at
outside its political context,the present programme could offer a great deal. But
it cannot be so divorced from its context.The fact is that Africans are offered
an inferior system,while Europeans receive educational advantages which few
developed countries can boast.
Table 2 shows data for the year ended 30 June 1972 which were submitted
in 1973 in separate reports on European and African education. All amounts
are expressed in Rhodesian dollars (El = $(R)2).
TABLE
2
European African
Total expenditure $21,388,451 $19,9i 2,435

Per capita expenditure per child :
Average total primary and secondary $309.25 $27.48
Primary $189.47 $19.58
Secondary (includingtechnicalin caseof Europeans) $398.72 $159.59
Enrolments: 69.162 724,44
Primary 41,075 695,452
Secondary 28,075 29,012
Teacher/pupilratio :
Primary 1 :28.57 1 :41 2 8
Secondary 1 : 19.21 1 :26.18
Note: No figuresfor teacher:pupilratios are Bivcn in the .4frican report The very inferior qualificationsrequired of teachers. Fhortage
of equipment. and the considerahle variationh in school administration make the ntio less significant. The figures quoted represent
[he most generous eFtimates.
Primary and secondary education

A new policy for an ‘extendedsecondary education for Africans’ was planned
for 1974,to enable 50 per cent of African primary school leavers to go on to
secondary school.But this percentage is based on the numbers who complete
primary school, not on the primary-school intake. Furthermore, only
12.5 per cent of these primary-school leavers are provided with academic
secondary schooling for four further years,at the academic (Fl)schools, and
only a fraction of these go on for a further two years and the possibility of
university education. Rhodesian Front closure of non-government schools
African teachersprotest.
effectively reduced F1 schools from 100 in 1972 to 99 in 1974. The bulk

(37.5 per cent) of this 50 per cent which is able to continue at school is
offered only two years’non-academiceducation in so-called junior secondary
(F2) schools. It is here that there has been an expansion of African
education,from twenty-oneF2 schools in 1971 to forty-onein 1972.
‘Full’primary education was to have been provided under the 1966 policy.It
introduced school fees on a sliding scale,from L2.85per annum for the first year
of primary school to £9 per annum in secondary school.The practical effect was
to reduce primary school enrolment as follows: 701,627 in 1968, 699,133 in
1969,694,875in 1970.Full education is available only for those whose parents
can pay full fees.The major effort in African education has been in the primary
sector. The African population is growing at over 3.4per cent per annum,
doubling itself every twenty years (1961,3,550,000;1970 (estimated), 4,818,000).
In 1963 there were 590,795primary places; in 1972,only 695,432.Between 1970
and 1972,the number of African primary schools decreased from 3,224to 3,219.
The contrast between African and European education is highlighted by
the fact that compulsory education for the latter ensures that ‘dropouts’are rare
until the final year of secondary school.European school leavers are thus either
academically (almost 50 per cent for university) or technically qualified,whereas
Africans are forced out by educational bottlenecks at various stages of un-
qualification. Thus the cohort which entered African education in 1966 at
grade I,122,590had been reduced to the 53,018who entered standard 5 in 1972.
In that year the F1 (academic) schools enrolled only 8,099into form I, while in
form V and form XI (where university admission qualification could be
achieved) there were only 292 and 221 African pupils respectively.
While European education is almost entirely state, in 1972 African
education was still left essentially to charity and self-help.Only 84 of the
3,219primary schools were government and only 25 of 140 secondary schools
(17 of 99 FI and 8 of 41 F2) were state schools.
Teachers’ qualifications are also significantly worse in the African sector.
In 1972 of 18,538 teachers in that sector, 11,874 had no more than the T4
(2 years’infant teacher training) qualification.Whereas all teachers in European
education are qualified and certificated, only 1,l O8 African education teachers
were qualified (but not certificated),and almost half (481) of these were employed
in mission schools.Indeed in the same year there were still 264 untrained teachers
in African education.Further contrasts arise from the fact that while European
education is a uniform, standardized system, there were seven different
recognized kinds of school for Africans plus 297 unaided farm schools.
Technical education and apprenticeship

There is a long-standingpolicy and practice of restricting technical education,
whether through direct training in schools or through indenture as apprentices.
Government labour policy has consistently discouraged the entry of Africans
into skilled trades,despite recurring shortages.The standard Rhodesian response
to a shortage of skilled labour being a campaign for white immigrants.This is
most recently exampled by the announcement in January 1974 of a massive
Rhodesia 49
1 million immigrants promotion drive, partly in response to a manpower

shortage in the manufacturing industry during 1973.
The 1959 Apprenticeship Act made it legally possible for Africans to be
apprenticed.Progresshowever has been slow,due to a combination of reluctance
on the part of employers,and resistance by the white dominated skilled trade
unions. Since 1969 there has been no breakdown on a racial basis of indentured
apprentices but prior figures showing the number of registered apprentices for
1962-69were as follows:
1962 436 10
1963 371 9
1964 378 8
1965 445 7
1966 378 9
1967 396 5
1968 498 17
1969 531 49
Since apprentices are expected to have had ten years of education the vast
majority of Africans are automatically excluded. Indeed post-1966 government
policy on ‘vocational’education may be explained in terms of a rationalization
of a system based upon the acceptance of a very large semi-skilled labour
reservoir. This may be quite sensible and fair for a developing country, in
Rhodesia its fault lies in the fact that semi-skilled status is reserved for
Africans.The establishment in 1968 of a special Apprenticeship Training and
Skilled Manpower Development Authority to meet the shortfall in apprentices
which was noted by a Rhodesian Front Parliamentary Select Committee in 1964
has achieved very little. In part this is due to employers’reluctance to meet the
cost of training,and preference for either ready-trainedimmigrants,brought in
at government expense or job fragmentation whereby the semi-skilled can be
employed at lower rates. White skilled trade unions adopt a contradictory
approach,which can only be explained by their racial attitudes.They encourage
immigration,but oppose direct training or energetic apprenticeship programmes
for Africans in the same breath as they reject job fragmentation.
A classic example of the destructiveness of racial fears on the national
economy is the fate of the Luveve College,which was established in 1961 to
provide direct training for blacks, rather patronisingly, its objectives were to
demonstrate Africans’ capacity for training in modern technical occupation,
and,more practically,to train apprentices by giving them a two-yearfull-time
course.Despite remarkable results,the college was closed in 1964,on the basis
that apprenticeship training had become non-racial,rendering it unnecessary.
Despite clear evidence that this was not so, and that apprentices are urgently
needed,the government refuses to re-establishthe college.
In the field of administrative training the same pattern prevails. The
tentative scheme to recruit Africans into the civil service, introduced by
Whitehead was deliberately reversed by the Rhodesian Front.
Arrest.
Rhodesia 51
Again the links between policy in education and other areas, in this case
industrial relations are significant. The structure of the Rhodesian trade union
movement as established by law,is upon essentially racial lines-thinly disguised
as skilled (whites) and unskilled (blacks). The result is a privileged white artisan
class who place their interest in privilege above the long-term interest of unity
of labour.
Compare Chapter IV in Peter S.Harris’Black Industrial Workers in Rhodesia
(1974);several studies in the Rhodesian Journal of Economics; F.M.Nehwati,
The Effect of Racial Discrimination on the African Worker in Southern Rhodesia.
University education
University education is unique in Rhodesia in being non-racial.But the educa-
tional background vitiates any beneficial effects this might be expected to have.
In 1972,978 students were registered at the University of Rhodesia: 510 Euro-
peans,400 Africans and 78 ‘otherraces’.In that year almost 2,000Rhodesians
were reported to have gone to university, while 5,140 appropriately qualified
Europeans left school.The privileged quality of education for white Rhodesians
emerges clearly from the fact apart from those attending university in Rhodesia,
there were 1,908 Rhodesians receiving government assistance for study at seven
South African white universities. Thus, discounting any white students not
receiving grants,about 50 per cent of qualified white school leavers can expect
a university education,a privilege enjoyed by few societies.
4 Basic economic
data
Contrary to the impressions given by the Rhodesian Front the country's econo-
m y is tragically weak.As Arrighi and Sutcliffe have brought out in their studies,
as a result of the deliberate underdevelopment of the African population and
their areas, stagnation has been reached and it is worsening. One of the most
significant factors is the rapid decline in the productivity of the peasant sector,
that is the Tribal Trust lands. In these areas over 60 per cent (3.2million in
1972)of the population live,yet they consistently contributed only 8 per cent to
the national income between 1960 and 1967.The racialist pattern of society,
depressing African development,has meant the whole economy must suffer in
the long run. Industrialization has been discouraged, and there seems little
prospect of change-especially since past racial policies have not only been
confirmed but strengthened by Rhodesia Front legislation such as the Land
Tenure Act.Only by making the large areas of unused,potentially arable land
in European areas available to the rapidly-growingAfrican rural population can
the main problems be tackled. These include the development of viable secon-
dary industry,the withdrawal of pressure on ecologically deteriorating soils to
rehabilitate them, the re-location of a large proportion of African land into
viable holdings. The position in African agriculture is not only stagnant but
dangerous-in 1972 a very small safety margin of food supplies was noted-in
1969 only 8 per cent surplus (a good year), in 1968 (a bad year) reduced to
1.5 per cent. A profile of estimated productivity in the African rural areas
between 1946 and 1970 is shown in Table 3.
TABLE
3
Period 1 Crops Population Productivity
194650 1 O0 1 O0 1 O0
1951-55 112 107 105
195660 130 125 104
1961-65 160 156 103
196670 201 199 101
1. The period 1946-50 was taken as a hase.
Source: Dunlop, Rhodesian Journai of Economrcs,1972
.
TABLE
4.Working population
Non-African African
Employed as Total Employed as
Total
population percentage population percentage
of total of total
1962-64 240,500 36.5 3,750,000 16.3

1965 239,700 37.3 4,000,000 15.6
1966 245,000 36.5 4.130,000 14.9
1967 250,400 36.3 4,260,000 14.2
1968 260,300 36.3 4,400,000 13.9
Source-G.Kay. in Rhodesia: o Human Geogruphj, London, University of London Press, 1970, points out that, at the 1962-64 level
ofAfrican employment. 718,800jobs were needed in 1968: the actual numbers available were 100.000 short.
Attempts have been made to explain away African unemployment in Rho-

desia in terms of the fact that many are ‘economically inactive’ (probably
supported by the rural subsistence economy) rather than unemployed. In fact
over 3 million Africans have to exist in the rural household sector. O n the
‘economicallyinactive’thesis it has been suggested that if, as was the case in
1969,there were 592,000adult males inactive when only 731,000Africans were
employed, it was a situation which ‘merits very much closer investigation’.
Hawkins,‘Howmuch African Employment? in Rhodesian Journalof Economics,
1972,notes that the increase of the African rural household sector between
1965 and 1970 was over 600,000whereas the number of Africans employed
increased by only 89,000.The GNP during this period averaged 5 per cent per
annum growth. The actual per capita growth has been referred to as no more
than 0.4per cent because the economic expansion by-passed the majority of the
people. In fact,as Table 5, based on Hawkins, derived from the August 1972
Digest of Statistics shows clearly,there was a decline in the proportion of the
African population in the money economy since 1958.
TABLE
5. Africans in the money economy
195x 1965 1971
Population 3,390,000 4,260,000 5,310,000

Employed 652.000 654,000 781,000
Percentage employed 19.2 15.4 14.7
The picture is a repetition of that found in other sectors of the Rhodesian

situation,the Africans forming the large numbers at the bottom of the distribu-
tion pyramid-this time of the standard of living.
The shortage of African labour in European agriculture persists despite the
large number of unemployed. Between 1964 and 1971 jobs for Africans in
European agriculture increased by 3.5 per cent,elsewhere by 35.4per cent.The
average wage on the farms was $(R)124 (£62)which,working on the assumption
that each adult worker has three dependants and aper capita income in the
Rhodesia 55
subsistence economy at $(R)25 per annum, makes the $(R)125 subsistence

income superior to the agricultural wage, especially in the light of the relative
unpleasantness of employment on a white farm. It should also be noted that
figures for 1965 showed average annual earnings for African employees on
farms at approximately $(R)140 (£70),indicating a decline over the years. At
the same time the average earnings of a European farm worker were £1,364.
The wage gap between the groups has in fact grown consistently.
The 10: 1 ratio of European to African income is in fact not consistent
throughout the economy,being much greater in some sectors (agriculture and
mining) than others.According to figures quoted by Nhandara in the Rhodesia
Herald in March 1973 domestic servants and African agricultural workers
(449,259of the 765,250total in 1969)were paid in 1971 an average annual wage
of $(R)260 and $(R)131 respectively.
The total number employed in the different sectors of the economy on the
basis ofthe 1969 census figures is as shown in<Table6.
TABLE
6
ASricans Europeans Coloured Asians Totdl
Agriculture and forestry 271,246 4,376 91 9 275,722

Mining and quarrying 47,821 3.109 68 8 51,006
Manufacturing 87,161 15,405 1,185 387 104,138
Electricity,gas and water 4,199 1,366 61 7 5,633
Construction 41.264 6.556 444 64 48,328
Finance,insurance and real estate 2.573 6.523 17 15 9.128
Wholesale and retail, trade,restaurants
and hotels 45,727 17,234 752 1,117 64,830
Transport, storage and communications 15,254 9,941 387 90 25,672
Services 178.013 28,116 761 321 207,211
Others 72,692 ~~
571 ~
114 _
50 73,427
_
765,950 93,197 3,880 2,068 865,095
Thus of 865,095 people employed in 1969, 765,950 were Africans. Their

share of the income 'taken home' is nothing near the large percentage they
constitute of the whole. Sutcliffe shows this in his Stagnation and Inequality
which is the source of Table 7.
7.White proportion of population and personal income

TABLE
Percentage Percentage share Percentage Percentage share
'iear of total oí toial Year oí total OS total
population personal income population personal income
1946 3.8 49.4 1960 6.2 61.2

1950 4.8 58.2 1965 5.1 58.1
1955 5.4 59.5 1968 4.8 56.5
Table 8,based on Mswaka, indicates what percentage of the total wages

earned went to the African employed,and what percentage they were of the
total employed.
TABLE
8
Africans African .4fricanï .4fricun

YCU employed share of Yeur employed sh.ire of
oftotal) wages (O,.) (O$ of total) wager (00)
1954 89.6 38.5 1961 87.7 37.3

1955 89.3 38.5 i 963 87.3 39.8
1957 88.6 37.5 1965 87.7 41.4
1958 88.0 37.0 1968 87.4 41.2
In 1973 the poverty datum line was estimated at $(R)60 per month, i.e.
$(R)720 per annum. In June 1972 the estimated distribution of cash wages to
Africans was as follows:
345,410received under $(R)10 per month ($(R)120 per annum);
172,610received from $(R)10-20 per month ($(R)120-240per annum);
25 1,270received from $(R)20-50per month ($(R)240-600per annum);
63,170received from $(R)50-90per month ($(R)600-1,080per annum);
9,270received from $(R)90-150 per month ($(R)l,OSO-1,800per annum);
3,800received over $(R)150 per month ($(R)1,800per annum).
The contribution of industrial sectors to GDP (in millions of pounds) is
shown in Table 9.
The picture of the economy is one of considerable danger, made all the
more dangerous by the fact that it is unobserved or unheeded by the governing
minority.The pressure upon rural land is immense,and can only be released by
redistribution of resources and the integration of the majority into the economy.
A special aspect of the problem has been the impact of international economic
TABLE
9
1959-61 196244 1965 1966 1967 1968
African agriculture and rural

household services 20.0 74.0 24.6 27.2 31.8
29.91
European agriculture 38.2 44.7 47.0 45.3 45.9
34.71
Mining and quarrying 18.3 17.3 24.1 23.1 23.0
22.2
Manufacturing 45.4 54.6 66.6 60.8 65.8
79.0
Construction 19.6 14.8 15.9 15.8 17.4
23.1
Others (including domestic service) 139.7_
_
157.9
_
175.7_
_
172~
201.0
~
.1 _
182.5_
281.2 313.3 353.4 344.3 366.4 389.9
1. The year I968 was a drought year.

Source: G.Kay. Rhodesia: a Human Geographr, London, University of London Press, 1977
Rhodesia 51
TABLE
10.Employment in various sectors 1962481
Year and level Agri- Mining Manulac- Con>- Domestic Other Total
culture turing tructlon service bervices
Non-Africans
i 96244 4.510 2,640 15,010 5,050 60,490 87,700
Level 1 O0 1O0 1 O0 1O0 1O0 1O0
1965 4,420 2,800 15,970 5,060 61,050 89,300
Level 98 106 106 103 101 1 o2
1966 4,440 2,930 15.770 5,200 60,960 89,300
Levei 99 111 105 103 101 1o2
1967 4,030 2.990 16,330 5,300 62,150 90,800
Level 90 i 13 108 105 103
1968 4,000 3,040 17.350 5,920 64,190 94,500
Level 88 115 116 117 106
Africans (thousands)
1962-64 258.1 41.7 65.4 29.5 92.1 125.1 612.3
Level 1O0 1 O0 1 O0 1O0 1O0 1O0 1O0
1965 372.5 41.5 68.9 30 89.3 121.8 624
Level 105 1O0 105 102 97 97 I o2
1966 262.2 42.7 67.2 31.2 89.4 122.3 615
Level 103 102 103 105 97 98 1O0
1967 341 43.5 72.4 32.4 90.6 125.1 605
Level 94 104 111 110 98 1O0 99
1968 239.9 44.1 78.4 38.1 92.9 128.6 622
Level 93 106 120 129 101 1o2 101
I. With changes in level of employment taking 1967-64 as base, (Based on G.Kay, Rhodesia a Hunian Geography, London.
University of London Press, 1970.)
sanctions. It has often been said and it is undoubtedly true that the major
impact of this (as indeed of any economic problem arising in Rhodesia) is made
to fall upon the African majority. It is also of course possible to analyse the
increased pressure and the erosion of the air of affluence as a means either to
force the minority to realize change is necessary, or alternatively to bring the
majority to a point where they seek to overthrow the system in lieu of reform.
5 Labour
Having taken the land, the settlers required labour to work it, extract the
minerals and man industry. (Logic was sacrificed to self-interest in that all
mineral rights in the reserves,which were set up for ‘the sole and exclusive use
and occupation of natives’could be legally exploited only by Europeans.) Initiai
African refusal to enter the white economy led to some of the earliest conflicts.
The hut tax, copied from the Cape Province, was imposed (at four times the
rate) together with a tax on polygamous marriage. Africans had to find money
to pay these taxes, and so were forced to enter a money economy. Once
involved,however,the white governments have made every effort to restrict the
power which could come with labour.
A griculture
Here again one finds a dual system operating. O n the one hand the African
rural areas,where traditionalpeasant,essentially subsistence,farming is typical,
and on the other the highly developed European controlled industrial sector
(which includes large-scale ranching and plantations). African peasants must
engage, at least intermittently in the industrial sector to survive. European
farmers operate on an entirely different scale,as indicated by the fact that in
1965 there were 5,700 white farmers holding 36.8 million acres, while in the
African Tribal Trust lands and Purchase Areas there were 608,000 black
farmers working 43.6 million acres (1970).In the Tribal Trust lands the average
annual gross output per family is about 250;hence 40 to 50 per cent of the men
must seek employment in towns to supplementfamily income.
Average African earnings are about one-tenth of those of Europeans. The
figures given in Table 1 1 were published in the Johannesburg Firzunckl Muil in
1973.
i I. Average earnings in Rhodesian dollars in Rhodesia 1965-71 1

TABLE
Yea1 White African Difference Year White African Difference
1965 2,576 246 2,330 1969 2,971 280 2,691

1966 2,664 255 2,409 1970 3,112 298 2,814
1967 2,722 262 2,460 1971 3,387 315 3,072
1968 2,836 272 2,564 1972 3,632 332 3,300
1. NRJ2= fl (1969).
The ratio of African to non-African earnings varies from sector to sector,

but is worst in agriculture,where about 40 per cent of Africans are employed.
In 1971 their average annual earnings (of which 35 per cent was paid in kind)
were $(R)124,representing an 8.9per cent reduction in real earnings since 1962.
The ratio of African to European earnings in the different sectors was as
shown in Table 12.
Table 12
I963 1971 1963 I971
Mining 1: 12.3 1 : 13.6 Transport 1: 5.3 1: 5.4

Manufacturing 1 : 7.4 1 : 7.8 Agriculture 1 : 20.5 1 : 22.6
Construction 1 : 8.7 1: 7.7
In 1967,the 605,000Africans employed in the industrial sector earned an

annual average of &138, whilst the 90,900Europeans, Asians and Coloureds
earned an average of £1,361.
Thus, living standards are very different,with Europeans in a dominant
position. Since 1958,moreover,the number of Africans employed in industry
has decreased while the total African population increased.Between 1969 and
1973, the total number of Africans in employment rose by 197,000 (cf. over
330,000 male Africans left school during the same period). The annual per
capita rise in GNP,0.4per cent, is amongst the lowest in the world, but the
implications are hidden from most whites because, in a very real sense, they
inhabit an entirely different economic world from the Africans.
W h y are Africans,who provide the overwhelming proportion of labour to
the system, in so deprived a condition? The white Rhodesian’s short answer
would probably be to contrast his inherent superiority and industriousness with
the inferiority and laziness of the African.This thesis is worth investigating.See
George Kay’s Rhodesia :u H u m u n Geogruphjj, Mlambo’s Rhodesia :the British
Dilemma (1971), F.M.Nehwati’s The Effect of Racial Discrimination on the
African Worker in Southern Rhodesia (1967), D.G.Clarke’sDomestic Workers
in Rhodesia: the Economics of Muster and Servant and Contract Workers and
Underdevelopment in Rhodesia (Mambo Occasional Papers) (1974),G.Arrighi’s
Labour Supplies in Historical Perspective and The Political Economy of Rhodesia,
W.J. Barber’sThe Economji of British Central Africa, R.B.Sutcliffe’sStagnation
and Inequality in Rhodesia (1971)and P.S. Harris’ Black Industrial Workers in
Rhodesia.
Africans forced into a money economy

In Rhodesia: u H u m a n Geogríiphj.,George Kay states that
it was widely believed by Europeans that excessive physical exertion in the tropics might be
harmful to their health,and South African experience and the slave trade had demonstrat-
ed possibilities of using Africans as labourers.
Rhodesia 61
The really exploitable wealth,once whites had taken the land,was thus African
labour.But it took many years of economic pressure combined with a constant-
ly growing body of laws (including a Compulsory Labour Act during the
Second World War) to force African labour to serve the white economy at the
rates, in the places and on the conditions determined by the whites (cf.
D.G.Clarke, ‘Settler Ideology and African Underdevelopment in Post-war
Rhodesia’,Rhodesian Journalof Economics,Vol. 8,1974).
Africans did not at first desire money.Apart from those tempted to stay by
the rare,generous and considerate employer,they worked only long enough to
obtain the minimun to pay taxes and buy a few necessities. Wages were
nevertheless kept low by a combination of deliberate policy, low productivity,
paternalism (food and housing provided by employers) and the assumption that
Africans should rely on the reserves for their living.As the African population
grew,a labour surplus formed.The low wage policy continued.African labour
could not organize,it lacked education and training to develop skills, and its
unity was undermined as in South Africa by the vast importation of Africans
from elsewhere in Africa. Migrant (contract) labour has thus been a basic
element of the African labour situation in Rhodesia.The duality must again be
noted, blacks in the white system are there only temporarily and for specific
purposes.They are not a permanent,integral part of it, because when they are
no longer needed must return to their own system. There they and their
problems are dealt with by the separate government imposed upon them (in the
form of the Internal (formerly Native) Affairs Departmentbby the minority
elected administration. African realities are in this way excluded from the
experience of most whites enjoying the fantasy of the fantastic Rhodesian ‘way
of life’.H o w successfully deceptive this dual system is can be measured by the
confident assertions of white Rhodesian politicians,that ‘our Africans are the
happiest’.
Racialism and labour unity

The policies outlined have tended to provide confirmation of the typical
European view of the African worker as unskilled and unreliable. This is
precisely what must be expected when training is deliberately restricted, and
migration (from foreign country or reserve) is encouraged. In spite of this,
in 1972,the Rhodesian Railways (a large and comparatively good employer with
the strongest African trade union) revealed that only 30 per cent of its
13,149strong African work force had been employed for less than ten years.
The situation reinforces prejudice, obstructs the rational development of
organized labour and indeed perverts normal trade union practices,such as the
‘closed-shop’, into racially based ‘job-reservation’. The white artisan is auto-
matically elevated by his colour,into a managerial role,over Africans.Thus the
prospect of‘working-class’ unity overriding the exploitation of labour is virtually
nil.In fact white artisan pressure,(in the wake of the 1929 depression revelation
of the prospect of whites being ‘reduced’to manual labour) pressed for legal
protection to be added to the social and economic barriers, which kept blacks
from economic power.(See D.G. Clarke’s ‘SettlerIdeology and African Under-
f
[Phrmi 4.4.4Photo)Picou]
Living quarters of African agricultural workers.

Rhodesia 63
development in Postwar Rhodesia’, and P.S. Harris’ ‘Ten Popular Myths

Concerning the Employment of Labour in Rhodesia’,both in the March 1974
Rhodesian Journal of Economics.)
Industrial Conciliation Act (1934)

A n Industrial Conciliation Act was passed in 1934. Gray, in The Titio Nations,
summed it up as follows:
Its effect was to introduce a modern and progressive method of industrial conciliation for
European wage-earnersand employees,while leaving the mass of the labour force under
the Master and ServantsAct,which resembled the legislation of Elizabethan England.
This had two results, as Kay points out. There was little possibility of an
African middle class emerging. Secondly,there has been relatively little conflict
between white artisans,clerical workers (whose good salaries make them major
beneficiaries of the system) and employers. The identity of white interests has
meanwhile survived all opposition and held intact.White unity is well illustrated
by the ability to survive the traumatic expulsion the Lord Malvern,Whitehead,
United Federal Party style of professional,patrician leadership, and the take-
over by the populist Rhodesian Front leadership supported by a combination of
white artisans,the inflated bureaucracy of the powerful civil service and wealthy
tobacco farmers. Established commerce and professionals labelled it the
‘Cowboy Cabinet’,but in the final analysis judged it best to join them rather
than upset the privilege which is their common bond.Many proposals for reform
have foundered on this solidarity.
The 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act (which has the same title as its South
African predecessor of 1924) establishes a dual system in labour relations by the
simple device of defining an ‘employee’as ‘anyperson engaged by an employer
to perform work... but shall not include a native’-surely the perfect example
of turning a person into a non-person.White trade unions then formed indus-
trial councils with white employers and made bargains for their mutual benefit
which of course excluded ‘non-employees’, that is Africans.
Labour relations between Africans and whites

The labour relations of unskilled African workerswho constitute the vast
majority of African workersare thus regulated primarily by the Master and
Servants Act (1901)passed to cover ‘bodilylabour’in domestic service,mining,
agriculture,husbandry,trade,manufacture and handicrafts. The ‘servant’who
‘absentshimself without leave from his master’s house or premises... is intoxi-
cated,refuses to obey any command of his master. .. is abusive or insulting,
either by language or conduct to his master or his master’s wife or children’ is
liable to criminal prosecution. The Africans (Registration and Identification)
Act (1957)penalizes any African who enters the service of another employer
while under an existing contract while,under the African Labour Regulations
Act,‘anyAfrican labourer who without lawful cause deserts or absents himself

from his place of employment or fails to carry out the terms of his contract’is
also liable to criminal prosecution. Punishments under the African Juveniles
Employment Act include whipping for defaulting juveniles.
Between 1962 and 1965, 1,047Africans were prosecuted under the Labour
Regulations Act: between 1960 and 1965, 13,166 Africans, 4 Europeans,
1 Asian and 1 Coloured were prosecuted under the ‘Masterand Servants’rules;
and between 1965 and 1969, 3,506 Africans were convicted for desertion or
insubordination.The statute,like so many others in Rhodesia, is couched in
largely non-racial terms, but is used to maintain a discriminatory economic
reality.This can be illustrated by contrasting these statistics with those for the
crime of non-payment of wages, an equally ‘non-racial’offence, for which
between 1960 and 1965;508 Europeans,88 Coloureds and Asians and 61 Africans
were prosecuted. Incidentally, the identity of white employer has found its
way into colloquial language,where the word baas (meaning overseer or em-
ployer) is now used to refer to any white man.
Negotiating structures
The 1934 Industrial Conciliation Act was amended in 1959,ostensibly to enable
African participation in negotiations on labour relations.A n earlier amendment
of 1945 had made the application of agreements made by the Industrial Coun-
cils to certain African workers optional,but, in practice, white trade unionists
did not do much about such application.Following a strike of African railway
workers in 1945, Labour Boards were established in 1947. O n these boards in
place of direct negotiations white civil servants or other ‘native experts’
(including white housewives) would discuss with employers their recommenda-
tions for minimum conditionsto apply to African workers in all industries except
agriculture and domestic service, where significantly,the majority of Africans
were employed (see Table 13). Advisory Industrial Boards still negotiate condi-
tions for a large proportion of black workers, ‘represented’by employees
appointed by the Minister of Labour and Social Welfare in his discretion.
13. Employment of Africans by economic sector

TABLE
1961 I968
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Mining 49,000 8 41,000 I

Agriculture 249.000 40 239,000 38
Manufacturing 184,000 29 121,000 20
Other 143,000 ~ 23 220.000
~ ~
35
624,000 1
0 623,000 1 O0
By forbidding the registration of trade unions ‘whichare formed or exist for

purposes of furthering the interests of its members on a basis of race or colour’
Rhodesia 65
the law excluded the registration of unions which could represent unskilled
workers-who were almost exclusively African. A trade union must satisfy the
that it does not exist to further the interests
registrar that it is ‘representative’,
of its members on a basis of race or colour,and that no existing trade union has
been registered to represent the industrial interests of the same industrial area.
Far from being a bar to racialism in industrial relations, this ‘anti-racial’
wording operating in the context of Rhodesian realities is designed, and
succeeds, as a means to protect the entrenched power of the white skilled
worker. In practice long-standingEuropean unions were operating when the
1959 Act was introduced.Their privileges were preserved by the voting provi-
sions in favour of skilled labour (see below), and their exclusive right to
negotiate was preserved by the provisions excluding new unions in the area
(inevitably African and unskilled) from registration.Once registered the union
bargains exclusively for all workers in the industry,whether members or not.
A n IndustrialCouncil is formed with the relevant registered employers’organiza-
tion,and their agreements bind all parties.Industrialboards operate in industries
where there is no representative employee organization (satisfactory to the
registrar), or where the registered trade union chooses to negotiate this way.
Their recommendations,if acceptable to the minister,are published as ‘Employ-
ment Regulations’ and are then binding, The Industrial Conciliation Act
consolidated in 1959 was accurately described by Francis Nehwati as ‘themain
bastion of industrialapartheid’.
First-and second-classtrade unionists

Unions which are not registered can play no effective part in industrial negotia-
tions.Unskilled Africans can choose inferior status in a white-dominated union
or become members of one which is non-registeredand so ineffective.Members
of the registered unions have voting rights graded in proportion to skill,and an
unskilled (black) vote counts a maximum of one-third of a skilled (white) vote.
Any union attempting to give equal voting rights can be ordered to amend its
constitution under pain of de-registration.The trade unions were forced to
organize on an industry-by-industrybasis,and the skilled ‘top’of each industry
controlled most of the voting power. No general union of unskilled workers
organized horizontally was allowed.Once again the significance of the intricate
link-upbetween education,land,labour,wealth and political power is obvious.
Europeans hold a monopoly of skills and manipulate education,apprenticeship,
trade unions and the legislature to maintain their position.
The powers of the Registrar under the IndustrialConciliation Act in regard
to trade union affairs (see below) are as arbitrary as those of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. He has sole discretion to register unions or not, and power to
cancel registration on the grounds that a union is not representative (the relative
criteria being nowhere defined) or that it is involved in ‘politicalactivities’.Thus
in 1968, the Registrar de-registered four Industrial Councils that included a
large African representation, so effectively denying collective bargaining
machinery to some 17,000Africans. T.E.Mswaka estimates that, because they
were employed in agriculture, forestry, domestic service, government service,
education and health, 62 per cent of Africans were excluded altogether in 1968
from bargaining machinery provided under the Industrial Conciliation Act.
The act was amended in 1964 to prohibit the use of trade union funds,
services or facilities for political purposes or any political organization.In 1967
African unions were forbidden to accept financial assistance from international
trade union organizations or from national trade unions in other countries,and
their members were forbidden to travel abroad. Trade unionists inevitably
became involved in political activity,and many were consequently affected by
various laws which inhibit criticism,especially by African nationalists.The right
to strike being the final measure of the power of labour,is closely controlled in
Rhodesia. The Industrial Conciliation Act restricts it for registered and un-
registered unions alike, to a last resort after a long and complex process of
negotiation and conciliation. Strikes are illegal in all ‘essential’services, and
whenever an existing industrial agreement is unexpired. Amendment of the act
in 1971 subjected the whole matter to direct presidential discretion,enabling him
to declare any strike (including a legal strike) to be ‘contrary to the public
interest’.By further amendments he may also interfere and rewrite agreements
made by the Industrial Councils, when he deems it ‘in the public interest’.
This level of political sensitivity and reaction to industrial action is not new to
Rhodesia. The law controlling trade unions is to be found as much in the field
of security legislation-the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act-as in industrial
law.The prohibition of Sunday meetings from which registered trade unions are
immune,has been a severe restriction on unregistered unions’activities. Strikes
in essential services,and any attempt to organize them could constitute ‘sabotage’
under this act,attracting severe penalties including death,made worse by provi-
sions transferring the burden of proof to the accused,once the police in their
discretion took a serious view of a strike.
Employment and freedom of movement

The African Affairs Act and the African (Registrationand Identification)Act of
1957 restrict freedom of movement and entry to (white) industrial areas.Under
African (Urban Areas) Accommodation and Registration laws unemployed
Africans are allowed only a limited period to seek work, and risk prosecution
for contravening the pass laws if they attempt to seek work wherever they wish.
It has been seen,above,how executive government has grown increasingly
authoritarian.Control in this,as in other areas of government,is the response
to the challenge to exclusively white privilege. The 1973 amendments to the
IndustrialConciliation Act were opposed by employers and trade unions,yet its
purpose is control to the ‘Rhodesian way of life’, and was unambiguously
brought out by a Rhodesian Front member of parliament supporting the
law-on the basis that it was ‘toprotect the present and the future of the working
man (in terms of the party) [sic] on which we fought the election and that is the
permanent establishment of the European in this country’.Remembering that
man in this context means ‘whiteman’,this typifies the objective of minority
government management of labour relations-the protection of the economic
superiority of the European.
6 White political
power at
Non-representative rule
The basis of government in Rhodesia is as dualistic as those elements seen
above.For the European there is democratic,parliamentary government. based
on the British model.Again, in form it is non-racial,the franchise being based
on criteria of education and wealth. In fact, the economic destitution of the
African majority effectively excludes it from the system.African participation in
the Assembly being limited to a fixed minority of black members of parliament
(16 of 60). Eight of these are elected by an electoral college of chiefs,headmen
and councillors. Eight are elected by the tiny proportion who qualify for the
separate,African voters Roll (2,980voted in the July 1974 election.)Africans
are not however without a government;they are administered separately by a
special government department, entirely controlled by whites,responsible only
to the white elected government,and making no pretence at being representative
of the African majority.
The white minority government rules Africans through its Ministry of
Internal Affairs (formerly Native Affairs), through the agency of District C o m -
missioners and chiefs and headmen. It operates on the assumption that Africans
are non-urban,and that the urban black proletariat is a transitory phenomenon.
Consequently Africans in towns inhabit a form of administrative limbo
(enjoying,at the most, an advisory relationship with the white municipalities
which ‘manage’the black townships) because they are away from the area where
the system assumes them to be for purposes of government. In fact as seen
above,Africans are vital to the European economy in both the urban areas and
on white farms. Weinrich demonstrates in Black and White Elites in Rural
Rhodesia the significance of the contemporary reality of demographic distribu-
tion to this system. Separation has so far been pursued less rigidly and less
consistently than in South Africa,but with similar consequences.
In the 1930s 50 per cent of Europeans lived in rural areas,this percentage
has now fallen to less than 25.There is now only one white per square mile in
European rural areas,that is they are outnumbered eighty to one. Most of the
population in ‘white’towns is black: the urban ratio between the groups, in
An African beer hall.
Rhodesia 69
1964was three Africans to one white. In the rural areas, however, the African
male population mainly consists of the very young and the very old,since most
of the men between 20 and 45 have to work in towns to make a living.This has
of course diminished the possibility of the countryside producing local African
leaders,and so further facilitated European dominance.
Apart from some attempts at multiracialism during the late 1950s, white
Rhodesia has always been governed in accordance with the racialist philosophy
formally incorporated by the Rhodesian Front in its 1969 constitution.
Virtual exclusion of blacks from the vote

The voters’ roll was kept almost exclusively white between 1898 and 1969 by
using various devices to restrict the vote to whites rather than by direct racial
exclusion. The qualifications for having a vote in 1898 were literacy plus an
income of 550 per annum and the ownership of £75 worth of property or a
mining claim.These qualificationswere enjoyed by very few Africans. Yet there
has been an almost paranoid fear of ‘floods of African voters’, and the
qualificationswere repeatedly raised.
In 1908,for example,only about fifty voters were ‘natives’.But in 1912 the
income and property qualificationswere doubled,and the literacy test was made
more difficult-primarily to exclude Afrikaners rather than Africans who were
already excluded by the financial qualifications.In 1919 the white electorate was
doubled when women obtained the vote and a wife could qualify on the basis of
her husband’s financial status.
In 1928 there were 62 African and 22,000European voters.
When it was proposed, under the Land Apportionment Act,that Africans
should be enabled to own farms, an attempt was made to raise the property
qualification to E500. This was stopped by the British Government. Under a
new rule introduced in 1937,property or communally held land was excluded in
assessing qualification for voting rights.This excluded many Africans who hired
property from Europeansin ‘urbanlocations’.Old age pensioners were exempted
from the property condition in 1939 but there were (and still are) no African
old age pensioners.
In 1939,there were 24,626voters,of whom 39 were African.
Various proposals to limit or exclude African voters were put forward,
including one which proposed to adopt the Hertzog scheme operating in South
Africa under which, instead of having African voters at all,two whites would
represent African interests in parliament.
The prime minister of what was then Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey
Huggins (Lord Malvern) reverted to this proposal after the Second World War
and tried to press it on the British Government,although recalling that such
moves must now be taken carefully ‘without creating a further uproar in the
United Nations organization’. At the 1948 election there were 136 registered
African voters. In order to help induce Britain to accept the proposed Federa-
tion of Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (which it did in 1953)
the prime minister dropped his proposal regarding African voters and the
common voters’roll.But in the 1951 Electoral Act,he increased the qualifica-
lions again: income from E100 to E240, property from E150 to E500, plus an
ability to read and write English.This effectively reduced the number of African
voters in 1951 from 453 to 380.Yet his alleged ‘determinationto maintain... [the]
common voters’ roll’ was a quality which commended him and his plan for
federation to many.
Britain was pledged to ensure the survival of the common voters’roll.When
Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front abolished it in 1969.they were merely doing
what their predecessors had often tried for,but failed to achieve. In Europem
Politics iii Southern Rhodesin Leys is particularly instructive on this point. By
November 1956 there were 560 African and 52,184European voters. In spite of
this, the Tredgold Commission was set up to make recommendations on the
franchise in order to ensure that ‘governmentis placed and remains in the hands
of civilized and responsible people’.
In common with a number of Rhodesian parliamentary commissions,this
commission produced a critical assessment and ideas for reform. It noted that
representation was racial in fact though not in name,and that ‘thequalifications
for the franchise are fixed so high that, in effect, the African is virtually
excluded’,and suggested arrangements for a qualified franchise that would have
allowed some African influence on the legislature.The commission’s recommen-
dations were largely ignored. Instead, the 1957 Electoral Act increased the
number of African voters, but ensured that they could never exceed 20 per cent
of the vote; it was hoped in this way to preclude any threat to minority white
voters for many years,and perhaps permanently.
By November.1961 there were 5,127 African voters in a electorate of
88.820.
The Federation (1953-63)

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was formed on 3 September 1953.
Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland hoped. to gain national
independence,and feared the power,in the Federation,of the 220,000Europeans
in Southern Rhodesia. In 1960,an inquiry into the federal constitution, set up
under Lord Monckton,concluded that the Federation could not survive unless
it was modified sufficiently to make it acceptable to the people of the
constituent territories.In 1961,Nyasaland obtained representative government.
In 1962 a predominantly African government was formed in Northern Rhodesia.
Finally,the Federation was dissolved on 31 December 1963.Nyasaland became
Malawi and Northern Rhodesia became Zambia.
It is difficult to assess the exact significance for Rhodesian politics of the
period of the Federation (I 953-63). Generally, relations between blacks and
whites, which is still the heart of the Rhodesian problem, were unchanged
despite the new liberalism called ‘Partnership’.However,the period made its
own specific contribution to the colonial mentality.It led to a sense of resent-
ment at the ‘ingratitude’of the African for white magnanimity. This theme
reappears time and again,not merely in the chatter of white society,but at the
highest political level, as successive ‘reforms’are questioned or rejected by
African opinion.
Rhodesia 71
‘Federated brethren’
‘Partnership’symbolized the new era, and both Rhodesian whites and many
outside observers believed it involved a real change.In fact,in both the private
and the public level,white Federal liberalism was largely a façade.
Before Federation it would have been uncommon for any white,apart from
missionaries or the uncommonly genteel,to address or refer to Africans in other
than essentially unfriendly terms : ‘kaffir’,‘munt’(a corruption of the Bantu
word for person), ‘native’,‘boy’Cjuvenile or adult) or ‘girl’(the feminine
equivalent). Federation, however, was to bring basic political and economic
advantages, but at the price of adopting more liberal social and personal
attitudes towards Africans. Politicians learned the necessary patter, but the
average white Rhodesian made it sardonically clear that his use of the term
‘African’was no betrayal of the common conviction that all Africans are
‘kaffirs’,illustrated by exaggerated phrases such as ‘our beloved Federated
African brethren’.But once the Federation ended, all could return to the
relaxed jargon of racialism and superiority to match the return to overt racial
politics.This helps to explain black and white responses to the much-talked-of
liberalism and changes that were supposed to characterize the period of the
Federation.
The symbolic admission of African representatives, first to the Federal
Assembly and, under the 1961 constitution,to the Rhodesian Assembly pro-
vided a façade of multiracialism. It did not satisfy the increasingly conscious
African masses but did help in enlisting some outside support for contemporary
Rhodesia as being at least somewhat less reactionary than South Africa.African
leaders became more and more suspicious of what were alleged to be schemes
for peaceful change and improvement,seeing in them a thinly disguised deter-
mination to maintain the status quo; and this African rejection led in turn to
white disillusionment and reaction in a vicious circle of increasingly violent
confrontation (cf. Leys’ European Politics ill Southern Rhodesia, Gray’s Tirso
Natiom and Mlambo’s Strugglefòr a Birthright).
The idea of Federation had been unpopular with Africans in all of the three
territories involved.The discovery of copper in Northern Rhodesia in 1928 was
one of the factors which led whites to press for a union of Northern and
Southern Rhodesia. The British Government refused to sanction union but
eventually accepted Federation.This caution at least made it easier to dismantle
the Federation when this became inevitable.A Labour government made the first
move in 1951 and the Federation was set up by a Conservative government in
1953. There is an interesting parallel here. Huggins and Welensky (the white
leaders of Southern and Northern Rhodesia respectively) warned the British
Government of the increasingly racist influence on Southern Rhodesia of South
Africa, which had elected a racist Afrikaner Government in 1948 and, to
counteract this, urged British acceptance of a liberal Federation. Ian Smith’s
supporters have often tried similar arguments. The 1953 arrangement, as Bow-
man points out, gave Rhodesia ‘complete control over its internal affairs (in-
cluding African administration), while gaining effective economic control of the
north’.The African presence in the Assembly was limited to six out of the
thirty-five members, Huggins saying that it would be difficult to find six Afri-
cans in the Federation sufficiently competent for the task.
Partnership was to be a feature of the new political arrangements. .White
Rhodesians approved them by 25,570to 14,750in a referendum;the 2.4million
Africans,apart from the 429 who had votes,were not consulted.Partnership was
defined by Huggins in terms ofjunior and senior partners,and as a junior in this
case the native gradually works himself up in the business’or more graphically
in terms of ‘therider and the horse’.
White political and economic dominance remained unchanged in the Fed-
eration. Minor concessions made in 1953 were soon undermined. The Federal
Assembly was increased without a pro rcztu increase of black members. The
African Affairs Board that was to have been the watchdog of black interests
became a rubber stamp for decisions made by white political parties.
The territorial government of Southern Rhodesia retained the main respon-
sibility for Africans living in the territory,but its revenue was much reduced
under the federal system.Federal spending,on the other hand, meant a large
increase in funds for schemes that mainly benefited whites. The gibe bamba
zonke (snatch everything) was the ironic term used by whites who did not live
in Salisbury, for the capital and its bureaucrats-capital of both Southern
Rhodesia and the Federation,monopolizing anything that was worth having.
White prosperity continued.Between 1938 and 1956,after taking account
of inflation the average increase in the real incomes of Europeans was estimated
at 30 per cent.Between 1954 and 1963,federal revenue from Southern Rhodesia
was substantially less than federal expenditure in the territory (cf. Bowman).
Nyasaland was also a beneficiary, but to a lesser degree. Northern Rhodesian
copper was exploited, and the former British colonial policy insisting on the
primacy ofAfrican interestswas sacrificed to pay for white Rhodesia’sprosperity
(cf. Hazelwood’sstudy of the economic background to Federation).
Symbolic desegregation
Some nominal concessions were made to multiracialism during the period of
Federation.They did little to change the structure,or give any real promise of
further change.Symbolic multiracialism,merely reinforced white prejudice and
awareness of their privileges, without achieving any substantial change in the
balance of power. Few Africans were appointed to the civil service; when the
Rhodesian Front came to power, there was no problem in eliminating them
without causing any dislocation.Desegregation in education applied only to the
élite fringesthe university,and some expensive private schools. Special exemp-
tions allowed important African visitors to use hotels (which were exclusively
white), or allowed African advocates into chambers near the law courts. The
average white Rhodesian, his wife and children continued to be segregated
from contact with ordinary black people except in master and servant
relationships.
The Southern Rhodesian wing of the Federal Party did suggest one really
significant change: the repeal of the Land Apportionment Act.However, this
was after certain liberal amendments had given Africans some openings in the
Separateness.
Racism and apartheid in southern Africa I4
economy and in society.The trend was rapidly checked and the hypocrasy of
the whole exercise revealed. The experiment in flexible government which
consisted in granting concessions to Africans while reassuring whites that
control would be preserved by increasing authoritarian measures if necessary,
was pushed to its logical conclusion,and inevitable failure. White voters had
been persuaded to accept reform, an improved status for Africans, and the
possibility that some day the 1961 constitution might enable Africans to
dominate parliament.O n the other hand,the United Federal Party demonstrated
to the same voters that black petitions for equality should be dealt with by
gagging the petitioners.Whites realized what was really at stake-the good life
under perpetual minority government. In 1962, they therefore elected the
Rhodesian Front, pledged to maintain this position at whatever cost. The
Rhodesian Front represented a coalition of the former Dominion Party and
elements of the former United Federal Party.
Intransigence or transition
The Federation (in common with contemporary Rhodesia) had to face a basic
question. Did the economic advantage of the enfranchised few make it worth
while to face the growing dissatisfaction of the unfranchised many? The majority
were forced to rely progressively upon extra-parliamentary organization and
demonstration,unconstitutional action,and finally violence.Fortunately for the
people of Zambia and Malawi, the final decision lay with Britain-which
through the Devlin and the Monckton commissions defined the terms of the
problem, and then warned that the threatening racial explosion could be
prevented only by force,or else by the admission of the majority to government.
Britain was confident enough of its own power and African support to ensure
majority rule in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Tragically for Rhodesia,
it had no such confidence in its ability in Southern Rhodesia,and the scene was
set for the white settlers to find their own solution in their own stronghold.
7 Soft constitution
and hard
government
The possibility of allowing change from minority to majority rule, to progress

by a pre-established,mechanical constitutional process (no matter how slow)
was offered in 1961,when a new constitution was arranged between Britain and
the white Rhodesian Government.O n the face of it, the new constitution offered
a great deal as an objective, gradual solution to the racial conflict. It was,
however. rejected by the African nationalist party, the National Democratic
Party (NDP),which had burgeoned in proportion to the growing number of
unkept white promises of reform which accompanied increased authoritarian
government, including the banning of its predecessor, the African National
Congress (ANC).
The soft constitution

Why was this rejected? The immediate political context of the 1961 constitution
was the Federation,then being propelled by white hopes towards total indepen-
dence,on the basis, as we have seen,of ‘multiracialism’which was essentially
minority rule.The I961 integralconstitutional restraints,especially the Declara-
tion of Human Rights. however. promised to provide a more efficient and
objective control of settler rule than the unpredictable reliance on imperial
intervention.Thus whites began to stress the idea of sovereign independence as
the answer to.ensure their freedom of action. It is obvious that the white
concession to multiracialism were intended to create the situation in which
Britain would, in Huggins’ earlier words, come to ‘trustingthe Europeans.. .
sufficiently to hand over 6,000,000primitive people to a Parliament dominated
by local Europeans’.The 1961 constitution was indeed sold to white Rhodesians
as the minimum cost of total independence.
Independence means freedom to do what they will,and their will with the
interests of Africans (after seventy years’experience of the sort we have traced)
was unlikely to attract African support.In 1961 as indeed in 1971,Rhodesian
Africans could not see the desirability of consenting to what would amount to
their transfer to exclusive sovereign settler control,whether the settlers were led
by ‘liberal’Whitehead or *illiberal’Smith. Of course, once again African
opinion was ignored,though a massive and impressively organized 'referendum'

was held by the NDP among the unenfranchised.Closely watched by police and
police reservists, it managed this massive peaceful demonstration. The result
was 372,546against the 1961 constitution, 471 in favour.The total number of
enfranchised votes was 63,795:21,846against 41,949in favour.
This judgement of African leaders,reflecting the views of their rank and file
has been proved highly responsible to the majority constituency they represen-
ted.First the constitution itself kept political power where it had always been,in
European hands. It reduced the prospect of change by increasing franchise
requirements, requiring higher educational or economic qualifications. These
qualifications,as we have seen, are still zones of guarded privilege, which a
white elected government would extend to Africans at its peril. The gesture of
granting immediately fifteen African seats in an assembly of sixty-fivewas only
a welcome surprise because Africans had not entered the Southern Rhodesian
legislative at all before. Their presence, however. was symbolic, they could
expect to be allowed to debate white power,not share it.
Rhodesia in 1961 was a country characterized by racial discrimination and,
as will be explained below, the most authoritarian laws directed primarily
against African aspirations.The 1961 constitution,although it included a Bill of
Rights as a gesture towards future equality and the rule of law, contained an
extraordinary provision that left all existing repressive and discriminatory legis-
lation intact. It in fact set the seal of approval upon the system of minority
government which precludes any change for the better for the overwhelming
majority of Africans. Equally it offered no change from the dual system of
government. Finally any change which might come would have to come not
from the operation of the law,but from the goodwill of white people seeking to
make progressive change.
Africans did not believe that the Europeans would make such changes.
Their fathers had taken African land and cattle without compensation.Their
kith and kin and made settling 'excursions'to Rhodesia to grow wealthy,while
they denied the right of economic competition to the indigenous people and had
then retired to the comfort of their alternative homes. Any doubt that they
could not be relied upon to initiate progressive change was dispelled when in
1965 they destroyed the very constitution which offered even tentative change,
and under which they had solemnly sought power by election.
Hard government
Apart from specific inadequacies of the 1961 constitution,we should note some
details of the machinery of arbitrary government,which was created during the
'liberal'era of prime ministers Todd and Whitehead, both as a reassurance to
whites, and more specifically as the immediate response to the growing African
nationalist organization.The latter could not be accomodated within the white
system,therefore it would be repressed.In 1948,to the great surprise of whites,
a widespread and peaceful strike of African workers took place : the response
was the Subversive Activities Act of 1950,introducing the power to ban meet-
ings,establish a secret police and ban any dissemination of ideas,undermining
Rhodesia 71
constitutional democratic government.In 1955 the Public Order Act was intro-
duced by Todd and in 1956 its powers to detain and restrict without trial were
used by him to ban meetings and detain,without trial,over 200 members of the
ANC Youth League,who had organized a bus boycott.
It is ironic and perhaps a cause for optimism,and a celebration of man’s
ability to learn and change,to note that in 1971 under laws directly deriving
from the same powers,Mr Todd and his daughter,now convinced opponents of
minority government, were themselves arbitrarily detained. For a personal
account of this experience see Judith Todd’s The Right to say No.
The banning power was resorted to in 1958 against nationalist attempts to
spread their ideas from urban to rural areas. (The sensitivity of the minority
government to rural political activity is a recurrent and increasingly dominant
theme in the history of African opposition.) In 1959 there was an emergency
throughout the Federation and a concerted effort to destroy the growing
nationalist criticism.Widespread detention created a virtual nationalist political
symposium in Khami prison outside Bulawayo and enduring links between
African nationalists,many of whom in Rhodesia spent the succeeding decade in
detention,while their Zambian and Malawian colleagues have been struggling
with the new problems of creating nations out of the colonial past.
Repressive legislation came to a peak in 1959-60. Whitehead sought to
destroy the ANC,which he described as the ‘canker in our body politic’,and
took wide powers of arbitrary government. The Unlawful Organizations Act,
the Preventive Detention Act were passed in 1959,together with amendments to
the Native Affairs Act.In 1960 came the Emergency Powers Act and that basic
instrument of the Rhodesian Government, the Law and Order (Maintenance)
Act.Its effect has been to produce at times a virtually comatose condition in
Rhodesian African politics, with detention, restrictions,long-term emprison-
ment and execution being the white answer to the call for the transfer of power.
The Law and Order (Maintenance)Act is a classic example of portmanteau
persecution. It interferes with almost every civil right in the book.In addition it
destroys the procedural guarantees of the rule of law which support them (such
as the presumption of the innocence of the accused).
Perhaps the only thing that can be said in its favour is that it was at the
time of its introduction so shocking that it led the Chief Justice of the Federa-
tion, Sir Robert Tredgold, a white Rhodesian of pioneer stock to condemn it
openly.In his book Rhodesia that was MI.Lifehe describes it as ‘an anthology
of horrors’,which made emergency government ‘theordinary law of the land’,
turning Rhodesia into a police state. This he defined as ‘a state in which the
police and the executive are given or assume complete control over all political
activity’.The condemnation was shared by the predominantly white legal pro-
fession.More significant,however,is the fact that Tredgold alone acted logic-
ally,given his opinion that the act effectively made political puppets of all officers
of the court,and resigned his position in protest.
The act has also been described aptly as ‘34pages descriptive of what
Africans cannot do,and what will happen to them if they do’.It empowers the
executive to ban meetings and attendance at meetings, to ban publications, to
order up to five years of restriction of liberty without trial. It allows and
prescribes arrest and search without warrant,minimum sentences for vague and
Salisbury-capital of Rhodesia.
Rhodesia 79
widely defined offences such as ‘intimidation’(three years), possession of any

