By WALTER LIPPMANN

and CHARLES MERZ

Pre+amd wd the assistance of
FAYE LIPPMANN

A n examination 0 f th e news reports in

the New York Times on aspects of
the Russian Revolution of special
importance to Americans
Mar& lSW-=-March 1920

INTRODUCTION VII. THE KOLCHAK OFFENSIVE

I. TO THE JULY OFFENSIVE VIII. DENIKIN
II. PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM IX. THE DENIKIN OFFENSIVE
III. WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIA X. THE WEST FRONT
IV. FOR INTERVENTION XI. OFFENSIVE AGAINST POLAND
V. THE FRONT CHANGES XII. INTERVENTION FAILS
VI. KOLCHAK DEDUCTIONS

A Su~&nent to
The New Republic of August 4th 1920
Vol. XXIII. PART II. No. 296
“Enlighten me now, 0 Muses, tenants of Olympian
homes,
For you are goddesses, inside on everything, know
e\.erything.
But we mortals hear only the news, and know
nothing at all.
ILIAD 11 484-86.
 A Test of the News
BY WALTER LIPPMANN AND,CHARLES MERZ

Cont ents
INTRODUCTION .............................. . 1 VII. THE KOLCHAK OFFENSIVE.. ... .. .. .. ... 22
I. TO THE JULY OFFENSIVE ................ . 4 The Offensive Starts......................... 22
Kolchak Triumphant ....................... . 24
Two Views of Russia’s Power ................ . 4 Disillusion ................................ . 24
Reputable and Disreputable ................... . 5 Re-Enchantment ...................... ..: .. . 25
II. THE PRELUDE TO BOLSHEVISM .......... . 6 The Strategic Withdrawal .................. . 26
Misleading Optimism ......................... . 6 The End of the Kolchak Myth .............. . 26
The Quest of a Dictator-Savior ...............
The Kornilov Rebellion VIII. DENIKIN ................................ 27
...................... : 87
The End of Kerensky ........................ Democracy in the Ukraine .................. . 27
. 9
The Picture Fades ......................... . 28
III. THE WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIA .......... 10
Would the Soviets Last?. ..................... . 10 IX. THE DENIKIN OFFENSIVE ............... . 28
During the Parleys at Brest-Litovsk ........... . 11 The Spring of 1919 ......................... . 29
Faith in the Bolsheviks Disappears ............ . 13 Midsummer ............................... . 29
Denikin’s Farthest North ................... . 30
IV. THE APPEAL FOR INTERVENTION ....... . 13 Denikin in Retreat ......................... . 31
The German Peril ........................... . 14
The True Voice of Russia .................... IS X. THE WEST FRONT ...................... . 32
The Push for Intervention .................... 15 The Spring Offensive ....................... . 32
V. THE FRONT CHANGES The Second Victory ........................ . 33
.................... . 16
Something to Fight For ....................... . 17 XI. THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST POLAND .... . 34
Red Peril .................................... . 18 XII. WHEN INTERVENTION FAILED ......... . 36
VI. KOLCHAK ................................. . 19 Dr. Nansen ................................ . 37
The Man On Horseback ....................... ,: 19
20 War’s End ................................. . 38
Recognition ................................. Red Peril Again ........................... . 40
Kolchak in Power ............................ . 21 DEDUCTIONS ................................. . 41

Introduction
I T is admi’tted that a sound public opinion can- makeup of the news in the Times is technically
not exist without access to the news. There
is today a widespread and a growing doubt
mirable, third, because the Times
enormous convenience to any student of contem-
whether there exists such an access to the news porary history, fourth, because the bound volumes
index is an
ad-

about contentious affairs. This doubt ranges from are easily accessible, and fifth, because the Times
accusations of unconscious bias to downright charges is one of the really great newspapers of the world.
of corruption, from the belief that the news is col- The Russian Rev801ution was selected as the topic,
ored to the belief that the news is poisoned. On so because of its intrinsic importance, and because it
grave a matter evidence is needed. The study which has aroused the kind of passion which tests most
follows is a piece of evidence. It deals with the re- seriously lthe objectivity of reporting.
porting of one great event in the recent history of The first question, naturally, is what constitutes
the world. That event is the Russian Revolution the test of accuracy. 3 A definitive account of the
from March, 1917, to March, 1920. The analysis Russian Revolution does not exist. In all prob-
covers thirty-six months and over one thousand is- ability it will never exist in this generation. After
sues of a daily newspaper. The authors have ex- a hundred years there is no undisputed history of
amined all news items about Russia in that period the French Revolution, and scholars are still de-
in the newspaper selected; between three and four bating the causes and the meaning of the revolt
thousand items were noted. Little attention was of the Gracchi, the fall of Rome, and even of the
paid to editorials. American Revolution and the American Civil War.
The New York Times was selected as the A final history of the Russian Revolution may never
medium through which to study the news, first be written, and even a tolerably settled account is
because the Times, as great as any newspaper in not conceivable for a long time. It would be foot-
America, and far greater than the majority, has less therefore to propose an absolute measurement
the means for securing news, sec,ond, because the of news gathered amid such excitement and con-
---w - -
2 THE NEW REPUBLIC Azdgust 4, 1920

fusion. It would be equally vain to accept the ac- would support Allied intervention. It was important
count of one set of witnesses in preference to any to know whether the Soviet Government was bound
other set. to collapse soon under Allied pressure. It was im-
i The “whole truth” about Russia is not to be portant to know whether the White Generals-
had, and consequently no attempt is made by the Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenitch were, or were not,
/’ /
authors to contrast the news accounts with any winning their campaigns. It was important to know
other account which pretends to be the “real truth” whether Poland was defending herself or invading
or the “true truth.” A totally different standard Russia. It was important to know the disposition
of measurement is used here. The reliability of of the Soviet Government toward peace at the time
the news is tested in this study by a few definite of the peace conference. It was important to know
and decisive happenings about which there is no whether there was a Red Peril before Allied troops
dispute. Thus there is no dispute that the offensive entered Russia, or whether that peril dates from the
of the Russian army under Kerensky in July 1917 German surrender. It was important to know
was a disastrous failure; no dispute that the Pro- whether the Red regime was tottering to its fall
visional Government was overthrown by the Soviet or marching to the military conquest of the world.
power in November 1917; no dispute that the On each one of these questions depended some
Soviets made a separate peace with Germany at aspect of policy involving lives, trade, finance, and
Brest-Litovsk in March 19 18 ; no dispute that the national honor. It is important now to know what
campaigns of Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch was ‘the net effect of the news on these points.
were a failure; no dispute that the Soviet G,overn- For the reader’s convenience certain tentative
ment was still in existence in March 1920, Against conclusions from the evidence are stated here:
such salient facts the daily reports about Russia I. From the overthrow of the Czar to the failure
in this period are measured. The only question of the Galician offensive in July 1917.
asked is whether the reader of ;the news was given The difficulties in Russia, and especially
a picture of various phases of the revolution which in the Russian army, are not concealed
survived the test of events, or whether he was from the attentive reader, but the domi-
misled into believing that the outcome of events nant tendency of the captions and the
would be radically different from the actual out- emphasis ‘is so ‘optimistic as to be mis-
come. leading. (See Section I.)
The question of atrocities and of the merits or 2. From the military disaster in July 1917 to
demerits of the Soviets is not raised. Thus, for the Bolshevik revolution of N,ovember.
example, there was a Red Terror officially pro- The difficulties of the regime play a bigger
claimed by the Soviet Government in the summer part in the news, but a misleading opti-
of I 9 I 8 ; and apart from the official terror, excesses mism still continues. In this period, the
occurred in many parts of Russia. No attempt is tendency to seek a solution through a
made here to sift the truth of the accounts, to de- dictator-savior appears in the mistaken
termine whether there were exaggerations, or how hope placed upon the Kornilov ad-
far the White Terror equalled the Red Terror. venture, a hope quickly falsified by his
The attempt is not made because no dependable collapse. It may fairly be said that the
account is available with which to measure the news growth of ,the Bolshevik power from July
reports. There was a round measure of truth in to November must have been seriously
the report of terror and atrocity. For analogous underestimated in view of the success of
reasons no discussion of the virtues and defects the November coup. (See Section II.)
of the Soviet system is attempted. There are no 3. From the Bolshevik revolution to the ratifi-
authoritative reports. Able and disinterested ob- cation of the treaty of Brest-Litovsk.
servers furnish contradictory evidence .out of which This period is on the whole the best in
no objective criteria emerge. Under these cir- the three years. Different points of view
cumstances an accurate report of the Soviet Govern- are ,given, and the emphasis is generally
ment and the Terror is no doubt more than could neutral. After the recovery from the
have been expected from a newspaper. shock of ,the second revolution, the re-
But what might more reasonably have been ex- ports are inspired by an eager curiosity
pected and what was more immediately important about the diplomatic battle between the
for Americans, was to know in the summer of 19 17 Bolsheviks and the enemy. At the height
whether the Russian army would fight, and whether of this diplomatic battle the news is
the Provisional Government would survive. It was handled in a rather ur&tically pro-
important to know in the winter of 1917-18 wheth- Bolshevik fashion, as a result of the
er the Soviet Government would make a separate optimistic assumption that the Soviets
peace. It was important to know in the spring and would refuse to make peace with
early summer of 1918 whether the Russian people Germany. (See Section III.)
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 3
4. Fr,om the ratification at Brest-Litovsk, which This deduction is more important, in the opinion
coincided approximately with the Great Ger- of the authors, than any other. The chief censor
man <offensive in March 1918, to the decision and the chief propagandist were hope and fear
for Allied intervention in August 1918. in the minds of reporters and editors. They
Under the stress of disappointment and wanted to win the war; they wanted to ward ofI
danger the tone and quality of the news bolshevism. These subjective obstacles to the free
change radically. Organized propaganda pursuit of facts account for the tame submission of
for ‘intervention penetrates the news. This enterprising men to the objective censorship and
propaganda has two phases. There is a propaganda under which they did their work. For
short and intense period in late March subjective reasons they accepted and believed most
and early April, which stops rather sud- of what they were told by the State Department, the
denly with the announcement that the so-called Russian Embalssy in Washington, the
President has decided against interven- Russian Information Bureau in New York, the
tion. There is a prolonged and intense Russian Committee in Paris, and the agents and
period beginning about May which cul- adherents of the old regime all over Europe. Fo;
minates in ,the American approval of in- the same reason they endured the attention of
tervention. (See Secti,on IV.) officials at crucial points like Helsingfors, Omsk,
5. The months immediately following the sign- Vladivostok, Stockholm, Copenhagen, London and
ing of the armistice. Paris. For the same reason they accepted reports
The Red Peril, which had hitherto of governmentally controlled news services abroad,
played #only an insignificant rble, now and of correspondents who were unduly intimate
takes precedence in the news from Russia with the various secret services and with members
and serves as a new motive for Allied of the old Russian nobility.
intervention. (See Section V.) From the point of view of professional journal-
6. The Spring, Summer and Autumn of 19 19. ism the reporting of the Russian Revolution is noth-
Kolchak, Denikin and Yudenitch are ing short of a disaster. On the essential questions
heralded as dictator-saviors of Russia ; the net effect was almost always misleading, and
for their campaigns, extravagant claims misleading news is worse than none at all. Yet
are made- when they are moving for- on the face of the evidence there is no reason to
ward; in retreat there is a steady as- charge a conspiracy by Americans. They can fairly
surance that ,a better turn is coming. be charged with boundless credulity, and an untiring
(,See Sections VI, VII, VIII, IX and X.) readiness to be gulled, and on many occasions with
Meantime the world is warned against a downright lack of common sense.
a Russian invasion of Poland-though Whether they were “giving the public what it
Polish troops are as a matter of fact wants” or creating a public that took what it got,
deep in Russian soil. (See Section XI.) is beside the point. They were performing the
7. The Winter of 1919-20 and the Spring of supreme duty in a democracy of supplying the in-
1920. f’ormation on which public opinion feeds, and they
Once more, with the failuresof the White were derelict in that duty. Their motives may have
Armies, the Red Peril reappears. been excellent. They wanted to win the war; they
The news as a whole is dominated by the hopes wanted to save the world. They were nervously
of the men who composed the news organization. excited by exciting events. They were baffled by
They began as passionate partisans in a great war the complexity of affairs, and the obstacles created
in which their own country’s future was at stake. by war. But whatever the excuses, the apologies,
Until the armistice they were interested in defeat- and the extenuation, the fact remains that a great
ing Germany. They hoped until they could hope people in a supreme crisis could not secure the
no longer that Russia would fight. When they saw minimum of necessary information on a supremely
she could not fight, they worked for intervention important event. When that truth has burned it-
as part of the war against Germany. When the self into men’s consci,ousness, they will examine
war with Germany was over, the intervention still the news in regard to other events, and begin a
existed. They found reasons then for continuing searching inquiry into the sources of public opinion.
the intervention. The German Peril as the reas,on T’hat is the indispensable preliminary to a funda-
for intervention ceased with the armistice; the Red mental task ,of the Twentieth Century: the insur-
Peril almost immediately afterwards supplanted it. ance to a free people of such a supply of news that
The Red Peril in turn gave place to rejoicing over a free government can be successfully administered.
the hopes of the White Generals. When these In devoting so long a study to the work of a
hopes died, the Red Peril reappeared. In the large, single newspaper the authors have proceeded with-
the news about Russia is a case ‘of seeing not what out animus against the Times, and with much ad-
was, but what men wished to see. miration for its many excellent qualities. They
 .

4 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

trust that the readers of this report, among them nothing were to be accomplished beyond a score in
the proprietors and editors of the “Times,” will the duel between liberal and conservative, then this
not regard it as an “exposure” of the Times, report would not have been made. Something much
but as a piece of inductive evidence on the problem greater is at issue, for the reliability of the news
of the news. The authors do not wish to imply, is the premise on, which democracy proceeds.
because honestly they do not believe, that the less A great .newspaper is ,a public service in-
conservative press is necessarily more reliable. As stitution. It occupies a position in public life fully
editors of a liberal weekly journal they know from as important .as the school system or the church
experience that there are large glass windows in or the organs of government. It is entitled to
their own house, and they are keenly aware of the criticism, and subject to criticism, as they are. The
fact that reliability is harder to attain in the haste value of such criticism is directly proportionate to
of a daily newspaper than in the greater delibera- the steadiness with which the ultimate end of a
tion of a periodical. If, consequently, nothing were better news system is clearly and dispassionately
at stake but the question of praise and blame, if kept in mind.

I. To the July Offensive

The Russian Revolution occurred during the ficial Russian C,ommuniq& (per British Admiralty
war with Germany. It was an event that affected per Wireless Press, Petrograd, July 22) said of
immediately and directly the lives, the fortunes, the disaster: “This is the result of the instabil-
and the dearest hopes of all nations engaged in ity of our troops, disregard for military orders,
the war. The Revolution began during the second and the propaganda of the Maximalists.” What
week of March in the year 1917. This date is had the news for the weeks from March to July
highly significant. It is about six weeks after the been ?
German Government had announced unlimited sub-
marine war, and six weeks after the rupture of
diplomatic relations by America. The Allies were Two Views of Russia’s Power
confronted at the same moment by the uncertainty
The Times of March 16 published the report
as to what Russia and what the United States
of the successful revolution. Together with ad-
would do. The United States was in the act of
mirably full accounts of events in Petrograd, there
making up its mind to begin to fight. The
began a series of semi-editorial news dispatches.
question which dominated all the news out of
Thus (special cable to the New York Times, Lon-
Russia was whether the Russians would continue
don, March 16) :
to fight.
Thus, the circumstances of the Revolution were “AS the sifuation is explained to The New York
not such as to invite impartial inquiry. What the Times correspondent, the revolution simply means
reader of newspapers was chiefly concerned about [italics ours] that German sympathizers within the
was the fighting power ,of Russia on the great east- Russian Government have been overthrown, and that
ern front. He could hardly have expected a cur- no chance remains for a separatepeacebeing secretly
rent history of so vast a revolution. arranged with Germany. This, it is felt, is the real
He did ex-
basis of the revolution. . . ,”
pect, and he had reason to demand, reliable reports
about the morale and strength of Russia’s armies. Such was the official public British theory. In the
For on those reports he had t,o arrive at judgments same issue Mr. Bonar Law (unidentified dispatch
of supreme practical importance. from London, March IS*) was quoted as saying
The reliability of the news for the first four that the ievolution was due to Russia’s pur-
months can fairly be measured by this one con- pose to fight the war out. This was, of course,
crete test: did it give a tolerably true account of not a statement of fact, but the expression of a
Russia’s military strength? Did the news lead to wish.
correct or incorrect expectations? This wish was father to much of the news which
The actual military power of Russia was tested followed for several months. Concurrently, there
against Germany just once. In July 1917, about were, however, other interpretations of the Revolu-
three and a half months after the Revolutionb tion. On Mar’ch 16 the Times published, of
the army attacked on a wide front in Galicia. After
a small initial success the offensive collapsed, the *A dispatch is called “unidentified” when it has no other
Germans attacked and pierced the Russian front; reference to source beyond place of origin and date. That
there were mutinies followed by a rout. The of- is,, the carrying
_ - agent
_ is not named.
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 5

course obscurely, an interview with Leon Trotzky: June 2, 3, 42y 5, 62, 7, g2, 9, 11, 13’~ 15, 16,
17, Ig2, ‘9, 212, 22, 23, 242, 2S2, 272,
CALLS PEOPLE WAR WEARY 282, 29, 302- 24 issues, 35 items.
Total 62 issues, 82 items.
BUT LEO TROTZKY SAYS THEY DO NOT WANT SEPA-
RATE PEACE Thus oftener than every other day for the whole
period the reader was assured that Russia would
Leo Trotzky, a Russian revolutionist now in fight, or that the Russian army was strong, or that
America, said last night in the office of the Novy the difficulties were being surmounted. Ordeal by
Mir . . . . that the committee which has taken the
battle proved all these assurances to be false.
place of the deposed Ministry in Russia did not rep-
Was a darker picture ever suggested? It was.
resent the interests or the aims of the revolutionists,
that it would probably be short lived, and step down In 49 different issues of the Times there were per-
in favor of men who would be more sure to carry for- haps 66 items of pessimistic character. Numer-
ward the democratization of Russia . . . . That the ically this seems to strike a tolerably even balance:
cause of the revolution was the unrest of the mass Optim’istic: 62 issues, 82 iitems.
of the people who were tired of war and that the Pessimistic: 49 issues, 66 items.
real object . . . . was to end war . . . . throughout
Europe. They do not favor Germany . . . . but wish
to stop fighting.” Reputable and Disreputable
Two days later, issue of March 18 (Berlin But closer examination of what has been included
March 17, by wireless to ‘the New York Times under “optimistic” and “pessimistic” reveals a far
via Tuckerton, N. J.) the Times printed a report greater discrepancy than the figures show. Take
saying that the general ‘opinion in Berlin was that for example the first day’s news (March 16).
the new government could not last long and that We have called optimistic the unidentified London
the lower classes were wishing for peace at any dispatch (March IS) quoting Mr. Bonar Law
price. that the revolution was due to Russia’s purpose to
fight the war out; we have also called optimistic the
There were thus two alternative theories: one
dispatch from London (March 16) printed on
the official Allied theory that Russia would fight;
the first page saying:
the other, ,the theory of an unknown Russian revo-
lutionist in New York and of “general opinion in “As the situation is explained to The New York
Berlin” that Russia would not fight. The bulk of Times correspondent, the revolution simply means
the news which followed appeared to sustain the that German sympathizers within the Russian Gov-
official theory. ernment have been overthrown . . . .”
Three and a half months elapsed to the Compare these authoritative pronouncements
offensive of July. The reader had by that with the “pessimistic” item printed at the foot of
time perused 107 issues of his paper, practically the fifth column of the fourth page quoting Leo
all of them containing news of the Rus- (sic) Trotzky from his New York office as saying
sian Revolution. He had received hints of that the people wished to stop fighting. Trotzky
profound economic disorder, of demoralization happened to be right, Mr. Bonar Law and the
in the army, and of confused dissatisfaction with people who interpreted the Revolution in London
the Allies. He was in a position to guess that the to the Times correspondent happened to be dead
striking power of Russia was not great, if he read wrong. But which interpretation was emphasized,
all the obscurely placed dispatches, read between and given the authority of the editors? The of-
the lines of the other dispatches, and sternly de- ficial and the optimistic, of course, against the ob-
clined to let his hopes govern his judgment. scure and the unpleasant. The unsatisfactory view
But if he read casually, and chiefly the captions was not suppressed, but it was ignored or played
and emphasized news, the impression of hopeful- down. This is characteristic of the news of the
ness, or at least of whistling to keep up hope, would period we are considering. The values placed upon
have been strong. Captions or prominent news on news items were wrong, wrong by the ultimate test
the following days all of them stated or implied a of battle.
Russian will to fight. It is easy to see how this came about. There
was an initial desire, shared by the editors and
March 16~, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 29, 302-9 readers of the Times, to have Russia fight, to se-
issues, 11 items. cure the military assistance of Russia without open-
April 2, 10, 12, 14, 18, 19~, 202, 21, 22, 242, ing up contentious questions of war aims, to smoth-
.28, 29, 302-13 issues, 17 items. er pacifist agitation. Conflicting estimates of Rus-
May 31 4, 7, 9, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, 212, sian strength and weakness came to the Times office.
23, 25, 282, 292, 31-16 issues, 19 One series was optimistic. The other pessimistic.
items. The optimistic series had the right of way.
‘6 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

Then, too, the sources of the optimistic reports Thus out of 82 optimistic items, 49 are from
were such as to commend themselves more readily friendly official sources, and the rest from respect-
to the credulity #of men who have high respect for able ones; out of 66 pessimistic items 36 are dis-
prestige. Out of 82 optimistic items approximately tinctly disreputable, and of the thirty remaining
49 emanated ‘directly from official sources includ- practically none contains more than a fragmentary
ing the Provisional Government, the American hint of the real difficulty ifi Russia as later revealed
State Depar,tment, Ambassador Francis, the Root by the collapse of the July offensive, the first Bol-
mission, etc. The remaining 33 are from sources shevik rebellion, and the ultimate fall of the Pro-
including 4 Reuter, I Harold Williams, 2 Herbert visional Government.
Bailey, I Special New York Times, I London It remains to be noted however that the optimis-
Times, 5 -London Daily Chronicle, 13 unidenti- tic items carried their own antidote to the sophisti-
fied, the rest scattering. cated reader. The very fact that it was necessary
When there were at least 49 official assurances to proclaim the solidarity and strength of Russia
and thirty odd more from sources of recognized every other day was a suspicious fact. Reiteration
authority in a period of 107 days it is not surpris- emphasized doubt, and tr.ained readers were ena-
ing that the net tone of the news about Russia was bled to reach conclusions quite opposite from those
optimistic. It is even less surprising when the insisted upon in the general intent of the news. But
character of the 66 pessimistic items is examined. what chance had they of persuading the casual
If we add together the distinctly unpopular and reader that Russian affairs required his earnest
therefore incredible sources, th’at is the German, the attention. Was the casual reader, absorbed in
Bolshevik, the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ our own war activities, not told about every
Deputies, and the items tagged and peppered with other day that he could afford to be compla-
epithets, the total is 36. cent ?

