Tañada vs.

Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule
upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J.Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
FACTS: with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized
as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and RUSTICO VEGA
of implementations and administrative orders. G.R. No. 80774, May 31, 1988
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
FACTS:San Miguel Corporation sponsored an Innovation Program and under which, the managemen
t undertook to grant cash awards to all SMC employees except higher-
ISSUE:
ranked personnel who submit to the Corporation ideas and suggestions found to be beneficial to th
e Corporation. Rustico Vega then submitted a proposal but was not accepted. Vega filed a complaint
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
against the company with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII, contending that he should be paid
and enforceable.
60,000 since his idea was implemented. The petitioner in his answer stated that they turned down
HELD:
the proposal for lack of originality. The labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
money claim is not a necessary incident of his employment. Upon appeal of Vega to the NLRC, it ord
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
ered the petitioner to pay the 60,0000. Petitioner then seek to annul the judgment on the ground th
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct
at the Labor Arbiter and NLRC have no jurisdiction over the case.
as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. ISSUE:

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette….
The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be Whether or not the fact that the money claim of an employee arose out of or in connection with em
enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be ployment relation with his company, is enough to bring such money claim within the original and exc
given substance and validity. lusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement

of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially HELD:No, just because the claim arises from employer-
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general employee relationship, it does not follow that it is automatically within the jurisdiction of the Labor A
application which have not been published have no force and effect. rbiter.
The company’s undertaking, though unilateral in origin, could nonetheless ripen into an enforceable
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA contractual (facio ut des) obligation on the part of petitioner Corporation under certain circumstan
ces. Thus, whether or not an enforceable contract, albeit implied arid innominate, had arisen betwe
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) en petitioner Corporation and private respondent Vega in the circumstances of this case, and if so,
whether or not it had been breached, are preeminently legal questions, questions not to be resolved
FACTS: by referring to labor legislation and having nothing to do with wages or other terms and conditions
of employment, but rather having recourse to our law on contracts.
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued If the relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor Code or other labor relations sta
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the tute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispu
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. te belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In such situati
ons, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not in labor management relations nor in wage str
ISSUES: uctures and other terms and conditions of employment, but rather in the application of the general
civil law.
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
Memita v. Masongsong
HELD: (Short title)
GR # 150912 | May 28, 2007
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean Petition:
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, Petition for Review on Certiorari of CA Decision
without its previous publication. Petitioner:
Nestorio Memita
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all Respondent:
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law Ricardo Masongsong
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or (Rule 8, Rules on Civil Procedure)DOCTRINE
as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest Whoever alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction must substantiate hisallegation, since it is
eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns andprivate concerns have been fair
public as a whole. and regular.
FACTS
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for - Masongsong, under the business name of RM Integrated Services, was the
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed distributor of San Miguel Foods Inc.’s Magnolia chicken products.
by the legislature. Masongsong supplied Magnolia chicken products on a 25-day paymentcredit to Memita’s Store in
Burgos Public Market, Bacolod City.- Masongsong filed a complaint before the trial court
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the and alleged that from 11March 1996 to 25 June 1996, Memitas credit on goods purchased
content of the law. alreadyreached the amount of P603,520.50 to which Masongsong made severaldemands upon
Memita to pay before the complaint.- Aside from payment, Masongsong also prayed for AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN
the issuance of a writ ofattachment against Memita.- FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
RTC: PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Ordered the issuance of a writ of attachment against Memita takinginto account the following: (1) Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
the allegations of the verified complaint; (2) thetestimonies of Masongsong and Joel Go, his sales On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
person; and (3)Masongsong’s bond.- According to the sheriff ’s return of service, the Provincial Sheriff committed by the lower court in its ruling:
issued anotice of levy on attachment to the Registrar of the Land TransportationOffice and a notice (1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable
of embargo to the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City.- In his answer, Memita did not deny that and oppressive exercise of police power;
he purchased goods on credit fromMasongsong and further stated that his refusal to pay was (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of
based on: (1)questionable deliveries; (2) short deliveries and discrepancies; and (3)possible all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
manipulation of delivery receipts.- Memita made a counterclaim and asked for actual damages for (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
the seizureof two of his vehicles; moral damages; exemplary damages; and attorney’s fees. Trial ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
proceeded soon thereafter.- Memita failed to testify in his own behalf. Memita and his counsel, HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Atty.Zamora, failed to appear for the hearing.- Atty. Zamora filed an Urgent Motion Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
for Postponement because he had toproceed to Iloilo City to attend to an urgent personal matter The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
that requires hispersonal attendance. Furthermore, he alleged that only minor details werebeing ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
discussed in the negotiation for the settlement of the collection case.- The trial court, however, enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
agreed with the reasons given by Masongsongscounsel, Atty. Sabornay, who stated that the parties following substantive requirements:
and their counselsexpressly agreed that the setting for 22 January 1998 was intransferrable (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
incharacter. Moreover, the motion for postponement did not conform to thethree-day notice (2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
rule.- Atty. Sabornay manifested that Memita’s settlement offer was not acceptableto (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
Masongsong.- The trial court thus denied the motion for postponement and deemed thecase (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
submitted for decision.- Atty. Zamora filed a motion for reconsideration stating that (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
the personalmatters had something to do with the ailment of his aunt to whom he owedso much for (6) must not be unreasonable.
