RULE 138-A CIRCULAR NO.
19 December 19, 1986
Law Student Practice Rule
Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by
the legal clinic of the law school.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized
by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding
privileged communications between attorney and client shall apply to
similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for
the legal clinic.
Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall
comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of
the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student
practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated
December 19, 1986).
SUPREME COURT CIRCULARS AND ORDERS
TO: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, SHARI'A DISTRICT
COURTS AND SHARI'A CIRCUIT COURTS
SUBJECT: ADOPTION OF RULE 138A OF THE REVERSED RULES
OF COURT TO PERMIT LIMITED LAW STUDENT PRACTICE
Quoted hereunder, for the information and guidance of all concerned, is
the text of new Rule of Court numbered Rule 138A adopted by the
Supreme Court's Resolution En Banc of December 18, 1986, effective
immediately, as follows:
Bar matter No. 194. — Re: Petition to amend the Revised Rules
of Court to include a Law Student Practice Rule. — The Court
Resolved to ADOPT the following Rule permitting limited law
student practice effective immediately, as follows:
RULE 138A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
SECTION 1. Conditions for Student Practice. — A law student who has
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed
law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without
compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to present any indigent clients accepted
by the legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be
filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the
legal clinic.
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Sec. 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged THIRD DIVISION
communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar
communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the
legal clinic.
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 G.R. No. 154464
Edang St., Pasay City,
Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall Present:
comply with the standards of professional conduct governing members of Petitioner,
the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student TINGA, J.,*
practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. - versus -
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES,
Let copies hereof be circulated among all Courts, the Integrated Bar of Presiding Judge, Regional Acting Chairperson,
the Philippines and major voluntary bar associations, and the Deans of Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay VELASCO, JR.,*
the law schools. City, Metro Manila,
NACHURA, and
December 19, 1986. Public Respondent.
REYES, JJ.
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332
(Sgd.) CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE Edang St., Pasay City,

Chief Justice Private Respondent. Promulgated:

September 11, 2008
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the
Resolutions dated May 10, 2002[1] and July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance
of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and
the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily
inhibit herself from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was
issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to
enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch
108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement
of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on

2
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-lawyer may
appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.
During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to
secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could
be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley
Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead
of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging
that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed.
Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and
calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.
On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to
Inhibit,[4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion
alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the
conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of
Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an
uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders
the belief that justice will not be served. [5]
In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for
inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on
the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition,
considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration[7] of the said order.
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to
submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to
satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, his appearance was denied.
In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his
appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He
contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different
circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking
Rule 138-A, in an Order[10] dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the
instant petition and assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE
APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS
BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138,
SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE
THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION
IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE
TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party
litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.
This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the
court where the application therefor will be directed. [11]A becoming regard
of the judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the
Court of Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in
exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the
nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of
petitions filed directly before it.[13]
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of
Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court
takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is
cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court
petitions under Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with
dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make
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a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar and is a rule distinct
important concerns before us. from Rule 138-A.
In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be
Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary. conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the
right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a
Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides: party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or
RULE 138-A with the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be
personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from
commencement to the termination of the litigation. [14] Considering that a
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has
party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of
successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed
evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner,
law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before
instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-
any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.
exercising his right to represent himself.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by
The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a
this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
law student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by
Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of
the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides
other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
for conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter
and in behalf of the legal clinic.
rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself himself.
and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In
The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by
denying petitioners appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in
virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal
the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19,
Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice.
which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on
In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-
record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools clinical legal education
lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court
program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the
through Rule 138-A.
law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was
Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides: It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an
accused to be heard by himself and counsel, [16] this Court has held that
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the
during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. [17] The rationale for
peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
that even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel,
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either

4
he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not case before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
know how to establish his innocence. discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff
therein. The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed
in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED.Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay
assistance, effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil
be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.
law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate
the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this
decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue
of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a
friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, SO ORDERED.
before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant,
wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge
committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid
ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor
during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the
respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness
and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and
confidence in the respondents impartiality.
We do not agree.
It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an
administrative case[19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15,
2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case
and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from
participating in a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.
The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the

5
 RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. —
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of
the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that
no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are
pending in any court in the Philippines.
Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United
States of America. — Citizens of the United States of America who,
before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in
active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular
standing as such may, upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the
Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after taking the
following oath of office:
I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to
continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly
swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of
the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein;
I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay
no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. —
Applicants for admission who, being Filipino citizens, are enrolled
attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or
in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest
court of any State or Territory of the United States, and who can show by
satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in any
of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they
have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the
Court, be admitted without examination.
Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants
for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding section
shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that
they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully
completed all prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially
approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of
the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school
of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may
be required by the court.
No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has
satisfactorily completed the following courses in a law school or university
duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial
law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor
and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination
shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the
Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish,
history and economics.
Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for
admission shall file with the clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence
required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of
this rule they shall also file within the same period the affidavit and
certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4
they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to
practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and
certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at
the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and
citizenship.
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Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission
shall be published by the clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers
published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days
before the beginning of the examination.
Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided
for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in
the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation; Mercantile
Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public
Corporations, and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public);
Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and
Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and
Conveyancing).
Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing.
— Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes
into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all
examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to
each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally
without help from anyone.
Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his
penmanship is so poor that it will be difficult to read his answers without
much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to use
a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall
be allowed to be used.
The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are
necessary to prevent the substitution of papers or commission of other
frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination
papers. No oral examination shall be given.
Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the
bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the City of Manila. They
shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the
committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows:
First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social
Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation
(afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law
(afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises (afternoon).
Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be
conducted by a committee of bar examiners to be appointed by the
Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the
Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated
by the court to serve for one year, and eight members of the bar of the
Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of
the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the
official reports.
Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to
influence any member of the committee, and during examination the
candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they give or
receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or
any other provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and
the same to count as a failure against him, and further disciplinary action,
including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the
court.
Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be
deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the
subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and
International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20
per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.
Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not
later than February 15th after the examination, or as soon thereafter as
may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result of such
examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall
be filed with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in
interest, after the court has approved the report.
Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who
have failed the bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from
taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of the court
that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes
as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.
The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the
candidates under this rule shall certify under oath that the candidates
7
have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the
particular subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant
who has passed the required examination, or has been otherwise found
to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the
applicant as a member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and
shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records, and that
a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which
certificate shall be his authority to practice.
Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept
a roll of all attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by
the person admitted when he receives his certificate.
Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as
appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes
to be honestly debatable under the law.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor,
and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no
compensation in connection with his client's business except from
him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's
cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the
cause of the defenseless or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and
honorable means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the
guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or
liberty, but by due process of law.
Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed
to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears,
and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in
court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party
and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney
who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the
authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to
any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully
appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of
the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who
has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent
client on appeal. — An attorney who appears de parte in a case before a
lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client on
appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in
the appellate court.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority,
compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a
client's claim but the full amount in cash.
8
Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An
attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than
a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the
importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the
proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the
court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an
attorney unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been
demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of the Court
who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under
this section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.
Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time
from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client
filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special
proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice
to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be
allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly
employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the
former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the
advance party.
A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his
place, but if the contract between client and attorney has been reduced to
writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable cause, he
shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated
in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court,
intervene in the case to protect his rights. For the payment of his
compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the
payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such
judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained
by the client.
Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of
First Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in the last
preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises.
Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First
Instance, further proceedings in Supreme Court. — Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the
Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and
make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the
attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No
attorney shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his
profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf,
and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he
fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.
Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if
upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable to
employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to
secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be
the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required service,
unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.
Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to
availability of funds as may be provided by the law the court may, in its
discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be
compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section
9
24 of this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not RULE 116
less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the following
amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos Arraignment and Plea
(P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave
felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —
capital offenses.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint
Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be
Government. — Any official or other person appointed or designated in made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a
accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the language or
shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
in any case in which said government has an interest direct or indirect. guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those
named in the complaint or information.
Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of
the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an (b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally
agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an enter his plea. Both arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally failure to do so shall not affect the validity of the proceedings.
or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a
plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (1a)
Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official
or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor
(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence,
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be
professional advice to clients.
entered for him. (n)
Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may
(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be
be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition
raffled and its records transmitted to the judge to whom the case was
of issues submitted to it.
raffled within three (3) days from the filing of the information or complaint.
The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the date of the
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10)
funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into days after arraignment. (n)
his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the
(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the
satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
arraignment for purposes of plea bargaining, determination of civil
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of failure of the
pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his
offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the
client, from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement
accused to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
included in the offense charged with the conformity of the trial prosecutor
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the
alone. (cir. 1-89)
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and (g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court
secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. The time of

10
the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of particulars or other
causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in
computing the period. (sec. 2, cir. 38-98)
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the
accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may
be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before
trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the
complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, circ. 38-98)
Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. —
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may present
evidence in his behalf. (3a)
Section 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of
evidence, discretionary. — When the accused pleads guilty to a non-
capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to
determine the penalty to be imposed. (4)
Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. — At any time before
the judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may permit an
improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be substituted by a plea of
not guilty. (5)
Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. —
Before arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to
counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is
allowed to defend himself in person or has employed a counsel of his
choice, the court must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. (6a)
Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering
the gravity of the offense and the difficulty of the questions that may
arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of the bar in
good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can
competently defend the accused. But in localities where such members of
the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of
the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the
accused. (7a)
Section 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for arraignment. —
Whenever a counsel de oficio is appointed by the court to defend the
accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to
consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the
arraignment. (8)
Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment,
move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to
prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the
complaint or information and the details desired. (10a)
Section 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession
of prosecution. — Upon motion of the accused showing good cause and
with notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise,
suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any written
statement given by the complainant and other witnesses in any
investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other
investigating officers, as well as any designated documents, papers,
books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things not
otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the case and which are in the possession or under the
control of the prosecution, police, or other law investigating agencies.
(11a)
Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. — Upon motion by the proper
party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental
condition which effective renders him unable to fully understand the
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the
court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a)
11
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994
FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO
MALDIGAN and GILBERTO SABSALON, respondents.
Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.
R E SO L U T I O N
REGALADO, J.:
Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil
action for certiorari to annul the decision 1 of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated
deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate
from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of actual payment,
and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.
We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de
minimis amounts involved should not impose upon the valuable time of
this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the resolution of
which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we
have heretofore repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only
for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed monumental cases of
national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged,
with the actual quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.
Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were
hired by the petitioners as taxi drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4
days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
"boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-
conditioned taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing,
and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.
In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the
petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons.
Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners
on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took
all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after
his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.
In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver
under the same terms and conditions as when he was first employed, but
his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis," that is, he
drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to
report for work during his schedule.
On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of
P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati
without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners
for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was
revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."
Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement
of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that
not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even
enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was
driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by petitioners to recoup
the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan
insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from employment was
effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.
On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the
Manila Arbitration Office of the National Labor Relations Commission
charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions. That
complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private
respondents two years to file the same and such unreasonable delay was
not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed to be
unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a
mere afterthought.
12
Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that
private respondents failed to controvert the evidence showing that
Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from February
10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on
September 1, 1990; and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar
employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly, affirmed the ruling
of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally
terminated. It, however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by
ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the awards stated at the
beginning of this resolution.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC,
this petition is now before us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of said public respondent.
This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies like the NLRC, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded
not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by
substantial evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not
supported by the evidence, they must be struck down for being whimsical
and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4
Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
respondents to defray any shortage in their "boundary" is covered by the
general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring
employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the
Secretary of Labor has recognized the same as a "practice" in the taxi
industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the
respondents must be refunded therefor.
Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall
require his worker to make deposits from which deductions shall
be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools,
materials, or equipment supplied by the employer, except when
the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business
where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is
necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor
in appropriate rules and regulations.
It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on
deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or equipments supplied by
the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to
defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of
his "boundary." Also, when private respondents stopped working for
petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required such
unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due
to private respondents after proper accounting must be returned to them
with legal interest.
However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is
as follows:
YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES
1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00
1988 720.00 760.00 200.00
1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00
1990 605.00 570.00
1991 165.00 2,300.00
———— ———— ————
P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00
The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was
able to withdraw his deposits through vales or he incurred shortages,
such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of P3,448.00.
With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning
the same even in the present petition. We accordingly agree with the
recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the evidence shows
that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the
amount of his accumulated cash deposits. 5
On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say
in his decision: "Anent the issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute
that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is
incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same
clean condition when he took it out, and as claimed by the respondents
(petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents
herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount
doled out was paid directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we
find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the
amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the
law." 6 (Words in parentheses added.)
13
Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the
P20.00 car wash payments they made. It will be noted that there was
nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units
themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor
General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of duty is a practice in
the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.
On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private
respondents' authorized representative, Article 222 of the Labor Code, as
amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-
lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the
members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the
authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer
who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence, by clear
mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.
Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his
services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such
relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer. 8
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission is hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for
reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and directing
said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment
by petitioners of the refund for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's
deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of this
resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997
KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and
BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO
CANETE, PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO
GONGOB, DARIO BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO
SACURA, FLORENCIO SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR,
JOSEPH CABIGKIS, RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON,
GUARINO EVANGELISTA, ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO
CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD,
ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO,
ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ, CRESENCIO FLORES,
ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR, HERNANI SURILLA,
DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS ORTIZ, EUSEBIO
BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS, EDUARDO BUENO,
PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and REYNALDO
NIETES, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Kanlaon Construction Enterprises
Co., Inc. seeks to annul the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, Fifth Division and remand the cases to the
Arbitration Branch for a retrial on the merits.
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business
nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista Subdivision,
Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the National Steel
Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant employees in
Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were hired by
14
petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the supervision of Similarly, this Branch would present in passing that "a court
Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the project neared cannot decide a case without facts either admitted or agreed
its completion and petitioner started terminating the services of private upon by the parties or proved by evidence." (Yu Chin Piao v. Lim
respondents and its other employees. Tuaco, 33 Phil. 92; Benedicto v. Yulo, 26 Phil. 160)

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent is hereby
before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty- ordered to pay the individual claims of the above-named
one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the complainants representing their wage differentials within ten (10)
minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and thirteenth- days from receipt of this order.
month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-respondents.
The Fiscal Examiner II of this Branch is likewise hereby ordered
Some of the cases were assigned to Labor Arbiter Guardson A. Siao to compute the individual claims of the herein complainants.
while the others were assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicodemus G. Palangan.
Summonses and notices of preliminary conference were issued and SO ORDERED.3
served on the two engineers and petitioner through Engineer Estacio.
The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by On June 29, 1990, Arbiter Palangan issued a similar order, thus:
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the
conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio
When the above-entitled cases were called for hearing on June
admitted petitioner's liability to private respondents and agreed to pay
19, 1990 at 10:00 a.m. respondent thru their representative
their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a
manifested that they were willing to pay the claims of the
result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner's
complainants and promised to pay the same on June 28, 1990 at
right to file its position paper.1 Private respondents declared that they, too,
10:30 a.m.
were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their
complaints as their position paper.2
However, when these cases were called purposely to materialize
the promise of the respondent, the latter failed to appear without
On June 19, 1990, Engineer Estacio appeared but requested for another
any valid reason.
week to settle the claims. Labor Arbiter Siao denied this request. On June
21, 1990, Arbiter Siao issued an order granting the complaint and
directing petitioner to pay private respondents' claims. Arbiter Siao held: Considering therefore that the respondent has already admitted
the claims of the complainants, we believe that the issues raised
herein have become moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE premises considered, the above-entitled cases are
Considering the length of time that has elapsed since these cases
hereby ordered Closed and Terminated, however, the respondent
were filed, and what the complainants might think as to how this
is hereby ordered to pay the complainants their differential pay
branch operates and/or conducts its proceedings as they are now
and 13th-month pay within a period of ten (10) days from receipt
restless, this Arbiter has no other alternative or recourse but to
hereof based on the employment record on file with the
order the respondent to pay the claims of the complainants,
respondent.
subject of course to the computation of the Fiscal Examiner II of
this Branch pursuant to the oral manifestation of respondent. The
Supreme Court ruled: "Contracts though orally made are binding SO ORDERED.4
on the parties." (Lao Sok v. Sabaysabay, 138 SCRA 134).
Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission.
It alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and

15
Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner. Petitioner's
appeal was filed by one Atty. Arthur Abundiente.
In a decision dated April 27, 1992, respondent Commission affirmed the
orders of the Arbiters.
Petitioner interposed this petition alleging that the decision of respondent
Commission was rendered without jurisdiction and in grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner claims that:
I by Sections 4 and 5 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure of the
THE QUESTIONED DECISION RENDERED BY THE
HONORABLE COMMISSION IS A NULLITY, IT HAVING BEEN
ISSUED WITHOUT JURISDICTION;
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ARBITRARILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY MAKING
THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS BASED NOT ON FACTS
AND BUT ON SPECULATION, SURMISE AND EVIDENCE
CONJECTURE:
A. Petitioner was deprived of the constitutional
right to due process of law when it was adjudged
by the NLRC liable without trial on the merits and
without its knowledge;
B. The NLRC erroneously, patently and
unreasonably interpreted the principle that the
NLRC and its Arbitration Branch are not strictly
bound by the rules of evidence;
C. There is no legal nor actual basis in the
NLRC's ruling that petitioner is already in estoppel
to disclaim the authority of its alleged
representatives.
D. The NLRC committed manifest error in relying
merely on private, respondents' unsubstantiated
complaints to hold petitioner liable for damages. 5
In brief, petitioner alleges that the decisions of the labor arbiters and
respondent Commission are void for the following reasons: (1) there was
no valid service of summons; (2) Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and Atty.
Abundiente had no authority to appear and represent petitioner at the
hearings before the arbiters and on appeal to respondent Commission;
(3) the decisions of the arbiters and respondent Commission are based
on unsubstantiated and self-serving evidence and were rendered in
violation of petitioner's right to due process.
Service of summons in cases filed before the labor arbiters is governed
NLRC. They provide:
Sec. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. — (a) Notices or
summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be
served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or duly
authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof
or by registered mail; Provided that where a party is represented
by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on
such counsel or authorized representative;provided further that in
cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served
on both the parties and their counsel; provided finally, that in case
where the parties are so numerous, service shall be made on
counsel and upon such number of complainants as may be
practicable, which shall be considered substantial compliance
with Article 224 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Proof and completeness of service. — The return is prima
facie proof of the facts indicated therein. Service by registered
mail is complete upon receipt by the addressee or his agent. . . .
Under the NLRC Rules of Procedure, summons on the respondent shall
be served personally or by registered mail on the party himself. If the
party is represented by counsel or any other authorized representative or
agent, summons shall be served on such person.
It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation
with principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner
were filed in Iligan City and summonses therefor served on Engineer
Estacio in Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was
an agent and authorized representative of petitioner.
16
To determine the scope or meaning of the term "authorized
representative" or "agent" of parties on whom summons may be served,
the provisions of the Revised Rules of Court may be resorted to. 6
Under the Revised Rules of Court,7 service upon a private domestic
corporation or partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
These persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they
know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any
legal papers served on them.8
In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre,
managed and supervised the construction project.9 According to the
Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to
the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees
thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to
realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the
same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons
for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.
Engineer Estacio's appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise
to settle the claims of private respondents is another matter.
The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the
labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The
Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless,
lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:
Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .
A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor
Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that
he shall be made to present written proof that he is properly
authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly
recognized by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10
A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if:
(a) he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an
organization or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c)
he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred to by the latter.11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-
accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the
labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized
under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on behalf
of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was incumbent
upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since both
engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the arbiters.
Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations Engineer
Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
The appearance of Atty. Arthur Abundiente in the cases appealed to
respondent Commission did not cure Engineer Estacio's representation.
Atty. Abundiente, in the first place, had no authority to appear before the
respondent Commission. The appellants' brief he filed was verified by
him, not by petitioner.12 Moreover, respondent Commission did not delve
into the merits of Atty. Abundiente's appeal and determine whether
Engineer Estacio was duly authorized to make such promise. It dismissed
the appeal on the ground that notices were served on petitioner and that
the latter was estopped from denying its promise to pay.
Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente
were authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could
bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and
respondent Commission. Petitioner's liability arose from Engineer
Estacio's alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to
compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express
consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence. 13 This is explicit
from Section 7 of Rule III of the NLRC Rules of Procedure, viz:
Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other
representatives of parties shall have authority to bind their clients
in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special
power of attorney or express consent, enter into a compromise
agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a
client's claim.
17
The promise to pay allegedly made by Engineer Estacio was made at the
preliminary conference and constituted an offer to settle the case
amicably. The promise to pay could not be presumed to be a single
unilateral act, contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General. 14 A
defendant's promise to pay and settle the plaintiff's claims ordinarily
requires a reciprocal obligation from the plaintiff to withdraw the complaint
and discharge the defendant from liability.15 In effect, the offer to pay was
an offer to compromise the cases.
In civil cases, an offer to compromise is not an admission of any liability,
and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror. 16 If this rule were
otherwise, no attempt to settle litigation could safely be
made.17 Settlement of disputes by way of compromise is an accepted and
desirable practice in courts of law and administrative tribunals. 18 In fact,
the Labor Code mandates the labor arbiter to exert all efforts to enable
the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement of the dispute within his
jurisdiction on or before the first hearing. 19
Clearly, respondent Commission gravely abused its discretion in affirming
the decisions of the labor arbiters which were not only based on
unauthorized representations, but were also made in violation of
petitioner's right to due process.
Section 3 of Rule V of the NLRC Rules of Procedure provides:
Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should
the parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or
in part, during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an
order stating therein the matters taken up and agreed upon
during the conferences and directing the parties to simultaneously
file their respective verified position papers
xxx xxx xxx
After petitioner's alleged representative failed to pay the workers' claims
as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties
to file their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a
decision on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to
substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their
right to file position papers but petitioner's waiver was made by Engineer
Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the
claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since
petitioner reneged on its "promise," there was a failure to settle the case
amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to
file their position papers.
Article 221 of the Labor Code mandates that in cases before labor
arbiters and respondent Commission, they "shall use every and all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in
the interest of due process." The rule that respondent Commission and
the Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of evidence and
procedure should not be interpreted so as to dispense with the
fundamental and essential right of due process. 20 And this right is
satisfied, at the very least, 'when the parties are given the opportunity to
submit position papers.21 Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan erred in
dispensing with this requirement.
Indeed, the labor arbiters and the NLRC must not, at the expense of due
process, be the first to arbitrarily disregard specific provisions of the
Rules which are precisely intended to assist the parties in obtaining the
just, expeditious and inexpensive settlement of labor disputes. 22
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division, is annulled and
set aside and the case is remanded to the Regional Arbitration Branch,
Iligan City for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., is on leave.
18
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 139 March 28, 1983
RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee. ATTY.
PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association, Inc., complainant,
vs.
ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Charged by Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., president of the Philippine Trial
Lawyers Association, Inc., of practicing law without having been
previously admitted to the Philippine Bar, Mr. Elmo S. Abad could not
deny and had to admit the practice. In exculpation he gives the following
lame explanation:
1. On July 23, 1979, respondent conformably with the Resolution
of the Honorable Supreme Court En Banc dated July 10, 1979, ...
prior to his taking the Oath of Office as a member of the bar, paid
his Bar Admission Fee in the amount of P175.00 as shown by
Official Receipt No. 8128792, ... paid his Certification Fee in the
amount of P5.00 as shown by Official Receipt No. 8128793, ...
and also paid his Membership Dues for the year 1979-80 to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines as shown by Official Receipt No.
83740,... .
2. On July 26, 1979, Atty. Romeo Mendoza, the then Clerk of
Court of the Honorable Supreme Court, included the respondent
as among those taking the Oath of Office as Member of the Bar
as shown by a Letter of Request dated July 23, 1979, ...
3. At around Eleven o' clock in the morning of July 26, 1979, while
waiting for my turn to take my Oath as a member of the Bar, I was
made to sign my Lawyer's Oath by one of the Clerk in the Office
of the Bar Confidant and while waiting there, Atty. Romeo
Mendoza told me that Chief Justice, the Honorable Enrique M.
Fernando wants to talk to me about the Reply of Mr. Jorge Uy
(Deceased) to my Answer to his Complaint. The Honorable Chief
Justice told me that I have to answer the Reply and for which
reason the taking of my Lawyer's Oath was further suspended . *
4. On July 31, 1979, I filed my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's Answer with a Prayer that the
Honorable Supreme Court determines my fitness to be a member of the Bar;
5. While waiting for the appropriate action which the Honorable
Supreme Court may take upon my Prayer to determine my fitness
to be a member of the Bar, I received a letter from the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter dated May 10, 1980
informing the respondent of an Annual General Meeting together
with my Statement of Account for the year 1980-1981, ... .
6. Believing that with my signing of the Lawyer's Oath on July 26,
1979 and my Reply to Mr. Jorge Uy's (Deceased) Answer, the
Honorable Supreme Court did not ordered for the striking of my
name in the Roll of Attorneys with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and therefore a Member in Good Standing, I paid my
membership due and other assessments to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Quezon City Chapter, as shown by Official
Receipt No. 110326 and Official Receipt No. 0948, ... . Likewise
respondent paid his Professional Tax Receipt as shown by
Official Receipt No. 058033 and Official Receipt No. 4601685, ... .
7. On February 28, 1981, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Quezon City Chapter also included the name of the respondent
as a Qualified Voter for the election of officers and directors for
the year 1981-1982, ... .
8. Respondent's belief and good faith was further enhanced by
the fact that on January 8, 1981, Complainant Jorge Uy in
SBC607 died and herein respondent submitted a verified Notice
and Motion with the Honorable Supreme Court on April 27, 1981;
notifying the Court of this fact with a prayer that herein
respondent be allowed to take his Oath as Member of the Bar;
9. Thereafter, respondent was again assessed by the Integrated
Bar for his 1981-1982 membership due and other assessment for
which the undersigned paid as shown by Official Receipt No.
132734 and Official Receipt No. 3363, ... .
19
 10. Respondent likewise paid his Professional Tax Receipt for
1981 as shown by Official Receipt No. 3195776, ... .

11. Respondent likewise has a Certificate of Membership in the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as a Certificate of
Membership in Good Standing with the Quezon City Chapter of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, ....

Respondent Abad should know that the circumstances which he has

narrated do not constitute his admission to the Philippine Bar and the
right to practise law thereafter. He should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys. (Rule 138, Secs. 17 and 19, Rules of Court.)

The proven charge against respondent Abad constitutes contempt of

court (Rule 71, Sec. 3(e), Rules of Court.)

WHEREFORE, Mr. Elmo S. Abad is hereby fined Five Hundred

(P500.00) pesos payable to this Court within ten (10) days from
notice failing which he shall serve twenty-five (25) days imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De

Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

* The case was SBC No. 607-Jorge Q. Uy vs. Elmo S.

Abad which was dismissed on November 25, 1982
because of the death of the complainant. However, there
is still pending BM No. 136-Esperanza T. Sistoso, et al.
vs. Elmo S. Abad for qualified theft. The respondent was
required to file an answer on October 26, 1982.

20