‘offensiveweapon or material’(twenty years), or of any ‘armsof war with intent
to endanger the maintenance of law in Rhodesia’ (compulsory death sentence
until 1969,now thirty years). Capital punishment (or thirty years) and a five-year
minimum sentence is prescribed for ‘anyact of terrorism or sabotage ... done
with intent to endanger the maintenance of Law and Order in Rhodesia ... or in
a neighbouring territory’(the latter to catch guerrillas operating against South
Africa or Portugal).
W e should note that the possession of arms of war or ‘offensiveweapons’
(which could include a stone) is an offence if a certain intention exists: but the
laws presume such does exist unless the accused proves the contrary-beyond a
reasonable doubt.Thus the heavy burden of proof normally on the prosecution
is placed upon the accused. This means in effect that any African caught in
circumstances which the security forces consider suspicious is very likely to be
found guilty if prosecuted. It introduced terrorist government into Rhodesia
well in advance of guerrilla war which is condemned by the régime for employing
terrorism.
The act is used almost exclusively against Africans despite its non-discrimi-
natory language.Also, in relation to ‘terrorism and sabotage’the definition of
the latter is so wide that again,combined with the placing of a presumption of
intention upon the accused, the decision of guilt or innocence has been taken
from the judge almost entirely,and given to those who decide to prosecute.
It is clear that Africans are precluded from influencing government by
participation in the legislature.Under various laws they are equally discouraged
from adopting even modest non-violentor industrial action to influence govern-
ment. Protest by the African masses. of whatever variety, is dangerous to
minority rule and is dealt with under what is essentially emergency law, so
boycotts and strikes would clearly consitutue ‘sabotage’under the act, and
could be met with the death sentence or thirty years.
Thus a pattern of repressive laws emerges.
First,normal political opposition in the legislature is altogether precluded.
Secondly, the extra-parliamentary process of political discussion and
debate are either totally banned (as in the rural areas it has been almost without
interruption since 1959), or made precarious, as in the urban areas where
‘regulating officers’have unfettered discretion to disallow political gatherings,
between long periods of total ban. Emergency government in which political
freedom is the exception rather than the rule is the norm for Rhodesia-and it
has the approval of the white minority.
Thirdly,political organizations are not merely harassed by prosecution of
their officers for political statements,and restriction or detention without rea-
son,but are totally banned.The African National Congress (ANC),the NDP,
ZAPU and ZANU were all banned totally and their assets seized.The present
African National Council-in many ways to be regarded as something of a
political mutation in Rhodesia politics-is under constant threat of a similar
fate.Its history of loss of officers into detention,restriction and prison (despite
its overt,non-violent stand much criticized by more radical opponents within
and especially beyond Rhodesia’s borders) is identical to the experience of
previous movements.
Fourthly,having closed every other avenue of political pressure for change,

the authorities have provided a panoply of laws designed only to suppress the
violent opposition that they have thus created. Communal punishment and
enforced concentration of rural people in 'defended villages' are devices only
needed by armies of occupation and in fact used by the pioneers. Militarily,this
is exactly the position in parts of Rhodesia,and politically it has always been the
general condition.
Nor is there today the same simulation of normality.The African has long
known the taste of forceful government.The whites were given a strong,but to
them, palatable taste of it, with the vigourous censorship of their press for
months after UDI.For them it merely created the exciting reality of the
emergency, for they were not much concerned that criticism of UD1 was
suppressed.Rhodesia has in fact had government by emergency powers since
shortly before UD1 in November 1965. It is significant that it has hardly
touched whites, and perhaps equally significant that for Africans the difference
has been one of degree only-and that limited to extreme situations.
The real change,which has occurred since 1971 particularly,is that in some
parts of Rhodesia the state of violence has turned to a state of war-which has
become two-sided.So freedom to move at will has now begun to be limited by
violence for white men, women and children,as it has always been for African
men,women and children.
The development of security laws to provide a negative answer to the
African demand for change is traced in detail in Palley's article on 'Law and the
Unequal Society' in Volume 12 of Race, in 1970-71 in Chapter 3 of Bowman's
Politics in Rhodesia, Mlambo's Struggle .for a Birthright,Chapters XII1 and IX.
South African legislative parallels are indicated in Sprack's South Africa's Sixth
Province.
Government and African leadership

W e have read above of an emerging African leadership during the federal years,
and since the break-up of the Federation.The nationalists who made and ran
the ANC have,despite the harassment of the past twenty years,survived many
of their oppressors,especially whites, many of whom played their oppressive
roles and moved on to new places,or went back to their own countries.
People and names are important in a political process such as that which
has been going on in Rhodesia.Contemporary official histories in the country
exclude the names of all nationalist leaders,partly as a matter of policy, partly
because under the laws providing for their detention without trial, it is unlawful
to publish their names.Nevertheless the names of Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi
Sithole,and their past and present fellow detainees (some detained for a decade
or more) such as Dan Madzimbamuto, Willie Musarurwa,Morton Malianga,
Michael Mawema, Josiah Chinamano,Clem Muchadi, Robert Mugabe, Enos
and Lazarus Nkala, Edson Sithole are now (despite their differing status,
loyalties and approaches to the problem) established, undying members in the
growing glow of the nationalist movement. Their successors or compatriots,
pursuing the cause of majority rule, whether by peaceful means inside the
Rhodesia 81
country, such as Abel Muzorewa, Canaan Banana, Elliot Gabellah, Henry

Kachidza; militarily in exile such as the late Herbert Chitepo, Jason Moyo,
James Chikerema, Joseph Msika, Nathan Shamuyarira, George Silundika or
many others pursuing the same goal by rational argument and publication
before the forum of the United Nations or the wider audience of world opinion,
have likewise carved that cause and a place into the future of Zimbabwe.The
majority of the leaders named are teachers,priests or lawyers.All,and many
other nationalist personalities, hold university degrees-often the result of
enforced study in the isolation of detention, or in exile. Yet most of them,
qualified though they are for a professional comfortable life, are involved in
political struggle for change,which is now a war of liberation.
Military might has never been far below the surface of the relationship
between the races in Rhodesia. Nevertheless, while the Rhodesian situation
described above suggests that it would be difficult to achieve peaceful change,a
further examination of the reasons for force as a major feature is desirable.
Clarification of the conflict

The 1961 constitution was designed to provide a neutral and if necessary irresis-
tible machine to achieve majority rule.
Its main defects were as follows :
1. Timing.It was too late.Blacks knew white government was mutable. Whites
were losing faith in their ability to control decisions in Britain concerning the
local black populace by sweet words and strong action, and sought refuge in
sovereignty and absolute independence.
2. Content. It asserted the value and legitimacy of equal rights and non-
discrimination for all, but left the actual granting of the rights to the
majority to the discretion of the privileged minority. It allowed insufficient
parliamentary responsibility to the majority to evoke a response. It gave
insufficient power to the law courts or the Constitutional Council, which
could have played educational and persuasive roles in refereeing peripheral
but crucial disputes in a transfer process. In fact for a while the courts
became the single legitimate and almost-equalarena for open battle between
the minority government and black nationalists, and sharpened the issues
(see Reg.Austin, ‘Politicsin the Courts’,Venture, October 1965). Whatever
its inherent qualities,the fact that it was dependent on white management
made it unworkable.The exercise could be compared with appointing the
manager and major shareholder of a perfectly healthy firm to the task of
liquidating it.
3. Method of production.African acceptance of the 1961 constitution was the
key to the small chance it may have had of success.The fact that the NDP
was only called in at the final stages to sanction it, and not to negotiate it,
reduced this chance to virtually nil.The terms of the constitution are set out
in abbreviated form in Appendix 6.They have been definitively analysed in
Palley, and dealt with more briefly but adequately in several works written
since 1961,including Bowman,Mlambo,Sithole and Shamuyarira.
8 Civil war
Landmarks
AFRICAN REJECTION OF THE 1961 CONSTITUTION A N D MINORITY RULE
Shortly after the African rejection of the 1961 constitution came the decision
to initiate chimurenga (the war of liberation) (1963), although armed conflict on
any scale followed only after a ‘phoney’war period of almost seven years.
The 1961 rejection is not, in this writer’s view, given sufficient recognition
as the first positive, mass assertion of African opinion in Southern Rhodesia
since the 1890s. It is open to speculation that, had the United Federal Party
under Whitehead been elected,liberalization might have prevented armed con-
frontation. This is possible, but the combination of Whitehead’s record of
authoritarian legislation and the minority instinct for privilege preservation
make it debatable. The flexibility of individual African leaders, and their
remarkable humanity, patience and willingness to seek solutions, are not
denied.However,the significance of the rejection,it is suggested,lies in the fact
that it represents a deep and widely, if not explicitly, felt state of fundamental
national awakening.The rift in the nationalist movement (between ZAPU and
ZANU),which followed in 196S64 has been variously attributed to personal-
ities, tribalism and differences over tactics. Its bitterness and violence, which
shocked nationalist supporters and opponents alike,is possibly the consequence
of a clarifying of this 1961 awakening and determination to bring oppression to
an end once and for all.
THE MINORITY ELECT THE RHODESIAN FRONT TO PERPETUATE MINORITY

GOVERNMENT
The second element in bringing about confrontation was the election of the
Rhodesian Front.Its party principles (Appendix 1 )were diametrically opposed
to those of the 1961 constitution, and the 1962 result was to all intents and
purposes the clearing of the decks for the action which commenced on
I I November 1965. Here again. this analysis may be criticized for being too
simplistic.After all. there were still the post-1962 white-blacknationalist clashes
in the courts. the removal of Winston Field (the first Rhodesian Front prime
minister). the interminable negotiations with the British Government to find a
constitutional path to independence.Again,however, it is submitted that this
activity (where it was not a conscious tactical exercise to eliminate the uncom-
mitted. or to fool the British Government), was more a matter of the whites
coming to terms with the contradictions of their own deeply emotional decision.
Rebellion involved several changes in their image of themselves (which
federation had in any case confused), though not of the essentials of their value
structure.
First,they had to return to the overt image of themselves as racially
superior.though many of them had never come to terms with ‘partnership’and
this was a minor problem.Second,and perhaps most difficult.was their need to
accept that the white ‘patricians’-the wealthy and the professional leaders of
the United Federal Party who had guided them since at least 1923-were
dispensable and must be displaced.The establishment’smistake had been to pay
more than lip-serviceto the subtle racial slogan ‘advancementon merit’,when
their voters had an old-established ‘gut feeling’ that ‘white is right’. The
Rhodesian Front cabinet was (see above) described derisively by some of its
critics as a group of ‘cowboys’.Yet that is exactly where its attraction for the
white electorate lies. They speak (preferably in a few nineteenth-centuryphrases
pronounced in ‘thatvowel-pinched accent’), the same language,political and
colloquial,as their supporters.
EMOTIONAL CONDITIONING FOR REBELLION
In their sentimentality for British Royalty,especially its most Victorian image,

Rhodesians are without equal.This helps to explain the rebels’insistence, for
five years that they remained loyal.A n interesting aspect of their treason was
the way in which the term ‘UDI’ (to describe the impending rebellion) was
broadcast,printed,discussed and re-discusseduntil it became literally a house-
hold word, and no longer a description for a dubious activity. Perhaps the
greatest tribute to Rhodesian Front psychological conditioning is to be found in
the virtually world-wideacceptanceof the description ‘Unilateral’(asopposed to
‘Illegal’)Declaration of Independence,even by those who formally regard its
illegality asunquestionable.(See,forahumerous but accurate description ofwhite
rebel society,Punch, 17 November 1970.)
B R I T A I N ’ SN O N - A S S E R T I O NO F L E G A L A U T H O R I T Y
The build-up to rebellion provided several classical examples of that self-

deception which makes possible for white Rhodesians what seems extraordinary
shortsightednessto others.One of these was the 1964 UD1 referendum amongst
whites, in which the Rhodesian Front sought support for independence, but
promised not to treat a ‘Yes’decision as a mandate for illegal action.In fact it
Rhodesia 85
declared independence almost exactly one year later with, significantly,no real
protest from the minority.
O n 3 November 1965,Jan Smith apparently tricked the Rhodesian gover-
nor into signing a document declaring an emergency.After holding it for two
days he gazetted it, and restricted or detained a number of African nationalist
politicians and one white (one of their legal advisers Leo Baron).
Litigation was to continue thereafter,but since that date Rhodesia has been
governed under Emergency Regulations,additional to those existing in the Law
and Order (Maintenance) Act,and the relevance of courts was reduced even
further.
The declaration of independence on 1 1 November 1965 was described by
Ian Smith as ‘an opportunity to strike a blow for the preservation of justice,
civilization and Christianity’.Brigadier Skeen,speaking as the Rhodesian Front
appointed high commissioner in London shortly before the rebellion, gave a
clearer indication of their objectives and their determination
, .to control the rate of African political advancement to power till time and education
,
have made it a safe possibility. Moreover we wished to have the power to retard it. should
that advancement outstrip the capability of the African to govern wisely and fairly. We
could not say five, ten. fifty or even ;i thousand years. It could not be forced, it had to
develop in accordance with the character and nature of the African and his hitherto
unproved qualities of democratic behaviour.
For these reasons the 1961 constitution lost its place as the basis of government.
Its displacement was sudden and clear,but the response of the legal sovereign
(Britain)was complex,highly sophisticated and physically non-existent.Conse-
quently opposition to this effort to achieve the permanent re-establishmentof
the Rhodesian way of life was minimal. Jn particular the fact of the British
Labour government’s advance public notice to Smith that the rebellion would
not be suppressed by force seemed to clear yet another potentially active
participant and opponent (Britain)from the combat zone.
C O N F R O N T A T I O N CLARIFIED
The importance of this opting out of the never present but legal sovereign has
been to maintain the relevant simplicity and clarity,internationally speaking.of
the confrontation.Apart from the overt military and economic support of South
Africa and (untilrecently) Portugal; the indirect commercial support of some
sectors of international business ; and occasional,but important,lapses such as
the breach of sanctions which permitted chrome exports from Rhodesia to the
United States under the Byrd Amendment, the conflict has been isolated to the
real contestants :the African majority and the white minority.
Sanctions have not defeated the illegal authorities,but they have proved
that to seek to establish a new sovereign State in the mid-twentieth century
based on the practices and ideas of racial supremacy will not be accepted by the
world community.That truth,where it has sunk in,has proved to be a new and
bitter one for many Rhodesian whites, and its lessons are of wider significance.
This is provided that the international community’scommitments to interna-
tional economic sanctions are seen for the muted and limited experiment with
enforcement machinery.
T H E 'KITH A N D KIN' S E T T L E M E N T S , 1966-71
Significant non-events,in terms of the basic problem of Rhodesia, are the

attempts by various British governments to reach a 'settlement' on Rhodesia
exclusively with the rebels. They may be seen as a resurgence of the British
habit of trusting the good faith and basic decency of the minority-despite
seventy years of settler rule,and the rebellion! In this sense they increased the
resolve of the military wings of the liberation movements to ignore British
involvement as an irrelevancy. Perhaps their greatest importance lies in the
criticism they evoked outside of the British context in the United Nations,
and especially in Africa, renewing international consciousness and awareness of
the continuing problem.Together with the Rhodesian Front's constant exten-
sion of authoritarian government,such as its determination in 1968 to execute
captured guerrilla fighters,it helped -to escalate mandatory sanctions to the
status of virtual universality.One of these efforts,however (the last to date in
1971), can be singled out as a separate landmark.
W A R A N D PEARCE
If Africans,as argued above,had decided in 1961 not to tolerate any further

Anglo-Rhodesian efforts made without consulting them, it took a further ten
years of resistance,and restrained but determined demonstration,to prove this
was a reality to Britain. It is possible that this truth has even begun to dawn
upon the minority government.
The agreement and constitution proposed by Ian Smith and Sir Alec
Douglas-Home.British Foreign Secretary, in 1971, after discussions between
Smith and the British negotiator Lord Goodman (see Appendix 2) involved the
same basic ideas as the 1961 constitution: (a) the initial retention of exclusive
power in the hands of the white minority;(b) the 'review' (not removal) of the
extraordinary stock of security and discriminatory laws; (c) a virtual guarantee
that (if matters ever developed so far and power was handed over to the
majority) whites would always enjoy, at least,disproportionate political repre-
sentation in the legislature.Furthermore,given the economic and social posi-
tion they have created for themselves, combined with the protection of the
established rights which the Declaration of Rights would give against future
(but not existing or past) governments acts, which might selectively (because
they are exclusively white) reduce these privileges,whites could look forward to
permanent constitutionally protected privileges.
More significantly,it was a product of the thesis that a new order for the
territory can be created for the people,and not by the people or their represen-
tatives.
Rhodesian negotiations with Britain,in spite of rebellion, should be seen
against a background of continuing sanctions and international pressures.
Successful negotiation would achieve their 'first prize'-recognized independence.
The exercise of the Pearce Commission involved no less than a total
reversal of several basic tenets of Rhodesian Front policy both before and after
UDI,including the fundamental one that sovereignty had been taken in 1965,
and Britain had no further place within Rhodesia's boundaries. The Pearce
Rhodesia 87
Commission was instructed to discover,by an unusual process of meetings and

consultations, whether ‘the Rhodesian people as a whole’ (including, for the
first time, the whole African population and not only an educationally or
economically qualified fraction of it) accepted the settlement proposed. Apart
from being a new exercise for Britain (though it must be remembered that the
African masses were asked in 1961 by their own nationalist leaders whom
generations of Rhodesians had declared non-representative and thugs) the
Pearce Commission also created an historical oddity in the political life of the
country.It brought African political, as opposed to military, activity back to
the surface.The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act had (as Palley has shown in
her articles in Race) been almost totally successful in supressing normal political
activity, including discussion among Africans. Politics between the races had
been reduced to sporadic, unspectacular and largely unsuccessful African
guerrilla incursions and counter-insurgencyoperations between 1966 and 1971.
This had created a vacuum,conveniently filled by the Internal Affairs Depart-
ment and the chiefs,which dutifully convinced whites and anyone else who would
listen that Africans were happy,and would be delighted with minority rule for
ever. During the Pearce exercise,political meetings were allowed,people could
talk politics-albeit still cautiously-and they were encouraged to do the
impossible,to openly criticize the white proposals.‘Open’politics have continued
to grow.
None of the security laws, however, were suspended, prosecutions
proceeded, and detentions and restrictions reappeared as the instruments of
white-blackpolitics. But the new nationalists in the African National Council
(ANC)(see Appendix 3) took the opportunity despite having learnt that the risks
(many were ex-detainees)of political opposition were,with obvious differences,
akin to those of military opposition.Not only did they articulate a resounding
‘No’to the proposals,they re-opened a new front in the struggle by lifting the
morale of the majority to great heights, from the depths of a period of depres-
sion. They offered the prospect of continued and open defiance of the degrada-
tion ofminority rule to almost the whole African population not only by war in
remote areas, but by daily peaceful confrontation in the urban areas. Like
other nationalist organizations, the ANC is banned from the Tribal Trust land.
At the same time (indeed the coincidence led to allegations of ANC collusion) a
renewed military onslaught took place by ZANLA,the military wing of ZANU,
shocking the minority,as it swept guerrilla war into the north-east province of
Rhodesia.
This escalation from sporadic to concerted guerrilla war, based upon the
ideal ofa people’s war,marks the most dramatic fruition to date of the African
decision in 1961 to find their own solution to colonialism.Its basis appears from
the policies of ZANU,ZAPU and FROLIZI (see Appendixes 4,5 and 6) and
its development is well described in Wilkinson’s study and the other material
referred to in the bibliography.
The full circle

In spite of white Rhodesian inability or unwillingness to appreciate the real
dangers inherent in a full scale racial confrontation,by the end of 1974 their
neighbours,black and white,were determined,for various reasons to ensure that

change should be brought about by less violent means.The leaders of Botswana,
Mozambique,Tanzania and Zambia were concerned to avoid the human and
economic dislocation of a prolonged conflict.They were also aware (in the light
of recent experiences in Angola) that the transfer of power might be delayed by
disunity within the African majority,and were impressed by the apparent unity
of the African majority expressed through the ANC,within the country.South
Africa expressed equal horror at the possibility of intensified conflict,and must
have been additionally aware that the achievement of majority rule by a military
victory over a settler government by means of an African armed revolution,
would create special problems for itself.The combination produced a series of
historic events in December 1974. Smith, clearly influenced by South Africa,
released the detained ZANU and ZAPU leaders,and permitted the president of
the ANC to travel with them to Lusaka. There talks with leaders of adjacent
African States resulted in an agreement to unify the four existing nationalist
parties (ANC, FROLIZI,ZANU and ZAPU)into a single,new African National
Council. Its basic policy was clearly outlined by its president,Abel Muzorewa,
at the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in April 1975.
Committed,without reservation to the achievement of (the) principle (of immediate self-

determination on the basis of majority rule), the A.N.C. . . . has dedicated itself to make
every effort to attain its end by peaceful negotiation. In doing so the A.N.C. is equally
committed,aware and conscious that failure to achieve self-determinationby negotiation
inevitably involves a re-intensifiedarmed struggle as the only alternative.
Detente Fe insisted]must be understood as the sole alternative to a prolonged armed
struggle.It has been brought about by the emergence of the increasingly effective military
struggle for liberation.
Thus the essence of these developments in the African majority’s attempt to

achieve power is a realization that unity is vital to the task,and though peaceful
negotiation is desired it is realized that continued readinessfor armed confronta-
tion is essential.
White skill,experience and ruthlessness in managing the majority cannot,
however,be overcome by declarations.The division and disorganization of the
African majority and their leaders has been and continues to be the basic
instrument of minority government.Its capability for attempted exploitation of
disunity at this stage may be exampled by the assassination of Herbert Chitepo
and the allegations that Rev. Sithole had plotted to assassinate his ANC
colleagues. Rumour, lies and half-truths,combined with the other ruthless
methods of a police state are likely to remain a prime weapon for the
maintenance of white rule and privilege.
The situation has now been reached where, for the first time since
Lobengula’s reign, a white authority recognizes (no matter how reluctantly,
hesitantly and in bad faith one may suspectit is) that negotiations for the future
must be with Africans,and agreementsmust be made with Africans.Equally,and
clearly connected,is the factthat (againfor the first time since 1896-97) the same
whites have been forced to realize the military threat of the majority.
9 The liberation
struggle
Political violence is mistakenly thought by many to be a recent phenomenon in

Rhodesia. As we have seen it has always been the basis of white domination.
The minority always resisted seeking the legitimizationof their rule by either the
electoral consent of the majority or the integration of the majority into their
system.The period of ‘pacification’,after the Ndebele and Shona resistance of
the 1890s had been crushed,depended essentially on the fact that for various
reasons the majority sought to come to terms with white rule.The end of that
period came in 1961. and gradually political violence has grown, and has
become more clear in its objectives.
This phase may more properly be regarded as appropriate to a study of
‘Zimbabwe’than ‘Rhodesia’.
A general point which may be made is that political nationalist armed
resistance,in common with non-violentnationalist politics has had to face the
particularly intractable problem in opposing ‘Rhodesia’of finding its real
enemy and clarifying its real aim. It is understandable that in Rhodesia the
rebellious settler system is the oppressor,and the task is to assist or persuade
the imperial power,Britain,to control and re-establisha path to freedom.Thus
both nationalist politics and political violence (and as Mlambo’s book shows
there was a great deal of political rioting in the days when African nationalist
parties were operating at a ‘political’level in the early 1960s) was and still is
aimed at achieving change by British intervention. O n practical grounds this
assumes that in spite of her surrender of military control to the whites in 1923
Britain is capable of physical control in Rhodesia. Until 1965 Britain pointed
out that the ‘legitimacy’of Rhodesia and its post-1923 self-governmentwould
make intervention ‘unconventional’in the British constitutional sense.
In 1965 Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front destroyed ‘legitimacy’,and
provided the perfect scenario for an end to minority rule,in ‘thenicest possible
way’,that is the resumption of physical control by Britain. Until the rebellion,
legitimacy and ‘normality’had been the settlers’ greatest asset, hence the
frustrated furore of the Rhodesian economic-patricianestablishment at Smith’s
blunder.
W h y did Britain not intervene? Among other explanations, the most
charitable is that Britain was thus providing a period of time to enable whites to
grasp the realities of a changed world. Once Rhodesian whites realized their
isolation,reforms would follow and black aspirations satisfied with a minimum
of dislocation. Peaceful change through the newly created United Nations
machinery would claim its first victory and Britain the credit for employing it to
solve her most difficult African colonial problem.The rebirth of open national-
ist politics in Rhodesia in the continued post-Pearce activity of the African
National Council should be seen within this framework. Racial confrontation
would give way to negotiations. compromise and a liberal consensus society.
This pattern. if it were successful, would in many ways repeat the British
decolonization of its two white minority territories,Kenya and Zambia. The
assumption is that in the final analysis Rhodesian settler colonialism is no
different,and that whites can be made to believe that without power their lives,
Little has happened to suggest
their privileges will still be essentially ‘Rhodesian’.
that this is possible or that Leys’ 1959 analysis of the situation (‘a solution of
the country’smajor problems is fundamentally impossible within the system.To
solve them is to change it’), is no longer correct. The chances of this type of
negotiated settlement were reduced by the type of white government Ian Smith
represents.It is not the liberal patrician government of earlier times, but a white
populist government gaining much of its support from the white artisans and
lower middle class. It is they who fear most an arrangement which they feel
would ‘sellout’their interest in an artificially high status and standard of living.
The situation could however be analysed differently : that the conflict of the
1970s was a continuation of a war against conquest and that therefore British
responses were irrelevant since the legitimacy of both settler rule and British
colonial rule were rejected. This analysis led ZANU to reject the concept of
‘Britishresponsibility’or the restricted aim of ending racial discrimination. The
goal then becomes national liberation. Inherent in this approach is the idea
that ‘Zimbabwe’can only be achieved by a people’s war, resulting in a total
collapse of the existing system,and of the political doctrine which is seen as a
part of it.
The policy of the other major nationalist group ZAPU was similar in its
analysis regarding revolution as ‘not only inevitable but necessary’ to the
achievement of socialism in the future Zimbabwe.Likewise the aims and objects
of FROLIZI referred to the establishment of a ‘people’sarmy’,‘to overthrow
British colonial capitalism’ and the establishment of ‘an independent socialist
economy’.
10 The liberation
campaigns
1966-74
Nationalist political violence commenced as early as 1961 and was directed as

much, if not more, against blacks identified with the settler system as whites
themselves,often taking the form of petrol bomb attacks. Obvious targets were
African police reserve volunteers and African members of parliament. The
Rhodesian Front’sextension of the law and order legislation in 1962 was largely
justified as intended to stem this violence. After the establishment of ZANU,
considerableviolence occurred between it and ZAPU in 1963.In 1964 plans for
establishing ‘fightingzones’were laid by both parties,and a period of contest
between the nationalists and the Rhodesian Special Branch developed. In the
same year the ZANU ‘Crocodile Commando’ attacked the police camp at
Nyanyadzi. and made a road-block attack. killing a white farmer. ZANU
groups,trained mainly in Ghana,attempted without success to infiltrate during
1965. ZAPU groups suffered much the same fate, generally being arrested
shortly after entering the country.The years 1964 and 1965 show how vital in
the suppression of this activity was the role of the new laws. There were 6,754
convictions under the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act during this period.
The idea that either white morale would be broken by these disturbances, or
that Britain would intervene proved to be unfounded.
The illegal declaration of independence was well prepared for in security
terms, and little organized response occurred. Tactics following the rebellion
appear to have been based upon Britain’s confusing indication that it would
only ‘intervene militarily’ if ‘law and order’ broke down in Rhodesia. This
concentrated upon demonstrative action more likely to be news-worthy than to
seriously involve the local population against the régime. Recruitment and
infiltration continued,however,and some attacks achieved considerable publici-
ty.Amongst these was the killing of another white farmer and his wife in the
Hartley district in May 1966. In August 1967 ZAPU and the South African
National Congress (SAANC) announced a military alliance,and later that year
a series of heavy engagements occurred between ANC-ZAPUgroups and Rho-
desian forces.One consequence of these was South African paramilitary rein-
forcement for Smith. which has been a significant contribution not only in
military terms but also in the boost it provided to white morale.
Throughout 1968 sporadic fighting and infiltration continued at a level

which clearly worried the minority government,but it was contained. Ambi-
tious claims on behalf of the liberation forces were frequently proved to be no
more than claims. But security action tended to produce a remarkable confi-
dence among the whites,and no noticeable optimism among Africans. This was
despite the obvious and novel development-that civil war was open,and that
whites and blacks in the security forces were being killed,including a noticeable
number ofSouth Africans.
The year of the new Smith constitution (1969) saw no insurgent conflict.
During 1970,a severe crisis of leadership interrupted ZAPU’sactivities, which
had opened in January with a successful attack on a South African Police camp.
Nevertheless infiltration continued; as was later shown.especially in the north-
eastern border areas,the involvement and integration of the rural people had
become a continuous process.
Smith’snew republic and the reassertion of basic racialist government no
doubt helped to keep African dissatisfaction alive. but the events of 1971 saw a
stimulation of African political morale from an unusual source.A mistake by
Ian Smith,combined with a British initiative,produced a revival of activity and
a readiness to stand up and be counted amongst Africans which might other-
wise have been delayed for some years.
The Pearce Commission’s ‘Test of Acceptability’ was at first much criti-
cised by African nationalists.In part this was an objection on principle to the
idea of an alien constitution,created without African participation and consid-
ered as a possible basis for settlement by Britain. In part it was a reflection of
well-founded distrust of the British and the Rhodesians. compounded by the
fact that the chairman of the commission,Lord Pearce,had been a member of
the Privy Council which had heard the case of Daniel Madzimbamuto against
the Rhodesian Government,brought essentially to test the constitutionality of
the rebel régime.The court had found the rebels to be illegal.Lord Pearce had
taken an opposite view and dissented from the majority. (His status as
something of a hero among Rhodesians was rapidly terminated by his later
judgement that the settlement was unacceptable to Africans.) The commission’s
task was historic since only African leaders had previously consulted African
opinion. Its finding is less so, though a sovereign minority-ruled Rhodesia,
recognized by the major Western States (which an ‘acceptable’settlement may
have achieved), would be a militarily and economically stronger opponent than
the present régime.
The exercise did, however, recharge African political enthusiasm, and
morale was boosted by this but unexpected political victory.The year 1972 thus
marked a turning point in morale and was subsequently seen as the start of a
new guerilla offensive.ZAPU introduced the widespread use of land-mines in
1973 rather than indulge in confrontational battles,causing a nuinber of casual-
ties to military and civilian personnel and inhibiting movement considerably.
Meanwhile,operating in co-operationwith FRELIMO in Mozambique,ZANU
succeeded in establishing bases of operation deep inside the north-eastprovince.
In December 1972 a series of hit-and-runraids were aimed particularly at
unpopular local white farmers.These attacks have caused widespread alarm and
have led to counteraction by the authorities more severe than any since 1897.
Rhodesia 93
Attacks have also been directed against government agents.district commission-

ers. land inspectors (one of whom was taken prisoner of war and released in
Dar es Salaam much later), headmen and their messengers. The Front for the
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) likewise organized raids into Rhodesia,
causing casualties and penetrating right into Salisbury.Urban action has not,
however,been undertaken.
The régime has responded to these attacks by attempting to isolate the
local population from the guerrillas. Emphasis has, however,been on negative
measures, such as the imposition of communal punishment of local communi-
ties ‘suspected’of not reporting guerrillas.This has taken the form of fines and
cattle seizures.In addition some areas have been totally isolated in a massive
attempt to create greater terror of official reprisals among a population whites
believe are motivated primarily by fear of heavily armed guerillas. Thus chur-
ches,schools and businesses in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust were forced to close.
People were interrogated and resettled in other areas. ‘Protected villages’,
photographs of which show buildings resembling the concentration camps the
liberation movements claim they are,have been hastily built and people settled
in them.The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act has provided its contribution
in the form of an amendment making the ‘harbouring,assisting or failing to
report the presence’ofguerrillas an offence,punishable by death.
Attempts to reform the system or to abolish inequality are nowhere in
evidence.In the meanwhile the civil war has reached significant proportions in
terms of killing,the numbers since December 1973 being in the region of 300.
The majority are guerrillas, the other main casualties being African civilians,
white and black security forces and white civilians.in that order.
O n the one hand the régime has not yet made real concessionsas a result of
these actions.O n the other an air of insecurity and unaccustomed nervousness
has apparently crept into the régime’sbehaviour.
Though Smith’sconstant restriction and detention of Bishop Muzorewa’s
officialsin the ANC suggests he lacks any real intention to change.nevertheless
his talking,even if only to buy time,is a contradiction of the basic tenets of
Rhodesian Front thinking and would seem to indicate that the fighting has at
least posed some dilemmas for the white population.
More significant are Smith’smiscalculations,for example the closing of the
border with Zambia in January 1973 to force that country to prevent guerrillas
operating from its territory. Zambia, despite further cost and inconvenience
(and next to the Africans of Rhodesia the illegal rebellion has cost Zambia more
than any other State), refused either to promise to curb the insurgent operations
or,when Smith climbed down,to re-openthe border.
The military conflict in Rhodesia has been quite extensively written on.A
very full account of the scale of early stages,up to late 1973,is to be found in
Kees Maxey’s The Figlit for Zinibab\i.e.‘ Mlambo in Struggle for a Birthright
provides a particularly useful account and explanation of the skirmishes before
1966. including the internal problems of the nationalist movements, as does
Shamuyarira in his Crisis in Rhodesia.Wilkinson’sInsurgency in Rhodesia 1957-73
is a very thorough and concise account and assessment.Ndabaningi Sithole’s
1. A self-publicationavailable from 48 St Thomas’ Road. Brentwood, Essex (United Kingdom).

1968 edition of African Nationalism sets out a complete political explanation of

the movement, including the use of force. Issues of the ZAPU and ZANU
information offices, Zimbabwe Review and Zimbabwe News, and the parties’
programmes, set out their objectives and activities from time to time. The
settlers’ attitudes and explanations are well documented especially in various
publications of the Rhodesian Ministry of Information. Like most such works
they tend to emphasize the horrors of the war4xclusively those caused by
guerrillas-and assume the reasons for the conflict are ‘communism’and intimi-
dation of the majority by a few hooligans;they dismiss or do not consider the
possibility of discontent with the system.Other studies of this sort include Shay
and Vermaak‘s The Silent War; A. J. A. Pecks Rhodesia Accuses and
Michael Morris’s Terrorism :Southern Africa.
11 Sanctions
The mandatory economic sanctions imposed by the Security Council, at the

invitation of the United Kingdom, were a part of a long political process
concerning the relationship between Europe, especially Western Europe, and
Africa. Until the emergence of independent States in most of Africa the Rhode-
sian problem was not seen as being unique but as part of a wider colonial
problem which included such future States as Ghana. Joshua Nkomo in 1958
was an active member of the All-AfricanPeoples’ Movement, and was indeed
engaged in internationalizing the problem when the African National Congress
was banned in 1959.
These early efforts aroused considerableoutside interest in the African case
in Rhodesia,making the later process of organizing international opinion much
easier.
In the United Nations, Chapter XI of the Charter was interpreted as
empowering the General Assembly to supervise and to criticize colonial admi-
nistering powers. Rhodesia was a matter of United Nations concern long before
the white rebellion.Britain’smain concern had been to emphasize the fact of
established self-government in Southern Rhodesia ‘toshow her own lack of
authority and consequently to explain that her inability to improve the situation
reduced her responsibility for the people and for the territory. The issue was one
of considerable controversy in British politics, and indeed British (Conservative
government) policy in the United Nations led to the resignation of Sir Hugh Foot
(later Lord Caradon) as the British permanent representative.
Awareness of the problem at the United Nations was therefore consider-
able by the time Smith made his illegal bid for independence. Britain has
insisted that independence could be granted to the minority on the basis of the
‘five principles’agreed between the Conservative government and the Rhode-
sians,namely :
1. Unimpeded progress to majority rule.
2. Guarantees against retrogressive amendment of the constitution.
3. A n immediate improvement in the political status of the African population.
4.Progress towards ending racial discrimination.
5. Britain’s need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
The seizure of independence and the continuity of policy guaranteed by the

Rhodesian Front clearly breached all of these principles. Yet it must be remem-
bered that the purpose of the sanctions policy,as enunciated and practised by
Britain (and endorsed by most members of the United Nations) was to do what
Britain had failed to do during over seventy years of imperial control-to
persuade Rhodesians to transfer power to Africans by a peaceful reformist
process.Britain’sabjuration of the use of force against Smith was not restricted
to the positive interventionof British armies.It included the negative protection
against ‘international’force by the use of the veto which Britain possessed at the
Security Council.That specific power to veto the use of United Nations force has
in fact been used by Britain on Rhodesia’s behalf on a number of occasions.
Sanctions were imposed in the hope that enough white people would rally
behind a ‘liberal’or ‘moderate’leader,who would then negotiate a settlement
providing for unimpeded progress towards majority rule. In terms of white
Rhodesian realities the emergence of this moderation was unlikely and has not
happened to date. In fact elections held since UD1 have confirmed white
support for the policies of the Rhodesian Front. Sanctions in any case never
came near to being total.
In November 1965 Britain itself imposed a total economic break with the
Rhodesians, but sought no more than a recommendation from the United
Nations that Member States do likewise-as many did (Security Council resolu-
tions 216 and 217, 1965). Only in December 1966, over a year later, were
mandatory sanctions imposed, and then only on selected products, the most
important of which was oil. In April 1966 it appeared that oil was getting
through to the Umtali refinery via the Mozambique port of Beira, so creating
a situation constituting a ‘threatto peace’ (Security Council resolution 221,
1966). In December 1966 after Ian Smith had rejected Britain’sproposed settle-
ment,Britain sought and obtained the authority to use force on the high seas to
prevent the delivery of oil to Beira where such delivery was suspected to be in
breach of sanctions.A minor landmark in international peace-keepingby the
United Nations was made, though the effect was minimal on Rhodesia
(Security Council resolution 232, 1966). Adequate supplies of oil were by then
coming into Rhodesia via Lourenço Marques in Mozambique, and South
African ports,in respect of which no such authority to police sanctions breaches
was sought or given.The mandatory sanctionscovered most Rhodesian exports,
which United Nations Member States were required not to import.
A report of the ‘SpecialCommittee on the Situation with Regard to the
Implementationof the Declaration on the granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (A/9623,Part v)describes how sanctions were evaded :
Since 1965,foreign economic interests have provided the illegal régime with the mechanism
to evade United Nations sanctions.First,through their interlocking interests.companies in
Europe and the United States can invest in Southern Rhodesia through their subsidiaries in
South Africa. Since South Africa co-operateswith Southern Rhodesia in many ways, it is
difficult to detect foreign investments channelled through South Africa. Through this
complex process,Southern Rhodesia has been able to evade United Nations sanctions.
Second, the prevalence of foreign economic interests in the economy of Southern
Rhodesia enables the illegal régime to pass to the companies the burden of sustaining the
economy and employment levels. Through a series of actions taken under the Emergency
Rhodesia 97
Powers Regulations (1969). the illegal régime has been able to insist that profits,except for
certain South African subsidiaries, cannot be repatriated. This has compelled foreign
companies to reinvest their profits in Southern Rhodesia.Furthermore,the companies are
not allowed to dismiss employees without the permission of the Minister of Labour, thus
enabling employees, especially Europeans, to continue to be employed by the foreign
companies even if they are not making any contribution to the productive process of the
company. Through a process of preventing their unemployment, the illegal régime has
therefore been able to shield the European population from feeling the burden of sanctions.
Although such compulsory employment should reduce the profits of the companies, the
companies have minimized the loss of profit by dismissing African employees and by
refusing to increase the salaries of working Africans.
In 1973 the illegal régime turned to foreign economic interests to increase public
revenue. In order to avoid alienating the Europeans by increasing income and property
taxes, a non-resident shareholders tax at the rate of 15 per cent on taxable profits was
imposed on subsidiary companies in Southern Rhodesia. The régime expected to raise
$(R)6.5 million in revenue from this tax in 1975.
In May 1968,soon after the British Privy Council had confirmed the continued
existence of Britain’slegal authority in the territory,Ian Smith demonstrated his
sovereignty and power. He threatened his own judges, through his Attorney-
General,and warned them that their acceptance of the Privy Council judgement
would be ignored.Accordingly, despite the fact that royal pardons had been
granted to certain Africans sentenced to death, and despite the legal pretence
that Rhodesia (and her judges) were still loyal to the Crown,the appeal based
on the pardons was refused.Following this Ian Smith asserted his authority and
executed five Africans,sentenced after the rebellion.The gesture angered United
Nations members and occasioned Security Council resolution 253 of 1968 which
imposed comprehensive mandatory sanctions,requiring United Nations Mem-
ber States to cease importing any goods from Rhodesia.The attempt to intro-
duce force against the régime was pressed by African States but successfully
resisted by Britain.
Thus it took two and a half years for a blanket prohibition upon trade with
Rhodesia to be introduced.
The impositions of sanctions did create severe difficulties for Rhodesia,
borne as we have seen,primarily by Africans,but sufficient to reduce the profits
of ‘legitimate’Rhodesian traders severely while creating new profiteers. The
argument is sometimes heard that sanctions have thus harmed those they were
meant to help. Nationalist leaders have all made it clear that they regard sanc-
tions as a small price to pay for hastening majority rule.Though living standards
in Rhodesia have in fact been maintained since 1965-average earnings having
risen for Africans from $(R)246 to $(R)359 and for Europeans from $(R)2,576
to $(R)3,901 (1973)-real growth has been stunted compared with neighbouring
States.This is clearly illustrated by T.Curtin in his analysis of the economy in
his South of the Sahara (Europa Publications, 1975,p. 662) from which the
following figures are taken :
Comparative growth (1964/65= 100).
E.xports (1973) School enrolments (all races, 1971)

Rhodesia 110 Rhodesia 105
Kenya 264 Kenya 159
Malawi 252 Malawi 111
Tanzania 156 Zambia 300
Zambia 148
Manilfartiiring production (1973) Education budget (1971)(1968: 100)

Rhodesia 166 Rhodesia 142
Kenya 175 Kenya 207
Zambia 184 Zambia 168
Manilfacturing enzploynzent (1971)

Rhodesia 149
Kenya 175
Malawi 400
Perhaps the most important effect of sanctions has been to deny to the
Southern Rhodesian minority the claims of legitimacy.Not a single State has
recognized the illegal régime.
Appendixes
1 The 1961
constitution
The Legislative Assembly

A Legislative Assembly consisting of sixty-fivemembers, of whom fifty-onewere European,
thirteen African and one Asian.The whole of Rhodesia was divided into fifty constituencies
and also into fifteen electoral districts,each of which elected one member to the Assembly.
The franchise
All persons 21 years of age and over were eligible for the vote.T w o registers were compiled
for each constituency and electoral district, namely an ‘A’roll and a ‘B’roll. The
qualifications for these rolls were as follows:
‘ A ’R O L L
i. Income of at least E795 for each of the two previous years, or ownership of immovable
property worth not less than El ,650;or
3. A Standard VI education and either (a) an income of a least E528 for each of the two
previous years or (b) ownership of immovable property worth not less than E1,000;or
3. A Form IV education and either (a) an income of not less than E330 for each of the two
previous years or (b)ownership of immovable property worth not less than E550;or
4.Appointment to the office of Chief or Headman.
‘B’R O L L
1. Income at the rate of not less than E264 per annum (E22 per month) during the six
months prior to enrolment or ownership of immovable property worth not less than
E495;or
2. A Form II education and either (a) an income at the rate of not less than E132 per
annum (Ell per month) during the six months prior to enrolment or (b) ownership of
immovable property worth at least E275.
Persons over the age of 30 were also eligible for registration on the ‘B’roll,subject to the
following qualifications:
i. A Standard VI education and either (a) an income at the rate of at least E132 per annum
(El 1 per month) during the six months prior to enrolment;or (b)ownership of immov-
able property worth not less than E275 ; or
2. A n income at the rate of E198 per annum (E16 10s.Od.per month) during the six months
prior to enrolment or ownership of property worth at least E385.
All kraal heads with followings of twenty or more heads of families,and ministers of
religion who could not fulfil the above qualifications were automatically entitled to enrol-
ment on the ‘B’roll.
Each voter had two votes, one in his constituency and one in an electoral district.
Under a system of cross-votingthe total number of ‘B’roll votes cast in any constituency
could not exceed 25 per cent of the ‘A’ roll votes in that constituency.By means of a special
formula,‘B’roll votes could be devalued to maintain the 25 per cent limit.
Similarly,in the electoral districts,‘A’ roll votes could not exceed 25 per cent of the ‘B’
roll votes.
The purpose of this system was to ensure that ‘A’roll voters dominate the fifty
constituencies and ‘B’ roll voters dominate the fifteen electoral districts.
The Declaration of Rights

The Declaration of Rights,embodied in the constitution,prescribed the fundamental rights
and freedomsto be enjoyed by the people of Southern Rhodesia. Several rights are limited
by various saving clauses,especially the following:
1. The Declaration did not apply to laws in force before I November 1962.
2. The provision that ‘no written law shall contain any documentary provision’ which
prejudices ‘personsof a particular description by race,tribe,colour or creed’is qualified
by reference to ‘special circumstances appertaining to persons of that or any other
description’, ‘the stage of social or economic development reached by the various
persons affected’and ‘thestate for the time being of the economy of Southern Rhode-
sia’.
3. The Declaration could be overridden on grounds of public safety, interest or order,
morality or health.
4.Laws applied during a state of emergency could not be held to be inconsistent with the
Declaration.
The Constitutional Council

A Constitutional Council consisting of eleven members elected by an electoral college and a
chairman appointed by the Governor to examine Bills before the Legislative Assembly and
report whether any proposed legislation would be inconsistent with the Declaration of
Rights. Draft regulations under Acts of parliament were also subject to scrutiny of the
council.It also had the right to recommend changes to existing laws.
All these functions were advisory and recommendations could be overruled by the
Legislative Assembly.
2 1971 settlement
proposals
The 1971 settlement proposals involved:

1. Retaining the 1969 constitution.
2. Appointing a commission to make recommendations regarding discriminatory iegisla-
tion and a Declaration of Rights whose terms could be enforced in law.However,under
the proposals,attempts to remove racial discrimination were to be subject to veto if the
government considered that there were ‘overridingconsiderations’,and the Declaration
of Rights (already subject to numerous exceptions and provisos) could be rendered
largely ineffectual simply by the suspension of rights after the declaration of a state of
emergency.
3. The possibility of eventual political parity.
4.Making the amendment of the constitution subject to:
(a) a two-thirdsmajority of all the members of the House of Assembly and the Senate,
voting separately,and
(b) the affirmative votes of a majority of the white representatives and a majority of the
black representativesin the House of Assembly.
While being intended to guard against possible future retrogressive measures, these
procedures could also be used to block progressive legislation.
Palley suggests that, under these proposals, majority rule would not be attained until the
year 2053 at the earliest.
3 Rhodesian Front
Principles
1. The Party affirms its loyalty to the Independent Country of Rhodesia.
2. The Party views the National Flag as the only and exclusive symbol of our Independent
Rhodesian Nation.
3. The Party will ensure that the Government of Rhodesia remains permanently in
responsible hands.
4.English will remain the official language of the Country.
5. The Party will preserve a strong and prosperous State based upon the fundamental
principles which affect a sound society,including :
(i) recognition of the family as the basis of society;
(ii) the right of all individuals,within the framework of the law,to private ownership,
freedom of worship,freedom of speech.freedom of association and opportunity to
develop their abilities to the full and to receive reward and recognition entirely on
merit;
(iii) total opposition to Communism and Communistic Ideologies.
6.The Party will ensure the permanent establishment of the European in Rhodesia and to
this end will encourage to the utmost European immigration.
7. The Party will uphold the principle of the Land Tenure Act.
8. The Party will uphold the principle of the preservation of the Tribal Trust lands and
will promote their development.
9.The Party opposes compulsory integration and believes that the peaceful Co-existence
of people can only be achieved when communities have the right and opportunity to
preserve their own identities, traditions and customs, and therefore recognises the
obligation of Government and respective communities where necessary to ensure the
provision of such separate facilities as will make this possible.
10.The Party will ensure that law and order are maintained.
11. The Party will promote the full economic development of Rhodesia and to this end will
seek the co-operationof all her people.
12. The Party will encourage and stimulate private enterprise,subject to the right of the
State to intervene when necessary in the interests of the Country.
13. The Party will strive to create conditions in which all inhabitants of Rhodesia may
attain reasonable standards of housing,health,social services and employment.
14.The Party will ensure the Government honours its obligations in the payment of
pensions.
Rhodesia 105
15. The Party will protect the standards of skilled workers against exploitation by cheap
labour.
16. The Party recognises the desirability of consultation and co-operationwith other States
in the solution of c o m m o n problems.
Rhodesian Front Headquarters,

Salisbury.
23 October 1969.
4 ZAPU:
the party’s
ideological
concept
i. Proceedingfrom historical and contemporary evidence,the Party is convinced that the

present system of life in Zimbabwe is capitalist in practice and orientation. The sole
motive for the penetration and settlement of the British settlers from 1890 on was to
survey,seize and exploit the resources of Zimbabwe-the land,minerals,other natural
resources and the labour of its people-for the benefit of just a few,in accordance with
the system.
The militarist method of the so-called pioneer column in 1890,the Chartered
British South African Company, the enactment of the land seizure laws-the Land
Apportionment Act in 1930 (now the Land Tenure Act), the privileged wage structure
for the whites, the negligence and later throttling of African education, the imposition
of the so-called Law and Order Act and minority rule itself,are all devices of a single
machinery to establish and maintain a capitalist way of life by the British settlers in
Zimbabwe.
2. The Party is equally convinced that what came as British racism has become white
racism for the conditions of Zimbabwe.White racism is a compound device to protect
the capitalist privilege of the white community as well as an attitude for degrading and
undermining the human dignity of the black man.
3. The Party is convinced beyond doubt that capitalism and the white racism of the
European settlers are the two basic evils facing the people of Zimbabwe today. They
are the root causes of the order of dishonesty prevalent today,and therefore of the lack
of harmonious relations among the Zimbabwe people.
4.A revolution is not only inevitable in Zimbabwe,but necessary.T o destroy capitalism,
racism and all their devices or apparatuses it must be an armed revolution. To prevent
their resurgence at any other future stage it must be a people’s armed revolution. The
revolution must mean and result in a complete and thorough change of the system of
life.
5. The Party is convinced that socialism is the better system of life and must therefore
prevail and be the order of life in Zimbabwe. The Party conceives socialism as the
seizure and retention by the people through their State of the basic means of produc-
tion-the land and all its natural resources, all industry,transport and communica-
tions,financial institutions (banks), external and internal trade and social services.
6.Within its socialist concept,the Party maintains that land,water,air and other natural
resources are natural gifts to all people and therefore must be retained and shared by
them all.As such,these means of livelihoodcannot be sold for a price nor be bargained
for in these terms but for the services in their improvement or distribution.
Rhodesia 107
7. It is the standpoint of the Party in its socialist concept that profit is the mainstay of all
exchange, bargains or trade and is not per se a contradiction to socialism. Profit must
neither be exploitative nor used for the benefit of a few; it must serve all the people
who put their labour into production.
8. The retention and use of all the means of production by and for the people through
their State should not imply the negation of private ownership of property.Ownership
of private property and ownership of the means of production are two different
meanings. There will be personal private ownership of property as the just earnings of
one’slabour.
9.The Party regards a sense of duty,hard work,diligence and honesty as the foundations
of socialism and,in the same sense,it regards laziness as the arch enemy of socialism.
10.Alongside land,water and air as the natural gifts to ail the people,the Party maintains
that knowledge, through education, and power, through government, cannot be the
monopoly of individuals or a few people. Every Zimbabwean has the right to these and
they must be shared by all as well.
O n the constitution and government