II. The Prelude to Bolshevism

Misleading Optimism tionary control into Bolshevik hands, and the next
day (September 20) the Moscow Soviet for the
The military weakness #of Russia was clear to first time refused a vote of confidence in the gov-
all observers on the spot after what Kerensky calls ernment of Kerensky. In five weeks that govern-
the “T,arnopol disgrace” of July 19. The condition ment had fallen.
of the army was explained by the Russian official Every shred of justification for complacent op-
communiqui (British Admiralty per Wireless Press, timism had ceased by July 19. The correspondents
Petrograd, July 22) ; the condition behind the lines in Russia abandoned it. Mr. Harold Williams,
was indicated by the abortive Bolshevik rebellion in the Times of July 28, speaks of “this hour of
of July 16-18. The most obvious facts rio longer national disgrace . . . how can Russia be saved . . .
justified the complacency which had dominated the the shameful collapse of (the) armies.” But
news. “Something” had to be done by somebody. though the Times of July 23 had printed a three
There were, roughly speaking, three parties con- column head saying:
tending for power; the Left led by the Bolsheviks, MUTINY ON RUSSIAN FRONT SPREADS
the center led by Kerensky, and the Right led by WHOLE LINE GIVING WAY
someone in the r&le of a Dictator-Savior. The
Bolshevik uprising of July was suppressed by Nevertheless ,the Times of July 28 carried the
Kerensky’s government. For the next two months following dispatch from Washington : “The State
the contenders, on the surface at least, are the Right Department has advices by cable that the defeat
and the Center parties. The Kornilov rebellion in of the Russian Army on the Galician front has had
September was the first of the many efforts of the a wholesome effect in Petrograd.”
Right to establish a Dictator-Savior. The rebellion Mea,ntime the headlines showed a continued op-
was easily put down by Kerensky. The government timism, ,as the following samples show:
had thus survived first an attack from the Left, and July 30 ARMY NOW RECOVERING
then an attack from the Right. But within a few
days of the suppression of Kornilov there is un- Jury 31 RUSSIAN ARMIES NOW STRIKING
mistakable evidence of the rise of the third power BACK
-that of the Bolsheviki. On September 19, six
days after the General’s capitulation, the Petrograd Aug. I RUSSIANS THROW GERMANS BACK
Soviet passed from Menshevik and Social Revolu-
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 7

Aug. 2 RUSSIANS ATTACK ON GALICIAN doubt there were minor successes, but the net
FRONT disaster was indisputable. Therefore the interlard-
ing of the news of big defeats with little resistances
Aug. 4 MINIMIZES CABINET CRISIS and verbal ,optimism must be described as confusing
in its total effect. The presentation of news values
Aug. 5 ROOT HAS FAITH RUSSIA WILL is eccentric, and distorts the main picture.
STAND

Aug. 7 TO FIGHT ON, SAYS FRANCIS The Q uest of a Dictator-Savior

NO EVIDENCE THAT RUSSIA INTENDS TO
QUIT But parallel with all this runs a great theme of
the Russian news: the theme of the Dictator-
Aug. 8 SEES RUSSIA SOON AS STRONG AS Savior and the strong man. This quest appears
EVER many times throughout the three years of the re-
volution dealt with in ‘this study. It culminates as
Aug. g WE CAN DEPEND ON RUSSIA WITH all the world knows, in Kolchak, Denikin, and
AID FROM US, ROOT SAYS Yudenitch, but it emerges long before. The first
choice of the correspondents, curiously enough, is
Aug. g RUSSIANS AGAIN ATTACK IN GALICIA Kerensky himself. The faith in Kerensky is short-
lived, but strenuous while it lasts:
Aug. 9 KORNILOV FIRM FOR WAR
July 24 KERENSKY MADE DICTATOR
Aug. 14 RUSSO - RUMANIANS TAKE 1,100 OF RUSSIA
TEUTONS PEASANTS YEARN FOR NEW MONARCHY

Aug. 15 PRESS TEUTONS BACK ON RUMAN- “Kerensky, who possessesall Peter the Great’s
IAN FRONT energy and twice his wisdom, is the national hero
. . . . It [a new Czardom] would give the imagina-
Aug. 15 TELLS KING GEORGE RUSSIA WILL tive peasants some one in whom to place that loyalty
FIGHT ON which they could never accord with the same enthus-
iasm to a blackcoated President.” (Herbert Bailey,
Aug. 18 RUSSO - RUMANIANS REPEL ALL SpeciaI to the New York Times, Petrograd, July 21.)
ATTACKS
That Kerensky did not altogether disdain the
Aug. 20 RUSSIANS REPULSE ATTACKS EVERY- role of strong man is indicated by his interview
WHERE to the Associated Press (issue of July 25) which
the Times heads:
Thus from the military rout in July
- _ to the verge -
of the Kornilov conspiracy, on the average once KERENSKY’S RULE TO BE MERCILESS
every other day, a certain show of optimism is
WILL BEAT RUSSIA INTO UNITY WITH BLOOD AND
made. It is derived from official reports of minor
IRON, IF NECESSARY, HE SAYS
engagements, from advices to the State Department,
and from the Russian Government. The persistent Mr. Harold Williams has at this time b.egun to
will to believe is illustrated by the Times of July cast about for a savior. Being better informed
24. The captions read as follows: than Mr. Bailey, he has never taken very seriously
RUSSIANS TAKE I,OCO PRISONERS the dictatorship of Kerensky. In the Times of July
26, he notes that the Council of Workmen’s
BREAK GERMAN LINE IN VILNA REGION and Soldiers’ Delegates attached a string to
DESPITE DEFECTION OF SOME REGIMENTS
Kerensky’s unlimited power by demanding an
BUT COLLAPSE IN GALICIA accounting not less than twice a week. And two
days later he is aware of “the brave commander
WHOLE FRONT DOWN TO THE CAR-
PATHIANS IN RETREAT-TARNOPOL GONE on the southwestern front, General Kornilov.”
Other correspondents present other guesses as to
Is it not just ,to say that the newspaper is a mis- where the saving force is to be found. Thus in
leading optimist which regards the capture of 1,000 the issue of August 31, the London Times cor-
prisoners as of greater significance than the col- respondent (Moscow, August 28), makes what
lapse of the whole front down to the Carpathians? appears to be the first sketch of the geographical
It was not always possible, of course, to extract area on which the counter-revolutions of Kolchak
hope out of a desperate situation, ‘but on fourteen and Denikin were later organized. Over a year
days out of twenty-two the Icaption writer succeeds. before the event he discovers that
On .the following dates he announces reverses: July
20, 21, 23, 26, 27, 28, 31, Aug. 3, x7, 23, 24. -No “The Knights of St. George, representing SO,OOO,-
8 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

ooo acres, (sic) have combined in military leagues military dictator acting as a savior of his country.
. . . . There is a solid (italics ours) block far ex- Kerensky in a proclamation*, also issued September
ceeding in size and population the combined strength 9, denounced him as a counter-revolutionist, rep-
of the Central Empires. From Lake Baikal to the resenting “a desire of some circles of Russian
Dniester, from the Don to the Persian border, loyal society to take advantage of the grave condition
sonsof Russia are ready to rise against the forces of of the state for the purpose of establishing in the
disintegration and defeat.” country a state of authority in contradiction to the
conquests of the revolution.” The rebellion was
The Times heads this dispatch:
proclaimed on September 9. By September 12 the
GREAT NEW POWER RISING IN RUSSIA Associated Press correspondent in Petrograd de-
No less interesting and prophetic is the appear- scribed the coup as a failure. Kornilov was sup-
ance of the first argument for external military pressed practically without bloodshed.
intervention in Russia. While Messrs. Bailey and Nevertheless the special correspondents showed
Williams and the London Times correspondent are their credulity about the possibilities of a military
looking for loyal Russians, the French authorities dictator. As early as July 3 I, the reporter of the
are thinking of the Japanese army. The Times of London Morning Post cables (New York Times
August 23, in a box on the first page, prints an of August 3) that “from intimations I have re-
unidentified dispatch from Paris, August 22, which ceived I gather that the fighting Generals have
says : placed before Kerensky what amounts to an ulti-
“The Figaro today asksif the moment has not ar- matum from the officers of Russia’s armies.” Note
rived for Japan to take further stepsin the war . . . . that the soldiers of Russia’s armies do not ppear.
The Petit Journal, in an editorial along the same On August 29 the Times carried, under h 1 adlines
lines . . . ., adds that never will the Japanesetroops
announcing “Hailed as Russia’s Savior,” ;j Mos-
be more needed on the Russian front than they are
cow dispatch reporting that “at present the name
today.” [Italics ours.]
of General Kornilov is on every tongue.” Mr.
The reader will note the common inspiration of Harold Williams, to be sure, noted in a cable pub-
these French newspapers and the synchronism ‘of lished the next day that the executives of the Coun-
the publication with the bad news of the German cil of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Delegates refused
offensive against Riga. With such estimates of to stand or to greet Kornilov at the Moscow Con-
the Russian problem in their minds, and with such gress.
prepossessions, it is not surprising that the news- But the bulk of the dispatches during the two
men were completely taken in by the Kornilov weeks following were highly optimistic. The
fiasco. counter-revolutionists were described as riding on
to glory. “Great New Power Rising in Russia,”
said a headline in the Times, August 3 I. “Kor-
The Kornilov Rebellion nilov commands confidence in military circles,”
The historical evidence about the affair is still cabled Mr. Charles H. Grasty on September II,
a matter of hot dispute, and there is much mystery “not only on his record as an officer, but because he
about the role of the various personalities who is a Cossack. This is the tribe around which intel-
figured prominently in the intrigue. This aspect ligent opinion in Western Europe has been cluster-
of the affair the correspondents did not report at ing hopefully f or several months past.” Lltalics
length, and could not have been expected to report. ours.]
But the facts which concerned the American reader News of the actual revolt was cabled that same
were simple. Did Kornilov represent the power day from London. “There is yet no indication of
of Russia? Were those who gathered ab,out him General Kornilov’s intentions,” said a special dis-
the effective substance of the nation? Was he, in patch to the Times, “but it is known that the Cos-
brief, the real thing, or a flash in the pan? sacks, the backbone of the Russian Army, are his
He was a distinguished officer of the General strong adherents.”
Staff, a Cossack, who had been appointed com- Ye:t two days later the Kornilov revolt was a
mander-in-chief by Kerensky himself after the de- confessed fiasco. “Kornilov Gives Up, Revolt
feat of July. According to his own proclamation,* Ends,” said a headline in the Times, September 14.
issued September 9, his purpose in rebelling against Where, one wonders, were the Cossacks who three
the Provisional Government of Kerensky and start- days before were “known” in London to be Kor-.
ing to march on Petrograd, was “the preservation nilov’s “strong adherents” and “the backbone of
of a Great Russia.” He swore “to carry .over the the Russian Army” ? A fortnight later Mr. Har-
people, by means of a victory over the enemy, to old Williams, in a special to the Times from Petro-
the Constituent Assembly at which it will decide its
own fate and choose the order of the new state * Printed in “The Prelude to Bolshevism,” by A. F.
life.” He was, in other words, to be a temporary Kerensky; Dodd, Mead, and -Company, rgrg.
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC ’ 9
grad, dated September 26, blurted out the follow- printed briefly Kerensky’s historic interview to the
ing : Associated Press : (Petrograd, November I.)
(The longer text was printed November 3.)
“The Kornilov affair has intensified mutual dis-
trust and completed the work of destruction. The RUSSIA WORN OUT, ALLIES MUST TAKE UP
Government is shadowy and unreal, and what per- BURDEN, KERENSKY SAYS
sonality it had has disappearedbefore the menace But the State Department in Washington knew
of the democratic conference. Whatever power there better: It issued a statement that:
is, is again concentrated in the hands of the Soviets,
and, as always happens when the Soviets secure a “There hasbeen absolutely nothing in the dispatches
monopoly of power, the influence of the Bolsheviks received by the DepartInent of State from Russia,nor
has increased enormously.” [Italics ours.] in information derived from any other source what-
ever, to justify the impressioncreated by the JVashing-
So runs the obituary by a friend of the first ton Post to-day . . . . that Russiais out of the conflict.”
Dictator-Savior.
In view of the fact that the Soviets seized the Now. 3 (Special to New York Times, Washing-
government six weeks after this dispatch was filed, ton, November 2.)

Mr. Williams had reported news of the first im- ‘<Russiais not out of the war. She is to make
portance. Does the news for the next six weeks, no separate peace. The Russian Embassy and the
the last weeks before the triumph of Bolshevism, State Department made this clear today.”
follow the lead given so clearly by Mr. Williams? Nov. 4 From London, Kerensky’s interview was
deprecated. (London, November 3.)
The End of Kerensky “The Petrograd correspondent of The Daily
The news out of Russia for the first ten days Telegraph, who is now in London, writes: ‘Premier
Kerensky’s statement seemsto have been taken a lit-
of October does not minimize the increasing diffi- tle too seriously in some quarters.’ ”
culties of the existing rkgime. But the news com- The Graphic (London) is quoted: “we should
ment out of Washington on October IO (unidenti- hate to regard the statements as authentic. They
fied dispatch from Washington, October 9)) is this: have the ring of pro-German propaganda.” [Italics
ours.]
“Russian diplomats here appear to be convinced
now that the Bolsheviks have been finally over- Nov. 6 On this day, the Times printed obscure-
thrown and that Premier Kerensky is once more ly on the fourth column of the fourth page the fol-
firmly establishedin the supreme power. lowing news of world-wide importance:
“It was said at the embassytoday that the Bol-
BOLSHEVIK PERIL ACUTE
sheviks were greatly discouraged by their first at- RUSSIAN RADICAL PACIFISTS
tempt to obtain control of the Government, on July EXPECT TO COME INTO POWER
8, when disturbances caused by them were sup-
pressedby the provisional authorities, and again dur- (London, Nov. 5). “At a meeting in Petrograd
ing the Kornilov movement, when the Bolsheviks on Saturday, as reported in an Exchange Telegraph
seized upon that occasionto overthrow the coalition dispatch from that city, representatives of the whole
administration. The action of the democratic con- Petrograd garrison passedunder the guidance and
ference in upholding the principle of a coalition influence of the Bolsheviks. . . .”
Cabinet was asserted to reveal the total defeat of The issues of November 7 and 8 carry the news
the extreme radicals.”
of the Bolshevik Revolution, culminating on No-
Nevertheless the correspondents in Russia are vember 9, with the six-column headline on the first
agreed as to the crisis, thus: page :

Oct. 13 RUSSIAN
CABINET IN HARD POSI- REVOLUTIONISTS SEIZE PETROGRAD;
TION KERENSKY FLEES
PLEDGE IS GIVEN TO SEEK “AN IMMEDIATE PEACE”
Oct. 15 DISORDERS GROWING AMONG THE
PEASANTS The reader who had ignored the State Depart-
Oct. 16 RUSSIAN FLEET IS DEMORALIZED ment and the Russian Embassy for the six weeks
Oct. 25 “The evening newspapers which publish preceding, and had read the news dispatches from
the program for the meeting of the Central Council Russia, had no reason to be surprised. The reader
of Soldiers’ and Workmen’s Delegates on Nov. 2 who had trusted official pronouncements was mis-
are filled with rumors of a Bolsheviki demonstra- led.
tion and an attempt to seize the Government. . . .” The Prsvisional Government having been over-
Oct. 28 RUSSIAN ROADS PARALIZED thrown by the Soviets, he was concerned in the
HANDLED LESS TRAFFIC IN SUMMER THAN weeks that followed, first, as to whether the
THEY DID LAST WINTER Bolsheviks would last, second, as to what they
Nov. 2 This was the day on which the Times would do about the war.
IO THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

III. The Withdrawal of Russia

regime or an intolerable one is not the question, nor
Would the Soviets Last? in fact has it ever been the important question in
Naturally there was doubt as to the stability of America’s relation to Russia. What mattered
this strange new regime. Russian experts in Amer- fundamentally in all those months of grave de-
ica were at once interviewed: cision was whether it was an enduring regime. The
Nov. 9. Herman Bernstein: historic fact is that the regime did endure for the
whole time we are now discussing. It may fall
“It can’t win . . . . for Lenin and Trotzky are both any day; it may last for a generation. That is of
extremely unpopular. They had a better chance no consequence. News reports in 1917, 1918,
last July . . . . the popular execration directed against
19 19, and early 1920 that the Soviets are about
Lenin . . . . was such as to convince me that he will
to collapse, or have collapsed, or will collapse
never be able to dominate the Russian people.”
within a few weeks is false news, and it will not
Mr. Alexander Sakhnovsky, Agent of the be true news if the Soviet regime should collapse
Zemstvos : late in 1920 or thereafter.
“A man like Prince Lvov would be considerably That the Soviet government could last only for
more useful, and I believe, from the reports I the moment was one of the most insistent of all
receive, that sentiment in Russia is setting in that themes in the news of Russia. Within a few days
direction. As for the Grand Duke Michael, he has after the November coup it had made its first ap-
always been very popular . . . .” pearance. On November 13 ( 19 17) the Times
A special dispatch to the Times (Washington, published a special dispatch from Washington, as-
November 8) declared : serting
“All doubt that the Maximalists in Petrograd will
“No doubt was expressed in diplomatic circles that be deposed has disappeared in Government and
the Allied Powers would recognize any Government diplomatic quarters here.”
formed to oppose the Bolsheviki . . . . MOSCOW was
regarded as the probable choice for the provisional It seemed only to be a question of who would fol-
capital, because all the elements there have been in low next:
sympathy with the Government as against the ex- “Officials are now debating whether Premier Ker-
tremist Socialists. Moscow also is held to be a more ensky, General Kornilov, or some other leader will
purely Russian city . . . .” take charge of the Government to rise out of the
The question of the stability of the Bolshevik ashes of Maximalist authority. The complete over-
throw of the Bolsheviki is predicted.”
regime is of course a fundamental question of the
Russian news. Correct information on that point Many times, in the months which followed, that
is the premise of correct information on many overthrow was predicted. No other note appeared
other great themes; the relation of Bolshevism to more faithfully and with emphasis so certain. In
Germany, the value and the possibility of military the two years from November, 1917, to Novem-
intervention, the prospects of the White Generals, ber, 1919, no less than ninety-one times was it
the reality of the Red Peril, and the problem stated that the Soviets were nearing their rope’s
of peace. For if the regime was temporary, then end, or actually had reached it.
its diplomacy as against Germany and the Allies In arriving at this computation no count is made
was not particularly significant, the possibility of of the ordinary reports that Russia was in chaos-
successful intervention was greater, the prospects though such reports of course implied a weaken-
of the White Generals were brighter, the menace ing in the prestige and authority of the government
was smaller, and the problem of peace might be attempting to wield power. What is counted, in
postponed. If on the other hand, the Soviet power arriving at the figure ninety-one, are reports more
was firmly rooted in the Russian people, then it explicitly reporting an early break-up. For in-
was Russia, and its diplomacy mattered enormous- stance, thirty different times the power of the Sovi-
ly, intervention was impracticable, the prospects of ets was definitely described as being on the wane.
the generals poor, the menace worth serious con- Twenty times there was news of a serious counter-
sideration, and peace a pressing matter. revolutionary menace. Five times was the explicit
The Soviet Government was still in existence in statement made that the regime was certain to col-
March, 1920, when this study closes. It had lasted lapse. And fourteen times that collapse was said
29 months up to that time and had brought all of to be in progress. Four times Lenin and Trotzky
Central Russia from the Arctic Ocean to the Cau- were planning flight. Three times they had al-
casus, as well as Siberia, at least to Lake Baikal, ready fled. Five times the Soviets were “totter-
under its jurisdiction. Whether it was a good ing.” Three times their fall was “imminent.” Once
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC II

desertions in the Red army had reached propor- major theme in a Wagnerian opera, comes this note
tions alarming to the government. Twice Lenin of Soviet impermanency. What its net effect has
planned retirement; once he had been killed; and been is plain. It has nourished the policy of lais-
three times he was thrown in prison. sez-faire. Creating the impression that a few days
Insistently appearing in the news, the steady more and there would be no Soviet power left to
repetition in these reports left its inevitable im- worry over, it helped postpone from month to
pression on the reader. How trustworthy were the month an insistence that in the face of definite fact
sources from which this material was drawn? the Allied statesmen must revaluate their policy of
The smaller part of it came via the shortest indecision, intervention and blockade.
route available: that is, as the observation of men
or of some group of men who, whatever their per-
sonal bias-even though it be the bias that might During the Parleys at Brest-
accompany a salary coming from some rival Rus-
sian faction -were at least cited by name as au-
Litovsk
thority for the news. That method accounts for The midwinter of 19 17-18 is worth more de-
twenty of the dispatches tallied in the present list. tailed examination, because it has a character of
On certain other occasions there was an official or its own.
pseudo-official source implied. Thus we have “ad- News items suggesting that the regime was tem-
vices to the State Department,” “officials of the porary appeared as follows. This tabulation is
State Department,” and “government and diplo- more inclusive than that asbove for reasons of fair-
matic sources in Washington”-each quoted in one ness which will be evident. It is more inclusive in
instance. Six more dispatches were drawn from that items merely suggesting weakness are ad-
statements or publications credited to the Soviet mi’tted, whereas they are excluded above.
government itself. That brings the total up to
November 94, 102, II~, 12~, 13~, 16, 17, 19~.
twenty-nine, all accounted for with sources possess-
December 2, IO, II~, 12, ‘7, ‘9, 21, 24, 27.
ing some measure of authority. Sixty-two are left.
January 9, 10.
And for those sixty-two there is less that can be
February 22, 7, 8, 9, 18~, 19, 20, 21~, 23, 25, 28.
said.
Totals :
The source of information, where cited, is
Items in November . . . . . . . . . .20
vague a,t best: “sources familiar with the Russian “
situation in its many phases” (London) ; a Stock- “ December . . . . . . . . . . . IO
“
holm dispatch to Paris; the opinion of some man “ January .... ........ 2
“
or group of men unnamed; “reports reaching Lon- “ February . . . . . . . . . . .14
don from Petrograd” ; “reports reaching London What strikes the eye immediately is the scarcity
from Peking and Copenhagen”; dispatches from of the items in January. The first of the two items
Copenhagen to the Exchange Telegraph Company, appeared January 9. It is a special to the New
London; correspondents of German newspapers, York Times from Harold Williams (Petrograd,
of Swedish papers and of Danish papers; unidenti- January 6) headed:
fied dispatches from Reval, from Geneva, from
Stockholm and from Helsingfors etc. Individual- RUSSIA SEEN ON VERGE OF UTTER COL-
ly the sending of a news dispatch based upon sec- LAPSE
PETROGRAD FACES FAMINE
ond-, third- or fourth-hand authority was a natural AND PARALYSIS, WHILE
enough procedure. A correspondent in Copen- ANARCHY REIGNS IN PROVINCES
hagen, perhaps, saw in some Danish journal a re-
port coming from Stockholm that someone else The second item on January IO is a dispatch
believed counter-revolution menaced the Soviet au- from the Petrograd correspondent of the London
thority. That was “news,” he judged, worth cab- Times, headed :
ling to America. Collectively, however, the re-
CRIME IS RAMPANT IN PETROGRAD
ports have no such incidental character. From
BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND MURDER COMMON-FOOD
the first days of Soviet power they have paint- SUPPLY IS GIVING OUT
ed a picture which the event itself has proved to
be misleading. They have prophecied what did Within a few days this picture of Russia was dis-
not happen. But they have left, in the minds of puted. CabIes from StockhoIm, London and Petro-
those who read them, an effect of real impor- grad reported that the Soviets had put their hands
tance. on fresh stores of food from the Ukraine, that they
Later themes find expression. At times the Red had successfully crushed a counter-revolution, and
Peril momentarily overshadows the conception of that in the opinion of Sir George Buchanan (British
Soviet power as an institution verging on collapse. Ambassador) Lenin was firm in the saddle, not
But over a space of many months, recurring like the to be overthrown for the present. The Soviets
I2 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

seemed to be gaining ground. In fact, on January Dec. 23 RUSSIA WON’T BOW BEFORE THE
29 headlines in the Times reported KAISER, TROTZKY INSISTS

ROMANOFFS AS BOLSHEVIK1 Dec. 26 TROTZKY PROTESTS AGAINST GER-

PROF. ROSS HEARS EX-CZAR’S DAUGHTERS MANS SHIFTING TROOPS
ARE CONVERTED TO CAUSE.