his education and that said aunt just died recently. The trialcourt denied the motion for The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
reconsideration.- City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the
RTC: LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
Masongsong was entitled to the reliefs prayed for in his Complaint.- The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
CA: A. The Ordinance contravenes
Affirmed in toto the RTC decision.- The appellate court identified two issues for its resolution: (1) the Constitution
whetherMemita was deprived of his right to due process when the trial court deniedhis motion for The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional
postponement; and (2) whether the trial court erred inadmitting the sales invoices submitted and repugnant to general laws.
by Masongsong.- As the first issue, the appellate court emphasized that due process The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of
demandsproper obedience to procedural rules.- As to the second issue, the appellate court pointed the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity
out that Memita failed toexplicitly deny or contest the genuineness and due execution of the of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
receiptsor any of the signatures on the receipts and that Memita failed to dischargethe burden Requisites for the valid exercise
of proving his allegations of short or questionable deliveries.- Hence, the instant petition. of Police Power are not met
ISSUE/S To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
1. W/N Rule 8, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, relied upon by theHonorable Court Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that
of Appeals does not apply because the Answer withCounterclaim of Memita was verified and under the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
oath and that petitioner does notappear to be a party to all of the seventy-two (72) sales invoices interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
admitted inevidence by the lower court. accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that
PROVISIONS no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work.
Rule 8Section 8. How to contest such documents. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means
— employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal
When an action or defense is foundedupon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
corresponding pleading asprovided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
theinstrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath specificallydenies arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts, but the requirement of anoath does not apply The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to theinstrument or when compliance with an values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
order for an inspection of the originalinstrument is refused. (8a)Section 10. Specific denial. within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
— thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
A defendant must specify each material allegation offact the truth of which he does not admit and, The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
whenever practicable, shall set forth thesubstance of the matters upon which he relies to support achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
his denial. Where adefendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or
itas is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant iswithout knowledge their conversion into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a materialaverment made to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments
complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of adenial. (10a) will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself
eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot
Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance
and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any
in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or
Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other
28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes fundamental right to liberty and property.
motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Modality employed is
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled– unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking
if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with
reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice
all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of
the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the
area.” The directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a
permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his
establishment to accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous
business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in
cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of
private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can
not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation.
Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be
destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we
know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal
interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon
no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured.
Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to
disturb the community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare
of the community.”
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to
guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing
the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause
In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions
bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to
women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such
establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights
of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance
warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D.