1. The Constitution of the State of the Zimbabwe people shall declare socialism as the
system of life, or the prevailing order in the country.For an appropriate reflection of
this,the State should be called:The People’sDemocratic Republic of Zimbabwe.
2. The Constitution shall lay down that it is treasonable for anyone or any group of
individuals to indulge in activities,direct or indirect,calculated to undermine or defeat
the people’ssocialist system of life.
3. The Constitution shall enshrine the universally accepted human rights,with particular
regard for the safeguarding of the socialist life of the Zimbabwe people.
Political rights shall include:the right of every member of the State to participate in
all activities for the welfare of the State,in accordance with one’s ability. freedom of the
press and writing,freedom to elect one’sgovernment.
Econoniic rights shall include: the right to work ; freedom from exploitation, the
right of living according to one’swork,protection of one’sprivate property;
Social rights: the right to education and the development of one’s talent,the right
to medical services,the right to old-ageand disablement pensions, the right to culture,
the right to marry according to the mutual choice of the individuals,concerned poliga-
m y shall be discouraged,the right to one’s life.
4.Government must rest on the three pillars of power: the legislature to make laws: the
executive to administer:the judiciary to interprete and enforce the law.
The constitution shall provide, within the aims of the system of the State. for no
interference of one branch in another within their respective fields. but with an emphasis
on the fact that the legislature is the supreme organ of the State.
5. The legislature shall result from the election machinery of the Party, from the branch
right up to its congress.In short,the legislature must be an enlargement of the People’s
Council elected by the Party’scongress.
The president of the Party shall be the president of the State and he shall appoint
his ministers from the legislature,but present their names to the legislature for approval.
The People’sCouncil and Secretariat of the Party shall maintain the Party.
6. The constitution shall lay down the obligation for everyone but the disabled to defend
the country and the socialist system of life.
O n the programme of economic revolution

The Party notes:
(a) that the Zimbabwe people lack the necessary technical know-how to bring about their
economic prosperity:
(b) that Zimbabwe lacks sufficient capital to set up all required industry or to exploit all
the resources :
(c) that Zimbabwe lacks basic industries for the complete manufacture of all its require-
ments ;
(d) that economic life in Zimbabwe,as well as industry,commerce and marketing, are all
tied to foreign capital and trade;
(e) that for its exports and imports,Zimbabwe is at the mercy of the capitalist monopolists
for transportation and communication ;
(I) that for whatever products it might market,Zimbabwe should take into cognizance the
threat of substituteproducts offsetting conventional products.
Notwithstanding the above-mentioneddifficulties,the Party equally notes that the greatest
danger to an independent people, their economy and country, is importation of foreign
capital goods or investments, because through them lies the trappings of terms which
harness the economy to the dictates of foreign trade and interests.
The first principle of the Zimbabwe people in their economic revolution towards
socialism is strict self-reliance,on the basis of locally available resources (both human and
material). in the creation of self-generatingcapital for the foundation of capital-producing
industries.
5 Constitution
of ZANU
Preamble
Proud of our Zimbabwe culture,traditions and our African personality;
Remembering that since the coming of the white man into this country we, the African
people,have been deprived of our God-givenrights of freedom and independence;
Condemning the undemocratic state the alien white-minority settlers have created in Zim-
babwe which has resulted in the oppression and suppression of our people;
Desiring to live in liberty and equality as a Zimbabwe people in a society organized under
democratic law and justice and dedicated to the promotion of the general welfare;
W e the representativesof the people of Zimbabwe in Congress here at Gwelo assembled on
the 22nd May, 1964,do hereby in the silent presence of our dead and before our living
citizens and those yet to be born inaugurate the Zimbabwe African National Union and grant
unto ourselves this constitution for the liberation of our country from bondage and for the
establishmentof a Nationalist,Socialist, Pan-Africanist.Democratic Republic in Zimbabwe.
Part I. N a m e
The name of this Nationalist Party shall be ‘The Zimbabwe African National Union
(ZANU)’herein after referred to as ‘theParty’.
Part II. Aims and objectives

1. To wage a relentless struggleagainst the undemocratic settler régime in Zimbabwe.
2. To establish a democratic state in Zimbabwe in which the government shall be created
through O n e man-One vote and remain at all times responsible to the people.
3. To promote national consciousness and the unity of all our people in pursuance of our
aims and objectives.
4. T o strive for the promotion of the social,educational and cultural welfare of the African
people.
5. To reconstruct Zimbabwe’s economy and evolve a socialistic pattern in which the
country’s resources are fully tapped for the common benefit of all the people of
Zimbabwe in close collaboration with the rest of the African continent.
6. To co-operate with other progressive organizations within Zimbabwe whose policies,

aims and objectives are not in conflict with those of the Party.
7.To engage fully in the Pan-African struggle for the complete liquidation of Settlerism,
Colonialism, Neo-Colonialism and Imperialism in Africa and to realize the complete
unification of the African continent.
8. To co-operatewith all nationalist liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere whose
aims,objects and policies are not in conflict with those of the Party.
9.To pursue the policy of positive non-alignmentin our external relations.
6 The African
National Council
The African National Council manifesto under

the banner of unity, March 1972
Salutation!
A R E A F R I C A N N A T I O N A L I S T SP E O P L E ?
Brothers and sisters,we welcome you here on this occasion. Although we are the ones who
should be really welcomed by you for it is because of your cry,petitions and demands that
we responded by setting the African National Council in a viable structure. This new
organization, like the old ones,will be referred to,by outsiders, as an African Nationalist
Organization.The term ‘AfricanNationalist’has unpleasant connotations to many people
with closed minds.
W e want to affirm that we are nothing but normal human beings who have an innate
desire for freedom and justice to all people. W e have organized ourselves so that with a
common voice our cry can be heard and our aspirations can be reached.
This cry,to many, will have an undesirable sound. They will regard us as ‘dangerous
creatures’who should be watched and prevented from acting freely. W e here declare that
we are simply creatures made in the image of God and,therefore,His children who need to
be liberated,nothing more-nothing less.
Only as we are fully liberated can we fulfil the purpose for which we were created.
Dedication
O n this tenth day of March 1972,at Highfield,Salisbury,W e here assembled,claiming no
more than to be heirs to the People’s Struggle which has ceaselessly been waged since the
imposition of alien rule in 1890,in the name of Almighty God,who,in His love and mercy,
created all people and races in His image,do hereby proclaim,constitute and declare the
AFRICAN N A T I O N A L COUNCIL to be the one sole voice and instrument of the
African masses of Zimbabwe and all people of goodwill,in their just and normal struggle
for national emancipation from the yoke of a racist and oppressiveminority rule.
Accordingly,the African National Council is born today as a result of the need and
demands of primarily the African people and other racial groups of this country.And we
here and now summon every African in this land, young or old,rich or poor, educated or
uneducated,chief or subject,and those members of other races dedicated to the establish-
ment of human brotherhood,to recognize the trumpet we here sound and to rally around
us,so that together,we continue our arduous journey to Zimbabwe in a Christian and non-
violent manner.
1. This Council believes in the power of the unity of the African masses in the imperative
need for the opposition of those elements or forces which seek to sow the seeds of
division among our people. Divided we will remain slaves and strangers in the land of
our birth.United though we may suffer,we shall toil,but with dignity,until we are free.
W e should,therefore,be warned that our worst enemies are those who seek to divide us
and those who labour to keep us in perpetual oppression,be they black or white.
2. W e believe in the invincibility of numbers of the masses of men and women of goodwill
in Rhodesia and that the African National Council is truly a grass-rootsorganization in
its very scope,membership and spirit.
3. W e believe in a government that will establish and promote the sanctity and practice of
the essential human freedoms of conscience. of expression,association,religion,assem-
bly and movement of all people irrespective of colour,race or creed.
4. W e believe in non-racialism,the universal brotherhood of man under the fatherhood of
God. This means forced segregation and forced integration violate the principle of free
choice of association.
5. W e believe in a non-violent,peaceful,orderly but permanent and continuing struggle to
be waged within the Law and for the establishment of a constitutionalgovernment.
6. W e believe that true peace and harmony among all people and economic stability of this
country can only be assured for all time by the establishment of 'the government of the
people,by the people and for the people'.
7. W e believe that the rights and property of the minority should be protected;we do not,
however,believe in the minority's amassing of social,political and economic privileges
at the expense of the freedom of the majority.
Declaration
The African National Council solemnly dedicates itself to strive for the realization of those
universal human rights conceded to the citizens in all democratic and just societies.This
being so.
1. W e shall not waver or prevaricate in our demand for the creation,in this country,of a
just social order;but shall strive to achieve this justice which is long overdue.
2. W e shall not deviate from our just demand for universal adult suffrage.
3. W e shall never concede to the fallacy that there is any justification for racial and other
forms of discrimination as between one human being against another. Thus, we shall
continue to oppose racial bigotry, religious intolerance, class arrogance, the idiocy of
tribalism and undeserved economic privileges. And we shall strive to create a nation
where black and white can live as children of the One Almighty God.
4. W e shall never compromise with the sin of greed which is the main characteristic of a
minority-controlledeconomy;but will continue to promote a fair and free participation
of each and every citizen of this our mother land-rich in natural resources.
5. W e shall forever abhor the continued denial, under the pretext of 'preservation of
Western Christian civilization'. of the masses' demand for legitimate self-determination.
Rhodesia 113
6. We shall never support nor respect a system which lays emphasis on Law and Order at
the expense of charity,justice and human dignity; but will continue to call upon the
conscience of this country to influence the establishment of law and order with justice.
7. We shall require and desire nothing less than self determination.
External relations
We declare our solidarity with those international organizations dedicated to the peaceful
creation and preservation of the basic universal human rights and the brotherhood of man
under the Fatherhood of God.
Challenge to the nation

Having stated our beliefs and declarations we now challenge all people of this country-
Africans, Asians, Coloureds and Europeans-who sincerely and honestly seek a genuine
peace and mutual understanding to join us.
Only as we work together can we bring our country out of its present political
deadlock.
W e challenge the people of this country to come out of the current political dream-
world by realizing that what has been called ‘peace’and ‘happiness’ and ’good race
relations’are,in fact,repressed fear,restless silence,forced tolerance and hidden hatred of
one another.
W e call and call again to make people aware that our race relations are deteriorating
and that they will continue to do so until all discriminatory legislation in this land has been
removed.
W e challenge our Rhodesian whites to realize the simple socio-psychologicalfact that
no one should expect love from a person he hates; or expect respect from a person he
disrespects;or expect admiration from a person he despises, nor loyalty from a person
whom he does not love.
W e finally and particularly direct this challenge to the Europeans of Rhodesia that
now is the day to sit down with us and, in peaceful negotiations,try and find a mutually
agreeable formula for achieving racial harmony. This is absolutely necessary for social
stability,economic growth and a secure future for ali of us and our children.
Time for such negotiations is fast running out. Believe it! This is the day that
circumstance and fate or,as we want to express it, God has led us all.
If we want to be blessed and not cursed by our children and children’s children we
have no time to lose.
W e challengingly remind our African people that whatever position we hold, or status
we enjoy we are all condemned as BLACK PEOPLE in this country. All are treated as
second if not third class citizens.W e therefore feel very sad when we see some of our people
and hear about their behaviour which points out to the fact that they have lost the purpose
and goal and are living and fighting for their own stomachs and self interests instead of
liberation for all which should be every sane person’sgoal.
W e have seen signs of these kinds of people who are bought to work out division, to
work out frustration,to work out embarrassment and to work out perpetual slavery of the
Africans. Shame!
W e challenge our African people to stop fulfilling the accusation that ‘theworst enemy
of Africans are Africans themselves’and instead become our own liberators,by stopping all
sorts of traitorous actions against the African United Fronts for liberation and labour for
the common goal of independence.
W e call our African people to praise. and congratulate our fathers-the chiefs-for
their courageous stand and true representationof their people which they displayed during
the test of Acceptability of the Anglo-Rhodesian Settlement Proposals.W e trust this is the
beginning of a new day in Rhodesia for Africans.
W e challenge the clergy of this country to stop preaching the useless and archaic
doctrine of ‘piein the sky’and start vigorously to preach a ‘whole gospel for the whole
man’.To teach our people that politics is not a ‘dirtygame’,but that what makes politics
dirty is the kind of people who play politics and how they participate in it. That the
definition of politics is ‘thescience and art of governing people’ and that there can never be
any evil in that kind of science or art.There is no virtue in participating or not participat-
ing in politics, but Christians must be involved when the political system disturbs people
and churches such as in the case of the Land Tenure Act.
W e challenge our African people to be purpose-centred rather than personality-
centred.
We challenge our African people to realize that,while we have chosen a peaceful and
loving method of approach,in UNITY we have more than a bomb can achieve.Therefore,
be UNITED,be United until UNITY is strength and strength becomes POWER.
7 The constitution
of FROLIZI
Preamble
The Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI)is the Zimbabwe people’s political
and military instrument for national liberation,born of the imperative for national unity
among all Zimbabweans and dedicated to a protracted armed revolutionary struggle against
the true enemy of the people of Zimbabwe, i.e. the capitalist imperialist and colonial
settlers in Zimbabwe.
Section I
AIMS A N D OBJECTS
1. To unite all the people of Zimbabwe in order to resolutely struggle to overthrow British
colonial capitalism in our country.
2. To establish and develop an independent socialist economy based upon the ownership
and control of land,capital,and all the means of production and distribution of wealth
by the masses.
3. To establish and guarantee Universal Adult Suffrage,one man one vote,as the basis of
government in a free Zimbabwe.
4.To establish a common,free and compulsory educational system for all,and free health
services.
5. To establish a revolutionary people’sarmy.
6.To build and develop our national culture and heritage,i.e. languages,norms,etc.-and
to ensure the equality,unity and fraternity of all Zimbabweans.
7.To establish and guarantee the people’s constitutional and human rights through a
people’slegal system.
8. To develop and strengthen solidarity with revolutionary movements. organizations and
governments in Africa, Asia, South and North America, the Carribean Islands and
elsewhere.
8 Zimbabwe
declaration
of unity, Lusaka,
Republic
of Zambia,
7 December 1974
1, ZANU,ZAPU,FROLIZI and ANC hereby agree to unite in the ANC.
2. The parties recognise the ANC as the unifying force of the people of Zimbabwe.
3. (a) They agreed to consolidate the leadership of the ANC by the inclusion into it of the
presidents of ZANU,ZAPU and FROLIZI under the chairmanship of the president
of the ANC ;
(b) ZAPU,ZANU and FROLIZI shall each appoint three other persons to join the
enlarged ANC executive.
4.The enlarged ANC executive shall have the following functions:
(a) to prepare for any conference for the transfer of power to the majority that might
be called ;
(b) to prepare for the holding of a congress within 4months at which:
(i) a revised ANC Constitution shall be adopted;
(ii) the leadership of the united people of Zimbabwe shall be elected;
(iii) a StatementofPolicy for the ANC shall be considered;
(c) To organise the people for such conference and congress.
5. The leaders of the ZAPU,ZANU and FROLIZI call upon their supporters and all
Zimbabweans to rally behind the ANC under its enlarged executive.
6. ZAPU,ZANU and FROLIZI will take steps to merge their respective organs and
structures into the ANC before the congressto be held within 4months.
7. The leaders recognise the inevitability of continued armed struggle and all other forms
of struggle until the total liberation of Zimbabwe.
ABEL TENDEKAYI M U Z O R E W A NDABANINGI SITHOLE

President ofANC President of ZANU
JOSHUA M Q A B U K O N K O M O JAMES ROBERT D A M B A Z A CHIKEREMA

President of ZAPU President of FROLIZI
STATE HOUSE,
LUSAKA.
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Colonial Sociopathy.
What happens if the world is fooled by the extreme meanings,

emerged out of sociopathic minds, which are convinced that non-
Arians are absolutely inferior? These meanings of the sick mind tell
us that the evidence is very clear and that one had only to look
around to understand that this inferiority is shown by their own
incapacity to develop further the "paradise" which was built by white
men.
However one forget to mention that, this paradise was built by and
for very few settlers which were not happy at all with their lives in
their often cursed, futureless motherlands! ... There was something
wrong with the mental health of these settlers. They indeed created
a paradise from themselves using the locals as a cheap workforce.
If we go to the South from the equator we can see that in the Belgian
Congo there was a total of 100.000 European settlers using less
than: 2,000,000 workers out of a population of 14 million, earning
3% of the salary of a settler. That means that 12 million were
unemployed and which didn't have the right to possess land.
Furthermore, we see a strict segregation (apartheid).
In the Rhodesian Nyasaland federation we could see a white settler
population of 300.000, less than 25% of the population with a Job
and just like in the Congo very low salaries for the Africans. Nobody
was aware, that in the whole region, south of the equator millions
were almost starving of poverty and misery.
The demographic statistics have rather shown a decline in
population, rather than an increase during almost a century. It is
remarkable that after the colonial powers left the scene in Africa,
suddenly there was a population boom. If one looks only to the
former Belgian Congo he could see that that boom went from 14
million to 70 million in a period half as long as the colonial time. For
all the neighboring countries one could see same evolution.
White settlers also were convinced that the Africans had a good life
because roads and railways and schools were constructed. But the
roads and railways didn't serve to connect regions or people, they
were an absolute need for the Belgian, Portuguese, Dutch or British
settlers to transport their merchandise to ports to export them to far
away countries with most of the revenues on foreign bank accounts.
Only 10% of the youth got a primary school education.
When a majority of White settlers was forced to leave massively the
newly independent States and when apartheid was abolished we
could see some strange phenomenon. The new African aristocrats
took over the colonial system and suddenly the differences between
them and others living in poverty became greater than before, but
there was more land available for everybody but without tools.
Despite poverty the population was growing but there were no
means or finances to adapt the "paradise" system serving to a
minority for a whole population of tens of millions... and a spook sat
by the door. The bilateral or multilateral corruption that resulted
when enterprises and governments of foreign powers, such as the
EU, the USA but also Latin American countries, Russia, India,
Taiwan, Korea and so on started to pay billions to corrupt
governments in Africa using all kinds of destabilizing methods...
Logically we will predict for the coming years after 2020 a huge
development in civil war and Balkanization matters... and as
always: it are the Africans who will be blamed for all of this...
Extract out of the comments of Victor E.Rosez

W o m e n and
racial discrimination in
Rhodesia
A . K . H . Weinrich
lunaco
Published in 1979 by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
7 Place de Fontenoy, 75700 Paris
Printed by Imprimerie des Presses Universitaires de France, V e n d ô m e
I S B N 92-3-101621-0
French Edition 92-3-201621-4
© Unesco 1979
Printed in France
Preface
This book, which examines the effects of present social and economic structures
in Rhodesia on w o m e n , as well as w o m e n ' s roles in traditional society and in the
future of Rhodesia, was prepared pursuant to Resolution 3 of the World Confer-
ence of the International W o m e n ' s Year and comprises a contribution of Unesco
to the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It is one
of four Unesco publications that have analysed the effects of Rhodesian dis-
criminatory policies o n African life. O n e of these publications, Mucheke: Race,
Status and Politics in a Rhodesian Community (1976), was prepared by the same
author, D r A . K . H . Weinrich, a social anthropologist w h o has done extensive
research on the situation in southern Africa and presently is a professor at the
University of Dar es Salaam. The two others are Southern Rhodesia: The Effects
of a Conquest Society on Education, Culture and Information (1976) and Racism
and Apartheid in Southern Africa: Rhodesia (1975).
Fieldwork for this book was undertaken by the author in a nation-wide
survey in Rhodesia between 1972 and 1975 including all major African ethnic
groups and all major settlement types, and additionally draws on certain previous
fieldwork. The author is responsible for the choice and the presentation of the
facts contained in this book and for the opinions expressed therein, which are
not necessarily those of Unesco and d o not commit the Organization.
Contents
Introduction 11
1. Changes in the economy of Zimbabwe 13
2. The effects of economic changes on the lives of African women 25
3. Changes in family structure 46
4. The changing function of bridewealth 91
5. The legal position of women 117
Bibliography 141
M a p of selected communities.
f V
J Korekore
19
/ • ) • Salisbury
13' .
18 14
Tonga
21
10 >
\ \ \ Kalanga / - • ' \
Zezuru
• V Manyika i
^l
i "\ Umtali « ( ^
\
\ V 12 i
Ndebele
X ', Ndau /
\ r~\
\y' Kalanga ( 1 6 » Bulawayo
9
15'
Karanga
Fort Victoria
\y
/
Key 100 miles

160 km
Rural areas: 1, Makoni T T L ; 2 , Chinamora T T L ; 3, Charter T T L ;
4, Gutu T T L ; 5, Zvinyaningwe PA; 6, Irrigation schemes; 7, Gwai T T L ;
8, Lupani PA; 9, MatopoTTL; 10, Kalanga group; 11, Tonga group.
Towns: 12, Sakubva; 13, Kambazuma; 14, St Mary's; 15, Mucheke;

16, Mpopoma.
Farms and mines: 17, Tea estates; 18, European-owned farms;

19, Government farms; 20, Sutton mine; 21, Wankie mine.
The Kalanga, Karanga, Zezuru, Korekore, Manyika and Ndau

together constitute the Shona people. The Venda and Shangaan,
immigrants from South Africa, share many social characteristics with
the Ndebele.
Introduction
The data presented in this book were collected in Rhodesia between 1972
and 1975. Under the sponsorship of various church institutions and the local
university, I was able to carry out a nation-wide survey of not only all the major
African ethnic groups, but also of all the major settlement types, such as tribal
trust lands, purchase areas, irrigation schemes, plantations, European-owned
farms and mines and the towns. Research methods comprised both the adminis-
tration of a long questionnaire and participant observation by a trained field
assistant. A total of 5,662 married couples were interviewed.
This total consists of the following subdivisions: 2,755 (48.7 per cent) of
the couples live in rural areas—of these 1,281 (22.6 per cent) are Shona, 513
(9 per cent) Ndebele, 222 (4 per cent) T o n g a and 185 (3.3 per cent) Kalanga.
Divided by settlement patterns, 1,281 (22.6 per cent) live in tribal trust lands,
309 (5.5 per cent) in purchase areas and 245 (4.4 per cent) on irrigation schemes.
In addition to these, 1,842 (32.5 per cent) of all couples live in urban areas and
1,065 (18.8 per cent) on European-owned mines, farms and plantations. T h e
m a p opposite sets out the locations of these communities.
I believe that from every point of view these communities represent a fair
cross-section of the African population in present Rhodesian society.
The data were originally collected with a different objective in mind; hence
the present publication, requested by Unesco, draws on only a fraction of the
material at hand. I hope to publish the remainder in a separate book. O n the
other hand, the requested study obliged m e to draw on earlier fieldwork, part
of which had already been published. Unesco also requested that I consult
with members of the Patriotic Front in the preparation of this study, so that
the book will remain of value after the country gains its political independence.
I therefore contacted the Central Committee of the P F ( Z A N U ) and, with its
approval and the aid of w o m e n cadres of the liberation movement, a survey of
fifty w o m e n in both military and refugee camps in Mozambique was carried out.
The results of this brief survey are incorporated in this book. In addition, docu-
ments and information on the aims of the Patriotic Front were obtained and
are incorporated in this study.
This book was written at the university of Dar es Salaam and I a m grateful
W o m e n and racial discrimination in Rhodesia 12
for the stimulation I received there. T h e intellectual climate at this university

has helped m e to see the situation of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in an ever-clearer
light. Also literature was m a d e available to m e which I had never seen while
staying in Rhodesia. Apart from the classic work by Engels, The Origin of the
Family, Private Property, and the State, I a m particularly indebted to the articles
of French Marxist social anthropologists, such as C . Meillassoux, M . Godelier,
E . Terray and M . Bloch. Through their writings I have found a way to break
through the limitations of traditional social anthropology which I had for a long
time found very restrictive.
T o facilitate analysis, I have adopted a uniform approach in each of the
five chapters of this book. Thus whether I a m dealing with the economic situation
of the country, the effects this situation has on the position of African w o m e n ,
husband/wife relationships, bridewealth, or the legal position of w o m e n , I have
always tried to assess the conditions which prevailed in these areas before the
colony of Southern Rhodesia was established. Then, in the broad central part
of each chapter, I analyse the present situation. In the third part I try to point
out what future developments are likely to take place, developments which aim
at overcoming the present sexual inequalities and the restrictions placed on
African w o m e n . I shall be happy if through this study I can m a k e a small contri-
bution towards the establishment of a better society in a country which has
suffered so m u c h during this century.
1 Changes in
the economy of
Zimbabwe
By using the idea of classes to understand precapitalist social formations, we

inevitably reduce the distance separating them from the capitalist formation.
(Terray, 1975, p. 133.)
The traditional economy of Zimbabwe
The traditional modes of production of the people of Zimbabwe fall under the
classification of communal or 'lineage m o d e of production', a suitable coinage
by Terray (1975, p. 94) which summarizes the essence of labour organization
and control over the means of production. For in this lineage m o d e of produc-
tion, the household is both the unit of production and of consumption, and this
holds true for both major ethnic groups of the country, i.e. for the Shona w h o
constitute some 80 per cent of the indigenous population and for the Ndebele
w h o constitute some 16 per cent. The importance of the lineage is true for both
the pastoral Ndebele and for the agricultural Shona. The Shona, w h o have lived
in Zimbabwe for about a thousand years, have developed a mixed economy
which for hundreds of years has regularly produced a surplus so that specialized
craftsmen, like blacksmiths, basket-makers, potters and herbalists, have arisen.
The more recent arrivals, the Ndebele w h o settled in Zimbabwe about 1840, were
a pastoral people w h o had an aversion for agriculture and supplemented their
meagre crop production by pastoralism and by raiding their eastern neighbours,
the Shona. Hence an integration of an unequal nature occurred between these
two economies.
A m o n g the Shona, surplus was mainly produced through the agricultural
labour of w o m e n . For whereas m e n were engaged predominantly in hunting and
cattle raising, thus contributing highly valued meat to the diet, w o m e n carried
out most of the regular agricultural work and so produced the largest component
of the food. Almost all the wearisome agricultural tasks, like weeding, fell to
them. They also contributed much labour at sowing and harvesting time. The
men's contribution to agriculture was predominantly confined to the clearing
of newfields,and since Shona agriculture depended on shifting cultivation, new
W o m e n and racial discrimination in Rhodesia 1 4
fields had to be cleared about everyfiveor six years. M e n joined w o m e n in sowing

and harvesting. In addition to their agricultural tasks, w o m e n took care of all
domestic work and of child-rearing. This division of labour between m e n and
w o m e n gave rise to a class division between them. This class division was founded
on the men's control over the means and instruments of production and hence
on their supervision of the women's work. The w o m e n were valued for their
labour power, for without their labour the system could not have perpetuated
itself. Thus w o m e n were exploited and the surplus value they produced was
appropriated by the m e n . This is most clearly seen in the households of m e n of
higher rank w h o needed m o r e labour in order to produce larger surpluses to feed
their followers. This labour was obtained through the practice of polygamy.
Chiefs and tribal elders married several wives w h o cultivated largerfieldsand so
produced enough grain to feed their husbands' councillors, visitors and all w h o
came to pay them their respect.
The superior position of m e n , therefore, was guaranteed by several factors:
they provided the most valued food, for a meatless diet was considered poor and
unsavoury, and they had control over the most important instrument of produc-
tion, the land, and this, in turn, empowered them to appropriate the agricultural
surplus created by the w o m e n .
Access to the means of production was regulated by seniority in the lineage
and chiefdom. Thus, the chief allocated land to the heads of households and the
latter divided the land a m o n g their wives and sons. But they also kept large
fields for themselves on which all household members had to work. The granary
of the head of a household remained the largest in the village, whereas those of
his wives and dependants were smaller and used to store the crops with which
the daily meals were prepared. In times of scarcity, all had to come to the house-
hold head for food.
The chief, w h o was the most senior lineage elder, worked closely with the
tribal spirit medium w h o annually blessed the seeds and so 'gave food' for the
next season to the people. The head of a household mixed the seeds he received
from the chief with those in his own store and then distributed them to his wives
and sons, i.e. to all the junior partners w h o worked with him to grow the food
for the next season. T h e senior man's control over food and seeds, therefore,
made the whole household dependent on him. 1
The older men's control over livestock also made young m e n dependent on
their elders for bridewealth, which was paid in cattle and it was the head of a
household w h o administered the family herd in the interests of all. In doing this,
he controlled the reproductive potential of the economic unit in a double sense,
for without him the young m e n could not marry and establish their o w n families
and thus beget children and obtain new labour power for their lineage.
Property rights were complex. Although the head of an establishment
administered all property for the c o m m o n good and had overriding authority,
all household members had a right to share in this communal property and this
meant that he could not dispose of it in an autocratic manner. Moreover, there
were minor items of property over which he had no control, such as the yields of
groundnuts and beans grown by his wife, or the income from the pots she m a d e
1. cf. Meillassoux, 1972, p . 99-100, w h o gives a similar account for a West African people.
Changes in the economy of Zimbabwe 15
or the rewards given to her if she acted as a midwife. Older w o m e n also received
at the marriages of each of their daughters, 'a c o w of motherhood' from their
sons-in-law, and these beasts and any offspring remained their o w n personal
property over which their husbands had no control. Hence as they grew older,
w o m e n could become property owners in their o w n right. But as persons they
always remained dependent on their husbands, or rather on their husband's
families, for the latter had paid bridewealth for them, and this bridewealth had
transferred rights over their labour and over their child-bearing power to their
husband's families.
These economic factors indicate that in traditional Shona society w e are
dealing with two distinct classes. Lenin's definitionfitsthis situation perfectly,
for he writes:
Classes are large groups of people differing from each other by the place they occupy
in a historicalfy determined system of sociaf production by the organization of labour,
and consequently by the dimensions of the share of social wealth of which they dispose
and the mode of acquiring it. (Terray, 1975, p. 86.)
A m o n g the Ndebele, class formation was slightly different. Because cattle were
their dominant source of income, m e n were in an even more powerful position
than they were a m o n g the Shona. M e n owned the cattle, m e n went raiding for
more cattle a m o n g the neighbouring Shona, and, therefore, both as herdsmen
and as raiders m e n supplied most of the food. In fact, the Ndebele not only went
raiding for cattle but also for grain and captives w h o were then integrated as
persons of lower rank into the Ndebele army. Lineage organization was combined
with age organization which assigned m e n to military units. Raiding for grain
was necessitated by the aridity of the territory, for rainfall in western Zimbabwe
is so low as to m a k e agriculture hazardous. This, in turn, meant that Ndebele
w o m e n had less opportunity than Shona w o m e n to m a k e a vital contribution
to production. They were m u c h more dependent on their husbands for their
upkeep than Shona w o m e n , and only elderly Ndebele w o m e n w h o , like the
Shona, received a 'cow of motherhood' from their sons-in-law on their daughters'
marriage, could build u p some property of their o w n . Because of their lesser
contribution to production, their labour power was less needed and hence the
bridewealth paid for them was smaller than that paid for Shona w o m e n .
The n e w capitalist formation
The new capitalist social formation which altered the relationships between the
Ndebele pastoral and the Shona peasant m o d e of production had far-reaching
consequences for both Shona and Ndebele. Although the Ndebele had raided the
Shona for aboutfiftyyears, they had been far fewer in number than the agricultur-
alists and their raiding parties never penetrated deeply or for long periods into
Shona territory. The n e w social formation, however, totally transformed the econ-
omic scene and reduced the majority of independent peasant producers as well as
the pastoralists to semi-proletarians w h o had to sell their labour power in order to
survive. This transformation was achieved by both military and economic forces.
T o indicate that a new era was being ushered in, the territory was n a m e d
'Rhodesia' after thefinancierof the occupying forces, Cecil Rhodes.
Military action was considered necessary by international capital interests
whose local representatives, the white settlers, arrived in Zimbabwe towards the
end of the nineteenth century, for the raids of the Ndebele into Shona territory
disturbed the economic plans of finance capital. Worse than this, the economic
self-sufficiency of the people restrained them from offering their labour power
to the newly established mines and farms of the settlers. Mutual provocations
led to several wars and the Shona, w h o like the Ndebele suffered from European
demands for labour and from an alienation of their land, joined the Ndebele in a
c o m m o n war for independence.
This struggle of the people to rid themselves of the newcomers was led by
spirit mediums, both m e n and w o m e n , w h o co-ordinated the uprisings over a
large area. O n e of the most famous leaders of the 1896-97 war was a w o m a n ,
Nehanda, w h o was captured by the settlers and executed in Salisbury in 1898
after the defeat of her people.
This defeat undermined the very foundation of the Ndebele's pastoral m o d e
of production. Most of their land and cattle were taken over by the Europeans
and they were allocated two utterly dry 'reserves' which consisted of areas that
they had never previously occupied. Since raiding became impossible, they had
to engage in some agriculture, but yields were too low to feed them and their
families. A s a result, the Ndebele had to work for Europeans and by 1948 some
60 per cent of all Ndebele m e n did so. This left the great majority of w o m e n
behind in barren rural areas, waiting for remittances from their husbands to
support themselves and their children.
In Shonaland the destruction of the traditional economy occurred at a
slower pace. The development of mines by the settlers had set a premium on
food and so peasant producers found a market for their surplus. M o r e land was
cultivated and the labour of w o m e n became even more important than it had
been in the past. This transition period, however, did not last long because
capitalist interests soon found that Rhodesia's soil was less rich in minerals than
had been expected and so agriculture was considered the second best money-
in average 3%
maker for white settlers. Like mining, capitalist farming required cheap of a white salary.
labour,
for merchant capital which then dominated the scene was interested in quick
profits and in as little investment in the country as was absolutely necessary. T h e
natural resources of the country, therefore, had to be exploited for export at as
cheap a price as possible and this was most easily achieved by employing under-
paid indigenous labour.
Capitalist agriculture directly undermined peasant production, for it necessi-
tated large-scale alienation of land from African peasants and so created an
artificial land shortage. B y employing more efficient methods of cultivation it
also drove the small producers out of the market. W h e n even under these press-
ures the people refused to work for Europeans, artificial money needs were
created by the imposition of taxes and by the stimulation of a desire for n e w
consumer goods. Through a combination of these forces peasants were forced
to sell their labour power. The British South Africa C o m p a n y , which controlled
the territory from 1890 to 1923, stated explicitly in 1912 that 'in a country where
millions have been invested in farming, and m a n y millions in mining; in a country
where the return from those millions depends so largely on sufficient unskilled
native labour, that labour must and will be procured'.1 Hence the Shona too
had to be proletarianized and become labour migrants, though not to the same
degree as the Ndebele. By 1948 only 41 per cent of them had left their villages
for labour centres. The would never participate in the sharing of the production wealth of mining nor agricultar.
The very low wages paid by the settlers were the result of their determination
to reap m a x i m u m profits. They calculated that since Africans still had their o w n
fields in their villages, there was n o need to pay them a wage sufficiently large
to support their families. This meant that social reproduction never entered into
the calculation of African wages. During the initial years of settlement there was
full agreement a m o n g employers that ten shilings, or at most one to two pounds
sterling per month, was an adequate remuneration for African labourers. Over
the decades, as wages rose and the value of money fell, the reasoning for fixing
wage standards remained essentially unaltered. A n African worker has always
been regarded as an individual w h o has to be fed and clothed while in employ-
ment. His wife and children live a shadowy existence in remote tribal areas and
enter calculations only as agents of social welfare, for once a worker falls ill,
becomes old, or for any other reason is no longer needed in the capitalist economy,
he can retire to the village where his kinship group is expected to take care of him.
This new social formation, in which the lineage modes of production are
dominated by the capitalist m o d e , transforms both the former and the latter.
The former cease to function in their o w n right and are relegated to the status of
labour reserves and welfare institutions for the capitalist m o d e of production,
and the latter is freed from paying its labourers a wage guaranteeing social repro-
duction. In this w a y it can exploit workers to a degree impossible in developed
capitalist countries where the labour force has n o income apart from its
industrial wages.
This change has brought about a new set of social classes, classes which are
m u c h more antagonistic to each other than were the older classes based on sex.
The basic new class division has become that between Europeans and Africans
and new political and ideological superstructures have been erected to reinforce
and lend an appearance of legitimacy to the new unequal relationships.
In addition to this major class division, n e w internal subdivisions have
arisen a m o n g the African people. This evolution is easy to trace. Atfirstmines
were the major employers of African labour, then European farms; later private
European households demanded large numbers of servants. These three employ-
ment sectors, which throughout the colonial history of Rhodesia remained the
main employers of African labour, have always offered their employees wages
far below those offered in other industries. Beside that there was a 100% apartheid
The importance of mining in the early labour market of Rhodesia can be
seen from the followingfigures:In 1904, 7,154 Africans, or 4.6 per cent of the
total population, were working for Europeans, and by 1921 their number had
risen to 140,304, or 16.3 per cent. In 1906 the mines employed 17,381, or 3 per
cent of the total African population or almost all Africans in employment.
1. See van Onselen, 1976, p . 115. These 'millions' had been spent by the British South Africa
C o m p a n y in the early years of its rule when it built the railway through Botswana into Rhodesia
and established mine workings and other infrastructure. By 1910, it became clear that mining
proved less profitable than expected. T h e company never paid dividends to its shareholders.
By 1923, 37,482 Africans, or 4.4 per cent of the population, worked in the mines.
B y that time agriculture had become a major employer of cheap labour and
Europeans, w h o that year numbered some 35,000, employed m a n y domestic
servants (Rogers and Frantz, 1962, p. 19; van Onselen, 1976, p. 114).
F r o m 1923 onwards, further changes occurred in the Rhodesian economy.
That year the settlers gained control of parliament and became independent of
the British South Africa C o m p a n y . During the new period which then started
foreign capital allied itself with local capital, though the latter never became
dominant. Exports still dominated the economy and continued to consist largely
of raw materials, but imports n o w included luxury items for the new white ruling
class.
The transition to internal self-government in 1923 went smoothly because
internationalfinancecapital had overestimated the mineral wealth of the country
and its profits had been less than anticipated. For the indigenous population,
however, the transition had far-reaching consequences. Until that time racial
discrimination had been practised in all spheres of life, but it had not been
enshrined in the law, for racial divisions were of minor importance to inter-
national finance interests; their concern lay in overall profits. T o the settlers,
however, racial divisions were essential, because in 1923 they were out-
numbered by 25 to 1 by Africans and their survival depended upon segregation.
Therefore, laws were passed to safeguard white interests.
In 1931, the Land Apportionment Act divided the land into black and white
areas, an arrangement which has since been regarded as the cornerstone of white
survival. European land included most of the fertile areas of Rhodesia and so
peasant agriculture became marginal to the market economy. Moreover, in
order to preserve the market almost exclusively for white farmers, the Maize
Control Act was passed in 1931 which m a d e the marketing of peasant produce
difficult.
Since the local people disliked working on European-owned farms because
of the low wages paid there, and since the Shona were able to support themselves,
however precariously, from the land that remained to them, government had to
import large numbers of foreign Africans to work in agriculture. Only in the
late 1950s, when the government realized that by inviting in Malawian and
Zambian workers it introduced into Rhodesia m e n whose political consciousness
was more advanced than that of local Africans, did it change its immigration
policy towards African labour. Still, by 1960 foreign Africans numbered 137,000,
or 60 per cent of all farm labourers, though by 1975 their number had fallen
to 116,618, or 32 per cent (Clarke, 1976, p. 16).
A s soon as better-paid jobs for Africans became available in the towns,
i.e. as the manufacturing, building and other urban-based industries developed,
large numbers of the indigenous people came to seek work. This raised fears
a m o n g Europeans that Africans might compete with white labour and so the
Every year the poverty level of the several African groups increased an land possession for own
use would be forbidden with the Land Husbandry Act in 1951.
According to Shamuyarira, 'the white workers k n o w that the inflated wages they
receive and the high standard of living they enjoy is creamed off from the surplus
produced by underpaying the black workers w h o m they supervise' (Shamuyarira,
1978, p. 17).
The major shift to industrial development in the urban areas occurred
during the Second World W a r , for although mining too developed fast—the
international community needed Rhodesian chrome and asbestos—the war
restricted capital transfers and thus created a protected market. This greatly
strengthened the position of local capital. The production of consumer goods
also rose rapidly so that by 1947 the gross output of the manufacturing industry
was three times as large as it had been before the war. M a n y Africans found
employment in this n e w industry where wages were m u c h higher than those
paid in agriculture and mining. Between 1936 and 1944 the number of Africans
in employment rose from 254,000, or 20 per cent of the total population,
to 377,000, or 22 per cent. That year foreign investment contributed 80 per cent
to the total investment in the colony (Stoneman, 1976, p. 33), and local capital
20 per cent. Yet although 20 per cent m a y appear small, this was a record level
which was not reached again until after the Unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence (UDI) in 1965.
During the federal period when Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland were linked together, large amounts of foreign capital were once
more poured into Rhodesia and this foreign capital, more interested in a stable
and well-trained labour force than in an abundant supply of cheap labour, led
to a relaxation of racial segregation in industry.
In the fast-developing manufacturing industry most new firms were foreign-
owned. They were interested in the evolution of an African middle class which
would eventually vote together with Europeans along class lines rather than
cast their votes on a racial basis. They also desired a stable labour force, for if
labour had to possess some skills, it was wasteful to train m e n on short-term
contracts. Hence efforts were made to create a permanent urban-based labour
force. T o achieve this aim, the ties between the rural and urban populations
had to be cut. B y 1956, 610,000 or 25 per cent of the total African population
lived in the towns.
T o create an authentic working class and to restrict labour migration,
provisions were m a d e in the Land Husbandry Act, which was passed in 1951
and implemented during the subsequent decade, to deprive of land all those
Africans w h o in the season before the Act was implemented had not cultivated
their o w nfieldsin their h o m e areas. These were to become the new proletarians
w h o would have to sell their labour power to earn a living. The great investment
b o o m which occurred at the time raised hopes that this proletariat could be
fully absorbed into industry. This hope, however, was not shared by Africans
w h o were convinced that Europeans would never offer them sufficient security
in the towns to m a k e it safe for them to cut their ties with their rural homes.
Later developments proved them right.
A precondition for the successful implementation of this policy was the
provision of family homes for the urban workers. Hence an Urban Affairs
Commission was appointed to look into the urban housing situation. In 1958,
the commission submitted its report which stated that only 41 per cent of all
Africans in the towns were living in family units (Southern Rhodesia Govern-
ment, 1958, para. 89); the rest lived in bachelor quarters. It, therefore, urged
that the building of family homes be speeded up.
Efforts to provide such accommodation were m a d e by both the government
and by local municipalities, but these efforts everywhere fell far short of the
houses needed to cope with the n e w flood of urban immigrants. Soon work-
seekers exceeded job vacancies, influx controls were introduced and the n o w
landless proletariat had to be supported by poor peasant kinsmen.
The building of family units also led to a greater immigration of African
w o m e n , some of w h o m found employment in domestic service or in industry.
Until the 1950s, the urban population had been predominantly male and most of
the w o m e n w h o had come to the towns had been single, often earning a living
through prostitution. N o w respected and married w o m e n settled d o w n to
town life.
International capital shared certain interests with the black labour force.
O n e was a larger participation of Africans in the internal market. Greater
purchasing power of Africans, however, while profiting industry, would require
a substantial rise in wages and only foreign-owned firms were prepared to pay
their workers more; local whites w h o ran parliament and exercised overall
control were totally opposed. Yet international finance capital was a c c o m m o -
dating: the new protected markets of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, created
by the federation, offered them an alternate outlet for Southern Rhodesian
manufactured goods. Hence Rhodesian industry could be consolidated without
narrowing the economic gap between the races. The correlation between race
and class had become perfect. But just as the federation had led to an inflow of
international capital, so the end of the federal period led to its outflow; within
a short time domestic capital accounted for 33 per cent of all investments. Part
of the rise of domestic capital was due to a decline in new foreign investments,
but the withdrawal of international capital in the immediate post-federal period
was more important. It was partly in an effort to arrest this trend that in 1965
the Rhodesian Government declared the colony unilaterally independent. This
declaration achieved its immediate goal, but it also led to thefinaldisintegration
of the Rhodesian economy.
U D I was opposed within Rhodesia by industries which depended largely
on foreign markets, such as mining and agriculture, especially tobacco farming,
but the manufacturing industry took an ambivalent attitude because it saw that,
although it would lose the markets of neighbouring African countries for its
low-quality products, such as cotton articles, it stood to gain from a completely
new internal market, a market for luxury goods for European consumers. For
since foreign currency could not be obtained to import non-essential goods, a
diversification of manufactured articles could count on a steady d e m a n d from
local whites, and also meet the government's concern that the level of white
consumption be maintained. This reorientation simultaneously averted the need
to raise African wages, for no expansion of the market to the black section of
the population was required.
In the business world the isolation of firms from their mother companies,
to w h o m they could no longer repatriate profits, resulted in greater restrictions
being placed on African labour. For as the distinction between foreign and local
capital became blurred, workers depended exclusively on Rhodesian whites.

A shift towards greater racial discrimination was also fostered by the
replacement of the United K i n g d o m by South Africa as Rhodesia's main trading
partner, because as economic sanctions weakened the country's ties with its
former metropolis, they strengthened its ties with its South African submetropolis.
Since n o sanctions have been operated by South Africa against Rhodesia,
South African industry has been able to m a k e several major investments in
Rhodesia. This is reflected in the followingfigures:out of a total of £550 million
of private liabilities, £200 million were held by South Africans (Stoneman, 1976,
p. 51). The component of South African capital has grown very fast since U D I .
During this period all new legislation passed by the Rhodesian Government has
been modelled on South African legislation.
Also State capital grew significantly during the same period. Between 1965
and 1976, public-sector investments rose by 68 per cent in real terms and
in 1970 they accounted for 40 per cent of all investments (Stoneman, 1976).
Both South African and State investments, however, represent white interests
in southern Africa and this means that the racial factor has become very
important in the Rhodesian economy.
In 1976, some 926,000 Africans had found paid work, and these constituted
14 per cent of the total population. This shows that although the absolute
number of African employees has increased, there has been a significant
reduction in the proportion of Africans in employment. T h e industries in
which these Africans worked are listed in Table 1.
T A B L E 1. Africans in industry, 1976
Industry Number employed Percentage
Agriculture 343,000 37.0

Mining 61,000 6.6
Manufacturing 132,000 14.3
Domestic service 141,000 15.2
Education 30,000 3.2
Health 9,000 1
Other 1 210,000 22.7
TOTAL 926,000 100
1. The 'other' category includes in order of importance, administration, transport and communi-
cation, construction, distribution, restaurants and hotels, and some even less important employ-
ment sectors, such as electricity and water in which only 2 per cent of the African labour force
are employed. Africans serving in the Rhodesian armed forces are also included.
Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics, June 1976, Table 14.
D u e to the intensification of the liberation war which, especially since 1976,

has caused the withdrawal of large numbers of white m e n from the economy and
necessitated the diversion of large sums into defence, a rapid disintegration of
the capitalist economy has taken place. M a n y Europeans have begun to emi-
grate and by 1977 the monthly net migration loss of whites amounted to
about 1,000. If the government had not restricted the export of local earnings and
savings, the outflow of white settlers would have been even larger. Although
most emigrants came from the urban areas, a substantial number of farmers
from the eastern districts of Rhodesia also left the country. It is to be expected
that the emigration rate will accelerate rapidly and that the present economic
structure will be fundamentally altered in the years to come. M a n y of the
Africans w h o lost their jobs as the economy disintegrated have joined the
liberation war. This would lead slowly to a total agriculture crash in the 80s.
These economic changes had two important consequences. O n the one
hand they led to the creation of new class divisions a m o n g Africans and on the
other they created a new political awareness and an environment in which the
new revolutionary ideology of the liberation movement
The process of class formations was hastened by the government in direct
proportion as African nationalism w o n adherents. A s early as the 1950s and
the 1960s, successful African businessmen were given wide publicity in the press
in order to create the impression that Rhodesia was a free society in which
everybody could advance on merit. Since the 1960s, black university graduates
were employed as personnel managers in largefirms,especially in multinationally
controlled enterprises. In the early 1970s, a number of black junior civil servants
were promoted to higher ranks in the police force and in 1977 thefirstAfricans
were commissioned into the army. This co-option of individuals succeeded in
establishing a new petty bourgeoisie which inclined towards moderate nationalist
factions. In recent years, intimidated by government propaganda, m a n y members
of this bourgeoisie have become fearful of the liberation movements. This n e w
bourgeoisie is numerically small, but it is difficult to m a k e a well-informed
guess of its size. W h a t is certain is that by 1976 income differentials within
the African employment sector were large. For example, whereas the average
agricultural wage in that year was $(R)201, wages in finance, insurance and
A s a consequence of these new class formations the population is n o w

real estate
divided were
into $(R)which
groups 1,351 (Stoneman,
were unknown 1978,inp.the36).
past. Each group has special
interests and these arise from the economic circumstances in which its members
find themselves. These subdivisions have slightly lessened the overriding racial
divisions, but they intensified the traditional sexual divisions. For n o w most
members of each sex participate in distinct modes of production, the majority
of w o m e n perpetuate traditional agriculture which is becoming ever less pro-
ductive, while m e n engage in industrial production. Thus, an ideological wedge
is driven between the w o m e n ' s and the men's consciousness. Even those w o m e n
w h o m o v e out of the villages often have their status reduced to a lower level
than in the past. Those w h o are married to respectable wage-earners have
become mere 'housewives', totally dependent on their husbands. Those few w h o
have found independent employment seldom earn m u c h . If they are single, they
generally fail to support themselves on their wages, the consequences of which
will be examined later. O n the whole, therefore, w o m e n have remained in the
background of Rhodesian capitalist development and yet it is their contribution
that has m a d e this development possible. For unless w o m e n had freed their
husbands from agricultural tasks, the latter could not have gone for wage
employment, and unless they had taken on the responsibility for supporting
their rural families and so supplementing their husbands' meagre wages, capital
accumulation in Rhodesia would have been m u c h slower.
The possible shape of the future economy

In the final sections of each chapter I shall work o n the assumption that the
future government of an independent Z i m b a b w e will be formed by leaders of the
Patriotic Front of Z i m b a b w e (PF).
Since the Patriotic Front has clearly stated its objectives, I shall briefly
examine what is likely to happen to the three types of class formations discussed
in this chapter: racial class antagonism, subdivisions of classes within the African
community, and sex-based classes.
F r o m documents of the Patriotic Front (Zimbabwe News, Zimbabwe Review
and People's Voice), it is clear that the future government will abolish all racial
discrimination. This means that the present racial division of land, job reser-
vation and differential pay will be things of the past and so will be the whole
overriding racial class formation.
A Patriotic Front official, referring to structural changes required, has
stated that the 'aim is to establish a proletarian party in Zimbabwe' which
will 'destroy all colonial capitalist structures, disengage the country from
imperialist connections, and build a self-reliant national economy' (Shamuyarira,
1978, p. 33). A n d M u g a b e , co-leader of the Patriotic Front, stated in 1978 at
the Malta conference with the British Foreign Minister, D r O w e n , that 'we are
not intending to replace the white bourgeois property owners with a black bour-
geois class. W e arefightingagainst the system in that country. The system has
to go' (The Times, 3 February 1978).
These statements m a k e it clear that the minor class divisions that have
arisen a m o n g Africans during the colonial period will also be abolished. In
fact, the Patriotic Front has been explicit that the n e w society it envisages will
be based on Socialist principles and o n Marxist-Leninist thought and that
the State it intends to establish will have n o r o o m for a privileged bourgeoisie
whose ties are with the capitalist world. T h e new petty bourgeoisie which has
grown fast since the liberation war accelerated will be disestablished and its
members will be reintegrated into the body of peasants and workers. Ngara
(1978, p. 19-20), writing in Thoughts on Cultural Independence, states that as
the bourgeoisie class is growing in strength and as the bourgeoisie are more influen-
tial in a capitalist state than workers and peasants, the latter will continually aspire
to acquire bourgeois privileges and . . . seek to become more and more like west-
erners and white settlers. InInfact nothing of the past would change and the new formed
African bourgoisie took over the financial ruling system of the white settlers.
H e concludes that 'these tendencies can be arrested by politicization and
re-education' and that 'already the indications are that the present W a r of
National Liberation is turning m a n y educated people into "revolutionary
intellectuals" '.
In the economic sphere the aim of a classless socialist society will require
nationalization of the major means of production and collective ownership of,
and w o r k in, factories and agricultural c o m m u n e s . If such plans are realized,
they will bring about changes in all aspects of social life, not least in the
relationship between the sexes. I shall examine these in each subsequent chapter.
Here, I merely wish to state the explicit policy of the Patriotic Front in regard
Women and racial discrimination in Rhodesia 24
to the emancipation of w o m e n . Teurai R o p a , Secretary for W o m e n ' s Affairs

of the Patriotic Front ( Z A N U ) , has declared that
the liberation of w o m e n is a fundamental necessity of the revolution, the guarantee

of its continuity and the precondition for its victory. The main objective of Chimurenga
[revolutionary war] is to destroy the system of exploitation and to build a new society
which releases the potentialities of human beings, reconciling them with labour and
nature. (Ngara, 1978, p. 72.)
A n d Jane N g w e n y a , Secretary for Welfare and W o m e n Affairs of the Patriotic