And this was the word that followed: Dec. 27 REPORT LENIN GIVES GERMANS
PEACE ULTIMATUM
“The Bolshevist movement is sincere, Professor
ROSSsaid, springing from the heart of Russia itself Dec.30 TERMS OF PEACE ROUSE THE FURY
and having as its object the liberation of the people,
Oi; PAN GERMANS
the establishment of world peace, and the institution
of a system of pure industrial socialism.”
Jan. 3 RUSSIAN STAND PLEASES LONDON
Thus the two dispatches indicating serious weak-
ness, are neutralized by news that the Soviets are Jan. 4 ALLIES NOW MAY RECOGNIZE LENIN
fairly strong. November and December preceding
Jan. 5 TROTZKY OPENED EYES OF GER-
report great weakness; so do the months following.
MANS
What is ‘there Ithat is peculiar about the month of
January, ISIS? Jnn. 7 BOLSHEVIKI’S STAND SHOCKS THE
Trotzky was debating with the Germans TEUTONS
at Brest-Litovsk and defying them; Lloyd
George made his speech proposing a con- Jan. 7 BOLSHEVIK1 MAY HELP ALLIES BEST
ciliatory peace; President Wilson announced
Jan. zz BOLSHEVISM SEEN AS NEW RELIGION
the Fourteen Points, with a most sympathetic ref-
erence to Russia. Is there any connection between Jan. 17 GREAT BRITAIN DECIDES TO TREAT
these events and the rather favorable view taken WITH LENIN
in the news of Russia’s stability? Let us examine
the manner in which the peace negotiations between The optimistic and friendly quality of these re-
Germany and Russia were handled. ports was no doubt a reflection of official opinion
During November, statements by Lenin and in England, and of Trotzky’s own opinions. The
Trotzky appear disavowing the idea of a separ- spell of Trotzky’s defiance at Brest-Litovsk per-
ate peace, (November 24, 26). On the other vades the news. Even Mr. Harold Williams is
hand Mr. Harold Williams states categorically temporarily under it, though he had written earlier
within three weeks of the revolution (Times of with hard realism that Russia would not and could
November 24, special dispatch from Petrograd, not fight. Mr. Arthur Ransome was even more
November 22, delayed) that the Russian masses thoroughly spell-bound. Trotzky was in good odor
were forcing the hands of the Bolsheviks by de- most of January, 1918. So good, in fact, that on
manding the execution of promises. In the issue January 20 the Times reported:
of Decem:ber 5 1Mr. Williams says (Special to
the Times from Petrograd, December 3) that: WHAT TROTZKY DID
WHEN IN NEW YORK
“The Bolshevist movement is by no means simple. INVESTIGATION FOR DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FAILS
It is a curious jumble of conflicting elements ranging TO SHOW HE RECEIVED GERMAN MONEY
from the purest idealism to German intrigue and 6‘
reactionary monarchism. These elements are tem- . . . . Attorney General Merton F. Lewis insti-
porarily agreed in a peace policy, and derive their tuted an investigation as to Trotzky’s activities dur-
authority from the strong pacifist tendencies of the ing that part of 1917 when he was in New York.
soldiers and Socialists and the pacifist mood of the The investigation was made at the request of the
u~orkmen. . . . In any case, the fact must be faced Department of Justice in Washington. Deputy At-
that, one way or the other, Russia, despite the will torney General Alfred R. Becker was in charge, and
of the best elements of the population, will have to the report of the investigation which is now com-
retire from the war. . . . We cannot contemptuously pleted is to the effect that no evidence was obtained
abandon this whole, great people because of a tem- to support any charge that Trotzky ever received any
porary fit of madness, the causes of which lie deep in German money while in New York.”
the history of years of oppression.” (Italics ours.) Two days later, however, Mr. Harold Williams in
Mr. Williams in subsequent dispatches emphasiz- a special dispatch from Petrograd interrupted the
ed the basic demoralization of Russia’s will to fight. optimistic series by reporting that the Bolsheviks
But as the parleys at Brest-Litovsk open, hope re- were a symbol of volcanic forces, that they were
vives with Trotzky in the center of the stage. Some not pacifists, and that they had stopped the war with
of the captions run as follows: Germany only. to kindle civil war.
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC I3
From the Revolution of March, 1917, to the
Faith in the Bolsheviks Dis- final collapse of the eastern front in early Febru-
appears ary, 1918, it is just to say that a strong bias is re-
flected in the presentation of the news. It is the
Hope that the Bolsheviks would somehow con- bias of hope, and this bias persistently plays down
tinue to fight faded rapidly by the end of January, news of Russia’s weakness and plays up announce-
and terminated abruptly on February 12 by the ments and events which sustain hope. There were
declaration of the Soviet government that the war plenty of exceptions, of course, and we have tried
was over. A new period opens almost immediate- faithfully to give them full value in what has pre-
ly. It is the period of the preparation for inter- ceded. We assert nothing more than the existence
vention. of a dominant tendency in the general course of the
Up to the time when Russia went out of the war news, a tendency contradicted by indisputable
the dominant tendency of the news is to be opti- events. Up to this point at least, we do not believe
mistic about the government in power. In their that on the face of the news any case appears point-
turn, Lvov, Milukov, Kerensky, Kornilov and ing to the existence of an organized propaganda
Trotzky had been reported as favorable to the working behind the censorship. The evidence, in
Allied cause. Even the Bolsheviks, denounced our opinion, disproves such a charge, and vindi-
while in opposition to Kerensky, were treated with- cates the good will of those who prepared and re-
out obvious prejudice once ‘they were established, ported the news. The difficulties revealed are pro-
and while they were still defying Germany. The fessional: where the news is misleading in the net
judgment of reporters and caption-writers was effect it is because the emphasis has been misplaced
governed, on the whole uniformly, by the will to by the powerful passions of a great war.
believe that Russia would assist the Allies. That The period which follows the withdrawal of
the events falsified this optimism again and again Russia shows a radical change in the character of
shows how strongly the wish intruded upon objec- the news. In order to understand that change it is
tive judgment. For while reporters in Russia did necessary to recall that the final loss of Russia was
advert on numerous occasions to the basic demoral- a frightful disappointment, that the German of-
ization of the war-weary people, those dispatches fensive of March was the supreme military crisis
flickered and disappeared in the prevailing desire of Ithe war. The period we are approaching now
to maintain an eastern front. That this motive was transcends all others in its desperate significance.
stronger initially than any hatred of Bolshevism, It begins with what looked to the western world like
any fear of the Red Peril, is shown rather emphat- downright betrayal, for the Allies stood face to
ically by the very friendly character of the news face with a Germany freed from Russian pressure
during the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. The in- on the eastern front. These facts bear heavily on
formal recognition of the Soviet Government by the quality of the news which follows. The pat-
Great Britain, the idealization of Russia contained riotic men who were engaged in furnishing the
in President Wilson’s address of January 8, ela- news about Russia had hoped in vain through
tion over the strikes in Germany and Austria, and a twelve anxious months. That the threshold of
good deal of war-weariness in Western Europe,- their credulity was almost immediately lowered
all coincide with news about Russia which is, to should surprise no one.
say the least, sympathetic to the Soviets.

IV. The Appeal for Intervention

On February I 2, 19 18, the Times published nomic resistance to German penetration. There
its obituary on Russia as a belligerent. On Feb- should be immediate steps in this important matter.
ruary 26 appeared the famous Grasty interview Don’t wake up after it is too late. Don’t wait until
with Foch. (Sp ecial to the New York Times, the enemy has too much of a start. . . .”
Paris, February 25) : Japanese and British marines landed at Vladi-
vostok early in April, and British troops on the
“If America will look ahead I am sure she will see Murman peninsula. Towards the end of May the
another field in which she can render immense service
Czechoslovak troops in Russia were in conflict with
without relaxing her efforts on the western front.
She should give her attention to the Orient. the Soviets. In July American troops were landed
America in Vladivostok; in August American troops were
“Germany is walking through Russia.
and Japan, who are in a position to do so, should go landed in Archangel. On August 4, 1918, the
to meet her in Siberia. Both for the war and after State Department issued its famous and puzzling
America and Japan must furnish military and eco- pronunciamento, saying : first that “military inter-
 G
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14 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

vention in Russia would be more likely to add to The Bolsheviks will not and cannot do this. The
the present sad confusion there than to cure it. . . .” problem is therefore to be solved by Allied, Jap-
Second, that “military action is admissible in Rus- anese, and American soldiers cooperating with Rus-
sia now only to render such protection and help as sian anti-Bolsheviks. The providential rebellion of
is possible to the Czechoslovaks against the armed the Czechoslovaks in May, June and July provides
Austrian and German prisoners who are attacking the nucleus.
them. . . .” Third, “to steady any efforts at self- This argument dominates the news in the Times
government or self-defense in which the Russians up to August, and more or less until the armistice
themselves may be willing to accept assistance. . . .” with Germany. The armistice, of course, destroy-
Fourth, “to guard military stores. . . .” Fifth, to ed the argument. But the intervention continued.
safeguard “the country to the rear of the westward- After the armistice intervention is justified by the
gnoving Czechoslovaks . . . .” Red Peril; before the armistice it is justified by the
Five and a half months intervened between the German Peril. Little fighting was done by Ameri-
withdrawal of Russia from the war and the formal can troops in Russia before the armistice. These
acceptance of the policy of intervention by the troops went to fight Germany and remained to fight
American Government. As early as April there Russians.
had been some intervention, but August 4 marks
the public and official triumph of the idea. What
was the character of the news in these months?
The German Peril
Ignoring all editorials, magazine features, etc., of The news looking towards intervention is thick-
which the volume was very large,. selecting only est from just after Foch’s interview to just before
from the news, we have noted about 285 items the great German offensive of March 21. It de-
bearing upon the problem of intervention. clines rather suddenly after the President had veto-
We have classified the 285 items according to ed the idea, and then begins again strongly in May
the theme they illustrate. Thus: with increasing intensity through June and July up
German Domination of Russia. . . . . .49 to the time of the President’s conversion. The first
Russian Anti-Bolshevism.. . . . . . . . . .34 unsuccessful phase in early March, 1918, is before
Japanese Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . .69 the fright caused by the German success. The sec-
Allied Intervention.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 ond successful phase coincides with the farthest ad-
American Intervention. . . . . . . . . . . . .26 vance of the Germans towards Paris. President
The Czechoslovaks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 I Wilson’s final decision on August 4 is four days
The Red Peril. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 before the day which Ludendorff calls the turning
Prisoners in Siberia Peril.. . . . . . . . . . 3 point of the war. Thus intervention was launched
Relief for Russia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 as part of the grand strategy of the war against
Japanese in Peril. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Germany. Th e news is all to that effect. “Sees
Guarding Stores.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Russia Now as Ally of Germany”-“Germans
Anti-Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Overrun Siberia”-“Germany Boasts an Open
That the Red Peril should have played so in- Route to India”-“German Leads Bolshevist Ar-
significant a part in the news at a time when the my”-“Bolsheviki Yield Russia’s Riches to Ber-
debate about imervention in Russia’s internal af- lin”-“Russians Sell Out to the Germans”-these
fairs was hottest is one of the curiosities of this are headlines typical of the items we have listed
history. It is also one of the most significant things under “German Domination of Russia,” in the
about it. The notion of a fundamental antagonism months between Russia’s withdrawal from the war
between the Soviet government and the American and the formal acceptance of the policy of inter-
is not insisted upon until after American troops vention by the American Government. Occasionally
are on Russian soil. (See Section V of this re- dispatches come through presenting another pic-
port.) ture. It is reported, for instance (as in the Times
The great reason for military action displayed on June 17), that Germany is finding her Russian
in the news is the German domination of Russia. venture somewhat disappointing in its results. But
It is Foch’s reason in February; it is Senator King’s these reports are not followed up, verified,
reason in his Senate resolution of June 10th; it is or insisted upon. The accepted news is ,that Ger-
Mr. Taft’s reason the same day. (Times of June many is dominating Russia. Assuming the sub-
I I.) The argument was simple : ,the eastern stance of this news to be true, there was still a
front is gone. Germany has an unblocked path practical question. Vladivostok was 5,000 miles
through Russia and Siberia to the Pacific, through from the old Russian front. The only other en-
Russia and the Caucasus to India. Germany will trance to Russia was on the Arctic Ocean. The
organize Russian resources and perhaps Russian Japanese alone had an army to use, if they were
man power; then she will win the war. Somewhere willing to use it, and they were over 5,000 miles
or other an eastern front must be reestablished. from Germany. Archangel and Murmansk were
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC I.5

gates to Russia, though bad ones, but there was no On August 22, the Allied governments issued
army of any size that could be diverted to that a statement at Archangel (Times, August 26) :
front before the armistice. All the other gates to
“The Allies, then, were called to Russia by the
Russia were blocked.
onIy Iegitimate and representative authority, for the
These elementary considerations do not figure purpose of military action in common aiming at the
very much in the news. The practical difficulty is expulsion of the Germans and the complete sup-
met, when it is met at all, by news of anti-Bolshe- pressionby force of arms of the Brest-Litovsk treaty,
vists in Russia ready to roll up around and behind traitorously signed by the Bolsheviki.”
a small allied army. These anti-Bolshevists and
On September 6, intervention then being a fact,
their intentions were crucial, for unless they existed
Mr. Arthur Copping says (Special to the Times,
and wanted intervention and were ready to fight,
Archangel, August 16) :
the meager allied forces available would be lost in
a wilderness. What does the news say about the “The true voice of Russia, the voice of non-Bol-
prospects of Russian support for allied interven- shevist Russia, besought the help of the Allies, and
tion? the Allies could not continue deaf to that insistent
appeal. . . .”
The True Voice of Russia One of the difficulties is that the appeal from
There were of course rebellions reported on the
Russia did not begin until nearly two months after
periphery of Central Russia. But the first serious
the appeal from Foch on February 26, 1918.
news which had some stategic relation to the Jap- Moreover the idea of intervention had been bruited
anese army appeared, we believe, April 21, 1918, among the Allies as early as August, 19’17, and
announcing from Washington the receipt of cables perhaps earlier.
to the effect that the Provisional Duma of Au-
tonomous Siberia requested Allied assistance in a
program of self-government and resistance to Ger- The Push for Intervention
man penetration. ‘On May 5, Mr. A. J. Sack,
Director of the Russian Information Bureau, issued Intervention was, as we have seen, based on two
an appeal to the American people for supplies and themes: German domination of Russia, and the
troops. readiness of anti-Bolshevik Russia to fight. Both
% the first place,” said Mr. Sack, “you must themes were an appeal to reason, if the information
distinguish between the Bolsheviki and the Russian they embodied was correct, correct, mind you, not
people.. . . An expedition advancing through Siberia, incidentally, but in the true perspective of events.
organizing the sound Russian elementsinto a great The German theme disappeared almost instanta-
force . . . . could certainly count on the support of neously with the armistice. The reality of the anti-
the Caucasian and Cossack peoples . . . .” Asked Bolshevik uprising was tested by military campaigns
whether there would be armed opposition he replied: The news
under Kolchak, Denikin, and Yudenitch.
“There would undoubtedly be opposition at first, but
it is highly improbable that Germany would be able of these campaigns is discussed in sections VI to
to spareany large number of men. . . . If Germany XI.
were in the allied place . . . . shewould have ~,ooo,- Beside the appeal to reason there was a vast
ooo Russiansfighting on the east front within a amount of news directly advocating or directly fore-
year.” casting the much desired intervention. The inter-
This was the picture of Russia conveyed by the ested reader will find more than one hundred and
official press bureau of the so-called Russian Em- forty news items bearing directly upon intervention
bassy in Washington. In the month of June the in the months between February and July.
advocates of intervention were busy making the All this leaves out of account the vast amount of
picture seem a true one. Lady Murial Paget, “a opinion and feature material frankly aimed to per-
group of influential Russians,” Mme. Botchkarova, suade the reader. It was even reported, in ‘the guise
M. Konovalov, other interventionists, all come to of news, that intervention would have a quieting
Washington “to tell about Russia.” The distin- effect on Russian politics. Thus a dispatch from
guished French philosopher, M. Henri Bergson, Tokio, dated August 3 :
arrived on a mission to ‘the White House about this
time, unrecorded so far as the Times Index shows, “It is predicted in well-informed circles here that
or our own search of the files. There were appeals the present concerted action by the Allies in Siberia
for intervention from the Far Eastern Russian will act as a sedative on the situation. . . .”
Committee, from Russians in Harbin, from Ker-
ensky and from Russians of the Murmansk coast. That the news columns in this period were used
On June 17 the Times reported “Russian military to persuade the readers of the wisdom of a certain
men in ‘this country” as eagerly awaiting action by policy, held by the Times itself, will hardly be dis-
Congress. puted. Take a front page dispatch like the follow-
16 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

ing on May 20. (Special from Washington, bfay ample of the invasion of the news by editorial opi-
nion. We are not overstating the matter when we
19.) The captions read as follows: say that a great deal of the news about Russia in
WASHINGTON SEES CHANCE TO BRING the period under consideration was marked by such
RUSSIA BACK IN WAR propagandist methods. We grant the patriotism
BUT VIEW IS TAKEN THAT IT MUST of the motives; we simply point out the fact,
BE SEIZED WITHOUT LOSS and question the conception of journalism which
OF TIME
it illustrates.
DELAY TO FOE’S ADVANTAGE
AND MILITARY AID TO BOLSHEVIST The tendency noted in the earlier sections, the
GOVERNMENT WOULD PLAY tendency to evaluate the news on the basis of hope,
GERMANY’S GAME degenerates after the shock of Russia’s withdrawal
COMBINED ACTION URGED and the increasing impetus of war psychology into
NATIOXAL ASPIRATIONS MIGHT BE FOSTERED passionate argument masquerading as news. This
BY JOINT CIVIL COMMISSION WITH degeneration is noticeable from February, 19 I 8,
MILITARY PROTECTION
right up to the final collapse of the White Generals,
This in our judgment is a clear and flagrant ex- and beyond.

V. The Front Changes

Why had Allied troops been sent Znto Russia? Again, a week later, a special to the Times from
In the months preceding intervention the dominant Washington asserted
reason defined by statesmen, press associations and
“What is regarded as closely approximating an
special correspondents was the necessity of recon- offensive and defensive alliance between Germany and
stituting some sort of an eastern front to face the the Bolshevist Government in Russia is involved in
Germans. As the foregoing section disclosed, in the treaty just negotiated between them, the first
the five and a half months tha’t elapsed between the official information concerning which reached the
withdrawal of Russia from the war and the formal State Department today in a dispatch from American
acceptance of the policy of intervention by the Ambassador Francis at Archangel.”
American government, ,the Red Peril played an in- It was about this time (September 15 to 21, in-
significant part in the hot discussion over interven- clusive) that the Sisson documents were published
tion in Russia’s internal affairs. Germany had the -proving, in the eyes of the Times, that the Bol-
front of the stage. Upon the notion of a Peril that shevists had ruled Russia “as German valets.” That
would sweep ‘out of Russia and attack western was still the loud note in the news from Russia
civilization there was practically no emphasis. during these days when the war in Europe was
This continued to be the situation in the first days drawing near its close. On October zo-twenty-
following the landing of Allied and American two days before the armistice-the Times publishtd
troops on Russian soil. There were, to be sure, a this news in a special dispatch from Carl Acker-
few warnings that Lenin either had declar- man, then at American Field Headquarters in Si-
ed war’ upon one or more members of the En- beria :
tente, or soon intended making such a declara-
tion. * But in August, Septem’ber and October- “In Khabarovsk the Russians believe that the Bol-
shevist life is measured by the ability of Germany’s
in the days immediately preceding the end of the
military to hold out. With the splendid advance in
war-it was still ,the anti-German note that pre- the west, every foot gained is also a gain in Russia,
dominated. On September 4, for instance, when because Germany is being weakened here, too. Once
Allied intervention had become an accomplished her prestige is destroyed, the power of the Bolsheviki
fact, the Times published an unidentified dispatch will crumble.”
from London, declaring
That was a bad guess. But it was reinforced by
“It is reported here on what seems to be good propaganda coming from the ever-ready “Russian
authority that the Germans have decided to take Information Bureau.” On5 the very eve of the ar-
military action in Russia against the Allies and have mistice this Bureau issued a statement (published in
delivered an ultimatum to the Bolshevist government the Times on November 5) misinforming the
demanding free passage for their troops. Oficial
American public that
confirmation of this is awaited.”
“The Bolsheviki, who rule in part of Central
* See, for example, the Times of August 7: 8, 9, IO and Russia by means of mass terror, are able to stay in
23, 191% power only through German support. As soon as
!W i
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August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC ‘7

