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Change agents at work: Lessons from Siemens Nixdorf

Article in Journal of Change Management · September 2002

DOI: 10.1080/714042535

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 Practice papers
Change agents at work: Lessons from
Siemens Nixdorf
Received: 6th August, 2002

Philip A. Dover
is Faculty Director of the School of Executive Education at Babson College, Wellesley, MA,
USA. He has previously served on the faculty at the Amos Tuck School and at IMD and
presently also acts as a visiting professor at Cranfield School of Management in the UK.
He teaches and consults extensively with Fortune 500 companies, mainly in the
technology sector. His major areas of interest lie in corporate entrepreneurship and
strategic market management.

KEYWORDS: culture change, change agents, programme evaluation, prescriptions

ABSTRACT This paper describes a major Change Agent Programme conducted by Siemens
Nixdorf (and later Siemens AG). This programme was part of a larger, sophisticated culture
change initiative. Details of the programme are provided and the benefits accruing to the
company are carefully assessed. It was found that impact should be considered at the levels of
(a) the participant, (b) the business unit and (c) the corporation and that evaluation requires a
longitudinal perspective. A number of lessons are extracted from the analysis — the
requirement for serious senior management commitment, the creation of realistic programme
expectations, providing a road map for post-programme implementation, and so on. Finally,
recommendations are made for future work on this very important topic.

INTRODUCTION Business School on the same Fortune 100

Philip A. Dover
Faculty Director, Babson
Executive Education,
Babson College, Wellesley,
MA, USA
Tel: 11 781 239 5330;
Fax: 11 781 239 5266;
e-mail: dover@babson.edu
Change is endemic in both private and
public lives. For corporations, according
to Fast Company, the choice is stark:
‘Change — or die’ (Fishman, 1997). And
yet, according to the same source, ‘Change:
Few can do it, few can sustain it, few can
survive it’. Moreover, there is substantial
support for this viewpoint. Fully two-thirds
of the Fortune 100 — and probably an
equally significant proportion of small and
mid-sized companies as well — claim to be
in the midst of some type of revamping or
major change that is aimed at the behaviour
and skills of hundreds or thousands of
people at all levels. Worryingly, research at
the Harvard
companies revealed that only 30 per cent of
change initiatives produced an
improvement in bottom-line results that
exceeded the company’s cost of capital,
and only 50 per cent led to an improvement
in market share price. As Pascale et al.
(1997) note, ‘This discouraging result was
not for lack of trying. On average, each of
the companies invested $1bn in change
programmes over a 15 year period.’
These observations are dispiriting, but
the alternatives to not adjusting to change
are even bleaker. Failure to recognise
increasingly powerful drivers of change —
rapid technology development, growing
globalisation of

Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243–257 Journal of Change Management 243
Dover
markets, shifting market boundaries, ever-
more demanding customers, and
intensification of direct and indirect
competition — has brought once-powerful
industry icons to their knees. In the Boston
area of the US alone, such recent
luminaries as Digital, Prime, Wang and
Polaroid have sadly passed into history.
Indeed, their collective demise was felt to
rest in an inability (or unwillingness) to
adjust their culture — the way employees
think and act — at least as much as
shortcomings in shifting strategy, process
or corporate structure.
This urgent interest in culture change and
corporate change management has
generated an extensive applied research
literature on the topic. Out of this
voluminous database a number of change
management ‘truths’ (findings that are
repeatedly supported) have emerged. Some
of the more interesting observations are:
— In order to achieve fundamental change
(often also called revitalisation or
transformation), employees at every
level must make committed, imaginative
contributions to organisational success.
The problem with change programmes
often lies less in programme design and
more in the burden of change resting on
too few people.
— A corollary of this is that employees
should be allowed to take more
responsibility for their own destiny
through participation in defining work
objectives, specifying how to achieve
them, and setting stretch targets.
Unfortunately, empowerment is more
honoured in the breach than in the
observance. Senior managers love
empowerment in theory but, ultimately,
the command-and-control model is what
they trust and know best (Argyris, 1998).
244 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257
— The kind of change required by most
companies is so much more radical and
uncomfortable than anything met simply
by shifts in technology, strategy or
structure. As Pascale et al. (1997) note:
‘it means a permanent rekindling of
individual creativity and responsibility, a
lasting transformation of the company’s
internal and external relationships, an
honest-to-God change in human behaviour
on the job. Revitalisation is not incremental
change. Its realizable goal is a discontinuous
shift in organisational capability’.
In short, the goal is culture change
through the learning of new
behaviour and skills.
— Implementation lies at the heart of
effective change programmes. It is the
CEO or other senior managers who
provide programme vision and
communicate the rationale for change
and the strategic direction to be adopted
by the organisation. It is, however, the
regular employees (the doers) who
implement the process, putting the detail
on the big picture. Without the
commitment of these people, no change
programme can succeed. There is much
support for the view that change
operationalisation should be task driven
— specific tasks designed at each
employee level to contribute to the
pursuit of overall change goals.
These four general findings — the need for
employee commitment to change at all
levels, the search for more empowerment,
the learning of new behaviours and skills,
and the emphasis on task-driven
implementation — raises an important
question. If the success of change
programmes depends so much on the goal-
based actions of large numbers of
committed and motivated employees,
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)

