Santiago vs. Guingona, Jr.
The meaning of majority vis-a-vis minority
G.R. No. 134577, Nov. 18, 1998
While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect the
minority leader. No law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other
than Senate President and House Speaker
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
legislature
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are
subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them
FACTS:
During the election of officers in the Senate, Sen. Marcelo Fernan and Sen.
Tatad were both nominated to the position of Senate President. By a vote of
20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was declared the duly elected Senate President.
Thereafter, Sen. Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Sen.
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming
position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Sen.
Fernan comprised the “majority,” while only those who had voted for him,
the losing nominee, belonged to the “minority.” However, senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – number 7 and, thus, also a
minority – had chosen Sen. Guingona as the minority leader. Thus,
Petitioners filed this case for quo warranto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an actual violation of the Constitution in the
selection of respondent as Senate minority leader
Whether or not courts have the power to intervene in matters of legislative
procedure
RULING:
The petition fails.
The term “majority” has been judicially defined a number of times. When
referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate, it simply “means
the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that
the Senate President must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the
senators. Not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise the
“majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is no
showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the
usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate
must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote
for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who could thereby elect
the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated
candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
xxx
Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes
referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction
with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between
two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater
number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as
easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing
all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the
Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be
several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the Comelec as
the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the
prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents
or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
Constitution silent on the manner of selecting officers in Congress other
than Senate President and House Speaker
 disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate majority.
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of
selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to
Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own
deem necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional
method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. principles that it is bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that
justifies the Court’s being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into
“to determine the rules of its proceedings.” xxx the internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a
tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding
Separation of powers: Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the rule and majesty of the law.
legislature
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority amount to judicial legislation, a clear breach of the constitutional doctrine
and minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition would easily
for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing fail.
the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice,
are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to
determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds
of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not
intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the
province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work. Paraphrasing the
words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that
where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then
the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate as well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.

Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, are matters of procedure and are
subject to revocation, modification and waiver by the body adopting them

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the
imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact,
they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or
Avelino vs Cuenco
83 PHIL 17, March 4, 1949
Facts:
1. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order
to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was
approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege
speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President,
the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and
walked out with his followers.
2. Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
1. The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
2. Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be
designated to preside over the session which suggestion was
carried unanimously.
3. The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the
Chair.
3. Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator
Arranz, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as
Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.
4. Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally
able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read
aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his
motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
5. The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding,
asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust
the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not
been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a
quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines Senate and oust respondent.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case.
The court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power
to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered
with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate
them. If, as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority
of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority
required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of
the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at
the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view
of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three
senators.
2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House”
shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the
members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the
House”. There is a difference between a majority of “the House”,
the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an
absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one
(23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the
rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively
upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate
about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any
time by that majority.
2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in
order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of
opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the
said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved
could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the
shadow of a doubt.
Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the
ground as it involved a political question. The Supreme Court should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them.
De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February 2002
Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857)
was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman
Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of
Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a “Motion To
Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997,
the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend
the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18
August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion
for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming
that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to
House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia,
Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within
10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the
House of Representatives; Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño,
Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or
a precautionary measure; and
Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of
Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.
Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8
August 1995), the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is
mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court,
not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of
valid Information.
As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine
of separation of powers does not exclude the members of Congress from the
mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act
3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under
the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.
Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary
evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It
is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other
hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a
House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for
disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings,
or vindicate its honor and integrity.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have
effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-
equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.
Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, G.R. No. 97710, 26 Sept 1991
Facts:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and
Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed
winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are Justices
of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives
(5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a
decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman
Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of
the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman
Camasura received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from
the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo
Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join
said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the
Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis
of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives decided to
withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.
Issue:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, may change that party’s representation in
the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the
tribunal in an election contest pending therein
Held:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral
Commission was to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan
consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must
discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and
independence even independence from the political party to which they
belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote”
in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and
appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the
House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion
against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security
of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election
contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution. Therefore, membership in
the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the
expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in
the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for
other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally
affiliated with another
201 SCRA 792 – Political Law – HRET – Removal of a Member
Separation of Powers
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in
the 4th District of Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc was a member of the
Nacionalista Party (NP). Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc
contested the result in the HRET (House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal). Bondoc won in the protest and he was subsequently declared as
the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr.
who was a member of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco (LDP’s leader)
that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc was a member of the NP. He
confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the
election. This resulted to Camasura’s expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then
moved that they withdraw Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed
that a new election be held and that the new LDP representative be
appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in
the reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by
HRET’s chairwoman Justice Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc
questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an official act of Congress
and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers, the judiciary may not
interfere.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of
the said act of the HRET without violating the doctrine of separation of
powers.
HELD: Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without
encroaching upon the function of the legislature particularly a part thereof,
HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be noted that what is
being complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here,
when Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been
made, members of the tribunal have already voted regarding the electoral
contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot
withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already
reached a decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has
already become moot and academic. LDP is merely changing their
representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should be
reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the
HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
**HRET is composed of 9 members. 3 members coming from the SC. 5
coming from the majority party (LDP). And 1 coming from the minority.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Codilla vs. de Venecia G.R. no. 150605, Dec. 10, 2002
If the validity of the proclamation is the core issue of the disqualification
case, the proclamation of the candidate cannot divest Comelec en banc of
its jurisdiction to review its validity
Ministerial duty of the House to administer oath of office to the winning
candidate
FACTS:
Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, were candidates for
the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A
petition for disqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a)
of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used the equipment and
vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and
distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte,
for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was
still pending so Codilla’s name remained in the list of candidates and was
voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, his
proclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After
hearing of his disqualification case, he was found guilty and ordered
disqualified.
Codilla’s votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the
duly elected Representative and subsequently took her oath of office.
Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and
also sought the annulment of Locsin’s proclamation.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a
Representative
Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as
the legally elected Representative
RULING:
First. The validity of the respondent’s proclamation was a core issue in the
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
xxx
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying
him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the
Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the
timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It
cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district
of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which
has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
xxx
(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the
validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably
challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue
was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.
Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the “doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is
this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving
members of the House of Representatives, could not have been
immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very
COMELEC pronouncements themselves.” This is because the HRET has no
jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether
issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of
respondent Locsin.
xxx
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility
and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither
the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and
if she won, to assume office.
A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has
been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number
of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation.
It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto
proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide
margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption
to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void
from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a
loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo
warranto proceeding.
Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning
but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person
may file a verified petition for mandamus “when any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” For a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on
the part of the board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-
defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of
discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled and
beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent
Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the
order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner.
The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this
Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and
executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the
constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands
that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative
to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

Cunanan v Tan5 SCRA 1 (1962)
FACTS:
Petitioner sought to nullify the ad interim appointment of Jorge Tan Jr as
acting Deputy Administrator of the Reforestation Administration.
Carlos Cunanan was formerly appointed in the same position but was later
on rejected by the Commission of Appointment prompting the President to
replace him with Jorge Tan Jr immediately without his consent.
Filing the quo warranto proceeding to the Supreme Court, Cunanan
questions the validity of the convened Commission of Appointments citing
irregularities as to the numbers of members comprising the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Jorge Tan Jr is valid.
HELD:
With the reorganization of the Commission of Appointment, it was ruled
that such is a power vested in the Congress as they deem it proper taking
into consideration the proportionate numbers of the members of the
Commission of Appointment members as to their political affiliations.
However, with their reorganization, this affected a third party's right which
they rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the
reinstatement of the petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn
over the office in contention.
In the case of Cunanan v. Tan, the Court noted that the Allied Majority was a
merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors had not
disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political
group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The
reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it
was not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in
the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court
held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to
arrangements of a more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led
to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to
authorize a reorganization of the membership of the Commission for said
House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to be
reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House.
The framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a
constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of
each House of Congress.
KINDS OF APPOINTMENT:
 Regular – requires concurrence of CA; if revoked by CA, can return
to his old post but cannot be reappointed; if bypassed by CA,
reappointment is allowed
 Ad Interim – permanent and effective until revoked or disapproved
by CA; if revoked by CA, cannot return to his old post or be
reappointed; if bypassed, the appointment shall only last until the
next adjournment of Congress and official may be reappointed to
the same position
 Temporary – appointments in acting capacity; no need for
concurrence of CA and shall last only for a period not exceeding one
year
Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund
Realignment – Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad
then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation.
So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted
therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds
are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be
reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate
the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such
growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President
as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions
with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their
contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the
GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of
Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec.
29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such,
it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in
required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the
merely being realigned via the DAP. Executive particularly by the DBM.

II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or
to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the
DAP was the transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true
that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their
respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated
by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even
though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-
existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not
provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used if
there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of
an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is
applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions
under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The DAP effects
can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the
DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the
authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not
acted in good faith.

On the issue of what are “savings”

These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared
by the Executive. Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only
occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a
slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers.
Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa
May 21, 2014
710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government –
Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
FACTS:
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since
about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary
funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal
designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority
Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40
million for “hard projects” (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings,
schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants,
medical assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for
hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into
their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or
concurred by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the
Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around
since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the
earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy,
exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system
had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping
lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s
(non-government organizations) which would make it appear that
government funds are being used in legit existing projects but are in fact
going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission
on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the
pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is
unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of
funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements
the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the
executive may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s
happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators
themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be
allocated to – a clear act of implementing the law they enacted – a violation
of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case of
PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or
the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The
Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being,
legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall
involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and
proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other
national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such
limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify
the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule
on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is
solely lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and
not lodged in the individual members. Further, nowhere in the exceptions
does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual
member of Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once
the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he
will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto
the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after
the approval of the GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the
President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But
with the PDAF, particularly on the part of the members of the house of
representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can either bypass
or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an
instance where the national government (note, a congressman is a national
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local
autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel
system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part
of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is
that it is unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings
of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which
amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected
from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential
Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI
of the Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have
to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the
case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (Formerly AASJAS) OFFICERS
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA and ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA;
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
CESAR PURISIMA; and HONORABLE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These
questioned provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006, after any of the following conditions have been
satisfied, to wit:
. . . That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance,
shall, effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year
exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment
by Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI,
Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT
is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be
included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this
refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods. They also said
that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege
that no guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance
will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that any
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately,
it is the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI,
Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in
violation of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection
under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.

Discussions:
1. Basing from the ruling of Tolentino case, it is not the law, but the revenue
bill which is required by the Constitution to “originate exclusively” in the
House of Representatives, but Senate has the power not only to propose
amendments, but also to propose its own version even with respect to bills
which are required by the Constitution to originate in the House. the
Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or
tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and
bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on
the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the
House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are
thereby made to bear on the enactment of such laws.
2. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its
terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing
was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that “no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.”
Rulings:
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively
originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income
taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24
of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the
extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House
revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion
as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress
does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his
authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which
the legislative process can go forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to
make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has
long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind
of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods
of assessment, valuation and collection, the State’s power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such
power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.