Front ( Z A P U ) has stated:
In their active participation in the liberation of Zimbabwe the w o m e n have always

been very clear about the objectives of the struggle. As they see it, they are fighting
for national independence and sexual equality. T o them the two things are insepar-
able and they insist that simply tofightfor improved status within the framework
of a racist oppressive system, as some 'successful' professional w o m e n have tried to
argue, is quite meaningless. The achievement of independence to them is the best
guarantee for changing the situation they are in and for guaranteeing the establish-
ment of equal rights for all irrespective of race, colour or sex . . . the enemy is not
the men of Zimbabwe but the racist system which oppresses and exploits African
men, w o m e n and children alike. (Ngwenya, 1979.)
The subordinate position of w o m e n , deeply rooted in the traditional m o d e of

production which places the means of production and the instruments of labour
into the control of m e n , can only be abolished by placing the control over these
instruments and means equally into the hands of m e n and w o m e n . Also the
overriding importance of the lineage and of m a n y traditional kinship practices
have to be revised and altered. If agricultural production is collectivized and
c o m m u n e s are established o n a different basis than descent, the basis for the
traditional domination of w o m e n will fall away. These c o m m u n e s can be
administered by elected councils {daré) in which all members, m e n and w o m e n ,
have an equal say. Such c o m m u n e s have already been tried in Rhodesia and
although the Rhodesian Government has closed them d o w n (Weinrich, 19786;
1978c), they have proved highly successful both economically and socially, for
they have created a large n u m b e r of m e n and w o m e n committed to socialist
production. Also in the present military and refugee camps in M o z a m b i q u e ,
collective farming and living are practised, and not only has the agricultural
production of these camps been successful and consumption equal, but in all
the camps of the liberation m o v e m e n t the equality between m e n and w o m e n
has been accepted as a basic principle.
The reconciliation of people with labour and nature implies a reversal of
current values, because it expresses an appreciation of manual work. During
the colonial period manual w o r k was almost exclusively performed by unskilled
African labour. This has degraded productive w o r k in the eyes of the people
w h o saw that individuals with power and wealth did not engage in it. The new
Z i m b a b w e will see in the abolition of the distinction beetwen manual and non-
manual w o r k a precondition for the formation of a classless society.
2 The effects of
economic
changes on
the lives of
African w o m e n
In order to change the conditions of life, we must see them through the eyes of
women. (Engels)
The position of women

in the communal mode of production
The essential functions of w o m e n in the communal or lineage m o d e of pro-

duction have already been discussed in the preceding chapter. A strict division
of labour assigned to them most of the agricultural and domestic tasks, leaving
to m e n hunting, the care of livestock and the initial preparation of the land for
cultivation. In this economic system w o m e n provided the 'variable capital', to
use Marx's expression, that is, through cultivating the land with some simple
instruments, such as the hoe, they produced the surplus which gave traditional
Shona society its characteristic shape. The surplus that w o m e n produced was
appropriated by their husbands or whoever acted as elder in the village c o m -
munity. A m o n g the Ndebele where cattle provided the major means of subsist-
ence and where raiding contributed vitally to the wealth of the people, it was
the young m e n w h o produced most of the surplus for the elders. Through this
production of surplus by w o m e n or young m e n , rudimentary class divisions were
introduced into these societies.
The commodities produced by w o m e n hadfirstof all a use-value: they were
used for social reproduction. A few items also had an exchange-value, but they
acquired this without the establishment of markets, for these products were
directly bartered between villagers and local craftsmen, or were received by
people for their services, such as those rendered by midwives or herbalists. Hence
relationships between producers and consumers remained close and personal.
Apart from their important role in the production process, w o m e n had the
even more important function of bearing children and so of directly reproducing
their husbands' lineages. A w o m a n only gained status by being the mother and
grandmother of m a n y children and grandchildren. A s a mere wife her position
was insecure, for if she did not become pregnant, her in-laws considered sending
her away. But as she gave birth to more and more children, and therefore
guaranteed the perpetuation of her husband's lineage, everybody treated her with
respect.
Moreover, a w o m a n ' s brother normally married with her bridewealth.
His children, therefore, were the children of her bridewealth and so she could
exercise influence over them. She became their 'female father' (yatete) a m o n g
the Shona, that is, the female representative of their patrilineage, and because
of this 'paternal' status she had to be consulted in all the major events of their
lives, especially in their future marriages. Through the bridewealth link between
a brother and sister, called chipctnda a m o n g the Shona, a w o m a n was acknow-
ledged to contribute not only to the reproduction of her husband's lineage but
also to that of her own. Her child-bearing power and that of the w o m a n married
with her bridewealth also contributed indirectly to their families' labour power,
because the more children they bore the greater became the labour forces of
their husbands' households and this meant that although w o m e n were in an
inferior position vis-à-vis m e n , they were also highly respected because everybody
recognized their indispensability.
Respect was especially shown to old w o m e n . They could participate in
discussions and they were respectfully listened to. B y that time they could
contribute only a little to agricultural labour, but their sons supported them
and everybody honoured them.
The education necessary tofityoung girls and boys into this kind of society
was received in the family and village where, through observation and living
the c o m m u n a l Ufe, norms and values of the society were internalized and
unquestioningly accepted. Children learned as they interacted with their kinsmen
in the village, as they worked with their elders and as they sat around the
kitchenfiresin the evenings listening to the folktales of their elders or learning
the songs which conveyed the wisdom of the community. This direct teaching by
elders, both by m e n and by old w o m e n , greatly enhanced their position, because
it revealed that they possessed all the knowledge on which their society was
built.
The role of w o m e n in the new capitalist formation
The domination of the capitalist m o d e of production over the c o m m u n a l or

lineage m o d e brought about a serious demographic imbalance in society.
Godelier rightly observed that 'demographic structures . . . are the combined
result of the actions of several "deeper" structural levels . . . the most important
of which is the m o d e of production' (Godelier, 1975, p. 4). For by the division
of the land into African and European areas, and by the forced recruitment
of black labour into the capitalist sector the family life of most Africans was
disturbed. T h e rural areas, k n o w n as tribal trust lands (TTL), were stripped
of their young m e n so that most w o m e n had to rear their children without
the assistance of their husbands. Figure 1 shows that hardly any m e n in their
twenties or thirties stay in the villages and even those w h o were at h o m e during
the time of the 1969 census, on which this population pyramid is based, were
often only on h o m e leave and ready to return to the towns and mines. This
The effects of economic changes 27
70 1 Male - hennale—
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
i10
FIG. 1. Tribal trust land population, 1969.
means that most w o m e n , w h o in the past because of their junior status had
relatively little say in community affairs, had to assume the main responsibility
for the economic welfare of their families. Legally, they had n o right to m a k e
important decisions, but had to wait until their husbands returned h o m e or
they had to consult their in-laws, but in reality such restrictions had to break
down.
M e n and w o m e n , however, n o w operated in different modes of production
and so developed different outlooks on life. Also a totally new division of labour
arose. For while husbands in European employment were daily confronted with
racial issues as they earned some cash to support their families, their wives
stayed at h o m e and remained engrossed in the traditional m o d e of production.
Within that mode their contribution increased, because n o w also the management
of livestock fell to them; and ever since ploughing with oxen was introduced,
w o m e n had to handle the plough as well. M y census of agricultural labour in
T T L s shows that w o m e n contribute some 33 per cent of the labour spent on
livestock, and children some 45 per cent (Weinrich, 1975, p. 318).
The major burden placed on w o m e n was poverty caused by the low
productivity of the land. This, as well as the penetration of rural life by the
W o m e n andracialdiscrimination in Rhodesia 28
70 1 1 1 r Male -i—i 1—i—i— Female -
65
60-
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
F I G . 2 . Purchase area population, 1969.
money economy, made them in a new sense heavily dependent on their husbands,
this time on their husbands' remittances, to buy the m a n y new commodities to
which their modern households had become accustomed, such as clothing, special
food items like sugar and salt, kerosene and, very importantly, school fees for
their children. This means that, just as the meat contribution of m e n in the
traditional society had been more highly valued than the routine food produced
by w o m e n , so n o w thefinancialcontributions by m e n , because of the multi-
purpose function of money, was rated higher than the food produced by w o m e n .
Hence the women's assumption of the economic activities traditionally per-
formed by m e n did not raise their status in the new economic order.
N o r was this lack of recognition of the women's vital contribution to
production and reproduction confined to African men. For the 1969 census
described all these w o m e n w h o cultivated land in the T T L s as 'inactive in
respect to their relationship to the labour market' (Clarke, 1977, p. 14), and
thus relegated them to the bottom of the economy, even though it was these
w o m e n w h o through their labour made the low wages of their husbands, and
therefore the high rates of profit for white employers, possible.
In the purchase areas (PA) where some 3 per cent of all Africans live, that is,
on land for which Africans can obtain title deeds, the position of w o m e n is
even lower. Figure 2 shows a larger number of w o m e n than m e n . This is the
direct result of widespread polygamy in these farming areas. S o m e 47 per cent
of all farmers in PAs have more than one wife, m a n y four orfive.It is due to
polygamy, not to labour migration, that in this second community type w o m e n
are again in the majority. Nowhere else in Rhodesia is polygamy as frequent
as in the P A s and nowhere else is the reduction of w o m e n to pure labour power
as explicitly stated as there. Several farm owners said in interviews that they
'bought' more wives because they needed more labour to cultivate their fields.
In these communities it is not the women's child-bearing power which is given
prime emphasis—after all, only one son m a y inherit his father's farm, a legal
provision which has caused much resentment among the children of P A
farmers—but purely their value as variable capital. Junior wives in a household
are seldom consulted by their husband and their requests have to be forwarded
to him through his senior wife or, where custom is ignored, through his favourite
wife; in such situations the h o m e is racked by acute tensions.
The emphasis on the women's labour power has also induced husbands
to exert a m u c h stricter control over their wives than do husbands in T T L s .
Not only are P A farmers always at h o m e and so do not let their farms be run by
their wives, thus eliminating any possibility of w o m e n gaining influence in
decision-making, but they also prevent their wives from 'wasting time' by
attending government or mission-run homecraft clubs where w o m e n learn
cooking, sewing, ch ld-care, hygiene, etc. For the P A farmers argue that such
clubs take their wives away from essential agricultural work and also teach
them insubordination to their husbands. They, therefore, m a k e a concerted
effort to prevent the emancipation of their wives. For this reason, these wives
often assist their daughters infindinghusbands outside the P A s so that their
married lives will be freer than theirs.
Both Figures 1 and 2 show that in the rural areas assigned to Africans
w o m e n are in the majority. This means that in the European areas m e n pre-
dominate over w o m e n . This is indeed the case, because in European employment
centres the sex ratio is 175 m e n to every 100 w o m e n (Fig. 3).
O n the European farms and in the mines the sex distortion of the African
population is less marked than in the towns. Although there are plainly m a n y
more m e n than w o m e n working on farms and in mines, a substantial number of
w o m e n too have found their way to these work places and this has occurred since
the beginning of capitalist mining and farming. O n the farms w o m e n have
always been able to find some work at harvesting time, but in the mining areas
they could atfirstonly m a k e money from fellow Africans since mine management
had no direct need for them.
In fact, since the beginning most mine workers in Rhodesia were foreigners.
Rhodesian w o m e n found their way to the mines before the m e n , because the
latter strongly objected to working underground in the poor and dangerous
conditions prevailing in the mines.
Rhodesian w o m e n came to the mines not because there were jobs available,
but because the impact of capitalism had undermined their security in the rural
areas. With an increasing shortage of land those w o m e n w h o were no longer
married, i.e., widows and divorcees, often found themselves in precarious
70 Male rr — P e r la le
1
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1
F I G . 3. Africans in European areas, including towns, farms and mines.
positions. If their marriages had broken d o w n because of barrenness—and a

divorce for this reason was often accompanied by a witchcraft accusation—these
w o m e n were set adrift. W h e n the news spread that m a n y single m e n from other
countries were working in the mines, m a n y of these w o m e n expected to find
in these n e w labour centres the necessary means of supporting themselves, be
it as housekeepers or as casual companions of these workers. The few local
m e n w h o sought work in the mines were likewise marginal to their o w n society.
Van Onselen (1976, p. 181) writes about the period from 1902 to 1912:
Industrialization in Rhodesia . . . gave rise to a new group of Africans—a group
that manifested some sort of cultural synthesis by being largely composed of 'foreign'
black workers and local w o m e n . . . . By 1910 it was estimated that 4,000 of the
32,000 black m e n on the mines could be called 'habitual labourers'. M a n y if not
most of these workers originally came from the fringes of their societies to form part
of a lumpenproletariat in South Central Africa.
It is important to note that whereas the majority of m e n w h o came to the mines
were young, the majority of w o m e n were older. Hence relatively few children were
born to them and this has to some degree remained true even today, as can be
seen by comparing the population pyramids set out in Figures 1 and 3.
Yet the means of subsistence which the w o m e n expected to find in the

mining areas were more difficult to obtain than they had anticipated. S o m e
started brewing beer for miners, others entered into short-term domestic arrange-
ments with single m e n , but a large proportion felt obliged to set themselves u p
as prostitutes. Just as African m e n c a m e to sell their labour power, something
inherent in them as persons, so the w o m e n had to sell part of themselves which
touched their very personhood. Both had to enter into market relations, offering
whatever they had that had exchange value.
These new transactions brought immediate advantages to white employers.
For just as capitalists in the wider Rhodesian economy had realized that the
agricultural work of w o m e n in the villages brought them profits by reducing the
need to pay their labourers a wage that would reproduce them, so the mine
owners found that the single w o m e n on their mining compounds brought them
material advantages, for by cooking meals for their labourers they enabled them
to work harder underground. M o r e than this, the presence of w o m e n attracted
more labourers and those w h o had taken u p a contract lengthened its period
and so became even more productive. All that was needed to reduce the negative
effects of this arrangement, such as an undermining of the workers' health through
venereal diseases, was a control of prostitution.
For this reason mining companies set up medical checks. At Shamva M i n e
near Salisbury, for example, a committee of African w o m e n was appointed to
inspect n e w w o m e n w h o wanted to live in the compound; at Falcon Mine
w o m e n were 'compelled to carry a medical certificate' after examination by
a mine medical officer (van Onselen, 1976, p. 181).
Prostitution became particularly widespread in the mines during the 1920s
and 1930s w h e n the economy was depressed and all other incomes of w o m e n
ceased, such as remuneration for sewing, housekeeping, or from beer sales.
Prostitution proved more adjustable to the depression than other activities, for
although income decreased in this profession as well as in wage employ-
ment—between 1900 and 1910 prostitutes charged their clients ten to fifteen
shillings a night—during the 1920s they accepted as little as five shillings and
during the 1930s they were satisfied with a credit token which was to be
redeemed later. This arrangement proved possible because the number of
w o m e n w a s still exceedingly small in relation to the number of m e n .
V a n Onselen (1976, p. 178-9) s u m m e d u p this development as follows:
Once the redistributive economy of the traditional society was undermined it offered
little security to the young, the old, the powerless and those without kin, and when
the standard of living in the rural areas dropped, women who were not part of a
family production unit were increasingly vulnerable. Those who lost their access to
land were forced into the urban areas to seek cash and fend for themselves. But in
Rhodesia, unlike S. Africa where there was at least the possibility for women to be
taken into domestic service in white homes, the bulk of the housework was undertaken
by 'boys' and working opportunities for females were few. The overwhelming majority
of prostitutes in the Rhodesian compounds therefore were probably women without
close family who, for want of any other means of earning a living, were forced to sell
their bodies.
O n the European-owned farms, prostitution is also widespread and its prevalence
is again due to economic reasons. But here w o m e n have been able to obtain
some w a g e employment with the European owners, and their employment

opportunities are constantly increasing because of the lower wages customarily
paid to w o m e n . Clarke (1976, p . 15) writes:
Since 1956 the numbers of w o m e n workers have increased markedly, from 29,450
to 84,556 in 1975, thereby increasing the employer dependence on this source from
11.9 per cent to 24.7 per cent of total labour supply. Most of these workers have
been 'drawn' from farm compounds where a greater degree of 'labour stabilisation'
has taken place in the last two decades. Only an element of the female labour force
has however been employed on a permanent basis, but this appears to be an increasing
proportion of the permanent workers. The vast majority constitute a casual or seasonal
labour supply. In 1972, for instance, there were 17,992 w o m e n employed as 'permanent
and semi-permanent' workers in plantation agriculture. This was 6.3 per cent of all
African employees at the time and 26.9 per cent of all w o m e n so employed. W h a t
is striking is the fact that employers have placed relatively less dependence on perma-
nent labour vis-à-vis casual labour during the 1969-72 period, a trend which reflects
the lower price of the latter form of labour supply and the wage 'discrimination'
element whereby African w o m e n workers have received lower rates of pay than
men.
FIG. 4. Africans in Salisbury, 1958.
70 -Male Female -
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The underpayment of w o m e n in this situation is revealed by the following

figures: whereas the average cash earning of a permanent farm labourer—sub-
sidized by some income in kind—is $(R)9 a month, that of a casual worker
is only just over $(R)4 (Clarke, 1976, Appen. Table 3). Since most w o m e n in
agricultural employment are casual workers, they earn too little to support
themselves and, therefore, on the farms too m a n y w o m e n have to supplement
their income by prostitution. The objective conditions on farms and mine sites,
therefore, m a k e promiscuity a social necessity for the majority of the people
and so prostitution is a social and economic problem, and not, in thefirstplace,
a moral one. W o m e n in these employment centres are exploited in a double
sense, both as persons and as workers. Such exploitation was unknown in the
traditional system and is a direct result of the domination of the capitalist m o d e
of production over the communal or lineage modes.
In the urban areas the imbalance of the sexes is still greater than on mine sites
and farms. Comparing the population pyramids of Africans in Salisbury
in 1958 and 1969, some rectification over time of the sexual imbalance can be
observed. In 1958 the sex ratio was 235 m e n to every 100 w o m e n , today it is
more even. But even today there is a marked preponderance of m e n over w o m e n ,
F I G . 5. Africans in Salisbury, 1969.
70 Male- Female-
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
especially in the lower-income groups. Family accommodation is more readily

available to white-collar workers, especially to professionals, than to manual
workers w h o mostly have to live in single-sex hostels. These latter still seek
companionship from w o m e n w h o , like themselves, live in single quarters and,
since w o m e n of this economic stratafindit even more difficult than m e n to find
self-supporting work, prostitution again becomes a necessary source of income
for them. A very high percentage of m e n living in single quarters are in fact
married, but they have to leave their families in the rural areas because their
wages are too low to support their wives and children in town. It is from these
underpaid workers w h o have their income supplemented by the agricultural
labour of their wives that the capitalist sector draws most of its profits. The wives
of these m e n occasionally visit their husbands in town, and the m e n regularly visit
their rural families, taking to them whatever savings they have been able to make.
By these visits they assert their right to settle in the villages once their active
working life is over, but as long as it lasts couples in this economic category are
unable to live a regular married life.
The w o m e n w h o m o v e to town fall roughly into three categories. First,
the wives of well-paid employees w h o experience few difficulties in budgeting
family income to meet the needs of their families. These families live in better,
middle-class suburbs, like K a m b a z u m a , a township included in this survey.
S o m e of these wives are themselves professionals and earn a good salary of
their o w n . Secondly, the wives of poorly paid urban workers w h o nevertheless,
for a variety of reasons, have followed their husbands to the towns. These
w o m e n find it often impossible to budget their husbands' wages in such a way
as to provide sufficient food for their families throughout the month. M a n y
of them, therefore, send their children back to the rural areas to let them
grow u p with their relatives and attend a rural school. In this w a y the chil-
dren not only reduce the cost of urban living, but they also maintain their
parents' right to an eventual retirement in the village. Those poor families
w h o keep their children with them in town tend to experience great stress and
hardship.
Thirdly, there are the single w o m e n , most of w h o m arrive in the towns
for similar reasons as w o m e n w h o go to the farms and mines. In contrast to the
latter, however, m a n y of these urban migrants have primary education, though
not enough to enable them to obtain well-paid jobs. Most of them, therefore,
take up w o r k as domestic servants and, since wages for domestic servants are too
low to meet their needs, these w o m e n too often drift into prostitution. The tight
budget on which most single w o m e n have to operate can be seen from the
followingfigures:in 1969 the average expenditure of twenty-four single w o m e n
in Fort Victoria consisted of: $(R)13 spent on food and $(R)1 on drink, this
accounts for 50 per cent of their total expenditure; about $(R)4 was paid for
rent, $(R)8 for a variety of needs, such as clothing, soap, kerosene, etc.; and
an average of some $(R)1 was set aside for school fees, for some w o m e n had
children w h o m they had left with relatives in rural areas, but for whose education
they had to pay. These various items already amount to $(R)27 (Weinrich,
1976, Tables, 20-8, p. 270-2). In addition to this expenditure, 58 per cent of the
w o m e n felt an acute need for saving: 42 per cent to provide for their children's
education, 11 per cent as an insurance against emergencies, and 5 per cent to
purchase some property (Weinrich, 1976, Table 19, p. 270). Yet the average
domestic female servant is paid only $(R)9 a month (Weinrich, 1976, p. 235),
and this proves once again that many single w o m e n have to rely on prostitution
as the only way out of their difficulties.
In spite of the economic difficulties they encounter, these single w o m e n are
more firmly town-rooted than the m e n . This is often due to the simple fact that
they cannot easily return to their villages where they have no means of support
and where self-respecting villagers do not readily accept them. A subsidiary
survey carried out in Fort Victoria showed that whereas 61 per cent of all m e n
were determined to return to their villages, only 37 per cent of the w o m e n
wanted to return to the country; and to the question of the time they intended
to stay in town, 33 per cent of the m e n but 74 per cent of the w o m e n stated
that they wanted to stay there indefinitely (Weinrich, 1967, p. 267).
Employment opportunities for African w o m e n have always been m u c h
worse than those for m e n , both because fewer jobs are available to them and
because those which are available are lower paying than those offered to m e n .
Thus in 1956 only 7.4 per cent of all African labourers were w o m e n and by 1961,
due to the departure of m a n y Europeans in the wake of political uncertainties,
this percentage had fallen to 5.9 per cent. This is predominantly an indication
of the loss of jobs a m o n g domestic servants. By 1969, after a temporary recovery
of the Rhodesian economy and the arrival of new white settlers, more domestic
servant positions became available and the number of w o m e n in employment
rose. By 1974, w o m e n constituted 127,000 (13.6 per cent) of the total African
labour force (Hawkins, 1976, p. 25).
A breakdown of this employment market for African w o m e n shows that
in 1974 16.4 per cent were domestic servants, 5.2 per cent were employed in the
manufacturing industries and 3.4 per cent were teachers. S o m e 9 per cent were
employed in various services, a small percentage as nurses, a slightly larger
percentage as clerks or in the distribution industries. Yet the large majority,
namely 64 per cent, were still employed in agriculture.
In whatever employment sector, African w o m e n are doubly discrimi-
nated against, both because of their race and because of their sex. Thus as a
teacher with a university degree an African w o m a n earns $(R)249.50 a month,
an African m a n $(R)313.25, a European w o m a n $(R)327 and a European
m a n $(R)339.75. Should an African w o m a n merely have an approved teacher
training of two years, she will be paid $(R)169 a month, but an African m a n
with the same qualification will earn $(R)207, a European w o m a n $(R)244.25
and a European m a n $(R)273.75 (Whitsun Foundation, 1976, p. 25).
M y survey of domestic servants in Fort Victoria, based on 25 per cent of
all non-African households, shows that whereas 34 per cent of all male servants
earn over $(R)13 a month, 15 per cent even over $(R)17, only 3 per cent of all
w o m e n servants earn over $(R)13 and none as m u c h as $(R)17 (Weinrich,
1976, p. 235). This unequal pay shows that it is advantageous for an employment
agency, be this a government ministry or a private person, to hire African
w o m e n rather than m e n .
Self-employment in trade is mainly confined to married w o m e n , because
most of the traders have been set up with the initial capital advanced by their
husbands. Most market vendors are w o m e n and so are m a n y shop assistants.
Their incomes are rarely high and are generally intended to supplement those
of their husbands.
W o m e n w h o find factory jobs are considered fortunate, for factory work is
difficult to obtain and reasonably well paid. A young w o m a n reported her
experience of finding a factory job as follows.
When I was looking for a job I just realized that academic standard plays a bigger
roll [sic] in chance [opportunity] especially to those who are trained in particular
jobs. But m y case was different. I had to face the hard way. I had to walk from gate
to gate of eachfirmand any site that showed chance of getting employment. Appli-
cations were utterly useless. I had to walk until I got a job. As a girl there were boys
who rushed after m e like dogs. . . . There was very plenty of disappointment and
despair. (Dorcey, 1975, p. 160.)
W o m e n w h o have obtained a secondary education have some chance of finding

clerical employment. Dorcey, analysing a small sample offifty-ninefemale
African secondary school-leavers, found that 34 per cent of them were employed
by government and 30 per cent by Christian missions; most of these will be
teachers and nurses. Another 4 per cent were employed by large and 14 per cent
by small European firms, and 12 per cent by African and 2 per cent by small
Asian firms; most of these will be secretaries, but some m a y d o manual work.
The rest gave no answer (Dorcey, 1975, p . 159).
Most of the w o m e n teachers in towns w h o m I personally interviewed had
previously been employed by missionaries in rural schools. They had generally
initiated their transfers to urban areas because they expected to find better
service and living conditions there. Teachers see themselves as a privileged
class. Their long vacations and their above-average salaries give them a freedom
available to few other African employees. Professional w o m e n constitute a very
small proportion of the African population, but because of the prestige they
enjoy their influence is far in excess of their numbers.
The small number of female professionals in the total labour force is due to
the very restricted educational facilities available to Africans and this, in turn,
is directly related to the overall low needs of the capitalist economy for skilled
black manpower. For if education were available to Africans to the same degree
that it is available to Europeans, the present class structure based on race
could not be maintained. The educational hurdles Africans have to overcome
are discussed below.
Unemployment a m o n g African w o m e n is especially wide-spread a m o n g
younger w o m e n and this means that it will increase rapidly in the near future.
The 1969 population census, which defined 4,460 w o m e n as 'active w o r k
seekers', i.e. as w o m e n w h o during the week preceding the census had looked
for work, showed that 2,880 (64.6 per cent) of them were less than 25 years old
(Clarke, 1977, p. 31). The scarcity of jobs for w o m e n is graphically demonstrated
by the following chance incident: in April 1976 the Deputy Minister for Internal
Affairs advertised forty-nine jobs for African w o m e n and received 1,800 appli-
cations (Clarke, 1977, p. 78, note 39).
The serious dimensions of unemployment and underemployment of large
sections of the African population, including w o m e n , shows the partial character
of Rhodesian industrialization which has brought advantages to only a small
section of the population. Since mechanization in industry will proceed, the

present uneven development will be intensified. But since this unevenness will
not reduce the rate of profit for the owners of the means of production, little effort
can be expected to rectify it, especially not since it will weaken even further the
already weak position of the African working class.
The educational handicaps of African w o m e n derive from two sources: in
thefirstplace, there is an overall government policy to offer only limited edu-
cational opportunities to Africans, for, as stated above, the economy has n o
r o o m for a large educated African work-force; educated workers would demand
higher wages, and this would reduce the employers' profit. T o maintain the
dominant class division between Africans and Europeans, the Rhodesian
Government has m a d e education compulsory for every European child, though
only about 34.5 per cent of all African children of school age attend school and
most of these receive only lower primary education: thus some 55 per cent of
all children aged 5-9 years are in school, some 34 per cent of all children
aged 10-14, but only 5 per cent of all teenagers between 15 and 20 years of age
(Whitsun Foundation, 1977, Tables 1, 2).
During the early years of white settlement in Rhodesia, education was
considered irrelevant and even harmful to African employees, and Christian
missionaries w h o considered education essential in their work of winning
converts faced strong opposition from white farmers and mine owners. Govern-
ment itself did not open schools for Africans until 1920, although it granted some
subsidies to the missions for their educational work on the condition that
missionaries inculcated in their pupils 'habits of discipline and cleanliness' and
so helped to create a working class which had respect for its employers and
accepted unquestioningly the m a x i m of the 'dignity of labour'.
During the federal period when the economy expanded, industries became
interested in a stable labour force and government saw the need for junior civil
servants in its various ministries. T o meet the requirements of the expanding
capitalist system, educational institutions for Africans were extended. Sec-
ondary schools were opened and a multiracial university was established. M a n y
African teachers and nurses were trained. Soon multinational corporations
began employing African personnel managers and even African lawyers were
allowed to open their chambers. A n African middle class was created. Yet most
of the educated members of this n e w bourgeoisie were m e n ; w o m e n continued
to face great difficulties in gaining access to institutions of higher learning.
This was due to a second barrier erected in the educational system. For
since African education is not free as is education for European children, and
since African parents have little m o n e y for school fees, theyfirstprovide for their
sons in the expectation that these will later on support, through their higher
salaries m a d e possible through education, other members of their extended
family. W o m e n , w h o at marriage leave their parents, cannot support them in
their old age and so African parents are not as eager to send their daughters
to school as they are to educate their sons. M a n y fathers argue that their
daughters' education will only profit their future sons-in-law. A s late as the 1960s
parents also feared that the mixing of young people at boarding schools would
corrupt their daughters' morals, enduce them to seek urban employment and
so endanger their parents' prospects for bridewealth; for should their daughters
drift into prostitution, no self-respecting person would pay a marriage remuner-

ation for them. In barring their daughters' access to education, they hoped to
prevent them from migrating to the towns. T h e effects of this educational
discrimination against w o m e n can be seen from Table 2.
Table 2 sets out both the actual education achieved by 10,890 adults in m y
sample and the distribution of African pupils as recorded in official government
statistics in 1976. A comparison of these two sets of figures shows that few
improvements have occurred over the years. Thus, whereas of the present adult
population almost half of all the persons w h o have been to school are w o m e n ,
a m o n g the present school population w o m e n constitute only 45.6 per cent.
O n the other hand, more w o m e n are achieving secondary education today than
they did in the past and this means that more w o m e n are likely to become
professionals.
Since income in the capitalist sector depends on education, the very uneven
distribution of education in the country leads to very different degrees of wealth
in the various Rhodesian communities. The most significant differences in edu-
cational achievements are between persons in tribal areas, urban areas and on
European-owned farms and mines. In addition to these, there are differences in
educational achievements between the various ethnic groups. These differences
are set out in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3 shows that higher education is most c o m m o n in urban areas where
only 11 per cent of all w o m e n are illiterate and unable to speak English. O n the
other hand, 8 per cent of all urban w o m e n have been to secondary schools and
some of them have obtained professional qualifications. This large proportion of
educated w o m e n in the towns is the necessary consequence of the pull of the
urban economy which constantly attracts people with special skills and so
drains the rural areas of their most educated people. Thus 36 per cent of all
w o m e n in the T T L s and PAs are totally illiterate and only 1 per cent have been to
secondary schools. These latter are generally lower primary school teachers and
assistant nurses w h o have received rudimentary training. Until the early 1970s
when government removed primary education from the churches, most of these
teachers were employed by missionaries.
One group of African w o m e n in the rural areas stands apart from all others.
These are w o m e n w h o have joined a religious congregation and as Sisters engage
in teaching and nursing. A complete census of one such congregation, taken in
the early 1960s, shows that of seventy-one Sisters, 32 per cent were trained
nurses, 30 per cent teachers, 6 per cent in charge of boarding establishments and
32 per cent engaged in domestic work. These w o m e n live in their o w n
communities on central mission stations and control to a significant degree the
various educational and health institutions run by the Catholic Church (Aquina,
1967, p. 20).
In addition to the small number of professional w o m e n in the rural areas, a
few w o m e n with primary education have been placed in charge of small shops
owned by either their husbands or by their brothers. Their kinsmen-employers
expect them to be capable of some basic arithmetic and book-keeping. In general,
shopkeepers are m u c h more satisfied with w o m e n shop assistants than with
m e n , claiming that the former are less likely to pocket some of the profits than
are m e n .
T h e effects of economic changes 39
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The least-educated w o m e n drift to the farms and mines. T h e last set of
figures on Table 3 shows that some 60 per cent of all w o m e n in these communities
are totally illiterate and 25 per cent barely literate. Taking into account the very
unskilled w o r k available to them and the exeedingly low wages they earn, it is
understandable that better qualified persons will not go to the farms and mines.
A few w o m e n with some secondary education have been employed as semi-
qualified teachers in the farm and mine schools.
Table 4 breaks d o w n the educational achievements of rural w o m e n by
ethnic grouping. The table shows that Shona w o m e n are m u c h better educated
than Ndebele w o m e n or w o m e n living in the remote communities in the north-
west of the country. T h e previous chapter stressed the m u c h more significant
economic contribution of Shona w o m e n to precolonial food production. T h e
very factors which prevented Ndebele w o m e n from making a more significant
economic contribution then have also prevented the acceptance of education
a m o n g the Ndebele as an ethnic group. For their pastoral and raiding economy
set obstacles to formal education. Ndebele youth herded cattle and so could not
go to school and parents saw no reason to send their daughters to school. A s a
consequence, the Ndebele turned to a m u c h larger degree in on themselves than
did the Shona and so failed to acquire the basic skills which would have enabled
them to find a better foothold in the new capitalist economy. A further conse-
quence of this has been thefillingof all better-paid posts in the country—even
in Bulawayo, the city right in the heart of Ndebeland—by Shona. This, in turn,
has intensified ethnic tensions inherited from the past. A s a result of this treble
discrimination—race, sex and cultural obstacles—very few Ndebele w o m e n have
become professionals.
Changes in African attitudes towards their children's education have been
summarized by a m e m b e r of the Patriotic Front as follows:
Atfirstboys were sent to school, because the boys were to go and work in town to
earn money for their families. W o m e n had to work hard in thefieldsso that the
children could go to school. Soon more and more parents began to think that their
children should go to school in order that they would be able tofightpolitically for
therightsof the African people. At that stage both boys and girls were sent to school
and parents sold everything they had to obtain school fees for their children. But
soon it was realized that even if Africans obtained secondary education, job reservation
prevented them from using their knowledge effectively. Hence we found that education
to obtain work and to fit us for the political struggle was insufficient. What we needed
was not formal education but the armed struggle. A n d so we crossed the borders and
trained for that.1
By the mid-1970s, the war of liberation had accelerated to such a degree that not
only the Rhodesian economy, but also the African educational system had
disintegrated. M o r e and m o r e young people were crossing the borders to join
the liberation forces. This crossing of the borders had reached a new intensity in
1. Translated from an interview by Ruvimbo Tekere, Liga Actuell, 1977, p . 32-3.

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M a r c h 1975 w h e n forty boys and three girls from forms four, five and six of a
mission school in eastern Rhodesia crossed into M o z a m b i q u e . B y M a r c h 1977,
it was reported that 25,000 African children were missing from the school rolls
(Rhodesian Herald, 12 M a r c h 1977). B y April, their number had risen to 36,000
(Daily News, 2 April 1977) and by August to 56,000 (Rhodesian Herald,
17 August 1977). Towards the end of September 1977 the Rhodesian Ministry
of Education reported that 378 African primary and fourteen secondary schools
had been closed since 1976 (The Times, 1 September 1977). These constituted
10 per cent of all African schools in the country. B y February 1978,438 African
primary and sixteen African secondary schools had been closed and more than
90,000 children were 'without education' (Sunday Times, 19 February 1978),
most of w h o m had crossed the borders.
The war situation has had a radicalizing effect on most w o m e n in the rural
areas, both those still living in villages and those confined to camps, called
'protected villages' by the government. B y 1977, the government had resettled
about 1 million of the rural people into c a m p s which were fenced with barbed
wire and patrolled by armed guards. T h e government designed this resettlement
to prevent people from co-operating with the liberation army. Confinement in
these camps and curfews during most hours of the day and night have m a d e
normal agriculture impossible. The people suffer from severe overcrowding and
lack of food. C o n d e m n e d to economic inactivity, exposed to unheard of hard-
ships and witnessing the torture of their husbands and children, as well as being
themselves objects of army aggression, these w o m e n have become strong sym-
pathizers of the liberation movement (Weinrich, 1977, p. 207-29). The other
w o m e n w h o still live outside these camps help the guerrillas as carriers, provide
them with information, food, and shelter, and like the w o m e n in the camps eagerly
accept their social teaching. M a n y w o m e n have been shot by the security forces
for 'running with and assisting terrorists'. A Zimbabwean militant observed:
'Zimbabwean w o m e n have fully supported the struggle. They have allowed and
even encouraged their children, including girls, to join their comrades in the
struggle even if it might m e a n death' (Zimbabwe Review, Vol. 7, N o . 1, 1978).
A s a result of these events, large sections of the population are prepared for
radical changes and this includes changes in the position of w o m e n in the future
Z i m b a b w e . During the liberation war w o m e n have proved themselves as equals
to the m e n in courage and commitment to the national goal of a free and inde-
pendent Z i m b a b w e .
The abolition of sexual discrimination

in the new Zimbabwe
Ngara (1978, p. 23-4) writes that w o m e n in Z i m b a b w e , just as w o m e n elsewhere,

have accepted a passive role in society relative to m e n . This is probably the direct
result of man's domination of w o m e n , but are w e to put all the blame on man? Not
entirely. T o condone the complacency of w o m e n in this regard is like condoning the
passivity of oppressed people w h o realize that they are oppressed but wait for the
oppressor to free them from oppression. Such people will never be free. M e n , w o m e n
and the young should join hands in the struggle for freedom, independence and social
justice. W o m e n have already played an important role in the present struggle for
justice. In an independent Zimbabwe they should be urged to play a much more
active role in the affairs of the nation.
A s shown above, w o m e n have already begun to live u p to this challenge. A

survey offiftyw o m e n in the liberation and refugee camps in Mozambique gives
some interesting insights into the origin, present activities and future aspirations
of w o m e n w h o are intensely concerned about the future of their country. O n e
striking characteristic of these w o m e n is their youth; thirty-six (72 per cent) are
between 15 and 19 years of age, thirteen (26 per cent) between 20 and 24 years,
and only one (2 per cent) between 25 and 29 years. Hence, the desire for a new
society comes especially from the young. The young people, however, c o m e
from every section of the Rhodesian society and neither town nor countryside
provides more recruits than the other. Thus thirty-one w o m e n (62 per cent)
come from TTLs—about that very percentage of all Africans live in tribal
areas—three (6 per cent) c o m e from P A s and 32 per cent from the towns. N o r
is recruitment confined to any particular economic category, for these young
w o m e n c o m e from rich and poor families in about the same proportion as rich
and poor are present in Rhodesian society. Their only differentiating charac-
teristic is that they have a higher average education than the rest of Rhodesian
w o m e n . Thus none of thefiftyw o m e n is illiterate and all have been to school
for several years: twenty-four (48 per cent) have about completed their primary
education, ten (20per cent) have studied for one or two years in secondary schools,
and fourteen (28 per cent) have been for three or four years in secondary schools.
But m a n y left just before completing their educational grade in their eagerness
to join the liberation struggle. Thus thirty-four (68 per cent) left straight from
school; nine (18 per cent) gave up employment, several of them had been teachers;
and only seven (14 per cent) had been living in their villages engaging in
agriculture. Most of them, namely thirty-three (66 per cent), left h o m e for the
express purpose of joining the liberation movement in order to create a new and
better Zimbabwe; they also wanted to take an active part in the war effort.
Fifteen (30 per cent) had left h o m e because they could no longer bear the
brutalities of the security forces in their villages, and two (4 per cent) stated that
they hoped for better educational opportunities in the liberation camps than
existed in their h o m e areas. Onlyfifteen(30 per cent) had consulted their parents
before leaving; thirty-five (70 per cent) left quietly, fearing opposition. It is a very
important step for young African w o m e n to do anything which might lead to
a break with their parents, for their whole upbringing binds them strongly to
their families, especially to their mothers.
A s far as the equality of w o m e n with m e n is concerned, all stated that there

was no sexual division of labour in the camps. M e n and w o m e n shared all tasks
in c o m m o n , whether these were of an agricultural, domestic or defensive nature.
Every w o m a n underwent some military training and five (10 per cent) did this
to the exclusion of almost all other activities. Six (12 per cent) combined military
training with education, either as teachers or students or both; for m a n y children
have c o m e to the refugee camps and these have to be taught by those with higher
education. The education given in the camps differs greatly from that given inside
Rhodesia and hence the teachers themselves have to undergo a re-education. For
all teaching in the camps has to conform to the ideals of the liberation movement
and so the teachers' teaching and their o w n learning dovetail. Ngara (1978,
p. 38) writes:
The type of education brought by colonialism is elitist and bourgeois orientated. It

does not teach the pupil to be of service to the community but encourages Western
individualism and selfish acquisitiveness.
The great majority of w o m e n , thirty-nine (78 per cent), combine military training
with production, mainly with agricultural work, for the liberation army wants
its cadres and refugees to become as self-sufficient in food as possible.
The shape of the future life in Zimbabwe is slowly emerging in these camps.
People are trying to find out the best way of communal living and communal
work. In all the camps, both production and consumption is communal.
Everyone shares in the work and the c a m p administration makes no distinction
in allocating tasks between m e n and w o m e n . All take part in discussions and in
electing their administrative bodies. Often w o m e n have still tofightfor recog-
nition as equals, especially in the domestic sphere. T o illustrate this struggle
one w o m a n told m e that until recently, when a group offightersreturned late at
night and wanted food, they always woke u p some w o m e n comrades to cook
for them; but slowly they learned that the w o m e n insisted that they look u p on
the chart which group was responsible for cooking that week, and more often
than not that group consisted of m e n comrades. Hence, they had to knock at
the male barracks for cooks.
These small day-to-day events show that a number of Zimbabwean w o m e n
have already shed their traditional passivity and have begun to insist on equality
in quite concrete situations. The fact that m a n y w o m e n come from secondary
schools where they had been taught by teachers w h o themselves had been imbued
with the new ideology has no doubt influenced them, for the higher institutes of
learning in southern Africa are at present experiencing a revolutionary ferment.
The w o m e n in the military and refugee camps in Mozambique are almost
unanimous in their expectations for the future Zimbabwe: forty-eight (96 per
cent) demand and expect that in a free Zimbabwe all sexual discrimination will
fall away and that m e n and w o m e n will have equal access to education and to
jobs. They oppose any discrimination in pay based on sex and are convinced
that such equality will be an effective way of countering the present widespread
prostitution; for prostitution, as this chapter has shown, is a direct conse-
quence of the current economic discrimination against w o m e n . The liberation
movement has written into its code of conduct thefightagainst prostitution and
thisfightis also announced in some of the songs sung in the camps, such as
Kune Nzirct dze Masoja which is played every evening during the party broadcast
on Radio Mozambique.
But more urgently than mere formal equality in the employment situation,
w o m e n want a say in the day-to-day affairs of production and equality in the
h o m e , and this will be more difficult to achieve than the former. Domestic
equality will be examined in the next chapter.
3 Changes in
family structure
To institute the political equality of men and women in the Soviet state was one
problem and the simplest. A much more difficult one was the next—that of insti-
tuting the industrial equality of women and men in the factories, the mills, and the
trade unions and of doing it in such a way that the men should not put the women
to disadvantage. But to achieve the actual equality of men and women within the
family is an infinitely more arduous problem. All our domestic habits must be
revolutionized. (Trotsky, 1923.)
Husband-wife relationships
under the communal mode of production
The previous chapters have shown that the delayed return system of peasant
agriculture makes w o m e n and young m e n strongly dependent on the head of
their household, for he controls the means of production and has therefore the
power to regulate labour and to determine the use to which surplus will be put.
Meillassoux (1972, p. 99-100) sees in this arrangement
the material and temporal basis of the emergence of the 'family' as a productive
and cohesive unit and of 'kinship' as an ideology; priority of the relations between
people over the relations to things; life time duration of personal and social bonds;
concern for reproduction, notions of seniority and of anteriority, respect for age,
cult of the ancestors, fecundity cult, etc. All these featuresfindtheir roots in the social
conditions of agricultural production and underlying this is the use of the land as an
instrument of labour. . . . These relations of production are materialized through a
redistributive system of circulation.
In the earlier chapters I have argued that the control of m e n over the means of
production has given rise to a kind of class division. This class division, however,
did not lead to open class antagonism because the surplus produced by w o m e n
had only a use-, not an exchange-value, and this meant that since the needs of a
household remained fairly constant, the intensity of exploitation, too, remained
fairly uniform (Terray, 1975, p. 98-9). This is an important difference to exploi-
Changes in family structure 47
tation in the capitalist system where the exchange-value of commodities induces

the owners of the means of production to increase their profit by increasing the
rate of exploitation. A s a result of the even pace and regularity of traditional
exploitation, w o m e n became so accustomed to it that they accepted it as part of
the natural order of life.
A husband and father as head of a household derived from this economic
control his dominant position in the family and full authority over his wives and
children. H e was respected and feared because everybody realized his power over
them. His word had always to be obeyed and those w h o aroused his displeasure
were physically punished. Thus a m a n could beat his wives and his children and,
what was considered worse by a wife than being beaten, a husband could refuse
to accept her food for this meant that he was withdrawing her conjugal
rights and this struck deep at their very relationship. Hence w o m e n tried to
appease their husbands on these occasions by offering them choice food, such
as chicken, in order to restore the strained or broken relationship; a husband
was always free to accept or reject this gift of atonement. A repeated refusal by
a husband to accept such signs of submission meant that the marital relationship
was coming to an end, even though no formal divorce or expulsion of the w o m a n
from the village took place.
M e n stood for lineage unity and continuity. All the m e n of a village belonged
to the same lineage and had 'the same blood', whereas w o m e n , due to virilocality
and exogamy, c a m e from different villages and lineages. The unity of the m e n ,
as against the unrelatedness of the w o m e n , was daily expressed in the eating
arrangements: for whereas all m e n of a village ate in c o m m o n , either under a
large tree in the village centre or in a special shelter built for this purpose, and
whereas all wives dutifully brought to this place the food they had cooked for
their husbands, they themselves and their children ate separately in their o w n
huts. Even in a polygamous household each wife prepared food for her husband,
but each wife ate alone with her o w n children whatever food her husband left
over for her.
The bond of each w o m a n with the wider village community was through her
husband, but there were no bonds uniting the w o m e n among themselves. In
fact, rivalries were c o m m o n a m o n g w o m e n , especially a m o n g co-wives as they
competed with each other for the favours of their c o m m o n husband. At times
such rivalries gave rise to witchcraft accusations. It is significant that most of
these occurred between w o m e n rather than between m e n and w o m e n , and never
between the m e n of a village because all of the m e n were blood relatives and it
was considered unthinkable that blood relatives should bewitch each other.
Such accusations would split the unity of the group and undermine their c o m m o n
economic interests. Divisions a m o n g w o m e n , on the other hand, facilitated male
dominance in the h o m e .
The continuity of the lineage and extended family, essential for the conti-
nuity of the lineage m o d e of production, was expressed through the importance
attached to the father-son bond. H s u ( 1971, p. 5), in an important anthropological
study of dominant kinship dyads, writes that if any one kinship relationship
becomes dominant in a society, its influence will extend to all other relationships
and so shape the entire kinship system. In a society, for example, in which the
father-son dyad is dominant, the intrinsic attributes of the husband-wife dyad
will be so influenced by the intrinsic attributes of the father-son dyad that the
former relationship will be greatly reduced in importance (Hsu, 1971, p. 33).
Since in precolonial Zimbabwean families prime importance w a s given to
the father-son relationship, the relationship between husbands and wives was
necessarily of secondary importance. A m a n valued a son more than a wife
because a son belonged to his o w n lineage and carried it on after his death; but
a wife was not an integral member of his lineage; yet he needed her so that she
would bear him sons. The father-son dyad stands by its nature for continuity,
because every father was once a son and every son hopes one day to become a
father. T o strengthen this continuity a m a n preferred to marry more than one
wife and hence polygamy was valued. Likewise divorce which endangered this
continuity was avoided.
The reasons w h y a m a n should value the continuity of his family were
primarily based on property concerns: he wanted an heir to w h o m he could pass
on his wealth. A m o n g both the Shona and the Ndebele wealth was counted in
livestock, and cattle meant prestige and the possibility of more wives and chil-
dren. N o m a n wanted his cattle to go to anybody but his legitimate heir. T h e
ideological justification for this concern for a legitimate heir was found in the
belief system, for the people maintained that immortality and life after death
depended on their descendants, for only if these offered them libations and
remembered them during religious rituals, would they become ancestors and be
able to influence the lives of their descendants.
Yet to have an heir of his o w n blood to w h o m property could safely be
entrusted, a m a n had to have the absolute surety that the child born to him by
his wife was truly his and not the child of an adulterous union. Hence great
emphasis was placed on the chastity of w o m e n . The ideal bride was a virgin and
an adulterous wife was divorced, for such w o m e n endangered the correct transfer
of property within a man's lineage. People expressed this concern for a wife's
faithfulness by stating that an unfaithful wife brought disgrace to her husband.
The demand for marital faithfulness extended only to w o m e n , not to m e n .
Since the men's adultery was of n o account as far as family property was
concerned, it was condoned. A s a consequence, a husband had exclusive sexual
rights over his wife, but a wife had n o such exclusive rights over her husband.
These unequal rights are a further instance of the inferior position of w o m e n in
traditional society. T h e w o m e n ' s inferior sexual position is the direct consequence
of the importance of property vested in m e n . Engels (1976, p. 72-6) pointed this
out w h e n he wrote that as soon as private property was acquired, ' m o n o g a m y
[was] only for the w o m a n , but not for the m a n ' , and in families 'based not on
natural but on economic conditions' adultery 'became an unavoidable social
institution'.
Although both the Ndebele and the Shona possessed property, the amount
of property and its source varied and this led to significant differences in the
kinship structures of these two ethnic groups. A m o n g the Shona, where the
creation of surplus value depended on the agricultural labour of w o m e n and
where crops were harvested once a year, continuity was of greater importance
than a m o n g the Ndebele where raiding parties could at any time replenish
insufficient food stores. A prerequisite for continuity are deep lineages, stable
marriages and large local settlements whose nuclear families can co-operate in
agricultural production, and these traits therefore characterised Shona society.

