G.R. No.

133547 November 11, 2003

Heirs of Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael, Petitioners,
vs.
Court of Appeals, Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, Respondents.

Facts:
This treats of the Report submitted to this Court by the Former Special Fourth Division of the
Court of Appeals, dated July 30, 2003, pursuant to Resolution, dated December 7, 2001, directing
said court to receive evidence on the conflicting claims over the subject properties covered by TCT
Nos. 52928 and 52929 between private respondents Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, on the
one hand, and intervenor University of the Philippines (UP), on the other.

On December 9, 1993, Maria Destura filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City against her husband, Pedro Destura, together with Jorge Chin and Renato Mallari. The
complaint sought the annulment of the memorandum of agreement (MOA) dated March 26, 1992
executed by Chin and Mallari as first parties, Pedro Destura as second party, and Jaime Lumansag,
Jr. as third party, over Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B located in Barrio Culiat, Quezon City, covered
by TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929. It alleged that Chin and Mallari were former agents of
Pedro Destura, authorized to sell Lot Nos. 588-A and 588-B, then covered by TCT No. 36048; that
when Destura came from Canada, he discovered that the title to the land has been transferred to
Chin and Mallari in whose names TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 were registered; that Chin
and Mallari executed the MOA subject of the complaint to appease Destura; that the MOA stated
that Chin and Mallari had a buyer of the lots and they promised to pay Destura one hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000.00) upon finality of the sale; that the sale did not materialize and the payment
of the promised amount has become uncertain, to the prejudice of the Destura spouses. The
complaint also sought the annulment of TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 as they were allegedly
obtained through fraudulent means. It prayed that the Register of Deeds issue a new title in the
name of the Destura spouses.

The case was dismissed against Pedro Destura after he and his wife entered into an amicable
settlement.
The trial court nullified the MOA in question, TCT No. 52928, and TCT No. 52929, after finding
that the records competently and credibly show that highly suspicious circumstances attended such
transfers of registered ownership. The transfers were by virtue of two deeds of sale – the vendors
in the first deed of sale were the spouses Luis and Leony Menor and those in the other were Roberto
Pael, Crisanto Pael, and Teofila Pael.

The trial court then ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to "cancel Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Jorge Chin and Renato B. Mallari and the transfer
certificates of title from which said certificates were derived until but not including Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 36048, and thereafter reinstate Transfer Certificate of Title No. 36048 in
the names of Spouses Antonio Pael and Andrea Alcantara and Crisanto Pael.

On April 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of Chin and Mallari. It
annulled the decision of the trial court upon finding that the gross and reckless negligence of their
former counsel which caused them to be declared in default and which later led to the dismissal of
their appeal and finality of the judgment amounted to extrinsic fraud. More so, the appellate court
reversed the order of the trial court canceling TCT No. 52928 and TCT No. 52929 and reinstating
TCT No. 36048 registered in the name of the Paels. It also rejected Maria Destura’s claim over the
property. It instead upheld the validity of the sale of 70% of the property by a certain Luis and
Leony Menor and 30% thereof by the Paels to Chin and Mallari.

The case was elevated to the Supreme Court by the Heirs of Pael and by Maria Destura via separate
petitions for review. However, the Court affirmed the title of Chin and Mallari over the property.

The Heirs of Pael and Destura filed separate motions for reconsideration. During their pendency,
the University of the Philippines (UP) filed a motion for intervention, alleging that the properties
covered by TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of Chin and Mallari form part of its Diliman
Campus, registered in the name of UP under TCT No. 9462.

The Court denied the motions for reconsideration but granted the motion for intervention filed by
UP. The former remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reception of evidence on the
conflicting claims over the property in question by Chin and Mallari as against UP.

On July 30, 2003, the Former Special Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals submitted its Report
recommending that the Court recognize the better rights of Chin and Mallari over the property as
against the claim of UP.

Issue:
Whether or not UP has the superior right over the property covered by the petitions at hand.

Held:
Yes.

The facts show that Chin and Mallari and the Desturas trace their claim of ownership over the
property to the Paels. The Desturas allegedly purchased the property from the Paels through their
agent, a certain Lutgarda Marilao. Chin and Mallari claim that they bought 70% of the property
from spouses Luis and Leony Menor, and 30% thereof directly from the Paels. The Menor spouses,
in turn, allegedly acquired the 70% also from the Paels.
The disputed property, however, is part of the UP Diliman Campus, covered by TCT No. 9462. It
was established, after the survey conducted by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) that the property claimed by Chin and Mallari
overlaps the property covered by UP’s title. The superiority of UP’s title over that of the Paels has
been recognized by the courts in an earlier case filed by Roberto Pael, et al. against UP.

It is judicial notice that the legitimacy of UP’s title has been settled in several other cases decided
by the Court. The case of Tiburcio, et al. vs. People’s Homesite & Housing Corp. (PHHC), et al.
was an action for reconveyance of a 430-hectare lot in Quezon City, filed by the heirs of Eladio
Tiburcio against PHHC and UP. The Court held that the decree of registration in the name of the
predecessor-in-interest of PHHC and UP, as well as the titles issued pursuant thereto have become
incontrovertible.

Further, it has been said that the foundation principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests
is that parties should not be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right
or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
The said doctrine is applicable in the case at bar.