this support is withdrawn the population will over- Red Flag movement. The troubles in Switzerland
throw them.” also cause uneasiness. A general strike began there
Six days later the armistice was signed. German today.”
support TOUSwithdrawn. One war was done. A new one was beginning to
The Soviets stayed where
they were. . . . But for nearly two years the “Rus- take its place. The Red Peril, hitherto an insig-
nificant item in the news as compared with the peril
Sian Information Bureau” has gone on making
prophecies. of a Russia dominated by Germany, now took pre-
cedence in the dispatches. Reports descriptive of
Russia’s aggressive intentions upon the rest of the
Something to Fight For world came more frequently over the wires. A
It seems to us important, at this point, once more week after this first dispatch, on November 21, the
to take stock of the situation that existed on the Times published a special cable from Mr. Julian
day of the armistice. Interventionist statesmen Grande, in Berne:
and correspondents had prepared the way for in-
tervention on the ground that war with Germany “The general strike here, which lasted three days,
demanded it. On the day of the armistice the war must not be considered as a mere local disturbance,
with Germany was ended. Not another German but as of international interest, because it shows the
extent of the mischief which the Russian Bolsheviki
soldier would march into Russian territory; Foch have already succeeded in doing. It is now known
had his complete surrender. There were, to be that the Bolshevist agents in Switzerland intended to
sure, still Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. And to organize a sanguinary revolution, hoping to extend it
those troops the State Department note of August to the neighboring countries, Italy and France.” Etc.
4 had promised “such protection and help as is
possible . . . against the armed Austrian and Ger- That same day the Times published a dispatch
man prisoners wh,o are attacking them,” But re- from Washington, stating that while “no definite
gardless of the numbers of those prisoners-now, word” had been received, “recent reports from
with Austria and Germany defeated, the Allies London have been taken by some observers to in-
could have shut down upon communication between dicate that Great Britain may propose the sending
any such armed bands and their home govern- of additional troops into Russia to place the country
ments. And there were, moreover, Allied and on a stable footing and eliminate the Bolsheviki.”
American troops in Russia-at Archangel, for in- A,new note, you observe, was appearing. It was
stance, and at different points in Siberia-who were not “to establish an easttern front” that this dis-
not associated with the withdrawal of the Czechs, patch suggested Great Britain might send troops
but rather dispatched to Russia in accord with the into Russia : it was “to place the country on a
plan ‘of reconstituting a new front against Germany. stable footing and eliminate the Bolsheviki.” The
There was, in addition, the question whether fur- note was a popular one. Three days later (No-
ther munitions and supplies should be shipped to vember 24) another Washington dispatch was
certain Russian factions to be used against certain published in the Times, reporting that in the
other Russian factions. opinion of Prince Lvfov, Premier <of the first Pro-
Did the interventionists
a,t once point out that with the armistice there re- visional Government, military and economic inter-
mained no possible reason for reconstructing an vention was “imperative to save Russia against the
eastern front against Germany? Or did there sud- revolutionary element now in control of its affairs.”
denly appear in the post-armistice news a new em- On December 13 the Times reported that “Corne-
phasis-an emphasis no longer upon Germany- lius J. Callahan, manager of the Russian-American
and yet one serving equally well to justify the re- Company for International Trade, a subsidiary of
tention of Allied troops on Russian soil and the Gaston, William and Wigmore, who left Moscow
furnishing of aid to one Russian faction as against six weeks ago, said yesterday at the company’s
another? offices, 39 Broadway, that, in h,is opinion, it would
Three days after the armistice (November 14) be necessary for the United States to send a ‘f,or-
midable’ army into Russia to restore order.” And
there appeared in the Times these headlines:
three days later there appeared an Associated Press
BOLSHEVISM IS SPREADING IN EUROPE; dispatch from Constantinople, giving the opinion
ALL NEUTRAL COUNTRIES NOW FEEL of Paul Milukov that “the only possible cure for
THE INFECTION the present trouble in Russia is that an Allied force
Under these headlines there appeared a dis- be landed immediately in the south.” The follow-
patch from London (unidentified) declaring “The ing day the Times asked editorially: “Having
most serious question of the hour, in the opinion entered Russia for a puppose, why not carry out
of some newspapers here, is how far Europe is in- that purpose?” Reconstitute an eastern front?
fected with Bolshevism.” Sweden was alarmed. No. “Start a real movement to drive the Bolsheviki
“Newspapers in Spain, Holland, and even Norway out.” “The presence of a foreign army is usually
also express a’pprehension over the spread of the an irritation; the irritation is there now; we can
18 ‘THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

remove it if we reinforce our armies and do some- December 28. “A French business man, just re-
thing that will make it safe to withdraw them turned from Moscow after three months’ imprison-
later . . . Unless we drive the Bolsheviki out of ment by ‘the Bolsheviki” had told Mr. Duranty
Petrograd and Moscow the population of the bulk “You people are living in a Fool’s Paradise.” A
of Great Russia will have a winter of starvation.” Danish diplomat, also unnamed, had reported
that “to believe that Bolshevism meant nothing
but disorganization . . . was to make a mistake for
Red Peril which the world might pay dearly in the near fu-
ture.” Moreover-
A month after the armistice thus found editorial
writer, correspondent and statesman all well on A high official at the Russian Embassy, whom I
the way toward supplying for intervention a reason saw this morning, confirmed the main points of the
as compelling as that motive which the armistice ominous condition of affairs in Russia.
had done away with. “Red Peril Pictured “It is certainly true,” he said, ‘(that the Bolsheviki
As Alarming” said a headline in the Times are better organized than most persons here imagine.
on December I 8 ; and four days later an Associated They have forced officers and officials of the former
Press dispatch from Berlin brought a report that r&gime to work for them under pain of death. Ac-
Radek, on the occasion of his recent visit to that cording to the latest information we have received, they
city, had “boasted that ‘the money sent to Berlin do appear to be spreading westward, and may create a
grave state of affairs for Western Europe by joining
to finance the revolution was as nothing compared
hands with the extremist party in Germany, which
to the funds transmitted to New York for the pur- seems to be getting control, at least, for a time.
pose of spreading Bolshevism in the United
States.’ ” “A mili,tary expedition starting at That day, editorially, the Times cast its
Odessa,” said the Times, that ‘same day, “could die. “The fault which the AlIies are committing
even now overthrow our armed enemies at Moscow in the front of their new enemy, the Bolsheviki,”
and save famine-stricken Petrograd, and then meet it said, “is the same they have so long committed
the little force we have put in Murmansk.” in front of their old enemy, the German autocracy.
Such passages as ‘these, from the pens of editorial They allowed the enemy all the ‘advantages of the
writers, correspondents and Authorities on Russia, offensive, and merely resisted at whatever point
show how facile was the transition following the the enemy ch,ose In ,turn to attack . . . .
armistice. A few days more, and it may fairly be Similarly the Bolshevi,st assault on civiliza-
said that the new motive was dominant. Thus, on tion has all the advantages <of the offensive . . . .
December 24, the Times published a special dis- As f’or the fear ‘that advance into Russia would
patch reporting that “Rumors have been current or might contaminate the soldiers of the advancing
in Washington that General Pershing, acting under force by bringing them into contact with Bolshevist
an understanding with President Wilson, has been argument, that merely means only a postponement
preparing to send forces from France to Russia.”
of the evil day, ftor ,the Bolsheviki are on the off en-
On the same day Mr. Charles Selden cabled from
sive and will bring that argument home to the
Paris ,that to deal with “the Bolshevism that men-
West without delay. When they do they will
aces the world” Prince Lvov and his colleagues
had asked for 150,ooo Allied troops. (Times, be stronger and more powerful than they are now.
December 26, 1918.) Two days later came a The Allies can fight Bolshevism now, before its
second cable from Mr. Selden, reporting that while teeth have ‘grown, and run the risk of having the
there would be no Allied intervention in Russia on cruder minds among their soldiers debauched by
a large scale-because “no European Government the argument that ignorance should rule knowledge;
at the present moment cares to risk arousing the or they can wait until Bolshevism has spread that
opposition of its people to sending large bodies of argument through the cruder minds not only of
troops to Russia for a Winter campaign”-never- their armies but of their whole populations, and
theless “a strong allied expedition is about ,to re- then fight it with their morale ,thus impaired. It
inforce the expedition already in Southern Russia, ought to be a choice easy to make.”
and they will take the place of the German troops Tmhe front had changed. “Their new enemy, the
evacuating the Ukraine.” Another two days, and Bolsheviki”-“the Bolsheviki are on the offensive”
headlines on the first page of the Times an- -“Allies can fight Bolshevism now,” or “they can
nounced- wait”-“it ought to lbe a choice easy to make.”
iVtENACE TO WORLD BY REDS IS SEEN Thus by the end of 1918, seven weeks after the
DIPLOMATS AND OTHERS IN PARIS EXPRESS MUCH armistice, was the transition effected. Gone was
ANXIETY OVER THE SITUATION the old enemy-Germany. In Germany’s place,
The dispatch which these headlines introduced demanding more cannon and platoons, stood the
was one from Mr. Walter Duranty in Paris, dated “new enemy”-Soviet Russia.
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC ‘9

VI. Kolchak
Kolchak was the spearhead of Russian inter- government of Omsk, and brought to the front,
vention. He was r-at yet in power when the Allied Admiral Kolchak as dictator with the approval of
councils determined to reconstistute the eastern the government. A group of #three military officers,
front. But when the emphasis shifted, with the on the night of November IS, according to these
end of the war against Germany, he came in time dispatches, arrested without authority two members
to play protagonist in the new drama. Within a of the directory, Avksentieff and Zenzenoff, and
few weeks after the signing of the armistice, he two prominent citizens of Omsk, Argunoff and
stood at the ‘head of the “All-Russian Government Rogovsky. Th e coup, the object of which is llot
of Omsk.” entirely clear, was attempted without any knowl-
There had preceded Kolchak, in Siberia., a gov- edge or participation of the government. It was
ernment headed by Peter Vologodsky. It was a promptly and emphatically disapproved by the
government (more than ‘one correspondent in government. In order to prevmt further irrespon-
Siberia reported) which commanded some measure sible activities and to maintain the principle of firm
of popular support. An Associated Press dispatch governmental power, the Council of Ministers
from Vladivostok (September 22, 19 I 8) asserted urged energetic measures and issued a decree
that “democratic organizations in Omsk and Tomsk authorizing Admiral Kolchak to take over the
are supporting the cabinet”; Mr. Carl W. Acker- power of the State. By his order, the offenders
man cabled to the Times on November 14, “I’t is were turned over at once for trial.”
a good beginning, with popular support and good This paragraph presents ‘the case of Kolchak’s
intentions and principles”; and the Times itself apolmogists : that Kolchak was no party to the
said editorially (November 24), “The Omsk gov- coup d’etat. That he was its innocent beneficiary.
ernment was the nearest approach to a democratic That he was, in fact, broughft into power f’or the
<government representing Russia which has been express purpose of preventing just such coups in
created since the Bolshevist revolution a year ago; future, and for punishing those who had carried off
it was the one which the Allies could most easily the present one. Did Kolchak, the innocent bene-
recognize.” ficiary of a coup d’etat, bring to punishment the
It was this government which a coup d’etat officers arrested for overturning the Vologodsky
turned out of power on the 18th of November. cabinet? We have been unable to find in the Times
An Associated Press dispatch from Vladivostok this final chapter of the story:.
tells the story: “Omsk. An order was issued to declare to all parts
“Through a coup on the part of the council of of the army that Col. Volkoff, Ataman Krasilnikoff
Ministers of the new All-Russian government at and Army Chief Kitanayeff, who had been tried by
Omsk, Admiral Alexander Kolchak has become vir- the Field Court Martial, were found-not guilty.”
tual dictator and commander of the All-Russian army
and fleet. Two ministers, M. Avksentieff and M. Thus runs a report in the monarchist People’s
Zenzenoff who opposed Admiral Kolchak’s dictator- Gazette of November 27.”
ship, have been arrested. A portion of the directorate
of the erstwhile Ufa government, which formed the
administrative body of the new government, and to The Man on Horseback
which the Ministry was responsible, supports Ad-
A few frank reports of the effect of the Kolchak
miral Kolchak. Telegrams received here from Omsk
coup d’etat came to the Times from Mr. Acker-
state that the move was ‘due to extraordinary circum-
man. He cabled (November 26) that “the situa-
stances and danger menacing the state.’ . . . .”
tion is daily growing increasingly serious as a re-
Was there an implication here that Kolchak him- sult of the Omsk coup d’etat.” And again, (No-
self had been a conspirator in the coup d’etat which vember 25) that ‘&the Omsk coup d’etat has had
had arrested Ministers who “opposed” his rise to a bad effect upon the Czech troops, according to
the dictatorship ? If so, the public was speedily in- General Syrovy. ‘The change of government,’ he
formed that no such implication was intended. said, ‘has killed our soldiers. They say that for
From Washington (November 22) came the fol- four years they have been fighting for democracy,
lowing dispatch-based on information supplied by and that now that a dictatorship ruled in Omsk,
the “Russian Embassy” (the italics are ours) : they are no longer fighting for democracy.’ ”
“Cable dispatches received at the Russian Embassy, But despite such reports, the coup d’etat found
today, from Siberia, throw a nczet light on the
changes that took place recently in ‘the All-Russian * See The New Republic of July 9, rgrg.
P’

20 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

an early welcome in other quarters. The same patches that followed. These rumors were the re-
issue of the Times which published first news verse side of that other picture drawn so often:
of the coup carried also the dispatch which fol- the picture of impending collapse in Petrograd and
lows : Moscow. Foreign correspondent and Washington
bureau kept repeating that Kolchak would “soon
COUP PLEASES WASHINGTON
be recognized” ; foreign correspondent and Wash-
STRONG HEAD OF SIBERIAN GOVERNMENT
CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL ington bureau kept repeating that Soviet Russia
would “soon collapse.” Prophecy was intertwined
“Washington, Nov. 2x.-News of the coup at with news-and was utterly false in both cases.
Omsk by which Admiral Kolchak virtually became Kolchak was never recognized; the Soviet govern-
dictator of the All-Russian forces, is regarded at the
ment, a full year later, had not fallen, But con-
State Department as another sign pointing to stabi-
lization of the movement relied upon to regenerate stant repetition had its effect on public opinion.
Russia. The great weakness of the situation in Si- So important is the subjective effect upon the
beria, it has been believed for some time, is the lack reader <of this sort of iteratiton that it is worth
of a powerful head of the government who cannot while following this story of KoIchak recognistion.
be swayed by popular demonstration and who will It began, as we have said, in the Spring of 1919.
work toward the reconstruction of the government We have in the following paragraphs listed a few
with a firm hand. . . .” of its varied reappearances. The instances seem
to us fairly chosen. In none of them does the cor-
A firm hand and an ability to resist “popular
respondent say that Kolchak should be recognized,
demonstration” had their charm. The same Times
or that he might be; he reports that there is
editorial (November 24) which had paid tribute
evidence Kolchak p&ill be recognized; and in
to the old government admitted this much about
some cases, (as items in the list show) he asserts
the new: “Kolchak’s stroke changes its outward
but may not have changed the es- that recognition is nothing less than an accomplish-
appearance,
ed fact.
sence . . . . Personally, Kolchak seems to be a
strong man, and an honest man. In the group April ZZ.* (Special dispatch, Washington)-“The deci-
around him, is certainly to be found the nearest sion of the United States, Great Britain, France, and
approach to ‘Russia’ at the present moment . . . . Italy . . . . to accord recognition to the Omsk cabinet as the
We should give all possible support to any stable de facto government of the country was reached, it is
and approximately representative government that learned today, under the leadership of the United States,”
can be found . . .” etc.
That government, it became more and more nlny 26. (Special cable, London)-“A well authorized
clear, was Kolchak’s. By January 17, the Times report reaches the New York Times correspondent that
was ready to say: “From this distance it appears recognition of the Kolchak government by Great Britain is
that his [Kolchak’s] appointment to a sort of con- imminent. . . .”
stitutional dictatorship was the best thing that could (The headline read : “Britain to Recognize Kolchak
have been done under the circumstances”; and by Government.“)
the time Kolchak’s armies were ready to move, he lDl~y 27. (Special cable, London)--“The Council of
might-so far as emphasis on the coup d’etat was Four has unanimously decided in favor of the recognition
concerned-have been elected to the post of dic- irr principle of the Kolchak government, advices from Paris
tator by a popular ballot. “It was a democratic say. This disposes of rumors current here reIative to Presi-
change,” said the Times on April 2 I, “there was dent Wilson’s opposition. . . .”
no arbitrary coup d’etat.” (The headline read: “Allies Recognize Kolchak Cab-
inet.“)

Julie 12. (Havas, Paris)-“The Council of Four has

Recognition the complete text of the reply of Admiral Kolchak. . . .
Recognition of the Omsk governrqent, it is believed, will
Kolchak ‘had not been in power more than a not be much longer delayed.”
few months before the question of diplomatic (Headline : “Recognize Kolchak Soon.“)
recognition for his government made the first of
14ugust 26. (Special dispatch, ‘1Yashington) --“Roland
its many appearances in the news. On April IS, S. Morris, the American Ambassador to Japan, who was
an unidentified dispatch from Washington asserted : sent to Omsk to confer with officials of the Kolchak gov-
“Unofficial advices from London have reached ernment and make report on the situation in Siberia, has
Washington today, that the leading Entente powers, recommended that the American government grant imme-
as well as the United States government, would diate recognition to the Kolchak government . . . . recog-
simultaneously recognize the Kolchak government nition is expected to be granted inside of a month. . . .”
at Omsk, in Siberia, immediately after the Ger-
mans have signed the peace treaty . . . .” ‘& The date, in each instance, is the date of publication in
It is important to note the stream of similar dis- the Times.
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 21

Kolchak in Power poses, and who threatened

Kolchak if he persisted.”
to use force against

Recognition is ordinarily granted a de fact’0 Kolchak, in other words, could not be expected
government only when it seems to have secured to take on Japan when he went gunning for two
a firm hold over the people which it governs. Dur- modest bandits. And with the reasonableness of
ing the months Kolchak was in power there ap- this logic we agree-though it might be pointed
peared in the Times evidence to show that despite out that the constant :open rebellion of Semenoff
the COUP d’etat which had upset a democratic gov- and Kalmykoff made a little absurd the designations
ernment, Kolchak was winning the loyalty of the “All-Russian Government” and “Supreme Ruler.”
Siberian people. Some of these reports had their But aside from the bandit chieftains, what of
origin in “the Russian Committee in Paris” (over Kolchak’s control over his own section of Siberia?
which an ex-Minister of the Tsar presided) ; others, What preparation had a reader of the Times for
in “the Russian Embassy” in Washington. Many the revolutionary explosion that was coming? Had
such reports, however, were based upon events of he been warned that it was from Vesuvius that
some significance and merited transmission as news. Kolchak ruled ?
No doubt there were Zemstvos and trade unions It is remarkable how little can be found in the
and other democratic bodies that gave their support columns of the Times ,to suggest the revolution that
to Kolchak; we know (by this time) that there was to sweep Kolchak out of power-until the re-
were also certain others, both in Siberia and in volution itself had broken. Reports received in
European Russia, that gave equal loyalty to the August, that Ambassador Morris had found
Soviets. A declaration of support by a democratic Kolchak’s position critical, were followed by reports,
assembly, either in favor of Kolchak or in favor of a more favorable turn. Even as late as December
of Lenin, is a news event of somewhat similar im- 2, the conclusion of a Times editorial was not
portance. Is it the true function of a newspaper one that foreshad80wed collapse. Kolchak 15as seek-
and a press association to report or to ignore such ing to remedy mistakes ; “his government should be
events without discrimination? In the Times you much more solidly established hereafter.”
will find sixteen reports* of declarations by Twenty-two days later, there was no government
Zemstvos, trade unions and other bodies, in favor left to establish. On December 23, a revolutionary
of the Kolchak government. There is no similarly government was proclaimed in Kolchak’s second
complete record of that gradual accretion of power capital (Irkutsk). The foll.owing day, came
which the Soviets must have had, to stay on top Kolchak’s abdication :
in Moscow.
Emphaiis is an important factor in journalism. “In order to unite all armed forces fighting to
make secure our political organization, I name Gen-
It is sometimes achieved simply by silence. Section
eral Semenoff, Commander in Chief, with head-
III of this review gives a resumi of the various
quarters in the Irkutsk and trans-Baikal Russian
reports of revolt in Soviet Russia, of strikes and military districts. All military commanders will be
of revolutions. It is fair to say that whenever the subordinate to him.”
Soviets were suspected of being in trouble, and of
course they were in trouble, the entire civilized The Supreme Rulerhad resigned in favor of the
world knew of it the following morning. Cossack Adventurer himself. Ironically, from
‘Was Kolchak never in trouble? He was, to be Tiashington, on December 31, came a special dis-
sure, harrassed by bandit leaders like Semenoff, patch to the l’imes (italics ours) :
and Kalmykoff .t But the Times had an explana- “

tion% for his failure to rid himself of such gentry: . . . . Information now received indicates that
the appointment of Semenoff was in reality very little
“In spite of the demands of his war with the Bol-
more than a recognition by Admiral Kolchak of n/z
sheviki, he [Kolchak] made preparations once, if
already established fact . . . .”
not twice, to send a military expedition against these
two Cossack adventurers, with the object of restor- To the reporting of Admiral Kolchak’s activities
ing all Siberia to allegiance to the Omsk govern- in the field it has seemed worth while to devote a
ment. Americans returned from Siberia say that separate section of this study. That section fol-
this vindication of authority was halted by the mili- lows. For Kolchak’s activities as a statesman, the
tary representatives of a foreign government, who Czechs may speak. They knew and served him
find the Cossack leaders useful for their own pur- best:

* Jan. g, Igrg; Jan. 18; Jan. 27; ApriI 6; May 21; “By guarding and maintaining order, our army has
May 22 ; June I ; June 7 ; June I I ; June 13 ; July 22 ; been forced against its convictions to support a state
July is ; July 31; Aug. 3 ; Sept. 27 ; Nov. 23. of absolute despotism and unlawfulness which has had
f See Times of May 31, rgrg ; August I ; August its beginnings here under defense of the Czech arms.
7; etc. “The military authorities of the Government of
$ Editorial, October 4, 1919. Omsk are permitting criminal actions that will stag-
 22 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

ger the entire world. The burning of villages, the
murder of masses of peaceful inhabitants and the
shooting of hundreds of persons of democratic con-
victions and also those only suspected of political dis-
loyalty occurs daily. The responsibiliity for this be-
fore the peoples of the world will fall on us, inas-
much as we, possessing sufficient strength, do not pre-
vent this lawlessness.
“Thus our passiveness appears as a direct conse-
quence of the principles of neutrality and non-inter-
ference in Russian internal affairs, and we are
becoming apparent participants in these crimes as a
result of our observing absolute neutrality.” (Times,
November 18, IgIg.)

VII. The Kolchak Offensive

thn American can picture the position of Kol-
chak’s armies, before the start of the 19 19 offen-
The Offensive Starts
sive, if he imagines that Moscow is Des M’oines, iNow the extraordinary thing about the news
aad that the Kolchak forces are drawn up on a of Kolchak’s westward push is the extravagance
line reaching roughly from Lake Ontario, on of the claims that were made for him, on the basis
the north, to Roanoke, Va., on the south. It must of what can fairly be called indefinite information.
further be imagined, of course, that the railway First news of what might be called the opening
lines reaching westward from the Appalachians are of the Spring offensive, was published in the Times
greatly inferior in trackage and rolling stiock to on March 25. (Unidentified dispatch, Paris.)
anything that might be called a trunk line in this Kolchak was then advancing on a line some 250
country. Moreover, while the Appalachian Moun- miles in length. “At certain points” he had driven
tains may be considered as non-existent, for Kol- the Bolsheviki back “more than ‘thirty miles”; a
chak, it is necessary to add a number of new and small city (Okransk) had been captured.
important rivers t,o our map-rivers flowing north Two days later, the Times published a second
and south, and thereby florming bunkers in the way dimspatch. (London via Montreal.) The definite
of an advance upon Des Moines, should hostile information it contained was meagre. “A large
forces dynamite the bridges. Finally, the important number” of prisoners had been captured; three
industrial cities between Des Moines and the Ap- Bolshevist. regiments had been “annihilated” ; the
palachians have no equivalent in Russia between city of Osa had been taken. Probably few Amer-
Perm and Moscow. There are, for our cal,cula. icans, however, realized that the capture of Osa
tions, no Pittsburghs, Buff al’os, Clevelands and had about the same significance and represented
Detroits-abong the line of advance-in which old about the same progress as ‘the advance of our imag-
equipment might be repaired and new material se, inary army from Hamilton, Ont., to a point on the
I cured. north shore of Lake Erie; and accordingly few may
What resources had Kolchak, for an advance have thought the headline of the Times and the first
upon Moscow, in the face of difficulties so sub- sentence of the dispatch unduly ‘optimistic:
stantial? KOLCHAK PURSUES BROKEN RED ARMY
Three months bef,ore the start of his of- * * * x * * * *
fensive, he was credited with an army numbering “London, March 26 (via Montreal)-The troops
“IOO,OOO men, 200,000 more recruited, and await- of the Kolchak government who pierced the Bol-
ing equipment.” (Statement by Boris Bakhmeteff, shevist front on a thirty-mile sector on March II,
published in the Times December 3 I, I 9 IS.) How continue their progress and the position of the Bol-
sheviki is precarious. . . . .”
many of ‘the second 200,000 had been equipped
R.hen Kolchak gave the word to start, it is impos- Their position, apparently, was equally precari-
sible to say. It is also impossible to find in the ous in Mosc,ow and Petrograd. On April 3, a
Times a confident estimate of the number of Soviet special cable to the Times fr,om London (quoting
troops opposing him. Some advantage Kolchak the Morning Post’s correspondent in Warsaw),
had, however, in rthe fact that the tide was running announced that “Lenin and Trotzky have come
in his direction when he started. Late in December, to a definite break.” “The situation in Moscow
Siberian and Czechoslovakian troops had captured and Petrograd has become so serious that there is
the city of Perm, (which corresponds to a point promise of a popular uprising against the entire
near Hamilton, Ont., on our transposed map) with Bolshevist regime . . . .”
reported captures of 3 1,000 prisoners, 120 field Meantime, during the first three weeks of April,
guns, 1,000 machine guns, and the annihilation of the news of Kolchak’s ,campaign was not substantial.
ten Bolshevist regiments. (Associated Press dis- Soviet troops were “retiring rapidly” on the ex-
patch from Vladivostok, published in the Times treme southern end of the line; a regiment had
January 3, 1919.) deserted in the north; nine hundred Bolsheviki
Augaist 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC

, I l

: ,, .:;.