A m o n g the Ndebele, on the other hand, where the lineage was overlaid with the
regimental system based o n age, lineages remained shallow, and since the labour
of w o m e n was less essential in their pastoral economy than in the agricultural
economy of the Shona, marriage stability too was of lesser importance. Moreover,
the minor role of agriculture in Ndebele economy rendered co-operation in
cultivation and harvesting unimportant and so settlements did not need to be
large. Often they consisted of no more than a m a n and his wife or wives and
children, and perhaps an ageing parent. Because of the overtowering economic
contribution of the Ndebele husband, his authority in the h o m e was even greater
than that of the Shona husband and the position of his wife weaker than that of a
Shona wife.
Wealth, however, i.e. cattle, had to be passed on to a legitimate heir and
hence the presence and legitimacy of offspring had to be assured. Consequently,
the Ndebele, like the Shona, watched carefully over the chastity of their daughters
and wives.
Changes in the husband-wife relationship under colonialism
Bloch (1975, p. 222) writes that 'since . . . kinship [under the communal pro-
duction] is itself part of the m o d e of production, it changes directly in reaction
to changes in the m o d e of production'. Such changes have occurred a m o n g both
the Shona and the Ndebele, though the reaction of these societies has varied in
accordance with the differences in their economic infrastructures.
The impetus for changes in both societies came from the outside, from the
new capitalist formation, and the direction of the changes was in both cases
away from kinship to contractual relations. Hence kinship lost its dominance
and ceased to be part of the economic infrastructure. It has been pushed into the
realm of superstructure where it has to justify new economic arrangements.
The period of capitalist penetration in Rhodesia can be regarded as a period
during which the African family has been thrown into aflux.For during this
period of instability various new and mutually antagonistic forms of family life
have emerged in response to the altered economic infrastructure, and over the
years the dominant father-son dyad has been replaced by the husband-wife,
and also by the mother-child dyad. With each new change the kinship group has
been narrowed d o w n until finally, in certain circumstances of extreme economic
exploitation, little more than the biological bond between mother and child has
remained. These changes do not necessarily follow in historic sequence, for they
are adaptations to varying economic circumstances. Hence n e w patterns shade
into one another even though the pattern most suitable to a particular economic
situation is in most instances clearly visible.
RURAL COMMUNITIES
Since the majority of people still live in T T L s , the father-son bond continues to
dominate kinship relations, even though male dominance is taking new forms.
The need of the capitalist system to preserve as m u c h of the traditional social
structure as possible in order to retain the tribal areas as cheap labour reserves
is partly responsible for this.
The most important change in rural family life is that lineage unity and
continuity are becoming less important and so the kinship system assumes a
new function. Instead of being part of the infrastructure regulating production,
it has become a welfare institution. Production is n o w divided between an
emasculated rural economy whose centres lie outside the rural communities
themselves and the centres of capitalist production. This division of labour
between subsistence and cash economy has had very negative effects on both
the traditional economy and on family life. For husbands have become visitors
in their o w n homes during holidays from wage employment and married couples
are forced to spend most of their married lives apart from each other. T h e
pastoralism of the Ndebele as well as the agriculturalism of the Shona have
both become unviable systems. Figures derived from m y survey, based on
513 Ndebele and 1,835 Shona rural households, show that the average Ndebele
family has merely some $(R)12 a month at its disposal, and this includes the
cash equivalents of their agricultural and pastoral products; the average Shona
family has some $(R)30. T h efirstsection of Table 5 1 sets out the earnings of
all rural Africans.
T A B L E 5. Monthly income
Other
employment
Rural areas Urban areas centres Total
Income Per- Per- Per- Per-

(*(R)) No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
0-4 590 24.5 37 2.0 627 12.0

5-24 1,351 56.1 737 40.5 661 65.4 2,749 52.5
25-^4 291 12.1 650 35.7 202 20.0 1,143 21.8
45-64 98 4.0 168 9.2 87 8.6 353 6.7
65-84 36 1.5 83 4.6 33 3.3 152 2.9
85-104 23 1.0 68 3.8 18 1.8 109 2.1
105-124 18 0.7 31 1.7 7 0.7 56 1.1
125-144 2 0.1 13 0.7 2 0.2 17 0.3
145-164 12 0.7 12 0.2
165-184 11 0.6 11 0.2
185-204 9 0.5 9 0.2
TOTAL 2,409 100 1,819 100 1,010 100 5,238 100
If this income is broken d o w n between Shona and Ndebele, the following

differences in the economic position of these two ethnic groups can be seen:
91 per cent of all Ndebele have an income of between $(R)5 and $(R)24 a month,
1. In this and the following tables, individual communities are combined in order to reduce the
number of tables which would otherwise be required. In m y analysis, however, I shall make use
of the returns from individual communities whenever these show significant differences. In this
section, I shall draw special attention to the differences among the Shona and Ndebele, since
their previously different modes of production give rise to significant differences even in the
current setting.
only eight families (1.6 per cent) earn between $(R)25 and $(R)44. The rest
were unable to state their income or thought that they never had more than a
few shillings at their disposal. This throws into relief the considerable larger
income distribution of the rural Shona, some of w h o m earn u p to $(R)100 a
month; only 38 per cent of them are in the $(R)5 to $(R)24 income bracket.
Poverty has a profound effect on family life. Therefore, I shall start m y
analysis of husband-wife relationships with an examination of the financial
aspects of rural families.
The most important alteration which has occurred in rural families is that
money has become indispensable and unless a m a n has become a successful
farmer w h o can regularly sell a surplus, he must look for paid employment out-
side his community. Cash income from agriculture is most c o m m o n in P A s ; in
the T T L s only some 3 per cent of progressive peasants have sufficient crops to
sell and so can avoid labour migration; some of these better-off peasants are at
the same time teachers or craftsmen w h o use part of their salary or other income
to buy seed and fertilizer in order to increase their agricultural output. Peasants
w h o have no such other income are seldom able to grow a surplus.
In families in which m e n are labour migrants, w o m e n must of necessity
take care of family finance, though generally only as executive agents of their
husbands. In these families w o m e n obtain the m o n e y they spend from remittances
sent to them by their husbands. In families in which both husband and wife live
in the village, either spouse m a y or m a y not have some cash at his or her disposal;
the m o n e y then available to w o m e n comes mainly from their sale of ground-
nuts and beans which they have grown for themselves or from the beer which
they have brewed. The first section of Table 6 sets out the monthly amount of
money normally at the disposal of rural families.
The high non-response rate to this question makes evaluation difficult. Also
the answer 'as m u c h as is necessary' is ambiguous. It is very likely that those
w h o gave n o answer had little or no m o n e y at hand and that those w h o claimed
to have sufficient had about as m u c h as the average of the people. Still, this is
uncertain and hence it is better to ignore these two categories. If this is done,
and if all percentages are expressed as those of the people w h o gave a definite
answer, the following picture emerges: in all rural areas household money is
scarce; some 97 per cent of all Ndebele husbands and 91 per cent of all Ndebele
w o m e n have less than $(R)10 a month at their disposal, and none have more
than $(R)15. Yet although 96 per cent of all Shona m e n and 95 per cent of all
Shona w o m e n also claim to have less than $(R)10 a month to spend, the few
remaining couples have quite substantial sums at hand; seven Shona w o m e n
(0.4 per cent), even more than $(R)30. Shona m e n keep slightly less money for
themselves than they give to their wives, or allow their wives to keep from their
o w n earnings, for none of the m e n claimed to keep as m u c h as $(R)25 a month.
The reason is that in m a n y families husbands leave the shopping for daily house-
hold needs to their wives and the larger amounts of money at the disposal of
w o m e n indicate the higher living standards of their families. Household heads
of the few rich families are either teachers or P A farmers. Sometimes the wives
of teachers are also teachers or nurses and so contribute substantially to the
family income. It is useful to compare the figures of Table 6 with those of
Table 7.
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Table 7 shows that 69 per cent of all rural Africans claim that m e n alone
are in full control of family finance, that in 29 per cent of all families w o m e n are
in charge of purchasing groceries and other goods necessary for family life, and
that in only 2 per cent of the families husbands and wives discuss expenditure
in c o m m o n . There is n o difference in this respect between Shona and Ndebele.
Thesefiguresdo not necessarily contradict those of Table 6 because m a n y m e n
and w o m e n w h o did not respond to thefirstquestion did give answers to the
second. Joint administration offinanceis almost u n k n o w n in T T L s ; most of the
few instances recorded occur in the P A s and on the irrigation schemes. People
on the irrigation schemes are generally younger and better educated than other
rural Africans and are more directly involved in commercial production. Only
one single Ndebele family out of 513 (0.2 per cent) stated that they discussed
financial matters in c o m m o n .
Tables 6 and 7 show that although m e n claim overwhelmingly to control
family finance, w o m e n in fact control a significant proportion of the m o n e y
because it is they w h o d o m u c h of the day-to-day purchasing of household
goods. M e n have to trust their wives to do this responsibly. The handling of
money increases the w o m e n ' s influence and reduces that of the m e n . M e n are
n o w forced by circumstances to share economic control with their wives.
T o ascertain h o w far the people were conscious of this diminution of the
husband's dominance in the h o m e , several questions were asked eliciting opinions
and attitudes. Responses to questions of this kind are naturally of a more sub-
jective nature than responses to concrete questions, likefinancialcontrol. Yet
although these answers will be less objective, they are nevertheless useful because
opinions too are 'social facts' which influence behaviour.
Both husbands and wives were asked h o w legitimate they considered the
husband dominance in the h o m e . Table 8 shows that 71 per cent of all m e n and
86 per cent of all w o m e n accepted unquestioningly the right of the husband to
control every aspect of family life; the w o m e n often added that even if they
disliked their husbands' dominance, they had no option but to submit to it.
A further 12 per cent of the w o m e n said that their husbands had the right to
control family life within reasonable limits. This leaves only a tiny fraction of
w o m e n w h o think otherwise, and these w o m e n consist mainly of teachers and
others with higher education.
It is interesting to note that a m u c h larger percentage of husbands regard
their authority to be more restricted than do their wives. A s stated earlier, the
men's immersion in the capitalist m o d e of production, their confrontation with
European m e n and w o m e n in the labour situation and their generally higher
education which has familiarized them with Western cultural patterns, all these
factors have given them opportunities to transcend their ethnocentricism to a
greater degree than is possible for their wives. For their wives remain encap-
sulated in the rural m o d e of production and have few opportunities of freeing
themselves from the tradition of male authority.
The changes, which are slowly affecting the interactions of husbands and
wives in the family, can be illustrated by a reference to eating habits. In ordinary
peasant households the meal arrangements described in thefirstpart of this
chapter still prevail, but in the families of teachers and nurses, husbands and wives
take their meals together, though their children are frequently given their food
T A B L E 8. Husband's dominance in family life
Other
employment
Rural1 areas Urban areas centres Total
Per- Per- Per- Per-

No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Husband's view of his right to dominate

Right to control
everything 1,266 70.7 1,119 61.5 572 56.6 2,957 64.0
Right of control
with reasonable
limits 25 1.4 71 3.9 61 6.1 157 3.4
Right to control
special aspects of
family life1 62 3.4 47 2.6 67 6.6 176 3.8
N o one has right to
dominate 436 24.4 582 32.0 310 30.7 1,228 28.8
TOTAL 1,789 100 1,819 100 1,010 100 4,618 100
Wife's reaction to husband's claim

N o option, must
accept husband's
control 2,362 85.7 1,533 83.2 714 67.0 4,607 81.4
A s far as is
reasonable 319 11.6 172 9.3 168 15.8 659 11.7
Within very
restricted limits 5 0.2 8 0.5 — — 13 0.2
Should not accept
husband's
dominance 69 2.5 129 7.0 183 17.2 381 6.7
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
1. In order of importance: 1, control of finance; 2, treatment

i of relative; 3, upbringing of children.
afterwards, at least until they have learned good table manners. Yet people still
feel uneasy about this arrangement, for they argue that if a visitor dropped in
during meal time there would be embarrassment, because he ought immediately
to be invited to share in the meal; but h o w could he eat together with the wife
of his host without feeling ashamed? The reason is that the association between
sexual relations and food presentation is still dominant in the minds of rural
people. The fact that most teachers live around the schools in which they teach,
outside the villages in which their relatives live, facilitates the emergence of the
nuclear family as the commensal unit in this n e w rural petty bourgeoisie.
The degree to which the barriers against open association between husbands
and wives are being broken d o w n can be seen from Table 9 which examines the
free time association between spouses. Thefirstsection of this table shows that
the great majority of people still avoid any joint recreational activities. In most
rural households m e n prefer to join in beer drinking with m e n , and w o m e n

prefer to visit their neighbours to chat about their children and families. This is
especially true in rural Ndebeleland where joined leisure-time activities between
spouses are almost unheard of. The percentage of 46 per cent in Table 9, i.e. the
percentage of husbands w h o never take out their wives, blurs significantly the
distinction between Shona and Ndebele.
T A B L E 9. Free time association between husband and wife
Other
employment
4>
Perce ntage
Perce ntage
Perce ntage
BO
S
c
Perce
Frequency of free ¿ o
o o
association Z Z Z Z
Husband never takes out

wife 1,259 45.7 396 21.5 172 16.1 1,827 32.3
Occasionally to relatives 952 34.6 597 32.4 449 42.2 1,998 35.3
Occasionally to parties
or sports 128 4.6 154 8.4 171 16.1 453 8.0
Once or twice a month 129 4.7 245 13.3 63 5.9 437 7.7
Once or twice a week 4 0.1 321 17.4 21 2.0 346 6.1
Weekly to church 283 10.3 129 7.0 189 17.7 601 10.6
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
Wife's desire for closer association with husband

Would welcome it 1,152 41.8 1,496 81.2 975 91.5 3,623 64.0
Would not welcome it 1,603 58.2 346 18.8 90 8.5 2,039 46.0
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
The same holds true for the percentage of spouses visiting relatives together.
The Shona are very concerned to maintain links between their extended families
and some 45 per cent of all couples visit the wives' h o m e regularly, but only
10 per cent of the Ndebele do so. A s stated earlier, kinship is of less importance
to the Ndebele whose shallow lineages, which have almost lost all their former
functions, are disintegrating m u c h faster than the deeper Shona lineages whose
functions have been altered and so have preserved some usefulness.
W h e r e mission churches have been active, husbands and wives tend to go
to church together on Sundays. Again, this is more c o m m o n a m o n g the Shona
than a m o n g the Ndebele, because few Ndebele have become Christians. Other
regular joint outings, such as visits to near-by towns, are also almost exclusively
confined to Shona couples. This means that a m o n g the Ndebele the traditional
sex division is carried over into present-day life to a m u c h higher degree than
a m o n g the Shona. The low average education of the Ndebele people, the very
high percentage of labour migrants a m o n g them, and the old customs associated
with the pastoral economy, all these factors contribute to this separation of the
spouses.
Ndebele w o m e n have far lower expectations of joint activities with their
husbands than have Shona w o m e n . This can be seen from their responses to the
question whether they desire closer association with their husbands during non-
working hours. S o m e 45 per cent of all Shona w o m e n were eager to spend their
leisure time more often in the company of their husbands than they did at
present, but only 29 per cent of the Ndebele wanted to do this. Nevertheless, it is
significant that the desire for closer association between the spouses is every-
where greater than its reality and this shows that w o m e n are slowly reaching out
for greater companionship with their husbands.
The penetration of the capitalist economy has not only affected the economic
conditions of the family and the position of the husband in the h o m e , but it has
also altered the very structures of the family and its stability. This can be seen
from Table 10.
T A B L E 10. Polygamy and divorce
Divorce and remarriage
Polygamists Men Women

Per- Per- Per-
Communities No. centage No. centage No. centage
Shona in T T L 1 137 8.4 143 8.8 54 3.0

Shona in P A 69 46.6 44 29.7 14 7.0
Rural Ndebele 8 1.7 108 22.4 58 11.3
Tonga 49 31.4 29 18.6 15 6.8
T O T A L (rural communities) 263 10.9 324 13.5 ~141 5.1
Tea Estates 37 12.3 17 5.7 7 2.0

Farms and Mines 12 1.7 120 14.8 73 10.1
TOTAL (other employment
centres) 49 4.9 137 13.6 80 7.5
Rural Areas 263 10.9 324 13.5 141 5.1

Urban Areas 35 1.9 65 3.6 77 4.2
Other Employment Centres 49 4.9 137 13.6 80 7.5
TOTAL 347 (6.6) 527 (10.1) 298 (5.3)
1. Including Kalanga in north-wt;st RhodesiEt.
In Table 10 the rural communities are divided into four sections: Shona
living in T T L s , Shona living in P A s , Ndebele and Tonga. The Tonga, of w h o m
222 families have been included in this study, live in the north-west of Rhodesia
and are part of the m u c h larger Tonga community living in Zambia. This ethnic
group has been divided by an international boundary, and since the creation of
Lake Kariba in the mid-1950s, when communications with their relatives on the
northern shore became difficult, the Rhodesian Tonga have had ever closer
associations with the Shona and Ndebele. The Shona and Ndebele, for their part,
have developed a kind of missionary fervour to convince the matrilineal Tonga

of the advantages of patriliny. T h e Tonga are the only matrilineal people in
Rhodesia. Unlike most matrilineal groups in Zambia, they pay a high bride-
wealth. Tonga m e n argue that they do this in order to gain control over their
children during their lifetime. A Tonga m a n has great authority in his family and
expects his children to obey him, though his wives do not show the same sub-
missiveness as do Shona and Ndebele wives. After his death, a Tonga's children
orientate themselves exclusively towards their mother's lineages of which they
are members. These few comments are necessary to understand the following
analysis.
Table 10 shows that there is a significant difference in polygamy between
Shona and Ndebele living in T T L s , 8.4 per cent as against 1.7 per cent. This is
very understandable because of the low importance attached by Ndebele
to lineage continuity and because of the lesser contribution of Ndebele
w o m e n to the families' food supply. This less-important economic role of
Ndebele w o m e n seems to be more responsible for the low percentage of polygamy
than lineage considerations. This can be proved by comparing the above figures
with those of Shona P A farmers. For P A farmers have practically severed their
ties with their wider kinship groups when they moved out of the T T L s into the P A s
in order to set themselves up as commercial farmers. In the P A s their polygamy
rate rose at the same time as their labour requirements increased. S o m e 47 per
cent of all P A farmers have more than one wife. In these farming communities
w o m e n are primarily valued for their labour power and this depresses their
standing. The Tonga too have a high polygamy rate; over 31 per cent of their
m e n are polygamists. This is due to both economic and structural factors; very
few Tonga are labour migrants and most earn their living from the land, just
as they did in the past. Hence the labour of w o m e n is essential in creating a
surplus. But to be able to control the activities of their households, m e n need
authority and in a matrilineal society a man's authority extends normally over
his sisters and their sons rather than over his wives and his o w n children. Yet
Tonga m e n try to reverse this custom and in order to acquire authority over
their o w n households they pay a high bridewealth. Since their influence and
authority increases with the number of their children, they desire m a n y wives
to bear them m a n y sons.
Anthropological literature has shown that matrilineal societies tend to have
a m u c h higher divorce rate than patrilineal societies. T h e divorce rate of the
matrilineal Y a o in Malawi, for example, has been recorded by Mitchel as 41.3 per
cent, that of the L a m b a in central Zambia as 41.8 per cent, and that of the N d e m b u
in north-west Zambia has been reported by Turner as 52.7 per cent. O n the other
hand, the patrilineal Palestinian Arabs have a divorce rate of only 8.7 per cent
and, according to Evans-Pritchard, the Nuer of the Sudan have a divorce rate
of 13 per cent. Gluckman claims that a m o n g the patrilineal Zulu of South Africa
divorce does not exist, and even if separation takes place, a w o m a n continues
to be considered the wife of her original husband. Gluckman (1958, p. 190-3)
writes:
1 have surveyed the literature of many African tribes and affirm tentatively that
divorce is rare and difficult in those organized on a system of marked father-right,
and frequent and easy to obtain in other types. . . . It seems that rare divorce goes
with levirate, sororate, rights to claim a betrothed girl, and with them it is found in
father-right societies. . . . Therefore, I suggest that the divorce rate is a reflex of the
kinship structure itself.
If it were merely the kinship structure, the Tonga ought to have the highest
divorce rate and the Ndebele the lowest, for the Ndebele are the only c o m -
munity included in this study which traditionally practised the levirate; in fact,
the Ndebele are an offshoot of the Zulu w h o , according to Gluckman, never
recognized divorce. Yet Table 10 presents a different picture: the Ndebele have
a m u c h higher divorce rate than the T o n g a and are only surpassed in this by
Shona commercial farmers in P A s . Although the divorce and remarriage rate
a m o n g the average tribal Shona is about 9 per cent, afigureto be expected from
Gluckman's hypothesis, none of the otherfigurescan be explained in the struc-
tural terms advanced by Gluckman. If, however, economic factors are taken
into account, especially in conjunction with structural forces, a more satisfac-
tory explanation can be given.
T h e high divorce rate a m o n g the Ndebele can then be explained in terms of
the unimportant role of w o m e n in food production and by the lack of import-
ance attached to lineage continuity. T h efiguresof this survey refer only to div-
orcees w h o have remarried; it excludes those w h o have remained single. In society
as a whole the number of male and female divorcees has to be equal; if this is
not reflected in the remarriage rate, there must be a sexual discrimination in
marrying a divorced person of a particular sex. Table 10 shows that everywhere
in Rhodesia divorced m e n find it m u c h easier to remarry than divorced w o m e n ;
yet a m o n g the Ndebele, female divorcees experience fewer difficulties than do
divorced w o m e n in other ethnic groups. This indicates that the Ndebele treat
divorcees with greater tolerance than d o other Rhodesian Africans.
T h e Shona in T T L s w h o value their kinship groups and good relation-
ships between families strongly discourage divorce. Yet in P A s , where farm-
owners have married additional wives with their o w n wealth and for purposes of
increasing farm labour, w o m e n w h o d o not measure u p to their husbands'
expectations are readily divorced. Lineage considerations are irrelevant in this
situation. Economic considerations are adequate to explain the high divorce rate
of commercial farmers.
T h e m e d i u m divorce rate a m o n g the Tonga is due to a combination of
structural and economic factors. The instability of typical matrilineal households
in which m e n are responsible for children w h o have been begotten by their
wives' brothers is counterbalanced by the Tonga men's control over their chil-
dren during their lifetime and so they have an interest in marriage stability. Yet
the interests of their wives in marriage stability are less; they k n o w that they
and their children willfinallyreturn to their matrilineage and so they look
constantly to their o w n brothers for support. They wish that the surplus they
produce would profit their o w n lineages more than their husbands, but they
have little power to divert it to their brothers as long as they live in their husbands'
h o m e . Their divided loyalties, therefore, contribute to the moderate divorce rate.
T h e concern of the Shona for marriage stability can be illustrated by case
histories showing the pressures exerted on wives to stay with their spouses even
under very trying circumstances. Likewise, the absence of pressures exerted by

Ndebele kinsmen on disaffected spouses can be proved by concrete examples.
The following two case histories are fairly typical.
Case 1
After the death of hisfirstwife, a Shona teacher in a T T L remarried. His second
marriage was unhappy because he treated his new wife as a servant and, although
he was rich by local standards due to additional income derived from a shop
and a mill, he did not let his wife share in the good food she had to cook for him
and for the children of hisfirstmarriage. H e also declined to buy her new dresses
and so she had to wear torn clothes.
Thefirstserious confrontation occurred when the son of hisfirstmarriage
discovered a sewing needle in his food. H e hid the needle quietly and in the evening
showed it to his father. The teacher accused his wife of trying to kill his children
and sent her back to her parents. Her parents returned her immediately saying
that he had not given her the traditional gupuro token, which is a sign that a
husband has officially rejected his wife. The teacher thereupon gave his wife
20 cents as gupuro and again returned her to her parents.
A month later, he visited his in-laws and asked them to return his wife, but
they were angry with the way he had treated their daughter and rudely ordered
him to leave their village. The teacher reported the case to the chief and the chief
s u m m o n e d everyone for a court hearing. Having heard all of the evidence, the
chief declared that the w o m a n ' s parents had acted wrongly in chasing away their
son-in-law, for although the teacher had given their daughter a gupuro, the mar-
riage had been concluded in church and no official dissolution had been initiated.
The teacher was allowed to take his wife h o m e with him.
S o m e time later, the wife quarrelled with a daughter of thefirstmarriage.
Immediately, the teacher gave his wife a gupuro of 30 cents and sent her h o m e .
S o m e days later, however, he fetched her back. Yet from then onwards he no
longer allowed her to cook for the family. H e built a new kitchen for the children
of hisfirstmarriage and his eldest daughter began cooking the family meal.
This marriage still existed at the time of the survey. The teacher continued
maltreating his wife, hoping that she would desert him; for only if he could
blame the breakdown of the marriage on her, could he claim a refund of the
bridewealth he had paid; and this was his major concern. Hence, it was property
consideration which kept this unhappy union in existence. The w o m a n , for her
part, did not want to leave her children, for under no circumstances would she
have been allowed to take them with her on her departure, and she knew that
once she was gone, her children would be treated badly by their father.
Case 2
A Ndebele labour migrant had for a long time neglected his rural wife by w h o m
he had three children and for w h o m he had paid a significant part of the agreed
bridewealth. H e spent most of his time in town with w o m e n friends and visited
his wife less and less frequently, and when he did c o m e h o m e , he spent his nights
in a nearby village drinking beer. Only in the early morning hours did he return
to his wife. By then he was usually drunk and frequently beat his wife and treated
her with disrespect.
O n e day, while her husband was away in town, the wife decided that she
could take this treatment no longer. She hired a cart and, assisted by her sister-
in-law, packed all her belongings on it and had it driven to the railway station.
She herself followed on foot with her three children. She went to her o w n
parents.
At the time of her departure, her mother-in-law was at a beer hall and,
although she was informed of what w a s taking place, she did not bother to
investigate and to persuade her daughter-in-law to stay. W h e n the w o m a n ' s
husband heard of her departure, he too m a d e no effort to recall either her or
his children, but soon afterwards he married a w o m a n in town. N o r did he try
to regain his bridewealth. His children grew up in their mother's h o m e .
Whereas thefirstcase history shows the efforts by the wider society to
prevent the dissolution of a union which had clearly become unbearable, the
second case history shows that a m o n g the Ndebele no community efforts were
m a d e to preserve the marriage. In fact, the second case history shows that even
close family members, like a sister-in-law, mother-in-law and the husband him-
self, no longer showed concern; interest in the children of the union was lost.
In such a society w o m e n are freer than a m o n g the Shona, individualism has
advanced farther and, I suggest, the greater poverty of the Ndebele has contri-
buted to this to a significant degree. For there is n o purpose for society in
maintaining an unsatisfactory union which brings advantages to no one.
The effects of labour migration, which separates spouses for most of their
married life, have of necessity placed n e w strains on marital faithfulness, strains
which are more keenly felt by m e n than by w o m e n because of the new environ-
ment of the employment centres where traditional controls no longer operate.
These strains have intensified the always accepted differential moral standards
between m e n and w o m e n . M e n still expect their wives to remain faithful to them,
but declare that they themselves cannot be expected to remain faithful to their
wives during the years they spend in the towns and mines.
A n e w custom, therefore, has evolved in rural Shonaland which takes
cognizance of this situation. It is an extension of an old custom which requires
w o m e n in labour w h o experience difficulties in giving birth to confess to their
midwives any act of adultery; for the belief that complicated births are the
direct result of marital unfaithfulness is still widespread. This belief also holds
that wives w h o have 'mixed the blood' of different lineages, cause the death of
their unborn children; hence if a w o m a n does not confess, she is called a witch
w h o has killed the offspring of her husband's lineage.
This custom has received the following extension: if a labour migrant returns
h o m e , he remains at some distance from his village and sends his wife a message
to c o m e and meet him. Then he confesses to her his disloyalties lest, should he
meet his children with his guilt unconfessed, he should cause their sickness and
death. A w o m a n is always expected to forgive her husband.
Yet although w o m e n are expected to forgive, few husbands are prepared to
forgive their wives. Moreover, almost all m e n expect their wives to remain
faithful to them during their long absences from the villages and assume that
their relatives will keep a watch over the wives. Only two Shona husbands
(0.2 per cent) thought that if they did not visit their wives frequently, they could
not expect their unswervingfidelity.But Ndebele m e n had less confidence in
their wives: 45 out of 513 (12 per cent) did not expect their wives to remain
faithful, and the ease of divorce a m o n g them proves them right.
The totally different reactions towards adultery, if committed by m e n or
w o m e n , is set out in Tables 11 and 12. Table 11 shows that almost 59 per cent
of all husbands will divorce their wives on hearing of their adultery and that a
further 26 per cent will take them to court; a court action in cases of adultery
often leads to a dissolution of the marriage. Both Shona and Ndebele m e n
reacted alike on this issue. The 8 per cent of the husbands w h o proposed to have
their wives' adultery discussed at a family court do not constitute a cross section
of all rural communities, but c o m e almost exclusively from the Tonga where
66 per cent of all m e n gave this answer.
Very few husbands are prepared to forgive their wives their adultery; the
only exceptions are 11 per cent of Ndebele husbands and the reasons why they
T A B L E 11. Action taken by husband o n hearing of wife's adultery
Other
employment
Action taken Per- Per- Per- Per-

by husband No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Divorce 1,046 58.5 1,525 83.8 603 59.7 3,174 68.7

Court action 460 25.7 239 13.1 294 29.1 993 21.5
Report to her parents 144 8.0 22 1.2 18 1.8 184 4.0
React violently 59 3.3 18 1.0 44 4.3 121 2.6
Forgive, work for
reconciliation 75 4.2 10 0.6 49 4.9 134 2.9
Consult a priest 5 0.3 5 0.3 2 0.2 12 0.3
TOTAL 1,789 100 1,819 100 1,010 100 4,618 100
T A B L E 12. Action expected from wife o n hearing of husband's adultery
Other
employment
Expected action Per- Per- Per- Per-

from wife No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Divorce 31 1.7 47 2.6 152 15.1 230 5.0

Court action 51 2.9 93 5.1 97 9.6 241 5.2
Report to his
parents 81 4.5 534 29.4 20 2.0 635 13.8
React angrily 561 31.4 709 38.9 560 55.4 1,830 39.8
Forgive work
for reconciliation 1,056 59.0 427 23.5 179 17.7 1,662 36.0
Consult a priest 9 0.5 9 0.5 2 0.2 20 0.4
TOTAL 1,789 100 1,819 100 1,010 100 4,618 100
are ready to forgive derive from the disintegration of their traditional social
structures. Once lineages have lost their significance and little property has to
be passed on, the importance of a legitimate heir is reduced. Absence of property
is a prime factor in present-day Rhodesian society which reduces marriage
stability and marital faithfulness.
Yet there can also be positive reasons for adultery. Should a w o m a n have
some property of her o w n and her husband fail to give her a son, she has an
incentive to conceive a son by any m a n whomsoever. Her husband m a y then
even give his tacit consent. The following case illustrates such a situation.
Case 3
A Ndebele labour migrant married a w o m a n w h o had grown up in Bulawayo, the
largest city in Ndebeleland. After their marriage in 1962, the wife went to live
in her husband's village while her husband continued to seek work in the town.
By 1967, the wife sought a divorce because she had become aware of her husband's
frequent adultery. Yet since the two had married in church, the priest w h o m they
consulted strongly objected to a divorce and so they separated for some time,
the w o m a n returning to Bulawayo to live with her parents. There she behaved
like an unmarried w o m a n , visiting beer halls and sleeping with m a n y m e n ; her
parents allowed her to bring her friends to their o w n house. For one and a half
years her husband entreated her to return andfinallyshe agreed once more to
live with him in the village.
Thefirstsix months of their reunion were happy, for both remained faithful
to each other. Then, however, the husband resumed visiting other w o m e n and
in retaliation the wife returned to Bulawayo to see her o w n friends. These friends
enabled her to acquire substantial property, which she left at her parents' h o m e .
O n e lover bought her a bed and others n e w dresses. She n o w shifted her residence
back and forth between town and village, but she took none of her possessions
to the village lest her husband should divorce her and claim all her property.
By the time the fieldwork for this book was carried out, the w o m a n had
begun to engage in prostitution in the village itself—a very rare occurrence—a
w o m a n in her neighbourhood had given her a room. There she saw her friends
whenever her husband was away at drinking parties and occasionally she even
left him at night to see one or other of her clients. Whenever her husband was
away in town, she let her lovers sleep in her husband's h o m e . She took the pro-
ceeds from her rural prostitution to a local shop where she opened an account
of which her husband was ignorant. Each of her lovers, including teachers and
businessmen, paid her an average of some $(R)7 a month.
Although this w o m a n tried to hide her love affairs from her husband, it is
unlikely that he did not k n o w about them. H e never asked her from where she
got her m a n y new dresses. A n d he was wise to ignore her infidelities, for he himself
took m a n y liberties. At the time of the fieldwork he had a w o m a n friend in a
homestead near by and visited her regularly. O n e day his wife found him sleeping
with this w o m a n in the bush, but she said nothing. Hence it m a y be assumed
their infidelities were by tacit agreement.
The w o m a n stressed that it was natural for people to long for a variety of
sexual experiences, though she herself had an additional reason for her adultery:
she hadfivedaughters but no son. She had in vain consulted herbalists and
diviners and, therefore, thought that in sleeping with m a n y m e n at least one of

them might give her a son. A son was essential to her, though not to her husband,
because she had amassed quite an amount of property, but her husband had not.
She also stressed that unless she had a son w h o would look after her in her old
age, she would feel very insecure, for her marriage remained brittle. These
reflections lead on to a new kinship configuration which will be discussed later
on in this chapter where economic circumstances which lead to a replacement of
the dominance of the father-son dyad by the mother-child dyad are examined.
The w o m a n claimed that only two of herfivedaughters had been begotten
by her husband. While still pregnant, she had always told their respective fathers
of her pregnancy and the m e n had assumed responsibility for the children,
buying them napkins and clothes and even visiting her in hospital during her
confinement. A like frankness about adultery has never been encountered a m o n g
the Shona, and I suggest that this is a direct consequence of the different economic
and social forces operative in these different communities.
S o m e 10 per cent of all Shona and Ndebele w o m e n , but as m a n y as 31 per cent

of all Tonga, stated that they had no strong objections to their husbands' sexual
freedom while away at work, and even the others, w h o did not consider it right
for their m e n to have other women-friends, were generally inclined to forgive
them. This leniency is k n o w n to their husbands because 59 per cent of all m e n
expect their wives to forgive them any unfaithfulness. This percentage is especially
high a m o n g the Ndebele where this expectation is shared by 92 per cent of all
husbands.
Less than 2 per cent of the m e n expect their wives to initiate a divorce and
only 3 per cent to initiate a court action; none of these are Ndebele. Almost
one-third of all husbands expected an angry reaction from their wives, but then
take it for granted that the matter will rest there. Hence husbands feel generally
free to do as they please. They derive this confidence from the knowledge that
their wives are economically dependent on them and so cannot afford to leave
them. Moreover, a separation generally means that w o m e n have to leave their
children and few mothers are prepared to do this.
The information set out in thefirstpart of Table 13 sheds some light on
the situation of single labour migrants in the towns w h o have to leave their
families in the country. Only seventy-six (4.3 per cent) of the large rural sample
were prepared to give information on their casual unions, the others either
refused to answer or declared that they had not entered into any. S o m e significant
points emerging from their answers are that the lengths of casual unions coincide
roughly with the average lengths of labour trips of m e n recorded in several
samples of migrants: one group of labour migrants leaves the rural areas after
the harvest, seeks work during the agricultural slack season and then returns
h o m e ; another group tends to work for a year or two and then comes back to the
village; relatively few stay away for longer periods at a time (Aquina, 1965, p. 24;
Weinrich, 1975, p. 60-2). Table 13 shows that the duration of casual unions
roughly coincides with this pattern. Migrants w h o are away from h o m e for only
a year or two seldom endanger their marriages, for their kinsmen guarantee the
continuation of their rural households and their urban love affairs remain
restricted in time. Most labour migrants in town look for companionship and
C h a n g e s in family structure 65
T A B L E 13. Extra-marital relationships of h u s b a n d s
Other
Rural Urban employment
areas centres Total
o o o
55
Z Z
Duration of casual unions

Less than 6 months 27 35.5 63 38.0 12 25.5 120 35.3
6-12 months 12 15.8 27 16.2 14 29.8 53 18.3
1-2 years 27 35.5 63 38.0 13 27.7 103 35.7
3-4 years 6 7.9 7 4.2 3 6.4 16 5.5
Longer 4 5.3 6 3.6 5 10.6 15 5.2
TOTAL 76 100 166 100 47 100 289 100
Reasons for casual unions

Pleasure 29 38.2 86 51.8 24 51.1 139 48.1
Companionship 36 47.4 46 27.7 18 38.3 100 34.6
T o obtain children 2 2.6 7 4.2 2 4.2 11 3.8
Test period for possible
future marriage 9 11.8 27 16.2 3 6.4 39 13.5
TOTAL 76 100 166 99.9 47 100 289 100
Percentage of men giving

record of casual unions 4.3 9.1 4.7 6.3
housekeepers and most temporary unions have been established for this reason,
for it is considered degrading for a m a n to have to cook for himself and to wash
his o w n clothes.
S o m e 12 per cent of the respondents regarded temporary arrangements as
a test period for future marriages. N o Shona wants to marry a w o m a n w h o is
unable to bear children and so premarital sex is widespread. Such co-habitation,
however, is difficult in the rural areas where traditional norms continue to be
more strictly enforced than in the towns and where the influence of missionaries
is greater. Hence m a n y young people live together for some time in urban areas,
even if both intend to ratify their marriage once a child has been born. Temporary
unions to test fertility are a direct result of church pressures: for in the past a
childless union was almost always succeeded by a second marriage, but the
churches forbid polygamy and they also m a k e a formal divorce difficult; some
denominations forbid the remarriage of divorcees under any circumstances. For
these reasons, m a n y young people try to assure themselves of children before
they marry.
Like some earlier tables, Table 14 tries to arrive at a subjective evalu-
ation. Married couples were asked which factors in their assessment were the
most important for harmony in the family. T o this open-ended question,
people gave m a n y answers, though the majority agreed that the most important
were mutual understanding between the spouses, sufficient food, clothing and
money to raise a healthy family, and the presence of children.
T A B L E 14. Factors making for harmony in family life
Other
employment
Rura1 areas Urban areas centres Total
Per- Per- Per- Per-

Factors No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Mutual understanding 818 29.7 459 24.9 410 38.4 1,687 29.8
Sufficient food,
clothing and
money 768 27.9 417 22.6 245 23.0 1,430 25.3
Presence of children 580 21.1 417 22.6 99 9.3 1,096 19.4
Faithfulness and love 215 7.8 365 19.8 105 9.9 685 12.1
Wife's obedience to
husband 267 9.7 78 4.2 119 11.2 464 8.2
Regular church
attendance 28 1.0 38 2.1 31 2.9 97 1.7
Correct handling of
money 9 0.3 38 2.1 34 3.2 81 1.4
Health of family
members 18 0.6 1 0.1 9 0.8 28 0.5
Hard work 11 0.4 5 0.3 8 0.8 24 0.4
Correct treatment of
relatives 12 0.4 13 0.7 — — 25 0.4
Aversion to gossip 19 0.7 1 0.1 1 0.1 21 0.4
G o o d running of the
home 8 0.3 1 0.1 4 0.4 13 0.2
Good friends 2 0.1 9 0.5 — — 11 0.2
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100.1 1,065 100 5,662 100
There were, however, some significant differences of emphasis between the

various ethnic groups. Thus 48 per cent of the Tonga emphasized that children
were most important, and the explanation given earlier explains this emphasis;
also 25 per cent of the Shona, but only 17 per cent of the Ndebele, gave this
answer. There is good evidence that the Shona percentage, but not that of the
Ndebele, is an understatement. M y data show that there are exceedingly few
Shona w o m e n w h o have not borne children and whose marriages still exist.
A m o n g the Ndebele childlessness does not automatically lead to a rejection of the
wife. Also a m u c h larger percentage of Shona than of Ndebele parents stressed
that they wished for as m a n y children as possible. The actual family size of the
Shona is slightly larger than that of the Ndebele,fivechildren as against four.
The Shona emphasis on continuity and the persistence of the dominance of the
father-son dyad a m o n g them further corroborate this point. I explain this under-
statement by the fact that for a Shona a marriage without children is not a valid
marriage and m a n y , therefore, did not even think it necessary to mention
children.
Another very important factor for a harmonious family life is economic

security. The poorer Ndebele laid m u c h greater emphasis on this than the Shona
did. Thus, 35 per cent of all Ndebele, but only 25 per cent of the Shona m e n -
tioned this factor. Another factor which greatly differentiates the various ethnic
groups is that of the authority of the husband in the h o m e . S o m e 12 per cent of
all Shona regarded it as very important for a harmonious family life that wives
obey their husbands, but only 6 per cent of all Ndebele gave this answer. This
lower emphasis a m o n g the Ndebele on the women's subordination goes together
with the higher divorce rate and the greater sexual freedom taken by Ndebele
women.
The above analyses shows that objective factors likefinanceand marriage
stability, which can be accurately measured, as well as values and attitudes,
such as an assessment of the husband's dominance in the h o m e and an evaluation
of factors most conducive to family harmony, all point in the same direction:
family life in the rural areas of Rhodesia is undergoing significant changes; the
former influential role of the husband as head of the household is being under-
mined by economic factors and the importance of kinship is waning. Neither
a m o n g the Shona, and certainly not a m o n g the Ndebele, can kinship relations
still be regarded as belonging to the infrastructure of society. The more c o m m e r -
cialized an area becomes—and the P A s are a good example—the less important
become blood relationships and the more important contractual ties. In spite of
the high polygamy rate, marriage in the P A s has already assumed a m u c h more
individualistic contractual nature than in T T L s ; this is indicated by the fre-
quency of divorce and the purpose of m a n y marital unions. A contract between
extended families is characteristic of kinship-based societies, but a contract
between individuals is typical of capitalist societies; contracts between P A farmers
and their in-laws are above all contracts between individual farmers and, at the
most, their wives' extended families. A s far as w o m e n are concerned, this new
marriage contract binds them exclusively to their husbands, but no longer to
their husbands' families. The implications of this will be examined in the next
chapter.
W o m e n in the rural areas find themselves at present in an ambivalent
position. O n the one hand, their need for cash from their husbands makes them
strongly dependent; on the other hand, the m u c h greater responsibility given to
them in running their rural households gives them greater authority than they
had in the past. The desire of m a n y w o m e n , especially Shona, for closer associ-
ation with their husbands is a sign of their desire for greater equality. A m o n g the
Ndebele, this desire has taken a different form: on the surface w o m e n do not
claim greater equality with m e n and m e n continue to insist on their authority in
the home—economic factors explain this situation—but below this verbal adher-
ence to old values, the structure of Ndebele society has changed even faster than
Shona society, and marital unfaithfulness and marriage instability have become
very widespread. These changes, as the above analysis has shown, are the direct
consequence of the tampering by the n e w capitalist formation with the Ndebele's
pastoral and raiding economy which could not withstand capitalist penetration
as successfully as could the peasant economy of the Shona. Impoverishment of
the people has had its most negative effects on Ndebele w o m e n w h o have seen
their security more rapidly undermined than have w o m e n of other ethnic groups
and w h o have reacted to this situation in the same way as have single w o m e n
elsewhere w h o were deprived of security in their villages, namely by
prostitution.
URBAN COMMUNITIES
If family structures have undergone significant changes in the rural areas, in the
towns these changes have been even more marked. I shall concentrate in this
section on families w h o live together in the urban areas, not on migrant
labourers and their wives and children. T h e most important characteristic of
families resident in the urban areas is that they have come to towns as individual
nuclear families and derive their income almost exclusively from wage labour.
At times wives too are in paid employment, but most of the time they stay in their
homes and depend completely on their husbands economically. Hence, on the
one hand, their dependence is m u c h greater than that of rural w o m e n ; on the
other, however, town life has widened their outlook on life; they are no longer
encapsulated in traditional values but have begun to question old patterns of
family interaction. Moreover, the isolation of their nuclear families makes
husbands more dependent on their wives than they have ever been in the past
and this has greatly altered the relationship between the spouses. T h e basis for
these changes is found in the new economic circumstances in which families find
themselves and these circumstances differ greatly between the families. There
are, for example, greater income differences in urban areas than there are in
rural communities. The second section of Table 5 shows that the income spread
of town households is between practically nothing and some $(R)200 a month.
These differences occur both within townships—a 'township' is the n a m e given
to an African suburb attached to a Rhodesian town or city; the towns or cities
themselves are reserved exclusively for white residents—and between different
townships. St Mary's, a township attached to Salisbury, is the poorest of the
five urban settlements included in this survey. N o family there has an income of
more than $(R)60 a month and 88 per cent earn between $(R)5 and $(R)44. At
the same time that thesefigureswere collected, a Poverty D a t u m Line study was
carried out in Salisbury and other Rhodesian cities. This study established that
for a family of six, that is, for a family consisting of a father, a mother and four
children, at least $(R)73.52 are required to cover that m i n i m u m necessary
consumption which guarantees basic physical health and social decency
(Cubitt and Riddell, 1974, p. 53-5).
The reason for the depressed economic condition of this community is that
it started off not as a government or municipally built African township, as do
most African urban settlements in Rhodesia, but as a shantytown. Its people
consisted of m e n and w o m e n w h o had failed to find accommodation in the
official townships or w h o had their rented accommodation in these townships
taken from them w h e n they fell in arrears in their rents. Also, since n o person
w h o lacks gainful employment is allowed to live in official townships, the u n e m -
ployed drifted to St Mary's. A further group of residents consisted of m e n w h o
had found single accommodation for themselves, but desired to bring their wives
and children to town.
All these people had set u p makeshift homes built of m u d , branches, plastic
bags, corrugated iron sheets or sacks. By the 1960s, their dwellings had become
so many that the government had to take note of them. But instead of bulldozing
this squatter settlement d o w n , as was done during the subsequent decade when
squatter settlements increased in number, the government started in 1969 to
improve living conditions for the people. It allocated a piece of land to each
family and instructed heads of households to build more solid houses. T h e
government used St Mary's to experiment with the introduction of community
development into urban areas. T o win the people's co-operation to a policy which
was widely rejected by local Africans, all w h o lived in the area were allowed to
stay and n o questions were asked whether couples had a marriage certificate, an
otherwise necessary prerequisite for married accommodation in the towns. 1
In 1973 St Mary's had some 3,550 families. Even then it was a township
which appalled visitors by its shabby houses, general slum atmosphere and
unpaved roads. S o m e 13 per cent of the randomly chosen household heads
included in m y survey were unemployed, some 3 per cent were vendors, some of
w h o m rummaged through scrap heaps tofindsomething that could still be sold.
S o m e 42 per cent of the m e n were labourers and 14 per cent worked in the
transport industry. These latter, mainly drivers, earned about $(R)35 a month
and formed part of the better-off section of the township. There were very few
clerks or other white-collar workers in St Mary's.
Very different is K a m b a z u m a , another Salisbury township, where better-off
Africans live. K a m b a z u m a is a municipal township run as a home-ownership
scheme, i.e. residents must rent land and then build on it their o w n houses
according to required m i n i m u m standards. In most other townships, houses are
built by the municipality and rented to African tenants. In K a m b a z u m a it is
stipulated that all household heads earn at least $(R)40 a month. M y survey
shows that 42 per cent of all residents earned more than this. In contrast to
St Mary's, a very high percentage of K a m b a z u m a residents are professional,
clerical and technical workers or self-employed businessmen. Also m e n in the
higher income brackets in the transport industry and in factories, but very
few labourers, have built their homes there.
K a m b a z u m a is a middle-class township proud of its peaceful atmosphere.
It is never subject to police raids, such as occur regularly in other townships
when illegal lodgers are sought, nor are unemployed youths seen waiting around
hedges and street corners. There is n o drunkenness and shouting in the streets.
Hence, residents proudly describe K a m b a z u m a as a 'dignified' township.
All the other townships included in this survey occupy an intermediate
position. M p o p o m a , the Bulawayo township with a majority of Ndebele resi-
dents, has the largest proportion of families in the lowest income category—36 per
cent earn only between $(R)5 and $(R)24, but it also has a small number of rich
families; most of these, however, are Shona.
Tables 6 and 7 show that in contrast to the better-off families, husbands
in the poor families hand over a larger proportion of their income to their wives
than they keep to themselves. In St Mary's, for example, 95 per cent of the
husbands keep less than $(R)10 a month for themselves, but 78 per cent of their
wives handle more money than this. This means that in the poorer homes w o m e n
1. For a detailed discussion of marriage certificates, see Chapter 5.

are given most of their husbands' meagre wages and are charged to see that their
families have enough to eat throughout the month. The money kept by husbands
is generally spent on the monthly rent, school fees for the children, other overhead
costs and on beer. In K a m b a z u m a , most spouses have larger sums to spend.
W h a t distinguishes this township from all others is the very high degree of joint
financial administration of family income. Table 7 shows that in almost 14 per
cent of all urban families m o n e y is jointly controlled by husbands and wives.
This is a relatively high proportion when compared with rural areas; but in
K a m b a z u m a thisfigureis higher still: there as m a n y as 32 per cent of all couples
administer family income in c o m m o n . This shows that in this township a
completely new relationship is emerging between the spouses, an equality which
did not exist in the past, for in rural areas only 2 per cent of all couples administer
the family income jointly. K a m b a z u m a is an almost exclusively Shona township.
In the predominantly Ndebele township of M p o p o m a , joint administration is
almost unheard of, and in 79 per cent of all M p o p o m a families husbands claim
full control over the family income. This shows that great differences exist in
urban families, differences which can be traced not only tofinancialreasons,
but also to some cultural factors.
The most important visible change brought about by the new economy on
family relationships is the replacement of the father-son dyad by the husband-
wife dyad as the socially dominant kinship relationship. A n emphasis on the
father-son bond is unsuitable to urban conditions because it implies the proximity
of and co-operation with large numbers of relatives. It postulates continuity,
and continuity is unobtainable in the towns. The replacement of the father-son
dyad by the husband-wife dyad has the following consequences: the husband-
wife dyad stands for discontinuity, it denotes a horizontal relationship which
stretches neither into the past nor into the future as does the father-son bond.
It ends with either divorce or with the death of a spouse. These factors m a k e
the family unit which is based on it necessarily small and of limited duration.
Yet small and unstable families are highly suitable to the capitalist m o d e of
production which depends on individualism and on an atomized work force.
The dominance of the husband-wife dyad also implies exclusiveness. H s u
(1971, p. 11) states that one of its characteristics is that it tries to exclude any
third party. Hence polygamy is alien to it, and this again limits family size and
so suits the employers.
Urban Africans are themselves aware of the advantages of small families
which this kinship dominance creates. For the low incomes of husbands are
rarely adequate to support large families, and only occasionally d o wives find
additional employment. Also housing shortage militates against large families.
The average urban family has some four children. Polygamy, as Table 10 shows,
is practiced by less than 2 per cent of all urban household heads and most of
these live in St Mary's where housing is the responsibility of individuals. In
K a m b a z u m a only one single household, or 0.4 per cent of the sample, was
polygamous. W o m e n in that township consider it degrading to share their hus-
bands with other w o m e n ; this attitude is especially wide-spread in K a m b a z u m a
where most w o m e n are better educated and reject polygamy as part of an out-
dated tradition.
M a n y urban families try to reduce the number of kinsmen living with them.
This is in their o w n interest as well as that of their employers w h o d o not want

a labour force that is responsible for many dependents. Also the government
and municipalities dislike an unnecessarily large African urban population for
reasons of European security. Hence by-laws have been passed prohibiting
'illegal lodgers' from staying with registered residents.
People w h o are new in town value help from their kinsmen as do urbanités
during times of economic hardship. But the well-established families w h o have
accumulated some m o n e y are often loth to share it with kinsmen newly arrived
from the country. Hence m a n y of the rich try to insist that they are 'forbidden
by law' to allow relatives to live with them in their homes, but the poor often
accommodate kinsmen illegally, even if this causes them extreme inconvenience.
This means that the better off an urban community is, the more have its nuclear
families isolated themselves from their kinsmen, and the degree of isolation
directly correlates to their self-sufficiency. Their rejection of traditional values
has to be justified, and this is done by subscribing to a new set of values, values
which are epitomized by the dominance of the husband-wife dyad. In these
communities kinship has become an exclusive component of the superstructure.
Individualism, which is a prerequisite for the successful functioning of the
capitalist m o d e of production, not only isolates the nuclear family from the
wider kinship unit, but it also strips the nuclear family of its o w n members. Thus
as soon as some sons have grown u p and become able to support themselves, they
tend to drift away to live their o w n lives. This is a possibility open to the young
which they never had under the communal m o d e of production, and this new
independence of the growing children directly undermines the father-son dyad.
Sons are assisted in these endeavours by their employers, because employers
must encourage individualism for their o w n sakes. Parents, on the other hand,
try hard to prevent their children's independence, but seldom succeed in this for
more than a few years. T h e following is a typical example of the loosening of
the father-son dyad in the African township of Sakubva, Umtali, in eastern
Rhodesia.
A labourer headed a household of one wife and seven children. Six of his
children were still at school, but his eldest son had found work, earning $(R)36 a
month. This made him richer than his father w h o earned only $(R)24 a month.
The son wanted to live apart from his parents in order to keep some money
for himself. H e approached his employer and the latter found him a room in the
single quarters of the town. At his parents' request the youth agreed to hand over
to them two-thirds of his wage, namely $(R)6 a week. H e kept his promise for
thefirstweek, but after the second week he handed over only $(R)3 because he
had bought himself new clothes. His parents complained and ordered him to
give up his private room and live with them. His father said: 'I a m your father
and you must obey m e . It makes no difference whether you are working or not.'
The son returned and his father ordered him to take care of the school fees
needed by his brothers and sisters and also to contribute to the food requirements
of the family. In return, he allowed him to bring h o m e decent girl-friends. T h e
son obeyed. The father praised him for the obedience and for the help he gave
to the family. H e often said to his other children: ' W h a t your eldest brother is
doing is what I expect of every child when he works. W e , your parents, struggled
hard to bring you up so that in our old age you will support us.'
The son, however, was not happy with this arrangement and tried hard to
persuade his employer to transfer him to the firm's branch in Salisbury so that
he would be free from family obligations.
This case history shows that a father's economic control over his children's
income decreases within a very short time and that as his sons earn more than he
does, his economic power-base is undermined. A father m a y have worked hard
to give his children a higher education; but once his sons earn, he depends on their
goodwill to reward him for his efforts. H e can plead, but he cannot c o m m a n d as
he could in the past.
Isolated from their kinsmen and deserted in time by their sons, urban hus-
bands must of necessity stay m u c h closer to their wives. In the country m e n could
always rely on their brothers and cousins for support; in the towns the only
persons they can really trust are their wives. Wivesfindadjustment to town life
easier than m e n , for already in the country they were used to live without blood
relatives on w h o m they could rely for support. In the towns, moreover, they
gain: their husbands are n o w m u c h more ready to accept them as true companions
than they ever were in the country.
This is especially true in the rich urban settlements where ties with the rural
areas are cut to a greater degree than in poor communities. Thus whereas in
St Mary's 97 per cent of all m e n still claimed absolute control over their families,
in K a m b a z u m a less than 23 per cent did so; in fact, 64 per cent of all m e n in
K a m b a z u m a claimed that no spouse had the right to dominate family life and
that all family affairs ought to be discussed between husbands and wives. Table 8
shows that there is an overall difference between rural and urban areas in the
extent to which the husband's dominance is verbally maintained, but the differ-
ences between the n e w economic classes of urbanités are even more marked
than those between the poor in town and country. M a n y w o m e n in town differ
little from rural w o m e n in their acceptance of male authority, though the
percentage of urban w o m e n w h o reject their husbands' overriding authority is
almost three times as high as that in the country.
The new emphasis on companionship as an ideal of family life can be seen
from Table 9 which shows that the percentage of urban husbands w h o never
take out their wives is far less than in the country. In fact, were it not for the high
percentage of Ndebele husbands in Bulawayo, 61 per cent of w h o m never take
out their wives, the average percentage would be very low indeed. Thus in
K a m b a z u m a less than 1 per cent of all husbands never take out their wives; even
in St Mary's this percentage lies below 8 per cent. In most townships, especially the
richer ones, husbands and wives go out together once or twice a month, or even
once or twice a week, for some social occasion, be it to watch a cinema show or
to visit friends of their o w n social standing. In poor families, especially a m o n g
residents of St Mary's, the most c o m m o n joint activity is still the occasional visit
to relatives, for poor urbanités must maintain their kinship ties with the country
as an insurance for their old age. M a n y husbands in St Mary's also take their
wives occasionally to watch games, for sports are a favoured leisure activity in
this township. W o m e n are very keen on joint outings with their husbands, for
they believe that their marriage bond is strengthened by frequent c o m m o n activi-
ties. Moreover, w o m e n of the upper social strata do not like their husbands
going out alone in the evenings and without knowing where they are going.
S o m e 81 per cent of all urban w o m e n said that they wished their association
with their husbands to be even closer than it is at present. This percentage would
be higher still, in the region of 97 per cent, were it not for the m a n y Ndebele
w o m e n in M p o p o m a w h o expressed n o such wish. The almost universal desire
of urban w o m e n for companionship—and this implies greater equality—shows
that the values inherent in the dominance of the husband-wife dyad are being
widely accepted, especially by the w o m e n .
The great varieties of interaction between husbands and wives in the urban
areas can be demonstrated once again by changing eating patterns. In the poor
families, wives take the food they have cooked for their husbands outside their
houses to a sheltered place in the street where the husbands sit and talk with
m e n from the neighbourhood. This is the closest urban equivalent of the
traditional rural eating pattern. In the slightly better-off urban households, hus-
bands and wives eat together around a c o m m o n table. In still more Europeanized
families, children eat with their parents, and in the richest families servants wait
on family members during the meal and eat what has been left over afterwards
in the kitchen, thus following the custom of European Rhodesian households.
This shows that as wealth increases, families m o v e away from a more communal
to a nuclear-family-centred m o d e of interaction in which the husband-wife dyad
occupies the central place.
Within most homes w o m e n continue to take care of cooking and child care,
but in some better-off families husbands are encouraged, and at times respond,
to help in the house. I k n o w of at least one family where the wife has taught her
husband to change their baby's napkins and to do m a n y other household tasks.
She argues that such equality in household tasks makes true equality possible
in all aspects of life, since a speedy completion of housework enables a couple
to spend a long evening out together. The structural and economic forces of
urban living drive m a n y families in the direction which this family has found
ideal.
M a n y writers, including Hsu, have argued that societies which greatly
emphasize the husband-wife dyad, i.e. societies in which the nuclear family has
been opposed to wider kinship groupings, have a high divorce rate. This, however,
is not the case in Rhodesia. For as Table 10 shows, divorce and remarriage rates in
the towns are m u c h lower than in the country: of 1,819 urban m e n , 65 (3.6 per
cent) were divorced and remarried, against 324 (13.5 per cent) out of 2,409 rural
m e n ; likewise only 77 out of 1,842 urban w o m e n (4.2 per cent) were divorced
and remarried as against 141 (5.1 per cent) out of 2,755 rural w o m e n . There are
no significant differences in this regard between the various townships. I suggest
the following explanations:
First, the actual divorce rate will be higher than thefiguresindicate because
more persons in the towns remain single after a divorce than in the rural areas.
Second, it is m u c h more difficult for m e n in the towns tofinda wife than it is for
m e n in the country; the unbalanced sex ratio is responsible for this. Hence m e n
are very reluctant to send their wives away since they k n o w that it will be
difficult for them to remarry. The reverse of this applies to w o m e n w h o never
find it difficult tofinda new husband in town. This is in the w o m e n ' s favour and
restrains husbands from inconsiderate divorce. Third, in urban areas w o m e n
have various opportunities of supporting themselves, unlike w o m e n in the
country, and so m e n k n o w that their wives feel more independent than rural
w o m e n , even though their economic dependence is greater while their marriage
lasts.
H s u (1971, p. 21) argues that marriages in which the husband-wife dyad is
dominant are marked not by intimacy but by calculation and contest for power,
both in the economicfieldand elsewhere. This is similar to Engels' statement
that contends that in m o n o g a m o u s families, i.e., in families of the above type,
property considerations play a dominant part. M y o w n analysis has shown that
where wealth exists, kinship recognition is restricted to an ever narrower circle
of relatives so that this wealth can be concentrated in the hands of a very few.
The above-quoted data have also shown that families w h o have settled
d o w n in town have m o r e money at their disposal than rural families. This is
especially the case of families in which the husband-wife dyad has firmly
established itself. T h e richer a family is, the stronger is the motivation of hus-
bands to insist on their wives' faithfulness in order to guarantee the transfer of
property to their o w n sons. Table 11 shows that 84 per cent of all urban husbands
would divorce their wives should they hear of their adultery and that a further
13 per cent are prepared to take them to court. With 97 per cent of all husbands
prepared to take such drastic steps, this issue is beyond dispute.
But just as m e n are unprepared to tolerate any unfaithfulness on the part
of their wives, so they expect their wives to allow them almost total sexual
freedom. Table 12 shows that only 2.6 per cent of all m e n — a n d most of these
are from Kambazuma—expect their wives to divorce them for adultery; this is
a slightly higher percentage than in the rural areas, but it is still very low. A
further 5 per cent expect their wives to take them to court for adultery, but
again most of these m e n live in K a m b a z u m a . In K a m b a z u m a only two m e n ,
or less than 1 per cent, believe that they have a right to extra-marital relations.
This means that in this middle-class township equality is not only being accepted
in the sphere offinancialadministration, but also in that of sexual rights. In
addition to equality in these two important spheres, K a m b a z u m a couples have
also achieved a high degree of social equality. This is reflected in the high per-
centage of c o m m o n leisure activities. It is above all in this township, due to its
secure economic base, that the husband-wife dyad has become truly dominant.
In all the other townships, the majority of husbands—39 per cent in all
urban areas, but as m a n y as 86 per cent in the slums of St Mary's—expect their
wives to m a k e a scene on hearing of their adultery and then forget about it.
S o m e 68 per cent of all m e n in St Mary's claim to have the right to extra-
marital relations. This great difference in accepted norms between rich and poor
townships indicates a different orientation by the people depending on their
position in the capitalist system: those w h o are most radically deprived of the
means of subsistence are evolving a different form of household unit than those
w h o have succeeded in integrating themselves into the middle classes of the
capitalist system. For the latter, the husband-wife dyad is a meaningful dominant
relationship which justifies their isolation from the wider kinship group. It is
this isolation which enable them to concentrate their wealth and so increase its
enjoyment by a few; for the others, w h o have no wealth, the dominance of the
husband-wife relationship has little meaning. Instead, a n e w kinship dominance
is emerging a m o n g the poor, a dominance which has found its clearest expression
in the dominance of the mother-child dyad on European-owned mine sites and

farms. This kinship constellation, typical of the most exploited section of the
African population, will be discussed below.
The second section of Table 13 does not add m u c h to that already given in
thefirstsection. Previous to the arrival of the townsmen's wives and children in
the urban areas, these m e n had engaged in the same pattern of extra-marital
relations as do workers whose families remain in the rural areas. That is, the
length of their casual unions depended on the length of their average employ-
ment, and they looked for w o m e n to keep them company and to look after their
domestic needs. The only differences are that a larger percentage of them stated
that they entered casual unions to obtain children. It is very significant that all
but one of these responses were given by m e n in K a m b a z u m a ; this indicates that
in this middle-class community m e n entered casual alliances in order to save
otherwise infertile existing marriages. A larger percentage of m e n in all townships
also stated that they had entered temporary unions as trial marriages, hoping
that these might lead to permanent unions once a child had been born.
Table 14 shows that the presence of children is as important to urban
families as it is to rural couples, though there is a significant difference between
rich and poor townships and between rich and poor families. In Sakubva at
Umtali, for example, 43 per cent of all couples stressed that children were most
important for a harmonious family life. Sakubva has close ties with the
surrounding rural areas and although some families in that township earn good
wages and salaries, most are still rural-orientated and ties with kinsmen in the
country are less frequently broken than they are in Salisbury and Bulawayo
townships. Hence m a n y rural values are being preserved. In K a m b a z u m a ,
25 per cent of all couples stressed the importance of children, though not of an
unlimited number. Quite a few added that they would be satisfied with only
one or two children, or as m a n y as they could comfortably rear on their salaries;
for they wanted to have only as m a n y children as they could provide with a good
education. Such an attitude is antithetical to that of rural parents and epitomizes
the changes which have taken place in the conception of a family: children are
seen as deserving to enjoy all the savings accumulated by their parents. Lineage
continuity is no longer a point at issue, for individualism has replaced group
interests.
Children are most warmly welcomed in the moderately well-off urban
families. A m o n g the very poor, unlike the poor in the villages, children are
a great problem and not an unqualified blessing. Thus in St Mary's, only 0.2 per
cent of all couples stated explicitly that children were important to them.
Families in this township have fewer children than families in other townships
or in the villages; only some three to four. The same low number of children
will again be found in families on farms and mine sites. In these communities
struggling for survival, children are neither a help, contributing to food pro-
duction as in the country, nor do they provide an ideal opportunity for investing
wealth, for there is none. Rather, they place a heavy burden on their parents
w h o often do not k n o w where to find food for the next meal. The result of such
poverty will be examined in the next section of this chapter.
Just as the importance of children for societies in which the father-son
dyad is dominant can be deduced from Hsu's theory, so can the importance of
mutual faithfulness and love for societies in which the husband-wife dyad is
dominant. For the exclusiveness with which such couples regard their rights
over each other implies an expectation of mutual faithfulness and love. T h e
various responses of members of the K a m b a z u m a township in which this kinship
configuration has found its clearest expression bear this out. S o m e 20 per cent
of all urban couples, against merely 12 per cent of the total sample of
5,662 couples, stressed faithfulness and love.
There is one interesting variant to this general trend. In the Ndebele
township of M p o p o m a , an even higher percentage of couples, namely 27 per cent,
stressed the importance of love and faithfulness. The rural Ndebele too had
stressed this quality more than rural Shona—11 per cent against 9 per cent—and
I suggest that this can be taken as a corollary of the declining importance of the
lineage in this ethnic group. Where the wider kinship group loses its relevance, the
husband-wife bond assumes greater importance until, with a further increase
of individualism, even the nuclear family disintegrates.
M o s t people everywhere are concerned that their families should have
sufficient food, clothing and the other basic necessities for a decent life. W h a t
is surprising, perhaps, is that the richer the urban communities are, the more
frequently they stress this factor, and the poorer they are, the less frequently
they mention it. A comparison between the two townships of K a m b a z u m a and
St Mary's shows that 31 per cent of all K a m b a z u m a couples, but only 22 per
cent of all families in St Mary's, stressed the supreme importance of economic
factors. In the next section, which deals with the economically most exploited
communities in Rhodesia, this declining emphasis on material preconditions
for a healthy family life reaches its peak. It is as if people in these communities,
by underemphasizing economic factors, stated their hopelessness at meeting
the elementary requirements of life.
T h e above analysis of husband-wife relationships in urban areas shows
h o w closely the husband's position in the h o m e is linked with his economic
ability to support his wife and children. Where a wife earns no m o n e y in her
o w n right but depends totally on her husband, and where a husband is able to
support his family adequately, the wife is in a weaker position than she is in
a poorer h o m e where she must m a k e some financial contribution in one w a y
or another. Contrasting families of these two economic categories, though
concentrating on the former, Engels writes that where the wife ceases to render
a public service and where her service becomes purely private, confined to her
husband and children, she
becomes thefirstdomestic servant, pushed out of participation in social production.

Only modern large-scale industry again threw open to her—and only to the proletarian
w o m a n at that f1]—the avenue to social production. . . . Today, in the great majority
of cases, the m a n has to be the earner, the breadwinner of the family, at least among
the propertied classes, and this gives him a dominating position which requires no
special legal privileges. In the family, he is the bourgeois; the wife is the proletariat.
(Engels, 1976, p. 81.)
1. This no longer holds true today, since it is n o w professionally trained w o m e n w h o frequently

engage in work outside the h o m e .
These families form the bulk of the present urban population; for even where
husbands earn little, they often consider it an insult to their ability to support
their families if their wives ask them for permission to go out to work. M a n y
m e n argue that w o m e n working in industry or even in the professions m a k e too
m a n y friends and that this puts their loyalty to their husbands under a great
strain. I k n o w personally of some nurses whose husbands forbid them to carry
o n their professions lest they should prove unfaithful. Such attitudes and actions
reveal an extreme possessiveness by husbands and greatly restrict the wives'
freedom. Through imposing these restrictions husbands try to preserve their
authority in the h o m e . O n the other hand, such attitudes m a y also occasionally
lead to more frequent joint activities between spouses.
Real companionship between spouses, however, is only fully developed
in the richer urban families where both spouses have received a higher education,
where the wife as well as the husband work in the professions, and where the
struggle for survival no longer preoccupies their minds. These are the families
which have been most successful in integrating themselves into the n e w capitalist
m o d e of production, w h o have severed their ties with their wider kinship groups,
w h o have accepted the values associated with individualism, and w h o have
learned to manipulate the new economic system to their o w n advantage. A s
members of the n e w African bourgeoisie they have 'arrived' and any revol-
utionary change aimed at creating a n e w social system which would redistribute
the country's wealth differently and more evenly is regarded by them as a
direct threat to their security. Hence they have become the mainstay of the
status quo; they are the small African élite w h o have been co-opted by the white
ruling class on the understanding that they will assist capitalists to stem any
radical change aimed at establishing a non-capitalist social formation.
COMMUNITIES ON E U R O P E A N - O W N E D
FARMS A N D MINE SITES
T h e various forces set in motion by the capitalist penetration of African society,

which have been described in the preceding sections, have their most far-
reaching effect on families living on European-owned farms and mines. In these
communities where the exploitation of the workers is total, hardly any features
of traditional family life have been able to perpetuate themselves. T h e minor
differences between individual mines and farms depend on slightly higher or
lower wages and on other remuneration given to the workers. T o highlight
differences in the responses of workers to different economic conditions, enter-
prises with different pay records have been selected in both the mining and
agricultural industries. O f the two mines chosen for this study, Wankie coal
mine has by Rhodesian standards a reputation for 'fair' pay; Sutton mine, a
chrome mine near Sinoia, is k n o w n to pay its work force very poorly.
Sutton mine, which has over 600 employees, is one of the oldest chrome
mines in the country. Originally, it was owned by an American company which
engaged in surface operations. Its present owners engage in underground mining
under very primitive conditions. There are no lifts taking the workers under-
ground, so they have to slither d o w n slippery loam passages to their places
of work. At the work place the tunnels are often so low that miners have to lie
flat on the ground to mine the chrome. Temperatures underground are high and
groundwater is rich in magnesium. Working conditions are therefore hard.
Chrome is mined twenty-four hours a day and the miners work three
shifts. Newcomers start at wages of 42 cents a day plus free food rations, and
receive a small increment every six months. M y census returns of 235 m e n shows
that 98 per cent of all employees earn between $(R)5 and $(R)44 a month, 89 per
cent even below $(R)24. The 2 per cent w h o earn more consist of clerical staff.
Workers are accommodated by the mine management in a 'compound',
a Rhodesian term for a residential area for low-paid black employees. S o m e
of the houses for married employees are built of brick. Here m e n w h o have
been employed for longer periods and w h o receive higher wages are a c c o m m o -
dated. The great majority of workers live in pole-and-mud huts which they
erect themselves. S o m e 92 per cent of all employees are foreign Africans, coming
from Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, because local Africans refuse to work
under such appalling conditions. Since 1961, mine management has entrusted
the supervision of the workers' domestic affairs to tribal elders. Tribal elders
have also been instructed to act as spokesmen for the workers should they
wish to raise issues with management. Tribal elders, however, are not m e n
elected on a tribal basis by fellow workers from their h o m e areas, but are
Rhodesian Africans appointed by management. Since few Rhodesians work
in the mines, these elders have no power base in their o w n ethnic groups. Their
knowledge concerning tribal customs surrounding their co-workers' marital
problems in minimal, because most workers come from matrilineal tribes.
Not only are tribal elders incompetent in this respect, they also fail to present
the requests of their co-workers to management, because they themselves
hold senior positions and do not want to lose their privileges by making them-
selves disliked by management.
The working conditions offered by Wankie coal mine are better and
remunerations are higher. Very few employees of this mine earn less than
$(R)25 a month and 71 per cent earn between $(R)25 and $(R)54; a few, 1.5 per
cent, earn over S(R) 100. These latter are employed in technical capacities. Wankie
coal mine is a large and complex establishment which offers m a n y different jobs
to Africans. This explains the large income-spread in the work force.
The work force itself is large. The mining company has built 1,110 houses
for married employees and 200 for single m e n . This emphasis on married
workers places the mine in the category of better employers in the Rhodesian
context. The quality of the accommodation is graded in quality and labourers
w h o earn higher wages receive better houses. Almost all better-paid staff are
local Africans, even though foreigners account for 41 per cent of the work force.
Tribal elders are appointed to present the workers' grievances and to advise
management on h o w to handle complaints. Tribal elders also try civil cases,
especially those dealing with marital disputes. Tribal elders are allowed to
charge small fees for these services.
Wankie mine has always had a large number of single w o m e n workers,
w h o work in the shops, stores and houses of white employers. They live in special
single quarters built separate from those of single m e n . By-laws forbid them to
receive male visitors in the evenings, but these laws are never enforced. N o
action is taken against w o m e n w h o are known to engage in prostitution. A large
number of single w o m e n are widows, divorcees or unmarried mothers whose

rural relatives have rejected them because of their disreputable life.
In the farming industry the conditions of workers are often even worse than
in the mines. S o m e 93 per cent of all employees on privately owned European
farms earn less than $(R)25 a month, 52 per cent even less than $(R)14. The
standard wage is $(R)8 a month for m e n and $(R)6.60 for w o m e n . A Poverty
D a t u m Line study carried out for employees on European-owned farms shows
that a family needs at least $(R)40 a month (Riddell, 1976, p. 3), though only
2 per cent of the m e n in m y sample earn that m u c h . The few w h o do meet
these m i n i m u m requirements tend to be higher-grade supervisors or drivers.
In addition to cash, workers receive some maize meal and sometimes beans
and meat. Often they are allocated small plots of land to grow additional food
for their households.
The labour forces offivesurveyed farms varied in size from between 40 to
150 employees; working hours were long and often indeterminate. Most workers
are expected to work from 06.00 hours to 17.00 hours, with a half-hour break for
lunch. O n some farms, the owners call on their workers to work on Sundays as
well as on weekdays. S o m e 62 per cent of the workers are foreigners. Most workers
lived in compounds of pole-and-mud huts they had constructed themselves.
O n big company estates, conditions are at times better. Thus on the tea
estates in eastern Rhodesia although there, too, 71 per cent of all workers earn
less than $(R)15 and a further 16 per cent only between $(R)15 and $(R)24,
some 6 per cent earn between $(R)65 and $(R)154. These latter are professional
and clerical workers. The tea estates run schools and clinics and one hospital
for their employees, as well as some other social facilities.
The tea estates differ from other farms in one important respect: only
2 per cent of their workers are foreigners; most come from the surrounding
area, for it has been company policy to attract local Africans and to induce
them to bring close relatives with them. The company has plenty of land and
hopes that, by offering workers their o w nfieldsand enabling them to live in
larger families, they will always have a sufficiently large work force at hand.
For Rhodesian agriculture, perennially short of labour, especially the tea estates
on which seasonal labour plays a large role, the presence of wives and children
is a great boon at labour-intensive periods of the agricultural cycle. Secondary
expenses on social welfare are relatively low in a situation in which people live
in stable villages, and are more than offset by the constant availability of extra
labour. Even the schools which are financed by management were, until the
early 1970s, a source of income as well as expenditure, because children had
to work in the fields during the mornings and lessons were confined to the
afternoons, and then only those children w h o had worked that day were allowed
to attend classes.
Workers likewise have an economic incentive to bring their whole families
to the estates, because their children are paid $(R)1.50 to $(R)3 a month for
their work and parents have no school fees to pay.
A summary of the economic conditions of employees on farms and mines
can be seen in the third section, 'Other Employment Centres', of Table 5. There
are no communities in Rhodesia which are as poor as those of mine and farm
woikers. Table 6 summarizes the m o n e y at the disposal of husbands and wives.
Almost all the larger sums of m o n e y at the disposal of wives c o m e from the
Wankie community. A t the Sutton mine, the management announced during
the time of fieldwork that w o m e n could earn some extra cash by collecting
chrome from the waste heaps around the mines. The w o m e n were most eager
and used every minute they could spare rummaging through the waste heaps.
A club, formed to teach w o m e n sewing, knitting and cooking, immediately lost
thirty of its sixty-six members. This shows the extreme need of the mine popu-
lation for extra cash to supplement the husbands' earnings.
Table 7 provides an indication of the control of family income on farms
and mine sites. O n the tea estates 87 per cent of all husbands control all
family income. There, as subsequent analysis will show, male authority
has been better able to perpetuate itself than in other employment centres.
O n the European-owned farms and at Sutton mine, that is the most
exploited communities and the ones in which m e n work the longest hours,
w o m e n are responsible for daily shopping; this requires that they have a fair
control over m o n e y and in 69 per cent of all households on the farms and in
83 per cent of all households at Sutton mine w o m e n control family spending.
Butfinancialadministration, however, rarely brings them prestige, because the
money at their disposal is exceedingly small and this causes the w o m e n great
worries and anxieties as they look for the means to cook the next meal. Only
at Wankie mine, where a significant number of middle-class Africans are
employed, do 31 per cent of all couples control family income jointly.
O n e important characteristic of the wage system in the lowest paying sectors
of the capitalist system is that not all workers are paid on a monthly basis; some
are paid weekly, others daily, and, in some instances, workers are paid on a ticket
system, i.e. they must work for thirty days before they are given money. This
means, that a m o n t h for them is longer than a calendar month and if a m a n is
ill, he will immediately lose some of his income. The lower the overall wage,
the more frequent the pay or the ticket system. A daily wage also implies a large
labour turnover, and this means great uncertainty for the labourer's family.
This uncertainty, as well as the low wages, prevent husbands from guaranteeing
their wives and children any security. F e w husbands, except on the tea estates
and at Wankie mine, can base their family authority on their economic contri-
bution to the family.
This economic inability of husbands has given rise to a completely new
family pattern, a pattern dominated by the mother-child dyad. H s u (1971,
p. 20-1) describes kinship systems of this type as follows:
In a mother-son dominated kinship system the father-son dyad tends to exhibit dis-
continuity. . . . Authority of the father will be greatly reduced so that the father is
less a strong, guiding, channelling and punishingfigurethan a nourishing, supportive
and succouring one. Furthermore, the father image is blurred so that there tends to
be the need for a son to seek other 'father'figures,not to replace the real father but
to assure himself of adequate sources of nourishment support and succour.
In communities of this nature, the divorce rate is high. In fact, m yfieldassistant

estimated that some 80 per cent of all households on the farms consist of more
or less temporary unions. Even those w h o claim to be married have a divorce
and remarriage rate of 43 per cent. Yet on the tea estates and at Wankie, where
economic conditions axe more stable, divorce and remarriage rates are relatively
low, only 6 per cent and 10 per cent respectively.
In communities of this nature, where continuity is absent, polygamy is
absent too; the only exception, again, are the tea estates where over 12 per cent of
all householders are polygamists. This relatively high percentage is explained
by the land given to workers which provides a means of support for more wives
and children, and the additional paid employment available to a man's depen-
dents. Polygamy, therefore, is advantageous for workers on the tea estates. O n
the other European-owned farms, only 2 per cent of the householders are
polygamists.
In these communities, the mother-child bond becomes dominant because
instability of marital unions and a constant realignment of adults offers children
no other security than that which their mothers can give them. A s Hsu states,
fathers can always be replaced by other fatherfigures,and m e n are generally
willing to give a temporary h o m e to children and to supply some of their needs
so long as they derive comfort and support from the children's mother. A good
example can be seen in the following case history:
A cook employed by a white farmer took a w o m a n living with a labourer on
a near-by farm, although this w o m a n ' s conjugal union had lasted for four years.
Before then she had been married in a tribal trust land. Her second husband tried
to reclaim her, but the cook hid himself and the w o m a n in his employer's house.
Thereupon, the employer gave him a place to live near his o w n house and so
the couple could consistently dodge the earlier husband. The w o m a n had four
children from herfirstmarriage. T w o of her daughters, one an unmarried mother
and one a grown-up girl, stayed with her and began calling the cook their father.
The cook himself was married to a w o m a n in a T T L and had had six children
by her. H e wanted to divorce her in favour of his n e w wife, but his parents
exerted pressure on him to keep her. Consequently, he rarely visited his h o m e
village. The two daughters of the cook's n e w wife occasionally worked for the
farmer, but most of their money came from prostitution.
This case history shows the dependence of children of unstable unions o n
a variety of 'fathers'. Since they seldom live with their o w n fathers, they look to
their mothers' current partners for support, and this is generally given to them
because single m e n in these employment centres are keen to attract w o m e n to
live with them for longer or shorter periods. In remuneration for the advantages
they derive from such unions, they are prepared temporarily to look after the
children. The fact that biological and social fathers are n o w different persons
greatly strengthens the mother-child dyad and inevitably raises it to dominance.
In these circumstances, the nuclear family has ceased to exist, for capitalism,
in its most exploitative form, has negated the nuclear family as the end product
of family evolution and has left nothing behind but atomized individuals. It
is from these remnants of the old lineages and of the more recent nuclear
families that the n e w society of Z i m b a b w e will have to create n e w stable
domestic units. These temporary unions cannot be regarded as aberrations from
a different and stable n o r m , but rather as a new way of life best adapted to an
environment of economic deprivation and insecurity.
The instability of family life in these work centres is not exclusively due
to low wages. There are also other factors introduced by the capitalist formation
such as an alien labour force and an unbalanced age-sex structure. A s stated

earlier, local m e n are reluctant to work on farms and in the mines. Consequently,
many of the employees are foreign Africans. These m e n have left families in
their h o m e countries and, since they intend to stay at their places of work for
long periods, they look for local w o m e n . The few local labourers w h o have
taken up work on farms and in the mines have at times brought their wives with
them, or they have left them in near-by villages. In either case, they have an
obligation towards their families and cannot afford to spend too m u c h money
on other w o m e n .
The majority of w o m e n , on the other hand, w h o come to the farms or
mines, are local. Most often they are older and either divorcees or widows
looking for some means of support. This demographic factor leads to the
creation of m a n y unions between elderly local w o m e n and younger foreign
workers. Local w o m e n , for their part, prefer to live with foreigners because
these have more money to spend than local m e n . These factors also reduce the
number of children. Thus the older age of the w o m e n reduces their chances of
pregnancy, though biological age is not the only reason. M a n y more w o m e n on
farms and minesites use contraceptives or traditional medicine to prevent
pregnancies than do w o m e n elsewhere. Consequently, there are only about four
children per couple on farms and mine sites. O n the tea estates where family
stability is guaranteed, the average number of children isfive;but on European-
owned farms and at Sutton mine, where poverty and instability are greatest,
families have an average of only three children. Again, therefore, as in
St Mary's, the number of children is reduced by extreme poverty.
Differences in cultural background between local w o m e n and foreign
workers, poverty and general instability, also give rise to m a n y domestic quarrels.
W o m e n in these unions feel quite free to end an unsatisfying relationship,
though m e n are more reluctant to send a w o m a n away. If a union has lasted for
about a year, partners begin to act towards each other as do husbands and wives
in formal marriages. But even then w o m e n claim for themselves the right to
friendships with other m e n . They know that no bridewealth has been paid for
them and that there will be no repercussions from their families should they be
caught in adultery. The following case history illustrates some of these factors:
A Malawian, aged 40, married a local w o m a n aged 45. The w o m a n had
been divorced a long time ago and had c o m e to work on the farm to support
herself. O n e of the children of her previous marriage was an unmarried mother
with two children of her o w n : this young w o m a n often visited her mother and
whenever she came to the farm, slept with an unmarried driver.
O n e evening during a beer party the Malawian's wife left the party quietly
to have an affair with another labourer. The m a n was very drunk and did not
realize that $(R)6 had fallen out of his pocket. The w o m a n kept this money in
addition to the agreed-upon fee. The next morning, the m a n noticed what had
happened and went to the Malawian's house to reclaim his money. T h e
Malawian beat his wife until she confessed everything. She had given the $(R)6
to her daughter w h o had already gone to the bus stop to return to her village.
The labourer went to the bus stop to reclaim his money, while the Malawian
continued to beat his wife.
This case history which demonstrates the freedom of w o m e n to choose
their o w n friends, and the previous case history which illustrates deputy paternity
of m e n over the children of their current partners, also show h o w w o m e n on the
farms are recruited. Older w o m e n w h o have left their children of previous
marriages in the rural areas are often visited by their growing daughters and later
these young w o m e n c o m e to stay on the farms. Even if atfirstthey come with
the intention of earning m o n e y through farm work, they soon establish friend-
ships with other workers. If they become pregnant, they stay with the father of
their child for a shorter or longer period, but then they are likely to change to
other companions. Often they move on to the towns. Their relatives in the rural
areas dare not charge the fathers of their children for damages—a normal fine
imposed a m o n g Africans in Rhodesia on m e n w h o cause the pregnancy of
w o m e n other than their wives—because the young w o m e n have by then acquired
the reputation of prostitutes. Only if these young w o m e n return permanently
to the villages and marry in a tribal area can their families attempt to ask for a
reduced bridewealth.
The stable families on mine sites and farms have generally been established
before the workers took u p their present employment. These husbands keep in
close touch with their rural relatives and frequently send their wives h o m e at
ploughing time to cultivate their villagefields.Such families have m u c h in
c o m m o n with the poor families in the towns and the mother-child dyad is not
dominant a m o n g them. This proves that family structure is mainly determined
by economic factors, not by the type of residence or other social circumstances.
If values and attitudes could be taught in school and did not depend on
economic circumstances, it could be expected that people living on mine sites and
farms, w h o belong to the least educated of all Rhodesians, would be the most
conservative in regard to husband-wife relationships; for it is in the schools that
m a n y of the n e w family values, conducive to equality between spouses, are
inculcated. But the responses of the people listed in Tables 8 and 9 contradict
this and point rather to economic forces as determinants for values and attitudes.
Thus Table 8 shows that less than 57 per cent of the m e n on farms and mine sites
continue to stress their absolute authority in their homes. This is far less than
in the rural areas and almost as low as in the towns. The abandonment of this
traditional attitude is not something learned in school but a true reflection of
the reduced economic control of m e n in their households. Also the very high
percentage of m e n w h o claim that n o spouse has the right to dominate family
life is significant: it is about equal to that of urban couples and m u c h higher than
that of families living in the villages.
M o r e important still than the reaction of m e n to this question of male
dominance in the h o m e is that of w o m e n . Table 8 shows that 86 per cent of all
w o m e n in the villages and even 83 per cent of all urban w o m e n grant their
husbands full authority in the h o m e , but on the farms and mine sites only 67 per
cent of the w o m e n do so. Likewise, 17 per cent of all w o m e n on the farms and
mine sites deny that their husbands have any overriding control in the h o m e ;
this is a very m u c h higher percentage than that of 2.5 per cent of all rural and
7 per cent of all urban w o m e n . It reflects that w o m e n in these employment
centres insist m u c h more on equality than other w o m e n . This reduction in the
men's influence and the increase in that of w o m e n is directly related to the
dominance of the mother-child dyad. Public recognition of its dominance frees
w o m e n from male control but in so doing throws them on to their o w n resources.

Table 9 shows that w o m e n in these communities feel that there ought to be
true equality between the sexes. Almost 92 per cent of all w o m e n demand closer
association with their husbands, against only 42 per cent of all w o m e n in the
villages and 81 per cent of all w o m e n in town. T h e very economic circumstances
which enable w o m e n to choose their male companions at pleasure and at pleasure
leave them, give them the power to insist o n the men's conformity to their
expectations. F e w w o m e n elsewhere have this freedom. Thus it is here in the
poorest of all Rhodesian communities that w o m e n have been most emancipated.
The section on joint activities in Table 9 bears further witness to this greater
equality between m e n and w o m e n . Only 9 per cent of all husbands never take out
their wives; this is a considerably lower percentage than that found in urban
areas. It reflects that w o m e n on the farms and mine sites are not as dependent on
their husbands as are urban w o m e n and this enables them to insist that the m e n
do what they want. Exactly 50 per cent of all couples stated that they visited the
wives' relatives together. Since the majority of m e n in these communities are
foreigners, visits to their wives' relatives create for them a strong bond with
local communities which quite a number of m e n have already used to settle d o w n
permanently in Rhodesia. For these m e n , in-law connections are of great
importance. This value placed on good relationships with in-laws can also be
seen by comparing the frequency of visits by foreign Africans to their wives'
relatives with that of m e n in either towns or rural areas, most of w h o m are
locals.
Another exceptionally frequent leisure activity on farms and mine sites is
watching games. S o m e 19 per cent of all couples enjoy this form of joint
recreation. Only the urban community of St Mary's surpasses the mines and
farms in this respect. O n all mine sites and large plantations, management pro-
vides sport facilities, like football fields, and so sports become a frequent
free-time activity.
Tables 11 and 12, which ask the hypothetical question of what spouses
would do on hearing of each other's adultery, provides a m u c h more traditional
answer than actual behaviour reflects. S o m e 90 per cent—all men—still state that
they would divorce their wives or take them to court. Actual case histories,
however, show that most husbands beat their wives and then forget about the
incident; if they took more drastic steps, they themselves would be the losers.
Nevertheless, the 5 per cent of m e n w h o express a willingness to forgive their
wives is certainly m u c h higher than responses to the same question in towns or
villages. It is also significant that most of the m e n willing to forgive their wives
live in the poor Sutton mine community. T h e absence of property, which
abolishes the need for a legitimate heir, is most likely responsible for this more
lenient attitude.
In contrast to the slightly more tolerant reactions of m e n , the expected
reaction of w o m e n to their husbands' adultery was m u c h more severe than that
of w o m e n living in towns and villages. This too is logical because it derives from
the greater equality of sexes. One-quarter of all w o m e n on mine sites and farms,
against only 8 per cent of all urban and 5 per cent of all rural w o m e n , are
expected by their husbands to take them to court or to divorce them; only 18 per
cent of the husbands in these poor settlements expect straightforward for-
giveness from their wives, though 24 per cent of all urban husbands and 59 per
cent of all rural husbands expect such forgiveness.
Because m e n can offer their w o m e n little economic security due to their o w n
totally inadequate wages, w o m e n feel little hesitation in terminating an unsat-
isfactory union; this readiness is further increased by their control over their
children. For in the rural areas it is often the mothers' fear of separation from
their children which induces them to put up with most unsatisfying marital
relationships.
The third section of Table 13 contains only minor deviations from the other
parts of the table. The fact that 11 per cent of all casual unions lasted longer
than five years indicates that c o m m o n - l a w marriages are more normative on
farms and mine sites than formal marriage arrangements. Also the mere 6 per cent
of temporary unions entered into in preparation for a formal marriage, i.e. to
m a k e sure that the union will be fertile, indicates less concern for children than
is found a m o n g couples in other communities.
This lack of preoccupation with children already indicated by the lower
average number of children mentioned above, is confirmed by Table 14 which
shows h o w infrequently couples in these poor communities mention children as
essential for family harmony. N o couple on the farms and only 4 (0.8 per cent)
of those on the mine sites mentioned children in response to this question. Only
on the estates did people mention them. For the poor on farms and mine sites, the
factor considered most important for family harmony is mutual understanding.
The overall percentage of 38 per cent conceals the fact that on the tea estates only
18 per cent of all couples mentioned this quality, but on the European-owned
farms 61 per cent, and at Sutton mine 66 per cent of all couples stressed this
value. This means that the more economically depressed a community is, the
more do its members value mutual understanding. This derives from the fact that
in these communities property considerations no longer play a part. W o m e n are
not given in marriage by their extended families or by their fathers, but they give
themselves, and they give themselves to m e n to w h o m they feel most drawn,
w h o seem to understand them best and w h o meet their emotional needs. Should
understanding cease, w o m e n are free to take themselves back with the same
ease with which they gave themselves. Every marriage, of course, requires a
degree of mutual understanding and this value is stressed in all communities,
but in communities dominated by the father-son dyad, where lineage consider-
ations are uppermost, or in societies in which the husband-wife dyad dominates
kinship interaction, this value is overlaid by lineage and property considerations.
It is only in societies in which the mother-child dyad reigns supreme that the
relationship between spouses takes no account of such secondary concerns.
Engels (1976, p. 87-8), in a crucial passage, writes:
If it was the duty of married people to love each other, was it not just as much the
duty of lovers to marry each other? . . . A n d did not the right of these lovers stand
higher than that of parents, relatives and other marriage brokers? . . . It happened
that the rising bourgeoisie . . . increasingly recognised freedom of contract for
marriage. . . . Marriage remained class marriage, but, within the confines of the class,
the parties were accorded a certain degree of freedom of choice. . . . But here the
irony of history asserts itself once again. The ruling class continues to be dominated
by the familiar economic influences and therefore, only in exceptional cases can it
show really voluntary marriages; whereas . . . these are the rule among the dominated
class.
Thus full freedom in marriage can become generally operative only when the
abolition of capitalist production, and of the property relations created by it, has
removed all these secondary economic considerations. . . .
Since sex love is by its very nature exclusive . . . marriage based on sex love
is by its very nature m o n o g a m y [sic]. With the disappearance of the economic
considerations which compelled w o m e n to tolerate the customary infidelity of the
men—the anxiety about their own livelihood and even more about the future of their
children—the equality of w o m e n thus achieved will . . . result far more effectively in
the m e n becoming really monogamous than in the w o m e n becoming polyandrous.
W h a t will most definitely disappear from monogamy, however, are all the
characteristics stamped on it in consequence of its having arisen out of property
relationships. These are,first,the predominance of the m a n , and secondly, the indis-
solubility of marriage. The predominance of the m a n in marriage is simply a conse-
quence of his economic predominance and will vanish with it automatically. The
indissolubility of marriage is partly the result of the economic conditions under which
m o n o g a m y arose.
A n d Engels concludes with a quotation from M o r g a n :
W h e n the fact is accepted that the family has passed through successive forms . . . the
question at once arises whether this [the present] form can be permanent in the future.
The only answer that can be given is that it must advance as society advances and
change as society changes, even as it has done in the past.
T h e above analysis has shown that the penetration of the capitalist formation
has caused the destruction of traditional family life and has given rise to
contrasted new patterns of family interaction. O n e of these patterns, generally
accepted by m a n y black and white Rhodesians as a positive response to
modern life, is the dominance of the husband-wife relationship as expressed in
the isolation of the nuclear family from the lineage. But the other pattern,
likewise the direct result of capitalism, i.e. the ever-greater incidence of unstable
unions shading into open prostitution characterized by the dominance of the
mother-child dyad, is deplored as moral degeneration. Yet without this n e w form
of the domestic unit the exploitation of farm and mine labourers could not be
carried out as thoroughly as it is at present, and this m a y be w h y society makes
no effort to assist people living in these unstable unions to consolidate their
families. A s a consequence, w o m e n are exposed to extreme insecurity; m e n suffer
from their inability to establish and to support their o w n families, and children
lack a stable h o m e , adequate food and the love of both a father and a mother.
It will be an urgent task of the n e w Z i m b a b w e a n government to provide,
first of all, economic security to those people w h o at present pay most heavily for
the concentration of the nation's wealth in the hands of a few employers.
Husband-wife relationships in a socialist Zimbabwe
T h e creation of a n e w society in Z i m b a b w e will be a task which will tax the

people's energies for m a n y years to c o m e , for the inequalities which exist in
Rhodesia today are manifold. There arefirstof all the different handicaps,
suffered by S h o n a and Ndebele w o m e n , which have been inherited from the past.
T h e n there are the n e w inequalities created by the capitalist system, the great
economic differences between n e w social classes in the e m p l o y m e n t centres.
O n e approach to these problems can be through the communalization of
all m e a n s of production, an approach repeatedly announced by leaders of
the liberation m o v e m e n t (Zimbabwe News, Zimbabwe Review). It seems that
communalization is also the most effective m e a n s through which w o m e n can
share equally with m e n in the control over the m e a n s of production and be
liberated from their inferior position in the h o m e . Engels (1976, p . 83) writes
that only w h e n the m e a n s of production are o w n e d communally will sexual
discrimination cease:
The position of m e n thus undergoes considerable change. But that of w o m e n , of all

w o m e n , also undergoes important alteration. With the passage of the means of
production into c o m m o n property, the individual family ceases to be the economic
unit of society. Private housekeeping is transformed into a social industry. The care
and education of children becomes a public matter.
There will be differences in achieving c o m m u n a l living in t o w n and country.

M o s t planning for a socialist transformation has so far been done for rural areas.
Already in 1964, Samir A m i n considered w a y s towards a socialist transformation
of rural Africa and c a m e to the conclusion that such change is even m o r e alien
to the traditional African society than it is to capitalist society. Concluding that
far-reaching changes had to be carried out before socialism could be achieved,
he wrote ( A m i n , 1964, p. 42-3):
It is an illusion to think that the primitive collective traditions facilitate the setting up
of modern socialist structures. . . . Nothing is further from socialism than primitive
communism. S o long as the traditional family structures have not been broken,
modern socialist structures can only remain empty of content. . . . W h a t must be
done to permit agricultural progress to really start is not to 'educate the peasants' in
the traditional family framework, but to break the family and its traditions. It is
not to create illusory formal cooperatives but to develop individualism, to free the
individual from the chains of tradition.
T o pass from the migrant worker with a hoe to the intensive use of livestock
for plowing, to liquidate the traditional juxtaposition of farmers and herdsmen . . .
demands the destruction of family structures.
This chapter has carefully delineated the differences in husband-wife relations

created by the different traditional m o d e s of production of the S h o n a and
Ndebele. Samir A m i n ' s argument, calling for the liquidation of the distinction
between pastoralism and agriculture, is valid for Z i m b a b w e . If c o m m u n a l
settlements are established in the rural areas, it would be advantageous if all
engaged m o r e evenly in mixed farming a n d livestock rearing, thus eliminating
the structural differences created by these different m o d e s of production in the
past. This will raise the position of the Ndebele w o m a n in the rural areas, even
if cattle-rearing remains of great importance in the west of the country. But
m o r e important than introducing mixed farming will be the collective owner-
ship of all the m e a n s of production in the rural areas. This will at once
eliminate sexual distinctions in the division of labour and give w o m e n the right
to do the work they choose and to take part in community discussions on h o w

production is to be organized and what is to be done with the surplus. T h e
way in which communal living in such communities can be organized has
been set out in several of m y publications (Weinrich, 1975¿, 1975c, 1979a).
There is no need for an artificial introduction of individualism in agri-
culture as A m i n recommends, but neither should traditional lineages be used
for recruiting members to the new communes. Present-day African society in
Rhodesia has already been individualized and even atomized to such a degree
that it will be quite a task to draw people together into new meaningful c o m m u n i -
ties. The large number of people currently working in mines and on farms have
long been stripped of lineage support, and they have thefirstright to be settled
in new caring communities.
With the departure of most white farmers m u c h farm land will become
available which the new government can use to settle most of the present farm
labourers, as well as m a n y of the people n o w living in T T L s w h o no longer have
adequate land to cultivate. F r o m the beginning, these new settlements can be
built on a communal basis so that all their members collectively o w n the land
they cultivate, the equipment they use, and the livestock they tend. Former farm-
houses can be transformed into community centres around which families can
build their o w n homes. The abolition of the family as the unit of production will
not lead to the abolition of the family, but rather free it from economic worries.
Whether meals are to be communal or private is a matter open for discussion by
the people. Changes in eating patterns have repeatedly been stressed in this
chapter. The example of Nyafaru in eastern Rhodesia has shown that a communal
kitchen and dining room are very acceptable to many people and that they have
a wonderful community-building impact on a group, quite apart from freeing
w o m e n from purely domestic burdens. Also the experience of m e n and w o m e n
in the camps of the liberation army prove that such communalism is readily
acceptable to many.
C o m m u n a l facilities for meals, laundry, child-care and education free w o m e n
to participate on an equal footing with m e n in the production process. A s the
survey carried out in the camps of the liberation movement has shown, cadres
of the Zimbabwe African National Liberation A r m y ( Z A N L A ) expect that in
the future Zimbabwe all work distinctions between the sexes will be eliminated.
The experience of the people of Nyafaru and of the cadres in the camps also
shows that communal discussions of tasks to be accomplished create a spirit of
commitment to a c o m m o n goal, because they involve everybody in its realization.
This commitment is essential if production is to be high and if people are to
experience satisfaction in their work and lives. T o guarantee this satisfaction,
c o m m u n e s must be small enough to allow face-to-face relationships a m o n g all
members.
Absence of private property will immediately abolish bridewealth, a topic
dealt with in the next chapter. It will give m e n and w o m e n equal standing and,
what is very important to w o m e n , it will give them the freedom to choose their
husbands on personal grounds, such as love and attraction, and yet guarantee
them full security. Hence they will no longer have to buy this freedom with
economic insecurity. They will be able to demand that their husbands be as loyal
and faithful to them as they are willing to be to their husbands. Under these
conditions, Engels (1976, p . 83) writes, 'prostitution disappears; m o n o g a m y ,

instead of declining,finallybecomes a reality—for m e n as well'.
A nationalization of the means of production in mining and other industries
and the introduction of worker councils to regulate and control the economic
process will facilitate the establishment of social services for urban workers and
their families so that conditions similar to those suggested for rural areas can be
established. A s early as 1974 members of Nyafaru worked out concrete plans of
h o w best to introduce c o m m u n a l living in industrial centres (Weinrich, 1975c).
The implementation of such proposals by a socialist government should alleviate
the poverty of this section of the population.
Government attitudes towards the present middle classes are difficult to
anticipate. There will undoubtedly be a scaling d o w n of the incomes of those w h o
presently earn m u c h more than the bulk of the population, for without reducing
the incomes of the very rich, a more equitable distribution of the national wealth
will not be possible. In these families, too, w o m e n will be as free as their husbands
to earn a living outside the h o m e and this, in turn, will require a redistribution of
household tasks between m e n and w o m e n . Since w o m e n in these households
tend to have a higher-than-average education, and since they are already n o w
achieving a greater equality in the h o m e than the poor, it can be assumed that
their efforts for full equality will continue and be successful. But to m a k e it
possible for all of these w o m e n to follow an independent occupation, they will
need as m u c h community assistance in child-caring and domestic work as the
other sections of the population, and this need m a y incline them to welcome the
introduction of communal services in their neighbourhoods. Still, one should
have no illusions: these couples of the present bourgeoisie will be more opposed
to any efforts by a new socialist government to introduce communalism in any
form than the other sections of the population, and unless the n e w government
is able to rally to its cause a large number of revolutionary intellectuals—and this
possibility exists because in recent years the majority of recruits to the liberation
movements have been students (Shamuyarira, 1978, p. 23-4)—great resistance
can be expected from those w h o have little to gain but m u c h to lose from any
socialist reform.
It m a y be asked what purpose will be served by freeing more labour power
in a country which already suffers from serious unemployment and which,
as economists are forecasting,1 will double its unemployment rate once
Europeans leave the country. The answer is that wealth is created by labour, and
once the capitalist system with its built-in restraints on production is removed,
people will be free to develop their o w n resourcefulness in generating commodity
production. The plans for grass roots economic development have already been
laid by the Patriotic Front in its programmes.
A s far as the equality of w o m e n in the future Zimbabwe is concerned, the
following antithetical situation is likely to arise: poor w o m e n will gain m u c h ,
but rich w o m e n will gain little. In the impoverished, poorly educated families in
which husbands generally occupy a still m o r e dominant position than in the
richer and better educated homes—leaving out of account for the m o m e n t the
position on farms and in the mines—the improvements in the position of w o m e n
1. cf. H u m e of Whitsun Foundation, in the Rhodesia Herald, 9 February 1978.

are likely to be great once communalism is introduced. But even here party
members will have to be on the alert to see that the intended equality is truly
carried out in daily living, for, as Trotsky remarked, to guarantee equality in the
h o m e requires a revolutionizing of all domestic habits, a task m u c h more difficult
to achieve than equality before the law or in industry.
In the better-off families, on the other hand, equality between spouses has
already been achieved to a fairly high degree, though m u c h remains to be done
in totally closing the gap in domestic power and authority; but in comparison
with the poorer families, the task is smaller. W o m e n in this category can be
expected to achieve full equality on their o w n , for the n e w social environment
will give them the necessary support.
Even before the basic conditions for sexual equality are created the govern-
ment must address itself to the urgent task of preventing new cleavages from
arising between rich and poor, between those w h o accept a great degree of
c o m m u n a l living because of the advantages it brings them and those w h o
bitterly oppose communalization. There is a great danger—and it would be
tragic were this danger to become reality—that the present social divisions are
overcome only to be replaced by new class antagonisms.
The prospects for full sexual equality in the new Z i m b a b w e are, however,
promising. Thus, the Secretary for Welfare and W o m e n ' s Affairs of the Patri-
otic Front ( Z A P U ) said in an interview:
They [men] have accepted it [the changing of women's roles] because some of us
women have taken active part in politics, active part in the liberation movement,
given very good ideas to the men; we discuss very well and they see our ideas are
very bright. So men have just to accept it whether they like it or not, because
w o m e n w h o have lost their husbands, m e n w h o have lost their wives, and w o m e n
who have taken an active part, are not destroying their homes, instead they are
rebuilding homes. In building the confidence of the m e n and the confidence of
w o m e n as well, w e meet together and w e do it very well together; m e n have
accepted it, a few of course are still resisting it because nobody will like everything.
(Weiss and Chappell, 1979.)
4 The changing
function
of bridewealth
A mere property career is not thefinaldestiny of mankind, if progress is to be

the law of the future as it has been of the past. . . . The dissolution of society bids
fair to become the termination of a career of which property is the end and aim,
because such a career contains the elements of self-destruction. Democracy in
government, brotherhood in Society, equality in rights and privileges, and universal
education, foreshadow the next higher plane of society to which experience,
intelligence and knowledge are steadily tending. It will be a revival, in a higher
form, of the liberty, equality and fraternity of the ancient gentes. {Morgan,
Ancient Society.)
Bridewealth in pre-capitalist society

Bridewealth, as the very term indicates, implies property. Property is rep-
resented by ideology as a relationship between people and things, though in
reality it is a relationship between people, because it is only between people
that relationships exist.
Wealth is counted in scarce goods. That which is freely available and in
which n o h u m a n labour has been invested is not wealth. Marriages are often
accompanied b y a transfer of valued property. In societies in which land is
scarce, such as in certain Arab or European countries, fathers used to give
their daughters a piece of land as dowry. In m a n y parts of Africa, where shifting
cultivation had been the rule, land was freely available but livestock was not.
Hence cattle became an integral part of marriage transactions. T h e bride-
grooms' families often presented livestock to the brides' families and in this
w a y tangible relationships between different lineages were established. Cattle
were exchanged for w o m e n , though before the penetration of capitalism neither
was regarded as merchandise. They h a d a use-value, but not an exchange-
value, because cattle were not commodities offered for sale. They provided
people with meat, but this meat was generally only eaten after a beast had
been killed in honour of the ancestors. Because of this link with the dead,
cattle expressed two sets of relationships: those between ancestors and their
living descendants, and those between different lineages.
A m o n g both the Shona and Ndebele, bridewealth consisted of a larger

payment in cattle, called rovora by the Shona and lobola by the Ndebele, and a
smaller payment in local currency, k n o w n to the Shona as rutsambo, iron
bracelet. Iron bracelets were used in the restricted market that existed for goods
which were not produced by every family. T h e Zanzi element of the Ndebele,
i.e. the 'pure' Ndebele w h o migrated into Z i m b a b w e from Zululand in South
Africa, were unfamiliar with this payment and even today they seldom m a k e
it. But it has been preserved under the n a m e gangaziwe by the Holi section of
the Ndebele, a Ndebelenized Shona group which during the last century w a s
fully incorporated into the Ndebele nation.
T h e two payments are very different and perform different functions. T h e
rutsambo or gangaziwe payment was always m a d e by the bridegroom himself
because it conferred on him individual domestic and sexual rights over his wife.
The rovora or lobola payments, on the other hand, affiliated the children he
was to beget to his lineage. Hence all his lineage elders were prepared to
contribute to this payment, for the survival of every lineage depended o n
descendants.
Lineage elders not only assisted young m e n in finding their bridewealth,
but because the young did not o w n livestock in their o w n n a m e , the elders
provided all of it. For all matrimonial goods were owned by the elders and
their very power to provide the young with wives was the foundation of their
authority. Meillassoux correctly writes (Terray, 1972, p . 166):
The elders . . . are thus the only ones able to enter into matrimonial relations. Their
wealth enables them to marry and to take several wives. The others are dependent
on them to obtain a wife. Therein lies the main source of the authority of the elders.
The young, in return for future wives, had to work for their elders thus enabling
the older m e n to organize a large labour force to create surplus value for their
families. During their youth, therefore, m e n were as dependent on the heads
of their households as were w o m e n , but, in contrast to w o m e n , they k n e w
that their dependence was only temporary, for the elders could not withhold
wives from their sons indefinitely and this inability restricted their absolute
authority. Meillassoux writes (Terray, 1972, p . 170):
W h e n the bride-price is paid the cycle of reproduction of the social structure is
complete. However, while the general principle of ancestral authority is thus preserved
and transmitted, it is at the expense of the progressive diminution of the individual
authority of the elder. Each bride-prite paid, each marriage performed, loosens his
hold over one of the dependents, since he has been given the means to achieve indepen-
dence. Even though each such event loosens the bonds which link the elder directly
with his juniors, and even though it is always tempting for him to use his wealth to
increase the number of his o w n wives rather than marry off his dependents, the elder
cannot avoid this obligation without the risk of seeing his community wither away.
The whole bridewealth system served, therefore, to underpin the elders'

authority. Its other function was the legitimization of offspring. If no bride-
wealth w a s paid, children did not belong to the m a n w h o begot them, but to
the lineage of the w o m a n w h o bore them. A m a n could, however, pay damages
plus a special payment which ceded to him a child once it was weaned from its
The changing function of bridewealth 93
mother. If he did, this payment was seen as a kind of fractional bridewealth

for the fraction of the w o m a n ' s fertility which had been ceded to him; but
without payment, there was no legal paternity. This custom is still valid today.
These functions of lobola or rovora m a k e it clear that bridewealth was
really a payment for a w o m a n ' s fertility; hence it was a genetricial payment as
against the rutsambo or gangaziwe which was an uxorial payment. The connec-
tion of bridewealth with fertility was traditionally expressed in a ritual during
which the cattle, given in exchange for a w o m a n , were officially 'shown' to
the ancestors by the bride's father w h o prayed that his forefathers would bless
the new union and grant it many children.
Originally, a bridewealth transaction was not only a non-commercial
transaction because the cattle were not a commodity for sale, but also because
brides were really exchanged for brides, a sister or daughter for a sister-in-law
or daughter-in-law. Cattle were merely the link in this chain. Because of this
substitution, w o m e n contributed indirectly to the growth of their o w n lineages.
This was expressed a m o n g the Shona by the chipanda arrangement, a pairing
of brothers and sisters. A m a n always treated his paired sister with great
respect because she was soon to be the vatete of his children, their 'female
father', and was closely equated with him because he had married with the
bridewealth paid for her.
Bridewealth always had the further function of guaranteeing marriage
stability. A t divorce, the whole or part of the bridewealth had to be repaid,
depending on the number of children w h o had been born. Normally, bride-
wealth was considered non-returnable if a w o m a n had borne a m a n at least
four children. The refunding of bridewealth always posed great difficulties
since bridewealth was generally used soon after it had been received for the
marriage of a junior m e m b e r of the w o m a n ' s lineage or, if no m a n intended to
marry at the time, the cattle were dispersed a m o n g those elders of the lineages
w h o had contributed to the marriages of their juniors. Thus, parents put
pressure on their daughters to stay with their husbands unless it was quite clear
that the husbands had grossly transgressed the limits of their authority and,
therefore, had lost the right to reclaim their cattle. Rutsambo payments were
never returned.
The previous chapter has shown that marriage stability is essential in a
society in which the father-son dyad is dominant. Bridewealth transactions
guarantee this stability; but at the same time they reveal that this stability is
bought at the expense of w o m e n : the marriage payment reduces the wives'
position in the h o m e and makes them dependent on their husbands. Marriages
in the past were arranged between extended families; the young, especially
w o m e n , had little say in the choice of marriage partners. It was the elders w h o
controlled the livestock, w h o had the knowledge of interlineage relationships
and w h o judged what alliances were most advantageous for their families.
A s soon as bridewealth had been paid, brides passed from the guardianship
of their fathers and their o w n families to that of their husbands and their
families. Under either set of guardians they enjoyed a high degree of security,
though under the guardianship of their husbands they also enjoyed the prestige
which the community conferred on married persons, especially on mothers.
Yet this prestige depended precisely o n the w o m e n soon becoming mothers;
failure to d o so m a d e them despised and either the husbands sent them away
or married second wives. In such instances all cattle payments had to be returned
to the husbands' families. This proves that w o m e n were not valued as persons
in themselves but as child bearers, and, as an earlier chapter has shown, as
food producers. If they failed in either of these roles, they were socially dead.
The w o m e n ' s weak position and inferior status was symbolized by the bride-
wealth payment which w a s m a d e for them.
Bridewealth under capitalism
The most significant changes which have occurred in the bridewealth system
have been brought about by the introduction of the monetary system. M o n e y
has acquainted the people with new forms pf property and has totally trans-
formed African society. T h e transformation of bridewealth into a commercial
transaction is a natural consequence of these changes.
Hardly two decades had passed since the introduction of money into
African communities before the cattle payment began to be replaced totally
or in part by cash payments. This development meant that, whereas in the
past w o m e n were exchanged for cattle, which had a use-value, w o m e n were
n o w exchanged for m o n e y , a m e d i u m of exchange which has no value in
itself, but is excellently suited to accumulation. A m o n e y transaction is both
neater and easier than a transfer of livestock, especially for people living in the
cities, and it also lends itself to the subsequent acquisition of other commodities.
This substitution of value-neutral m o n e y for cattle has inevitably increased
the spirit of acquisitiveness in the recipients. Commercialization has occurred
whenever marriage payments have been used for purposes other than obtaining
wives in exchange for sisters or daughters.
T h e replacement of cattle by m o n e y has been favoured by three major
factors. First, cattle were pre-eminently lineage property and intended for the
perpetuation of the lineage; as the lineage lost its relevance, cattle, too, ceased
to be the most important factor in a marriage transaction. Second, the first
persons drawn into the new money economy were young m e n w h o soon realized
that with their earnings they could buy cattle and then negotiate for brides with
relative independence from their elders. This directly undermined the position
of their fathers and, as the next chapter will show, has disturbed the Rhodesian
government which depends on conservative forces for its o w n acceptability.
Third, the vicissitudes of cattle disease and government policies have forcefully
reduced African livestock and so hastened its replacement by m o n e y .
Taking the last factorfirst,during the nineteenth century rinderpest had
almost wiped out the African cattle population and the little livestock left
to the Ndebele was forcibly taken over by European settlers as war booty.
Yet African cattle herds soon recovered and from 1910 onwards they increased
rapidly, especially in Shonaland where Ndebele raiders n o longer carried off
large sections of the people's herds. B y the 1940s, African livestock had
increased to such an extent that overgrazing had caused serious soil erosion
and government began passing legislation limiting African herds. T h e rapid
growth of African-owned livestock can be seen from Table 15.
T A B L E 15. African-owned cattle
Estimated Cattle Approximate

number of per head of N o . of cattle
Year cattle population per family
1901 44,000 0.1 0.7