how can such positive support be actually
generated on the ground? Enter the
change agent (CA) or, in McKinsey
parlance, real change leaders (McKinsey
deals with organisational change rather
than broader culture change, although
there is clearly a strong association
between the two (Katzenbach, 1995)).
Although there is some disagreement
over the definition of a CA, in this paper
this will be viewed as a person who
translates the strategic change vision of
leaders into pragmatic change behaviour.
They will be the early adopters — through
structured learning programmes and other
stimuli — of the new values, actions and
skills required by the company. Through
this knowledge, they will act as a catalyst
for the introduction of new ways of doing
things across the four corners of the
corporation. Their goal will be to act as a
positive virus infecting their host company.
This paper examines an extraordinarily
sophisticated and ambitious Change Agent
Programme (CAP). Its role within a
broader Culture Change Programme (CCP)
is assessed, and important lessons are
drawn for the future design and execution
of CA initiatives. In particular, the ability of
CAs to act as an effective intermediary in
creating operational impetus for improved
performance through changed behaviour
will be evaluated.
Much of the background description of
the CAP is taken from cases written at the
Harvard Business School (Kanter, 1996,
1997) and the London Business School
(Ghoshal, 1997).
THE CHANGE AGENT PROGRAMME
AT SIEMENS NIXDORF
Siemens Nixdorf Informationssysteme
(SNI) was the largest European-owned
computer manufacturer and information
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
technology vendor in 1994. The company
was created by a 1990 merger between
Nixdorf Computer, an entrepreneurial
minicomputer firm, and the mainframe
computer division of Siemens AG, the
German electronics giant. The company
offered a broad range of computer products,
from personal computers and mainframes to
software and support services. In 1994, the
company posted $8bn in revenues and
employed 39,000 people. Despite its size
and a strong market presence in Europe,
SNI had not posted a profitable quarter
since the merger. The company had lost
over $350m in fiscal 1994. Over 65 per cent
of its products were sold in Germany, and
the company had only a weak base in the
growing markets of Asia and North
America. While technological focus was
high, SNI was slow to respond to market
realities that required more customer
responsiveness and less emphasis on large
mainframe systems. In addition, SNI’s
efforts to trim high labour costs were
hampered by strong union pressure and
strict German layoff regulations. Industry
analysts observed that the company was
constrained by a rigid corporate culture
established during the merger. The
organisational structure was considered too
bureaucratic in its approach to decision
making for the rapidly evolving market.
In mid-1994, a decision was made by the
Chairman of Siemens AG (the 100 per cent
shareholder of SNI) to bring in a new CEO
for Siemens Nixdorf in the search for
profitability. Gerhard Schulmeyer, President
and CEO of the American division of Asea
Brown Boveri (ABB), a Swedish–Swiss
engineering company, was chosen.
Schulmeyer’s goals for SNI were that the
company become more customer driven
and responsive to the market. Most
importantly, he was convinced that the
major adjustments
of Change Management 245
Dover
Figure 1
Schulmeyer’s
transformation DIRECTION
model
S S
Y T
S R
T U
C V
E
T I
M U
S R
E R
LEARNING
necessary to recreate SNI could only occur
alongside a radical change in the corporate
culture. He wanted to create an SNI culture
that enhanced entrepreneurial thinking and
team building. He aimed to replace top-
down procedures with innovative
leadership that rewarded decision making
and risk taking.
To accomplish these goals, Schulmeyer
initiated a company-wide CCP which had
three major objectives:
1 To change the behaviour of managers
and employees with a view to achieving
dramatic improvement in performance
and results.
2 To change work systems to foster a
culture of operational excellence.
3 To change processes to emphasise the
customer and to ensure the primacy of
customer service.
In order to achieve these aims,
Schulmeyer instigated his own
transformation model (see Figure 1).
He calculated that SNI’s radical change
requirements could only be met holistically,
addressing structure, systems, behaviour
and strategic philosophy,
246 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)
B
E
H
A
O
U
underpinned by a continuous learning
process for both individuals and the
organisation itself. A road map (Figure 2)
was created and published, and execution
set in motion in October 1994.
Of particular importance in creating a
foundation for change at SNI were the
behavioural and learning components of the
model. On the behavioural side, a set of
mutually reinforcing initiatives was
introduced to encourage new ways of acting
and to support the development of new
capabilities. Learning activities were
supported by commitment to a
comprehensive development programme for
individuals (including the CAP) as well as
processes to assist organisational learning
(eg introduction of an improved
management information system (MIS)).
Behaviour: The Culture Change
Programme
The mobilisation of the change process
started with the scheduling of four major
change events in Hanover, Germany. The
first, Hanover I, held in December 1994,
was a gathering of selected SNI employees
with the theme of ‘Giving Employees a
Voice in Defining the New