European Russia, superimposed upon a map of the United States to show relative distances.
Moscow coincides with DRS Moines, Iowa.
24 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920 *

had been slain in Sarapul (a city which would cor- From the hills of Kentucky Kolchak saw, but
respond, on our transposed map, to Lorain, Ohio) ; only with his mind’s eye, the steeples of Des Moines
and the cEty ‘of Sterlitamak (about as far west, com- -saw them, now no more than four hundred and
paratively, as Grafton, W. Va.) ‘had been taken. ninety miles before him.
On the basis of such achievement, however, the
Times published (April zo) -under the headline :
“Reds Colla’psing in the East”-the opinion vol- Disillusion
unteered by the “Russian Embassy” in Washington, Samara was the apex. Three weeks later
that “a collapse of the B,olshevist forces in Eastern
(June 6)) the Times reported Kolchak’s capture
Russia was imminent.” The Soviet army, declared of Uralsk. But Uralsk was behind the line of ad-
the “Embassy,“, was becoming “more and more vance, farther to the south. And the following
demoralized.” day, there appeared this cryptic sentence in a Lon-
don report of Winston Churchill’s address to the
Kolchak Triumphant House of Commons:
Two days later, Ion the first page of the Times “Mr. Churchill said that the check to admiral
there appeared the headlines : Kolchak’s advance was now more pronouxed, and
that no attempt should be made to encourage estra-
RED RULE TOTTERS AS KOLCHAE; WINS vagant hopes in that quarter.”
Now Kolchak, though readers of tht Times
might not (have realized it, was still some five What did Mr. Churchill mean? He may have
hundred and ninety miles away from Moscow when puzzled readers of the Times. But in this instance
the Soviets ‘thus tottered. At Chateau-Thierry the he proved himself a prophet. Five days later, the
Germans were fifty miles from Paris. What was Times published a report that Soviet troops were
the basi,s of such cheer? “Heavy losses” had been in Ufa; July 3, they had recaptured Perm. Kol-
inflicted on the enemy; demoralization of the Bol- chak was back where he had started. An unidenti-
shevist troops was “reported to be growing”; three fied dispatch (Paris, July 5) brought a ray of hope:
divisions had refused to fight; there were more “Reports from Omsk” ‘told of “an improvement in
rumors of revolts by the peasants. the situation.” Soviet troops were “showing fat-
We are, at this point, hastening along toward igue” ; Kolchak was “receiving reinforcements.”
the very zenith of Kolchak’s success. Note what But it was of little use. On July 17, the Times re-
happens in the meantime: an Associated Press ported the capture by the Soviet army of the city of
dispatch from Paris (dated April 28) reports him Ekaterinburg. Kolchak in that defeat lost one of
in a village forty miles east of Samara (which, on his most important bases. Ekaterinburg was the
an Americanized version of the map, might put him center of the Ural mining district, and the site of
somewhere near Covington, KY.) ; another dispatch important factories. Was it the end of the offen-
from Paris (dated eleven days later) reported the sive ?
evacuation of Samara itself; another six days, and No. Not, at least, for the “Russian Embassy.”
Kolchak was in #the city. This, in a few words, A special to the Times from Washington, dated
is ‘the story of the drive on Moscow. Practically July 31, brought the reassuring opinion of Boris
no definite claims had been made of prisoners Bakhmeteff, now returned from Paris. One should
taken, losses inflicted, or war material captured. go slowly in evaluating a “temporary reverse.”
Kolchak’s troops had simply fmollowed an army “Ups and downs, fluctuations of military chance are
(size unknown) apparently retreating at least in but natural.” “For a healthy cause, a setback is
good enough order to save ‘the bulk ‘of its supplies. but a step toward improvement.”
So far as the occupation of Des Moines was con- And then, the following morning, came a bolt
cerned. Kolchak still had Indiana, Illinois, and half from the blue:
of Iowa to fight across. Yet on May IS, the French “Paris, Aug. I (Associated Press)-The All-
Wireless Service, plus the headline-writer of the Russian government is preparing to move from Omsk
Times, informed ‘the public : to Irkutsk, Siberia, and the morale of the Kolchak
KOLCHAK PLANS MOVE ON MOSCOW army is becoming so bad that there is little hope of it
BUT SIBERIAN DICTATOR SAYS HE WILL FIRST SEEK regaining the territory lost to the Bolsheviki, accord-
TO DESTROY THE RED ARMY ing to dispatches received in Paris. . . .”
* 0 t * * * wr * Cheliabinsk was lost. Another important base.
“Paris, May 13 (French Iiireless Service) -Plans There was no base left for Kolchak, now, in
are being made by the All-Russian government at European Russia. Brusquely, on August 12, the
Omsk to begin an advance on MOSCOW, Admiral Times told its readers what they might expect:
Kolchak, the head of the government, declared in an
interview with the correspondent of the Petit Pa- “Spmial to The New York Times. Washington,
risien. . . .” Aug. II-The position of the anti-Bolshevist army
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 25

European and Asiatic Russia, superimposed upon an outline of the United States. Moscow comes whve San
Francisco would be. h’olchak’s retreat from Perm to Irkutsk u’as accordingly a retreat corresponding to one
from Santa Fe, N. ill., to a point off the Bahama Islands.

commanded by Admiral Kolchak is so critical that The news suddenly struck a cheerier note. Two
official Washington is now openly apprehensive of the days after the commemorative editorial, ther e ap-
collapse of the entire movement headed by Kolchak. peared in the Times these headlines:
. . . The time has come, a high official of the govern-
merit stated tonight, to prepare the people of the anti- LONDON NOT ANXIOUS ABOUT KOLC HAK
Bolshevist world for a possible disaster to the Kolchak AMERICAN FEARS THAT ADMIRAL’S FORCE IS NEAR
regime in Western Siberia. . . .” COLLAPSE CAUSE SURPRISE

The following morning, three m’onths after the DOUBT HE IS IN PERIL

headlines had said ‘Kolchak Plans Move on sic * * 0 * 0 +
Moscow,” the Times tolled the bell for the fallen “Special Cable to the New York Times. London,
Admiral. “Kolchak Beaten” was the caption on Aug. 14.---American fears that Admiral Kolchak’s
its editorial. force is on the eve of collapse have been heard with
surprise in lvell informed circles here . . . .”

Re-Enchantment The dispatch

informed
went on to say that the well-
circles had heard nothing alarming from
As later events demonstrated, the judgment in General Knox (in the field with Kolchak) , and that
that editorial was entirely sound. Kolchak’s day alarmist reports seemed to “be inspired by deliber-
was done. But consider, for a moment, the con- ate misrepresentations ‘in Bolshevist wireless re-
sequences of “Kolchak Beaten” : ports.“- Propaganda, in other words.
Kolchak was “the All-Russian Government.” He The Times correspondent in Washington wired
had been groomed for leadership. Suppose that he simultaneously in the same optimistic tone used by
had failed? Suppose it was clear that he had lost his brother correspondent in London : “Despite
his chance to get to Moscow? There might, in that the unfavorable news that has come from Omsk re-
case, have been two queries working their way in- cently, there are many army officers”-no clue to
sidiously into American opinion. First: Where their identity--“who do not consider the situation
was that popular backing which Kolchak’s prop- in Siberia so bad as it has been painted in the last
agandists had claimed for him? Second: If the few days. Th esc ,officers point out that equipment’
Soviet Government were to continue to hold power, should now be reaching Kolchak, and with the Si-
was it not necessary to stop regarding it as a gov- berian winter,” etc . . . . Moreover, “the State
ernment we need have no policy about? Department received advices from Scandinavian
26 THE NEW1 REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

press sources today”-original

ian information
source of Scandinav-
not stated-“that conditions in
The End of the Kolchak Myth
Bolshevist Russia are very unsettled, while there is The collapse of the “All-Russian G’overnment”
underway a great exodus from Moscow, the Bol- came suddenly, and for readers of the Times, per-
shevist capital.” haps a little unexpectedly. A brief two weeks
more, and there arrived direct from Omsk news
that gave warning of the impending smash. An
The Strategic Withdrawal Associated Press dispatch (dated October 29) re-
ported that “the Siberian armies of Admiral Kol-
chak have been falling back rapidly since their re-
Nevertheless, the retreat continued. Kolchak’s
cent reverses on the line of the Tobol River.” These
army fell back into Asiatic Siberia-lost Tiumen,
reverses foreshadowed the loss of Kolchak’s capital.
another base of supply. Was it a serious loss? The
Nevertheless, an Associated Press dispatch from
special correspondent of the Times in Washington
Omsk, on November 6, reported that the departure
wired ,on August 18 that “from almost every point
of the Allied Missions was “not believed to denote
of military stategy” the position of the Omsk army
any immediate danger to Omsk.” But the danger,
was superior to what it had been “before the recent
for all that, was there. Nine days later Kolchak
withdrawal of the Kolchak forces began.” (Times,
had fled his capital with the last remnants of his
August 19.) An Associated Press dispatch from
army, and the Bolsheviki had marched in. It is
Tokio (published three days later) was less en-
typical of reports of the whole campaign that even
couraging; reports apparently reliable, it said, in-
in the loss of the capital itself there was consolation
dicated “that the Omsk government’s positi,on is
to be found:
growing weaker instead of stronger because of
the advances of the Bolsheviki and the deser- “Sentiment despite the reverses suffered by the All-
tion of Siberian troops.” We had heard very little, Russian armies continues in favor of Kolchak and
up t,o this point, about the desertion of Siberian the evacuation of Omsk is not regarded as jeopard-
troops. izing the stability of the government and the integrity
The attempts during the month of September to of the army.” (Associated Press, via NOVO Niko-
keep an appearance of life in an already dead levsk, November I I. )

movement were heroic. On September 6, a head-

So ended the Kolchak offensive. It ended, as
line in the Times announced:
it began, on a note of cheer. There was a thin
KOLCHAK RALLIES FROM HIS REVERSES stream of later news: the weary withdrawal to
The dispatch that followed (a special to the Tomsk; the further retreat to Irkutsk; the British
Times from Washington) declared that from what War Office statement (Associated Press, London,
was “gathered” in the “Russian Embassy” the tone January I) that Kolchak had “ceased to be a factor
of telegrams from Omsk during the last ten days in Russian military affairs.”
had been “more encouraging and comforting”; An extraordinary offensive it had been indeed. It
Kolchak was “making plans for dealing with the never got within four hundred miles of its objective.
situati,on.” It ended two thousand miles behind the line from
And though, a few days later, a wireless from which it started. On its behalf, when it was mov-
Moscow claimed the surrender to the Bolsheviki ing westward, extravagant claims were put forward;
of what remained of Kolchak’s Southern Army, in retreat, there was constant assurance that an early
there was at this time a little flurry about Kolchak’s turn was coming.
regaining the offensive. He had, by the end of Failure of the Allies to send war material was the
‘the month, pushed the Soviet troops back seventy- chief cause of Kolchak’s rout? Y,ou will find Times
five miles, “along the whole front,” and taken editorials to assure you of that. But you will find
I 5,000 prisoners. (A ssociated Press, Omsk, Sep- also Mr. Lloyd George, saying in the IHouse of
tember 28.) And on October 13, a wireless mes- Common, on Nsovember 8: “We have given real
sage from Omsk to London claimed again that “the proof of our sympathy for the men of Russia who
Bolsheviki are retreating along the whole line.” have helped the Allied cause, by sending one hun-
According to a London dispatch: dred million sterling worth of material and support -
“The message also reports that a Bolshevist wire- of every form.”
less dispatch had been received which admitted that That was not enough? No. Something more in-
in a plebiscite in MOSCOW, the workmen had declared deed was needed. ‘What Kolchak’s offensive demon-
themselves against the Soviet and as supporting Ad- strated was that soldiers, too, were necessary. And
miral Kolchak.” the soldiers did not materialize-those Russian
Certainly, with the Moscow proletariat coming soldiers who, the interventionists had promis-
out for Kolchak there was reason to keep faith ed us, would so willingly flock to Kolchak’s stand-
burning. ard.
 I’ I’

August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 27

VIII. Deni kin

The Denikin government, even more clearly than to describe what the government was up to. Thus
the government of Omsk, was a product of military Mr. Harold Wiliams cabled from Ekaterinodar on
power. Under the Tsar’s rigime, Denikin had held July 2, 1919:
high office. He had once been Chief of Staff; later,
“The scheme is clear and simple. It comprises :
in command of the Russian armies on the south-
Russia, one and undivided, with broad local self-gov-
western front. Apparently he was an able soldier; ernment extending in certain regions to autonomy ;
but until his sudden rise to power there was certain- land reforms giving ordered satisfaction to the land
ly nothing in his career to mark him as that sort of hunger of the peasantry, an advanced labor program,
radical democrat who alone could hope to rule suc- a National AssembIy, elected by universal suffrage, to
cessfully in revolutionary Russia. determine the form of government, whether republic
What put Denikin at the head of a government or constitutional monarchy. , . .”
was simply the support of Cossack troops. The fol-
Was this an accurate report of the intentions of
lowing dispatch tells the story:
the Denikin government on the date it was cabled?
“Copenhagen, Nov. ao.-The Ukrainian govern- In such a case, it seems to us, the correspondent and
ment has been overturned and Kiev has been captured his e’mployer owe a responsibility to the public for
by troops from Astrakhan, according to Kiev dis- an examination into the sincerity of programs which
patches to the Swedish newspapers. The Ukrainian one of them offers as evidence of Denikin’s demo-
National Assembly has fled and a Provisional GOV- cratic intentions, and the other prints.
ernment has been established by the captors of the The second sort of evidence introduced to sub-
city, who are apparently commanded by General
stantiate the democracy of Denikin’s rigime con-
Denikin, leader of the anti-Bolshevist forces.”
sisted of reports ,of the loyalty he commanded.
There was no “coup d’etat.” Denikin simply There were not many such reports, compared with
marched in and smashed the government headed by the number of similar declarations circulated in
Skoropadski. That government, however, was “pro- behalf of Kolchak. But there were enough to sug-
German”? It has been variously described. Mr. gest that Denikin had found popular backing.
Harold Williams, cabling to the Times from Thus Mr. Williams cabled from Ekaterinodar, on
Geneva, on November 20, asserted that “General June 8:
Skoropadski’s last cabinet was pro-Entente, and in- “When Denikin passed in his car through the
stead of independence of the Ukraine demanded a streets of Kharkov women weeping for joy pressed
union with federated Russia.” Whether pro-En- forward to kiss his hand and those who could not do
tente or pro-German, Bolshevik or Bourbon, one that, kissed even the mud-guards of his car. Endless
thing is clear. It was no sort of popular referendum deputations greeted him, among them one of factory
that put an end to ‘the last Ukrainian cabinet. It workers who thanked him for their deliverance from
was a Cossack army. the Bolsheviki liberty.”
And again, from Taganr’og, on November 20,
Mr. Williams reported that “the number of volun-
Democracy in the Ukraine teers for the army far exceeds the capacity of the
Now despite the fact that Denikin had been Chief army to receive them.”
of Staff under the Tsar, despite the fact that he had Finally, so far as concessions to Ukrainian na-
chosen the Tsar’s own Foreign Minister (Sergius tionalism were concerned, Mr. Willams reported
Sazonoff) to represent him internationally, an at- that Denikin had “made allowance for all reason-
tempt was nevgrtheless made to establish the credit able demands by pledging himself to a considerable
I of Denikin’s government as a democracy. Effort degree to the principle of regional autonomy, and
to create such an impression, while never so in- to permitting the cultivation of the Ukrainian or
sistent as in the case of Kolchak, followed the same Little Russian language and literature.” (Rostov-
lines. Evidence principally of two sorts was intro- on-Don, September 13.) From the start, less at-
duced. tention was paid to the political side of Denikin’s
First: There were declarations of a democratic venture than to its military results. Nevertheless
program. Some of these statements came from the such reports as these lent a certain aura of democ-
government itself. For such statements, needless to racy to the leader of anti-Bolshevism in the South.
say, neither the Ti,mes nor its field service shares Denikin had undertaken the construction of a dem-
any responsibility. Such matter was properly trans- ocratic government, had found popular support and
mitted as news. But there were certain other oc- had “made allowance for al1 reasonable demands”
casions when the correspondent himself undertook on the part of Ukrainian nationalism.
 28 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

ceive them”-and compare it with the after-the-

The Picture Fades fact explanation made by Mr. E. L. James in a
Suppose one were to consult the dispatches de- special cable from Paris, on January 3 I, 1920:
voted not to celebration of Denikin in the heydey “It is impossible to recruit in Russia an anti-Soviet
of his success, but to explanation of his failure after army, large enough to achieve success, according to
the event? M. Cinguareanu, representing Bessarabia at the peace
From Riga, on December 7, 19 Ig-when Deni- conference. . . . M. Cinguareanu told me that there
kin was no longer a real factor in the military situ- were many reasons why a big anti-Soviet army could
ation-Mr. Walter Duranty cabled that it was not be raised in Russia, but all others were subordi-
“precisely toward the re-establishment of the old nate to one reason, that not enough men could be
rigime that the Allies’ support has been direct- found who wished to fight the Bolsheviki.”
ed. No matter what the White leaders may pro- Or compare the early Summer report sent by
fess in the way of liberal intentions, the facts speak Mr. Williams that Denikin was winning popular
more loudly still.” What were these facts that support with such a cable as the following:
spoke more loudly still?
From other dispatches to the Times-dispatches “Berne, Oct. I r .-The Ukrainian rising against
General Denikin in southwestern Russia, is continu-
which arrived when the battle was over, and judg-
ing, especially in the neighborhood of Kiev, accord-
ment of Denikin’s rigime no longer a critical
ing to reports received here by the Ukrainian mission.
issue-some of these facts may be assembled. . . . Among the troops who are fighting against Gen-
The cable sent by Mr. Williams on July 2, 1919, eral Denikin are many former soldiers and mounted
with its report of “a National Assembly,” etc. (see peasants who are said to have become enraged against
above), must have seemed to many Americans to the Cossack leader because of alleged atrocities. . . .”
indicate an effort on Denikin’s part to establish a
Mr. Williams had reported that Denikin had
genuinely democratic and responsible government.
made “allowance for all reasonable demands” on
Yet it was not until seven months later, (February
the part of the Ukrainians. Nevertheless, it was
2, 1920) that Mr. Williams reported certain po-
revolt in the Ukraine-widespread and almost con-
litical developments by which Denikin “ceases to be
stant revolt-that played a major part in Denikin’s
dictator, and has taken the plunge into democ-
ultimate defeat. He pushed h is troops toward
racy.“*
Moscow. But he marched on a bed of quicksand.
Again, take Mr. Williams’s report (November
It would be easy, however, to overstress the im-
20, 1919) that “the number of volunteers for the
portance of the political side of the Denikin ad-
army far exceeds the capacity of the army to re-
venture. Kolchak, not Denikin, was the protag-
onist of democracy in Russian intervention. Deni-
* The truth of the matter is, that Denikin’s government
grew more and more democratic as his army fell farther kin counted by virtue of his army. That army, for
and farther away from Moscow. In fact, by February 17, many months, stood between the American public
1920, Mr. Williams reported the creation of a cabinet re- and a realistic appraisal of the situation in Russia.
sponsibleto the elective Assembly. Note that he terms How effectively, a summary of the Denikin offen-
this “a complete change in form of government.” sive will perhaps reveal.

IX. The Denikin Qffensive

There would be little value in tracing day by tle to the American public. The fall of Vladikav-
day the news reports of the campaign in southern kaz, of Paulograd, of Kamishin, had no significance
Russia. The campaign does not fall into the more for the ordinary reader. But the capture of troops
,or less clearly marked phases that characterize the and guns and war material was another matter.
Kolchak offensive in the East. Furthermore, its One thousand prisoners on Tuesday, two thousand
advances and retreats are more local in character. on Friday, a steady iteration of this sort of news
There is not always a general movement of the inevitably produces an effect upon the mind of any
line. Reports of successes in the Caucasus appear reader.
simultaneously with reports of reverses farther A second factor of importance, from the stand-
west. point of the present discussion, is the extent to
Nor is it the purpose of this study to write which the American reader was either rightly guid-
the detailed annals of that campaign. Its purpose ed or misled, by the conclusions which correspond-
is rather to review the variaous news dispatches that ents drew from actual achievements in the field.
reached the -American reader, and to indicate their It is with an eye upon these two factors, particu-
character. larly, that this review of General Denikin’s cam-
Cities in South Russia, of course, meant very lit- paign is written.
 August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 29

The Spring of 1919 from London.) Later in the month, 5,500 more
prisoners, IO more guns, and three armored trains
During the months of April, May and June, were added. That brought the total for prisoners
19 19, Denikin’s troops were operating on a line to 55,500, for the guns (including machine guns)
running from the Caspian Sea to the Sea of Azov. to 740. These figures let us carry over.
Perhaps it will make events more graphic if the
American analogy is again brought into service.
Moscow, once more, is represented by Des Moines. Midsummer
On that basis, Denikin is operating on a
line running roughly east and west across cen- Denikin’s army, by the first of July, had become
tral blississippi and southerA Arkansas. He is try- the chief hope of the interventionists. The Kol-
ing, of course, to push north. Meantime, an anti- chak offensive in the East had collapsed. Kolchak
Bolshevist army is operating in the Caucasus was back at the line from which he started. But
(the Gulf, on our map) ; and there are anti-Bolshe- Denikin was the new hope of Russia.
vist Ukrainian troops along the Pripet River During the months of July and August the anti-
(much farther north and west; we might say, west- Bolshevist forces in the South took from the Bol-
ern Kansas). sheviki a half dozen cities of some importance.
Without doubt, the Spring offensive in the South Odessa was their chief prize-although, through-
had one genuinely important result. Denikin man- out the campaign in the South-the fact that an
aged to cut the contac.t between Moscow and the Allied fleet patrolled the Black Sea made Odessa
valuable Donetz coal basin. June was the month a point of less real value to the S’oviets than it
in which the Soviet armies began their counter-of- might otherwise have been. Denikin’s line by the
fensive against Kolchak in the East. Troops from end of August, ran east approximately from Pol-
the South may have been diverted, and, from the tava to Kamishin, via Kharkov and Pavlovsk. That
Soviet point of view, diverted wisely. But the loss is, on an American version of the map, with Des
of the Donetz regi’on must certainly have been a Moines representing Moscow-it ran, roughly,
serious one. across the northern end of Oklahoma, Arkansas
Aside from this success, however, there was no and Tennessee. Kharkov was nearest to Mos-
great shift in the situation in the South, during the cow of .the larger cities Denikin had captured.
months of Spring. Denikin managed to push his And Moscow was still 375 miles away.
troops north as far as Paulograd (which might be Nevertheless, the reports narrating this advance
compared to an advance as far as McAlester, Ok- (to a point 375 miles removed from its ‘objective)
lahoma, on the push towards Des Moines). Never- were often put in such a way that a complete col-
theless, there were more or less open promises of lapse of the Bolshevik defensive was made to seem
great things soon to come. The Times on June likely. Thus Mr. Williams asserted, in a cable
24 printed a special cable from Mr. Harold Wil- published on the 13th of July:
liams, declaring the rout of Bolshevism on the Eka-
“There is really nothing now to prevent a rapid
terinodar fr’ont to be “marvellously complete.” break through to Moscow, provided communications
There was also news of trouble on the inside of could be secured and civil administration be guar-
Soviet Russia. A dispatch from the Washington anteed. . . .”
Office of the Times reported, on April 22, news
reaching the State Department that “the Lenin- Headlines told much the same story:
Trotzky r6gime is beginning to crack.” A special July 3.
dispatch from Geneva, published on the same day, DENIKIN SWEEPING
asserted that the government was “menaced by an ALL BEFORE HIM
entirely new revolutionary movement.” And on
July IO.
May 24, the Times gave its readers a report more
TROTZKY’S FORCES
promising still :
FLEEING IN PANIC
“LondOn, May 2;.- The entire Bolshevist struc-
July 16.
ture in Russia appears to be crumbling.
“The evacuation of Rgoscom, the head centre of COULDN’T FIND FRONT
Bolshevism, has begun, according to reports brought OF DENIKIN’S ARMIES
from Petrograd to Copenhagen by travelers, and for- ADVANCED SO FAST DR. WILLIAMS
warded by the Exchange Telegraph Company. . . .” AND BRITISH OFFICERS WERE
UNABLE TO CATCH UP
It was in captures, however, that Denikin’s army
had made a rich showing during the Spring cam- July 24.
paign. “It had already, by June I . . . . captured ONWARD TO MOSCOW
50,000 prisoners, 30 guns, 700 machine guns, and IS DENIKIN’S ORDER
200 locomotives.” (T imes, June 27, special cable Denikin, to be sure, was moving forward. Did
30 THE NEW REPtrBLIC August 4, 2920

headlines such as these seem to put him very near Two hundred miles from Moscow, it might be rep-
that ultimate success which (as events demonstrat- resented in the advance upon Des Moines which
ed) he was due never to attain? There was again, we have imagined, by a point near Topeka, Kansas.
in August, the familiar run of prophecy and rumor Beyond Orel, Denikin managed ,to throw a
of domestic crises facing the Soviets. On August part of his army. But there the tide turned back.
5, the Times published an Associated Press dis- The present period was marked, as the earlier
patch from Paris, quoting the opinion of a former ones had been, by repeated stories of trouble be-
Kerensky Minister that “perhaps the bottom would hind the lines of the Soviet army. Taken by them-
drop from the resistance of the Bolsheviki.” A selves, these stories were enough tbo keep alive the
week later, a headline in the Times announced: myth that Soviet power might soon be broken;
“Strikes All Over Russia”-with a report coupled with some of the prophecy and suggestion
that Lenin intended quitting his post. Notice contained in the report of the offensive, there may
how this report came to the American reader from have seemed to be no doubt about it. On Septem-
its original source, whatever and wherever that ber 2S, for instance, headlines in the Times an-
source may have been. The Times got it from nounced :
some unidentified news service. This service got DErjIKIN SMASHES
it from its representative in Gpenhagen. That rep- BOLSHEVIST ARMY
resentative got it from “dispatches from Helsing- Staff correspondents of the Times in Washing-
fors.” And those dispatches, finally, were based on ton, and in Europe, reported that chances seemed
“Russian reports.” Where these “reports” in turn
good for an early and a complete success. Readers
had their source, there was nothing in the dispatch of the Times were informed, on October 2 I, of
to indicate. the confidence of such an outcome “in diplomatic
Before leaving the midsummer phase of the cam-
circles” in Washington. “Diplomatic circles” often
paign in the South, it is worth noting that during imparts of?icial color to a dispatch without ‘the as-
the months of July and August there were announc- sumption of responsibility. On the present occa-
ed in Denikin’s behalf captures amounting to 74,-
sion “diplomatic circles” were reported to feel that
ooo prisoners, 60 guns, ISO machine guns, 130 “a few more successes” for the White armies and
locomotives, I 200 cars, “large quantities of sup-
“the Bolshevist leaders would make a fresh at-
plies and war material,” and “about half of the
tempt to negotiate peace.” “It is the impression
military supplies and equipment of the Bolshevist
here, however, that none of the anti-Bolshevist
troops.“* If these figures are amalgamated with
leaders will consider anything but unconditional sur-
the captures announced during the Spring, the re- render, and the punishment of the Soviet chief-
ported victories of Denikin had, by the end oftains.”
August, netted him: But though its news columns exhaled an air of
129,500 prisoners, 950 guns, 330 locomotives, 1200 early victory, the Times, it must be said, was more
cars, “large quantities of supplies and war material” ; cautious editorially. Had the Kolchak fiasco been
and “about half of the military supplies and equip- a warning? “Lenin is still strong,” said the Times
ment of the Bolshevist troops.” on September 25, “but he is far weaker than he
Late in August a dispatch from London (August seemed to be a few weeks ago.” Weak indeed, if
2 I) reported that “the latest information” indi- the correspondents of the Times might be relied
cated the strength of the Soviet armies on the south- upon. Mr. Walter Duranty, cabling on October
ern front to be 146,000. Denikin’s captures, then, S, reported “the growing opinion” in Paris, “that
by the end of August, had amounted to almost as the days of the present Bolshevist rigime are num-
many prisoners as there were troops left in the bered” and that the government of Lenin “will
army opposing him. be overthrown from within.” News of the
sort of thing Mr. Duranty may have had in mind
Denikin’s Farthest Worth appeared in the Times a few days later (October
It was the month and a half beginning early in ,ij :
September that saw Denikin at his best. His XE\f’ OUTBREAK
troops during that period ,occupied a number of IN PETROGRAD
strategic railway centers, one of which was the im-
ANTI-SOVIET FORCES SAID TO HAVE
portant city of Kiev. And in mid-Oct’ober he CAPTURED IMPORTANT GOVERN-
marched into Orel. Ore1 was Farthest North. MENT BUILDINGS

di This material is drawn tram tne tollowmg sources:

communiqu& from Omsk, published July 18; unidentified “Copenhagen, Oct. I I.-According to a dispatch
dispatch, London, August I ; Associated Press, London, from Helsingfors, Russian newspapers report that
August 12, quoting War Office report; and unidentified serious fighting has broken out in Petrograd between
dispatch, London, August 28, quoting report from Gen- adherents and opponents of the Soviet regime.
era1 Kamontolv. “The ‘Counter Revolutionaries’ have taken posses-
 ,Y
\ i’
, )9ugust 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 31

sion of several important buildings and Government

institutions, it is said. . . .”
D&kin in Retreat
The turning, we have said, came, in late October.
Revolution in Petrograd, reports from Paris There were, ‘to be sure, later offensives on Den-
that the days of the Soviet government were num- ikin’s part, some of them recovering considerable
bered, Denikin moving upon Moscow,-a reader territory. But from this time forward, most ot
might not have guessed that six months later the Denikin’s announced successes were on one flank
Soviets would still remain in power. Moreover, or another. He pressed no nearer Mosccw. Re-
there were more impressive reports of prisoners volts behind his ,own line, in Ukrainia, were costly.
captured and war material taken by Denikin. How By the end of November, Soviet troops were 120
copious those captures were, the following table miles south of Orel. Three weeks more, and they
shows. (Duplications have been omitted, as in all had recovered Kiev and Kharkov. A,t that point,
earlier tabulations.) a dispatch from London (December 18) summar-
SOWLYE. Prisoners. War Material. ized the opinion of the British War Office:
Associated Press, London, 11 guns, 100 machine
Sept. 13, quoting British guns. “During the last week, the Bolsheviki have com-
War Office 9,000 pelled Denikin to withdraw another fifty miles along
a vast front . . . . the present indications are there
Special cable, Harold is no reason why the Reds should not continue to
Williams, Taganrog, advance.”
(published Sept. 18) 13,000
By the end lof the month Soviet troops had re-
Special cable, Harold covered Ekaterinoslav; three weeks more, and they
Williams, Rostov-on-Don
(published Sept. 28) 13,600 were in Odessa-with a line flung eastward to the
Sal River, six hundred miles southeast of Moscow.
Unidentified dispatch, Lon- The campaign in South Russia was ended. On
don, Oct. 7, quoting a “a large amount of March 4 came this dispatch from London: “The
Denikin communique 15,000 booty.” *
complete elimination of the forces of General Den-
Unidentified dispatch, Lon- ikin in South Russia has been brought about, ac-
don, Oct. 13, quoting a cording to expert interpretation of the War Office
Denikin communique 5,000 . . . .
advices of the past week’s operations.
. . . .
. . . ”
And yet, throughout this vast retreat, what sort
Associated Press, London,
Oct. 16, quoting a Deni- 27 guns and “many ma- of news arrived from the staff correspondent of the
kin communique 5,000 chine guns.” Times with Den&n’s forces in South Russia? Was
it plain statement ‘of events? Or was there once
Unidentified dispatch, Lon- more that false note of optimism, keeping alive
don, Nov. 5, quoting a
5 5,000 the old belief ‘that there was no need of revaluating
Denikin communique
our policy of intervention? Let us examine a few
Total 115,600 of Mr. Harold Williams’s dispatches, printed in
the Times not in the first days of the retreat, but
It had been estimated, let us remember, on the after a summary ‘of British War Office opinion
basis of “the latest informati,on,” that on August had reported that Denikin was falling back “along
2 I, ,the Soviet forces on the southern front amount- a vast front” and that there appeared to be no
ed to 146,000 troops. Since that date, Denikin’s military reason “why the Reds should not continue
announced captures had amounted to I 15,600. to advance.”
There was left, then, the small force of 30,400 men From Denikin’s headquarters in South Russia,
to defend Msoscow (assuming there had been no on December 16, Mr. Williams sent this message
one killed or wounded; in that case there would to counteract any “wrong impression” :
have been fewer still). Other troops were rushed
in as reinforcements? Presumably. But let us “The spectacular fall of Kharkov may easily give
remember, too, that during the time with which a wrong impression of the situation here. It is neces-
we are now dealing, the Bolsheviki were also oper- sary, therefore, to say that in Denikin’s armies there
is no impression or expectation of defeat. The losses
ating against Kol,chak in the East-a thousand
during the retreat have been small, and great has
miles away from M~oscow. Just how inexhaustible
been the army’s disappointment at leaving the area
were the troops and the supplies of this tottering recently conquered. There are not the faintest symp-
and distracted government? Total the figures toms of dkbicle, and the determination to win is as
given in these tables, and you will find that between strong as ever. . . .”
April 1st and late October Denikin’s forces cap-
tured 1,008 guns (of various sorts) and no fewer Mr. Williams, all along, had the disadvantage of
than 245,100 Bolsheviki. And yet, there came a poor cable communications. There was, according-
turnine of the tide. ly, little snap left in his prophecies by the time they
32 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

actually got published. The present message ap- less announcing that Denikin’s army had subse-
peared in the Times on December 27-and by quently been driven back to the Sea of AZOV.
that time Soviet armies were eighty miles south-
west of the city whose loss Mr. Williams had mini- With this sort of alternately exploded and re-
mized. viving optimism, the campaign in southern Russia
died gradually away. Denikin’s offensive, like Kol-
Again, from Novorossysk, on January 12, Mr.
chak’s, showed how little popular support the in-
Williams cabled that Denikin’s army had “been
terventionists could muster. Denikin, like Kol-
greatly strengthened by the infusion of fresh
chak, drew supplies and equipment from the Allies.
troops”; but two days after this report had f’ound Probably he was even better cared for. But he
its way to New York and appeared in print (Jan- could not march to Moscow, he could not even hold
uary 2 I ), a Moscow wireless announced that Soviet the line from which he started, because behind him
troops were within six miles of the Black Sea at there was no body of genuine enthusiasm. For
Perekop. On February 2, Mr. Williams, cabled Den&in’s offensive, as for Kolchak’s, great claims
(again from Novorossysk) that “the position at were made in the campaign’s early stages. And
the front is steadily improving.” In fact, “the when the’ later stages came, when Denikin’s troops
morale of the Bolshevist troops seems suddenly to were driven hundreds of miles by the beaten armies
have collapsed.” But that optimistic message did of a tottering government, at least one voice was
nut get ,into print until February 18. And in the raised to cry “This can’t be true!” That voice be-
Times of that same date appeared a Moscow wire- longed to the correspondent of the Times.

X. The West Front

.
From Kolchak and Denikin we turn to the West armies would be welcomed by the Russian people.
front, omitting from this study the question of in- There were two off ensives in-the West: on; in*the
tervention in the North. That chapter is not in- Spring of 1919, which the Finns and Esthonians
cluded because this is primarily a study of Russian started; the other in the Fall, chiefly the affair of
news, not Russian history, and the news from Arch- the “Northwestern Army” under Yudenitch. Why
angel-throughout the period of Allied occupation the Finns and Esthonians should have been so con-
-was limited principally to brief reports of mili- cerned about law and order in Russia as to want to
tary engagements. We believe that there were de- invade the country, remains a question still unan-
velopments in Archangel, particularly in the dic- swered.
tatorship of Russian civil government exercised by
Allied soldiers, which failed to receive adequate The Spring Offensive
description in the Times. We have chosen, how-
Petrograd, of course, was the objective of both
ever, throughout this study to limit our case prim-
campaigns in the West. To its assailants, the city
arily to the news as printed. Partly for that rea-
offered none of the tremendous distances involved
son, and partly because the Archangel adventure
in an advance upon Moscow. It lay just across
was never on the main track t,o some new “All-Rus-
the border from Finland, not much more than a
sian Government,” we pass over an experiment
hundred miles from the eastern line of Esthonia.
both disingenuous and disastrous.
At home, in their own capitals, the Esthonians and
On the West front intervention never attained
the Finns were nearer Petrograd than either Kol-
the scope it had in the East and South: There were
chak or Denikin ever got to Moscow.
neither Czechoslovaks nor Don and Kuban Cos-
The first offensive in the West began late in
sacks upon whom it could be based. The offensives
April, 1919. On May 2, the Times published an
were the work of Finns and Letts and other border unidentified dispatch from Helsingfors announcing
peoples, assisted by certain numbers of anti-Bolshe-
that Petr’ograd was “being evacuated by the Bol-
vist Russians. To such forces the French and
sheviki.” This dispatch was based on “reports
British governments lent aid. The French supplied
from reliable sources.” Two days lamter, there ap-
military advisers; the British dispatched warships
peared on the first page of the Times the headline:
to the Gulf of Finland; and both governments fur-
nished materials of war. PETROGRAD REPORTED WON
But while interventi,on in the West was upon a The source of this news was another unidentified
scale more limited than that upon the other fronts, dispatch, this time from Paris: “Petrograd has
it played nevertheless an important part in the probably been taken by the Finns, according to in-
familiar process of convincing the western world formation believed to be trustworthy, which has
that Soviet power was cracking, and that foreign reached Paris.”
 August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC ‘b 33
But though “reports from reliable sources” and But not without results. Twice Petrograd had
“information believed to be trustworthy,” were thus been evacuated. Three times it had fallen. And
encouraging, Petrograd was not doomed to fall this since the collapse of the attacking army received
early in the Spring. It simply disappeared from the nothing like the headlines and the news position that
news for a few days-and then a fresh start was went to the “evacuations” and the “falls,” a reader
made. On May 13, headlines announced: of the Times might be pardoned if he found him-
self, at the end of the offensive, believing the hold
TWO RUSSIAN COLUMNS of the Soviets on Petrograd a tenuous one at best.
MOVING ON PETROGRAD
Three thousand troops were to march on Petro-
grad from the southern shore of the Gulf of Fin- The Second Victory
land, three thousand more from the Olonetz dis-
trict on the North. This information was supplied During the Summer months there was little news
by a dispatch from London, quoting a Socialist of the attack upon Petrograd; but early in the Fall
newspaper published in Helsingfors. Would the the second offensive started with Yudenitch in com-
advancing columns reach the city? mand. It moved quickly. By October 12 it had
The following morning there were headlines reached Jamburg, seventy-five miles southwest of
. reading: Petrograd. (Th ere were so few casualties for
Yudenitch at Jamburg-twenty-seven killed and
TREDWELL REPORTS
one hundred fifty wounded-that it seemed to some
RED RULE SHAKY
observers possible that the Soviet troops intended
Mr. T-redwell’s reports (according to a special
to make their stand in the defenses of Petrograd
dispatch from Washington) had strengthened the itself.) One day later and Yudenitch was approach-
belief “of officials here” that the “days of the ing Gatschina, thirty-five miles from Petrograd.
Lenin-Trotzky regime are numbered.” Two more
Four days more, and an Associated Press dispatch
days, and a dispatch from Helsingfors (based on from Stockholm announced the capture of the
“reports received here”) announced that again the
fortress of Kronstadt by a British fleet (“acc’ording
government had advised people living in Petro- to advices received here”). And then, on the fol-
grad to leave without delay.
lowing morning, and continuing for four successive
What happened, next, the following headlines
days, began perhaps as remarkable a series of head-
show : lines as ever the Times has published:
May 25.
October 18.
PETROGRAD AFIRE
ANTI-RED FORCES
AS FALL IMPENDS
NOW IN PETROGRAD
May 28. STOCKHOLM HEARS
FOREIGN REDS October 19. ~
OUST BOLSHEVIK1 ANTI-BOLSHEVIK1
CHINESE, LETTS, AND FINNS CON-
GRIP PETROGRAD;
TROL PETROGRAD AFTER SEV- END OF REDS SEEN
ERAL DAYS OF FIGHTING
October 20.

June 4. PETROGRAD’S FALL

REPORT PETROGRAD TAKEN AGAIN REPORTED;
BY ANTI-REDS MOSCOW LINE CUT

ESTHONIAN AND FINNISH FORCES October 21

HAVE ENTERED RUSSIAN CAPIT- ANTI-RED FORCES

AL, COPENHAGEN HEARS NEAR PETROGRAD
NEWS OF FALL OF -CITY BEFORE
These headlines marked the high tide of the first YUDENITCH’S ARMY HOURLY
offensive. What happened afterwards is not quite EXPECTED IN LONDON
clear. There was a report, several weeks later,
(Reval to Helsingfors to London to New York, On to Moscow? Well, not immediately. Ac-
published June 17) that the naval base of Kron- cording to a special dispatch from Washington,
stadt was about to be captured by anti-Soviet ar- also published on the 2 1st: “Word was received
mies. But a little later (July 7) the Esthonian today to the effect that Gen. Yudenitch, if he cap-
Bureau announced quite unexpectedly that the at- tures Petrograd, will not immediately move against
tacking army had “suffered a reverse.” It was MOSCOW, but will stay in Petrograd long enough
“now in full retreat.” The first offensive was end- to organize the population and create a more ef-
., fective force for the southward movement.” Mos-
ed. ,I/,
34 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

cow could wait. “It is believed here that Denikin Yudenitch is thoroughly beaten.” The offensive had
will have invested Moscow before Yudenitch is collapsed.
ready to march against the Soviet capital.” Yudenitch, like Kolchak and Denikin, had found
S,o unreliable did these dispatches prove to be no soldiers with loyalty sufficient for his enterprise.
that the Times itself, after its four days of head- Whether his army actually melted away in its ad-
lines, lamented in an editorial the quality of its vance upon Petrograd (as a Kornilov army once
news. The four reports had been based respective- melted) we were not told. But once it had met
ly on a dispatch received in Stockholm; on “the lzt- reverses, once it was checked, its disintegration
est official advices” received in London; on “a tele- proved again that there was no real support for
gram received at the Russian Embassy in Paris”; the interventionists. A reverse that might have
and on a statement of the British War Office plus proved temporary became nothing less than defeat
“a message from Helsingfors.” Coming on suc- itself, because there was no real 1,oyalty to the
cessive days they marked the high point of success cause. Yudenitch’s soldiers left him. His forces
for Yudenitch. During the week that followed, dwindled. By Nsovember 24, the Esthonian Chief
sensational headlines disappeared. There was still of Staff reported that the Yudenitch Army “had
encouraging news : “The fall of Petrograd is in- virtually gone out of existence.”
evitable, according to reliable advices,” said an Yudenitch was an adventurer. There is no more
unidentified dispatch from Reval, dated October grim appraisal of the cause he represented, the
26. But the offensive, for all that, had reached its character of intervention in the West, than this
end. From London, an Associated Press dispatch, brief item in the T,imes of February 29:
dated only one day later, reported: “The chances YUDENITCH QUITS ARMY
of General Yudenitch, commander of the Russian STARTS FOR PARIS WITH HIS FORTUNE OF
Northwestern Army, capturing Petrograd before 100,000,000 MARKS
Winter puts an end to operations, seem again to
“Copenhagen, Feb. 27.-It is officially announced
be fading.” Overmght the situation had so chang-
that the Latvian Government has permitted General
ed that what had been considered “inevitable” in Nicholas Yudenitch, former Commander of the
Reval on Saturday was, by Sunday, “fading” in Northwestern Army, and some of his staff officers,
London. to proceed to Paris, by way of Libau.
The fading, once started, proved a rapid process. “The Berlingske Tidende’s Reval correspondent
“Extraordinary pressure” was brought to bear to says that General Yudenitch and his Generals left
induce FinIand to join in the attack (Associated Esthonia in an automobile flying the British flag.
The correspondentstatesthat Yudenitch is taking his
Press, Helsingfors, October 30) ; but while Finland
private fortune, estimated at 10o,oo0,000 Esthonian
hesitated, Yudenitch continued to faI1 back. By marks. Of Yudenitch’s army, it is said, there remain
November 4, Soviet troops had recovered Gat- in Esthonia 12,000 men, who are suffering from
schina; a week later, Mr. W’alter Duranty cabled spotted typhus. There are also in Esthonia 21,000
to the Times from Stockholm: “It is believed that hunger-stricken fugitives.”