499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate
area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair
shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule
is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers
of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power
to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Topic : AR R ES TS , SE AR CHES AND SE IZUR ES (WAR R AN TLE SS AR RES T - Valid
Waiver)Ti le: !E"!LE v#
TUDTUD$ R N o % & ' ' * S e p e + e r . ,
/ACTS
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station,Davao City received a
report from a “civilian asset named !o"ong Solier a"out ace rta in #oe l Tudtud$ Solie r
re la te d tha t his ne igh"ors ha ve "ee n com pla ininga"out Tudtud, %ho %as allegedly
responsi"le for the proliferation of mari&uana inthe ir a rea $ 'eac ting to the re port, P (1
'ona ld Des ie rto, P (1 'am il )lore ta a ndthe ir s upe rior, SP (1 *illa longhan, a ll
mem "e rs of the +nte llige nce Sec tion of the Toril Police Station,
conducted surveillance in Solier s neigh"orhood in Sapa, Toril,Davao City$ )or - days, they
gathered information and learned that Tudtud
%asi n v o l v e d i n i l l e g a l d r u g s $ A c c o r d i n g t o h i s n e i g h " o r s , T u d t u
d % a s e n g a g e d i n selling mari&uana$Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cota"ato and %ould "e"ac. later that day %ith ne% stoc.s of mari&uana$ Solier descri"ed Tudtud as
"ig/"odie d a nd s hort, a nd us ua ll y %or e a ha t$ A t a round 0 2 2 p$m $ tha t
s ame da y,
at e a m c o m p o s e d o f P ( 1 D e s i e r t o , P ( 1 ) l o r e t a a n d S P ( 1 * i l l a l o n g h
a n p os te d thems e l ve s a t the corne r o f S a ip on a nd 3cA rthur 4 ig h
% a y t o a % a i t T u d t u d s arrival$ All %ore civilian clothes$ A"out 5 22 p$m$, 6 men
disem"ar.ed from a "usand helped each other carry a carton mar.ed “7ing )la.es$ Standing some -
feeta%ay from the men, P(1 Desierto and P(1 )loreta o"served that one of the men8t Tudtud s
description$ The same man also toted a plastic "ag$ P(1 )loreta andP(1 Desierto then approached
the suspects and identi8ed themselves as policeo cers$ P(1 Desierto informed them that the police
had received information
thats t o c . s o f i l l e g a l d r u g s % o u l d " e a r r i v i n g t h a t n i g h t $ T h e m a
n %ho
r e s e m " l e d Tudtud s description denied that he %as carrying any drugs$ P(1 Desierto as.edh i
m if he could see the contents of the
" o : $ T u d t u d o " l i g e d , s a y i n g , “ i t % a s alright$ Tudtud opened the "o:
hims elf as his c ompa nion loo. ed on$ The "o: yie lded pieces of drie d 8s h,
"ene a th %hich %e re t%o "undles , one %rapped in
as triped plas tic "ag and anothe r in ne %s pape rs $ P(1 Des ie rto as. ed Tudtud
tou n % r a p t h e p a c . a g e s $ T h e y c o n t a i n e d % h a t s e e m e d t o t h e p o l
i c e o c e r s a s mari&uana leaves$ The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion,
informedthem of their rights and "rought them to the police station$ The t%o did not
resist$ The con8scated items %ere turned over to the Philippine #ational Police ;P#P<Crime
=a "ora tor y for e :am ina tion$ )orens ic tes ts on s pec imens ta. en from
thec o n 8 s c a t e d i t e m s c o n 8 r m e d t h e p o l i c e o c e r s s u s p i c i o n $ T
h e p las tic "a gc onta ine d >,62 2 g ra ms of m a ri&ua na le a ve s %hi le
t h e n e % s p a p e r s c o n t a i n e d another 592 grams$#oe l Tudtud and his
com pa nion, Dindo !ulong, %e re s u"s e? uentl y c ha rge d"e fore the ' TC o f Da va o
Cit y %ith ille ga l poss ess ion of prohi"ite d drugs $ @pona rra ignm ent, "oth
accus ed plea ded not guilt y$ The de fe ns e , ho%e ve r , res e r ve d their right to ?uestion
the validity of their arrest and the sei ure of the evidenceagainst them$ Trial ensued thereafter$
Tudtud, denying the charges against them,cried frame/up$ S%ayed "y the prosecution s evidence
"eyond reasona"le dou"t,the 'TC rendered &udgment convicting "oth accused as charged and
sentencingthem to suBer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a 8ne of P-22,222$22$(n
a ppea l, #oe l Tudtud and Dindo !olong as s ign, a mong othe r e rrors ,
theadm iss ion in e vide nce of the m a ri&uana lea ve s , %hic h the y c la im %e re
s ei e d in violation of their right against unreasona"le searches and sei ures$
ISSUES
hetherornottheTudtud simpliedac?uiescence;Tudtud sstatementof
“it sa l l r i g h t %hen the police o cers re?uested that t
h e " o : " e o p e n e d < " e considered a %aiver
RULIN$S
#($ The right against unreasona"le searches and sei ures is s
e c u r e d " y Section 6, Article +++ of the Constitution$ The 'TC &usti8ed the %arrantless search