1911 330,000 0.4 2.8
1926 1,197,000 1.3 9.1
1932 1,755,000 1.6 11.2
1938 1,555,000 1.2 8.4
1943 1,824,000 1.2 8.3
1964 1,916,000 0.5 3.5
1968 2,218,000 0.5 3.3
1973 3,125,000 0.5 3.5
1975 3,317,000 0.6 4.2
Source: Weinrich, 1975a, p . 24: Rhodesia Government, 1976a, Tables 1 and 18; Rogers and Frantz
1962, p . 12.
During the 1950s, the government carried out destocking campaigns in

order to bring the cattle population d o w n to the carrying capacity of the land
reserved for Africans. B y the mid 1960s, however, it handed over the control
of African livestock to African chiefs (Weinrich, 1975a, p . 107) because the
Ministry of Internal Affairs realized that it could n o longer cope with the
problem. Chiefs allowed cattle herds once again to increase to such an extent
that the quality of the grazing land deterioriated to danger levels. T w o T T L s in
which I carried out detailed agricultural research of soil erosion in 1966 are
summarized in Table 16.
TABLE 16.
Soil erosion in two T T L s Percentage of total area
Degrees of
erosion Chilimanzi Victoria
Nil 8 9
Slight 29 55
Moderate 41 19
Severe 19 11
Very severe 3 6
TOTAL 100 100
Source: Weinrich, 1975a, p . 318.
A s a consequence of badly eroded soils, heavy overgrazing and a succession

of drought years, m a n y cattle died in the early 1970s, causing an annual loss
of millions of dollars to African peasants (Weinrich, 1975a, p . 42-3).
In spite of the overall cattle increase during this century, the relationship
of cattle to the population, or the number of cattle per family, increased only
up to 1932 and thereafter declined, for the African population also increased
fast. This means that the average family wealth in livestock, which in 1932 was
higher than eleven beasts, declined within ten years to eight and, after destocking
in the 1950s, to just over three. Table 17, which sets out the cattle payments of
all recorded marriages, reflects some of these general trends.
Table 17 also shows that from the beginning of the century until the 1930s
there was an increase in cattle payments, but that thereafter there has been
a steady decline. At most times the total payment of livestock tended to be
just at or below the level of the average family holding in cattle, except during
the early 1970s when cattle were paid in only 19 per cent of all marriages. It is
possible that this rapid decline in the 1970s is due to incomplete payments and
that more cattle will be handed over as time passes. Still, there has been a
decrease in marriages with cattle transfers from the beginning of the century;
this can be seen from Table 17.
A s the proportion of marriages without cattle has increased so the pro-
portion of those without money payments has declined, except during the last
decade, thefiguresfor which include a large number of marriages where hus-
bands are still paying bridewealth debts to their fathers-in-law. Table 18 shows
that during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s, cattle payments were highest and m o n e y
payments were lowest. During the 1950s, when large-scale destocking took
place, m o n e y payments were higher than during any other decade.
The 1950s were also a decade of great industrial expansion in the urban
areas, a decade during which African workers had better chances than ever
before of earning higher wages. With the dissolution of the Federation of
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the early 1960s and the subsequent declaration
of U D I , employment opportunities declined. This too is reflected in the m o n e y
payments for brides, and so is the temporary recovery of African earnings in
the early 1970s. F r o m the ever greater importance of the money component
of bridewealth, as well as from itsfluctuationin relation to the national economy,
it can be inferred that it is wage labourers, i.e. the young m e n themselves, w h o
are n o w responsible for finding their o w n bridewealth.
This inference is proved by Table 19 which shows that 93 per cent of all
young m e n in the rural areas and 89 per cent of all bridegrooms in the total
sample of 5,662 marriages received nofinancialassistance from their relatives.
Slightly more received help infindingthe cattle component of their payments,
though 79 per cent of all bridegrooms had tofindeven this without any support.
This means that most of the bridegrooms bought cattle with their earnings;
for few young m e n o w n cattle in their o w n n a m e . This shows further that elders
no longer control the allocation of bridewealth. T h e young have become
financially more powerful than their fathers and senior kinsmen. Financial
independence, moreover, gives them greater freedom to choose their marriage
partners than they ever had in the past.
This greater financial self-sufficiency of bridegrooms has had a negative
effect on the position of the future wives, for they are n o w almost exclusively
dependent on their husbands. In the past, if a husband seriously maltreated
his wife, she could appeal not only to her o w n family but also to her husband's
family; today these have little influence in restraining their son even if he obvi-
ously abuses his authority in the h o m e . This means that wives are becoming
more vulnerable as their position loses some of its traditional safeguards.
The changing fonction of bridewealth 97
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The reduced influence of the wider kinship group can also b e deduced
from Table 19; it shows that whatever help is given, is given mostly by the
bridegroom's father, or at most by his elder brother in cases where the father
is already dead. The bridegroom's father's brothers seldom assist. Also chipando
arrangements, i.e. marriages with the bridewealth received for a sister, have
become rare. This means that lineages are losing their influence in regulating
modern marriage contracts and this, in turn, favours the emergence of nuclear
families even in rural areas.
M a n y people have argued that bridewealth payments have greatly increased
in size since m o n e y replaced the traditional cattle payment, because m o n e y
offers the possibility of accumulation. Garcia-Gonzales (1972, p . 299), w h o
studied the Ndebele in both rural and urban areas, writes that
in the decades before 1950 the average lobola was betweenfiveand seven head of
cattle or its money equivalent, which was estimated by the courts at £5 per head.1
Since then the increase has been considerable. In 1960, the average lobola in rural
areas was £16 plus eight head of cattle and in urban areas about £75. In 1969, both
rural and urban sectors gave an average of £125.
Garcia-Gonzales gives no information o n h o w he arrived at these averages.

Elsewhere in his dissertation he mentions that his sample is based on 130 respon-
dents. This is a relatively small sample and I have reason to suspect that it is
not very representative. I base this reservation on the figures in Table 20.
In this table, I have converted all cattle into their monetary equivalent at a
standard rate of $(R)20, irrespective of the decade in which cattle were trans-
ferred. This exaggerates the size of bridewealth in thefirsthalf of this century
since m o n e y in those decades had a greater purchasing power than it has today.
With this proviso in mind, the following interpretation seems to be valid: even
if it is agreed that the money value of the bridewealth payments from 1910
to 1949 has to be scaled d o w n , thefiguresdo not indicate that there has been an
increase in the average size of marriage payments. Aconsistent $(R)122 in value
throughout the century does not seem to be too far off the mark. A s stated before,
the lower averagefigurefor the 1970s is due to several payments being as yet
incomplete.
There is, however, a marked spread in marriage payments, a spread which
in every decade reaches from practically nothing to more than $(R)400 at times.
Undoubtedly, it is these discrepancies that have given rise to the belief that
marriage payments are increasing in size. A comparison with Table 5 in the
preceding chapter shows that incomes also differ widely in the African population.
It seems, therefore, that fathers-in-law tailor their demands for bridewealth to
fit the paying ability of their sons-in-law. It has also often been suggested that
fathers vary their demands for bridewealth according to the education they
have given to their daughters. There is some evidence to support this view.
Garcia-Gonzales, for example, records a case in which a Ndebele father-in-law
presented his prospective son-in-law with a pile of bills, including a record of
1. This equals $(R)10, a value well below that normally paid for livestock. In the following section,
in which I convert cattle into their m o n e y value, I use a standard equivalent of $(R)20 for one
head of cattle, because this was the average price paid for African livestock in the 1960s when
most of the recorded marriages were contracted.
T h e changing function of bridewealth 101
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every single item of expenditure he had ever had in bringing u p bis daughter:
medical bills, receipts for school fees, bills for clothes, etc.; with the demand
that the son-in-law pay him a bridewealth equivalent to this amount (Garcia-
Gonzales, 1972, p. 118).
Garcia-Gonzales (1972, p. 188) also writes that after interviewing sixty-nine
secondary-school students aged 17 to 23, he was told by the girls that lobola
should be graded according to the level of education reached by brides: 'Lobola
for a girl with Cambridge (Form IV) education should be $(R)350, for a girl
with secondary education (Form II) it should be $(R)260, with primary edu-
cation $(R)170.' Such a grading of w o m e n would imply a complete evaluation of
worth according to the investment in their education and would thus reduce
them indeed to commodities.
It is a fact that a m o n g themselves w o m e n often compare the bridewealth
paid for them, and those for w h o m more has been paid pride themselves on
being considered worth more than the others. Several such discussions have been
recorded in villages. Yet a statistical correlation between higher bridewealth and
higher education of the w o m e n could not be established in the 5,662 recorded
cases, except in instances in which w o m e n had received professional training and
so could contribute substantial salaries to the family finances. Education below
the professional level does not m a k e a substantial difference to the earning
abilities of w o m e n , even though a completed primary education has generally
familiarized young girls through domestic-science classes with m a n y skills which
less-educated w o m e n do not possess. Their knowledge of a balanced diet,
hygiene and child-care often m a k e a great difference to the way they run their
homes.
I have argued above that cattle, being traditionally lineage property, will
decline as marriage payments to the degree that the lineage declines in import-
ance. In Chapter 3, moreover, I have shown that the destruction of the pastoral
economy of the Ndebele has had a m u c h more devastating effect on Ndebele
lineages than had the transformation of the agricultural economy of the Shona.
A further proof of this is given in Table 21.
This table shows that whereas 80 per cent of all rural Shona pay part of
their bridewealth in cattle, only 47 per cent of the rural Ndebele still do so; and
whereas some Shona m a k e large cattle payments—some bridegrooms pay over
fifteen head—no Ndebele marriage has been recorded in which husbands paid
more than nine beasts. Several explanations can be advanced for this. A s stated
before, the Ndebele were almost totally stripped of their livestock by the first
European settlers in retaliation for their uprising; no such action was taken
against the Shona. Subsequently, the cessation of cattle raids prevented the
Ndebele from supplementing their herds in the traditional way, but it allowed
the Shona to increase their herds without interference, an opportunity they did
not have during the second half of the nineteenth century. A s a consequence,
the Shona o w n more cattle today than do the Ndebele. But also, and this is very
important, Ndebele w o m e n m a k e a less significant contribution to food pro-
duction than do Shona w o m e n and so the surplus labour extracted from them
by their husbands is less than that extracted by Shona husbands. This in itself
explains the lower bridewealth. Finally, the disintegration of Ndebele lineages
makes the need for offspring less important. These latter factors apply equally
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to payments of bridewealth in cattle and in cash and Table 22 shows that Ndebele
money payments also lag far behind money payments m a d e by Shona husbands.
Table 23, which combines the results of Tables 21 and 22, shows that
whereas only 36 per cent of all Ndebele pay more than $(R)100 for a wife,
76 per cent of all Shona do so. This is well k n o w n to the people and the Shona
living in Bulawayo often c o m m e n t on it. S o m e try to marry Ndebele wives because
they will then have to pay a lower bridewealth, but others refuse to do so, arguing
that as a result of the low bridewealth Ndebele w o m e n feel little constraint to
be loyal to their husbands; they also point to the high divorce rate for Ndebele
marriages.
Tables 21, 22 and 23 indicate a correlation between high bridewealth and
marriage stability, as well as one between high bridewealth and high living
standards. T h e conclusion to be drawn from this is that husbands w h o earn more
money and, therefore, possess more property want to be assured of a legitimate
heir to w h o m they can pass on their wealth, an argument already put forward
in the preceding chapter. T o m e n of this class, bridewealth is of great importance
since it is only through the payment of bridewealth that they gain legitimate
paternity over their sons.
A further confirmation of this argument is obtained if urban communities
are compared with those of the farms and mines, since urban husbands m a k e
m u c h larger bridewealth payments than husbands in these communities. At
first sight, it is surprising that urban m e n m a k e relatively large cattle payments.
The reason is that most of their fathers-in-law still live in the country and it is
they w h o insist on cattle payments. O n the other hand, the exceedingly low
frequency of cattle payments on mine sites and farms is understandable because
most of the husbands in these communities are foreigners and do not o w n any
livestock. Those cattle transfers which do occur mostly take place on the tea
estates, and to a lesser degree at Wankie mine. Other farm workers, and the m e n
at Sutton mine, seldom exchange any livestock at marriage. That the poor seldom
transfer cattle can also be seen from the low cattle payments in the Ndebele
townships of M p o p o m a , and St Mary's, the slum area near Salisbury; in both
of these communities, cattle payments are exceedingly rare.
A s far as cash payments are concerned, these closely reflect the husbands'
wages: where m e n earn more money, they pay more, and where they earn little,
they pay less. The few larger payments on farms and mine sites come from
husbands in well-paid positions at Wankie mine and professionals on the tea
estates. It should not cause surprise that bridewealth paid by urban bridegrooms
is not m u c h larger than that of rural husbands—taking into account the current
higher wages and salaries earned by urbanités—since in their youth m a n y of the
present urban householders were still labour migrants and in the same financial
situation as m a n y of the present rural residents. Even if they were young
townsmen earning salaries, their income was still relatively low at the commence-
ment of their career, and so at the time they established their families they were
not necessarily in a betterfinancialposition than labour migrants. Also young
urban familiesfindit harder to establish themselves than do rural families since
the initial expenses of a young urban family are m u c h higher than in the country
and most of the savings of young husbands have to be handed over to their
wives' families.
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discrimination in Rhodesia 106
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Bridewealth payments always constitute a large investment for bridegrooms

and most young m e n have to work for several years until they can give their
fathers-in-law enough m o n e y to gain their consent to take their wives h o m e .
Less than half of all couples in the survey had completed their marriage payments,
though only a few outside the farms and mines had m a d e n o marriage payments
at all.
TABLE 24. Reasons for incomplete bridewealth
Other
employment
Per- Per- Per- Per-

Reasons No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Not applicable
because completed 1,330 48.3 904 49.1 477 44.8 2,711 47.9
Not demanded — — — — 205 19.3 205 3.6
N o money 979 35.3 697 37.8 308 28.9 1,984 35.0
N o time 8 0.3 1 0.05 6 0.6 15 0.3
Delayed for n o
specific reason — — 5 0.3 — — 5 0.1
N o longer talked
about 168 6.1 166 9.0 26 2.4 360 6.3
Customary to delay
payment 153 5.6 16 0.9 5 0.5 174 3.1
Permitted to stay
together — — 3 0.2 12 1.1 15 0.3
Other reasons 117 4.2 50 2.7 26 2.4 193 3.4
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
Table 24 shows that most of the m e n w h o remained in debt to their wives'

families did so because they had no money to pay the whole agreed bridewealth.
In the past, it had not been necessary that all bridewealth was paid before a
household was established; in fact, once the rutsambo or gangaziwe payment had
been m a d e and an initial advance towards the rovora or lobola had been handed
over, a w o m a n ' s father had generally agreed to the transfer of his daughter to her
husband's h o m e . Referring to this practice, quite a number of m e n in the rural
areas stated that it was customary to delay marriage payments. Others, especially
in the urban areas, interpreted this custom as an excuse for withholding out-
standing debts, stating that since the missing cattle or m o n e y were no longer
talked about, or since they were allowed to live with their wives already, there
was no need for them to repay their debts.
The only marriages which were established without even the stipulation of
a bridewealth payment took place on the farms and mine sites, namely 205 out
of 1,065 (19 per cent). These marriages were mostly contracted by foreigners with
w o m e n w h o had been written off by their families as prostitutes, or whose
families were taking it for granted that marriages on farms and mine sites had
little likelihood of stability. In such cases, to demand a bridewealth was regarded
as an invitation to unnecessary trouble, since in all probability it would soon

have to be refunded.
Although young m e n find it hard to collect large sums of m o n e y to satisfy
their fathers-in-law, hardly any of them suggested that bridewealth should be
abolished; only a few suggested that it should be reduced in size. W o m e n ,
however, especially w o m e n with higher education, have begun to question the
value of bridewealth and some are opposing it openly. Garcia-Gonzales collected
the responses, shown in Table 25, which confirm this statement.
T A B L E 25. Should bridewealth be abolished?
No Yes
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Rural adults 43 100.0 — —

Urban adults 17 94.5 1 1.5
Male students 12 100.0 — —
Female students 46 80.7 11 19.3
TOTAL 118 90.7 12 9.2
Source: Garcia-Gonzales, 1972, p . 304.
The reasons given by most Africans for the retention of bridewealth are that
it is an integral part of their culture and ought to be preserved as a most authentic
aspect of their heritage. Rural elders especially stress that its abandonment would
be an act of gross disobedience to their ancestors which would be punished by
barrenness. T h e older Shona also stress that bridewealth still links families
together. Yet all these reasons, representing values of the traditional super-
structure, are not sufficient to explain w h y even young educated m e n still insist
on paying bridewealth, nor w h y educated young w o m e n begin to resent it. N o r
do they explain the universal adherence of the older generation to a custom
which has so radically changed its function. Such explanations can only b e
found from an examination of the actual power relations within families.
A s stated earlier, young m e n greatly gain in independence if they pay their
o w n bridewealth. The ability of the young to pay their o w n bridewealth has as its
consequence marriages that n o longer link together different lineages but rather
establish relationships between individual m e n and the families of their wives.
This ability of young m e n to pay their o w n bridewealth increases their self-
esteem. Several husbands and even youths w h o had not yet married told m e
that they were prepared to pay a high bridewealth because this would m a k e them
masters in their o w n homes. Ngara, criticizing increasing bridewealth charges,
writes that m e n w h o have paid m u c h to obtain their wives often feel justified in
ill-treating them. H e quotes an African writer, Andifasi, as saying (Ngara,
1978, p. 16):
When a m a n marries and is asked to pay for a human being a price he has never
paid for anything else, he m a y forget that he has married a partner; rather he m a y
think that he has bought a slave. Some m e n m a y tell their wives that they bought
them and therefore they should be submissive and obedient.
Ngara (1978, p. 16) concludes:

The commercialization of rovora, a direct result of the capitalist inclinations intro-
duced by colonialism, has further reduced the status of women to that of an object
to be acquired through the use of money and a commodity to be sold for the benefit
of the father.
This change in the source of bridewealth payments has put some w o m e n at the
mercy of their husbands to a degree that never occurred in the past. I k n o w of
one case, which seems far from exceptional, in which a w o m a n after her marriage
was n o longer allowed to write personal letters, but had to have all her letters
written by her husband. W h e n I met her again she told m e that her husband
forbade her to engage in private correspondence. In the majority of cases in
which a husband allows his wife to carry on her profession, he collects his wife's
salary, claiming that since he has paid the bridewealth, he has full rights over all
his wife's activities and earnings.
This humiliating position of w o m e n , brought about by the commercial-
ization of bridewealth, is felt most painfully by educated w o m e n . Urban w o m e n ,
especially those w h o are watched over jealously by their husbands and forbidden
by them to carry on their profession, feel that they have become little more than
prestige symbols. They have lost the productive role which they had in the
country and are reduced to 'housewives', i.e. housekeepers w h o look after their
husbands' h o m e and children and w h o are allowed no independent activity of
their o w n . It is therefore understandable that the majority of persons w h o object
to the bridewealth custom are young w o m e n with higher education w h o see most
clearly that it is due to the bridewealth payment that they are denied equality in
the h o m e . For this reason, some w o m e n with a university education have insisted
that n o bridewealth be paid for them since they will not grant their husbands
propertyrightsover them. Such action by educated w o m e n , however, generally
leads to ruptures with their families because their fathers, w h o paid for their
higher education, were looking forward to a correspondingly high reward.
The reasons w h y old people insist on marriage payments are clearly materi-
alistic, even if they are clothed in appeals to the ancestral religion. Since economic
power has slipped from the hands of the old, and since they no longer control
family property, they depend upon the young. The education of elders is minimal
and their earning capacity is therefore almost nil; no farmer,firmor mineowner
wants to employ old m e n , except, perhaps, as night watchmen. Also their agri-
cultural knowledge is low by modern standards and so they are unable to grow
crops for sale. If they want to o w n wealth, they must receive it from the young. The
best way in which they can demand wealth without appearing to be beggars is to
demand a high bridewealth for their daughters. That this wealth is no longer
exclusively used to obtain brides for other family members can be seen from
Table 26, which shows that more than half of all respondents did not k n o w what
happened to the bridewealth they had paid. If bridewealth had been used for
its traditional purpose, namely to obtain another wife for the family, this would
have been known to the respondents. It is reasonable to assume that in most of
the cases in which people did not k n o w what had happened to their bridewealth
it was used for a variety of purposes which lie outside its traditional
scope.
T A B L E 26. Disposal of bridewealth
Other
employment
Rural1 areas Urban areas centres Total
Per- Per- Per- Per-

Allocation No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
N o t yet paid/not
asked for 124 4.5 50 2.7 263 24.7 437 7.7
Wife's brother's
bridewealth 569 20.6 400 21.7 95 8.9 1,064 18.8
Wife's father's
bridewealth 54 2.0 21 1.1 59 5.5 134 2.4
Refund to father's
sister — — 3 0.2 — — 3 0.1
Education of children 102 3.7 109 5.9 11 1.0 222 3.9
Purchase of cattle 90 3.3 42 2.3 25 2.4 157 2.8
Purchase of farm 16 0.6 28 1.5 1 0.1 45 0.8
Purchase of farm
equipment 7 0.2 3 0.2 3 0.3 13 0.2
Purchase lorry/car 9 0.3 23 1.2 — — 32 0.6
Purchase of bicycle 2 0.1 1 0.1 2 0.2 5 0.1
Purchase of clothes 115 4.2 40 2.2 60 5.6 215 3.8
Construction of house 16 0.6 35 1.9 1 0.1 52 0.9
Establishment of
business 2 0.1 26 1.4 1 0.1 29 0.5
Refund of debts/
medical bills 1 — 6 0.3 6 0.6 13 0.2
Investment in b a n k
account 6 0.2 12 0.7 13 1.2 31 0.5
Don't k n o w 1,642 59.6 1,043 56.6 525 49.3 3,210 56.7
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
Only some 21 per cent of all fathers-in-law in the villages and towns used the
bridewealth they received for their daughters in order tofindwives for their sons,
and a few more tofindadditional wives for themselves. O n the farms and mine
sites only 9 per cent of all bridewealth payments were used to obtain brides for the
wives' brothers. Almost all the cases in which fathers-in-law used the bride-
wealth received to obtain wives for themselves occurred o n the tea estates,
explaining the high polygamy rate of that community.
Most other couples stated that their elders used the bridewealth for a variety
of other purposes. S o m e 6 per cent of all urban couples knew that the bride-
wealth handed over had been used for the education of the wives' younger rela-
tives; also 4 per cent of all rural couples, but only 1 per cent of all couples on
farms and mine sites, k n e w this. This is a reflection of the relative importance
attached to education in these communities and the spread of educational
opportunities. Education, as one older m a n explicitly stated, is 'an investment
in our children so that they will care for us in our old age; it is the most reliable
pension fund w e have'.
Such an investment, of course, depends o n the continued recognition of
kinship ties, at least within the narrow circle of the nuclear family. W h e n these
ties are not recognized, as on the farms and mine sites, it is better to put bride-
wealth into a bank, given, of course, that m o n e y can be spared. Thus 1.2 per cent
of all m e n on farms and mine sites stated that their in-laws had put the bride-
wealth m o n e y into bank accounts. In the towns this percentage was 0.7 per cent
and in the villages a mere 0.2 per cent.
M u c h more important are the instances in which bridewealth has been used
to acquire new means of production, such as farms or farm implements, cattle,
lorries, shops or houses. These latter constitute a permanent investment which
can be used as capital assets in the towns by renting out rooms. The importance
of such direct investment is related to the successful integration of people into
the capitalist system. Thus almost 9 per cent offathers-in-law of urbanités, though
only 5 per cent of fathers-in-law of rural husbands and a mere 3 per cent of those
on the farms and mine sites, used the bridewealth for these purposes. The reason
for this difference is that true capital accumulation can only take place a m o n g the
already better-off families; among the poor, pressing needs prevent accumulation
for deferred consumption.
Just as various forms of investment are an indication of relative affluence,
so the spending of bridewealth on consumer goods of limited duration is a
sign of poverty. If people spend bridewealth on clothes which last only a limited
number of years, this is an indication of poverty. Thus a m o n g the better-off
rural Shona only 0.7 per cent all fathers-in-law used the bridewealth for clothes
for themselves and their families; a m o n g the poor Ndebele over 8 per cent
and a m o n g the even poorer Kalanga in the north-west of the country as m a n y as
24 per cent did so. Likewise better-off urbanités never spend bridewealth m o n e y
on clothes, but in the Ndebele township of M p o p o m a 6 per cent of all couples
reported that the money they had paid as bridewealth had been used for clothing.
O n the farms and mine sites—except on the tea estates—23 per cent of all bride-
wealth payments were used for clothes. This makes clothing the most important
single item on which the poor spend marriage payments. Those w h o earn enough
to clothe their families respectably do not spend large sums of money, which only
seldom comes their way, on such consumer goods; but those w h o hardly earn
enough to feed themselves regard bridewealth as a rare opportunity to replenish
their wardrobes.
There is a further reason why few Shona spend money on clothes: once
bridewealth proper has been agreed upon between a father-in-law and the nego-
tiator representing his prospective son-in-law, the older m a n generally states
that in addition to the bridewealth proper he wants some 'small things',
zviduku. Zviduku payments consist of items of clothing for the father- and
mother-in-law to be worn by them on their daughter's wedding day. Zviduku
payments are not paid by Ndebele, but they are c o m m o n a m o n g both Shona
and Tonga. Zviduku payments are not returnable on the dissolution of a
marriage.
Table 2 7 shows that zviduku payments are still far from c o m m o n ; only
35 per cent of all rural bridegrooms pay them, though 50 per cent of all Tonga
do so; also some 45 per cent of all urbanités; but only 7 per cent of the m e n on
farms and mine sites. Although most zviduku payments are below $(R)20, some
exceed $(R)100 in value. If sons-in-law protest against any aspect of marriage
payments, it is against these zviduku which they regard as direct exploitation.

Zviduku are especially resented if fathers-in-law refuse to grant permission for
the registration, or solemnization of a marriage in church, before these payments
are handed over. There is no law in the country which makes the conclusion of
a marriage agreement dependent on zviduku payments, but there is a law which
states that for a valid civil marriage the w o m a n ' s father must give his consent,
and he is seldom asked for what reason he is withholding it.
T A B L E 27. Value of additional marriage payments
Other
employment
Money in Per- Per- Per- Per-

*(R) No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Nil 1,944 70.6 1,020 55.4 989 92.9 3,953 69.8

5-14 530 19.2 507 27.5 39 3.6 1,076 19.0
15-24 134 14.9 262 14.2 8 0.7 404 7.1
25-34 87 3.2 37 2.0 20 1.9 144 2.5
35^14 22 0.8 7 0.4 4 0.4 33 0.6
45-54 15 0.5 2 0.1 17 0.3
55-64 6 0.2 1 0.1 3 0.3 10 0.2
65-74 7 0.2 2 0.1 1 0.1 10 0.2
75-104 5 0.2 2 0.1 1 0.1 8 0.2
105-134 3 0.1 2 0.1 5 0.1
135-164 2 0.1 2 0.0
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
This analysis of the uses to which bridewealth payments are put shows the
extent to which this custom has been commercialized. Bridewealth provides old
m e n with a unique opportunity of acquiring wealth which can be used for
whatever purpose they wish. This is totally different from the role of bridewealth
in the past.
Table 28 shows that it is n o longer the extended family as a whole which
receives marriage payments, just as Table 19 showed that it is n o longer the
extended family which assists young m e n infindingtheir bridewealth. The figures
show that it is the individual father-in-law or his representative w h o accepts all
marriage payments and it is he w h o later decides what to do with them. Only if
the bride's father is dead will his brother or, if the responsibility for the deceased's
family is entrusted to a son, will the bride's o w n brother accept the bridewealth.
The various communities do not differ in this respect, not even the matrilineal
Tonga for, as stated above, Tonga fathers have assumed all family functions
which in typical matrilineal societies are performed by a mother's brother.
Hence, only one mother's brother a m o n g the 222 Tonga families received bride-
wealth for his sister's daughter.
This concentration of bridewealth in the hands of only one person further
facilitates accumulation. If livestock or m o n e y had to be distributed a m o n g a
variety of claimants, no large property items could have been purchased with it.
T A B L E 28. Recipients of bridewealth
Other
employment
Per- Per- Per- Per-

Recipients No. centage N o . centage N o . centage N o . centage
N o n e , no payment
made 124 4.5 50 2.7 263 24.7 437 7.7
Wife's father 2,137 77.6 1,541 83.7 586 55.0 4,264 75.3
Wife's father's
brother 80 2.9 47 2.6 19 1.8 146 2.6
Wife's father's
sister 0.2 0.2 4 0.4 14 0.2
Wife's father's
mother 8 0.3 1 0.0 21 2.0 30 0.5
Wife's brother 371 13.4 177 9.6 98 9.2 646 11.4
Wife's mother 12 0.4 4 0.2 6 0.5 22 0.4
Wife's mother's
brother 10 0.4 15 0.8 58 5.5 83 1.5
Other 7 0.3 3 0.2 10 0.9 20 0.4
TOTAL 2,755 100 1,842 100 1,065 100 5,662 100
Hence it is again property considerations and property concentration in the hands

of a few which favour the disintegration of the larger kinship group and its
replacement by small nuclear families.
If all bridewealth transactions are considered together, it becomes clear
that 88 per cent of all marriage payments are m a d e to members of a senior
generation and only 12 per cent to members of the couple's o w n generation.
This shows clearly that wealth flows from the young to the old. I consider this
m u c h more important than the flow of wealth from one family to another or
from one individual to another. The people also recognize this and one young girl
said to m e :
It is only fair that m y parents should be rewarded for all the care they took in bringing
m e up. Your European custom of giving wealth to young couples is bad. It shows
that you do not respect your elders w h o are n o w becoming weak and can no longer
look after themselves. Y o u care only for the young w h o are strong enough to care
for themselves. Y o u invert the natural order of things, for the young do not count
very much.
The future of bridewealth in a socialist Zimbabwe
Bridewealth, as the preceding section has shown, has to a large extent become
commercialized. Its provision by the bridegroom himself has greatly strengthened
the position of the husband and weakened that of the wife. Yet at the same time
the preservation of this custom has artificially preserved the power of elders, a
conservative influence which, as the next chapter will show, is used by the present
government to arrest necessary changes in family relations. It is only in

communities in which bridewealth has ceased to be important, i.e. on the
mine sites and farms where in a quarter of all marriages bridewealth is n o
longer paid, that w o m e n have acquired greater freedom. The close link between
bridewealth and the w e a k position of w o m e n suggests that a future socialist
Zimbabwe, which will insist on the equality of m e n and w o m e n , will also work
for the abolition of bridewealth.
The extent of a socialist state's opposition to bridewealth will depend on
the extent of radical commitment towards total equality. The government of the
United Republic of Tanzania, which is also committed to socialism but to a more
gentle form, took no such steps in 1970 during discussions of a bill in parliament
in preparation for the n e w marriage law. For the chairman of the parlia-
mentary debate declared:
As regards the Bride Price (Mahari), Government cannot at this moment abolish it
by law. The Bride Price is an institution which will disappear of its own accord
under the pressures of social change. Those who have asked Government to abolish
it are demanding something Government cannot do. True, Government is well aware
of the abuses inherent in this institution . . . but. . . Government cannot change the
Bride Price simply by passing a law abolishing it altogether. What Government
however can do and will do is pass a law recognising as legal any marriage that is
contracted even where the Bride Price has not been paid. (United Republic of
Tanzania, 1970.)
It can be expected that the Zimbabwean government will take more radical
steps than the Tanzanian government, and in so doing will have strong backing
from those m e n and w o m e n w h o have been most actively engaged in the liber-
ation war. The survey carried out a m o n g w o m e n in the camps in M o z a m b i q u e
has shown, for example, that 48 (96 per cent) of those interviewed wanted
bridewealth abolished.
There are numerous documents issued by the liberation movements which
oppose bridewealth. A s recently as January 1978, the P F ( Z A N U ) Secretary for
W o m e n ' s Affairs, declaring that w o m e n in Zimbabwe suffer at present from both
feudalism and capitalism, commented o n the effects of bridewealth as follows
(Ngara, 1978, p. 16):
W o m e n suffer from the disadvantages of being a symbol of prestige, and are often
treated by men as little better than a commodity. This is a problem faced by w o m e n
in all capitalist countries, and Zimbabwean w o m e n arefightinghard to be treated
as free human beings rather than objects of pleasure or tools for labour. A further
problem faced by Zimbabwean w o m e n is that of feudal oppression where a w o m a n
is subject to the authority of her father and then of her husband.
In M a y 1974, the P F had m a d e a more explicit appeal to the w o m e n of

Z i m b a b w e , declaring (Liga Actuell, 1977, p. 51-3):
N o w w e must talk about our most deadly enemy, capitalism, embodied in our
country in colonialism. It was capitalism which rigidified the suppression of w o m e n ,
quite apart from the fact that it was itself responsible for their inferior position.
Because the brideprice is high and the wage of our parents low, we are forced to marry
while w e are still young. W e are still being sold as commodities. They haggle about
bride-price as at an auction. Every one of us has to watch this transaction silently;
sometimes w e are not even present.
Often w e are only briefly told h o w m u c h w e are worth. This leaves a deep scar
in the life of every w o m a n of this country. W h e n we have difficulties with our husbands,
we are told that we have been bought. . . . A n d so m a n y husbands become ruthless
and inhuman in their relationship to us. . . . It is most humiliating for us to see h o w
our parents beg us to put up with the ill treatment meted out to us by our husbands
in order not to ruin them financially.... W e still have to put up with forced marriages.
W e have w o m e n in Z A N L A [Zimbabwe African Liberation A r m y ] w h o ran away
from h o m e because they had been married to m e n w h o m they did not love. Such
parents are concerned about nothing else but the relationship between extended
families. . . . Child marriages are also still wide-spread. If a father cannot care for
his large family, he tries to marry his daughters while they are still young in order to
obtain bridewealth for his sons or to get school fees for his other children, or even
just to escape from his miserable poverty. Here in Z A N L A w e have comrades w h o
were married when they were only eleven or thirteen years old. These examples
show that there are certain aspects of our culture which are bad and w e must fight
against their reactionary tendencies. W e do not rebel against our parents, but in the
course of our liberation struggle w e also have to transform the negative aspects of
our own past. This, however, cannot be done exclusively by w o m e n . Our m e n too
have to be confronted with the negative aspects of our traditions and they have to
fight together with us, for w e are engaged in a many-sided national struggle.
Z i m b a b w e a n w o m e n in the liberation c a m p s in M o z a m b i q u e are in close

contact with the w o m e n ' s branch of F R E L I M O and at times discuss with them
their future role in society. Hence it is relevant to look also at statements on
bridewealth m a d e by M o z a m b i c a n w o m e n . A t the 1973 All-Africa W o m e n ' s
Conference in D a r es Salaam, the M o z a m b i c a n delegate listed as concrete m a n i -
festations of the w o m e n ' s inferior position in traditional society ( L S M Press,
1974, p. 19)
the bride-price, which reduces a w o m a n to a mere object to be sold and bought and
makes her a simple object of pleasure and reproduction in the eyes of the buyer—the
husband. Other examples are polygamy and forced and premature marriages. . . .
Apart from reflecting a reactionary attitude, these practices constitute a serious obstacle
to the women's involvement in the liberation struggle and this in two respects: because
they condition a w o m a n to feel alienated, and because they confine her to domestic
life and agricultural production at the service of her husband, depriving her of any
prospects of taking part in political, cultural or social work.
The official policy of the future Z i m b a b w e a n government towards bride-

wealth is therefore clear. But whether Z i m b a b w e a n w o m e n will also break with
this custom in concrete situations is another matter. T h u s one highly educated
w o m a n in the c a m p s w h o h a d married just before I interviewed her, agreed in
principle that bridewealth should be abolished. Yet in spite of this, she had asked
her husband to pay her parents a bridewealth because, as she added in a voice
that showed concern for her parents:
M y parents are not yet as progressive as we are and they would feel very hurt if they
did not receive this payment and think that I had become an ordinary prostitute.
Nevertheless, m y husband and I will always regard each other as equals. T o us,
bridewealth is n o longer meaningful.
There is n o doubt that the attitudes of members of the liberation movement

towards bridewealth are m u c h more negative than are those of the people inside
Rhodesia and the reasons for this are clear. In the camps, the generally accepted
ideology is Marxism and cadres submit their past traditions as well as their
colonial past to what they call 'a scientific analysis'. Marxist writers axe unani-
m o u s in explaining bridewealth as a reflection of property relations which for
centuries have subordinated w o m e n to their husbands. Secondly, cadres in the
camps are predominantly recruited from either the more exploited sections of
the Rhodesian population, i.e. from labour migrants and others w h o lived on
the margin of capitalist society or, since 1974, from a m o n g students. Yet it is
these two social strata that, even inside Rhodesia, are most critical of bridewealth.
A reorganization of the economy and of other social structures in
Zimbabwe will of itself negate both the past and the present functions of bride-
wealth. In a socialist society in which, according to Samir A m i n , extended
families are a hindrance rather than an advantage to c o m m u n a l living, there is
no reason to maintain an institution originally serving the preservation of lineages
and later perverted by capitalism. Moreover, collective ownership of the means
of production will m a k e impossible the accumulation of livestock and other
items of productive wealth in the hands of individuals.
The c o m m u n e s of the Cold Comfort F a r m Society and Nyafaru have dealt
with the bridewealth question in ways which have satisfied their members: in
instances in which a young m a n from a c o m m u n e married a w o m a n from
outside, the c o m m u n e as a whole provided him with bridewealth for his in-
laws; in cases in which a young m a n from the outside married a w o m a n from
a c o m m u n e , n o bridewealth was accepted; in instances in which people married
within a c o m m u n e , the question of bridewealth was not even raised. Rather the
members of the community examined whether the young people wanted to marry
each other because of mutual love or for any other reason. If they were satisfied
that the intended union was truly based on affection, they gave their consent
and from that m o m e n t on the couple could establish a c o m m o n h o m e ; if they
wished, they could register their marriage or have it consecrated in church.
T h e members of the c o m m u n e built a house in which the young couple
could live. But they continued to share in the c o m m u n a l meals, and the
community as a whole saw to their material needs. Once children were born,
everyone took a lively interest in them and as the children grew older, the
community looked after them in a day-centre while the parents worked at
c o m m u n a l tasks. Although there was n o doubt about the children's real parents,
they were considered to be the children of the whole c o m m u n e .
Unlike marriage legislation in the United Republic of Tanzania, which
merely discourages bridewealth, Zimbabwean future marriage laws are almost
certain to abolish bridewealth. It is unthinkable that bridewealth, which during
this century has become an integral part of the capitalist system, will be preserved
in a socialist Zimbabwe. Bridewealth has become the touchstone of the w o m e n ' s
current inferior position and, as the next chapter will show, it is on bridewealth
that current legislators base their arguments for keeping w o m e n in that inferior
position. N o argument that bridewealth was never intended to be a brideprice
will be acceptable to w o m e n w h o through participation in the liberation war
have become equal partners to their male comrades.
5 The legal
position
of women
We are supposed to talk about the role of women in our struggle; wefindthis
somehow difficult, since in our organization women and men fight and work
together, side by side, in every kind of activity: we women participate in the actual
fighting, integrated in military units; we work as political commissars, mobilizing
the people, enlightening them on all aspects of our struggle; we transport war
materials to the front lines; we defend the people against enemy incursions; we
participate in production; we are active in the schools and in hospitals. So if it is
true that some tasks, by their nature, fall more under our responsibility—like
taking care of children (we have several nurseries and crèches which are run by
women)—in general we can say that we do the same work as men. And this we
consider as one of the greatest achievements of our revolution. (Delegate of the
F R E L I M O Central Committee at the 1973 All-African W o m e n ' s Conference in
Dar es Salaam.)
The legal position of w o m e n in traditional society
Throughout this book it has been shown that the position of w o m e n in tra-
ditional society was weak, especially w h e n w o m e n were considered as individuals.
But when w o m e n were seen in relation to others, as the centres of kinship webs
which radiated out from them through their o w n children and grandchildren,
and from thr children born to their brothers w h o had married with their bride-
wealth, they became persons of influence. In addition to the information given
in the earlier chapters, the relative weakness and strength of w o m e n in tra-
ditional society can be shown by the following data.
At birth, a girl was received with less enthusiasm than a boy. If she was
born as a twin to a brother, she was killed, because twin births were con-
sidered unnatural and therefore harmful to society. Since custom demanded
that at least one of a set of twins be killed, girls were sacrificed in preference to
boys. Girls were welcomed, however, for the bridewealth they brought and
which, in turn, enabled boys of the household to marry. T h e previous chapter
has shown that w o m e n had an exchange-value and that daughters were
exchanged for daughters-in-law. At times of famine or dire poverty m a n y fathers

pledged young daughters in marriage to older m e n w h o were able to support
their families with food. This custom, though legally forbidden during this
century, nevertheless continues and Holleman (1952, p. 115-16) has recorded
that even unborn girls were at times pledged in marriage to rich m e n w h o could
give substantial economic aid to their in-laws. The agreements in such cases
stipulated that the next baby girl born to the poor m a n should become the wife
of either the m a n w h o economically assisted her family, or of his son. In 1952,
Holleman (p. 120) wrote that of his sample in a backward tribal area in central
Rhodesia 10 per cent of all marriages were between immature girls and adult
m e n , and of his sample in a more advanced tribal area such marriages amounted
to 7 per cent.
Until a girl married, she lived with her father and his extended family w h o
acted as her guardians. She was considered a minor with no legal standing. Her
father and his brothers were mainly concerned that at the time of her marriage
she should be a virgin, for this enhanced the standing of their family and
brought them a higher bridewealth than if the girl had led a sexually loose life.
Hence girls were periodically examined by the older w o m e n of their lineage to
ensure that they were still virgins. This custom underlines the value placed on a
woman's fertility and on its integrity.
O n marriage, a bride passed from the guardianship of her family to that
of her husband's. Once she was married, she dropped her o w n n a m e and was
addressed by that of her spouse; she became the 'wife of X ' . This change of
name indicated her new status in society. It also showed that she received her
identity from her husband, not from herself.
Once she gave birth to a child, her prestige rose even more. She once more
changed her name and became known as the 'mother of Y ' , the name of her
first-born. Motherhood conferred full adult status on her and her marriage
promised to be stable since she had given proof of her fertility. Essentially, it
was her child, and later her children, w h o conferred high social standing on
her, for she was respected because of them, not because of what she was in
herself.
W h e n her own children married and grandchildren were born, she became
a grandmother (ambuya) and, as such, a matriarch. B y then, she had ceased
bearing children and in some contexts she was regarded as a ' m a n ' , i.e. she
could attend meetings of m e n and drink with them the strong beer forbidden
to the younger w o m e n and children. B y that time, she had reached the peak of
her influence and, when she died, she was venerated as an ancestress and
informed during rituals of the future marriages and children of her o w n
daughters and granddaughters, and of those of her chipanda brother. She had
become the spiritual guardian of their fertility.
This continuous ascendency during and after their lives reconciled w o m e n
with their inferior status during the earlier years when they were young and
contributed the bulk of their families' labour; for the ideological superstructure
held out to them great rewards in the future.
Although in traditional society it was the labour of the w o m e n which
created most of the wealth, the w o m e n never controlled this wealth. Bridewealth
transactions were public declarations that all property rights, as well as all rights
The legal position of women 119
over children, were vested in m e n , especially in the elders, i.e. in the guardians
of the young and of the w o m e n . At a man's death all his property went to his
kinsmen. His widow could only retain a few minor items which she had acquired
as rewards in restrictedfields,such as midwifery, herbalism or pottery, and her
'cows of motherhood'.
These 'cows of motherhood'—called mombe youmai by the Shona and
inkomo yohlanga by the Ndebele—were gifts m a d e to w o m e n by their sons-in-law
at the marriages of their daughters. W o m e n retained sole rights of disposal over
all these cows and over their offspring (Child, 1965, p. 76-7). S o m e w o m e n
were able to acquire substantial herds of livestock through these gifts.
Children belonged to their father's lineage. Since widows were expected
to live with their husband's brothers—either through widow inheritance a m o n g
the Shona, or through a leviratic union a m o n g the Ndebele—widowed mothers
were not normally separated from their children. Divorce was also rare—except
in cases of barrenness—and thus the mother-child bond was seldom broken.
Where divorce after the birth of children did occur, w o m e n were allowed
custody of their children for a few years until these were weaned and able to live
without their mothers in their fathers' h o m e . The remarriage of widows within
their husbands' families also solved the problem of their support in old age. They
continued cultivating thefieldsthey had cultivated until then and their o w n
children and in-laws nursed them w h e n they became too old to work. These
practices emphasized the value placed on continuity, for continuity was a
precondition for the communal m o d e of production on which these societies
were based.
O n a wife's death, her bond with her husband's family was in some ways
broken: though buried in her husband's h o m e , her o w n patrilineal kin came to
'fetch her spirit h o m e ' , i.e. to cut off from around her waist a string of beads
which symbolized her fertility. These beads were buried in her ancestral h o m e
so that she could become the guardian of her brother's children and grand-
children as well as of her o w n . This rite symbolically returned her fertility to her
o w n lineage and thus showed that bridewealth had not sold her to another
family, but that it had only been an interest paid on her loaned fertility.
The legal position of w o m e n under capitalism
A s the preceding chapters have shown, the European settlers' arrival set into
motion economic forces hostile to the people's traditional m o d e of production.
African family life was compelled to adjust itself to capitalist penetration.
Chapter 4 in particular explained h o w the traditional power structure was
undermined as the young became economically independent and came into
possession of greater wealth than their fathers. The possibilities for structural
changes thus created by this new distribution of wealth were seen as threatening
by the new powerholders in society, the colonial government. Hence legislative
efforts were made to control, arrest or channel the various forces unleashed by
capitalist penetration. T h e n e w laws rigidified the position of w o m e n and
prevented their emancipation.
Forces bearing on the transformation of African family life also originated
from missionaries whose o w n cultural backgrounds inclined them to see in the

nuclear family the ideal expression of Christian life. Hence they encouraged the
disintegration of the lineage and extended family and so paved the w a y a m o n g
their converts for a fast acceptance of the capitalist ethos. T h e aims and
objectives of missionaries at times coincided with those of civil servants, at times
they were diametrically opposed. T o see these changes in a historical perspective,
I shall first examine the impact of missionaries on African family life and then the
effects of government legislation on the position of w o m e n .
C o n w a y (1975, p . 35), in a comprehensive survey of marriage laws in
South, Central and East Africa, writes that in none of these territories had
missionaries had so decisive an influence on marriage legislation as in Rhodesia.
H e traces the reasons for this influence back to the early history of white
settlement which shows that missionary penetration had only become possible
under 'company rule'; all earlier missionary endeavours had failed.
T h e very fact that white settlement had facilitated mission w o r k created
in missionaries a feeling of indebtedness to the civil administration. Seeing the
civil servants as a civilizing influence, the missionaries co-operated with them,
pressured them and in every possible w a y used them to advance their work.
Since civil servants and missionaries shared the same cultural background, that
of the Victorian age which regarded Western civilization as identical with
Christianity and African society as 'pagan' and inferior, fit to be replaced by
their o w n superior civilization, such co-operation seemed natural so long as
missionary activities did not threaten the economic interests of the ordinary
white settlers.
M a n y missionaries c a m e to regard two African customs as major hindrances
to the acceptance of a 'civilized and Christian' w a y of life: bridewealth and
polygamy. O n the issue of polygamy, missionaries found support a m o n g civil
servants, but their appeals to legislate against bridewealth were totally ignored,
because the administration realized that hardly any custom was as powerful as
bridewealth to arrest social change and the disintegration of extended families,
and these had become useful welfare institutions facilitating the exploitation
of black labour. Hence as early as 1901 Ordinance N o . 2 (Conway, 1975, p. 36)
was promulgated which recognized no African marriage as valid unless bride-
wealth had been delivered at or within twelve months before the date of the
marriage. N o bridewealth beyond four head of cattle or their cash equivalent was
permissible. Cohabitation without bridewealth was declared a punishable
offence.
T h e missionaries pleaded in vain for contrary legislation. Garcia-Gonzales
(1972, p. 273-4) writes:
Some Rhodesian branches of the Protestant denominations—among them the influen-

tial Dutch Reformed Church—have prohibited their members from becoming parties
to any lobola transaction, either accepting it or handing it over in marriage. The
custom was regarded as something intrinsically evil since it involved the purchase of
a w o m a n . They even urged the civil authorities to take steps towards its suppression,
and to this effect the Southern Rhodesian Missionary Conference made, already
in 1915, the following recommendation: 'In the opinion of this Conference, the practice
of brideprice is the greatest obstacle to the higher development of the natives of this
territory and this Conference contends that legislation should aim at its total abolition. '
These pleas went totally unheeded.