XI. The Offensive Against Poland

The activity of Poland’s army, unlike that of the were summoned to the rescue. Poland needed guns
other anti-Bolshevist armies, was theoretically lim- and ammunition.
ited to the defensive. It was never advertised for Were the war materials that Poland sought in
an advance upon Petrograd, as was the army of fact to be used exclusively for the protection of
Yudenitch; nor f’or a march on Moscow, like the Poland’s frontier? Or were they wanted for an
armies of Kolchak and Denikin. It was, so far as offensive-an offensive which was to dig deeper
official statement went, an army fighting to preserve into Russia, to cut a larger slice of territory for
that new state created in the councils of Versailles. new Poland than the generous diplomats in Paris
Poland, however, was the keystone of the cordon had awarded her?
sanitaire which Foch and Clemenceau endeavored We know, now, two things indisputably:
to build around Soviet Russia. The ostensible rea- First: that by December 2, 1919, the Polish ar-
son for this cordon sanitaire was the danger of Rus- mies were more than 180 miles deep in Russian ter-
sian armies carrying Bolshevism into western Eu- ritory (General Bliss told this to a Congressional
rope. That danger the Polish statesmen frequently committee on January 15 ; it must have shocked
proclaimed. Soviet Russia, according to their evi- Congressmen who had been reading about the So-
dence, was continually on the point of launching an viet offensive).
offensive against Poland. America and the Allies Second: that Poland, on February 24, 1920, put
h*g*st 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 35
in a claim for an eastern frontier as it existed in could set himself right by locating Vilna. But
1772 -a claim w,hich the Times’ own Washington how many readers are <of ithat sort? In this
correspondent characterized as so ambitious that it dispaach it is explicitly stated that “the Bolsheviki
might “threaten the future peace and stability of have forced the Poles to take up arms by their
that part of Europe unless the program of the Pol- advance into Polish territory”; and then, as evi-
ish imperialists is abandoned.” (Times, March 7, dence, is cited an advance upon Vilna, a city outside
1920.) Polish borders. Was the correspondent of the
Now, these facts are known ,to most people Associated Press in Warsaw proceeding on the
today. It was not until July of rgao, in fact, that assumption that the Peace Conference would as-
the Soviets started a counter-offensive against the sign to Poland this city which he defined as “Polish
Polish army. That Polish army, meantime, had territory” ?
for more than a year and a half been deep in Rus- January 22, 1920.
sian soil. And the theory that a Polish army The Spring offensive of rg Ig had not material-
can be advancing into Russia and still be on the ized. Would there be a Spring offensive of Igzo?
defensive is a theory many reasonable people have A special to the Times from Washington, dated
found difficult to accept. Since General Bliss made January 21, made this flat statement, and made it
his statement and since the Polish diplomats put as news:
up their peace terms, there is probably a growing
number of Americans who suspect that for a year “The strategy of the Bolshevist military campaign
during the coming Spring contemplates a massed at-
and a half the repeated threats of a Bolshevist of-
tack against Poland, as the first step in a projected
fensive simply served as a smokescreen for Polish Red invasion of Europe and a military diversion
aggression. through Turkestan and Afghanistan toward India.
There is no criticsm to be made of a newspaper Plans for both campaigns are well under way, ac-
or a press service for reporting the <opinions of cording to the best military and diplomatic intelli-
Polish or any other statesmen, provided such opin- gence received in Washington,” etc.
ions come clearly labelled.* Collecting such ma-
Eight days later, as a matter of fact, the Soviet
terial is part of the business of news-gathering. But
government again “recognized ‘the independence
is it not another matter if the propaganda of states-
and sovereignty of the Polish republic” and again
men appears in the form of news? We quote a few
invited Polish statesmen to enter into peace discus-
dispatches descriptive of the relations between
sions. That offer was insincere? Assume it was.
Poland and Soviet Russia. In our opinion it is fair
Where were Polish troops when Russia was plan-
to say that in the guise of news they picture Rus-
ning “a projected Red invasion of Europe”? They
sia, and not Poland, as the aggressor as early as
were (see General Bliss’s testimony) 1.80 miles
January, IgIg. What was the actual situation, at
the time each dispatch was filed? across their border into Russia.
January I, 1919. February 16, 1920.
On this date, the Times published an Associated One further instance: A special cable to the
Press dispatch from Warsaw, December 30. Times from Copenhagen, dated February 15, again
“Poland,” is said, “is preparing for a military made a flat statement of fact:
campaign along her entire Russian frontier . . . . “Information collected from reliable agents in
The Bolsheviki have forced the Poles to take up Russia leaves no doubt that the Bolsheviki are pre-
arms by their advance into Polish territory.” paring an enormous offensive against Poland, for
(Italics ours.) early in the Spring, that negotiations with England
At what point were the Bolsheviki advancing are only to gain time, and then, Poland, undermined
into Polish <territory ? The same dispatch had this by propaganda, cannot resist the Soviet Army of
to say: “The Bolsheviki are advancing toward 2,000,000.”

Vilna.” Now where is Vilna? Is it in Poland? On this date not only were Polish troops still
For the reader of this dispatch, that is certainly the deep in Russian territory, but in the Times itself it
inference to be drawn. But Vilna, as a matter of was reported (special dispatch from Washington,
real fact, is east of the boundaries later drawn for March 6) that the Polish representative in Paris
Poland by the Conference of Versailles. Of course refused to “transmit to Poland the demand of the
the man familiar with Eastern Europe or the man Allies for withdrawal of Polish troops to the ethno-
who reads with an ethnographic map in hand, graphic frontier fixed by the Allied Supreme Coun-
cil.”
* A scrupulouseditor might have felt it necessaryin the
Soviet Russia, the aggressor ; Poland desperately
caseof these threats of a Soviet offensive against Poland,
to have added a note for the benefit of his readers. He in need of assistance that she might hold the fron-
might have suggested,for instance: “It is hard to seehow tiers assigned her by the Peace Conference-that,
a Soviet mobilization against foreign troops 180 miles deep we believe, is the conclusion a reader might have
in Russian territory can be called an offensiwe.” drawn from manv dispatches in the Times while
36 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

Polish troops were still on Russian soil. There dispatch adds that Nikolai Lenin, the Bolshevist Pre-
is one particularly illuminating incident. It is un- mier, in a speech at the Cossack Congress said:
important, but it throws a light on the handling of “If the Polish aggressor invades our country, we
will give him a blow that will not be forgotten.”
Polish-Russian news in the columns of the Times.
On March 4th appeared this dispatch: Lenin declared that Russia would fight in self-
London, March 3.-A Moscow wireless dispatch defense. And the headline in the Times read:
received here, says the proposed peace conditions with
Poland have been denounced as extravagant. The LENIN THREATENS POLAND

XXI. When Intervention Failed

One section more will serve to bring this study raw materials, and to place concessions in mines, for-
to an end; for with the collapse of intervention, ests, etc., at the disposal of citizens of the Entcnte,
provided ‘the social and economic order of the Soviet
in the last months of I 9 19, relations between Russia
Government is not affected by internal disorders con-
and the AlIied world entered a deadlock during
nected with these concessions.’ The message adds:
which a single, easily discernible note has dominat- ‘The extent to which the Soviet Government is pre-
ed the news of Russia, as that news finds expression pared to meet the Entente will depend on its military
in the columns of the Times. position in relation to that of the Entente Govern-
Before turning to this final chapter, however, it ments, and it must be emphasized that its position
is worth while to note one factor which in our improves every day’. ”
opinion played a substantial part in keeping many This constitutes the full reply of ‘the Soviet gov-
Americans satisfied that there was no better policy ernment, as printed in the Times. And it lends it-
to be adopted towards Russia, from February to self to M. Tardieu’s interpretation. For though it
November, I 9 I 9, than the policy of helping White considers other subjects, in it there is not a word
Guards make their wars. This factor is the inade- about willingness to suspend hostilities.
quate and therefore misleading fashion in which Compare, however, this abbreviated version of
were reported the several efforts of the Allied Pow- the reply with the full statement as now published
ers, during that period, to give their policy a new in “Russian-American Relations.“* In this com-
turn. plete statement the Soviet government declares it-
Of these efforts the Prinkipo proposal was the self “anxious to secure an agreement that would
first. Why did that program fail? On March I, put an end to hostilities” ; it is, in fact, ready to
1919, the Times printed a dispatch from Paris, discuss “the question of annexation of Russian ter-
quoting M. Clemenceau’s aide, M. Andre Tar- ritories by the Entente Powers,” or by “forces
dieu : which . . . receive financial, technical, military, or
“There was no longer any question of going on any other support from them”-in other words,
with the Prinkipo conference, he informed the cor-
Kolchak and Denikin.
respondents. He said that the Bolsheviki had
What is the meaning of this discrepancy between
failed to comply with the conditions laid down by the
Entente as to a suspension of hostilities and that the the complete and the abridged versions of the So-
Allies had in view new methods of restoring order in viet reply? Simply this: that whoever prepared
Russia and were examining available means to carry the abridged version for publication-whether gov-
out this purpose.” ernment censor or correspondent or editor-omit-
ted from thalt version the ‘offer of the Soviet gov-
Had the Soviets in fact refused “to comply with ernment to conclude an armistice-and that subse-’
the conditions laid down by the Entente as to a sus- quently. it was on the ground of Soviet unwilling-
pension of hostilities”? Examine the Soviet reply ness ‘to quit fighting that M. Tardieu, official rep-
to the Prinkipo proposal, as printed in the Times resentative of France, justified the abandonment of
(February 7) : the whole plan. The Allies may indeed have been
“The Russian Soviet Government, in a wireless unwilling to trust the word of the Russian govern-
message to the Entente Governments sent out from ment-though to it they addressed a formal pro-
Moscow by M. Tchitcherin, Minister of Foreign Af- posal. The fact remains that Americans who re-
fairs, announcing that it is willing to begin conversa- lied on the Times’ version of the Soviet reply were
tions with the Entente with the object of bringing
about a cessation of military activities, declares it is * “Russian-American Relations, rqr7-rg2o” (page 298).
willing to acknowledge financial obligations regard- As an earlier footnote has pointed out, one of the three
ing the creditors of Russia of Entente nationality. men who directed the preparation of this volume-William
Moreover it offers to guarantee the payment of inter- Allen White-was selected by President Wilson as Amer-
est on its debts by means of stipulated quantities of ican representative at the Prinkipo conference.
August 4, 1920 THE NEW REPUBLIC I 37
simply not supplied with a fact necessary to an in- that it will be impossible to give up fighting, as ene-
telligent understanding of why the Prinkipo plan mies are attacking on all sides.”
was a failure. Read in the light of the complete How accurate a version of the Soviet reply did
statement certain other news items appearing about this summary offer? It makes an interesting com-
the same time assume more significance. In the
parison with the complete document.* In the first
three weeks before M. Tardieu gave the press his
place, that document is more than 1,300 words in
explanation, you find not all ‘the fighting in Russia 1ength-and even the best reporter or the most
was being done by the Soviet forces: an Allied of- conscientious censor (whichever did the editing in
fensive had been started near Kadish, in the North this case) must supply a necessarily inadequate ver-
(Times, February 9) ; Denikin had reached the
sion when he compresses a document of that length
Caspian Sea after a march in which he scattered into 144 words. If the complete reply was avail-
“over IOO,OOO Bolsheviki” (Times, Felbruary 19) ;
able to the Associated Press agent, this would seem
Polish forces were “steadily advancing along the
to have been one of those occasions (particularly
railways”-advancing into Russia-and thus far
in view of the unimportant material which often
they had “met with no determined resistance from
comes over the wires) when he was warranted in
the Bolshevik? (Times, February 23). In these
sending a full text. It may be that a more adequate
circumstances the complete reply of the Soviets to summary was indeed cabled by the Associated
the Prinkipo offer would have been instructive. It Press, and that the pruning was done somewhere on
was not available. this side of the Atlantic. In any event, either cen-
sor, correspondent or editor missed a chance of sup-
plying the American public with information neces-
Dr. Nansen sary for an independent judgment of the situation.
But this is not all. The published summary is
The Nansen offer, following close upon the heels
not only abbreviated, but it omits entirely the one
of the Prinkipo affair, serves as a second incident of
point in the complete document which in our opinion
the sort with which we are now dealing. On April
is most relevant. According to the published sum-
3* ( 19 19) Dr. Fridtjof Nansen proposed to the
mary, the Soviets declare “it will be impossible to
Supreme Council his plan for “a purely humanitar-
give up fighting.” What does the unabridged text
ian commission for the provisioning of Russia.”
say, at this point?
On April 17* the Supreme Council, declaring it
“shocking to humanity that millions of men, women “We are in a position to discusscessationof hostil-
and children lack the food and the necessities which ities only if we discussthe whole problem of our
make life endurable,” marked out the conditions relations to our adversaries--that is, in the first place,
of its cooperation and asserted that upon those con- to the Associated Governments. That meansto dis-
ditions “we should be pfepared to give it our full cusspeace,and to open real negotiationsbearing upon
Yet the plan failed. Nothing came of the true reasonsfor the war waged upon us, and upon
support.”
those conditions that can bring us lasting peace. We
the sudden humanitarian interest. Why?
were always ready to enter into peace negotiations,
“Lenin Rejects Feeding Project,” said head- and we are ready to do it now as before.”
lines in the Times, on May Iq---and this report
followed : Add this passage to the Soviet reply as published
in the Times of May 14. It does not, to be sure,
“Paris, May 13, (Associated Press)-A wireless alter the fact that the Soviet government turned
message received here addressed to Dr. Fridtjof
down the Nansen offer. The Soviets did reject that
Nansen, head of the commissionto feed Russia,from
M. Tchitcherin, the Bolshevist Foreign Minister, and proposal, as the headlines said they did. But their
relayed by the Foreign Office at Berlin, announces declared reason for rejecting it-a reason indicated
that the Bolsheviki refuse to ceasehostilities as a con- neither in headlines nor in the dispatch-was not
dition of the provisioning of Russiaby neutrals. because they chose to keep on fighting, but because
“Tchitcherin says he received Dr. Nansen’s com- they asserted only a general peace could put an end
munication, dated April 17, on May 4. He thanks to war. This was an irrelevant observation? No.
Nansen for his interest in the conditions in Russia, The Council of Four, in its reply to Dr. Nansen,
but declaresthat a continuation of hostilities is neces- had declared that any “relief to Russia which did
sary for political reasonsand that it would be poor
not mean a return to a state of peace would be
policy to stop them. The Soviet Government, he
futile and would be impossible to consider.” The
adds, is willing to support a movement to feed Russia
so long as it has no political character, ‘but will not Soviet government thereupon declared its willing-
be duped’. ness “to discuss peace and to open real negotia-
“He then goes on to denounce Admiral Kolchak tions.” Its offer may have been disingenuous. The
and General Denikin, and concludes by declaring Council of Four, though it declared for peace, may

* See “Russian-American Relations, IgI7-1920” (pages * Now published in “Russian-American Relations, Ig17-
329-33I> - 1920” (page 332).
2-u I I I I !a” \ \.
I
i
38 THE NEW REPUB’LIC August 4, 19~~

have been unwilling to face it, when it came. But Some such policy, we (believe, was a natural out-
this was not the phase of the question suggested to growth of the factors in the Russian situation at
the American public by the abridged version of the the end of 1919- an outgrow,th of the failure of
Russian reply published in the Times. That abridg- intervention, of the nat,ural reaction from war
ed version declared the Soviet reply lto be: “at will towards peace, and of the uneasiness that must have
be impossible to give up fighting.” The proposal been growing in the minds of many normally gener-
for a general peace was entirely omitted. Six days ous Americans over a policy which condemned to
later (May 20) the Times published this second starvation and to death by disease ,many Russian
dispatch-a tombstone marking the burial spot of men and women innocent of all complicity in the
Dr. Nansen’s plan: Soviet adventure. Wfhat prevented these opinions
from ripening into insistence upon a re-assessment
“Paris, May r8.-There is a general impression of American policy toward Russia?
that the reply of M. Tchitcherin, Bolshevist Foreign
Doubtless a number of different factors played
Minister of Russia, to Dr. Fridtjof Nansen’s pro-
posalsto feed Russia, brings the whole project to a their part. One factor, we believe, f,alls within the
close. The reply is generally accepted here as, in range of this present study: the character of the
effect, a refusal by the Bolsheviki to ceaseattempting news about Russia (coming in a rush during ‘the final
to invade their neighbors’ territory. . . .” period with which we are now dealing.
From .the time the three Wlhite Generals had
started their off ensives until the winter months came
War’s End round, the dominant note in the news-as the fore-
going sections amply illustrated-had been one of
The failure of the Nansen plan and of the all-pervading optimism. Kolchak and Denikin
Prinkipo conference, with the subsequent and equal- were on more than one occasion advancing upon
ly dismal failure of the three White Generals, Moscow-Yudenitoh, upon Petrograd. And from
brought the Allies through their second year of in- within Soviet Russia, we remember, came many r.e-
decision and left them, at the end of 1919, no ports of crises and counter-revolutions heralded in
nearer peace in Eastern Europe than ‘they had been headlines as foreshadowing the doom of Soviet
before. The p eriod which followed, the period power. In the months between March and No-
with which this study closes, may be said to have vember, 1919, there was little in the news about
had its beginning ‘in November, 1919. By that Red Peril. White was triumphant.
time there was little hope left of success for the Once before, in such a moment ‘as this, when Al-
Whi’te armies. Kolchak was “falling back rapidly” lied diplomacy had come squarely to the cross-roads,
in Siberia (Associated Press dispatch dated October the Red Peril played a part in ‘turning it from peace.
29) ; Yudenitch had had his second try at Petro- That, as an earlier se’ction of this study has told,
grad, and missed ist; Denikin had touched his farth- was immediately after the armistice-when there
est north, and now was facing south again. Winter was no longer motive for reconstituting an eastern
promised little to the imerventionists. front, and when reason pointed to a withdrawal
Out of ,the failure of the White Generals might of troops from alien soil. Then the Red Peril ap-
have come, in ,those days of early winter, a break peared-furnishing a new cause f,or intervention.
in the current of American opinion. Intervention Once again, at the present cross-roads, that Peril
was discredited. So was the Imyth of a Soviet Gov- emerged from the oblivion to which the past six
ernment perpetually tottering on the brink of de- months had relegated it-and cast its shadow on
struction. If (the Soviets were there to stay, even the sky.
‘though th’eir s’tay lbe temporary, was it not neces- Early November ( 1919) marked its reappear-
sary to revaluate the policy of ,the Allies? Reports ance. On the 10th of that month the Times printed
of atrocities-there had bee’n scores of such reports, a special cable from London. “Attempts were made
during I9 I9-had kindled ‘in American opinion no in several countries over the week-end,” it read, “to
feeling of respect or friendliness for the Soviet put into operation an ambitious program of a ‘Red’
Government. But war had failed. W.ar in Eastern international effort at a world rising in support of
Europe meant no peace for the rest ,of the world. Bolshevism.” Four days later appeared another
Why not ,try peace with Russia? Not peace in its dispatch from London :
diplomatic sense, probably, with loans and treaties,
and all that may accompany formal recognition. LENIN THREATENS INDIA
But peace in the sense of having nothing more
to do with playing favorities, with dis- HINTS AT FUTURE OPERATIONS IN LETTER TO
TURKESTAN REDS
patching arms to one faction at the expense of
another. Peace, ‘too, in the matter of the blockade, London, Nov. 13.-Nicolai Lenin, the Russian
with medicines for a stricken country, and a re- Bolshevist Premier, has sent a letter to Turkestan
sumption of trade relations provisional upon good Communistsin which he says that the restoration of
behavior in respect to “international propaganda.” communicationsbetween Soviet Russiaand Turkestan
 1 ,’
I

August 4, I920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 39

“opens the way for a struggle against universal im- headline in the Times itself announced: “Esthonia
perialism headed by Great Britain.” Got Much From Soviet Russia” (Times, February
The message is interpreted here as a hint at opera- 6, 1920).*
tions in the direction of British India.
Again, ,there was the ,special peril menacing
Two weeks later (November 30) healdlines in countries less directly in the path of Soviet Russia
the Times announced : than were the Baltic states. Headlines on the first
page of the Times, December 30, 1919, reported
CRISIS IN THE FIGHT “Reds Seek War with America”; and the Times
AGAINST BOLSHEVISM of February I I, 1920, carried this dispatch:
A NEW MILITARY MENACE TO BE OVER- 0 * * * iy * * 0
COME IN EASTERN EUROPE TO
FEAR THAT BOLSHEVIK1 WILL NOW INVADE
MAKE VICTORY SECURE
JAPANESE TERRITORY
There followed a special dispatch from Washing- Honolulu, T. H., Feb. 9 (Associated Press)
ton. Events in Russia, it declared, had brought -Siberian Bolsheviki have captured Alexandrovsk,
officials and diplomats “to a sudden reconsideration capital of the island of Sakhalin, and fear is felt that
the radical forces may enter Japan proper, according
of the whole complicated situation involved in the
to a special cable dispatch from the Tokio corres-
worldwide menalce ‘of the Bolshevist movement.” pondent of Nippu Jiji, Honolulu Japaneselanguage
That familiar device-the “well4nformed circle”- newspaper. . . .
was busily spinning again:
Now and then there was peril which the Amer-
“The best canvass of opinion in well-informed
ican Government #itself took a hand in advertising.
circles in Washington indicates that the RussianBol-
shevist movement is now to be regarded primarily as Thus the Times on February 7, 1920, under head-
a military menace rather than as a political one-a lines asserting “Reds Raising Army To Attack
menace that should be dealt with militarily and India,” carried a dispatch beginning in the follow-
crushed militarily, just as the threat of German mili- ing fashion :
tarism and imperialism against the world’s safety,
which loomed larger when the German drives began Special to the New York Times.
in the Spring of 1917, almost simultaneouslywith the Washington, Feb. 6.-A brief but significant
entry of the United States into the world war, had announcement was issued by the State Depart-
to be met militarily.” ment today, basedon its official advices, to the effect
that the Bolsheviki were endeavoring to establish
What was to be the Allied program? Those in- military basesin Turkestan for a campaign against
timately familiar with ,the &uation had ready a India.
solution : “The department’s information,” says the official
announcement, “is to the effect that in Turkestan the
“It has now become clear to men intimately fa-
Bolsheviki are recruiting natives and war prisoners
miliar with the situation that the Bolshevist military into new units and are establishing military bases
menacemust be smashedand that in President Wil- said to be preliminary to a campaign against India.”
son’s phrase, it can be met only with ‘force without
stint’.” As authority for this statement the Department
To a long train of similar dispatches picturing cited an intercepted wireless message from Moscow
the Red Peril these two were the forerunners. Those to Tashkend, on December 6, 1919, announcing
which followed touched on many themes. that “a propaganda train for organization an’d in-
Aside
from the idea of general peril there was, for in- structive purposes will be diepatched to Turkestan.”
stance, the special peril menacing the Baltic States. This intercepted wireless was all of the document-
Thus on December I 7 ( 19 19) the Times published ary proof brought forward. Nothing in the pub-
a special dispatch from Washington, asserting that lished report was said of any propaganda outside of
the Soviets were attempting ‘(to dragoon the Turkestan. Was the State Department (guilty of
Esthonians into acceptance of impossible demands more than one sl,ip in the past) forgetful of the fact
in the face of military pressure.” A high official
in the State Department ‘had summarized for the * Esthonia, according to accounts in the Times, Feb-
correspondent his idea of the Russi’an tactics: ruary 3, 4, and 6, 1920, received full recognition of her
independence; fifteen million rubles in gold ; exoneration
“These demands,” said a high official of the State from her proportional share in the repayment of Imperial
Department today, in an authorized statement having Russia’sdebt; and preferential rights to a concessionfor
the indorsement of Secretary Lansing, “which would building and exploiting direct railway connectionsbetween
make Esthonia essentiallya part of Bolshevist Russia, Moscow and the Esthonian frontier. Times headlinesan-
are being enforced by determined military attacks nounced February 15, however, that the Esthonian peace
upon the Esthonian front. . . .” was onIy a “Lenin makeshift,” and that Lenin had de-
clared the terms would “be quite different when local Reds
Yet when Peace was signed.
. v ,
seven weeks later, a get control.”
40 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

that Turkestan had been p.art of Russia when the January 2 I : “A dispatch to the Central News
Tsar sat on the throne? Was it no longer a part from Paris” states that the Supreme Council will
of Russia? The one solid ‘thing in the State De- send 200,000 troops to oppose the Soviets in the
partment’s memorandum was an intercepted wire- Caucasus. (A ssociated Press, London.)
less, and that wireless proved only that the Govern- January 22 : “The best military and diplomatic
ment of Russia was attempting the no doubt ,hazard- intelligence received in Washington” expects a
ous experiment of winning the Mohammedans of massed attack against Poland. (Special dispatch
Russians Turkestan by propaganda instead of simp- from Washington.)
ly by the bayonet in the manner of the Tsar. January 23 : “Poland’s diplomats” expect a mil-
lion Soviet troops to be sent against them. (Mr.
Red Peril Again ” James, cabling from Paris.)
To gauge the effect of steady repetition, and to January 30 : “The French Foreign Office has
mark the sources from which material for that re- received from its agents in India a report saying
petition was drawn, take the news of a single month. that the Bolsheviki are making extensive prepara-
We have chosen January of the year 1920. For tions for an uprising in India against the British.”
the present purpose that is an im’portant month be- (Mr. James again.)
cause it was then that final elimination of the last
of the three White Generals had begun to prepare Fourteen dispatches in the month of January, .
the way for new rumors that the Allies contemplat- warning of Red Peril to India and Poland, Europe
ed peace with Russia. The Red Peril, in that month, and Azerbaijan, Persia, Georgia and Mesopotamia.
wa,s a ‘frequent visitor: That, averaged, is a dispatch almost every alter-
January 5 * : Mr. Duranty cables from Riga nate day throughout the mont,h. The net effect was
that he has obtained copies of letters written to certainly towards checking growth of an opinion
Moscow by a capt,ured courier, and that they prove that Russia’s failure to rally to the interventionists
Moscow is working for “the establishment of had demonstrated the need of a new policy-of
universal dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet considering the Soviets as an authority with which
rule.” some sort of truce could and must be made. You
January 9 : “Official quarters” describe the Bol- cannot make truce with Peril.
shevist menace in the Middle East as ominous.
(Special cable from London,) There is, of course, the point of view which re-
January I o : “It is asserted” that the Soviets gards as wholly desirable this checking of the
plan an offensive against the British in India. (Un- growth in pubhc opinion towards support of a new
identified dispatch, Londmon.) po&cy. The reiterated warnings of Red Peril, ac-
January I I : “Allied officials and diplomats” cording to this point of view, performed a useful
envisage “a possible invasion of Europe.” (Special public service. That, certainly, is a logical attitude
dispatch from Washington.) -and it is no part of our task to dispute it. We
January 13 : “Allied diplomatic circles” fear an are discussing not Russian policy but Russian news.
invasion of Persia. (Another special from Wash- It seems to us important, however, not only to note
ington.) the fact that such dispatches appeared with regular-
January I 6 : “British military authorities” ex- ity during a period when they were most useful,
pect an attack on Persia. (Special cable from but also to mark the sources from which they were
London.) drawn : letters of a captured courier, “official
January I 6 : “Expert military opinion” expects quar;;rs” (London), “allied officials and diplo-
yony;~F on Poland. (Associated Press, from y$ hJ~as~wzt~dI . “allied diplomatic circles”
. as m on , Brltlsh military authorities”
January I 6 : “Well-informed diplomats” expect (London), “expert military opinion” (London),
both a military invasion of Europe and a Soviet “well-informed diplomats” (Washington), infor-
advance into Eastern and Southern Asia. mation “placed before the three Premiers” (Paris),
(Special
dispatch from Washington.) “a dispatch to the Central News from Paris” (Lon-
January 20: “It is understood” that the Supreme don), “the best military and diplomatic intelligence
Council considered measures for protecting Azer- received in Washington,” “Poland’s diplomats,”
baijan and Georgia from attacks by the Soviets. agents of the French Foreign Office in India. There
(Unidentified dispatch, Paris.) are certain sources here-the last, for instance-
January 21: “Information . . . placed before the which seem more definite and responsible than cer-
three Premiers” shows the Soviets are planning to tain others. But to us it seems fair comment that
open the way into Mesopotamia and Persia. taken as a whole, with their reliance upon unidenti-
(Mr.
fied “experts” and “diplomats” and upon “official
Edwin L. James, cabling from Paris.)
quarters” where rumor invariably finds its favorite
* The date, in each instance, is the date of publication in haven, particularly with the subordinate, these
the Times. sources represent in fact a fairly irresponsible as-
 , r(

August 4, I920 THE NEW REPUBLIC 41

I sortment. The impression that they had their in- a contrast between rumor and fact would-even
spiration in rumor rather than in fact, it must be were there no other reasons for doubt-raise legiti-
added, is heightened by contrasting them with what mate suspicion concerning the accuracy of other
has actually happened subsequent to their publica- news pitched in a similar key.
tion. Five months have passed since January. But
it was Poland, and not Russia, that first started an It is on the note of the Red Peril that this study
offensive. Soviet troops have indeed been landed ends. It has appeared at every turn to obstruct
in a Persian port (Enzeli) , but there they went in the restoration of peace in Eastern Europe and
pursuit of a Russian fleet which had landed there Asia, and to frustrate the resumption of enonomic
bef’ore them-Denikin’s-and a dispatch to the life. The Allied proposal in January to open trade
London Herald states they have subsequent- relations was speedily labelled “nothing more than
ly ‘been withdrawn.* There has been no uprising a tactical political move” on the part of the Allied
in India. Nor has there been an invasion of India. Governments (special dispatch from Washington
There has been no invasion of Mesopotamia. The to the Times, January 22). In that way, too, have
most sensational, in fact, of all these January dis- been tagged successive offers coming fr,om Russia.
patches, was as sensationally contradicted on the “There has been no doubt at any time in Washing-
very day f,ollowing its publication. January 16, a ton official circles,” said a special dispatch to the
first-page headline in the Times, eight columns Times, March 14, “that the Soviet ‘peace’ drive
wide, announced : represented nothing more than a scrap-of-paper
policy of the Soviet leaders, a mere tactical move,
BRITAIN, FACING WAR WITH REDS, CALLS and that what they really sought was a breathing
COUNCIL IN PARIS spell in which t’o concentrate their energies for a
And the following morning came the news: renewed drive toward world-wide revolution.”
Each peace proposal, whichever side first launch-
NO WAR WITH RUSSIA, ALLIES TO TRADE ed it, a tactical move . . . . Meantime the Red Peril.
WITH HER That, with armed intervention no longer a possibil-
The first report, then, was sot reliable. So swift ity, was the propaganda in the news. And if the
peace of the world had not hung in ‘the balance it
* See the Times, June 19, Igzo. would have made an interesting stalemate.

.
Deductions
Assuming that the preceding chapters constitute Minister says they are stronger. By any high jour-
at least a prima facie case for saying that the run nalistic standard, the Minister’s statement if it deals
of the news on one matter of transcendent impor- with a matter of vital importance is a challenge
tance to Americans has been dubious, what de- to independent investigation.
ductions are there to be drawn by the constructive The analysis shows that even more misleading
critic of the press ? Primarily, we believe, that the than the official statement purporting to be a state-
professional standards of journalism are not high ment of fact, is the semi-official and semi-authorita-
enough, and the discipline by which standards are tive but anonymous statement. Such news is
maintained not strong enough, to carry the press fathered by such phrases as:
triumphantly through a test so severe as that pro- “Officials of the State Department”
vided by the Russian Revolution. “government and diplomatic sources”
First as to standards. The analysis shows how “reports reaching here”
seriously misled was the Times by its reliance upon “it is stated on high authority that”
the official purveyors of information. It indicates Behind those ‘phrases may be anybody, a minor
that statements of fact emanating from govern- bureaucrat, a dinner table conversation, hotel lobby
ments and the circles around governments as well gossip, a chance acquaintance, a paid agent. Dis-
as from the leaders of political movements cannot patches of this type put the editor at home and the
be taken as judgments of fact by an independent reader at the mercy of opinion that he cannot check,
press. They indicate opinion, they are controlled and it is time to demand that the correspondent
by special purpose, and they are not trustworthy take the trouble to identify his informants suffi-
news. If, for example, the Russian Minister of ciently to supply the reader with some means of es-
War says that the armies of Russia were never timating the character of the report. He need not
stronger, that cannot be accepted by a newspaper name the individual source but he can ‘place’ him.
as news that the armies of Russia are stronger than The analysis shows that certain correspondents
ever. The only news in the statement is that the are totally untrustworthy because their sympathies
42 THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920
_ . .. .
are too deeply engaged. Mr. Harold Williams’s is the intrusion of an editorial bias, that it will re-
reports from Denikin’s army were obviously queer quire serious reform before ,the code which has
at the time and are ridiculous in the light of events. been violated can be restored.
A reporter is not entitled to hold an assignment W,here is the power to Ibe found which can define
when his disinterestedness is open to question. One the standards of journalism and enforce them?
is not able to avoid ‘the impression that in the se- Primarily within the profession itself. We do not
lection of correspondents the virture of conformity believe that the press can be regulated by law. Our
is at least balanced against the virtues of objectivity, fundamental reliance must be on the corporate tra-
insight and credibility. dition and discipline of the newspaper guild. It
The analysis indicates also that even so rich and is for them to agree on a code of honor, as the
commanding a newspaper as the Times does not Bar Associations and Medijcal Societies have agreed,
take seriously enough the equipment of the cor- and for them to watch vigilantly for infracti,ons of
respondent. For extraordinarily diffi:cult posts in that code. As citizens they cannot escape this duty,
extraordinary times, something more than routine and as members of a profession they are forced
correspondents are required. Reporting is one of to it by the growing distrust which everywhere
the most difficult professions, requiring much expert greets them. They,know that to-day they are feared
knowledge and serious education. The old conten- but not intimately respected, and the sins of some
tion that properly trained men lack the “news are visited upon all.
sense” will not stand against the fact that improper- But while the technical code of journalistic stand-
ly trained men have seriously misled a whole nation. ards, the tradition anld the discipline belong to the
It is habit rather than preference which makes read- guild, newspapers must be prepared for an in-
ers accept news from correspondents whose useful- creasing supervision from the readers of the press.
ness is about that of an astrologer or an alchemist. Those readers will not simply “write letters to the
Important as it is for the press to read lessons in editor” effective as such letters are. They will
efficiency to workingmen, employees and politicians, speak through organizations which will become
it is no less important for the press to study those centers of resistance. The report on the steel strike
lessons itself. Measured by its responsibility and made by the Interchurch World Movement is an
pretensions the efficiency of the newspapers is not example of such resistance to the newspaper reports
what determined men could make it. of that strike. The report on the activities of the
The analysis shows further that at critical periods Attorney-General ‘by twelve lawyers for the Popu-
the time honored tradition of protecting news lar Government League is an example of re-
against editorials breaks down. The Russian policy sistance ‘to the red hysteria ‘of 19 19-20. They il-
of the editors of the Times profoundly and crassly lustrate the Ipoint that a powerful engine of criticism
influenced their news columns. The office handling is appearing in the community which will no longer
of the news, both as to emphasis and captions, was naively accept the current news on contentious
unmistakeably controlled by other than a profes- questions. With that fact ‘the profession of jour-
sional standard. So obvious is this fact, so blatant nalism will have to make a reckoning.
 THE. NEW REPUBLIC

E take pleasure in announcing that we have just been ap-

pointed official publishers in the United States for The Brltish
Labour Party. This means that we will be in a position to
offer to the readers of the New Republic a greater number
of Important books treating of social, economic and political
conditions and opinions thrcughout the world.
The following: list is selected for those interested not only in Russia but
also in the various phases of domestic and lnternatlonrl problems;
Just published

The Advancing
By NORMAN HAPCOOD
Hour
Late U. S. Minister to Denmark and Ex-President of the League of Froe Nations Aseociation
,’\’
Our follier in Russia; the outlook in Russia; the productive forces of Russia and the relation
between the Soviet government and the Russian people form an important part of this timely and
vitd book. Mr. Hapgood asks whether Socialism is n&ad; writes about the reforms that liberals
must bring about soon if Socialism is to be avoided, and describes the moral and religious spirit that
must make possible a new world. Price $2.00 Postage 1Oc

For early August publication

What §aw in ssia

By GEORGE LANSBURY
In this book the spiritual leader of The British Labour Movement presents for the first time a
genuine view of the social, industrial and political conditions of Soviet Russia to-day. To the general
reader the book will be a revelation. It is pleasant to remark that efforts made in England to dis-
credit Mr. Lanebury’s veracity have completely broken down. These efforts were made because of
the frightful picture he describes as a result of the allied blockade. Price $1.50 Postage 1OC

Ten Days That ‘Shook the World Liberalism in America

By JOHN REED By HAROLD STEARNS
“This book is unsurpassed for the period it covers and The study of the fragile structure of American Liber-
seems likelv to remain *o for some time to come.“- alism as it existed before the war, by the former ASSO-
New Republic. ciate Editor of The Dial. A book no thoughtful man or
Profusely illustrated Price $2.50 Postage 15~ woman should neglect or ignore.
Price $2.00 Postage 1Oc

The Bolsheviki and World Peace British Labor and the War
By LEON TROTZKY By PAUL U. KELLOGG and ARTHUR GLEASON
“‘A reading of this volume is advised to all who would “The best discussion of ‘its subject for the American
authoritatively know at first-hand what the Bolsheviki reader. A volume without which no American student
are seeking to accomplish. It will greatly illumine and of English conditions can pretend to be acquainted with
instruct.“-New York Tribune. the facts.“-The New Republic.
Price $2.50 Postage 15~
Price $1.50 Postage 1Oc -
In Prepatatim
The Awakening of Asia The Gulf of Misunderstanding
By
H. M. HYNDMAN By
TANCREDO PINOCHET
“Mr. Hyndman’s study is the most powerful exposure A successful attempt by the editor of “El Norte Ame-
of the pretensions of the white man in Asia. It is marked r&no” to explain North America and South America to
by that fairness of spirit, honesty of purpose and virility each other.
of pen which made Mr. Hyndman one of the molding in-
fluences of present day British public life.“-The New The Evolution of Revolution
Republic. Price $2.50 Postage 15~ By H. M. HYNDMAN
A masterly history of the political and social evolu-
tion of the human race by the distinguished English
Current Social and Industrial publicist. ---
Forces By LIONEL D. EDIE
Introduction by Professor James Harvey
The Course of Empire
By Ex-U. S. Senator R. F. PETTICREW
Robinson. A really imposing stock-taking of
A scholarly presentation of the more im-
current speculation upon pressing economic
portant phases of the development of im-
problems. This symposium has been unani- perial policy in the United States by the ex-
mously heralded as the most valuable and United States Senator from South Dakota.
useful work of its kind published in the
last couple of years. And John Reed’s
Price $2.50 Postage 15~ New Book on Rumba
II THE NEW REPUBLIC August 4, 1920

“Barbarous Soviet Russia”

By ISAAC MCBRIDE By William English Walling
“An unprejudiced and unbiased view of Russian gov- An authoritative source book for students of the Russian
ernment, education, organization, finances, industrial
conditions.“-Reedy’s Mirror. situation which includes the Soviet Constitution and De-
“A straightforward, conscientious statement of facts crees, Lenin’s Speeches, copious extracts from the Bolshevist
. . . . . it deserves to be widely read for its sincerity
and the data so carefully gathered.“-The Bookseller, press, published opinions of Maxim Gorky, the Soviets’ Plan
Newsdealer and Statloner.
“Mr. McBride’s book is important because it gives us for World Revolution, the Soviets as a Military Menace, etc.
‘the other side’.“--The Xochester Post Express, Illustrated, $2.00
Cloth, 83.50

L enin INTIMATE LETTERS

The Man and His Work
By ALBERT RHYS WILLIAMS from PETROCRAD
and others By Pauline S. Crosley
The first authentic biography of Lenin, and the first (Wife of a Temporary Diplomat)
account of him in action since his accession to power.
“To learn about Lenin., read a book by his friends- Remarkable for its unbiased opinions, penetrating judgment
‘Lenin, The Man and His Work.’ “-Arthur Brisbane in (I of political situations and realistic pictures of the chaos that
special article. Cloth, $1.50 reigned in Russia after the fall of the Czar. $3.00

A History of Russia By V. 0. Kluchevsky

The Passing of the Late Professor of Russian
One of the best historical
History--University
works published
of Moscow
in any language

Old Order in Europe in recent years.-Annals of the American

3 Vols., Each
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$4.00, Set $12.00
Russia’s Agony By Robert Wilton
By GREGORY ZILBOORG Correspondent of the “Times” at Petrograd $6.00
This work is the first attempt at a general survey of The Last of the Romanofs By Charles Rivet
the forces which have brought about the downfall of
the old order in Europe. The author demonstrates that Petrogrod Correspondent of the “Paris Temps” $3.00
the Russian Revolution was the logical consequence of
what he ironically calls a policy of Bolshevism which Russian Revolution ASP&S By Robert Crazier Long
the ruling classes of Europe have pursued dur’ing the Russian Correspondent of American Associated Press JS.00
Past Seventy Years. It was a policy for the suppression
of the individual in the interest of the classes in Potential Russia By Richard Washburn Child
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Order from Any Bookstore or
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Publisher,5 W. 50th St., N. Y. E. P. DUTTON & CO., 681 Fifth Ave., New York

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN ’
RELATIONS March, 1917, to
T is’nt so much fun to March, 1920--Documents and Papers

I saY “1 told you so” as Compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming

and Walter W. Pettit, under the direc-
it is to be able to say it. tion of John A. Ryan, D. D., J. Henry
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pretty generally sworn by, ganda or partisan bias.“-New York Tribune.

Also he is likely to be
LIBERTY AND THE NEWS
a reader of The New By WALTER LIPPMANN

REPUBLIC A discussion of public opinion and the

news as a problem of the modern state.
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For the enclosed eight z-cents stamps, please send a copy to be written than there was for this. The only
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Name ... ..._.....................................................................................................

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 -
--

PUBLIC

DONEJohn FOR RUSSIA? IMPORTANT

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Russo
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of his intensive
From
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the Soviet’s
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study of the
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to cope with the fun-
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He calls his book THESPIRITOf RUSSIA:Studies in
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This is an important historical work dealing with
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the instrumentality of Russianliterature. In Two
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I

II
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I WAR AND REVOLUTION
IN
THE RUSSIAN PEASANIr RUSSIA,19144917
By General Basil Govko
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AND THE REVOLUTION
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"So concrete, so careful of fact, so impartial, London.
and so free from propaganda. that 1 am sure “One of the most temperate and judicial works
that, a hundred years hence, historians of the on the subject that we have seen, and one which
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By Arthur Bullard
Mr. Bullard, in his new book on Russia, gives
T HE Russian Soviet Government
is issuing a series of pamphlet
Bureau
reprints
a preliminary survey of the old regime-the soil in
which Lenin sowed his seed: he then follows the
of important Soviet documents. The follow- swing of the political pendulum from the Kerensky
government to its overthrow by the Bolsheviki.
ing are the first four of these pamphlets: $2.00.

(1) The Labor

with introduction,
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52 pages, stiff paper THE WAY OF MARY
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addi-
THE TALESOF CHEKHOV
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 One of many illustrations
accompanying W i I1 a r d
Straight’s biography, from
his own sketch-book.

He Saw an Emperor Pray- d

Kuang H’su, Emperor of China, was to worship at daybreak in the inner shrine
of the Imperial Lama Temple. It was sacrilege for a foreigner to look! These
raw-boned Mongol priests were ugly customers to offend.
Willard Straight made up his mind to see. A friendly Lama, religiously re-
creant, breaking his vows by all his Mongol gods, determined that Straight should
see. And then Straight, shaven bald-headed, in high-necked purple camel-hair robe,
crouching all night among the golden Mongol idols, lotus-stands, skull goblets of
wine1 From afar the bugles of the Emperor’S guard-the Imperial court eunuch
rousing from his slumber-approaching footsteps-the eight High Priests-red-
buttoned men and yellow lacquered hats-wands of incense--
And a few years later Straight is negotiating with the Chinese Government as
the American banker’s representative for a $~oo,ooo,ooo loan. In

The American
ASIA Magazine on the Orient
with more than 60 illustrations-special art insert The story of Willard Straight is only one of
of eight pages-the story of Willard Straight in many features in the SEPTEMBER issue. What
serial form has just begun. His dream of America can be said of the bombs that were dropped into
_ lzlpmg to rehabilitate China has come true in the The Garden of Geths8mane by reconnoitering air-
American-British-French- Japanese Consortium for men in rg r 7 ? William D. MacCracken has brought
loans to China just completed by Thom.as W. La- back a new picture of the Holy Land, and, strange-
mont. It is the story of a vital young American ly enough, almost a happy one. Dhan Mukerji
of unusual talents, working out a national problem makes Tagore a very real person in his article.
for America in terms of continents ten years ahead “Tagore’s India,” with glimpsesof the great poet’s
-3 of time. And he worked in surroundings dis- passionfor India and a summary of his philosophy.
tinguished from normal American activity by the Roy Chapman Andrews, who knows the big game
romance of Oriental life in contact with the wit, of Eastern Asia as few big game hunters and
intrigue and gaiety of European high diplomatic naturalists in this country do, went hunting much
society. Much of the story is from Straight’s own as the old Chinese emperors did in their hunting
diary, letters and sketch-books. parks. His hunting park was the magnificent forest
that shelters the Eastern Tombs of the Man&u
ASIA is a magazine which one of its read- dynasty. There is fiction of a high order in this
ers has called “a mine of entertainment issue, with short articles and sketches that make
and information.” Gold and jewels are imaginative reading for summerhours.
dug out of the mysterious East and ASIA is a magazine which appealsto every mem-
transported to your door in its ber of the family. If you do not know it, perhaps
pagesof exquisite photographs your neighbor does. He will tell you to get ac-
and fascinating stories. They quainted.
Send the next five tell of strange customsand
the alluring charm of FIVE MONTHS FOR $r.o+-September to
American Magazine on
. the Orient, beginning with that 4,000 year-old January, 192I.
September, 1920.
culture from which ASIA is on sale at all newsstandsat 35~ per
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