Finally, it should be emphasized that this Court’s Decision in Tiburcio, et al. vs. PHHC, as well as
in the subsequent cases upholding the validity and indefeasibility of the certificate of title covering
the UP Diliman Campus, precludes the courts from looking anew into the validity of UP’s title.
The title of intervenor UP over the disputed property is therefore upheld. Thus, the Registry of
Deeds in Quezon City is ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 52928 and 52929 in the names of private
respondents Jorge H. Chin and Renato B. Mallari, and Civil Case No. Q-95-22961 filed by private
respondents against intervenor UP before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, for
quieting of title is hereby dismissed.
G.R. No. 178411 June 23, 2010

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY

ADMINISTRATOR OF PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY ENGINEER OF
PARAÑAQUE CITY, OFFICE OF THE CITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
COORDINATOR, OFFICE OF THE BARANGAY CAPTAIN AND SANGGUNIANG
PAMBARANGAY OF BARANGAY VITALEZ, PARAÑAQUE CITY, TERESITA A.
GATCHALIAN, ENRICO R. ESGUERRA, ERNESTO T. PRACALE, JR., MANUEL M.
ARGOTE, CONRADO M. CANLAS, JOSEPHINE S. DAUIGOY, ALLAN L. GONZALES,
ESTER C. ASEHAN, MANUEL A. FUENTES, and MYRNA P. ROSALES, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIO D. EBIO AND HIS CHILDREN/HEIRS namely, ARTURO V. EBIO, EDUARDO
V. EBIO, RENATO V. EBIO, LOURDES E. MAGTANGOB, MILA V. EBIO, and ARNEL
V. EBIO, Respondents.

Facts:
The case is based on a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the January 31, 2007 Decision and June 8, 2007 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91350 allegedly for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. The CA had reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City, Branch 196, issued on April 29, 2005 in Civil Case No. 05-0155.

On April 21, 1987, Pedro Vitalez executed a notarized Transfer of Rights ceding his claim over
the entire parcel of land in favor of Mario Ebio, his son-in-law. Subsequently, the tax declarations
under Pedro’s name were cancelled and new ones were issued in Mario Ebio’s name.

On March 30, 1999, the Office of the Sangguniang Barangay of Vitalez sought assistance from
the City Government of Parañaque for the construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek
located in the said barangay, with the proposed road traversing the lot occupied by the respondents.
When the city government advised all the affected residents to vacate the said area, respondents
immediately registered their opposition thereto. As a result, the road project was temporarily
suspended.

Threatened of being evicted, respondents went to the RTC of Parañaque City on April 21, 2005
and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners. In the course of the
proceedings, respondents admitted before the trial court that they have a pending application for
the issuance of a sales patent before the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
On April 29, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying the petition for lack of merit. The trial court
reasoned that respondents were not able to prove successfully that they have an established right
to the property since they have not instituted an action for confirmation of title and their application
for sales patent has not yet been granted. Additionally, they failed to implead the Republic of the
Philippines, which is an indispensable party.

Aggrieved, respondents elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. On January 31, 2007, the
Court of Appeals issued its Decision in favor of the respondents.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the State is an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory
injunction; and
2. Whether or not the character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject
property entitles them to avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

Held:
No, the State is not an indispensable party to respondents’ action for prohibitory injunction.

Yes, character of respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property entitles them to
avail of the relief of prohibitory injunction.

An action for injunction is brought specifically to restrain or command the performance of an act.
In the case at bar, respondents filed an action for injunction to prevent the local government of
Parañaque City from proceeding with the construction of an access road that will traverse through
a parcel of land which they claim is owned by them by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Petitioners, however, argue that since the creek, being a tributary of the river, is classified as part
of the public domain, any land that may have formed along its banks through time should also be
considered as part of the public domain. The Supreme Court is not convinced, for alluvial deposits
along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain and the alluvial property
automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only
restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same
under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.
Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion, the land which is formed by
the gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the
public domain by clear provision of law.
A right in esse means a clear and unmistakable right. A party seeking to avail of an injunctive
relief must prove that he or she possesses a right in esse or one that is actual or existing. It should
not be contingent, abstract, or future rights, or one which may never arise.

In the case at bar, respondents assert that their predecessor-in-interest, Pedro Vitalez, had occupied
and possessed the subject lot as early as 1930. In 1964, respondent Mario Ebio secured a permit
from the local government of Parañaque for the construction of their family dwelling on the said
lot. In 1966, Pedro executed an affidavit of possession and occupancy allowing him to declare the
property in his name for taxation purposes. Curiously, it was also in 1966 when Guaranteed
Homes, Inc., the registered owner of Road Lot No. 8 (RL 8) which adjoins the land occupied by
the respondents, donated RL 8 to the local government of Parañaque.

From these findings of fact by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, only one conclusion
can be made: that for more than thirty (30) years, neither Guaranteed Homes, Inc. nor the local
government of Parañaque in its corporate or private capacity sought to register the accreted portion.
Undoubtedly, respondents are deemed to have acquired ownership over the subject property
through prescription. Respondents can assert such right despite the fact that they have yet to
register their title over the said lot. It must be remembered that the purpose of land registration is
not the acquisition of lands, but only the registration of title which the applicant already possessed
over the land. Registration was never intended as a means of acquiring ownership. A decree of
registration merely confirms, but does not confer, ownership.

Further, the filing of a sales patent application by the respondents, which remains pending before
the DENR, do not estop them from filing an injunction suit.
Thus, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioners.