G.R. No. 161921 July 17, 2013
Theresa paid the delinquent bills
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER,
vs.
SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE,
CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR
GONZALEZ,* JR., RESPONDENTS.
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000. The CA Decision
affirmed with modification the August 15, 2001 Decision3of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 24, while the CA Resolution denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and her husband Dr.
Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily
Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City with a lot area of one
hundred fifty-three (153) square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69905.
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (Exh. "B", pp. 470-473,
Records) selling, transferring and conveying in favor of
[respondent] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their rights and
interests in the housing unit at Emily Homes in
consideration of ₱70,000.00. The Memorandum of
Agreement carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject property
shall be for the account of the Second Party (Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994." (Records, p. 47)
vis-a-vis Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's assumption of the
payment of the mortgage loan secured by Joyce Ardiente
from the National Home Mortgage (Records, Exh. "A", pp.
468-469)
For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water
connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 7-
8) until on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to the
office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District (COWD) to
complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma. Theresa that she
was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the
months of December 1998, January 1999, and February
1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment
was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-
12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at the instance of
Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N.,
February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma.
(T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On the same date, through
her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to
explain who authorized the cutting of the water line
(Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager,
[respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter
dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the
instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off
(Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and
her husband] filed [a] complaint for damages [against
petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez]
(Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was
only restored and reconnected when the [trial] court issued
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December
14, 1999 (Records, p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their
duties, defendants did not act with justice, gave plaintiffs
their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before
disconnecting the water supply, defendants COWD and
Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection
notice to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar,
in-charge of the Commercial Department of defendant
COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days after
the actual disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date
for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they did not act
with justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce
V. Ardiente. They should have investigated first as to the
present ownership of the house. For doing the act because
Ardiente told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce
Ardiente should have requested before the cutting off of the
water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell
plaintiffs but she did not have the patience of seeing them.
She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the
water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should have been
very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and
Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the
following sums:
(a) ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;
 (b) 200,000.00 for exemplary damages; and
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee.
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and Engr.
Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is not
swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of plaintiffs
was because they were influenced by defendant Joyce
Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they should be
liable.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the CA.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed
Decision disposing as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the awarded
damages is reduced to ₱100,000.00 each for moral and
exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is lowered to
₱25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.7
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a "legal
duty to honor the possession and use of water line by Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum of
Agreement" and "that when [petitioner] applied for its
disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice and
[injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide."8
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they "failed to
give a notice of disconnection and derelicted in
reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid
bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide]."9
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed their respective
Motions for Reconsideration, but these were denied by the
CA in its Resolution dated December 17, 2003.
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No. 161802.
However, based on technical grounds and on the finding
that the CA did not commit any reversible error in its
assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004. COWD
and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied with finality through this Court's
Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
Petitioner, on the other hand, timely filed the instant
petition with the following Assignment of Errors:
7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH
IT HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS
STILL COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY
LIABILITY OF PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE
WITH CAGAYAN DE ORO WATER DISTRICT
(COWD) AND ENGR. GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR
THE LATTER'S FAILURE TO SERVE NOTICE UPON
RESPONDENTS SPOUSES PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO
THE ACTUAL DISCONNECTION DESPITE
EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN
WITHOUT PETITIONER'S REQUEST, COWD WAS
ALREADY SET TO EFFECT DISCONNECTION OF
RESPONDENTS' WATER SUPPLY DUE TO NON-
PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR THREE (3) MONTHS.
7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN
IT RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND
FAILED TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE
GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN
THEY FAILED TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR
THREE MONTHS AND TO MOVE FOR THE
TRANSFER OF THE COWD ACCOUNT IN THEIR
NAME, WHICH WAS A VIOLATION OF THEIR
MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT WITH
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS
LIKEWISE DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE
DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY
TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE
ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF
THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND
GOOD FAITH.
7.4 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED AN AWARD
OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS AGAINST PETITIONER
ARDIENTE.12
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and Gonzalez,
who were petitioner's co-defendants before the RTC and
her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as respondents
in the instant petition. This cannot be done. Being her co-
parties before the RTC and the CA, petitioner cannot, in the
instant petition for review on certiorari, make COWD and
Gonzalez, adversary parties. It is a grave mistake on the part
of petitioner's counsel to treat COWD and Gonzalez as
respondents. There is no basis to do so, considering that, in
the first place, there is no showing that petitioner filed a
cross-claim against COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set
up shall be barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim
against COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is
already barred from doing so in the present petition.
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and Gonzalez's
petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court was
already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, making the
presently assailed CA Decision final and executory insofar
as COWD and Gonzalez are concerned. Thus, COWD and
Gonzalez are already precluded from participating in the
present petition. They cannot resurrect their lost cause by
filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless,
reiterating the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed
with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise
noticed that the main issues raised by petitioner are factual
and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the
function of lower courts, whose findings on these matters
are received with respect and considered binding by the
Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of
which is present in this instant petition.13 This is especially
true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the
CA as in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily
show that the instant petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply,
because she had no participation in the actual
disconnection. However, she admitted in the present
petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect
the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed
by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim against
petitioner. While it was COWD which actually discontinued
respondent spouses' water supply, it cannot be denied that
it was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses
Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in the first
place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even
require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the
former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant
to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy
to enforce such right is not to cause the disconnection of the
respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
there must be no intention to harm another.15 Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.16 In the
present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of
respondent spouses’ water supply without warning or
informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that
her request for disconnection was based on the advise of
COWD personnel and that her intention was just to compel
the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
intention, then she should have advised respondent
spouses before or immediately after submitting her request
for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply
to force them to comply with their obligation under their
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made
matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook the
disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply despite
payment of their arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right
on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are
guilty of bad faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of
the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty
and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila
Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be
observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 "lays down
a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The
Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code
is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON
THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code,
seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely
stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were
"designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to
serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as
golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and
dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among these
principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's
rights, but also in the performance of one's duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all
rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct
set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by
itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results
in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of
social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or
Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of
the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do
not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to the
standards set forth in the said provision and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of
the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of
rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article
20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the
circumstances of each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable act of
having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify
respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD
and Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the
impending disconnection and their subsequent neglect to
reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the
latter's settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the CA
that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based
on the provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection with
Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that
exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary
damages are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish
another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the
instant case, the Court agrees with the CA in sustaining the
award of exemplary damages, although it reduced the
amount granted, considering that respondent spouses were
deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9)
months, and such deprivation would have continued were
it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of
the Civil Code provides, among others, that such fees may
be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when
the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff
to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and
evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs’ plainly
valid, just and demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202791 June 10, 2013
PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LEANDRO LEGASPI, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the January 5, 2012
Resolution1 and July 20, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 116686, which denied the
petitioner’s motion to amend the dispositive portion of the
June 29, 2011 CA Decision.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent) was employed
as Utility Pastry on board the vessel "Azamara Journey"
under the employment of petitioner Philippine
Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (petitioner). Respondent’s
employment was covered by a Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) wherein it was agreed that the company
shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to
US$60,000.00 only.
While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac
Arrest S/P ICD Insertation." He was checked by the ship’s
doctor and was prescribed medications. On November 14,
2008, respondent was repatriated to receive further
medical treatment and examination. On May 23, 2009, the
company designated physician assessed his condition to be
Disability Grade 2.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full and
permanent disability compensation against petitioner
before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The Labor Arbiter’s Ruling
In its January 25, 2010 Decision,3 the LA ruled in favor of
respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents (now petitioner) are hereby
ordered to pay complainant jointly and severally, the
following:
1. US$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time
of payment as permanent disability compensation;
2. US$1,320.00 or its peso equivalent as sick wages;
3. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total
award.
SO ORDERED.
Notably, the LA awarded US$80,000.00 based on the ITF
Cruise Ship Model Agreement for Catering Personnel, not on
the CBA.
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed the LA decision before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
The NLRC’s Ruling
In its May 28, 2010 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the decision
of the LA. Petitioner timely filed its motion for
reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in its July 30,
2010 Resolution. On September 5, 2010, the NLRC issued
the Entry of Judgment stating that its resolution affirming
the LA decision had become final and executory.
On October 22, 2010, during the hearing on the motion for
execution before the NLRC, petitioner agreed to pay
respondent US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said
payment were embodied in the Receipt of Judgment Award
with Undertaking,4 wherein respondent acknowledged
receipt of the said amount and undertook to return it to
petitioner in the event the latter’s petition for certiorari
would be granted, without prejudice to respondent’s right
to appeal. It was also agreed upon that the remaining
balance would be given on the next scheduled conference.
Pertinent portions of the said undertaking provide:
xxxx
3. That counsel (of the petitioner) manifested their
willingness to tender the judgment award without
prejudice to the respondent’s (now petitioner)
right to file a Petition for Certiorari and provided,
complainant (now respondent) undertakes to
return the full amount without need of demand or
a separate action in the event that the Petition for
Certiorari is granted;
4. That complainant’s counsel was amenable to the
arrangement and accepted the offer. NOW
THEREFORE complainant and his counsel hereby
acknowledge RECEIPT of the sum of EIGHTY-ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND
0/100 (US$81,320.00) covered by CITIBANK
CHECK with No. 1000001161 dated October 21,
2010 payable to the order of LEANDRO V. LEGASPI
and UNDERTAKES to RETURN the entire amount to
respondent PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC. in the event that the Petition for
Certiorari is granted without prejudice to
complainant’s right to appeal. Such undertaking
shall be ENFORCEABLE by mere motion before this
Honorable office without need of separate
action.5 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
On November 8, 2010, petitioner timely filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA.6
In the meantime, on March 2, 2011, the LA issued a writ of
execution which noted petitioner’s payment of the amount
of US$81,320.00. On March 16, 2011, in compliance with the
said writ, petitioner tendered to the NLRC Cashier the
additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorney’s fees and
₱3,042.95 as execution fee. In its Order, dated March 31,
2011, the LA ordered the release of the aforementioned
amounts to respondent.
The CA’s Ruling
Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of judgment of
the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010 payment of
US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of execution issued by the LA,
the CA rendered its Decision, dated June 29, 2011. The CA
partially granted the petition for certiorari and modified the
assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding only
US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between Celebrity
Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa Transporti CISL.
Petitioner then filed its Manifestation with Motion to
Amend the Dispositive Portion, submitting to the CA the
writ of execution issued by the LA in support of its motion.
Petitioner contended that since it had already paid the total
amount of US$89,452.00, it was entitled to the return of the
excess payment in the amount of US$29,452.00.
In its assailed January 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the
motion and ruled that the petition should have been
dismissed for being moot and academic not only because
the assailed decision of the NLRC had become final and
executory on September 5, 2010, but also because the said
judgment had been satisfied on October 22, 2010, even
before the filing of the petition for certiorari on November
8, 2010. In so ruling, the CA cited the pronouncement in
Career Philippines Ship Management v. Geronimo
Madjus7 where it was stated that the satisfaction of the
monetary award rendered the petition for certiorari moot.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was
denied by the CA in its assailed July 20, 2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED
IN COLLECTING THE EXCESS PAYMENT IT MADE
TO THE RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
RECEIPT OF JUDGMENT AWARD SIGNED BY THE
RESPONDENT
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
INVOKING THE RULING OF CAREER V. MADJUS
Petitioner argues that it clearly filed its petition for
certiorari within the 60-day reglementary period and, thus,
the NLRC resolutions could not have attained finality. Citing
Delima v. Gois,8 petitioner avers that the NLRC cannot
declare that a decision has become final and executory
because the period to file the petition has not yet expired.
Petitioner, thus, contends that the finality of the NLRC
judgment did not render the petition moot and academic
because such is null and void ab initio.
Petitioner also argues that the Receipt of the Judgment
Award with Undertaking, which was never refuted by
respondent, clearly stated that the payment of the judgment
award was without prejudice to its right to file a petition for
certiorari with the CA. Petitioner asserts that the case relied
upon by the CA, Career Philippines, is not applicable as it is
not on all fours with this case. Instead, it asserts that the
applicable case should be Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v.
Villamater,9 where it was held that the satisfaction of the
monetary award by the employer does not render the
petition for certiorari moot before the CA.
On the other hand, respondent reiterates the CA ruling,
asserting that the voluntary satisfaction by petitioner of the
full judgment award rendered the case moot, and insists
that it was a clear indication that it had already been
persuaded by the judiciousness and merits of the award for
disability compensation. He also avers that this petition is
merely pro-forma as it is a reiteration of petitioner’s
previous issues and arguments already resolved by the CA.
The Court’s Ruling
Petition for Certiorari, Not Moot
Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides that decisions, resolutions or orders of the NLRC
shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof by the parties, and entry of
judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said
period.10 In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,11 however, it
was ruled that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC may
be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and under Section 4 thereof,
petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from notice of the
assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition.
Hence, in cases where a petition for certiorari is filed after
the expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC
Rules of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant the petition and
modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the
NLRC.
Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari
was not filed within the 10-day period, petitioner timely
filed it before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period
under Rule 65. It has, thus, been held that the CA’s review of
the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under Rule 65,
particularly those which have already been executed, does
not affect their statutory finality, considering that Section
4,12 Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides
that a petition for certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay
the execution of the assailed decision unless a restraining
order is issued. In Leonis Navigation, it was further written:
The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it
finds that the NLRC, in its assailed decision or resolution,
committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously,
whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is
material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot
make this determination without looking into the evidence
of the parties. Necessarily, the appellate court can only
evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence,
which is alleged to have been capriciously, whimsically, or
arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all other
evidence on record.13 Notably, if the CA grants the petition
and nullifies the decision or resolution of the NLRC on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC
is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab initio; hence, the
decision or resolution never became final and executory.14
Career Philippines not applicable
In Career Philippines, believing that the execution of the LA
Decision was imminent after its petition for injunctive relief
was denied, the employer filed before the LA a pleading
embodying a conditional satisfaction of judgment before the
CA and, accordingly, paid the employee the monetary award
in the LA decision. In the said pleading, the employer stated
that the conditional satisfaction of the judgment award was
without prejudice to its pending appeal before the CA and
that it was being made only to prevent the imminent
execution.15
The CA later dismissed the employer’s petition for being
moot and academic, noting that the decision of the LA had
attained finality with the satisfaction of the judgment
award. This Court affirmed the ruling of the CA, interpreting
the "conditional settlement" to be tantamount to an
amicable settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of
the petition for certiorari, considering (i) that the employee
could no longer pursue other claims,16 and (ii) that the
employer could not have been compelled to immediately
pay because it had filed an appeal bond to ensure payment
to the employee.
Stated differently, the Court ruled against the employer
because the conditional satisfaction of judgment signed by
the parties was highly prejudicial to the employee. The
agreement stated that the payment of the monetary award
was without prejudice to the right of the employer to file a
petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee
agreed that she would no longer file any complaint or
prosecute any suit of action against the employer after
receiving the payment.
In contrast, in Leonis Navigation, after the NLRC resolution
awarding disability benefits became final and executory, the
employer paid the monetary award to the employee. The CA
dismissed the employer’s petition for certiorari, ruling that
the final and executory decisions or resolutions of the NLRC
rendered appeals to superior courts moot and academic.
This Court disagreed with the CA and held that final and
executed decisions of the NLRC did not prevent the CA from
reviewing the same under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It
was further ruled that the employee was estopped from
claiming that the case was closed and terminated,
considering that the employee’s Acknowledgment Receipt
stated that such was without prejudice to the final outcome
of the petition for certiorari pending before the CA.
In the present case, the Receipt of the Judgment Award with
Undertaking was fair to both the employer and the
employee. As in Leonis Navigation, the said agreement
stipulated that respondent should return the amount to
petitioner if the petition for certiorari would be granted but
without prejudice to respondent’s right to appeal. The
agreement, thus, provided available remedies to both
parties.
It is clear that petitioner paid respondent subject to the
terms and conditions stated in the Receipt of the Judgment
Award with Undertaking.17 Both parties signed the
agreement. Respondent neither refuted the agreement nor
claimed that he was forced to sign it against his will.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was not rendered moot
despite petitioner’s satisfaction of the judgment award, as
the respondent had obliged himself to return the payment
if the petition would be granted.
Return of Excess Payment
As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and
represented a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the
parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a
change of mind.18 Respondent agreed to the stipulation that
he would return the amount paid to him in the event that
the petition for certiorari would be granted. Since the
petition was indeed granted by the CA, albeit partially,
respondent must comply with the condition to return the
excess amount.
The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award
with Undertaking was a fair and binding agreement. It was
executed by the parties subject to outcome of the petition.
To allow now respondent to retain the excess money
judgment would amount to his unjust enrichment to the
prejudice of petitioner.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect
of failure to make remuneration of or for property or
benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal
or equitable obligation to account for them. To be entitled
to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory
of reconveyance. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.19 There is unjust
enrichment when:
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and
2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another.20
In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent
US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference plus
attorney’s fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to the writ of
execution. The June 29, 2011 CA Decision, however,
modified the final resolution of the NLRC and awarded only
US$60,000.00 to respondent.1âwphi1 If allowed to return
the excess, the respondent would have been unjustly
benefited to the prejudice and expense of petitioner.
Petitioner's claim of excess payment is further buttressed
by, and in line with, Section 14, Rule XI of the 20 II NLRC
Rules of Procedure which provides:
EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT. – Where
the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or
annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the
Labor Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such orders of
restitution of the executed award, except wages paid during
reinstatement pending appeal. [Emphases supplied]
Although the Court has, more often than not, been inclined
towards the plight of the workers and has upheld their
cause in their conflicts with the employers, such inclination
has not blinded it to the rule that justice is in every case for
the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and applicable law and doctrine.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Resolutions, dated January 5, 2012 and July 20,
2012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Leandro Legaspi is ORDERED to return the excess amount
of payment in the sum of
US$29,452.00 to petitioner Philippine Transmarine
Carriers, Inc. The amount shall earn interest at the rate of
12o/o per annum from the finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 July 23, 2013
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST),
represented herein by its Chairperson and First
Nominee, FRANCISCO G. DATOL, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 206982
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR CITIZENS), represented
by its President and Incumbent Representative in the
House of Representatives, ATTY. GODOFREDO V.
ARQUIZA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions
within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR
CITIZENS) that are now praying for essentially the same
reliefs from this Court.
One group is headed by Godofredo V. Arquiza (Rep.
Arquiza), the organization’s incumbent representative in
the House of Representatives. This group shall be
hereinafter referred to as the Arquiza Group. The other
group is led by Francisco G. Datol, Jr., the organization’s
erstwhile third nominee. This group shall be hereinafter
referred to as the Datol Group.
G.R. Nos. 206844-45 is the Extremely Very Urgent Petition
for Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO])1 filed
in the name of SENIOR CITIZENS by Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
For brevity, we shall refer to this petition as the Datol
Group’s petition.
G.R. No. 206982 is the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari
(With Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction)2 filed on behalf of SENIOR
CITIZENS by Rep. Arquiza. We shall refer to this as the
Arquiza Group’s petition.
The above petitions were filed pursuant to Rule 643 in
relation to Rule 654 of the Rules of Court, both assailing the
Omnibus Resolution5 dated May 10, 2013 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPP No.
12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM). Said Resolution
disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS from participating in the May
13, 2013 elections and ordered the cancellation of its
registration and accreditation as a party-list organization.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On March 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc accredited
SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list organization in a
Resolution6 issued on even date in SPP No. 06-026 (PL).
SENIOR CITIZENS participated in the May 14, 2007
elections. However, the organization failed to get the
required two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast.7 Thereafter, SENIOR CITIZENS was granted leave to
intervene in the case of Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission
on Elections.8 In accordance with the procedure set forth in
BANAT for the allocation of additional seats under the
party-list system, SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat
in Congress. Rep. Arquiza, then the organization’s first
nominee, served as a member of the House of
Representatives.
Subsequently, SENIOR CITIZENS was allowed to participate
in the May 10, 2010 elections.
On May 5, 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed
an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, the relevant
terms of which we quote:
IRREVOCABLE COVENANT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENT
We, in representation of our respective personal capacity,
hereby covenant and agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
PARTIES AND PERSONS
1. ATTY. GODOFREDO V. ARQUIZA, of legal
age, married, Filipino, and residing at 1881
C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila, and
representing the Senior Citizens Party-list
in my capacity as President with our
General Headquarters at Room 404 West
Trade Center, 132 West Avenue,
hereinafter referred to as the FIRST
PARTY;
2. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, of legal age,
married, Filipino, and residing at 35
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, hereinafter
referred to as the SECOND PARTY;
3. FRANCISCO G. DATOL, JR., of legal age,
married, Filipino, and residing at North
Olympus Blk., 3, Lot 15 Ph4 Grieg St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City, hereinafter
referred to as the THIRD PARTY;
 4. REMEDIOS D. ARQUIZA, of legal age,
married, Filipino, and residing at 1881
C.M. Recto Avenue, Sampaloc, Manila,
hereinafter referred to as the FOURTH
PARTY;
5. LINDA GADDI DAVID, of legal age,
married, Filipino, and residing at 150 Don
Francisco, St. Francis Vil., San Fernando,
Pampanga City (sic) hereinafter referred
to as the FIFTH PARTY;
xxxx
ARTICLE III
THE LIST OF CANDIDATES
We agree that official candidates of the SENIOR CITIZENS
PARTY-LIST and in the following order shall be:
ARTICLE IV
SHARING OF POWER
The Nominees agreed and pledged on their legal and
personal honor and interest as well as the legal privileges
and rights of the respective party-list offices, under the
following circumstances and events:
ELECTION RESULTS
Where only ONE (1) candidate qualifies and is proclaimed,
then No. 1 shall assume the Office of Party-list
Representative in CONGRESS from July 1, 2010 to June 30,
2012 and shall relinquish his seat in Congress by the proper
and legal acts and No. 2 shall assume said seat from July 1,
2012 to June 30, 2013;
In the event TWO (2) candidates qualify and are proclaimed,
then, No. 1 shall serve for three (3) years, and No. 2 and No.
3 will each serve for one-and-a-half years.
In the event THREE (3) candidates qualify and are
proclaimed, then No. 1 shall serve for three years; No. 2 will
serve for two (2) years and afterwards shall relinquish the
second seat to No. 4 nominee, who will then serve for one
(1) year; No. 3 will occupy the third seat for two (2) years
and afterwards shall relinquish said seat on the third year
to Nominee 5, who will serve for the remaining one (1) year.
SHARING OF RIGHTS
BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES
That serving incumbent Congress Representative in the
event one or more is elected and qualified shall observe
proper sharing of certain benefits by virtue of his position
as such, to include among others, appointment of persons in
his office, projects which may redound to the benefits and
privileges that may be possible under the law.
The above mentioned parties shall oversee the
implementation of this COVENANT.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their
hands this MAY 05 2010 in QUEZON CITY.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR
CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates
and was allocated two seats in the House of
Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its
second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
The split among the ranks of SENIOR CITIZENS came about
not long after. According to the Datol Group’s petition, the
members of SENIOR CITIZENS held a national convention
on November 27, 2010 in order to address "the unfulfilled
commitment of Rep. Arquiza to his constituents."10 Further,
a new set of officers and members of the Board of Trustees
of the organization were allegedly elected during the said
convention. SENIOR CITIZENS’ third nominee, Francisco G.
Datol, Jr., was supposedly elected as the organization’s
Chairman. Thereafter, on November 30, 2010, in an
opposite turn of events, Datol was expelled from SENIOR
CITIZENS by the Board of Trustees that were allied with
Rep. Arquiza.11
Thenceforth, the two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS had been
engaged in a bitter rivalry as both groups, with their own
sets of officers, claimed leadership of the organization.
The Resignation of Rep. Kho
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of
COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. in a letter12 dated
December 8, 2011 that the second nominee of SENIOR
CITIZENS, Rep. Kho, had tendered his resignation, which
was to take effect on December 31, 2011. The fourth
nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza, was to assume the vacant
position in view of the previous expulsion from the
organization of the third nominee, Francisco G. Datol, Jr.
The letter of Rep. Arquiza was also accompanied by a
petition13 dated December 14, 2011 in the name of SENIOR
CITIZENS. The petition prayed that the "confirmation and
approval of the replacement of Congressman David L. Kho,
in the person of the fourth nominee, Remedios D. Arquiza,
due to the expulsion of the third nominee, Francisco G.
Datol, Jr., be issued immediately in order to pave the way of
her assumption into the office."14 Before the COMELEC, the
petition was docketed as E.M. No. 12-040.
Attached to the petition was the resignation letter15 of Rep.
Kho, which was addressed to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The letter stated thus:
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER
House of Representatives
Congress
Republic of the Philippines February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof
Quezon City provided that:

Sir: SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. Filing of vacancy as a

I am hereby tendering my irrevocable resignation as
Representative of the Senior Citizens Party-list in the House
of Representatives, effective December 31, 2011 in the
event that only two (2) seats are won by our party-list
group; and will resign on June 30, 2012 in case three seats
are won.
result of term sharing agreement among nominees of
winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be
allowed.
On March 12, 2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR
CITIZENS that were allied with Rep. Arquiza issued Board
Resolution No. 003-2012, which pertinently stated thus:

As a consequence thereof, the Coalition of Associations of BOARD RESOLUTION NO. 003-2012

Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. shall nominate my Series of 2012
successor pursuant to law and Rules on the matter.
A RESOLUTION RECALLING THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE
Please accept my esteem and respect. BOARD IN RESOLUTION NO. 11-0012 OF THE
RESIGNATION OF CONGRESSMAN DAVID L. KHO AND
Truly yours, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE REPRESENTING THE
SENIOR CITIZENS PARTY-LIST IN THE HOUSE OF
(Signed) REPRESENTATIVES, ALLOWING HIM TO CONTINUE HIS
Rep. David L. Kho TERM AND IMPOSING CERTAIN CONDITIONS ON HIM TO
Party-list Congressman BE PERFORMED WITH THE COALITION;

Copy furnished: WHEREAS, the second nominee, Congressman David L. Kho,

The Board of Trustees tendered his resignation as representative of the Senior
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Citizens Party-list effective December 31, 2011, x x x;
Philippines, Inc.16
WHEREAS, the said resignation was accepted by the Board
According to the Datol Group, Rep. Kho submitted to them a of Trustees in a resolution signed unanimously, in view of
letter dated December 31, 2011, notifying them of his the nature of his resignation, and in view of his
resignation in this wise: determination to resign and return to private life, x x x;

December 31, 2011 WHEREAS, after much deliberation and consultation, the
said nominee changed his mind and requested the Board of
Trustees to reconsider the acceptance, for he also
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF reconsidered his resignation, and requested to continue his
SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILS., INC. term;
Rm. 405, 4th Floor, WTC Building
132 West Avenue, Quezon City
WHEREAS, in consideration of all factors affecting the
party-list and in view of the forthcoming elections, the
Gentlemen/Ladies: Board opted to reconsider the acceptance, recall the same,
and allow Cong. David L. Kho to continue his term;
It is with deepest regret that I inform this esteemed
organization of my decision to resign as the party-list WHEREAS, the Coalition, in recalling the acceptance of the
nominee for the House of Representatives this 15th Board, is however imposing certain conditions on Cong. Kho
Congress for personal reason already conveyed to you. to be performed;

Thank you for the opportunity to serve the Senior Citizens NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY
of our dear country. RESOLVED to recall the acceptance of the resignation of
Congressman David L. Kho in view of his request and change
Very truly yours, of mind, hence allow him to continue his term subject to
conditions stated above.19
(Signed)
DAVID L. KHO17 Thereafter, on April 18, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc
conducted a hearing on SENIOR CITIZENS’ petition in E.M.
In the interim, during the pendency of E.M. No. 12-040, No. 12-040. At the hearing, the counsel for SENIOR
COMELEC Resolution No. 936618 was promulgated on CITIZENS (Arquiza Group) admitted that Rep. Kho’s tender
of resignation was made pursuant to the agreement entered
into by the organization’s nominees.20 However, said
counsel also stated that the Board of Trustees of the
organization reconsidered the acceptance of Rep. Kho’s
resignation and the latter was, instead, to complete his
term.21 Also, from the transcript of the hearing, it appears
that the Arquiza Group previously manifested that it was
withdrawing its petition, but the same was opposed by the
Datol Group and was not acted upon by the COMELEC.22
On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution23 in E.M. No. 12-040, dismissing the petition of
the SENIOR CITIZENS (Arquiza Group). The pertinent
portions of the Resolution stated, thus:
First, resignation of Kho,
pursuant to the party nominees’
term-sharing agreement, cannot
be recognized and be given effect
so as to create a vacancy in the
list and change the order of the
nominees.
Under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7941, the withdrawal in
writing of the nominee of his nomination is one of the three
(3) exemptions to the rule that "no change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after
the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC." While
we can consider the resignation of Rep. Kho as akin to the
withdrawal of his own nomination, we are constrained
however NOT to recognize such resignation but only in so
far as to change the order of petitioner’s nominees as
submitted to the Commission.
xxxx
Considering that it is an admitted fact that the resignation
of Rep. Kho was made by virtue of a prior agreement of the
parties, we resolve and hereby rule that we cannot
recognize such arrangement and accordingly we cannot
approve the movement in the order of nominees for being
contrary to public policy. The term of office of public
officials cannot be made subject to any agreement of private
parties. Public office is not a commodity that can be shared,
apportioned or be made subject of any private agreement.
Public office is vested with public interest that should not
be reined by individual interest.
In fact, to formalize the policy of disallowing term sharing
agreements among party list nominees, the Commission
recently promulgated Resolution No. 9366, which provides:
"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. – Filing of vacancy as a
result of term sharing agreement among nominees of
winning party-list groups/organizations shall not be
allowed."
Considering all these, we find the term sharing agreement
by the nominees of the Senior Citizen’s Party-List null and
void. Any action committed by the parties in pursuit of such
term-sharing arrangement—including the resignation of
Congressman David Kho—cannot be recognized and be
given effect. Thus, in so far as this Commission is concerned,
no vacancy was created by the resignation of Rep. Kho and
there can be no change in the list and order of nominees of
the petitioner party-list.
Second, the expulsion of Datol –
even if proven true – has no effect
in the list and in the order of
nominees, thus Remedios Arquiza
(the fourth nominee) cannot be
elevated as the third nominee.
xxxx
It must be noted that the list and order of nominees, after
submission to this Commission, is meant to be permanent.
The legislature in crafting Republic Act No. 7941 clearly
deprived the party-list organization of the right to change
its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list
is submitted to the COMELEC, except for three (3)
enumerated instances such as when: (a) the nominee dies;
(b) the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c)
the nominee becomes incapacitated.
xxxx
Thus, even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-
list were true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior
Citizen’s party-list remains the same in so far as we are
concerned as it does not fall under one of the three grounds
mentioned above. Neither does it have an automatic effect
on the organization’s representative in the House of
Representatives, for once a party-list nominee is "elected"
into office and becomes a member of the House, he is
treated similarly and equally with the regular district
representatives. As such, they can only be expelled or
suspended upon the concurrence of the two-thirds of all its
Members and never by mere expulsion of a party-list
organization.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, there being no vacancy in the list of nominees
of the petitioner organization, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The list and order of nominees
of petitioner hereby remains the same as it was submitted
to us there being no legally recognizable ground to cause
any changes thereat.24 (Citation omitted.)
The Datol Group filed A Very Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration25 of the above resolution, but the same
remained unresolved.
The Review of SENIOR CITIZENS’ Registration
Meanwhile, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group filed
their respective Manifestations of Intent to Participate in
the Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections under the name of SENIOR CITIZENS.26 The
Manifestation of the Datol Group was docketed as SPP
No. 12-157 (PLM), while that of the Arquiza Group was
docketed as SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9513,27 which, inter alia, set for summary evidentiary
hearings by the COMELEC En Banc the review of the
registration of existing party-list organizations, which have
filed their Manifestations of Intent to Participate in the
Party-list System of Representation in the May 13, 2013
Elections.
The two factions of SENIOR CITIZENS appeared before the
COMELEC En Banc on August 24, 2012 and they both
submitted their respective evidence, which established
their continuing compliance with the requirements of
accreditation as a party-list organization.28
On December 4, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution29 in SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM).
By a vote of 4-3, the COMELEC En Banc ordered the
cancellation of the registration of SENIOR CITIZENS. The
resolution explained that:
It shall be recalled that on June 27, 2012, this Commission
promulgated its resolution in a petition that involved
SENIOR CITIZENS titled "In Re: Petition for Confirmation of
Replacement of Resigned PartyList Nominee" and docketed
as EM No. 12-040. In the process of resolving the issues of
said case, this Commission found that SENIOR CITIZENS
nominees specifically nominees David L. Kho and Francisco
G. Datol, Jr. have entered into a term-sharing agreement. x x
x.
Nominee David Kho’s term as party-list congressman is
three (3) years which starts on June 30, 2010 and to end on
June 30, 2013 as directed no less than by the Constitution of
the Philippines. Section 7, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution states:
"Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall
be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election."
But following the term-sharing agreement entered into by
SENIOR CITIZENS, David Kho’s term starts on June 30, 2010
and ends on December 31, 2011, the date of effectivity of
Kho’s resignation. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement,
the term of Kho as member of the House of Representatives
is cut short to one year and six months which is merely half
of the three-year term. This is totally opposed to the
prescription of the Constitution on the term of a Member of
the House of Representatives. Hence, when confronted with
this issue on term sharing done by SENIOR CITIZENS, this
Commission made a categorical pronouncement that such
term-sharing agreement must be rejected.
xxxx
From the foregoing, SENIOR CITIZENS failed to comply with
Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 7,
Rule 4 of Comelec Resolution No. 9366. This failure is a
ground for cancellation of registration under Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 7941 which states:
"Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. –
The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified
complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional
or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to CANCEL the
registration of Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines (SENIOR CITIZENS) under the Party-List
System of Representation.
The rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS challenged the above
resolution before this Court by filing their respective
petitions for certiorari. The petition filed by the Datol Group
was docketed as G.R. No. 204421, while the petition of the
Arquiza Group was docketed as G.R. No. 204425.
On December 11, 2012, the Court initially granted status
quo ante orders on said petitions, directing the COMELEC to
include the name of SENIOR CITIZENS in the printing of
official ballots for the May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
Eventually, both petitions were consolidated with the
petition in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,
which was docketed as G.R. No. 203766.
On April 2, 2013, the Court promulgated its Decision in
Atong Paglaum, which ordered the remand to the COMELEC
of the petitions that have been granted mandatory
injunctions to include the names of the petitioners in the
printing of ballots. Following the parameters set forth in the
Court’s Decision, the COMELEC was to determine whether
said petitioners, which included the two factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS, were qualified to register under the party-list
system and to participate in the May 13, 2013 elections. For
this purpose, the Court stated that the COMELEC may
conduct summary evidentiary hearings.
Thereafter, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc
rendered the assailed Omnibus Resolution in SPP Nos. 12-
157 (PLM) and 12-191 (PLM), ruling in this wise:
Guided by these six new parameters [enunciated by the
Court in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections], as
well as the provisions of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
7941 ("R.A. No. 7941") or the Party-List System Act, and
other pertinent election laws, and after a careful and
exhaustive reevaluation of the documents submitted by the
petitioners per their compliance with Resolution No. 9513
("Res. No. 9513"), the Commission En Banc RESOLVES as
follows:
I. SPP Nos. 12-157 (PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) – SENIOR
CITIZENS
To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and to
CANCEL the registration and accreditation, of petitioner
Senior Citizens, for violating laws, rules, and regulations
relating to elections pursuant to Section 6 (5) of R.A. No.
7941.
The Commission En Banc finds no cogent reason to reverse
its earlier finding in the Resolution for SPP Nos. 12-157
(PLM) & 12-191 (PLM) promulgated on 04 December 2012,
in relation to the Resolution for E.M. No. 12-040
promulgated on 27 June 2012. The sole ground for which
the petitioner Senior Citizens was disqualified was because
of the term-sharing agreement between its nominees,
which the Commission En Banc found to be contrary to
public policy. It will be noted that this ground is
independent of the six parameters in Atong Paglaum, and
there is nothing in the doctrine enunciated in that case
which will absolve the petitioner Senior Citizen of what, to
the Commission En Banc, is a clear bastardization of the
term of office fixed by Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution as implemented by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7941,
which expressly provides that Members of the House of
Representatives, including party-list representatives, shall
be elected for a term of three years. A term, in the legal
sense, is a fixed and definite period of time during which an
officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, a fixed
interval after which the several incumbents succeed one
another. Thus, service of the term is for the entire period; it
cannot be broken down to accommodate those who are not
entitled to hold the office.
That the term-sharing agreement was made in 2010, while
the expression of the policy prohibiting it was promulgated
only in 2012 via Section 7, Rule 4 of Resolution No. 9366
("Res. No. 9366"), is of no moment. As it was in 2010 as it is
now, as it was in 1987 when the Constitution was ratified
and as it was in 1995 when R.A. No. 7941 was enacted into
law, the agreement was and is contrary to public policy
because it subjects a Constitutionally-ordained fixed term
to hold public elective office to contractual bargaining and
negotiation, and treats the same as though it were nothing
more than a contractual clause, an object in the ordinary
course of the commerce of men. To accept this defense will
not only open the floodgates to unscrupulous individuals,
but more importantly it will render inutile Section 16 of R.A.
No. 7941 which prescribes the procedure to be taken to fill
a vacancy in the available seats for a party-list group or
organization. For this mistake, the petitioner Senior Citizens
cannot hide behind the veil of corporate fiction because the
corporate veil can be pierced if necessary to achieve the
ends of justice or equity, such as when it is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, or protect fraud. It
further cannot invoke the prohibition in the enactment of ex
post facto laws under Section 22, Article III of the
Constitution because the guarantee only the retrospectivity
of penal laws and definitely, Reso. No. 9366 is not penal in
character.
From the foregoing, the cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of the petitioner Senior Citizens is therefore in
order, and consequently, the two Manifestations of Intent to
Participate filed with the Commission should be denied.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Commission En Banc RESOLVES:
A. To DENY the Manifestations of Intent to Participate, and
CANCEL the registration and accreditation, of the following
parties, groups, or organizations:
(1) SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) & SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) –
Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc.;
xxxx
Accordingly, the foregoing shall be REMOVED from the
registry of party-list groups and organizations of the
Commission, and shall NOT BE ALLOWED to PARTICIPATE
as a candidate for the Party-List System of Representation
for the 13 May 2013 Elections and subsequent elections
thereafter.30 (Citations omitted.)
On May 13, 2013, the elections proceeded. Despite the
earlier declaration of its disqualification, SENIOR CITIZENS
still obtained 677,642 votes.
Questioning the cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS’
registration and its disqualification to participate in the May
13, 2013 elections, the Datol Group and the Arquiza Group
filed the instant petitions.
On May 15, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Very2 Urgent
Motion to Reiterate Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order,31 alleging that the
COMELEC had ordered the stoppage of the counting of votes
of the disqualified party-list groups. The Datol Group urged
the Court to issue a TRO and/or a status quo ante order
during the pendency of its petition.
Meanwhile, on May 24, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued
a Resolution,32 which considered as final and executory its
May 10, 2013 Resolution that cancelled the registration of
SENIOR CITIZENS. On even date, the COMELEC En Banc,
sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC),
promulgated NBOC Resolution No. 0006-13,33 proclaiming
fourteen (14) party-list organizations as initial winners in
the party-list elections of May 13, 2013.
The Arquiza Group filed on May 27, 2013 a Supplement to
the "Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari,"34 also reiterating
its application for a TROand a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On May 28, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued NBOC
Resolution No. 0008-13,35 which partially proclaimed the
winning party-list organizations that filled up a total of fifty-
three (53) out of the available fifty-eight (58) seats for
party-list organizations.
On May 29, 2013, the Chief Justice issued a TRO,36 which
ordered the COMELEC to submit a Comment on the instant
petitions and to cease and desist from further proclaiming
the winners from among the party-list candidates in the
May 13, 2013 elections.
On June 3, 2013, the Datol Group filed a Most Urgent Motion
for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to Proclaim
Petitioner Pendente Lite.37
In a Resolution38 dated June 5, 2013, the Court issued an
order, which directed the COMELEC to refrain from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May
10, 2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM), insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS was concerned and to
observe the status quo ante before the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC resolution. The Court likewise ordered
the COMELEC to reserve the seat(s) intended for SENIOR
CITIZENS, in accordance with the number of votes it
garnered in the May 13, 2013 Elections. The Court,
however, directed the COMELEC to hold in abeyance the
proclamation insofar as SENIOR CITIZENS is concerned
until the instant petitions are decided. The Most Urgent
Motion for Issuance of an Order Directing Respondent to
Proclaim Petitioner Pendente Lite filed by the Datol Group
was denied for lack of merit.
On June 7, 2013, the COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Comment39 on the instant
petitions. In a Resolution40 dated June 10, 2013, the Court
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
On June 19, 2013, the Arquiza Group filed its Reply41 to the
Comment of the COMELEC. Subsequently, the Datol Group
and the Arquiza Group filed their separate
memoranda.42 On the other hand, the OSG manifested43 that
it was adopting its Comment as its memorandum in the
instant case.
THE ISSUES
The Datol Group’s memorandum raised the following issues
for our consideration:
IV. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
4.1
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ADDED ANOTHER
GROUND (VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY) FOR
CANCELLATION OF REGISTRATION OF A PARTY–LIST
GROUP AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 6, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7941.
4.2
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CANCELLED
PETITIONER’S CERTIFICATE OF
REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
4.3
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT
PETITIONER VIOLATED PUBLIC POLICY ON TERM
SHARING.
4.4
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE
AUTOMATIC REVIEW BY THE EN BANC OF THE
REGISTRATION/ACCREDITATION GRANTED BY ITS
DIVISION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION THAT THE EN BANC CAN ONLY REVIEW
DECISIONS OF THE DIVISION UPON FILING OF A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION.44 (Citation omitted.)
Upon the other hand, the memorandum of the Arquiza
Group brought forward the following arguments:
4.1. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC
RESOLUTION of MAY 10, 2013 is invalid for being
contrary to law and having been issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The Comelec En Banc Resolution of
May 10, 2013 was issued pursuant to the
directive of the Supreme Court in Atong
Paglaum. Therefore, the SUBSIDIARY
ISSUES arising therefrom are:
 a. Are there guidelines prescribed
in Atong Paglaum to be followed
by respondent Comelec in
determining which partylist
groups are qualified to participate
in party-list elections?
b. If there are these guidelines to
be followed, were these adhered
to by respondent Comelec?
(2) Is the ground -- the Term-Sharing
Agreement between Senior Citizens
nominees -- a legal ground to cancel Senior
Citizens’ Certificate of Registration?
4.2. Whether or not COMELEC EN BANC
RESOLUTION of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being
contrary to law and having been issued without or
in excess of jurisdiction or in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Has the Comelec En Banc Resolution of
May 20, 2013, in fact, become final and
executory?
4.3. Whether or not NATIONAL BOARD of
CANVASSERS’ (NBOC) RESOLUTION No. 0006-13
of MAY 24, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to law
and having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast
which was made as the basis thereof
correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula
prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been
followed?
4.4. Whether or not NBOC RESOLUTION No. 0008-
13 of MAY 28, 2013 is invalid for being contrary to
law and having been issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
(1) The SUBSIDIARY ISSUES are identical with
those of Issue No. 4.3, namely:
a. Is the factual basis thereof valid?
b. Is the total of the party-list votes cast
which was made as the basis thereof
correct?
c. Has the Justice Carpio Formula
prescribed in Banat vs. Comelec been
followed?
4.5. What is the cardinal rule in interpreting
laws/rules on qualifications and disqualifications
of the candidates after the election where they have
received the winning number of votes?
4.6. May the COMELEC En Banc Resolutions of May
10 and 24, 2013 and NBOC Resolutions of May 24
and 28, 2013 be annulled and set aside?45
THE COURT’S RULING
After reviewing the parties’ pleadings, as well as the various
resolutions attached thereto, we find merit in the
petitioners’ contentions.1âwphi1
SENIOR CITIZENS’ Right to Due Process
First, we shall dispose of the procedural issue. In their
petitions, the two rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS are
actually one in asserting that the organization’s
disqualification and cancellation of its registration and
accreditation were effected in violation of its right to due
process.
The Arquiza Group argues that no notice and hearing were
given to SENIOR CITIZENS for the cancellation of its
registration on account of the term-sharing agreement of its
nominees. The Arquiza Group maintains that SENIOR
CITIZENS was summoned only to a single hearing date in
the afternoon of August 24, 2012 and the COMELEC’s
review therein focused on the group’s programs,
accomplishments, and other related matters. The Arquiza
Group asserts that SENIOR CITIZENS was not advised,
before or during the hearing, that the issue of the term-
sharing agreement would constitute a basis for the review
of its registration and accreditation.
Likewise, the Datol Group faults the COMELEC for
cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS without giving the latter the opportunity to show
that it complied with the parameters laid down in Atong
Paglaum. The Arquiza Group confirms that after the
promulgation of Atong Paglaum, the COMELEC conducted
summary hearings in executive sessions, without informing
SENIOR CITIZENS. The Arquiza Group says that it filed a
"Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For Hearing Or To Be
Included In The Hearing Set On Thursday, May 9, 2013," but
its counsel found that SENIOR CITIZENS was not included
in the hearings wherein other party-list groups were heard
by the COMELEC. The Arquiza Group subsequently filed on
May 10, 2013 a "2nd Very Urgent Motion To Set Case For
Public Hearing," but the same was also not acted upon. The
Arquiza Group alleges that it only found out after the
elections that the assailed May 10, 2013 Omnibus
Resolution was issued and the Arquiza Group was not
actually served a copy thereof.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 794146 provides for the
procedure relative to the review of the registration of party-
list organizations, to wit:
SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. – The
COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of
any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination,
organization or association organized for religious
purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek
its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign
government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its
officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or
regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2)
preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-
list system in the two (2) preceding elections for
the constituency in which it has registered.
Unquestionably, the twin requirements of due notice and
hearing are indispensable before the COMELEC may
properly order the cancellation of the registration and
accreditation of a party-list organization. In connection with
this, the Court lengthily discussed in Mendoza v.
Commission on Elections47 the concept of due process as
applied to the COMELEC. We emphasized therein that:
The appropriate due process standards that apply to the
COMELEC, as an administrative or quasi-judicial tribunal,
are those outlined in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations, quoted below:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing,
which includes the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. x x x.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity
to present his case and to adduce evidence tending
to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose
the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support its decision. A
decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity, a place when directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence
must be "substantial." "Substantial evidence is
more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its
judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons
for the decisions rendered. The performance of this
duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
These are now commonly referred to as cardinal primary
rights in administrative proceedings.
The first of the enumerated rights pertain to the substantive
rights of a party at hearing stage of the proceedings. The
essence of this aspect of due process, we have consistently
held, is simply the opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial-type
hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential; in
the case of COMELEC, Rule 17 of its Rules of Procedure
defines the requirements for a hearing and these serve as
the standards in the determination of the presence or denial
of due process.
The second, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth aspects of the Ang
Tibay requirements are reinforcements of the right to a
hearing and are the inviolable rights applicable at the
deliberative stage, as the decision-maker decides on the
evidence presented during the hearing. These standards set
forth the guiding considerations in deliberating on the case
and are the material and substantial components of
decision-making. Briefly, the tribunal must consider the
totality of the evidence presented which must all be found
in the records of the case (i.e., those presented or submitted
by the parties); the conclusion, reached by the decision-
maker himself and not by a subordinate, must be based on
substantial evidence.
Finally, the last requirement, relating to the form and
substance of the decision of a quasi-judicial body, further
complements the hearing and decision-making due process
rights and is similar in substance to the constitutional
requirement that a decision of a court must state distinctly
the facts and the law upon which it is based. As a component
of the rule of fairness that underlies due process, this is the
"duty to give reason" to enable the affected person to
understand how the rule of fairness has been administered
in his case, to expose the reason to public scrutiny and
criticism, and to ensure that the decision will be thought
through by the decision-maker. (Emphases ours, citations
omitted.)
In the instant case, the review of the registration of SENIOR
CITIZENS was made pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No.
9513 through a summary evidentiary hearing carried out
on August 24, 2012 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No.
12-191 (PLM). In this hearing, both the Arquiza Group and
the Datol Group were indeed given the opportunity to
adduce evidence as to their continuing compliance with the
requirements for party-list accreditation. Nevertheless, the
due process violation was committed when they were not
apprised of the fact that the term-sharing agreement
entered into by the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS in 2010
would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the
organization’s qualifications as a party-list group for the
May 13, 2013 elections. As it were, both factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS were not able to answer this issue squarely. In
other words, they were deprived of the opportunity to
adequately explain their side regarding the term-sharing
agreement and/or to adduce evidence, accordingly, in
support of their position.
In its Comment48 to the petitions, the COMELEC countered
that petitioners were actually given the opportunity to
present their side on the issue of the term-sharing
agreement during the hearing on April 18, 2012.49 Said
hearing was allegedly conducted to determine petitioners’
continuing compliance for accreditation as a party-list
organization.
The Court is not persuaded. It is true that during the April
18, 2012 hearing, the rival groups of SENIOR CITIZENS
admitted to the existence of the term-sharing agreement.
Contrary to the claim of COMELEC, however, said hearing
was conducted for purposes of discussing the petition of the
Arquiza Group in E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition
asked for the confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho,
who had tendered his resignation effective on December 31,
2011. More specifically, the transcript of the hearing reveals
that the focus thereof was on the petition filed by the
Arquiza group and its subsequent manifestation, praying
that the group be allowed to withdraw its petition. Also,
during the hearing, COMELEC Chairman Brillantes did
admonish the rival factions of SENIOR CITIZENS about their
conflicts and warned them about the complications brought
about by their term-sharing agreement. However, E.M. No.
12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the qualifications of
SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and the issue of
whether the term-sharing agreement may be a ground for
disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in that case.
Chairman Brillantes’s remonstration was not sufficient as to
constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing agreement
would be considered as a ground for the cancellation of
SENIOR CITIZENS’ registration and accreditation.
Furthermore, after the promulgation of Atong Paglaum,
which remanded, among other cases, the disqualification
cases involving SENIOR CITIZENS, said organization should
have still been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the
matter of the term-sharing agreement, either through a
hearing or through written memoranda. This was the
proper recourse considering that the COMELEC was about
to arrive at a final determination as to the qualification of
SENIOR CITIZENS. Instead, the COMELEC issued the May
10, 2013 Omnibus Resolution in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and
SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) without conducting any further
proceedings thereon after its receipt of our Decision in
Atong Paglaum.
The Prohibition on Term-sharing
The second issue both raised by the petitioners herein
constitute the threshold legal issue of the instant cases:
whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued
the assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and
cancelling the registration and accreditation of SENIOR
CITIZENS solely on account of its purported violation of the
prohibition against term-sharing.
The Datol Group argues that the public policy prohibiting
term-sharing was provided for under Section 7, Rule 4 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366, which was promulgated
only on February 21, 2012. Hence, the resolution should not
be made to apply retroactively to the case of SENIOR
CITIZENS as nothing therein provides for its retroactive
effect. When the term-sharing agreement was executed in
2010, the same was not yet expressly proscribed by any law
or resolution.
Furthermore, the Datol Group points out that the mere
execution of the Irrevocable Covenant between the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS for the 2010 elections
should not have been a ground for the cancellation of the
organization’s registration and accreditation because the
nominees never actually implemented the agreement.
In like manner, the Arquiza Group vehemently stresses that
no term-sharing actually transpired between the nominees
of SENIOR CITIZENS. It explained that whatever prior
arrangements were made by the nominees on the term-
sharing agreement, the same did not materialize given that
the resignation of Rep. Kho was disapproved by the Board
of Trustees and the members of SENIOR CITIZENS.
Still, granting for the sake of argument that the term-
sharing agreement was actually implemented, the Arquiza
Group points out that SENIOR CITIZENS still cannot be held
to have violated Section 7 of Resolution No. 9366. The term-
sharing agreement was entered into in 2010 or two years
prior to the promulgation of said resolution on February 21,
2012. Likewise, assuming that the resolution can be applied
retroactively, the Arquiza Group contends that the same
cannot affect SENIOR CITIZENS at it already earned a vested
right in 2010 as party-list organization.
Article 4 of the Civil Code states that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." As held
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Reyes,50 "the
general rule is that statutes are prospective. However,
statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take
away vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against
the retroactive operation of statutes." We also reiterated in
Lintag and Arrastia v. National Power Corporation51 that:
It is a well-entrenched principle that statutes, including
administrative rules and regulations, operate prospectively
unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest by
express terms or by necessary implication because the
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested. This is based on the Latin
maxim: Lex prospicit non respicit (the law looks forward,
not backward). (Citations omitted.)
True, COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 does not provide that
it shall have retroactive effect. Nonetheless, the Court
cannot subscribe to the argument of the Arquiza Group that
SENIOR CITIZENS already earned a vested right to its
registration as a party-list organization.
Montesclaros v. Commission on Elections 52 teaches that "a
public office is not a property right. As the Constitution
expressly states, a ‘Public office is a public trust.’ No one has
a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right
to an expectancy of holding a public office." Under Section
2(5), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC is
entrusted with the function to "register, after sufficient
publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions
which, in addition to other requirements, must present
their platform or program of government." In fulfilling this
function, the COMELEC is duty-bound to review the grant of
registration to parties, organizations, or coalitions already
registered in order to ensure the latter’s continuous
adherence to the requirements prescribed by law and the
relevant rulings of this Court relative to their qualifications
and eligibility to participate in party-list elections.
The Arquiza Group cannot, therefore, object to the
retroactive application of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 on
the ground of the impairment of SENIOR CITIZENS’ vested
right.
Be that as it may, even if COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
expressly provided for its retroactive application, the Court
finds that the COMELEC En Banc indeed erred in cancelling
the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS.
The reason for this is that the ground invoked by the
COMELEC En Banc, i.e., the term-sharing agreement among
the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented.
This fact was manifested by the Arquiza Group even during
the April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En
Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group
manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s replacement.
Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in E.M. No.
12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused to recognize
the term-sharing agreement and the tender of resignation
of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even declared that no vacancy
was created despite the execution of the said agreement.
Subsequently, there was also no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement,
much less succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing
agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the
Datol Group insist on this fact of non-implementation of the
agreement. Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho
continued to hold his seat and served his term as a member
of the House of Representatives, in accordance with
COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the COMELEC En Banc
ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the COMELEC is silent
on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually
implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR
CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly
and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily,
how can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR
CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying
out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an
election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of
its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand
on.
In sum, the due process violations committed in this case
and the lack of a legal ground to disqualify the SENIOR
CITIZENS spell out a finding of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
COMELEC En Banc. We are, thus, left with no choice but to
strike down the assailed Omnibus Resolution dated May 10,
2013 in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM).
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court finds no need
to discuss the other issues raised by the petitioners. In
particular, the dispute between the rival factions of SENIOR
CITIZENS, not being an issue raised here, should be
threshed out in separate proceedings before the proper
tribunal having jurisdiction thereon.
Having established that the COMELEC En Banc erred in
ordering the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation, said
organization is entitled to be proclaimed as one of the
winning party-list organizations in the recently concluded
May 13, 2013 elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for
Certiorari (With Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance
of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante
Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very
Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for
a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) in G.R. No. 206982 are
GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of
the Commission on Elections En Banc in SPP No.
12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191 (PLM) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc. is concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Bane is
ORDERED to PROCLAIM the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,
Inc. as one of the winning party-list organizations
during the May 13, 20 13 elections with the number
of seats it may be entitled to based on the total
number of votes it garnered during the said
elections.
No costs.
G.R. No. 161107 March 12, 2013
HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, in her capacity as
City Mayor of Marikina City, JOSEPHINE C. EVANGELIST
A, in her capacity as Chief, Permit Division, Office of the
City Engineer, and ALFONSO ESPIRITU, in his capacity
as City Engineer of Marikina City, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE and ST. SCHOLASTICA'S
ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC., Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to set aside the
December 1, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 75691.
The Facts
Respondents St. Scholastica’s College (SSC) and St.
Scholastica’s Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina) are
educational institutions organized under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines, with principal offices and
business addresses at Leon Guinto Street, Malate, Manila,
and at West Drive, Marikina Heights, Marikina City,
respectively.2
Respondent SSC is the owner of four (4) parcels of land
measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in
Marikina Heights and covered by Transfer Certificate Title
(TCT) No. 91537. Located within the property are SSA-
Marikina, the residence of the sisters of the Benedictine
Order, the formation house of the novices, and the
retirement house for the elderly sisters. The property is
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty
(30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are
buildings, facilities, and other improvements.3
The petitioners are the officials of the City Government of
Marikina. On September 30, 1994, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Marikina City enacted Ordinance No.
192,4 entitled "Regulating the Construction of Fences and
Walls in the Municipality of Marikina." In 1995 and 1998,
Ordinance Nos. 2175 and 2006 were enacted to amend
Sections 7 and 5, respectively. Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, is reproduced hereunder, as follows:
ORDINANCE No. 192
Series of 1994
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF
FENCES AND WALLS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF MARIKINA
WHEREAS, under Section 447.2 of Republic Act No. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991
empowers the Sangguniang Bayan as the local legislative
body of the municipality to "x x x Prescribe reasonable
limits and restraints on the use of property within the
jurisdiction of the municipality, x x x";
WHEREAS the effort of the municipality to accelerate its
economic and physical development, coupled with
urbanization and modernization, makes imperative the
adoption of an ordinance which shall embody up-to-date
and modern technical design in the construction of fences
of residential, commercial and industrial buildings;
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known
as the National Building Code of the Philippines, does not
adequately provide technical guidelines for the
construction of fences, in terms of design, construction, and
criteria;
WHEREAS, the adoption of such technical standards shall
provide more efficient and effective enforcement of laws on
public safety and security;
WHEREAS, it has occurred in not just a few occasions that
high fences or walls did not actually discourage but, in fact,
even protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless
elements from the view of outsiders once they have gained
ingress into these walls, hence, fences not necessarily
providing security, but becomes itself a "security problem";
WHEREAS, to discourage, suppress or prevent the
concealment of prohibited or unlawful acts earlier
enumerated, and as guardian of the people of Marikina, the
municipal government seeks to enact and implement rules
and ordinances to protect and promote the health, safety
and morals of its constituents;
WHEREAS, consistent too, with the "Clean and Green
Program" of the government, lowering of fences and walls
shall encourage people to plant more trees and ornamental
plants in their yards, and when visible, such trees and
ornamental plants are expected to create an aura of a clean,
green and beautiful environment for Marikeños;
WHEREAS, high fences are unsightly that, in the past, people
planted on sidewalks to "beautify" the façade of their
residences but, however, become hazards and obstructions
to pedestrians;
WHEREAS, high and solid walls as fences are considered
"un-neighborly" preventing community members to easily
communicate and socialize and deemed to create "boxed-
in" mentality among the populace;
WHEREAS, to gather as wide-range of opinions and
comments on this proposal, and as a requirement of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), the
Sangguniang Bayan of Marikina invited presidents or
officers of homeowners associations, and commercial and
industrial establishments in Marikina to two public
hearings held on July 28, 1994 and August 25, 1994;
WHEREAS, the rationale and mechanics of the proposed
ordinance were fully presented to the attendees and no
vehement objection was presented to the municipal
government;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE
SANGGUINANG BAYAN OF MARIKINA IN SESSION DULY
ASSEMBLED:
Section 1. Coverage: This Ordinance regulates the
construction of all fences, walls and gates on lots classified
or used for residential, commercial, industrial, or special
purposes.
Section 2. Definition of Terms:
a. Front Yard – refers to the area of the lot fronting
a street, alley or public thoroughfare.
b. Back Yard – the part of the lot at the rear of the
structure constructed therein.
c. Open fence – type of fence which allows a view of
"thru-see" of the inner yard and the improvements
therein. (Examples: wrought iron, wooden lattice,
cyclone wire)
d. Front gate – refers to the gate which serves as a
passage of persons or vehicles fronting a street,
alley, or public thoroughfare.
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed
under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than
one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1)
meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty
percent (80%) see-thru; and
(2) Fences on the side and back yard – shall be in
accordance with the provisions of P.D. 1096
otherwise known as the National Building Code.
Section 4. No fence of any kind shall be allowed in areas
specifically reserved or classified as parks.
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within
the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments and educational
and religious institutions.7
Section 6. Exemption.
(1) The Ordinance does not cover perimeter walls
of residential subdivisions.
(2) When public safety or public welfare requires,
the Sangguniang Bayan may allow the construction
and/or maintenance of walls higher than as
prescribed herein and shall issue a special permit
or exemption.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. Real property owners
whose existing fences and walls do not conform to the
specifications herein are allowed adequate period of time
from the passage of this Ordinance within which to
conform, as follows:
(1) Residential houses – eight (8) years
(2) Commercial establishments – five (5) years
(3) Industrial establishments – three (3) years
(4) Educational institutions – five (5) years8 (public
and privately owned)
Section 8. Penalty. Walls found not conforming to the
provisions of this Ordinance shall be demolished by the
municipal government at the expense of the owner of the lot
or structure.
Section 9. The Municipal Engineering Office is tasked to
strictly implement this ordinance, including the issuance of
the necessary implementing guidelines, issuance of building
and fencing permits, and demolition of non-conforming
walls at the lapse of the grace period herein provided.
Section 10. Repealing Clause. All existing Ordinances and
Resolutions, Rules and Regulations inconsistent with the
foregoing provisions are hereby repealed, amended or
modified.
Section 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason or reasons,
local executive orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof in conflict with this Ordinance are hereby repealed
and/or modified accordingly.
Section 12. Effectivity. This ordinance takes effect after
publication.
APPROVED: September 30, 1994
(Emphases supplied)
On April 2, 2000, the City Government of Marikina sent a
letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish and
replace the fence of their Marikina property to make it 80%
see-thru, and, at the same time, to move it back about six (6)
meters to provide parking space for vehicles to park.9 On
April 26, 2000, the respondents requested for an extension
of time to comply with the directive.10 In response, the
petitioners, through then City Mayor Bayani F. Fernando,
insisted on the enforcement of the subject ordinance.
Not in conformity, the respondents filed a petition for
prohibition with an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order before the
Regional Trial Court, Marikina, Branch 273 (RTC), docketed
as SCA Case No. 2000-381-MK.11
The respondents argued that the petitioners were acting in
excess of jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192,
asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. That demolishing their fence and
constructing it six (6) meters back would result in the loss
of at least 1,808.34 square meters, worth about
₱9,041,700.00, along West Drive, and at least 1,954.02
square meters, worth roughly ₱9,770,100.00, along East
Drive. It would also result in the destruction of the garbage
house, covered walk, electric house, storage house, comfort
rooms, guards’ room, guards’ post, waiting area for visitors,
waiting area for students, Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area,
and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss
of their beneficial use. The respondents, thus, asserted that
the implementation of the ordinance on their property
would be tantamount to an appropriation of property
without due process of law; and that the petitioners could
only appropriate a portion of their property through
eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the
provisions to deter lawless elements and criminality did not
exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as
sufficient protection for many years.12
The petitioners, on the other hand, countered that the
ordinance was a valid exercise of police power, by virtue of
which, they could restrain property rights for the protection
of public safety, health, morals, or the promotion of public
convenience and general prosperity.13
On June 30, 2000, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining the petitioners from implementing the
demolition of the fence at SSC’s Marikina property.14
Ruling of the RTC
On the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision,15 dated October
2, 2002, granting the petition and ordering the issuance of a
writ of prohibition commanding the petitioners to
permanently desist from enforcing or implementing
Ordinance No. 192 on the respondents’ property.
The RTC agreed with the respondents that the order of the
petitioners to demolish the fence at the SSC property in
Marikina and to move it back six (6) meters would amount
to an appropriation of property which could only be done
through the exercise of eminent domain. It held that the
petitioners could not take the respondents’ property under
the guise of police power to evade the payment of just
compensation.
It did not give weight to the petitioners’ contention that the
parking space was for the benefit of the students and
patrons of SSA-Marikina, considering that the respondents
were already providing for sufficient parking in compliance
with the standards under Rule XIX of the National Building
Code.
It further found that the 80% see-thru fence requirement
could run counter to the respondents’ right to privacy,
considering that the property also served as a residence of
the Benedictine sisters, who were entitled to some sense of
privacy in their affairs. It also found that the respondents
were able to prove that the danger to security had no basis
in their case. Moreover, it held that the purpose of
beautification could not be used to justify the exercise of
police power.
It also observed that Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192, as
amended, provided for retroactive application. It held,
however, that such retroactive effect should not impair the
respondents’ vested substantive rights over the perimeter
walls, the six-meter strips of land along the walls, and the
building, structures, facilities, and improvements, which
would be destroyed by the demolition of the walls and the
seizure of the strips of land.
The RTC also found untenable the petitioners’ argument
that Ordinance No. 192 was a remedial or curative statute
intended to correct the defects of buildings and structures,
which were brought about by the absence or insufficiency
of laws. It ruled that the assailed ordinance was neither
remedial nor curative in nature, considering that at the time
the respondents’ perimeter wall was built, the same was
valid and legal, and the ordinance did not refer to any
previous legislation that it sought to correct.
The RTC noted that the petitioners could still take action to
expropriate the subject property through eminent domain.
The RTC, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents
to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing
Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as amended, on
petitioners’ property in question located at Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
Ruling of the CA
In its December 1, 2003 Decision, the CA dismissed the
petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the RTC decision.
The CA reasoned out that the objectives stated in Ordinance
No. 192 did not justify the exercise of police power, as it did
not only seek to regulate, but also involved the taking of the
respondents’ property without due process of law. The
respondents were bound to lose an unquantifiable sense of
security, the beneficial use of their structures, and a total of
3,762.36 square meters of property. It, thus, ruled that the
assailed ordinance could not be upheld as valid as it clearly
invaded the personal and property rights of the
respondents and "[f]or being unreasonable, and undue
restraint of trade."17
It noted that although the petitioners complied with
procedural due process in enacting Ordinance No. 192, they
failed to comply with substantive due process. Hence, the
failure of the respondents to attend the public hearings in
order to raise objections did not amount to a waiver of their
right to question the validity of the ordinance.
The CA also shot down the argument that the five-meter
setback provision for parking was a legal easement, the use
and ownership of which would remain with, and inure to,
the benefit of the respondents for whom the easement was
primarily intended. It found that the real intent of the
setback provision was to make the parking space free for
use by the public, considering that such would cease to be
for the exclusive use of the school and its students as it
would be situated outside school premises and beyond the
school administration’s control.
In affirming the RTC ruling that the ordinance was not a
curative statute, the CA found that the petitioner failed to
point out any irregularity or invalidity in the provisions of
the National Building Code that required correction or cure.
It noted that any correction in the Code should be properly
undertaken by the Congress and not by the City Council of
Marikina through an ordinance.
The CA, thus, disposed:
WHEREFORE, all foregoing premises considered, the
instant appeal is DENIED.1âwphi1 The October 2, 2002
Decision and the January 13, 2003 Order of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 273, granting
petitioners-appellees’ petition for Prohibition in SCA Case
No. 2000-381-MK are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18
Aggrieved by the decision of the CA, the petitioners are now
before this Court presenting the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT CITY
ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF 1994 IS NOT A
VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
AFOREMENTIONED ORDINANCE IS AN EXERCISE
OF THE CITY OF THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CITY
VIOLATED THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE IN
IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE NO. 192, SERIES OF
1994; AND
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED ORDINANCE CANNOT BE GIVEN
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.19
In this case, the petitioners admit that Section 5 of the
assailed ordinance, pertaining to the five-meter setback
requirement is, as held by the lower courts,
invalid.20 Nonetheless, the petitioners argue that such
invalidity was subsequently cured by Zoning Ordinance No.
303, series of 2000. They also contend that Section 3,
relating to the 80% see-thru fence requirement, must be
complied with, as it remains to be valid.
Ruling of the Court
The ultimate question before the Court is whether Sections
3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 are valid exercises of police
power by the City Government of Marikina.
"Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature
to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people."21 The State, through the legislature,
has delegated the exercise of police power to local
government units, as agencies of the State. This delegation
of police power is embodied in Section 1622 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the
General Welfare Clause,23 which has two branches. "The
first, known as the general legislative power, authorizes the
municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations
not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
the municipal council by law. The second, known as the
police power proper, authorizes the municipality to enact
ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health
and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort,
and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and
for the protection of their property."24
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,25 discusses the
test of a valid ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line
of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must
also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1)
must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not
be unreasonable.26
Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of
Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police power. To
successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the
rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it
from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests
have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test
and the strict scrutiny test:
We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if
they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest.
Under intermediate review, governmental interest is
extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive
measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus
is on the presence of compelling, rather than substantial,
governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.27
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test,
Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down for
not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the City’s
purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass
the following requisites as discussed in Social Justice
Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:28
As with the State, local governments may be considered as
having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require its exercise and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In
short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and
lawful method.29
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police
power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights and a violation of the due
process clause.30
Section 3.1 and 5 of the assailed ordinance are pertinent to
the issue at hand, to wit:
Section 3. The standard height of fences of walls allowed
under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard – shall be no more than one (1)
meter in height. Fences in excess of one (1) meter shall be
an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within
the five (5) meter parking area allowance located between
the front monument line and the building line of
commercial and industrial establishments and educational
and religious institutions.
The respondents, thus, sought to prohibit the petitioners
from requiring them to (1) demolish their existing concrete
wall, (2) build a fence (in excess of one meter) which must
be 80% see-thru, and (3) build the said fence six meters
back in order to provide a parking area.
Setback Requirement
The Court first turns its attention to Section 5 which
requires the five-meter setback of the fence to provide for a
parking area. The petitioners initially argued that the
ownership of the parking area to be created would remain
with the respondents as it would primarily be for the use of
its students and faculty, and that its use by the public on
non-school days would only be incidental. In their Reply,
however, the petitioners admitted that Section 5 was, in
fact, invalid for being repugnant to the Constitution.31
The Court agrees with the latter position.
The Court joins the CA in finding that the real intent of the
setback requirement was to make the parking space free for
use by the public, considering that it would no longer be for
the exclusive use of the respondents as it would also be
available for use by the general public. Section 9 of Article
III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision on eminent domain,
provides that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.
The petitioners cannot justify the setback by arguing that
the ownership of the property will continue to remain with
the respondents. It is a settled rule that neither the
acquisition of title nor the total destruction of value is
essential to taking. In fact, it is usually in cases where the
title remains with the private owner that inquiry should be
made to determine whether the impairment of a property is
merely regulated or amounts to a compensable
taking.32 The Court is of the view that the implementation of
the setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking
of a total of 3,762.36 square meters of the respondents’
private property for public use without just compensation,
in contravention to the Constitution.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of
unlawful acts and "un-neighborliness," it is obvious that
providing for a parking area has no logical connection to,
and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment of
these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the setback
requirement, it has long been settled that the State may not,
under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.33 The
Court, thus, finds Section 5 to be unreasonable and
oppressive as it will substantially divest the respondents of
the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is
invalid.
The petitioners, however, argue that the invalidity of
Section 5 was properly cured by Zoning Ordinance No.
303,34Series of 2000, which classified the respondents’
property to be within an institutional zone, under which a
five-meter setback has been required.
The petitioners are mistaken. Ordinance No. 303, Series of
2000, has no bearing to the case at hand.
The Court notes with displeasure that this argument was
only raised for the first time on appeal in this Court in the
petitioners’ Reply. Considering that Ordinance No. 303 was
enacted on December 20, 2000, the petitioners could very
well have raised it in their defense before the RTC in 2002.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that a party cannot
change the legal theory of this case under which the
controversy was heard and decided in the trial court. It
should be the same theory under which the review on
appeal is conducted. Points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not adequately brought to the attention of the
lower court will not be ordinarily considered by a reviewing
court, inasmuch as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. This will be offensive to the basic rules of fair
play, justice, and due process.35
Furthermore, the two ordinances have completely different
purposes and subjects. Ordinance No. 192 aims to regulate
the construction of fences, while Ordinance No. 303 is a
zoning ordinance which classifies the city into specific land
uses. In fact, the five-meter setback required by Ordinance
No. 303 does not even appear to be for the purpose of
providing a parking area.
By no stretch of the imagination, therefore, can Ordinance
No. 303, "cure" Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192.
In any case, the clear subject of the petition for prohibition
filed by the respondents is Ordinance No. 192 and, as such,
the precise issue to be determined is whether the
petitioners can be prohibited from enforcing the said
ordinance, and no other, against the respondents.
80% See-Thru Fence Requirement
The petitioners argue that while Section 5 of Ordinance No.
192 may be invalid, Section 3.1 limiting the height of fences
to one meter and requiring fences in excess of one meter to
be at least 80% see-thru, should remain valid and
enforceable against the respondents.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner.
For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the
petitioners must show the reasonable relation between the
purpose of the police power measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise
of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those
pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.36
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is "to discourage,
suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or
unlawful acts." The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly
the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security.
The means employed by the petitioners, however, is not
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this
purpose and is unduly oppressive to private rights. The
petitioners have not adequately shown, and it does not
appear obvious to this Court, that an 80% see-thru fence
would provide better protection and a higher level of
security, or serve as a more satisfactory criminal deterrent,
than a tall solid concrete wall. It may even be argued that
such exposed premises could entice and tempt would-be
criminals to the property, and that a see-thru fence would
be easier to bypass and breach. It also appears that the
respondents’ concrete wall has served as more than
sufficient protection over the last 40 years. `
As to the beautification purpose of the assailed ordinance,
as previously discussed, the State may not, under the guise
of police power, infringe on private rights solely for the sake
of the aesthetic appearance of the community. Similarly, the
Court cannot perceive how a see-thru fence will foster
"neighborliness" between members of a community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in
accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily
includes their right to decide how best to protect their
property.
It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property
via a see-thru fence is violative of their right to privacy,
considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is
also located within the property. The right to privacy has
long been considered a fundamental right guaranteed by
the Constitution that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. The right to privacy is essentially the right to be
let alone,37 as governmental powers should stop short of
certain intrusions into the personal life of its citizens. 38 It is
inherent in the concept of liberty, enshrined in the Bill of
Rights (Article III) in Sections 1, 2, 3(1), 6, 8, and 17, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution.39
The enforcement of Section 3.1 would, therefore, result in
an undue interference with the respondents’ rights to
property and privacy. Section 3.1 of Ordinance No. 192 is,
thus, also invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents.
No Retroactivity
Ordinance No. 217 amended Section 7 of Ordinance No. 192
by including the regulation of educational institutions
which was unintentionally omitted, and giving said
educational institutions five (5) years from the passage of
Ordinance No. 192 (and not Ordinance No. 217) to conform
to its provisions.40 The petitioners argued that the
amendment could be retroactively applied because the
assailed ordinance is a curative statute which is retroactive
in nature.
Considering that Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192
cannot be enforced against the respondents, it is no longer
necessary to rule on the issue of retroactivity. The Court
shall, nevertheless, pass upon the issue for the sake of
clarity.
"Curative statutes are enacted to cure defects in a prior law
or to validate legal proceedings which would otherwise be
void for want of conformity with certain legal requirements.
They are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities
and curb certain evils. They are intended to enable persons
to carry into effect that which they have designed or
intended, but has failed of expected legal consequence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their
own action. They make valid that which, before the
enactment of the statute was invalid. Their purpose is to
give validity to acts done that would have been invalid
under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied
with. Curative statutes, therefore, by their very essence, are
retroactive."41
The petitioners argue that Ordinance No. 192 is a curative
statute as it aims to correct or cure a defect in the National
Building Code, namely, its failure to provide for adequate
guidelines for the construction of fences. They ultimately
seek to remedy an insufficiency in the law. In aiming to cure
this insufficiency, the petitioners attempt to add lacking
provisions to the National Building Code. This is not what is
contemplated by curative statutes, which intend to correct
irregularities or invalidity in the law. The petitioners fail to
point out any irregular or invalid provision. As such, the
assailed ordinance cannot qualify as curative and
retroactive in nature.
At any rate, there appears to be no insufficiency in the
National Building Code with respect to parking provisions
in relation to the issue of the respondents. Paragraph 1.16.1,
Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations of the said code
requires an educational institution to provide one parking
slot for every ten classrooms. As found by the lower courts,
the respondents provide a total of 76 parking slots for their
80 classrooms and, thus, had more than sufficiently
complied with the law.
Ordinance No. 192, as amended, is, therefore, not a curative
statute which may be applied retroactively.
Separability
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, as amended, are,
thus, invalid and cannot be enforced against the
respondents. Nonetheless, "the general rule is that where
part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if susceptible
to being separated from the invalid, may stand and be
enforced."42 Thus, the other sections of the assailed
ordinance remain valid and enforceable.
Conclusion
Considering the invalidity of Sections 3.1 and 5, it is clear
that the petitioners were acting in excess of their
jurisdiction in enforcing Ordinance No. 192 against the
respondents. The CA was correct in affirming the decision
of the RTC in issuing the writ of prohibition. The petitioners
must permanently desist from enforcing Sections 3.1 and 5
of the assailed ordinance on the respondents' property in
Marikina City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The October 2, 2002
Decision of the Regional Trial Court in SCA Case No. 2000-
381-MK is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of
prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents
to permanently desist from enforcing or implementing
Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192, Series of 1994, as
amended, on the petitioners' property in question located
in Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS
AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision1promulgated
on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423,
President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal
and Pasay City for a military reservation. The military
reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was
later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President
Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208, amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort
Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded
area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is
under the administration of herein respondent Military
Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2476, further amending Proclamation No.
423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper
Bicutan and Signal Village from the operation of
Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition
under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and
730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos
made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette3 on 3 February
1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C.
Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation No. 172
which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western
Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and
declared the said lots open for disposition under the
provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation
No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied
some areas of Fort Bonifacio including portions of the
Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito
Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force
Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized
occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures
at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang
Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition
with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-
434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the
reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of
SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to
alienable and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director
of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s
facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot to
its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot
Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-in-
Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as
those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to the area the
former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in
Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a
Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions
of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No.
2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the
President could not be defeated by the negligence or
inadvertence of others. Further, considering that
Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was
exercising legislative powers, it could not be amended,
repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment.
Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded
much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter
was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s
legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina
AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article 2 of the
Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case.
Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is
clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the
court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken
as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally,
she maintained that the Commission had no authority to
supply the addendum originally omitted in the published
version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be
tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for
Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking
to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1 September 2006
and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First
Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-
PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 1,
2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the
Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the
petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are
DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further,
pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by
filing their respective Petitions for Review with this Court
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO.
2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN
BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY
PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS
NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO.
172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND
OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP
HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE
PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE
EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS
NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE
OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND
E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PUBLICATION.15
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the subject lots
were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation
No. 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was not included in the publication of the
said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of
Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims were anchored
on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former
President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the
reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable
public land when he made a notation just below the printed
version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum
was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as
reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of
whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2
of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication
is indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself
has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than
after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s
publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that
the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The
issue of the requirement of publication was already settled
in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we
had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his
separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil
Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from
its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply because it
was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason
is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it
would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are
supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly
provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or
after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is
not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not
know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of
penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many
non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before
they can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to
those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting
citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization.
It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the
public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to
all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may question
in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the
courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even
if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated
by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the
national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of
that place. All presidential decrees must be published,
including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the
presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette
cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is
not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general
applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather
than disclose information on this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to
make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint,
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases
supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court
cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of
Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication,
the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the
Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution
or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not
President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is
not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts
may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the
law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law
when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v.
Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil
Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can
create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for
enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where
ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto
itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these
Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another
legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners'
lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions
are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29
April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's
status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED.
Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in
contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the
defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial question to
stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of
the defendant for estafa through falsification. This is
because the result of the independent civil action is
irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August
18, 2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No.
71252 entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas,
Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial Court, Makati
City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order
issued on November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring the arraignment
of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v.
Rafael Consing, Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the
existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases pending
between him and the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig
City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his
mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various loans totaling
₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans
were secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a
parcel of land (property) covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Cavite registered under the name of de la
Cruz.2 In accordance with its option to purchase the
mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half
of the property for a total consideration of ₱21,221,500.00.
Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and
Consing in the amount of ₱18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the
property, they learned that the title to the property was
really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and
Juanito Tan Teng, the parties from whom the property had
been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No. 687599 held
by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total
amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had
been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the
latter ignored the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the
Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil case) for
injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of the
₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had acted as a mere
agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint
for estafa through falsification of public document against
Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s
Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in
Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery of a
sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ
of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City filed against Consing and De la Cruz an
information for estafa through falsification of public
document in the RTC in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-
120), which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal
case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his
arraignment in the Makati criminal case on the ground of
existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of
the Pasig and Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001,
Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of his
arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the CA. On November 19, 2001, the
Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending
the proceedings in the Makati criminal case on the ground
of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18,
2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for
reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the
RTC in the Makati criminal case via petition for certiorari
(C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing the petition for certiorari
and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the
Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig
case, i.e. whether or not private respondent may be held
liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt
or innocence of private respondent Consing in both the
Cavite and Makati criminal cases.
The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati
criminal case, Makati civil case and Cavite criminal case
show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions
in controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of
Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4) the questioned
Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in
question are identical; and (6) the issue of private
respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is
identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the
Pasig civil case identical to or intimately related to the
criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also
extend to the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of
Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the
arraignment of private respondent in the Makati case, in
view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a
party thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to
take judicial notice of an official act of another judicial
authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent
multiplicity of action, to which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712 may be validly invoked to suspend private
respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case,
notwithstanding the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an
offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders
commenced its own suit for damages against Consing (Civil
Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil
case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through
falsification of public document was filed against Consing
and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21
(Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a motion to defer the
arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question, i.e., the pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil
cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC handling the
Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it
also denied his motion for reconsideration. Thereafter,
Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action for
certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his
arraignment and trial in the Cavite criminal case. The CA
granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated
its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for
certiorari and setting aside the January 27, 2000 order of
the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from
proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the Pasig
and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this
Court (G.R. No. 148193), praying for the reversal of the May
31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the Court
granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and
reversed and set aside the May 31, 2001 decision of the
CA,14 viz:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an
agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or
any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved
in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages
and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be
determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the
criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of
the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto
follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa
through falsification of public document. Stated differently,
a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be
paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily
absolve respondent of liability in the criminal case where
his guilt may still be established under penal laws as
determined by other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a
criminal case for violation of Article 319 of the Revised
Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on
personal property in favor of another party without consent
of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended party
filed a civil case for termination of management contract,
one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner
having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous
chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner
moved that the arraignment and trial of the criminal case be
held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question, the resolution of which was necessary
before the criminal proceedings could proceed. The trial
court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the
ground that no prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the
order of the trial court and ruled that:
… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil
case on the eleventh cause of action based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February
20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar" Tractor with Serial No.
9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will
not determine the criminal liability of the accused in the
said Criminal Case No. 56042 for violation of paragraph 2 of
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even
granting for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is
involved in this case, the fact remains that both the crime
charged in the information in the criminal case and the
eleventh cause of action in the civil case are based upon
fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could proceed
independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new
Civil Code which provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud
and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That,
therefore, the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders
referred to in the instant petition was not made with "grave
abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages
and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to
PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case
at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved
for the reconsideration of the adverse decision of the CA,
citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that
the Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial
question that justified the suspension of the proceedings in
the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that under the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not
raise a prejudicial question that would cause the suspension
of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration,
Consing contended that the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 was
not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders,
which was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the
Makati criminal case. He added that the decision in G.R. No.
148193 did not yet become final and executory, and could
still be reversed at any time, and thus should not control as
a precedent to be relied upon; and that he had acted as an
innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be
held personally liable under a contract that had involved
property belonging to his mother as his principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing
itself. It relied upon the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, and held
thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The
transactions in controversy, the documents involved; the
issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned
transactions are all identical in all the proceedings; and it
deals with the same parties with the exception of private
complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No.
63712, People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr.
(G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil Case No.
99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in
selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will
justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of
the aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We are
thus amending Our May 20, 2003 decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is
GRANTED. The Orders dated November 26, 2001 and March
18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No.
00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA
denied the motion through the second assailed resolution of
December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R.
No. 148193 was not controlling in relation to C.A.-G.R. No.
71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the
complainant in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in
arriving at its amended decision, the CA did not consider the
pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418),
which raised a prejudicial question, considering that the
resolution of such civil action would include the issue of
whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully
defrauded Unicapital, the resolution of either of which
would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No.
00-120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that Unicapital brought the Makati civil case as an
independent civil action intended to exact civil liability
separately from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully
authorized under Section 1(a) and Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took
cognizance of the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its
challenged amended decision that the Makati civil case, just
like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action
instituted by virtue of Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the
Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that
justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and
that as finally settled in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig civil case
did not also raise any prejudicial question, because the sole
issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his
mother, had any obligation or liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that
he filed and Unicapital’s Makati civil case were not intended
to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to
pre-empt such resolution; and that such civil cases could be
validly considered determinative of whether a prejudicial
question existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal Case
No. 00-120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence
of a prejudicial question that warranted the suspension of
the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm
holding in the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to the effect that the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be
suspended because the Makati civil case was an
independent civil action, while the Pasig civil case raised no
prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do
considering that the ruling fully applied to him due to the
similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his case
with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case
reveals that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint
to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a
"wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent manner in
offering as security and later object of sale, a property which
they do not own, and foisting to the public a spurious
title."22 As such, the action was one that could proceed
independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code, which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,
fraud and physical injuries may be independently instituted
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not
operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of a criminal case.23 This was precisely the
Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the independent civil action may be brought by the offended
party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages
and Attachment on account of the alleged fraud committed
by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to
PBI is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case
at bar.24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA
to apply the ruling in G.R. No. 148193 to his case with
Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases
involved different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and
Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and Unicapital
had separately instituted against him were undeniably of
similar mold, i.e., they were both based on fraud, and were
thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the
resolution of the Makati civil case that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of
Consing’s being a mere agent of his mother who should not
be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property
involved having belonged to his mother as principal has also
been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would
justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No.
SCA 1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is
whether or not respondent (Consing) merely acted as an
agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No.
99-95381 (the Manila civil case), for Damages and
Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount
paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if
respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he
cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or
any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public
documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved
in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant
to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal
case for estafa through falsification of public
document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision
promulgated on August 18, 2003; and ORDERS petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17
August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed
a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that
on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena Alegre
(Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children,
namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with
Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the auto
parts and supplies business owned by Benjamin’s family. In
December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her
father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally,
knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children,
Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin, married to
Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when
Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification
of public documents against Benjamin, using their
simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial
court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the
properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article
148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the
case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties
became the subject of the partition before the trial court.
Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin
in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a
demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally
filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial court also
denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
of Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of
Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her
petition before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28
February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11
September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28
November 2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial
court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting
the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in
favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were
issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin
and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of
the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly,
the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case. The trial court did not rule on the
issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley
because they were not parties to the case. The trial court
denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because she was
not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise denied
support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age
and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could
not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer as part
of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court
ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were
owned by Benjamin’s parents who gave the properties to
their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance.
The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his
brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely
descriptive of Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards
the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial
court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his
own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual
contribution of money, property or industry in their
purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered
co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656,
and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial court ruled that
the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium
units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone.
The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos.
61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and
Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute
his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith
because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court
forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley
while Benjamin’s share reverted to his conjugal ownership
with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro
Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is
further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the
thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723,
17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in
Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035,
194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625,
194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631,
194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637,
194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211,
206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr.,
Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B.
Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go"
Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and
Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally
Go" from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT
Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from
petitioner’s money without contribution from respondent,
hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful
wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the
administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is
ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of
income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof. Except for lot under TCT No.
61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30)
days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control
and possession of these properties including the documents
of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681,
these properties are under co-ownership of the parties
shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent
is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and
Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall
belong to his conjugal ownership with Azucena Alegre. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section
21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support
and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further,
no declaration of the status of the parties’ children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels,
the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the Registry
of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with
Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August
2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the
trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly
granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial
court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The
Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the
case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial
reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to present
her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She
insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other
witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that
Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity
of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamin’s
action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and
there was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or
dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage
with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to
Sally null and void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37
properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to
Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the
Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under TCT
Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin
belong to him exclusively because he was able to establish
that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of
Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be
owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However,
the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while
Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the absence of a clear and
convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to
present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias
and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify
his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order dated
March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification
declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be exclusively
owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-
appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722 shall be owned
by them and common and to be shared equally but the share
of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his first marriage while the share of
respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of the
decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’
decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court of
Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s ruling
that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming the trial court’s
decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent;
and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error in affirming with modification the
trial court’s decision regarding the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court’s ruling that she waived her right to present her
evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present
evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial
court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an
inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or
postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to
the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sally’s
presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February
2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on
10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October
2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sally’s
instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November
2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed
to present her evidence, the case would be submitted for
decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the
presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on
presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that
day. Sally’s counsel insisted that the trial court could not
dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented,
disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the
numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain
that she had been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were at her
instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would
submit the case for decision should she still fail to present
her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal
to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived
her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence
despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed
her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was
clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was
waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her
petition questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer
to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals did
not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed
for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect
marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court
also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the
deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a
marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time,
null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were
allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her
marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to Benjamin,
Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real
properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he
was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in
their children’s birth certificates where he stated that he
was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his
family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that
there was no real property registered in the names of
Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges that Benjamin
was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children
with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September
1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced
by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the
time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage
on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and
Azucena was valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita
Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid
marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros
confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to
6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982.
Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series
issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local
civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License
No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The certification from
the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license and absent any suspicious
circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value,
being issued by the officer charged under the law to keep a
record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into
a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the
purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta
B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita R.
Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for
Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III,
Civil Registration Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved
that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As
pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" 16 and "a
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to
cover her up from expected social humiliation coming from
relatives, friends and the society especially from her
parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it was a
fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth
certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that
Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate
which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 198218 while Sally was the informant in Bentley’s
birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally
were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were
supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match
the dates reflected on the birth certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall
be void from the beginning." In this case, the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did
not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35 20 which
made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the
beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-
existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties,
the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s
decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision
stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss
bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive
portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the
decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial
court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally is not bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under
the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of
the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that
is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is
no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079],
it was held that what was committed was contracting
marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article
349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code. Concluding,
the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous
because there was no marriage license. The daring and
repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to
petitioner cannot, in any instance, be sustained. Assuming
that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet
the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it
would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of
petitioner and Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage
must have all the essential requisites for validity except for
the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was
really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In
short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented themselves as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148
of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even
if both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the
37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance.
Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their respective
spouses which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the
decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No.
61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the
descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of
Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin"
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the
name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status
of the registered owner.29 Such words do not prove co-
ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either
or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge
Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case. She cited
the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in
presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his
decision, showing his partiality against her and in favor of
Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on
the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there
must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error
which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32 In
this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella
did not err in submitting the case for decision because of
Sally’s continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge
Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in
writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his
prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in
deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary
inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and
the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 94226.
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and
MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing the
28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88589,1the
decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and
the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
(Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City. 3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both
capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the
validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it
was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito
Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent,
Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by
Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and
personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to
preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation
of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix
of her late father’s estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid,
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was
a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac
and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no
factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the
issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of
the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that
Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate
of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be
posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached
by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas
City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7
August 2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE
PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS
PIÑAS;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON
WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO
QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE
FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN
ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS
OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Court’s Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial
Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the
Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the
original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Emphasis supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor.13Even where
the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.17 Venue
for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was
properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records
that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting
Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason,
the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the
said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate
that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his
estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof,
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from
1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action
for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to
the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia
and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings
arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of
rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It
must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil
Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v.
Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In
Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed therein
petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of
their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24
It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the
marriage directly or collaterally without prescription,
which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties
to the marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of
such marriage even after the death of her father. The said
marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action
attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as
an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably,
Elise, as a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of
Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said
marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether
or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas
de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to
the said marriage exists does not diminish the probative
value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the
fact that the first marriage was celebrated more than 50
years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can
no longer be found in the National Archive, given the
interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in
the absence of any showing that such marriage had been
dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was
solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter
marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’
contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the
Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down
the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of
letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
— If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. —
A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs,
and the names and residences of the creditors, of
the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the
property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance
of letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands
to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming
evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in
the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings
of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the
debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed
28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution,
arc AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on
a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated
31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition
for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue
and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to
file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not
sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact
Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to
direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate
the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and
withdrawing the case from its active civil docket. 7 The RTC
cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband
or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner or the
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior
to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at
the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the
petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions.
The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply
with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC
took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to
declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions
for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for
recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding,
which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the
rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the
Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the
Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd
because only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue.
In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the
prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest
and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous
marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is
applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of
the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a
duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment
of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to
the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved
or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule
108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to
"marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in
the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of
the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted
that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it
dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki
stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue
with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of
jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its
own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the
defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of
the venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover,
petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied
with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated
that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for
dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue
under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce
issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to
be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC
did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as
a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken
together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x
which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the
petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza
ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry
under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can
be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a]
petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the
validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The
trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to
dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and
certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the
Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and
Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file
their comment on the petition for review.30 The public
respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
participated through the Office of the Solicitor General.
Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed
that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to
comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside"
and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further
proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as
the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can
sue to declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v.
Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave,
this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take
action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial
period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the
conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage,
it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not
only threatens the financial and the property ownership
aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the
spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which
sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo
Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in
the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also
affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil
registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other
words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a
Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no
jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under
Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court
to comply with the directive for them to comment on the
petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him
the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had
no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like to
maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might
cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is
applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage
can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or
her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize
the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,
in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file
a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not
apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to
prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment
may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the
officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which
has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan
and authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for
recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial
court and the parties should follow its provisions, including
the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the
setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew.
It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments,
which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v.
Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff
would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded
litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and
other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require,
for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom
it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a
foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a
"presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the
judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts
are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign
judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven
in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of
efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well
as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts
have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino
and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under
the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines
does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may,
however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to
capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her
foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent
with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of
the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires
proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special
proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded
by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No.
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file
a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising
from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil
registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to
protect his property interests that arise by operation of law
the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and
preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by
the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage
extends further to relational rights recognized under Title
III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of
the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section
2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive
right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the
wife of the union recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are
void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous
marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the
law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest
in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can
file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity
of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer
personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also
personally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting
his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is
therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-
Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the
financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to
the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment
is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there
should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can
be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to
invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards
are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the
spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the
investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under
the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a
Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or
cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the
recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law,
nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to
nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which
presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A.
No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce
decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to
determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic
v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of
the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,
is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the
laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to
adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is
tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective
measure to address the anomaly that results from a
marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow
divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. The correction is made by
extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce
decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v.
Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who
obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the
ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of
bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after
the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated
to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the
Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse
can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a
situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the
marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry.
Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent
that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic
public policy. A critical difference between the case of a
foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse
has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without
prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts
are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case
was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its
effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex
nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1)
whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether
any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy
nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of
the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court states that the foreign judgment is already
"presumptive evidence of a right between the parties."
Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis
for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil
registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes
a new status, right and fact 92 that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for
bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability
under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run
when the offender is absent from the Philippine
archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no
longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and
the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and
5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31
January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case
No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the
petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City,
and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of
minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD,
JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines
boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total
population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of
Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their
wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church
and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to
curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women.
The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women
(NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female
violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse
and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March
27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the
woman has a common child.5 The law provides for
protection orders from the barangay and the courts to
prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay officials,
law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social
workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests
for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal
protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private
respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse;
emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result
of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial
support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she
was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and
faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On
the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese
descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her
friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay
at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive
wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point
threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an
affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod
City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner
admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted
him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help
about his sexual relations with said bank manager.
Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just
using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In
one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent
on both arms and shook her with such force that caused
bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their
daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent
to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him.
He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-
Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter
leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys
are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-
old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his
father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005,
while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner
simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7)
days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor
apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every
week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the
bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things
and told private respondent that he was leaving her for
good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives
with them in the family home, that private respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not
cohabiting with his paramour and has not sired a child with
her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from
petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children
from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner
had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle
with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly
the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three
corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he
and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast
to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations,
private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of
₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less
than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private
respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn,
are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of
₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys
unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of
thousands of pesos from the corporations.16 After private
respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan,
where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted,
thereby depriving her of access to full information about
said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo,
petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting
of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to
millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the private respondent and her
children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,
which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is
hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings
from the conjugal dwelling or family home within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that
he be removed by police officers from the conjugal
dwelling; this order is enforceable notwithstanding
that the house is under the name of 236 Realty
Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states
"regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the
Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the
conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner
decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by
police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner
police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006
because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he
arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her
children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall
not enter the gate of the subdivision where the
Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or
contact directly or indirectly her children, mother
and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children
may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM
caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the
Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives
Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to
cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He
should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed
firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner
and the children, including rental of a house for
them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits,
bonuses and other cash he received from all the
corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March
2006, which himself and as President of the
corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to
the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an
accounting of all these funds shall be reported to
the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain
of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order
granting support pendente lite, and considering the
financial resources of the Respondent and his
threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a
single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up
a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private
respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included
the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are
given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the
Starex Van which they are using in Negros
Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and
occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila,
whenever they go to Manila.
 k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a
bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner
provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus
rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
50,000.00) per month until the matter of support
could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of
the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on
the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day
notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further
asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle
used by private respondent and returning the same to its
rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2)
cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from
₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the
modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet
again, but subject only to the following modifications
prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the
clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie
and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel
for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel,
otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of
Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of
furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the
Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove
Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot
return until 48 hours after the petitioners have left,
so that the petitioner Rosalie and her
representatives can remove things from the
conjugal home and make an inventory of the
household furniture, equipment and other things in
the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the
Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00
and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for
clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be
declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and
all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within
24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational
expenses of the children upon presentation of
proof of payment of such expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of
financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO;
and committed new acts of harassment against her and
their children, private respondent filed another
application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged
inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself
by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly
no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the
Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent
and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long
firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and
Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to
school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which
incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly
grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father
for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated
the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home
of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against
private respondent. This came about after private
respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her
and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things
inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids'
room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft
against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for
thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is
hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, acts of
violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended
party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his
friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the
Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children,
Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother
Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver
Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita
Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the
petitioner's other household helpers from a
distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the
gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of
the three children; Furthermore, that respondent
shall not contact the schools of the children directly
or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to
pay for their tuition or other fees directly,
otherwise he will have access to the children
through the schools and the TPO will be rendered
nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including
.9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the
Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for
rental for the period from August 6 to September 6,
2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to
August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for
2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan
Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van
with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent
fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered
to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is
the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate,
sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal
assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus
Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and respondent have an interest in,
especially the conjugal home located in No. 14,
Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City,
and other properties which are conjugal assets or
those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of
Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent
have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1,"
and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos.
T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod
City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this
TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are
ordered not to allow the transfer, sale,
encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited
properties to any person, entity or corporation
without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie
J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of
petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged
in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these
properties to defraud her or the conjugal
partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days,
and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended,
or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however,
that he has not received a copy of private respondent's
motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in
its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be
furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an
Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been
issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The
pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be
finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued
on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for
thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed
for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further
orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered
by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing
that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner
filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1)
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the
due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the
validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being
"an unwanted product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate
court dismissed36 the petition for failure of petitioner to
raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial
court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to
resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to
annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
having been denied in the Resolution37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST
OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN
NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE
TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL
INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE
DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY
OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by
petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we
shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the
appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-
SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding
it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that
the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that
is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts.
Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts
Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
against women and children.42 In accordance with said law,
the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each
of several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with
the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a
Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of violence against women and their children
under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in
the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its
elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of
Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of
general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases
whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a
law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said
in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should
have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any
treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final
judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the
earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for
protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had
jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence
Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind
of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition
to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may
file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall
verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses
and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent
protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any
cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner
that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party
complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue
of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A
counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other
relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either
of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally,
a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party
may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to
the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any
other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed
out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a
third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from
being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection
order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary
in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising
the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not
need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may,
Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among
others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court
determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that
have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to
present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by
both parties which shall be done in one day, to the
extent possible, within the 30-day period of the
effectivity of the temporary protection order
issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to
the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of
A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may
extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may
likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary
protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of
the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of
the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB -
SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an
honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he
could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j)
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-
day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or
certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall
not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO,
which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time, 56 should
not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional
or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the
same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme
Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in
their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct
prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course,
even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or
member of the community is immune from prosecution, in
good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of
such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity
which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent
irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid.
(Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status
quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It
bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children
from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such
orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against
VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not
shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or
issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as
final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason
now, in view of private respondent's plea in her
Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And
so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent
and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very
well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender
alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of
the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No.
2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the
sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as
Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she
called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of two
measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the
"Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 –
providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one
in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to
women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be
denied protection under the same measure. We quote
pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr.
President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns
and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include
domestic violence apart from against women as well as
other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to
address domestic violence of which the main victims or the
bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the
female partners in a relationship. We would like to place
that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this
kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of
women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate
Relationship. They do not want to include men in this
domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused
by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of
the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing
protective measures for victims. This includes the men,
children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with
the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to
families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The
understanding that I have is that we would be having a
broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator
Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support
of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe
that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in
the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless
women who have not had the opportunity to file a case
against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if
not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to
include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by
the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the
already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations,
concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this
Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will
agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it
is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter
how empowered the women are, we are not given equal
opportunities especially in the domestic environment
where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is
stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the
committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are most
likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the
measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and
that children are almost always the helpless victims of
violence. I am worried that there may not be enough
protection extended to other family members particularly
children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610,
for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of
abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection
orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may
use this law to justify their abusive behavior against
women. However, we should also recognize that there are
established procedures and standards in our courts which
give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just
arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family
relations and to protect the family as the basic social
institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations
between men and women in our society, I believe we have
an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both
husband and wife and their immediate family members,
particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled
to include other family members as a critical input arrived
at after a series of consultations/meetings with various
NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr.
President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the
other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on
the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is
recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the
"men and children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of
that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi"
Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not
because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the
amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the
rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may
maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At
saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan.
Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the
children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very
much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors.
The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their
fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to
find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children,
this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and
hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only
women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we
remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority
Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be
women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is
approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
justice, policy, or expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare
not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the
members of Congress in limiting the protection against
violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children
only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be
entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its
choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this
judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or
repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of
powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection
of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated
disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in
order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes
does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely
as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of
rights. The Constitution does not require that things which
are different in fact be treated in law as though they were
the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different. It does not
prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to
operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution
allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of
things in speculation or practice because they agree with
one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid
because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification
is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter
of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to
the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick,
we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as
shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate
the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men;
the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims
of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the
classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence
of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed
to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
between women and men otherwise known as "gender-
based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate
people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers,
and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on
subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men
gaining more power over women. With power comes the
need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of
men's expression of controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a
human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the
Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is
a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
between men and women, which have led to domination
over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social
mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and
social context of gender-based violence and developments
in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered
during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its
Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted
in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were
seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both
physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies,
women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband
to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property
right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions
oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the
male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control
over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted
in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one
and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s
and through the entire 1600s, English common law began
to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus,
common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed
husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker
than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of
these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal
punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing violence
to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the
Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court
to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat
his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife
with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or
kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person,
the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated
it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the
evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence,
they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their
crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding
the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for
women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since
then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of
the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in
transforming the issue into an important public concern. No
less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country,
approximately two million women are the victims of severe
assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women
reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had
assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American
Medical Association] views these figures as "marked
underestimates," because the nature of these incidents
discourages women from reporting them, and because
surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not
speak English well, and women who are homeless or in
institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted.
According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence
agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably
double the above estimates; or four million severely
assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-
third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner
or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day
in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely
assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes
place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture.
Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their
abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income... Returning to
one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of
Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are
killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality
was no less successful. The United States Charter and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the
equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General
Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted
the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women
have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen,
Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission
on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full
– steps of all these women's movements. No less than
Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the
State to recognize the role of women in nation building and
to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well
as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted
Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence
Against Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,
official statistics on violence against women and children
show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at
5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported
(9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381
reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%.
xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are
1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of
5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female
violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse
and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented
comparative statistics on violence against women across an
eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with
violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different
VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against
Women, 2004 - 2011*
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children
Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on
domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines
because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps,
because many men will not even attempt to report the
situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or
more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of
men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and
women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4
or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in
Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a
man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around
(18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in
fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less
likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of
physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-
defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional
abuse.76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and
abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same
cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up,
gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or
discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public
highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance
was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal
protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and
drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through
the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the
reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number
must be negligible and their appearance therein merely
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to
constitute a menace to the health of the community." 77 The
mere fact that the legislative classification may result in
actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal
protection, for every classification of persons or things for
regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but
the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution,
trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often
treated differently and less seriously than other crimes.
This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights
remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority
under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He
stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has
institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape
or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double
victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then
of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship
Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter
and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once
the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter
is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be
withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be
involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic
violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices
and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC
Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge.
He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to
the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A.
9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting
her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute,"
and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed"
and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such
remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of
gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
measures focused on women does not discriminate against
men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is
discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-
bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration.
As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself
to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice Puno
correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing
the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
public offense will require the development of a distinct
mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the
judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the
purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the
State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members
particularly women and children, from violence and threats
to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in keeping
with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the
Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the
Rights of the Child and other international human rights
instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW,
which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981.
Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also
ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003.86 This
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to
women equality with men before the law87 and shall take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The
Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said
Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the
existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future
conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and
abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC
as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or
against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within
or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering,
or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or
physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes,
but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as a sex object, making demeaning
and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the
victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and indecent shows
or forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films thereof,
forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live
in the conjugal home or sleep together in
the same room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause the
victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm
or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It
includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the
family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to
pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to
custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to
make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is
not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner objects
on valid, serious and moral grounds as
defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of
financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money or
properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the
aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has
exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts
described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what
constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent
action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and
ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The
acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor
differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that
phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the
woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the
conjugal or common money or properties," "marital
infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are
so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal
abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible
as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in
its provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262
singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined
above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman
with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships.
Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-
Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L.
Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in
the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and
their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in
the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due
process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity
to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of
what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts
of violence against women and their children, their family
or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs.
Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further
harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of
their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the
remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the
victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk
of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
or household member safety in the family residence, and to
prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that
jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also
enables the court to award temporary custody of minor
children to protect the children from violence, to prevent
their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their
financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the
victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim
from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition,
but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged
as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of
preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and
hearing because the time in which the hearing will take
could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or
dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of
VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in
the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be
prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the
ordinary requirements of procedural due process must
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal safety
and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an
opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the
court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO
be served immediately on the respondent by the court
sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days
from service on the respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless
order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon
the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the
petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the
preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself
shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a
petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
"stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere
product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of
one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal
arguments in court; one may be heard also through
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through
oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006
an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of
the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24,
2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion
for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights
to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated
September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to
show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment
arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility,"
conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned
TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and
that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if
he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so,
petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was
denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of
the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the
victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually
a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as
her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any
stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The
protection order shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of
the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove
personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a
law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the
residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered
his things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from
private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership,
only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter.
Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where
no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for
herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy
of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall
not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The
reason behind this provision is well-explained by the
Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic
and Family Violence as follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring
parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach
consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence,
however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which
involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that
the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of
issues in a proceeding for an order of protection is
problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to
participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the
exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is
placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower
courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the
delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer
to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay
ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts
under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong
Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue
the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application.
If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by
any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a
Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the
BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days.
Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the
Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally
serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate
in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand,
executive power "is generally defined as the power to
enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO
issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by
any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the
woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the
woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
"enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
order in the barangay."114
of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada
v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its
plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the
facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the
history of the women's movement against domestic
violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was
the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in
mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of
women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required

by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to
apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect
private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial
powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains

through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has
been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof,"
the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to
believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly,
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true
with the issuance of a BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that

since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies
are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their
duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are

voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one,
must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds
for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the
instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing
arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is
an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer