Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
FACTS:
The PCGG issued and implemented numerous sequestrations, freeze orders and
provisional takeovers of allegedly ill-gotten companies, assets and properties, real or personal.
Among the properties sequestered by the Commission were shares of stock in the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) registered in the names of the alleged “one million coconut
farmers,” the so-called Coconut Industry Investment Fund companies (CIIF companies) and
Private Respondent Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. In connection with the sequestration of the said
UCPB shares, the PCGG, on July 31, 1987, instituted an action for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages docketed as Case No. 0033 in the Sandiganbayan.
This Sandiganbayan Resolution was challenged by the PCGG in a Petition for Certiorari
docketed as GR No. 96073 in this Court. Meanwhile, upon motion of Cojuangco, the anti-graft
court ordered the holding of elections for the Board of Directors of UCPB. However, the PCGG
applied for and was granted by this Court a Restraining Order enjoining the holding of the
election. Subsequently, the Court lifted the Restraining Order and ordered the UCPB to proceed
with the election of its board of directors. Furthermore, it allowed the sequestered shares to be
voted by their registered owners.
Respondents petitions for declaratory relief filed in the RTC asserted their claim of
ownership over the sequestered CIIF companies and indirectly the CIIF SMC Block of Shares.
Petitioners Arguments
PCGG contends that respondent judge gravely abused his discretion. It argues that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the acts performed by PCGG pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions, particularly those relating to the issuance of writs of sequestration, and that all cases
involving ill-gotten wealth assets are under the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Respondents Arguments
UCPB and COCOLIFE argue that since they have properly alleged a case for declaratory
relief, jurisdiction over the subject matter lies in the regular courts such as the RTC of Makati
City. Having filed a motion to dismiss, PCGG is deemed to have admitted the material
allegations of the complaint. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction if the subject matter of the case
does not involve or has no relation to the recovery of ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Lack of jurisdiction over suits involving the sequestered coco
levy assets and coco levy funds.
RULING:
Yes. The RTC has no jurisdiction over suits involving the sequestered coco levy assets
and coco levy funds.
Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a
case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and is
determined by the allegations of the complaint and the relief prayed for, regardless of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to recovery upon all or some of the claims prayed for therein. Jurisdiction
is not acquired by agreement or consent of the parties, and neither does it depend upon the
defenses raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss.aw
Under Section 4 (C) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975 and R.A. No. 8249, the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan included suits for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and related
cases:
(C) Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the
issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction
over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
In PCGG v. Pea, we made the following clarification on the extent of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction:
x x x Under section 2 of the President Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all
cases of the Commission regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired
or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees
whether civil or criminal, are lodged within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases
necessarily fall likewise under the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to
review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court
MAMISCAL v. ABDULLAH
FACTS:
Petitoner averred that he and his wife, Adelaidah Lomondot (Adelaidah) had a heated
argument. In a fit of anger, Mamiscal decided to divorce his wife by repudiating her (talaq).The
repudiation was embodied in an agreement (kapasadan) signed by Mamiscal and Adelaidah.
A few days later, Mamiscal had a change of heart and decided to make peace with his wife. For
the purpose, he sent their common relatives to see Adelaidah and make peace with her on his
behalf.a
Almost five (5) months later Adelaidah filed the Certificate of Divorce (COD), with the
office of Abdullah for registration. Although unsigned, the certificate, purportedly executed by
Mamiscal, certified that he had pronounced talaq in the presence of two (2) witnesses and in
accordance with Islamic Law for the purpose of effecting divorce from Adelaidah. Abdullah
issued the Certificate of Registration of Divorce (CRD) finalizing the divorce between Mamiscal
and Adelaidah.
Petitioner Mamiscal sought the revocation of the CRD contended that the kapasadan was
invalid considering that he did not prepare the same and no witnesses to its execution. He
claimed that he only signed the kapasadan because of Adelaidah's threats. He contended that
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws, a divorce under talaq could only be filed and
registered by the male spouse, considering that female Muslims could do so only if the divorce
was through tafwid.C
Respondent Abdullah denied Mamiscal's motion. In sustaining the divorce between
Mamiscal and Abdullah, Abdullah opined that it was simply his ministerial duty to receive the
COD and the attached kapasadan filed by Adelaidah. Considering the fact that Adelaidah
manifested her opposition in writing to any reconciliation with her husband and the fact that the
90-day period of 'iddah had already lapsed, Abdullah ruled that any move to reconstitute the
AAC would have been futile because the divorce between Mamiscal and his wife had already
become final and irrevocable.
Contending that the issuance of the CRD was tainted with irregularity, Mamiscal comes
to this Court, through the subject complaint, charging Abdullah with partiality, violation of due
process, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a court employee.
ISSUE:
Whether this Court has jurisdiction to impose administrative sanction against Abdullah
for his acts.
RULING:
No.Court does not have jurisdiction to impose the proper disciplinary action against
civil registrars. While he is undoubtedly a member of the Judiciary as Clerk of Court of the
Shari'a Circuit Court, a review of the subject complaint reveals that Mamiscal seeks to hold
Abdullah liable for registering the divorce and issuing the CRD pursuant to his duties as
Circuit Registrar of Muslim divorces. It has been said that the test of jurisdiction is the nature
of the offense and not the personality of the offender. The fact that the complaint charges
Abdullah for "conduct unbecoming of a court employee" is of no moment. Well-settled is the
rule that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the actual facts recited in the
complaint. Verily, unless jurisdiction has been conferred by some legislative act, no court or
tribunal can act on a matter submitted to it.
Jurisprudence is replete with rulings that jurisdiction, or the power and authority of a
court to hear, try and decide a case must first be acquired by the court or an adjudicative body
over the subject matter and the parties in order to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits. Elementary is the distinction between jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction
over the person. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law. In
contrast, jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the court by virtue of the party's voluntary
submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive processes.
Jurisdiction over the person is waivable unlike jurisdiction over the subject matter which is
neither subject to agreement nor conferred by consent of the parties.