of appellants "elongings under the 8rst e:ception, as a search incident to a la%fularrest$ A
search incidental to a la%ful arrest is sanctioned "y the 'ules of Court$
+ti s s i g n i 8 c a n t t o n o t e t h a t t h e s e a r c h i n ? u e s t i o n p r e c e d e d t h
e a r r e s t $ ' e c e n t &urisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the searchE
the process cannot"e reversed$ #evertheless, a search su"stantially contemporaneous %ith
an arrestcan precede the arrest if the police have pro"a"le cause to ma.e the arrest at theoutset of
the search$ The ?uestion, therefore, is %hether the police herein had pro"a"le cause toa rres t
Tud tud , e t$ a l$ The long /s tand ing rule in this &uris d ic tion, a pp lied %ith
agreat degree of consistency, is that “relia"le information alone is not su cient
to &ustify a %arrantless arrest under Section - ;a<, 'ule 11>$ The rule re?uires, ina dd ition, that
the accus ed pe rform s om e o ve rt a c t tha t %ould ind ica te tha t he“has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an oBense$ ) o r t h e e : c e p t i o n
i n S e c t i o n - ; a < , ' u l e 1 1 > t o a p p l y , t h i s C o u r t r u l e d , t % o e lements
m us t c oncur ;1< the p e rs on to "e a rres ted mus t e :ec ute an o ve rt
ac ti n d i c a t i n g h e h a s & u s t c o m m i t t e d , i s a c t u a l l y c o m m i t t i n g , o r
i s a t t e m p t i n g t o commit a crimeE and ;6< such overt act is done in the presence or %ithin
the vie%of the arresting o cer$ 'elia"le information alone is insu cient$ Thus, herein,
inn o s e n s e c a n t h e . n o % l e d g e o f t h e a r r e s t i n g o c e r s
t h a t T u d t u d % a s i n p oss ess ion of m a ri&uana "e des cri"ed as
“pe rs ona l, ha ving lea rned the s ame only from their informant Solier$ Solier, for his
part, testi8ed that he o"tained hisinformation only from his neigh"ors and the friends of Tudtud$
Solier s informationis hea rs a y$ Confronte d %ith s uc h a du"ious inform ant, the
p olice pe rhaps fe lt itnecessary to conduct their o%n “surveillance$ This “surveillance,
it turns out, did not actually consist of sta.ing out Tudtudt o c a t c h h i m i n t h e a c t o f
p l yi ng his i lle g a l t ra de , "ut o f a me re “g a the ring
of information from the assets there$ The police o cers %ho
c o n d u c t e d s u c h “surveillance did not identify %ho these “assets %ere or the "asis of
the latter sinformation$ Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
.no%ledge$)inally, there is an eBective %aiver of rights against unreasona"le searches
ands e i ures onl y i f the follo%ing re?uis ites a re p res ent ;1< +t m us t a ppea r
tha t the rights e:istE ;6< The person involved had .no%ledge, actual or constructive, of
thee:istence of such rightE ;>< Said person had an actual intention to relin?uish theright$ 4e re ,
the p ros ecution fa ile d to es ta"lis h the s econd a nd third re? uis ites $ 'ecords
disclose that %hen the police o cers introduced themselves as such
andr e ? u e s t e d T u d t u d t h a t t h e y s e e t h e c o n t e n t s o f t h e c a r t o n " o
: s up pos e d l yc onta ining the m ar i&ua na , Tud tud s a id “it %as al ri
g h t $ 4 e d i d n o t r e s i s t a n d openedthe"o:himself$ TudtudFs implied ac?uiescence, if at
all, could not have "een more than merepass i ve c onform it y g i ve n und e r c oe rc i ve
or intim ida ting c ircums tances and is ,t h u s , c o n s i d e r e d n o c o n s e n t a t a
l l % i t h i n t h e p u r v i e % o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l guarantee$ Conse?uently,
TudtudFs lac. of o"&ection to the search and sei ure isnot tantamount to a %aiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary su"mission tothe %arrantless search and sei ure$ As the
search of TudtudFs "o: does not comeund e r the recogni ed e :cep tions to a va lid
%a rra ntless s earc h, the ma ri&ua na leaves o"tained there"y are inadmissi"le in evidence$
And as there is no evidenceother than the hearsay testimony of the arresting o cers and their
informant, theconviction of Tudtud, et$ al$ cannot "e sustained$
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search
warrant. The search warrant wassought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms, explosive materialsand subversive
documents were seized and taken during the search. Petitioners presented a Motion
for Consolidation, Quashal of SearchWarrant and For the Suppression of All IllegallyAcquired Evidence. However, the court
denied the quashal of the search warrant and the validityof which warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelineswhichprovidesthatsearchwarrantscanbeservednotonlywithintheterritorialjurisdictionoftheissuingcourtbutanywhereinthe
judicialregionoftheissuingcourt.
ISSUE:
W/N a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense
committed outside its territorialboundaryand,thereafter,issuethewarrant toconductasearchonaplaceoutsidethecourt's
supposedterritorialjurisdiction
HELD:
A warrant,suchasawarrantofarrestorasearchwarrant,merelyconstitutesprocess.
A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction asan order in writing issued in the name of the People of the
Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him tosearchforpersonalproperty
andbringitbeforethecourt.
5 Asearchwarrantisinthenatureofacriminalprocessakintoawritofdiscovery. Itisaspecialandpeculiarremedy,drasticinitsnature,and
made necessary because of a public necessity.A judicial process is defined as a writ,warrant , subpoena, or
other formal writing issued by authority of law. It is clear, therefore, that a searchwarrantismerelyajudicial
processdesignedbytheRulestorespondonlytoanincidentinthemaincase,ifonehasalreadybeeninstituted,orinanticipationthereof.Since
a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expresslyor impliedly
provides a jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover, in our jurisdiction,
no period is provided for theenforceabilityof warrantsofarrest,andalthough within tendays fromthedeliveryofthewarrantof
arrestforexecutionareturnthereonmustbemadetotheissuingjudge, saidwarrantdoesnotbecome functus officio butisenforceable
indefinitelyuntil the same is enforced or recalled.The following are the guidelines when there are possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the
criminalcaseis pending in one courtand thesearchwarrantis issuedbyanothercourt for theseizure ofpersonalpropertyintended to be
used as evidence in said criminal case:1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary
jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application
for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that theapplicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which mayor maynot give due course to the
applicationdependingonthevalidityofthejustificationofferedfornotfilingthesameinthecourtwithprimaryjurisdictionthereover.2. When
the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be
resolved by said court, withoutprejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court
by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds andobjections
then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for
the quashal of the warrant, otherwisetheyshallbedeemedwaived.3.Wherenomotiontoquashthesearchwarrantwasfiled
in or resolved bythe issuing court, the interested partymaymove in the court wherethe criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidenceofthepersonalpropertyseizedunderthe warrantifthesame isofferedtherein forsaid purpose. Since two separate
courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant
and amotion to s uppress e vide nce a re a lte rna ti ve a nd not c umulati ve
re medies . In orde r to pre ve nt forum s hopping, a m otion
to quas h s ha llc ons eque ntl y
be go ve rne d b y the omnibus motion rule , pro vide d, howe ve r , tha t objec tions n
ot a va i la ble , e xis te nt or known during theproceedings forthequashalof the warrantmaybe raisedin the
hearingofthemotiontosuppress. Theresolutionofthecourtonthemotiontosuppressshalllikewisebesubjecttoanyproperremedyinthe
appropriatehighercourt.4 . W here the c ourt whi ch is s ued the s ea rch wa rra nt de nies the
m otion to quas h the s ame a nd is not othe rwis e pre ve nted from furthe rproceeding
thereon,allpersonalpropertyseizedunderthe warrantshallforthwith betransmittedbyitto thecourtwherein thecriminalcaseispending,
withthenecessarysafeguardsanddocumentationtherefore.
1
MylaRuthN.Sara
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed intwoormorecourtswithconcurrentoriginaljurisdictionoverthecriminalaction.Where
the issue of which court wil trythe case shall have beenresolved, such court shall be considered as vested with
primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminalcase.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED
.
MARQUEZ vs. DESIERTO
LOURDES T. MARQUEZ vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, et al.
G.R. No. 135882
June 27, 2001
En banc
FACTS:
In May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated
April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to
various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) Julia Vargas Branch where
petitioner was the branch manager. The accounts to be inspected were involved in a case pending
with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al,
for violation of RA 3019 Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public
Estates Authority and AMARI. The Order was grounded on Section 15 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) which provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman,
to wit:
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therein.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank
Deposits (R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law
in this regard.”
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts was a trail of
managers checks (MCs) purchased by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending
with the office of the Ombudsman. It appeared that Trivinio purchased on May 2 and 3, 1995, 51 MCs
for a total amount of P272.1 Million at Traders Royal Bank (TRB) UN Ave. Branch. Out of the 51 MCs,
eleven 11 MCs in the amount of P70.6M were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the
UBP.
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met with petitioner Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the bank’s
main office in Makati City, for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino to view the checks
furnished by TRB. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty. Macalino advised
Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera inspection
set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, Marquez wrote the Ombudsman that the accounts in
question could not readily be identified since the checks were issued in cash or bearer, and asked
for time to respond to the order. Marquez surmised that these accounts had long been dormant,
hence were not covered by the new account number generated by the UB system, thus sought to
verify from the Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of these accounts. opening of the bank account for inspection.

The Ombudsman, responding to the request of Marquez for time to comply with the order, stated that Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "every person
UBP-Julia Vargas, not Interbank, was the depositary bank of the subject TRB MCs as shown at its shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons"
dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippine Clearing House. Notwithstanding the fact that the and punishes as actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It
checks were payable to cash or bearer, the name of the depositor(s) could easily be identified since also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation
the account numbers where said checks were deposited were identified in the order. of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer, the
Even assuming that the accounts were already classified as dormant accounts, the bank was still revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense
required to preserve the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual
required by existing banking rules and regulations. Property Code.
On June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing Marquez to produce the bank documents
relative to the accounts in issue, stating that her persistent refusal to comply with the order is Ombudsman is ordered to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank Manager Lourdes T. Marquez,
unjustified, was merely intended to delay the investigation of the case, constitutes disobedience of or or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14, 1998, and similar orders.
resistance to a lawful order issued by the office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section
3(b) of R.A. 6770.
On July 10, 1998, Marquez together with UBP filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and G.R. No. 185125 January 30, 2012
injunction with the Makati RTC against the Ombudsman allegedly because the Ombudsman and other Ruben Del Castillo
persons acting under his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents vs.
relative to the accounts in question. Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another People of the Philippines
order stating that unless she appeared before the FFIB with the documents requested, Marquez would Facts:
be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of justice. Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu, police
officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after conducting surveillance and test-buy operation
The lower court denied petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order stating that since at the house of petitioner, secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of
petitioner failed to show prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside Del Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run
the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no writ of injunction may be issued by the RTC to towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail,
delay the investigation pursuant to Section 14 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989. because he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went
back to the residence of Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house of petitioner
On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt. On August 31, including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men who searched the
1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from
ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. Petitioner the nipa hut several articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
likewise reiterated that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425
wanted to be clarified as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the
particularly RA 1405. Supreme Court the petition for certiorari contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed
ISSUES: to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Marquez may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 by mere
documents requested by the Ombudsman. presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over the place where the shabu was found?
2. Whether or not the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned Held:
account is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (RA 1405). No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
HELD: property is under petitioner’s control or possession. The records are void of any evidence to show
that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure
An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (RA 1405) would reveal the following exceptions: as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due
1. Where the depositor consents in writing; to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.
2. Impeachment case; The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and presence of the
3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials; drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drugs. With the
4. Deposit is subject of litigation; prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there
5. Sec. 8, R. A. No. 3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions, he is
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such constitutional presumption of innocence.
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that “Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of
Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be “absolutely confidential” except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is
specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground
to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit
provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the
exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation”

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is
existing is an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the
Ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo,
et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending case in court which would warrant the