Figure 2 Change Siemens Nixdorf Master Schedule Programme
programme road Fiscal Year 95/96
1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter
map
Behavioural capabilities
Culture change initiative
Systems
Re-engineering/Profit Improvement Programme
Systems
Introduction of new MIS Platform
Learning
Change agent programme/entrepreneurship development programme/management development programme
Doing/learning
Culture’. Over 300 employees, called
Opinion Leaders, met with 75 managers,
known as Business Leaders, to agree on
changes that were worth striving for at the
company. Nineteen topics were identified
(eg ‘establishing an environment of
creativity’), followed by brainstorming to
translate ideas for change into actions. The
discussions led to the establishment of 60
action teams with agendas that required
tangible results within 90 days. A Results
Fair was held in Munich in May 1995,
where 12,000 employees were shown what
had been accomplished so far on the action
items and what would happen in the future.
Hanover II, in June 1995, followed the
theme of ‘Giving Customers a Voice in
Defining the New Culture’. A new
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
Fiscal Year 96/97
4th quarter 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter
Behavioural capabilities
Friday Forum and comm. of practice
Structural capabilities
Fine tuning the organisation
Systems
Company-wide productivity and quality
Directions/structure/systems
Corporate strategy
Direction/systems
Business strategies and budgeting
Learning/performing
set of 300 SNI Opinion Leaders and 75
SNI managers teamed up with 54
customer representatives to develop
change ideas and recommendations. An
additional 18 action initiatives were
generated, such as ‘how to hear the voice
of the internal customer’. As with Hanover
I, a Results Fair in January
1996 presented the status of the work on the
actions identified and assigned during
Hanover II.
Hanover III, in December 1995, had the
theme of ‘Giving Partners a Voice in
Defining the New Culture’. During this
meeting, SNI worked on strengthening its
partner relationships. In attendance were
350 employees and 40 SNI partners, who
looked for new ways to reinforce and
expand the areas in which they worked
together.
of Change Management 247
Dover
Hanover IV took place in October
1996, with a presentation by Schulmeyer
on the need to develop a new matrix
organisation. This final event involved
decentralising the organisation’s businesses
and associated responsibilities and
delegating them to some 250
‘entrepreneurs’ (Unit Managers) out in
the field with full profit-and-loss
responsibility.
These Hanover meetings were designed
to help people learn new patterns of
behaviour. Instead of the typical
hierarchical distinctions, first names were
the rule, and everyone was free to
intervene in the discussions. This
atmosphere deeply affected participants,
who returned to their day-to-day activities
motivated and fired up with a new sense of
mission.
In an effort to disseminate change
information and to stimulate change ideas
from throughout the company, a series of
Friday Forums was introduced. Whereas the
Hanover meetings were large and one-off
public events, Friday Forums were an
attempt to build a frank and open
communication environment within the
fabric of the organisation. Any topic could
be brought to the meetings, from day to day
problems to ‘hot potatoes’ which involved
employees from all levels of the company.
Information exchanged in the forums was
broadcast more widely throughout the
organisation via a fortnightly electronic
mail. In addition to sharing information,
employees were encouraged to form small
groups to act on issues raised in the
meetings.
Learning: The Change Agent
Programme
During Hanover I, Schulmeyer
introduced the CAP, a programme that
allowed 20 employees to go to the US to
participate in a 13-week training event
run initially by CSC Index, a
248 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257
consulting firm known for business re-
engineering. (Although the first programme
comprised 13 continuous weeks of study,
subsequent programmes broke down into
two to three week modules in order to
avoid long periods away from home.
Teaching was conducted at MIT and
Stanford, with site visits arranged to high
technology companies in the Boston and
Silicon Valley areas.) Each participant
undertook a project drawn from a
previously defined list of the most
important challenges facing the company,
with the project findings being
implemented on the employee’s return to
SNI. A further post-programme task for the
employee was to act as a catalyst and
multiplier of change to ensure that the
culture change initiative would be spread
across the company.
The high-potential participants were
selected from the original 300 ‘opinion
leaders’ invited to Hanover I. The goal of
the CAP was to build an understanding of
business fundamentals and business change
along three dimensions: customer,
competitiveness and culture. The cost of the
instruction was estimated at $100,000 per
participant, with the ambitious demand that
each project generate at least $1m in added
revenue or saved costs. A key element of the
CAP was that each CA was sponsored by
two members of management: (1) a
‘Business Leader’, who was typically a
senior manager in the division in which the
CA worked, and who provided funding for
the CA’s participation in the programme;
and (2) an ‘Executive Sponsor’, one of 14
Executive Board members, who was
responsible for the entire division in which
the CA worked. The CAs discussed and
defined their projects in cooperation with
their sponsors. The programme also
intended the sponsors to provide leadership,
guidance and support
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)