The only concession missionaries could extract on the bridewealth issue
was the limitation of bridewealth. T h e ceiling of four head of cattle was
reconfirmed in the Native Marriages Act of 1950, even though it had never been
adhered to and insistence by civil servants on this limitation only led to false
entries on the marriage registers.
Four head of cattle m a y or m a y not have been a typical average for tra-
ditional bridewealth. This is relatively unimportant in comparison with the
vital change that in the past bridewealth had been paid for the young by their
elders and that during this century young m e n worked to obtain their o w n
bridewealth. They were encouraged by the missionaries w h o regarded the
influence of the older generation, whose members remained aloof from Chris-
tianity, as harmful to their converts. Since m a n y elders were opposed to
Christian marriages in principle, young converts could almost count on help
from the missionaries in their attempts to become independent byfindingtheir
o w n bridewealth. Thus one missionary from Chishawasha, the oldest Catholic
mission station in Rhodesia, wrote {Zambezi Mission Records, Vol. 1, p. 63):
The natural wish of the Missioner to secure good Christian couples will force him to
help young m e n with money, if they are ready to 'work it off', and though they are
willing to do this, it is a great inconvenience to have such accounts pending.
According to the same journal, African wages amounted to about 5 or 6 shillings
a month.
In their endeavour to create Christian families according to the Western
pattern, missionaries had to isolate nuclear families from their wider kinship
groups. Only the Jesuit missionaries settled converts in compact villages on
mission property and close to the mission stations themselves. They hoped that
by isolating Christians from their 'pagan' relatives, they would be able to reduce
the incidence of both traditional religious practice and of polygamy. T o further
protect their converts from harmful influences, Jesuit missionaries expelled
from their mission properties everyone w h o failed to observe the Christian moral
code. The Jesuits created such Christian villages on all their mission stations,
not only at Chishawasha near Salisbury but also at Driefontein near Gwelo
and at G o k o m e r e near Fort Victoria. The people w h o grew up in these villages
became therefore familiar with a concept of married life in which the husband-
wife dyad was dominant and the importance of the extended family minimal.
M a n y of thefirsttown-dwellers came from these mission stations.
The Zambezi Mission Records of the Jesuits, which give valuable infor-
mation on the early period of mission work, cite m a n y instances of missionaries
assisting young converts to break away from lineages; they also show h o w
missionaries taught the young in practical ways the value of individualism. The
converts not only asked missionaries to help them find their bridewealth, but
also to assist them to obtain the brides of their choice. It was especially in cases
in which w o m e n had already been pledged to older m e n that the missionaries
readily intervened. At times, they succeeded in persuading a w o m a n ' s father
and her older suitor to accept a new payment from a young m a n to w h o m the
w o m a n felt drawn; then the first marriage contract was dissolved and a new
agreement entered into {Zambezi Mission Records, vol. 7, p. 173-4). In cases in
which n o agreement could be reached, or in which a father refused to give his

daughter in marriage to a Christian, missionaries tended to advise and assist the
young in appeals to the native commissioner. Once the latter had convinced him-
self that there was no reasonable objection to the marriage, he authorized the
union, subject to the young m a n paying his father-in-law the customary bride-
wealth. Whenever cases came before civil servants in which people were denied
the right to choose their o w n marriage partners, they could expect support; for
European settlers considered such freedom a fundamental h u m a n right. Legis-
lation was soon passed that no marriage was considered valid unless both partners
had given their free consent.
The convergence of values and interests of both missionaries and secular
authorities on personal freedom—a value inherent in capitalism—also enabled
young Christian w o m e n to override parental opposition in instances in which
they wished to join a sisterhood of the Catholic church. A s early as 1927 some
young w o m e n joined the Dominican Sisters, a group of predominantly G e r m a n
missionaries w h o had accompanied the Jesuits into Rhodesia. By 1975, there were
435 African Sisters in Rhodesia (Randolph, 1976, p. 13). M a n y of them had to
overcome serious parental opposition w h e n they entered, because their parents
were unwilling to lose the bridewealth for their daughters and they also believed
that their daughters were wrong in giving up the possibility of having children of
their o w n . In 1969, I carried out a complete survey a m o n g the Sisters of one
African congregation and the results showed that only 17 per cent of the Sisters
entered religious life with the approval of their parents; some parents were
indifferent, but the majority objected to their daughters' decision; 27 per cent
objected strongly, some even resorted to violence and kidnapping of their
daughters from mission stations (Aquina, 1967, p. 25).
T h e following case history shows that civil authorities could be relied upon
to guarantee the young w o m e n ' s freedom to lead their o w n lives:
A young girl from a Methodist family was invited by a Catholic relative
to c o m e and live with him on the understanding that he would send her to school
and pay her school fees. The girl attended a Catholic mission school and was
taught by African Sisters. After some time she asked to become a Catholic and
her parents raised n o objection. S o m e years later, however, when the girl
expressed a desire to become a Sister, her parents objected violently and ordered
here to leave the mission at once.
Since she wanted to become a nurse, she went to another mission station
which offered a nursing course. U p o n completion of her basic training, she
transferred to a government hospital in Salisbury to study midwifery. Because
her parents knew that she had not abandoned her desire to become a Sister, they
were highly suspicious of all her moves.
In 1955, while she was still at the government hospital, the Salisbury diocese
was raised to the level of an archdiocese and bishops from all over Rhodesia and
m a n y guests arrived for the celebration. The young w o m a n ' s parents also came
because they had heard that the bishop of their diocese was going to attend. They
confronted him, berated him and ordered him to instruct their daughter to return
h o m e with them. The bishop advised the young w o m a n to postpone her entry into
the novitiate until her parents had given their consent. But the nurse knew that
her parents would never agree to her decision. Therefore, as soon as she was
The legal position of w o m e n 123
21 years old, she went to the native commissioner and asked him for legal
recognition of her right to determine her o w n future and to enter a convent.
The native commissioner granted this recognition and she entered the novitiate.
O n e morning during prayers in the mission church the Sisters kneeling next
to her noticed a group of African elders near the church door whose behaviour
aroused their suspicions. T h e young Sister turned and recognized her family.
After the religious service was over, her family met her in the novitiate quarters
and ordered her to return h o m e immediately. W h e n she refused, her father tore
off her veil, took an axe and threatened to kill her, saying: ' W h e n a hen breaks its
o w n eggs and drinks the inside, nobody can take it amiss.'
The noise had alarmed the missionaries w h o came and rescued the young
w o m a n . Her parents only left after they had extracted an assurance from the
missionaries that a full bridewealth of £80 ($(R)160) would be paid to them.
Since missionaries never participate in bridewealth transactions, they advised
the young Sister to interrupt her religious training until she had earned enough
money to pay her parents. This she did, but the payment from daughter to father
broke family relations for a long time.
Missionaries have been more successful in obtaining the support of civil
servants in their fight against polygamy than in their attempts to win their
co-operation to suppress bridewealth. For Rhodesian settlers generally hold
polygamy responsible for the rapid African population increase which they see
as a threat to their survival. This is a misconception based on the belief that
polygamists have m a n y children. But it ignores the fact that the number of
children per mother in polygamous households is lower than in m o n o g a m o u s
families.1 Civil servants have seldom had objections in assisting missionaries on
this issue. Yet their co-operation has resulted in a tangle of legislation which has
greatly complicated the registration of African marriages without achieving the
intended results. In the end m a n y missionaries have c o m e to accuse civil servants
of hindering Christians from marrying in church. The sequence of events leading
up to these accusations is as follows: In the early days of the colony, all civil
marriages, whether of Africans or of Europeans, were contracted under the Cape
Order-in-Council of 1838. In essence, this order differs little from the present
Marriage Act of 1964. It did not recognize customary African marriages
(Conway, 1975, p. 35-6), but neither did the majority of Christian denominations
in Rhodesia. This non-recognition made it easier for m e n to marry additional
wives and for this reason the Rhodesia Missionary Conference of 1915 'fully
agreed with the Government in its contention that the incidence of bigamy was
sufficiently grave to demand immediate legislative action' (Conway, 1975, p. 37).
Hence the Native Marriages Ordinance N o . 15 of 1917 was passed, the
first act of marriage legislation which m a d e special arrangements for Africans
and Europeans (Conway, 1975, p. 37). It required that all African marriages
be registered with the native commissioner and that the latter assure himself that
each w o m a n party to a contract had given her free consent. Once a marriage was
thus registered, it became by law m o n o g a m o u s and any subsequent traditional
marriage entered into by the husband became punishable by law as 'bigamy'.
1. I will publish data to support this statement in another book on family life, The Impact of
Christianity on African Marriage in Rhodesia!Zimbabwe.
However, since the ordinance did not recognize an unregistered marriage as

valid, multiple but unregistered marriages by a husband could not be taken to
court. After the shortcomings of this legislation were realized, the Native
Marriages (Amendment) Act of 1929 was passed which called for an 'enabling
certificate' being issued by a native commissioner before an African marriage
could be solemnized in church (Conway, 1975, p. 38). This 'enabling certificate'
was only to be issued to a couple after the native commissioner had explained
to them the full obligations entered into by anyone w h o contracted a civil or
Christian marriage. At that time, all registered marriages were regarded as civil
marriages and those w h o entered them were bound by European/Christian
commitments. Certain traditional customs, such as bridewealth, were not for-
bidden if practised in addition to the n e w prescriptions laid d o w n for civil
marriages.
The enabling certificate was only to be issued if the bride's father was present
at the registration, gave his consent to the marriage, stated the amount of bride-
wealth agreed upon and declared that his daughter had freely consented to the
marriage. The couple also had to state that they freely consented to the marriage
and that they fully understood the legal consequences of the registration.
The implementation of this legislation, however, caused new difficulties and
soon missionaries began to call for a totally new African marriage act. Finally,
during a meeting between the chief native commissioner and the missionaries
in 1949, a bill was discussed which m a n y missionaries warmly welcomed.
Subsequently, this bill became law as the Native Marriages Act (Cap. 105)
of 1950. Under this act, customary marriages were considered invalid unless
registered; but they could n o w be registered as traditional marriages, i.e. parties
to a marriage did not bind themselves to m o n o g a m y ; a penalty for non-
registration was established; bridewealth was limited to £20 ($(R)40)—a provision
repealed in 1960 after chiefs had been consulted and objected to this ceiling—but
the enabling certificate was retained for those w h o wanted to enter a Christian
marriage. T h e enabling certificate m a d e it possible for Africans to have a
'marriage according to native law and custom' solemnized in church and thus
upgraded to the status of a civil marriage, which again approximated marriages
contracted by Europeans (Conway, 1975, p. 39-40).
Marriages by Christian or civil rites have always been regarded in Rhodesia
as a higher form of marriage than traditional ones. Hence afinalact of legislation
was passed to distinguish marriages according to traditional law and custom
from civil marriages. The Marriage Act (No. 81 of 1964) applies to both Africans
and Europeans. Itfixesthe m i n i m u m age for brides at 16 years of age—under
the 1950 Act it was 12 years—insists that the contracting partners consent freely
to the union and requires the consent of the guardians of minors to a marriage
contract. This latter requirement means that African w o m e n w h o retain the
status of minors even after the age at which Europeans reach majority status,
must be represented by their fathers (Conway, 1975, p. 61-3).
A marriage under the 1964 act does not of its nature involve a church
ceremony. Conway (1975, p. 79), w h o examined 12,050 European and
11,778 African marriages contracted under the act between 1967 and 1971, found
that although 5,087 (42.2 per cent) of the Europeans married in the registrar's
office without seeking a solemnization of their marriage in church, not a single
T h e legal position of women 125
African couple had done so; all Africans w h o married under the 1964 Act married
in terms of theritesof their Christian denomination.
This n e w legislation has resulted in a higher marriage registration rate than
existed before. Legal disabilities for non-registration also contribute to the higher
frequency of registration. T h e results of the survey of 5,662 marriages shows that
just over 70 per cent of all African couples registered their marriages under either
the 1950 or the 1964 act. Table 29, which breaks d o w n the rural communities and
gives special information o n the various ethnic groups, reveals that there are
great differences in the incidences of marriage registration between Shona,
Ndebele and other ethnic groups. In the urban areas no great variations occur
o n a regional bases. In the other employment centres, Wankie mine has a m u c h
higher registration rate than Sutton mine or the farms.
T A B L E 29. Marriage registration and church marriages
Registered Registered
No. under under Church
registration 1950 Act 1964 Act1 Total marriages
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-

cent- cent- cent- cent- cent-
Community N o . age N o . age N o . age N o . age N o . age
Rural Shona 411 22.4 969 52.8 455 24.8 1,835 100.0 511 27.9
Rural Ndebele 281 54.8 220 42.9 12 2.3 513 100.0 17 3.3
Kalanga and
Tonga 272 66.8 129 31.7 6 1.5 407 100.0 9 2.2
Total Rural 964 35.0 1,318 47.8 473 17.2 2,755 100.0 537 19.5
Total Urban 157 8.5 1,380 74.9 305 16.6 1,842 100.0 524 28.4
Wankie mine 9 3.3 201 74.5 60 22.2 270 100.0 65 24.1
Other employment
centres 493 46.3 457 42.9 115 10.8 1,065 100.0 128 12.0
TOTAL 1,614 28.5 3,155 55.7 893 15.8 5,662 100.0 1,189 21.0
1. Or earlier legislation enabling Africans to enter a Christian marriage.
T o appreciate the differences revealed in Table 29, it is necessary to k n o w

the advantages derived from marriage registration under either of the two acts.
T h e clause that non-registration is punishable seems to be ignored by everybody,
from civil servants d o w n to the people; I k n o w of no prosecution for non-
registration. This means that there is n o reason for rural people w h o desire
to live their traditional w a y of life to bother about registering their marriages.
T h e only factor which inclines rural people to do so is the degree of their
involvement in labour migration, coupled with the desire of migrants to take
their wives and children along with them to the towns; for this they can only do
satisfactorily if they produce a marriage certificate; without such a certificate they
cannot get married accommodation. Yet a m a n can only take his family to town
if he earns a reasonable wage. Hence communities with better-educated migrants
w h o earn larger wages can be expected to register their marriages more frequently.
That this is indeed the case can be seen from Table 29 which shows that whereas
only 22 per cent of all Shona families failed to register their marriages, the
figure is 55 per cent for the Ndebele and 67 per cent for the Kalanga and Tonga.
The regulation that urban Africans cannot obtain married accommodation
unless they can produce a marriage certificate is the major reason why only
8.5 per cent of all urban couples failed to register their marriages. M e n without
a marriage certificate are forced to live in bachelor quarters, be these barracks or
other inferior single accommodation, or they have to become illegal lodgers,
constantly threatened by police raids.
O n farms and small mine sites where workers have to put u p their o w n
huts, marriage registration carries no advantages; but at Wankie, one of the
largest mines in Rhodesia, where life is regimented and closely supervised by a
large staff of mine personnel, unregistered marriages are almost unheard of.
The most widespread form of registration is that under the 1950 act, that
is, the registration of a marriage according to traditional custom. Almost 53 per
cent of all rural Shona married under this act and so did three-quarters of all
urbanités and of all the couples at Wankie. Even in other employment centres
43 per cent of all couples married under the 1950 Act. W o m e n derive no special
advantages from marrying under this act; their status is neither enhanced nor
reduced by it.
Improvements in the position of w o m e n accrue only to those w h o marry
under the 1964 Act and to those w h o marry under the 1950 Act and then obtain
an enabling certificate which subjects their marriages to the same conditions
as those of the 1964 act. Table 29 shows that such marriages are most frequent in
rural Shonaland where one-quarter of all couples obtained an enabling certifi-
cate; but a m o n g the Ndebele, Kalanga and Tonga only some 2 per cent of all
couples did so. The reason is that relatively few people in these areas are
Christians.
Christianity and education in Rhodesia are closely linked, since until very
recently most schools were run by Christian missionaries. Hence, wherever there
is a concentration of more highly educated people, there is also a concentration
of Christians, and where there are Christians, there is a greater incidence of civil
marriages. Thus at Sutton mine and on the farms marriages under the 1964 Act
or by enabling certificate under the 1950 Act are extremely rare, but at W a n k i e
over 22 per cent of all marriages were thus contracted. In the urban areas too,
where people tend to have a higher education, an average of 17 per cent of all
couples obtained an enabling certificate and married in church.
All of the 5,662 couples w h o entered a civil marriage also married in church.
In fact, they obtained their enabling certificates for the very purpose of having
their marriages solemnized by a minister of their religion. The last column of
Table 29, which lists the total number of church marriages, shows that more
people marry in church than have complied with the civil requirements for a
Christian marriage, namely 1,189 (21 per cent) against only 893 (16 per cent)
w h o obtained an enabling certificate. This means that quite a number of
ministers of religion—mainly Catholic priests—are prepared to solemnize m a r -
riages of their Christians if these people earnestly ask for this blessing and give
valid reasons as to w h y they could not obtain an enabling certificate. These
marriages, however, although they allow couples to become full communicant
members of their churches, do not confer on w o m e n the legal rights associated

with civil registration.
African w o m e n value church marriages because they confer on them great
prestige in the community as well as other advantages. Thus they k n o w that their
husbands will have difficulties in obtaining a divorce once suchfinalityhas been
given to their union and they also believe that their m e n are reluctant to commit
adultery once they have married in church. Sometimes w o m e n cannot marry in
church because their fathers refuse to give their consent. For m a n y parents fear
that if any bridewealth is still outstanding, or even just some zviduku payments,
they will not be able to recover these once a civil registration has taken place.
Experience has taught them that m a n y sons-in-law fail to pay remaining debts
once they are sure that their fathers-in-law can no longer recall their daughters.
S o m e fathers-in-law also withhold their consent to a church marriage in order
to retain afinalsay in their daughters' marriages. O n e w o m a n said:
M y husband asked m y parents for permission to obtain an enabling certificate and

to marry in church, but m y parents wanted him to wait for some time because I was
still very young. After I had given birth to two children, m y husband again asked
m y parents for permission tofinalizeour marriage, but m y parents refused; this time
on theflimsygrounds that he had not yet paid all the zviduku payments. N o w m y
husband no longer presses the issue and m y parents don't care. All they want is their
money.
Apart from the greater security and the prestige, associated by most w o m e n with
a church marriage, there are some concrete legal advantages associated with a
civil registration, but few Africans are aware of them. Thus, w o m e n w h o marry
under the 1964 Act remain minors and need the guardianship of their husbands
as long as the marriage lasts; but should their husbands divorce them or die, they
acquire majority status and n o longer require the consent of a guardian for their
future marriages. Their guardians, however, can claim bridewealth for them.
This means that the dissolution of a civil marriage is the only way for a Rhodesian
African w o m a n to acquire majority status.
A w o m a n ' s ability to o w n or to inherit property is not affected by the type
of marriage she enters. A n y African can freely dispose of his property by will
and bequeath it to anyone he pleases. T h e law makes no distinction in this
regard between m e n and w o m e n . F e w Africans, however, m a k e use of this right
and the property of all w h o die intestate is divided a m o n g their heirs according
to traditional custom (African Wills Act, C a p . 108). N o r does a w o m a n married
under the 1964 Marriage Act gain special rights over her children, for the act
makes no reference to children. Hence customary law applies unless a couple,
under the African Wills Act, makes specific arrangements for the upkeep of their
children. However, only persons married in civil ceremonies can m a k e provisions
for the guardianship of their children through a will, and this applies to m e n as
well as to w o m e n . Thus only w o m e n w h o are married under the 1964 Act can,
at their husbands' death, obtain control over their children if their husbands
had m a d e a will to this effect (Conway, 1975, p. 71-2). This is a very important
point for w o m e n .
Conflicts between missionaries and civil servants over the implementation
of marriage legislation began w h e n a number of district commissioners 1 intro-

duced special requirements before they issued couples with an enabling certifi-
cate, requirements not laid d o w n in the law. Church leaders frequently
complained to the Ministry of Internal Affairs andfinallythe ministry issued
guidelines to its commissioners. These took the form of a circular dated
20 M a r c h 1974. F r o m this circular, it appears that over and above the legal
requirements some district commissioners insisted that a marriage could only
be registered in the h o m e district of the w o m a n ; that her father's consent w a s
required even though she had been previously married and could produce her
earlier marriage certificate; that the chief or subchief of the w o m a n ' s district
had to be present; and that the full bridewealth had been paid (Conway,
1975, p. 77-8). Personal observation has shown that some district commissioners
also insisted on bridegroomsfirstpaying all their outstanding taxes before
issuing the enabling certificate. N o statistical evidence is available to show h o w
frequently these additional requirements were imposed on people, but the very
fact that the circular w a s issued indicates that these instances must have been
far from exceptional.
T h e very nature of these demands shows that individual district c o m -
missioners tried to discourage Africans from registering civil marriages and that
they also used their position to invest in traditional tribal leaders, be these chiefs
or subchiefs, more power than was theirs by law. This means that they acted as
a conservative brake on the evolution of African family life. Bourdillon (1975,
p. 145) m a d e an interesting c o m m e n t on this conservatism w h e n he wrote:
District commissioners cannot keep up with changing customs and values of local
communities. Thus district commissioners' courts easily fall behind the chiefs'
courts. . . . M a n y still insist that a w o m a n is legally a minor w h o cannot normally
represent her o w n case although chiefs' courts n o w regularly accept a w o m a n on her
own terms. In traditional courts, the local community both makes the law and enforces
it and can take liberties with the law it has made. A district commissioner cannot take
such liberties; he must apply traditional law with arigiditywhich was never intended.
Unlike tribal courts, district commissioner's courts do not change their decisions
as community values change. Unlike the law of Rhodesia, 'customary law' does not
immediately affect either members of the government or of the electorate and there is
consequently little incentive to keep it up to date through enactments.
Although district commissioners m a y have exceeded their legal rights by

imposing additional difficulties on people trying to enter civil marriages, they
certainly interpreted correctly the government's conservative policy towards
African w o m e n . This can be shown by an examination of the 1976 Report of the
Select Committee of the Senate on testate and intestate succession. In 1973, a
select committee of the Rhodesian Senate was appointed to investigate laws
affecting marriage and family life and the position of w o m e n . This committee
consisted of four male senators, i.e. two Europeans and two African chiefs. It
was expected that the commissioners would carefully investigate the position
of both African and European w o m e n . A large number of w o m e n ' s organ-
izations, European as well as African, submitted m e m o r a n d a setting out their
1. In 1962, 'native commissioners' were renamed 'district commissioners'.

requests for changes in the law. But the publication of the report proved very
disappointing to African w o m e n . It showed, however, that even a multiracial
commission appointed by the Rhodesian G o v e r n m e n t can be trusted to w o r k
exclusively for the interests of Europeans. T h u s of the eighty-seven paragraphs
in the report, eighty-two concern European w o m e n . T h e remainingfiveare as
follows (Rhodesian government, 19766, p . 21-3):
Para. 55 N o n e of the recommendations contained in this Report should be applied

legislatively to African Customary L a w .
Para. 56 The disposal of the property of a deceased African under African Customary
L a w is subject to a complex procedure which is not only tied to the spiritual
life of the deceased and his family group but also to the entire proprietary
consequences of the lobola system. S o m e 43 years ago an attempt was m a d e
to import European ideas of succession and inheritance, and only in so far
as the making of a will was concerned, to the African succession procedures.
This took place with the introduction of the African Wills Act. The facilities
aiforded to the African by this Act, so w e were advised, have been only
infrequently used; and even where they have been used, the family and
heirs of the deceased have often ignored terms of the will and reverted to
the old Customary L a w for the distribution of the estate. W e were advised
that the making of a will by an African leaving property otherwise than in
accordance with the traditional succession and procedures often arouses
suspicion against the widow, w h o is thought to have deprived the family
of itsrightfulshare of the deceased's estate, and to have persuaded her
husband to abandon his family and tribalrightsto effect this. The conse-
quent hostility towards the w i d o w or other beneficiary was something which
was a potent factor. . . . W e are of the opinion that because of the deep
seated adherence to Customary L a w by the vast majority of our indigenous
people, any legislative change relating to the law of succession and inherit-
ance would be an encroachment which at best would upset spiritual
beliefs and the complicated lobola system, and at worst could lead to non-
observance or even resentment.
Para. 57 Your Committee is aware that there is nowadays an increasing number of
Africans w h o find family and tribal ties irksome and restrictive, particularly
African professional w o m e n w h o wish to have control of the assets produced
from their earnings. Tribal authorities recognize that these Africans,
especially the w o m e n , are becoming emancipated and are in the process
of casting aside family and tribal ties. However, the Tribal authorities do
not want to see a wholesale severance of these ties by legislative action
because they think that this will encourage young w o m e n to leave the tribal
areas for the towns where they will enter into casual employment, work
until they are n o longer capable of doing so and then return to the family
to be maintained, having brought nothing into the family by way of lobola
or personal savings. Your Committee is of the opinion that African
Customary L a w is a viable system of law capable of growth and adaptation
to contemporary social and economic circumstances, and that evolutionary
changes in this law to cater for the emergent African will indubitably occur.
While conscious of the disappointment this conclusion m a y cause to some
people, your Committee thinks this would be the better way of achieving
change.
Para. 58 It has been suggested that in present circumstances, action to obtain release
from family and tribal ties could be initiated by the individual. In the first
place he, or she, could seek agreed release by the family and the tribal
authority. In this case there m a y be family or tribal commitments to be
discharged, such as lobola arrangements; these will have to be a matter
of personal arrangement. In the second place it has been suggested that the
individual African should be able to opt out of the family and tribal structure
by making a formal declaration that from henceforth he, or she, wishes to
be governed in all respects by the 'western' law in operation in the country.
If agreement could be reached on either or both of these proposals, then it
could perhaps be possible to introduce suitable legislation.
Para. 59 W e reiterate that, in present circumstances, none of the recommendations
contained in this Report should apply to African Customary L a w , and w e
recommend that customary law should not be changed by legislative direction
merely to make it conform to 'western' practices [italics in original text].
In paragraph 56, appeals are m a d e to the religious superstructure of the past

to justify the arrest of a natural evolution of property rights. These appeals are
unrealistic because only a small proportion of Africans still adhere to their
ancestral religion. O f the 1,068 adults interviewed for this study, only 22 per
cent still claimed to follow their tribal religion. But an emphasis on past values
is in the interests of the ruling classes because it sanctions the existing order and
lends it a n apparent legitimacy. Terray (1975, p. 90) writes:
In every m o d e of production the motive and goal of social activity is not only the
creation of use-values necessary to the life of the society, but also the maintenance and
consolidation of social relations. . . . The superstructure appears then as the political
and ideological conditions of the orderly reproduction of the relations of production.
The negative evaluation of the African Wills Act which gives s o m e minor rights
to African w o m e n is due to the importance attached to the bridewealth system
and the property rights deriving from it. In this and in the preceding chapter,
I have s h o w n that the Rhodesian government tries to uphold the powers of
elders because it has found it easier to turn the old into agents for its interests than
the young. T h e elders, for their part, readily co-operate because their o w n
wealth has c o m e to depend almost entirely on the bridewealth they can expect
from the young.
Paragraph 57 aims at preventing the w o m e n ' s emancipation by hindering
them from breaking a w a y from restrictive tribal ties and from earning a living
in their o w n right. Again property considerations are given as the main reason
for arresting such emancipation: the fear of the chiefs that w o m e n w h o have
brought n o bridewealth to their families will, w h e n they are old and no longer
able to w o r k in town, return to their families to be maintained by their rela-
tives. Y e t n o mention is m a d e of male urban workers w h o are in the same pos-
ition. T h e natural evolution in this regard, which the report suggests, is unlikely
to occur because, as Bourdillon pointed out, customary law cannot be stripped
of its rigidities as long as it is administered by district commissioners. This rigidity
is most painfully felt b y professional w o m e n .
Paragraph 58 suggests that legislation might be prepared allowing indi-
vidual w o m e n to opt out of the tribal structure as well as out of their o w n
families in order to be governed by 'western' law. This m e a n s that a w o m a n
will have to break with her family—an action exceedingly painful to contem-
plate for a n y African w o m a n — a n d even then her decision will only be accept-
able if both her family a n d the tribal authority of her area, i.e. the local chief,
agree. Very few w o m e n will be emotionally capable of such a break and this
m a y be the reason for this concession.
T h e African m e m b e r s of the commission, t w o senior chiefs, had every
interest in preventing the emancipation of w o m e n . T h e y had personally profited
from incorporation into the n e w capitalist system, because it h a d bolstered u p
their archaic position, a n d the Rhodesian government h a d every reason to
accept their report because it is only through an alliance with powerful elements
of the pre-capitalist order that the present government can retain its p o w e r .
T h e report is therefore a clear statement that the government has n o intention
of facilitating the emancipation of African w o m e n . A n y such emancipation
will have to wait until a socialist government gains control of the country.
This report caused special disillusionment a m o n g the n e w African bour-
geoisie w h o s e w o m e n are interested in gaining greater rights in the present
class society. T h e y w a n t the elimination of discrimination, but they fear a
socialist transformation. H e n c e the report h a d hardly been published w h e n
twenty-one w o m e n ' s organizations signed a d o c u m e n t and handed it in to
the Minister of Internal Affairs, r e c o m m e n d i n g that
(a) the provisions of the Legal A g e Majority Act be extended to all African w o m e n ;
(b) that the Enabling Certificate be abolished and replaced by a marriage licence;
(c) that the registration of bridewealth be at the discretion of the parties concerned
and not a condition of the solemnization of the marriage;
(d) that the proprietary consequences of a civil marriage be determined by the L a w
of Rhodesia and not by African Customary L a w ;
(e) that at the death of a husband w h o has not m a d e a will the wife be regarded as
the natural guardian of the children;
(f) that at the death of her husband a wife inherit a certain proportion of the family
property if her husband died without making a will;
(g) that an African w o m a n be entitled to sue for support of illegitimate children.
(Rhodesia Herald, 8 July 1976.)
T h e document further stated that educated African w o m e n h a d b e c o m e part

of the m o d e r n , urban and industrial society a n d , like w o m e n of other races,
believed that the time h a d arrived for t h e m to be invested with the rights a n d
obligations accorded to all full citizens of their native land.
A day after the above requests were printed in the national newspaper,
the editor expressed sympathy with the w o m e n ' s d e m a n d s , but c o m m e n t e d
that legislation would not be appropriate to satisfy professional w o m e n
(Rhodesia Herald, 9 July 1976). A m o n t h later the Rhodesian Council of
Chiefs stated that it w a s prepared to consider changes in customary law,
especially in laws concerning property earned b y w o m e n through their o w n
efforts, but it concluded that the council w o u l d prefer, if possible, to 'listen
to the representatives of w o m e n ' s organizations accompanied b y their guard-
ians' (Rhodesia Herald, 26 August 1978). This last c o m m e n t shows better
than any argument that tribal authorities will never willingly grant greater
rights to w o m e n . Indeed, it reflects a high degree of contempt for the w o m e n
delegates.
Such reactions b y society inevitably call for rebellion. Innumerable

examples can be quoted to s h o w h o w the present law is manipulated against
w o m e n so that even the slender legal rights accorded to them are nullified.
The following is a typical example:
A n African couple w h o were graduates and teachers were married and lived western
style. After many problems the w o m a n left her husband when the situation became
unbearable. A divorce was arranged and the wife was awarded custody of the children.
Because of the woman's situation as a minor she could not become a tenant, in fact
the only accommodation was a single room in which she and the three children were
living. Her husband then applied successfully to the courts for custody, giving the
conditions under which they were living as ground for the w o m a n being unfit to care
for her children. (Rhodesia Herald, 26 January 1977.)
T h o u g h m a n y w o m e n are accommodating themselves to this exploitation and

suffer it silently, m a n y others have drawn the logical conclusion that n o internal
reform will grant them their rights and have joined the liberation m o v e m e n t .
F r o m the liberation c a m p s , they have repeatedly called u p o n the w o m e n still
in Rhodesia to consider their humiliating position. In their 'Appeal to the
W o m e n of Z i m b a b w e ' in 1974, they stressed (Liga Actuell, 1977, p . 54-5):
W e wish to draw attention to a great injustice suffered by our w o m e n . The illegal regime
grants no rights to w o m e n . W h e n our m e n die, w e are not treated as human beings.
If we live in the towns, w e lose our houses. W e are ordered to return to the country
to live with our relatives. Even if w e are professionals, w e are deprived of our homes.
The racists forget that some of us have lived since childhood in the towns. . . . In the
rural areas widows are even worse off. If our husbands die, w e are forced to pay
taxes for ourfieldsand our acreage is reduced. W e are unable to send our children to
school. N o European widow is exposed to such hardships.
The personal humiliation of African w o m e n has also been expressed by a

highly educated w o m a n militant in M o z a m b i q u e . She states (Liga Actuell,
1977, p . 20):
Even when a w o m a n goes to the towns to find work as a domestic servant or factory
worker, she is not really free because she does not earn enough . . . and if she never-
theless manages to save something, she is not allowed to possess personal property,
and that for the simple reason that she is a w o m a n . She is not even allowed to claim a
registered letter addressed to her, although she is working and, in the eyes of her
employer, she is regarded as a responsible person. She is still a minor and needs a
m a n to identify her before she can collect her registered letter at the post, or before
she can open a bank account. Even if she has saved enough money to buy a house,
she is not allowed to purchase it in her o w n name, but has tofinda m a n to buy it
for her.
T h e revolutionary changes envisaged by such writers are anathema to both

tribal and civil authorities in Rhodesia w h o are concerned that w o m e n confine
their energies exclusively to improving their domestic skills and to becoming
better housewives. T o reduce w o m e n ' s awareness of social issues and of their
o w n rights, some European w o m e n , especially the wives of district c o m -
missioners, are using their spare time to form African w o m e n ' s clubs in rural
and urban areas in which to teach w o m e n knitting, sewing, cooking, baking,

child-care and hygiene. These skills are n o doubt useful in improving the lives
of simple people, but they also divert the w o m e n ' s attention from larger issues,
and so prevent their political awareness. A b o v e all, such clubs reinforce the
class distinctions which the capitalist system has introduced into African society,
and thus they further consolidate the present social order.
A detailed study of the African township of M u c h e k e at Fort Victoria,
for example, has revealed that members of voluntary associations and their
leaders are carefully graded according to 'respectability', and this respect-
ability is measured by their husbands' income and by their o w n marital status.
For example, professional w o m e n and w o m e n married to husbands w h o also
are professionals attend voluntary organizations specializing in debates
and intellectual exchanges, such as the Y o u n g W o m e n ' s Christian Associ-
ation ( Y W C A ) ; respectably married w o m e n of the middle strata join clubs
where a variety of domestic skills are taught, such as the W o m e n ' s Institute
Homecraft Club which teaches sewing and cooking or the Cold Storage
W o m e n ' s Club, run exclusively for wives of employees of the Cold Storage
Commission; this club also teaches its members knitting and sewing. W o m e n
whose marriages have not been registered and for w h o m n o bridewealth has
been paid are not allowed to join these clubs because such w o m e n are not
regarded as 'respectable'. For w o m e n like these, as well as for single w o m e n of
doubtful reputation, like prostitutes and other unattached w o m e n , there exist
sports clubs, such as the netball clubs. Membership of these clubs immediately
stamps the w o m e n as poor and 'not respectable' (Weinrich, 1976, p . 153-63).
For a long time, w o m e n accepted their inferior position in society. They
became aware of the importance of politics in freeing themselves from their
humiliating position m u c h later than m e n and w h e n they had reached this
awareness they not only ran up against the European system, but also against
their o w n m e n . But once they were convinced of the importance of politics,
they insisted on participation. A s noted by the Secretary for Welfare and
W o m e n ' s Affairs of the Patriotic Front ( Z A P U ) :
Numerous factors contributed to the upsurge of women's political militancy. Econ-

omic and legal disabilities were among them. . . . All these added to the fury of
women so that it was not difficult to convince them of the need tofightfor national
liberation and political independence. In many cases women were found to be more
responsive than men. M a n y m e n joined the political movement following their wives.
(Ngwenya, 1979.)
In the 1960s, w o m e n began to travel to all the major employment centres trying
to win new members for the women's branches of Z A P U and Z A N U . Efforts
were taken from the beginning to involve w o m e n in political work. But the
contributions of w o m e n in those days were restricted to ancillary tasks. A
w o m a n comrade in M o z a m b i q u e recalls (Liga Actuell, 1977, p . 40):
W o m e n attended political meetings only in company of their husbands, to sing songs
and to brew beer, but not to take an active part in deliberations. Later, women
were elected as presidents of local branches and as representatives overseas. But when
they returned home, their position was little altered and they were incapable of
making decisions.
This restricted participation possible to w o m e n naturally resulted in a lower

degree of politicization than occurred a m o n g the m e n . For example, a survey of
political aspirations carried out in M u c h e k e in the late 1960s shows that
only 68 per cent of all w o m e n said that they wanted a completely African
government, against 77 per cent of all m e n ; 15 per cent of the w o m e n , as
against only 6 per cent of the m e n desired a truly multiracial government, and
9 per cent even preferred the Europeans to stay in power (Weinrich, 1976,
p. 203). Also only 29 per cent of all w o m e n as against 33 per cent of all m e n
wished that after independence Europeans be subjected to the same discrimi-
nation that the Africans had suffered (Weinrich, 1976, p . 205).
If similar questions were asked of African w o m e n in the rural areas in
the mid 1970s, there is n o doubt that the answers would be very different,
for through their exposure to the guerilla war rural w o m e n have become
much more radicalized than urban w o m e n . This was already noticeable during
the early 1970s when the war had just begun to spread and the research for
the current study was being carried out. Thus after a club meeting, at which
the government-sponsored Family Planning Association had given a talk on
birth control, a w o m a n got up and declared that it was the duty of every single
w o m a n in the village to bear as m a n y children as possible 'in order to rear
soldiers w h o will free our country from white oppression'. B y the mid 1970s,
many rural w o m e n had taken an active part in the liberation struggle by feeding
and sheltering guerillas and carrying ammunition for them. B y then w o m e n in
these areas had become m u c h more radicalized than their m e n w h o still
worked for Europeans in the towns.
W h e n the m e n returned for brief holidays and found their wives and
children highly politicized, they were frightened because they had come to
believe that any support for the guerillas w a s suicidal. In the towns, the all-
pervasive government propaganda had presented the liberation struggle as
doomed to failure. N o w they found their families committed to its victory.
Moreover, it was the wives w h o established good relations for them with the
liberationfighterslest they be regarded as spies of the Rhodesian government.
It was very often due to such experiences that m e n returned to the urban areas
convinced that the war could be w o n and so they spread this confidence a m o n g
townsmen.
The h o m e visits of urban workers also convinced them that the picture
drawn by government propaganda of the 'terrorists' was erroneous. They
saw for themselves that in m a n y areas in which government-sponsored clinics
had been closed in order to prevent guerillas from obtaining medicines, the local
population, also deprived of medical care, were n o w being treated by the liber-
ation army. They also saw that liberation army cadres had begun teaching their
children after government-paid teaching personnel had left and the schools had
been closed. M o r e than that, they even saw cadres helping their w o m e n to culti-
vate theirfields,especially in areas which had already gone over to collective pro-
duction, as had happened in some liberated areas in late 1977 and early 1978.
These recent developments, brought about by the politicization of rural w o m e n
and their co-operation with liberation army cadres, will greatly assist the future
reorganization of rural life; they will also have far-reaching consequences for
the equality of m e n and w o m e n once the country becomes truly independent.
Likely changes in the legal position

of w o m e n in a socialist Zimbabwe
A Z i m b a b w e a n w o m a n militant in the c a m p s of M o z a m b i q u e said in a n

interview (Liga Actuell, 1977, p . 41-2):
W h e n freedomfightersarrived in the villages, theyfirstmet w o m e n . They asked

them for food and lodging, clothing or help to transport war materials. In this w a y
w o m e n were immediately confronted with the war and m u c h more radically politicized
than their husbands in the towns. The result was that m a n y more w o m e n came to take
part in the war. They helped to carry arms from the neighbouring states into the
country, they were spotted by enemy helicopters and killed. They could not defend
themselves because they were not trained tofight.The most important consideration
was to safeguard the cadres. Thus it became obvious that w o m e n were still not fully
incorporated into the war as equals. If they organized a column to transport arms,
they had to have arms to defend themselves against the enemy. Therefore, w e began
in 1973 to give military training to w o m e n . F r o m that date onwards m e n and w o m e n
received the same training, were given the same weapons and partook in an identical
life in the camps. This has been very important for the liberation of w o m e n and for
the role they perform in the struggle. Since that time w o m e n have been treated in the
same way as m e n , they had the samerightsand duties in the military as well as in the
non-military sphere. . . . Thus, in a very short time w e have trained a number of
excellent w o m e n cadres, commanders and trainers.
Another important aspect was that m e n and w o m e n fought shoulder to shoulder,
and together they survived because they saved each other's lives. A mutual respect
developed and the thought ' Y o u are only a w o m a n , you can't do it', faded away.
This has had more than only psychological consequences. For the w o m e n in the
villages then knew that they were equal to theirfightingm e n and so the enemy could
no longer exploit them. A s long as they were not convinced that they were equal, the
regime could still persuade them to play another role, namely that of betraying the
cadres for large sums of money.
A n d another Z i m b a b w e a n observed:
All along the tendency has been that the liberation war of our country could only
be waged by m e n . This view has proved to be very wrong. A n y struggle without the
participation of w o m e n cannot be complete and effective. This has been evidenced by
the large number of young w o m e n coming forward to join the struggle which was
not the case in the past. This is the assurance that the birth of Zimbabwe is just
around the corner. It is because w o m e n have n o w realised that they have a big role
to perform in the struggle. (Zimbabwe Review, 1978, Vol. 7, N o . 1.)
This incorporation of w o m e n into the w a r effort can be regarded as the first

really effective change towards sexual equality. T h e necessities of the war have
forced everybody dedicated to the liberation of their country to co-operate o n
a basis of equality, since their very survival depends o n this equality. Yet,
as Trotsky (1973, p . 21) said,
to institute political equality of m e n and w o m e n is one thing, to institute such equality

in industry is more difficult, but to achieve it in the daily lives of the people is a most
difficult task because it requires a revolutionizing of all domestic habits.
There are m a n y statements by the Patriotic Front as well as F R E L I M O with

which the P F has m a n y contacts which stress the importance of sexual
equality while admitting that this equality is a goal to be striven for. For
example, Josina Machel, w h o died during the M o z a m b i c a n war of liberation,
said ( L S M Press, 1974, p . 6-7):
Since 1967 the w o m e n have demonstrated that they have a key role in the mobilisation
and political education of both the people and the soldiers themselves.... W e explain
to the people the need tofight,and against w h o m , what are the reasons for our
struggle, what are our aims, and why w e chose an armed struggle as the only means
to independence. . . .
The success of the revolution depends on the combined efforts of everyone . . .
and thus the traditional rather 'passive' role of w o m e n must be changed so that their
abilities are used to the full. W o m e n are encouraged to give their opinions in meetings,
to participate in the various committees, etc. Here we have the rather difficult task
offightingold prejudices that the women's functions should be confined to cooking,
rearing children, etc. It has been proven that w e w o m e n can perform this task of
mobilisation and education better than m e n for two reasons. First, it is easier for us
to approach other w o m e n , and secondly, the m e n are more easily convinced of the
important role of w o m e n when confronted with the unusual sight of confident and
capable female militants.
A similar observation w a s m a d e by the Z i m b a b w e a n comrade quoted above.

She said (Liga Actuell, 1977, p . 36-7):
In our camps we discuss and criticise and develop, based on our experience, the future
role of w o m e n . W e take care that the role of w o m e n is not seen in isolation, for
we do not want w o m e n put into a special category. A w o m a n should do exactly the
same tasks as all other cadres. There will be differences based on age, but not differ-
ences based on sex. . . . Thus w e shall refer back to our tradition in which the role
of w o m e n was not confined to the rearing of children, but in which she was taking
a full role in production, while mostly old people took care of the children.
It is beyond doubt that nowhere in southern Africa have w o m e n obtained as

influential a position as have those in the liberation movements. There is
concrete evidence that w o m e n are engaged in the actual fighting and hold
high-ranking positions in the army. N o t only the publications of the Patriotic
Front, but also the hostile Rhodesian press bear witness to this. Thus in
N o v e m b e r 1977, after a security force raid on a base c a m p in M o z a m b i q u e ,
the Rhodesia Herald (24 December 1977) published the following pictures of
Z i m b a b w e a n w o m e n undergoing military training: (a) a platoon of w o m e n
drilling withfixedbayonets; (b) a group of w o m e n with S A R rifles receiving
blackboard instructions o n h o w to load and unload; (c) three w o m e n with
camouflaged headdress beside a 1 2 . 7 - m m anti-aircraft gun, and (d) t w o
w o m e n , one with a rocket launcher and the other with an A K , beside radio
equipment.
Yet for all the determination of leaders and of w o m e n to achieve full
sexual equality, obstacles are encountered even within the ranks of the cadres.
Thus a newspaper article, claiming to reproduce a captured Z A N U report of
the Department of Administration to thefirstsession of the enlarged Central
Committee, M a p u t o , dated August 1977, quotes the following extracts from

a section entitled 'Place and Role of Female C o m r a d e s in the Revolution'
(Rhodesia Herald, 24 D e c e m b e r 1977):
Since the March-April Chimoio meeting at which two of our female comrades were
appointed to positions on the Central Committee, the Department of Administration
has been pleased to see continual efforts by the Executive Committee to get as m a n y
as possible of our w o m e n comrades to participate in more challenging and satisfying
tasks. But it must be pointed out that the ground is still insignificantly scratched. The
party still badly needs to revolutionize its attitude towards female comrades and to
urgently supervise the development and practice of a new attitude.
There is an overwhelming reluctance to invite and challenge female comrades
to the more significant tasks of the revolution. . . . Male comrades still think it
humiliating to salute their senior-ranking female comrades. Our female comrades
are also to blame. M a n y are still just ' w o m e n ' in the old traditional sense. They still
think it is anathema for them to take u p the challenge of the revolution on an equal
footing with male comrades The party badly needs to define with m u c h greater exact-
ness what role the w o m e n of Zimbabwe must play along the path of revolution.
Simply enacting legislation to institute equality between m e n and w o m e n is not

enough. T h e United Republic of Tanzania has experienced the ineffectiveness
of such an approach. T h u s legislation w a s passed in that country to guarantee
the full equality of m e n and w o m e n in the labour market—the E m p l o y m e n t
Ordinance C a p . 366 is the backbone of these laws—yet the implementation of this
legislation is far from perfect. For example, an article in the national Tanzanian
Sunday newspaper repeats that employers often discriminate against w o m e n by
denying t h e m the right to contribute to the National Provident F u n d ; that
although w o m e n start off at the same pay level as m e n , they are less frequently
promoted than m e n and their salary increases are lower. Discrimination against
w o m e n reaches its peak w h e n w o m e n are heads of families; for m a n y organ-
izations d o not consider w o m e n eligible or entitled to housing, nor their children
to medical treatment, whereas the children of male employees receive free
medical care. T h e same article also states that m a n y capable w o m e n are denied
responsible positions in order not to 'embarrass' their husbands. It quotes one
instance in which a
husband had written a letter to the employer of his wife claiming that by virtue of being
the husband of the employee, he had therightto stop his wife working. The employer,
being a m a n , agreed, A n d nothing was done, although he had contravened the law.
(Sunday News, 5 February 1978.)
Z i m b a b w e a n w o m e n are likely to have a better chance than w o m e n in the

United Republic of Tanzania to see that laws d o not remain a dead letter,
because their present active involvement in the w a r and both their o w n experi-
ence and that of their m e n in the present w a r have initiated equality. It is not
surprising, therefore, that w o m e n in other parts of Africa look to the w o m e n
in the liberation movements for inspiration in their o w n endeavours towards
emancipation. For example, at the Pan-African meeting at Noutakchott,
called two years after the United Nations had proclaimed the International
W o m e n ' s Year in order to assess the progress m a d e towards the emancipation
of w o m e n , the delegate from the United Republic of Tanzania declared:
W e feel enormous encouragement in the fact that it is w o m e n w h o are sheltering,

feeding and providing medical aid to the combatants for freedom in southern Africa,
thus playing an already vital role in the struggle for h u m a n emancipation. (Sunday
News, 20 November 1977.)
She then drew a parallel to w o m e n in the Western world w h o had played a

similar role during the Second World W a r and concluded that it w a s due to
their war experiences that the present campaign for equal rights for all w o m e n
had been rekindled.
A Z i m b a b w e a n w o m a n cadre likewise felt:
I think it [the liberation struggle] has had a lasting effect on the emancipation of
w o m e n . T h e w o m e n have taken a very active part in it, they have been trained; they
are in the professions; they are everywhere, and I feel that after our Zimbabwe is
free, no m a n will tell m e m y rights because they know I live and I live as a h u m a n
being. . . . They are our counterparts, they have worked with us and they have learnt
to accept us. . . . W h e n m e n die, I die, so there is no reason to remain blind. T h e
emancipation has started and will keep on going; w e will not find it difficult. (Weiss
and Chappell, 1979.)
The experiences of the present w a r , therefore, give grounds for hope that
the emancipation of Z i m b a b w e a n w o m e n , effectively begun during the struggle,
will be completed once their country gains true independence. If the socialist
aspirations of the people are realized, there is a great likelihood that laws
establishing the equality of the sexes will not remain dead letters. N e w legis-
lation affecting marriage and family life will be required because the present
Marriage Acts are totally unsuitable for a socialist society. In looking for s o m e
rough guidelines on h o w to legislate for the transition period until the people
have evolved their o w n customs, the Marriage L a w of the People's Republic
of China m a y prove useful. This law is devoid of sophistry and ordinary people
can understand it; it is rudimentary a n d so allows for future development;
and it is based on the absolute equality of m e n and w o m e n . T h e most relevant
articles are (Croll, 1974, p . 107-12):
Article 1: The feudal marriage system based on arbitrary and compulsory arrangements
and the supremacy of m a n over w o m a n , and in disregard of the children, is
abolished. The New-Democratic marriage system, which is based on the free
choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on the
protection of the lawful interests of w o m e n and children, is put into effect.
Article 2: Bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference in the remarriage of
widows, and the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriages, are
prohibited.
Article 3: Marriage is based upon the complete willingness of the two parties. Neither
party shall use compulsion and no third party is allowed to interfere.
Article 6: In order to contract a marriage, both the m a n and the w o m a n should register
in person with the people's government of the district or township in which they
reside. If the proposed marriage is found to be in conformity with the provisions
of this law, the local people's government should, without delay, issue marriage
certificates.
Article 7: Husband and wife are companions living together and enjoy equal status
in the h o m e .
Article 8: Husband and wife are in duty bound to love, respect, assist and look after
each other, to live in harmony, to engage in productive work, to care for their
children and to strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building
up of the new society.
Article 9: Both husband and wife have the right to free choice of occupation and free
participation in work or in social activities.
Article 10: Husband and wife have equalrightsin the possession and management of
family property.
Article 13: Parents have the duty to rear and to educate their children; the children
have the duty to support and to assist their parents.
Article 17: Divorce is granted when husband and wife both desire it. . . .In dealing
with a divorce case, the country or municipal people's court should, in the first
instance, try to bring about a reconciliation between the parties.
Article 20: The blood ties between parents and children are not ended by divorce of
the parents. N o matter whether the father or the mother has the custody of the
children, they remain the children of both parties. . . . After divorce, the guiding
principle is to allow the mother to have the custody of a breastfed infant. After
the weaning of the child, if a dispute arises between the two parties over the
guardianship and an agreement cannot be reached, the people's court should
render a decision in accordance with the interests of the child.
Article 25: After divorce, if one party has not remarried and has maintenance diffi-
culties, the other party should render assistance.
Perhaps it needs to be emphasized that a socialist transformation of Z i m b a b w e a n

society does not imply a n abolition of the family, as happened briefly in the
Soviet U n i o n after the October Revolution of 1917. T h e family will always
remain the cell of Z i m b a b w e a n life, even if its form changes; this can be seen
from the experiences of the people at Cold Comfort F a r m Society and at
Nyafaru. T h e experiences of these c o m m u n e s , as well as those of the Chinese
people, have proved that an emphasis o n c o m m u n a l production does not
tamper with family integrity. W h a t will change, however, is that the family
will cease to be the unit of production. Its m e m b e r s will closely co-operate with
their neighbours, irrespective of blood ties, to build u p a n e w society constructed
according to a well thought-out m o d e l that will be tested and readjusted as the
experience of the people increases.
O n c e the vision of the present freedomfightersbecomes a reality, Z i m b a b w e
will be one of the few States in which Engels' prediction of 1884 can c o m e true:
W e are n o w approaching a social revolution in which the hitherto existing economic

foundations of m o n o g a m y will disappear. . . . M o n o g a m y arose out of the concen-
tration of considerable wealth in the hands of one person—and that a man—and out
of the desire to bequeath this wealth to this man's children and to no one else's. For
this purpose m o n o g a m y was essential o n the women's part, but not on the man's;
so that this m o n o g a m y of the w o m e n in n o way hindered the overt or covert polygamy
of the m a n . The impending social revolution, however, by transforming at least the
far greater part of permanent inheritable wealth—the means of production—into
social property, will reduce all this anxiety about inheritance to a m i n i m u m . Since
m o n o g a m y arose from economic causes, will it disappear when these disappear? O n e
might not unjustly answer: far from disappearing, it will only begin to be completely
realized. For with the conversion of the means of production into social property . . .
m o n o g a m y , instead of declining, finally becomes a reality—for the m e n as well.
<Engels, 1976, p. 82-3.)
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[A25] SS.78/D.103/A.

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Rhodesia

Introduction note by Victor E. Rosez:

Already in 1958/59 Sir Roy Welensky had on several occasions contacts

The leader of the Congolese province of Katanga, Moise Tshombe,

The Unesco Press Paris 1975

ISBN 92-3-1 O 1270-3

4. Basic economic data,5 3

6. White politicalpower at any price,67

7. Soft constitution and hard government,75

9. The liberation struggle, 89

IO. The liberation campaigns 1966-74,91

1200-1500 Settlement of various Shona-speakinggroups in the area.

1891 Britain establishes protectorate over Mashonaland.

Railway joins Bulawayo and Salisbury.

Divides Rhodesia into African and European areas.

representation of the people . . . under which government is

Vagrancy Act passed.

Labour government elected in Britain (October).

Kingdom to use force to blockade illegal unloading of oil for

Intermittent clashes between ZAPU and Rhodesian forces

Ceasefire declared (December 1 i).

The white invasion

between the Limpopo,the Zambezi,the eastern mountains of Inyanga and the

In fact the most significant powers arrogated by the company to itself,especially

The first armed conflict

The establishment of Rhodesia

An ancient civilization-the Zimbabwe ruins.

serious defects revealed in company administration,Britain retained the BSAC

1. Quotation from Bulawayo Chronicle,p. 15, of 31 March 1938,reproduced by Bowman

And finally, the illegal Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UD1)-the

The political and economic subservience of the African population is directly

The Tangwena case

The physical division

The qualitative division

Natural farming regions.

Tsetse fly infested areas (1964).

African 747,537 21,400,000 12,412,000 L16.60

The quality of African education

systematic training in household work or agriculture’; Rhodesian Front policy

Total expenditure $21,388,451 $19,9i 2,435

Primary and secondary education

effectively reduced F1 schools from 100 in 1972 to 99 in 1974. The bulk

Technical education and apprenticeship

1 million immigrants promotion drive, partly in response to a manpower

1962-64 240,500 36.5 3,750,000 16.3

Attempts have been made to explain away African unemployment in Rho-

Population 3,390,000 4,260,000 5,310,000

The picture is a repetition of that found in other sectors of the Rhodesian

subsistence economy at $(R)25 per annum, makes the $(R)125 subsistence

Agriculture and forestry 271,246 4,376 91 9 275,722

Thus of 865,095 people employed in 1969, 765,950 were Africans. Their

7.White proportion of population and personal income

1946 3.8 49.4 1960 6.2 61.2

Table 8,based on Mswaka, indicates what percentage of the total wages

Africans African .4fricanï .4fricun

1954 89.6 38.5 1961 87.7 37.3

African agriculture and rural

1. The year I968 was a drought year.

i I. Average earnings in Rhodesian dollars in Rhodesia 1965-71 1

1965 2,576 246 2,330 1969 2,971 280 2,691

The ratio of African to non-African earnings varies from sector to sector,

Mining 1: 12.3 1 : 13.6 Transport 1: 5.3 1: 5.4

In 1967,the 605,000Africans employed in the industrial sector earned an

Africans forced into a money economy