to the CAs in order to help them achieve
their project and other goals upon return to
SNI. The projects spanned a variety of
topics from improving innovation at SNI to
exploring international markets for the
company. Much of the CAP’s instruction,
including case studies, company visits and
coaching was intended to help CAs find
innovative ways to approach and implement
their projects. (Two additional educational
programmes, the Entrepreneurial
Development Programme and the
Management Development Programme,
supported the learning objectives of the
CAP. The discussion in this paper will be
restricted to the CAP, because it had such a
high corporate profile and was most closely
linked with the broader goal of culture
change.)
The CAP ran for six years — it was
officially discontinued in late 2000 — in
which time 142 participants graduated as
‘CAs’. Although the broad ‘catalyst for
change’ goals remained throughout, the
operational dynamics shifted over the tenure
of the programme. In years 2 and 3 of the
programme, management switched to the
consultancy, McKinsey. A heavy emphasis
remained, however, on the projects with the
retention of a high level of stress among
participants. The question was often asked,
‘who has control of the process —
McKinsey or Siemens Nixdorf?’ Indeed,
towards the end of the third programme, the
level of discontent of participants grew to a
point where they decided to take over
design of the final module. There was a
sense that the project was too dominant with
a resultant lack of concern in the
programme design for individual
development.
In 1998, substantial changes were made
to the programme. An internal design team
was formed which included three CAs
from the previous year’s programme.
Supporting culture change
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
within SNI continued as an important goal.
The development of leadership, business
and project management skills grew in
significance. The projects shifted from
being the driving force in the programme to
being an important but not dominant way
for participants to apply their new skills.
The ‘10 3’ return ($100k investment 5 $1m
payback) was dropped and replaced by a
stretch goal agreed on by the participant
and his/her Business Leader and Executive
Sponsor. A study trip to Southeast Asia was
added to the programme, to complement the
time spent in Boston and Silicon Valley.
(Although geographic coverage was
extended — a module at INSEAD was
added in 1999 to add a European
perspective — considerable effort was
expended to make it a more cost-effective
programme. Cost per participant dropped
from $100,000 to DM100,000 (about
$50,000) when the programme was brought
in-house.)
The internal management of the CAP by
SNI proved short-lived. In October 1998,
SNI was fully integrated into the parent
company, Siemens AG, and ceased to exist.
Siemens had become exasperated with the
perceived underperformance of its computer
subsidiary and absorbed all of its activities.
With this transition, the CCP came to an
end, as did Gerhard Schulmeyer’s
champion’s role. It was decided, however,
to continue the CAP under the auspices of
the newly formed division — Information
and Communication (I&C) — at Siemens
while retaining the same internal
programme team. A strong content
programme was delivered in 1999, with
significant individual benefits resulting.
Unfortunately, the raison d’etreˆ of
inculcating the whole corporation with
culture change had been lost because most
senior managers at Siemens showed little
interest in learning from either the
of Change Management 249
Dover
project results or the enhanced skills of
participants. Interestingly, one or two
business units did continue to encourage the
CAs to act as change catalysts, with positive
results in terms of both behaviour and
performance. The programme was run again
in 2000, when mid-level managers rather
than high-potential participants were
chosen. By this time, the focus had changed
to become more of a leadership excellence
programme. Because of these shifts in the
environmental and political situation, the
official CAP was terminated at the end of
2000.
What did SNI — and later Siemens
— learn from the CAP? What attitudinal
and behavioural changes, if any, actually
took place within the company? The
remainder of the paper examines these
questions.
OBSERVATIONS FROM THE CHANGE
AGENT PROGRAMME
One of the challenges, and perhaps
frustrations, of change initiatives is in
isolating reliable measures of effectiveness.
After all, the change programme takes place
in the context of many other mitigating
internal and external variables (eg varying
market conditions; shifting competitive
forces). Moreover, the CAP took place
within the broader purview of the CCP (at
least until the absorption of SNI by
Siemens). It is useful, therefore, to look
initially at some outcome indicators from
this latter programme. One can think of
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ measures of success. This
is similar to the distinction that has been
made between ‘hard’ change programmes
(total quality management, business process
re-engineering, etc.) and the more ‘nebulous
and soft’ culture change initiatives (eg
Newman, 1997).
In terms of ‘hard’ financial results, SNI
produced its first profitable year in
250 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257
1994–95, the first year of the CCP. Until
Siemens intervened, it remained mildly
profitable, with reported sales of almost
DM18bn and net income of DM500m
in 1998. This performance was
insufficient, however, to convince senior
Siemens management that SNI should
remain as a stand-alone information
technology company. On the ‘softer’
side, employee satisfaction surveys
indicated a steady improvement in
morale and confidence over the period
of the CCP. Unstructured observations
indicated that, after a slow start, a
growing number of employees at all
levels of the organisation saw both
personal and institutional benefits from
changed and more focused values, beliefs
and attitudes. The take-over by Siemens
came as a shattering psychological blow
to many SNI personnel, as the CCP
came to an abrupt end with the parent
company showing a marked reluctance
to consider the culture change initiatives
previously undertaken. In truth, SNI was
seen as something of a dilettante —
privileged, overpaid and a constant drain
on resources — so that there was little
willingness to adopt their ideas, regardless
of merit.
The change agent experience
An objective measure of programme
outcome is a count of the number of
participants who remain with the
company. Over the six years of the
programme, 142 ‘graduated’ as CAs. By
December 2001 — one year after
cessation of the programme — 85 (60
per cent) remained with the company.
Of these, many are now in strategically
important positions within Siemens AG.
For those who left, exit interviews
revealed that the main reasons were
‘couldn’t find an appropriate post-SNI
position’ and ‘was not being used
properly’. Indeed, a large number left in
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)

the 1998-99 period, in the immediate
aftermath of the SNI absorption. (Change
agents contracted to stay with the company
for at least two years after completing the
programme. A small number of CAs —
never more than 2 per year — chose to
leave while still under contract.) The most
popular destination for these leavers was
start-up companies, implying that the
programme had imbued them with an
entrepreneurial spirit and tolerance of
change. In fact, these CAs were in heavy
demand from outside employers, who
universally viewed the programme in a very
positive light.
How did the CAs evaluate the
programme? This question will be addressed
first, before the broader issue of institutional
benefits accruing to SNI/Siemens are
discussed. In addition to informally
monitoring the programme over its duration,
the author of this paper conducted in-depth
interviews with 12 CAs in the Autumn of
2000. Members from each of the first four
classes were included in the group.
Clearly the programme can be assessed
from two major perspectives — the
programme experience itself and the post-
programme re-entry into the company.
Although programme content and structure
shifted as time evolved — project
importance lessened, attention to Europe
and Southeast Asia was added to the
original US centricity, the locus of control
shifted from external consultants to internal
personnel, and so on — it was widely
agreed that it offered a superb learning and
growth opportunity. Some of the reasons for
this follow.
(a) The Change Agent Programme
— The delivery of a mini-MBA,
customised to the change needs of SNI:
This included a strong emphasis on
entrepreneurship, leadership and
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
cross-functional integration. In addition,
every effort was made to ensure that
faculty fully understood the issues facing
the company. This programme tailoring
improved steadily as the programme
evolved, especially when taken over by
internal personnel.
— The provision of a truly top-notch
faculty at MIT, Stanford and, later,
INSEAD. This included such
luminaries as Ed Schein, a world
authority on culture change, Arnaldo
Hax, a leading expert on technology
strategy, Gary Hamel, a guru on
strategic transformation, and Peter
Senge, a respected leadership author.
— The ability to take an international
standpoint on challenges facing the
modern corporation. This was
particularly important to SNI, who
sought to shake off their parochial
German image and replace it with a
‘global’ presence.
— The chance for real-time application of
holistic learning within the business
projects. This also created layers of
support within the company through the
involvement of ‘business leaders’ and
‘executive sponsors’.
— The contribution, beginning in 1997, of a
strong self-awareness and personal
leadership skills component to the
programme.
— The establishment of a tightly knit
network of CAs. The intensity of the
programme experience led to the
creation of strong bonds and a mutually
supportive passion for change that was
enthusiastically taken back into the
company.
As a result of this largely positive outcome,
almost all participants returned to SNI with
the belief that they had the tools and
capability to change the culture and
operations of this traditionally conservative
company. It is at this point
of Change Management 251
Dover
that cracks begin to appear in the CAP. For
all the excitement at the study component,
the abiding emotion of CAs on their return
was one of frustration.
(b) Post-programme re-entry
— In many cases, CAs received little
support from senior managers back at
the office. This phenomenon manifested
itself in a number of ways. First, CAs
were often allocated to positions that
differed little, if at all, from their pre-
programme jobs. Consequently, there
was limited opportunity to stimulate
change from positions of weak authority
or responsibility. Secondly, there was
considerable variance in post-
programme enthusiasm from project
‘business leaders’ and ‘executive
sponsors’. In business units or
departments where management truly
embraced the philosophy of the CCP,
some significant progress was made.
One surrogate measure of change
implementation was perceived project
success. While it is difficult to assess
financial performance, and project
outcome depends on more than senior
executive involvement, it was calculated
that 10 to 25 per cent of projects were
‘successful’. SNI was left with the
interesting situation of having isolated
areas of change excellence, while other
areas of the company remained largely
unaffected. It should be noted, however,
that this situation improved in the later
years of the programme. Efforts were
made to ‘train’ senior managers as to
their responsibilities (including
participating in part of the programme)
and to create realistic expectations for
project implementation.
— The CAP initially generated considerable
resentment on the part of personnel not
selected for the
252 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257
programme. This was particularly
evident when the CAs returned to work
and tried to assume a leadership role in
change initiatives. A certain amount of
jealousy and resistance was to be
expected. The situation at SNI was
exacerbated by some additional
considerations. In launching the CAP,
Schulmeyer had made it clear that the
future of the company depended, in large
part, on these ‘chosen few’. In short,
expectations were very high. Moreover,
he was deeply and personally involved
in a selection process that appeared to
lack transparency. This led to the
somewhat warped but widespread view
that participants were ‘anointed’ by the
CEO to lead the culture change charge.
The CAs became known sarcastically as
‘Schulmeyer Kinder’ or ‘Schulmeyer
Kids’, because they were viewed as
‘special’ elites designated by the boss. In
some cases, they believed their own
publicity, going back to the office with
an elevated sense of their own
importance and an unrealistic belief in
their ability swiftly to encourage change.
Here again, the situation improved over
time with much greater transparency and
equity being used in participant selection
for the later programmes and a strong
effort being made to keep CA feet rooted
firmly on the ground.
— The post-programme integration of
the CAs back into the company lacked a
clearly defined road map. How could
they be best used both to communicate
and to operationalise what they had
learned? How could they be a
continuous stimulus to change? These
decisions, in fact, were largely left to the
individual CA to make. Little HR
support was forthcoming in the form of
coaching on how to implement ideas
and
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)

sensitively assume leadership roles.
Although the CAs built supportive
informal networks, very few formal
events were arranged where former
participants could get together to seek
guidance and share experiences. While
accepting the need to be somewhat
proactive, most CAs desperately needed
an organisational framework that
outlined a flexible but consistent modus
operandi. This shortage of structure,
along with senior management’s
ambivalence, caused many CAs to
question the true commitment of the
company to genuine cultural change.
Things did improve in the 1999–2000
period, when formal post-programme
coaching was introduced.
Despite these misgivings, most CAs
continued to seek ways to contribute
strongly to positive change within the
company. Mixed with their sense of
frustration was perhaps a touch of guilt in
that they had benefited enormously
personally from the programme, while only
achieving a modest institutional impact.
There remained a firm desire to ‘give
something back’ to the company, if only a
clearer road map could be found.
If the CAs were left with mixed
feelings, what about the broader
institutional reflection on the programme?
Although a number of CAs are now using
their entrepreneurial and leadership skills
well in responsible positions, the overall
result from this multi-million dollar
investment would have to be considered
mixed for the corporation as a whole.
Why was this? It had visionary leadership,
a generous budget, a well-planned and
executed educational programme and
widespread admiration from external
observers. A few major reasons for
expectations not being fully met follow.
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
(c) Change Agent Programme impact
— Any programme assessment must start
with the paradoxical role of Gerhart
Schulmeyer. It was his vision and energy
that took a dysfunctional company and
gave it a sense of purpose and direction.
It was his imagination and
entrepreneurial spirit that saw the need
for a both a CCP and an associated CAP
to help facilitate the change process. It
was his dedication and tireless support
that led to the design of two of the most
sophisticated change programmes
heretofore seen. But in the end, it is
execution that counts. Schulmeyer was
seen as a Godfather, an enlightened
leader, a breath of fresh air — CAs
talked of being incredibly galvanised by
his motivational speeches on their role in
the change process — but he could not
guarantee implementation. In fact, his
own missionary zeal may well have
clouded his judgment. He failed to
realise that not all managers shared his
passion, and he therefore relied heavily
on his own personal inspiration rather
than the creation of pedantic but much
needed operational checkpoints and
structures.
— Expectations for change were set too
high. In order to achieve the vision of
becoming the ‘European partner of
choice among world-class information
technology players’, the goal was set to
alter the culture to a ‘customer-driven
ideas factory (where) we encourage
entrepreneurship throughout the entire
Simens Nixdorf network’. The CAs
were expected to be a vital component in
this change process. But the difficulties
and barriers that they confronted have
been seen. The more radical the intended
change, the greater the likelihood of
resistance, especially in
of Change Management 253
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an inherently conservative culture as
found in this large German company,
where many managers could be
considered ‘uncertainty avoiders’.
Change partners needed to be found at
all levels of the organisation and this the
CAs found hard to do as they strove to
shake-off their ‘exclusive club’ image.
— The CAs were expected to inoculate the
whole of the organisation with their
entrepreneurial ideas and culture change
style. This they intended to do through
Friday Forums and other forms of broad
communication. In reality, however,
their impact — where positively felt —
was mainly at the departmental and
business unit level. Here, they were able
to assume a leadership role in bringing a
project to market, in building
entrepreneurial teams, and winning the
confidence of close colleagues by
sharing learned knowledge. Thus change
— where it took place — was a largely
incremental rather than dramatic
occurrence. As noted earlier, by the time
of the SNI take-over a growing number
of employees had embraced the
requirement for cultural adjustment. This
leads to an interesting conclusion.
Change Agent Programmes should be
evaluated at three levels: (a) the
individual; (b) the business unit; and (c)
the corporation. It is at the first two
levels, at least in the short run, where
positive impact can be best expected. It
is noteworthy, however, that the
company continues to gain above-
average contributions from old CAs who
claim that their experience in the
programme is significantly responsible
for their enhanced performance.
We are left with a major change experiment
that produced variable results.
254 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257
It does provide us with some powerful
lessons, especially on the role of CAs
within the change process. In addition, a
number of areas for future study are
suggested.
KEY LESSONS FROM THE CHANGE
AGENT PROGRAMME
1. Incorporate change agents into
culture change
A CAP — at least of the nature of SNI’s
— needs to be part of a larger change
management initiative. The CAs can be
seen as the early adopters or opinion leaders
in the pursuit of change, replete with a set
of skills that encourages entrepreneurial
thinking and innovative management. But
these efforts must be positioned within a
broader change context that has clearly
articulated vision, goals, strategy and
desired cultural values that are continuously
communicated and updated for all
employees. Teams play an integral part in
this process (recall the 60 team-based
Action Initiatives that followed Hanover I),
with CAs potentially fulfilling an active
formal or informal role in team
management or direction.
2. Blend programme design with
post-programme planning
An effective CAP depends on both an
outstanding training experience and the
clear opportunity for idea implementation
on return to the workplace. Too often, the
former is well designed and executed but far
too little attention is given to the latter. This
was the apparent situation at SNI, although
improvements were evident in the later
programmes. Effective implementation
requires the presence and integration of
many components — an operations road
map, strong communications assistance for
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)

CAs’ actions, facilitation of networking
activities, dedicated senior management
support, continuous guidance in the
transition to a leadership role, the
transmission of knowledge to peers and
subordinates. A key question is ‘Who
should assume the responsibility for the
coordination and direction of these
activities?’ Should this be centralised
through the Human Resources function or
should it be localised within the
appropriate Business Unit? Or should it be
left to the CAs themselves? It is such
operational decisions that often slip
through the cracks and result in largely
unfulfilled CAPs.
3. Create realistic programme
expectations
It is vital to create realistic expectations for
any CAP. While it is reasonable to position
CAs as catalysts and multipliers of change,
they should also not be seen as ‘walking on
water’. There is a real danger that they can
unwittingly be set up for failure — myopic
promises from the senior managers who
instigate the change initiative, inflated sense
of self-importance from cosseted CAs,
resentment and often downright resistance
from co-workers excluded from the
programme, poor support mechanisms for
implementation activities generate a non-
conducive atmosphere for change. Planning
can be greatly aided by this proactive sense
of what can go wrong without carefully
devised objectives and vigilant control and
monitoring.
4. Who should be selected?
From what ranks of the company will the
greatest change stimulus be generated and
therefore where should candidates come
from? It is reasonable to argue that this task
should be put in the hands of
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
the ‘future of the organisation’. Most
companies cultivate a pool of high potential
individuals who have been earmarked for
rapid advancement. This group will
generally be young, flexible, hungry for
new management knowledge and highly
receptive to ideas that require considerable
cognitive and behavioural adjustment. But
is this enough? The most common refrain
heard in executive development
programmes is: ‘This is excellent and
thought provoking material. I wish my boss
could be here to learn from it.’ A familiar
barrier to change is that layer of
management just below the Board or
divisional heads. This group has probably
been at the company for many years, is risk
averse and suspicious of change, often
fearing a diminution of their own
responsibilities and authority. Recognising
this problem, such managers can be
removed or sidelined. Alternatively, they
can be included as CAs, receiving a tailored
educational programme to provide the
change skills required. All too often, this
group is neglected as ‘has beens’, when in
reality there can be a lot of creative (if
somewhat buried) talent waiting to be
released.
An associated issue is the number of
CAs to be trained. This is a quality versus
quantity consideration. Change agents
must be able to command credibility and
respect from their colleagues, yet the
dissemination of an entrepreneurial
mindset throughout the organisation
demands as many ‘disciples’ as possible.
To overcome this, SNI developed a series
of Entrepreneurial Development
programmes (a five-week project-based
programme, also with active support from
Schulmeyer) that provided training for a
further 600 high potential employees. This
programme was provided by Babson
College, a leading provider of
entrepreneurial education.
of Change Management 255
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5. Make change task driven
In the case of SNI, the CA effort was part
of a company-wide CCP. Questions have
been raised, however, as to whether
change is best attained in an incremental
(eg one business group at a time) rather
than holistic fashion. Similarly, should
change be a continuous process or be
much more task oriented? Although the
broad culture change philosophy is often
driven from the centre (through the CEO
or other very senior executives), actual
change must also be a bottom-up
phenomenon. While CAs may have a
mandate to operate company-wide (eg
appearing in Friday Forums at SNI), they
are most effective in stimulating new ways
of doing things at a local and highly
focused level. Indeed, change programmes
are energised by quick and very visible
‘wins’. The ability, for example, to bring a
new product to market significantly more
rapidly while using innovative
cross-functional teams and improving
decision-making empowerment at the
point of customer contact can profoundly
and positively impact change momentum
within a company. As a corollary, it is
suggested that effective change comes best
from an integrated and well-articulated
series of tasks, each of which attains a
powerful impetus of its own. Too often
grandiose change programmes peter out
through lack of focus and the inability to
retain the attention of employees who
perceive the goals as increasingly
amorphous and remote.
6. Determine locus of control
Should CAPs (and, for that matter, broader
culture change projects) be designed and
run by external consultants or should the
responsibility rest within the company? The
SNI experience suggests that there are real
merits of external guidance at the initial
design stages. An established consultancy
has the
256 Journal of Change Management Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257
benefits of both past knowledge and an
objective perspective on the company’s
challenges. Equally evident is the
observation that programme management
should be pulled inside as soon as possible
after launch. It was observed that ‘most
companies are overconsulted and
undermanaged’. It is vital to understand that
the pursuit of institutional change is a
radical activity for which responsibility
should not be relinquished to outside forces.
Moreover, there is always the suspicion that
consultants — however well intentioned —
may put their own interests ahead of those
of the client.
7. Establish performance measures
Finally, there remains the tricky issue of
how to measure the effectiveness of a CA
initiative. As mentioned earlier, one can
think in terms of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ indicators
of success. Another way of looking at it is
to contrast business targets with cultural
adjustments. Achieving short-term
commercial goals (eg an internal rate of
return on a new product introduction that
exceeds the cost of capital within two
years) is a necessary but not sufficient
measure of CA accomplishment. To be a
true catalyst of change, they must
contribute significantly to the way people
act and think about their work. They must
impart their newly acquired knowledge to a
wide and diverse audience. In the SNI case,
CAs had not only to achieve positive
business results from their projects, but also
to improve the entrepreneurial mindset
within the company through effective team
building and the development of more
streamlined organisational processes.
Patience is required to achieve such results,
and these may continue to be observed long
after the duration of the programme. As we
have seen, benefits are likely to accrue
initially to the
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003)

individual, then to the local business
unit, and only finally (if at all) to the
corporation as a whole.
CONCLUSIONS
Much has been learned from the design and
delivery of the CAP at SNI. The fear of both
practitioners and researchers is that
institutional memory quickly dims and that
important lessons are too easily forgotten,
others then being destined to repeat the
same mistakes. It is abundantly clear that
devising and managing a truly effective CA
initiative is a complex and demanding task.
The SNI experience established some strong
premises — the need for CA integration into
a broader culture change effort, the
requirement for serious senior management
commitment, the benefit of an operational
road map, and so on. It also pointed out
areas where far less certainty exists — the
identification of appropriate CAs, the
breadth of programme coverage (company
wide or localised?), and the creation of
realistic expectations remain some of the
unresolved issues demanding further
attention. There can be no question,
however, of the pivotal importance of the
CA in contributing to corporate culture
change. It is suggested that future applied
research be directed toward two related
activities. The first would be the
development of a database containing
details of the design, implementation and
results from institutional CAPs similar to
that
Henry Stewart Publications 1469-7017 (2003) Vol. 3, 3, 243– 257 Journal
Change agents at work
witnessed at SNI. This would allow a more
scientific assessment of what appears to
work and not to work. Linked to this would
be a second proposal — to devise a
template that would, at the very least, pose
a series of questions that companies can
ask as they put CAPs in place. This would
ensure that future change professionals and
academics could reap the benefits from
such rich outcomes as those experienced at
SNI.
REFERENCES
Argyris, C. (1998) ‘Empowerment: The
Emperor’s New Clothes’, Harvard Business
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Fishman, C. (1997) ‘Change’, Fast Company,
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Ghoshal, S. (1997) Managing Change in the
Computer Industry: The Case of Siemens
Nixdorf International, London Business
School, July.
Kanter, R. M. (1996) Andy Chew at Siemens
Nixdorf: Change from the Middle, Harvard
Business School, Case 9–396–204.
Kanter, R. M. (1997) The Change Agent
Program at Siemens Nixdorf, Harvard
Business School, Case 9–396–203.
Katzenbach, J. (1995) Real Change Leaders,
Random House, New York.
Newman, K. (1997) ‘Re-engineering for Service
Quality: The Case of Leicester Royal
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255–264.
Pascale, R., Millemann, M. and Gioja, L.
(1997) ‘Changing the Way We Change’,
Harvard Business Review, November–
December, 127–139.
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