University

of the East
College of Law
Manila

A Report on
Res Judicata



Legal Technique and Logic
Atty Allosyius Yebra




Submitted by:

Mario Abong III
Ismail Calma
Mary Angelyn Elagor
Warren Jean Quizon
1-B-2

RES JUDICATA

Overview

Res Judicata is a latin term which means ‘a matter already judged’. In the Philippine
Legal System, the term is used to mean either a final judgment no longer subject to
appeal or to bar or preclude continued litigation on such cases between the same
parties.

The following are the elements of Res Judicata:

1. The former judgment must be final
2. Judgment must be on the merits of the case
3. The former decision is rendered by the court having jurisdiction over the subject.
4. There is similar identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action for both
cases.
a. Cause of action means an act or omission of second party in violation of
the legal right or rights of the other.
The elements of cause of action are:
i. Legal right of the plaintiff
ii. Correlative obligation of the defendant
iii. Act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal
right.

Test for Application

If it is doubtful that the second action is the same as the first, the test of application of
res judicata is to consider the facts of the case, essential to their maintenance, or
whether the same evidence would sustain both.

If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the
same and principle res judicata will apply, barring the second action by the judgment of
the first action.

If the two actions will rely on different set of facts or evidence, the judgment in one is
no bar to the maintenance of the other.








APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE

Urbana Velasco vs People's Homesite

Facts:

Plaintiff-appellant occupied a piece of land to which she filed an application for the
award of the sale of land several times. However, the defendant corporation said that
the application got lost and the land was awarded to the defendant spouses. Plaintiff-
appellant claims that the sale was in bad faith and unlawful since they previously
purchased a piece of the land from the defendant corporation and filed a complaint on
the validity of the sale of the land and the authority of the defendant corporation to
grant the sale knowing that there is presence of violation in their charter. Defendant
spouses invoke res judicata since they issued a suit which clarifies the defendant
spouses as the true owner of the land.

Issue:

Whether or not Res Judicata is appreciated in the case.

Ruling:

The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff-appellant by stating that the principle of res
judicata is not applicable in the case at bar. The first action is not the same as the
second one since a different set of facts and evidence are needed to decide on the
second case.

The first case is about the removal on the cloud of the title of the land, while the second
action is the nullification on the sale of the land and the authority of the defendant
corporation to issue the sale.

The case was remanded back to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.












Nabus vs Court of Appeals

Facts:

On June 23, 11965 Albert Nabus sold a parcel of land to Mariano Lim as evidenced by
deed of absolute sale. The total purchase price was P258,000 which was to be
amortized. However, there was an unpaid balance of P75,000. On June 8, 1970, Nabus
through his counsel offered to repurchase the said land but the defendant refused and
denied the offer. Plaintiff is willing to repurchase the property for P183,000. An action
for reconveyance of land was filed.

Lim moved to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 2159 (24) on the grounds of lack of
cause of action.The trial court denied the motion.

On February 5, 1980, the trial court ordered Nabus to deposit the repurchase price,
which the latter failed to do so. On March 13, 1981, the court dismissed the civil case. A
motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied. No appeal was taken.

Nabus filed another civil case for the annulment of the order of dismissal in Civil Case
No. 2159 (24). On August 8, 1986, Lim filed a motion to dismiss invoking res judicata and
that the action had already prescribed. The lower court ordered the dismissal which was
later affirmed by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for rescission and damages is barred by the order of
petitioner’s action for reconveyance under the principle of res judicata.

Ruling:

No. The doctrine of res judicata will not apply.













Degayo vs Dinglasan

Facts:

The present case involves a property dispute, which gave rise to two civil cases for
ownership and damages between conflicting claimants over a parcel of land located on
the northeastern bank of Jalaud River.

The respondents Cecilia Magbanua-Dinglasan, Johnny Dinglasan, Pascualito Magbanua,
Mariano Magbanua, Asuncion Magbanua-Porras, Amado Magbanua Jr. (respondents)
initiated the first civil case against Nicolas Jarencio, Cesar Jarencio, Myrna Olmo,
Fredercio Sumvilla, Herminio Sumvilla, Perpetuo Larano and Angelo Larano, the tenants
(tenants) of Lot No. 861.

Degayo, on the other hand, initiated the second civil case, which eventually reached this
Court via the present petition.

Issue:

WON the CA erred in taking judicial notice of the RTC decision in Civil Case No. 16047,
which was not even presented during the hearing of the present case

Held:

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final judgment or
decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of
the parties or their privies in all later suits on points and matters determined in the
former suit.13 It rests on the principle that parties should not to be permitted to litigate
the same issue more than once; that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has
been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.











Fernando vs. Vasquez

FACTS:

This case had its beginning prior to October 1961, when certain lessees of market stalls
erected on the premises denominated as Folgueras Remnants Center located at Nos.
922-926 Folgueras Street, Tondo, Manila, found themselves in a quandary as to who
was the lawful owner thereof and entitled to receive their rental payments. Because of
this, they commenced suit for interpleader in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against petitioner Valentin A. Fernando and his children Pelagia Fernando Santos,
respondent, and Urbana Fernando Cruz.1 The judgment of October 10, 1961 declared
Valentin A. Fernando owner of the property to whom the tenants must pay the rents.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals affirmed. The petition to review the appellate court's
decision was dismissed by this Court's resolution of October 1, 1965.3 The move to
reconsider was denied. This Court, on December 21, 1965, refused to grant leave to file
a second motion for reconsideration. This denial terminated said case.

Respondents Pelagia Fernando Santos and her husband Pablo G. Santos had all the
while been occupying the second floor of the building standing on the property
involved. Petitioner asked them to vacate the premises, orally at first in the early part of
1965, then in writing in April and May of the same year. The spouse Santos refused to
leave. Thus, on May 24, 1965, petitioner lodged a complaint for unlawful detainer in the
City Court of Manila4 against the spouses. Averment was there made that the latter's
occupation of the premises was upon petitioner's sufferance. The city court's decision of
November 11, 1965 ordered the spouses to vacate the premises and to pay petitioner
P1,000 per month beginning January 1965 as reasonable compensation for the use
thereof, P500 as attorneys' fees, and the costs. A writ of execution was thereafter issued
by the city court.

Came the decision on the merits of March 25, 1966. Herein respondent judge found that
their spouses Santos had been unlawfully withholding possession for more than one
year prior to the filing of the complaint, and ruled that the proper action for recovery of
possession was accion publiciana, not unlawful detainer. The judge, accordingly,
declared the city court without jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case and nullified
the proceedings therein, including the writ of execution.

Petitioner herein attempted to appeal from this judgment. He filed his notice of appeal
and appeal bond on April 25, 1966. However, on January 11, 1967, this Court dismissed
his appeal for failure to pay the docket fee on time.

On August 17, 1966, petitioner started before this Court the present proceedings
for certiorari.
However, on October 1, 1966, before the case on the merits could be decided, counsel
for private respondents brought to the attention of this Court the fact that on
September 20, 1966, the parties herein amicably settled their differences. He advanced
the information that respondent spouses had already left the premises and posited the
view that the present case had, therefore, become moot and academic.

HELD:

As fatal to petitioner's cause is the judicial amicable settlement entered into between
petitioner and respondent spouses earlier in this opinion related. That amicable
settlement was submitted to and acted upon by the Court of Appeals in a case between
the same parties herein at the time pending in said court. It stipulated that respondents
would leave the premises (they have already in fact left), and that petitioner agreed to
retain the tenants on the property. Such amicable settlement, in the nature of a judicial
compromise, has the effect and authority of res judicata.

We are then faced with a situation whereby all the judicial proceedings relative to the
controversy between petitioner and respondent spouses have become moot and
academic. These are the ejectment case in the city court, the prohibition case in the
Court of First Instance, and the present certiorari proceedings before this Court. To
nullify the decision of Judge Vasquez would be an idle ceremony. That decision has
becomefunctus officio. Nullification of that decision would but be aimed at the revival of
the judgment of ejectment and writ of execution issued by the city court. Which
obviously have become useless. Because, respondent spouses have already vacated the
premises from which they are sought to be ejected. No intimation there is in the
amicable settlement that petitioner would want to recover from respondent spouses
(his daughter and son-in-law) damages for their use and occupation of the premises.
Suggestion there is none that such damages were not obliterated by the amicable
settlement between the parties.

All these funnel down to the conclusion that any decision now on the merits of the
present case would be of no practical value and effect. 20This has been made so by the
amicable settlement of the parties. 21 This Court is left with no further controversy to
adjudicate. 22 Surely, it is not the function of this Court to furnish an answer to a
purposeless question that no longer exists. 23 Because of the supervening circumstance
of an amicable settlement between the parties, this Court has no alternative but to
dismiss the present petition for certiorari.

So it is, that either on the merits or because this case has become moot and academic,
the result is the same - the petition must fail.

References:

Res Judicata. (2011, February 14). Retrieved from
http://talkaboutphilippinelaw.weebly.com/case-digests/res-judicata
Urbana Velasco vs People's Homesite GR No. L-39674 (January 31, 1978).
Nabus vs Court of Appeals GR No. 91670(February 7, 1991).
Degayo vs Dinglasan GR No. 173128 (April 6, 2015).
Fernando vs Vasquez GR No. L-26417 (January 30, 1970).
GROUP 2 – Stare Decisis and Obiter Dictum

MEMBERS:
Ablir, Allana Lorraine R.
Atayde, Garri A.
Gutierrez, Mary Arianne Vivienne R.
Yu, Bea Cheryl C.


Stare Decisis

v Concept
a. Legal maxim – Stare decisis et non quieta movere which means “Follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.
b. It requires that past decisions of the court be followed in the adjudication of
cases. In other words, once a case has been decided one way, then another
case, involving exactly the same point at issue, should be decided in the same
manner.
c. It is an invaluable aid in the construction or interpretation of statutes of
doubtful meaning that the interpretation of a statute by the Supreme Court
forms part of the statute itself and of the legal system and comes from that
branch of government entrusted with the duty to construe or interpret the
law.
d. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal
rules established by this Court in its final decisions.
e. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
f. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issues, necessary
for two simple reasons: economy and stability.
g. In order that a ruling of the Supreme Court will come within the doctrine of
stare decisis:
 • It must be categorically stated on an issue expressly raised by their
parties
• It must be a direct ruling
• The facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are
substantially the same

v Statutory Foundation
In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code, which
reads:
Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

v Nature
a. It is not absolute
b. It presupposes identity of facts and issues
c. It is Direct
d. It is Primary
e. Essentially cumulative
f. Impressed with jurisprudential warranties

v Inherent limitations
a. It would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable;
b. Where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions
c. The binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles
necessary for the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the
decision
d. If it found to be contrary to law, it must be abandoned
e. It should not be applied when there is a conflict between the precedent and
the law
 f. Where the court resolved a question merely sub silencion (“under” or “in
silence”; without notice being taken or without making a particular point of
the matter in question; often used as a reference to something that is
implied but not expressly stated)

v Academic and Jurisprudential Classifications
a. Constitutional vs Statutory
Constitutional Stare Decisis Statutory Stare Decisis
involves judicial interpretations of
involves interpretations of statutes
the Constitution

b. Vertical vs Horizontal
Vertical Stare Decisis Horizontal Stare Decisis
• deals with the duty of lower
courts to apply the decisions • requires that high courts must
of the higher courts to cases follow its own precedents
involving the same facts • Matter of Policy
• Matter of Obligation

(Lambino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 174153 and 174299,
October 25, 2006, 505 SCRA 160, CJ Puno’s Dissenting Opinion)

v Rationale
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons:
a. It legitimizes judicial institutions
b. It promotes judicial economy
c. It allows for predictability

v Prospective Application
 “…the interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the
law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may
have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old
doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the
familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit.” (Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562)

v Cases
Ting v. Velez-Ting, G.R. No. 166562
Facts: In 1972, Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez met each other in medical
school. In 1975, they married each other. In 1980, Benjamin became a
full-fledged doctor and he practiced at the Velez Hospital (owned by
Carmen’s family). Benjamin and Carmen had six children during their
marriage. But after 18 years of marriage, Carmen went to court to have
their marriage be declared void on the ground that Benjamin was
psychologically incapacitated. She alleged that even before she married
Benjamin, the latter was already a drunkard; that Benjamin was a
gambler, he was violent, and would rather spend on his expensive hobby;
that he rarely stayed home and even neglected his children and family
obligations. Carmen presented an expert witness (Dr. Pureza Trinidad-
Oñate) to prove Benjamin’s psychological incapacity. However, Oñate
merely based her findings on the deposition submitted by Benjamin.
Oñate was not able to personally examine Benjamin because at that time,
Benjamin was already working as an anesthesiologist in South Africa. On
his part, Benjamin opposed the petition. He also presented his own
expert witness (Dr. Renato Obra) to disprove Carmen’s allegations. Obra
was not able to personally examine Benjamin but he also evaluated the
same deposition evaluated by Oñate. Also, Benjamin submitted himself
for evaluation to a South African doctor (Dr. A.J.L. Pentz) and the
 transcript of said evaluation was submitted to Obra and the latter also
evaluated the same. Obra found Benjamin not to be psychologically
incapacitated. The trial court, and eventually the Court of Appeals, ruled
in favor of Carmen.

Issue: Whether or not the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to
follow the guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases

Held: NO. The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to
doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on
the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided,
it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it
is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two
simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is
entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code. To be forthright, respondents
argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of
stare decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but
was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca, and again in Antonio v. Reyes. In these
cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by
courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted.
It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a different
view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith under the familiar rule
of lex prospicit, non respicit.

Lazatin vs Desierto
Facts: Petitioners were accused of violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code and of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019
(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) as amended. The Complaint alleged
that there were irregularities in the use of that then Congressman Lazatin
of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996. With the help of
his co-petitioners, Lazatin was able to claim 18 checks amounting to
Php4, 868,277.08 and convert them into cash. After a preliminary
investigation, it was recommended that they be prosecuted. The
Sandiganbayan, however, ordered a re-evaluation of the case.
Subsequently, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (which under the
Office of the Ombudsman by virtue of R.A No. 6770) recommended that
the case be dismissed. The Office of Legal Affairs on the other hand
recommended the prosecution. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA
recommendation, which the petitioners assert is beyond his jurisdiction
because the Constitution meant for the OSP to be independent from the
Ombudsman, and therefore the Ombudsman has no power to prosecute.

Issue: Whether or not the Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the provisions
of R.A. No. 6770 should be revisited and the principle of stare decisis be
set aside

Held: NO. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied
in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus: ART.
8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.

It was further explained in Fermin v. People as follows: The doctrine of
stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in
a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme
Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed
in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis
is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association of the Philippine Islands v.
Remington Steel Corporation, the Court expounded on the importance of
the foregoing doctrine, stating that: The doctrine of stare decisis is one of
policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability of
judicial decisions, thus: Time and again, the court has held that it is a very
desirable and necessary judicial practice that when a court has laid down
a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to
that principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are
substantially the same. Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the
decisions and disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that
for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first principle of
justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a
previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of
stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue. The
doctrine has assumed such value in our judicial system that the Court has
ruled that “[a]bandonment thereof must be based only on strong and
compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and
the public's confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished.” Verily, only upon showing that circumstances attendant in a
 particular case override the great benefits derived by our judicial system
from the doctrine of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in setting
aside the same.
In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to
convince the Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be
applied to this case. They have not successfully demonstrated how or
why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the Ombudsman, who has
been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the
latter. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Obiter Dictum

v Concept
a. Opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before it
b. A remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a
cause ‘by the way’, that is, incidentally, and not directly upon the question
before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of
the cause, or introduced by way of the illustration, or analogy or argument
c. Not binding as precedent
d. Include, but are not limited to, words “introduced by way of illustration or
analogy or argument”

v Test to determine whether the decision is ratio or obiter
• Wambaugh’s Inversion Test – ask whether the decision would have
different had the statement been omitted.
o If yes = statement is crucial
o If no = statement is an obiter

v Cases
Delta Motors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Roberto M. Lagman and
State Investment House, Inc.
Facts: SIHI filed a motion for clarification, asking for a deletion of a portion of the
resolution for it being mere obiter dictum (While it is true that as a
necessary consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
January 22, 1991 ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 “has
not attained finality pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta,
which may appeal therefrom within the reglementary period”, all
proceedings and/or orders arising from the trial court’s decision in Civil
Case No. 84-23019 are null and void x x x.”) SIHI claimed that the
statement was “not necessary for the case before it” (the denial of the
Omnibus motion and therefore “could not be held binding for
establishing a precedent”.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was obiter
dictum

Held: YES. The Court of Appeals likewise did not commit reversible error in
deleting the phrase SIHI protested as obiter dictum. An obiter dictum has
been defined as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of
law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. It is a
remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a
cause, "by the way," that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly
upon the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in
the determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or
analogy or argument. Such are not binding as precedent. The assailed
phrase was indeed obiter dictum as it touched upon a matter not raised
 by petitioner expressly in its petition assailing the dismissal of its notice of
appeal. It was not a prerequisite in disposing of the aforementioned
issue. The body of the resolution did not contain any discussion on such
matter nor mention any principle of law to support such statement.

Ient vs Tullett
Facts: Tullet Prebon and the company of Ient and Schulze Tradition Philippines
are competitors in the deal breaking business At some point in time
several Tullet deal brokers resigned and went to work with Tradition
Philippines. Tullet filed a complaint against Tradition for sabotaging their
business by taking their deal breakers. Tullett wanted Tradition to be
criminally liable under Sections 31, 34 and 144 of the Corporation Code

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is correct that previous decisions of this
Court have already settled the matter in controversy in the consolidated
cases at bar

Held: NO. The declaration of the Court in Home Insurance Company v. Eastern
Shipping Lines that “The prohibition against doing business without first
securing a license [under Section 133] is now given penal sanction which
is also applicable to other violations of the Corporation Code under the
general provisions of Section 144 of the Code" is unmistakably obiter
dictum. We explained in another case: An obiter dictum has been defined
as an opinion expressed by a court upon some question of law that is not
necessary in the determination of the case before the court. It is a remark
made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his decision upon a cause by
the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon the
question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or
 analogy or argument. It does not embody the resolution or determination
of the court, and is made without argument, or full consideration of the
point. It lacks the force of adjudication, being a mere expression of an
opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata. The issue in the
Home Insurance Company case was whether or not a foreign corporation
previously doing business here without a license has the capacity to sue
in our courts when it had already acquired the necessary license at the
time of the filing of the complaints. The Court ruled in the affirmative.
The statement regarding the supposed penal sanction for violation of
Section 133 of the Corporation Code was not essential to the resolution
of the case as none of the parties was being made criminally liable under
Section 133.

PEPSICO v Lacanilao
Facts: PEPSICO (now Pepsi cola) launched the “Number Fever” promo in 1992.
Instead of 1 winner, there were over 400,000; winning combination ‘349’
on 800,000 caps. Case about one claimant for the prize, Jaime Lacanilao
who had 2 winning caps. PEPSICO hired Mexican firm DG Consultores to
pre-select the winning numbers. Something went wrong and the winning
number instead printed on 800,000 caps. To appease the holders of 349
caps, PEPSICO offered 500 pesos for each cap. Some ‘winners’ did not
agree, including Lacanilao; the CA agreed with Lacanilao. Previous cases
on the event such as Rodrigo v PCPPI, Mendoza v PCPPI and De Mesa v
PCPPI also reached the court and petitioners denied.Before the court
renders its decision, Lacanilao decides to agree to compromise
agreement and abandon claims

Issue: Whether or not the principle of stare decisis will be applied

 Held: YES. When a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain set of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases in which the facts are substantially the same. Stare decisis et non
quieta movere. Stand by the decision and disturb not what is settled. It
simply means that a conclusion reached in one case should be applied to
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the
parties may be different. It comes from the basic principle of justice that
like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same question
relating to the same event is brought by parties similarly situated as in a
previous case already litigated and decided by a competent court, the
rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
The Rodrigo and Mendoza cases were both decided by this Court through
a minute resolution. It is axiomatic that when a minute resolution denies
a petition for lack of merit, the challenged decision, together with its
findings of fact and legal conclusions, is deemed sustained. The De Mesa
case, on the other hand, was decided on the strength of the stare decisis
doctrine considering that the legal rights and relations of the parties, the
facts, the applicable laws, the causes of action, the issues, and the
evidence are exactly the same as those in the decided cases of Rodrigo
and Mendoza. The instant case falls squarely within the same set of facts
as the Rodrigo, Mendoza, and De Mesa cases, which all ruled that the
security code number was an indispensable element of a winning crown
and that petitioners were not negligent in the conduct of their
promotional campaign.






SOURCES:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/march2009/166562.htm
https://lawreviewnotes.wordpress.com/2016/07/19/meaning-and-application-of-stare-
decisis-doctrine/
https://bataspinoy.wordpress.com/quotations/supreme-court/
Ting v. Velez-Ting,, G.R. No. 166562
Lazatin v. Desierto, G.R. No. 147097
Delta Motors Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, Hon. Roberto M. Lagman and State
Investment House, Inc., G.R. No. 121075
Ient v. Tullett, G.R. No. 189158
PEPSICO v. Lacanilao, G.R. No. 146007
Agpalo, R.E (2009). Statutory Construction


















GROUP 3 – Doctrine of Necessary Implication

MEMBERS:
de la Cuesta, Blanche Khaylil P.
Basilio, Princess
Naseef, Acrami
Vallejo, Noreen Patricia

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

I. INTRODUCTION

No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details that can provide all the
details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a
particular situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future. So-called
gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction
used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication.

II. CONCEPT

• Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that
which is expressed.

Meaning: Every statute is understood, by implication to contain all such

provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges, or jurisdiction which it grants, including all
such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms.

• The principle is express in the maxim Ex necessitate legis or from the necessity of
the law.
• Every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to include all
incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because the greater includes the
lesser (In eo quod plus sit, simper inest et minus).
• The term “necessary implication” is one that is so strong in its probability that the
contrary cannot reasonably be supposed.

Meaning: It is one which, under the circumstances, is compelled by a

reasonable view of the statute, and the contrary of which would be improbable
and absurd.
 • Necessity, “the great master of all things” –

ü includes such inferences as may be logically be drawn from the purpose or

object of the statute, from what the legislature must be presumed to have
intended, and from the necessity of making the statute effective and operative.

ü excludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, or desirable must be consistent

with the Constitution or to existing laws an implication which is violative of
the law is unjustified or unwarranted.

• The doctrine of necessary implication may not be used to justify the inclusion in a
statute of what to the court appears to be wise and just, unless it is at the same
time necessarily and logically within its terms.

III. IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.

The court expanded on the duty of good faith by describing it in various ways.
The doctrine of necessary implication dictates that, absent an express provision, the law
will imply a contract between the parties to “perform those things that according to
reason and justice they should do in order to carry out the purpose for which the contract
was made and to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.” (Somers v Somers)

“Compliance in good faith’’ means performance in accordance with the

stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code
recognizes the right of such contracting parties to establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy. Good faith must, therefore, be
observed to prevent one party from taking unfair advantage over the other party.

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.

• A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,
with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. (Art. 1305,
Civil Code)
• It presupposes the validity and enforceability of the contract.
• A party cannot be allowed to renege on his obligation under a contract simply
because he changed his mind. (Morla v. Belmonte, et al. G.R. No. 171146)
Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that moment the
parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has been expressly stipulated
but also to all of the consequences which according to their nature may be in
keeping with good faith, usage and law.

• These contracts are commonly called consensual contracts. Once the contract is
perfected, the valid contract has the force of law binding the parties to comply
therewith in good faith, where neither one may renege therefrom without the
consent of the other.
• There are certain contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledge
and commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of the object of the
obligation.

IV. OTHER IMPLICATIONS

A. Remedy implied from a right

• It is a well-settled principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy in

violation thereof. (Ubi jus, ibi remedium)
• The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him from
vindicating his right, for such remedy is implied from such right.
• Where there is “wrong,” (deprivation or violation of a right) there is a remedy
• “Wrong” means deprivation or violation of a right, and is not equivalent to
“error.”
• If there’s no right, principle does not apply.

B. Grant of jurisdiction

• Settled is the rule that jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is conferred only by
the Constitution or by the Statute.
• Cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court
• Jurisdiction cannot be implied from the language of a statute, in the absence of a
clear legislative intent to that effect.

C. What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction

• The grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all necessary and incidental
powers to employ all writs, processes and other means essential to make its
jurisdiction effective.
• Power to do all things which are reasonably necessary for the administration of
justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates, even though the court may be called to decide matters
which would not be within its cognizance as original caused of action.
 • Where a court has jurisdiction over the main cause of action, it can grant reliefs
incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise be outside its jurisdiction

D. Grant of power includes incidental power

• Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power

necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred.
• The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are
therefore of lesser degree than the power granted.

Examples:
ü Power to establish an office includes authority to abolish it, unless xxx
ü Warrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined by the
judge xxx implies the grant of power to the judge to conduct preliminary
investigations
ü Power to approve a license includes by implication the power to revoke it
ü Power to revoke is limited by the authority to grant license, from which it
is derived
ü Power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable aliens after
investigation
ü Power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make
temporary appointments , unless xxx
ü Power to appropriate money includes power to withdraw unexpended
money already appropriated

E. Grant of power excludes greater power

• The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers necessary to
make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those which are
greater than that conferred.

Examples:
ü Power of supervision DOES NOT INCLUDE power to suspend or
removal
ü Power to reorganize DOES NOT INCLUDE the authority to deprive the
courts certain jurisdiction and to transfer it to a quasi-judicial tribunal
ü Power to regulate business DOES NOT INCLUDE power to prohibit

F. What is implied should not be against the law

• The statutory grant of power does not include such incidental power which cannot
be exercised without violating the Constitution, the statute conferring the power,
or other laws on the same subject.
J. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly

• Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum – what cannot,

by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly.

V. CASES

CHUA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMISSION

G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992

FACTS: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers
those who are qualified:

Sec. 2. Coverage. – This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government. The benefits authorized under this
Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees,
regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years
of government service as of the date of separation…”

Petitioner Lydia Chua, a co-terminous employee, believing that she is qualified to

avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with
respondent National Irrigation Administration, which, however, denied the same. A
recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded negative result.

ISSUE: Whether or not a co-terminous employee, or one whose appointment is co-

existed with the duration of a government project, who has been employed as such for
more than two (2) years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under Sec.2 of RA No.
6683.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that a co-terminous employee is no different from
a casual or temporary employee, and by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter
in the class of government employees entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily
implies that the former should also be entitled to such benefits.

SHIOJI V. HARVEY
GR No. 18940, April 27, 1940

FACTS: In a previous case, judgment was rendered ordering defendants Toyo Kisen
Kaisha & Pacific Mail Steamship Co. to jointly and severally pay plaintiff (Shioji).
Defendants Toyo and Pacific appealed by bill of exceptions to the Supreme Court.
Defendants however, failed to present their brief or to file for extension during the 30-day
period within which they should have served and filed copies of their brief under Rule 21.
The Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 24, then denied defendant’s motion for additional
period for being filed out of time. Subsequent motions were likewise denied.
 Execution was issued to enforce judgment but prior to the levy, defendants Toyo
and Pacific filed an action in the CFI of Manila claiming that the SC’s decision was
unconscionable and rendered without due process , and that Rule 24 , is unconstitutional
being in conflict with law. Judge Harvey, respondents in this case, granted an injunction
in accordance with Toyo & Pacific complaints. Hence, this petition by Shioji to compel
Judge Harvey to desist from interfering with the execution and revoking the preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 24 is a valid law

HELD: Yes, Rule 24 is a valid law. It is a necessary rule for orderly procedure

RATIO: The Supreme Court is expressly authorized by statute (the Judiciary Act) to
make rules for the regulation of its practice and the conduct of its business. The Rules of
Court prescribing the time within which acts must be done are absolutely indispensable to
the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business.

The Rules of Court have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with
positive law. The Sec. 28 of the Judiciary Law and Sec. 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
constitute the legislative authority of the Supreme court, granting the latter power to
make necessary rules for orderly procedure in the court, including regulations on
preparation and filing of briefs . Respondents point out no provision of Federal statute
which the questioned rule comes in conflict with. Even if the respondents have a
perfectly good bill of exceptions, they failed to take the next step (filing within the
specified period) seasonably hence the decision favoring Shiojo must stand.

Rule 24 must be enforced according to the discretion of the court. Every court has
inherent power to do all things reasonably for the administration of justice within the
scope of its jurisdiction.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT V. PROVINCE OF CEBU

GR No. 141386, November 29, 2001

FACTS: The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local
school board, under Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom
teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would
accommodate students in the public schools. In the audit of accounts conducted by the
Commission on Audit (COA) of the Province of Cebu, for the period January to June
1998, it appeared that the salaries and personnel-related benefits of the teachers appointed
by the province for the extension classes were charged against the provincial SEF.
Likewise charged to the SEF were the college scholarship grants of the province.
Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Suspension to the province of Cebu, saying
that disbursements for the salaries of teachers and scholarship grants are not chargeable
to the provincial SEF.
Faced with the Notices of Suspension issued by the COA, the province of Cebu,
represented by its governor, filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school
teachers appointed by the local chief executives in connection with the establishment and
maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college scholarship grants,
chargeable to the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the local government unit concerned?

HELD: Even under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of
teachers who should, as a matter of course be compensated for their services. Every
statute is understood, by implication to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to
effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as
may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.

FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR., vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO

G.R. No. 96422, February 28, 1994

FACTS: Tantuico was Chairman of COA. He sought clearance in 1985 which was
granted. He applied for another clearance in 1986 after his retirement but this was not
signed by the new Chairman Guingona. The next Chairman Domingo required a
committee to audit transactions during Tantuico’s term but indorsed Tantuico’s
retirement to GSIS. Domingo informed Tantuico of the approval of his retirement but
withheld half of the benefits which will be subjected to the results of the final audit.

ISSUE: WON Tantuico’s benefits were validly withheld.

HELD: Tantuico was already issued an initial clearance during his tenure. He also
applied for a second clearance which was signed by all the officials, except the Chairman.
Whatever infirmities or limitations existed in said clearances were cured after Domingo
favorably indorsed petitioner's application for retirement to GSIS
Regardless of petitioner's monetary liability to the government that may be discovered
from the audit concerning his fiscal responsibility as former COA Chairman, Domingo
cannot withhold the benefits due Tantuico under the retirement laws.

Also, under Section 4 of R.A. No. 1568 (An Act to Provide Life Pension to the Auditor
General and the Chairman or Any Member of the Commission of Elections), the benefits
granted by said law to the Auditor General and the Chairman and Members of the
Commission on Elections shall not be subject to garnishment, levy or execution.
Under Section 33 of P.D. No. 1146, as amended (The Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977), the benefits granted thereunder "shall not be subject, among
others, to attachment, garnishment, levy or other processes."
Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because the intention is to
provide for the retiree's sustenance and comfort, when he is no longer capable of earning
his livelihood.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS V. TORRES
GR No. 93468, December29, 1994

FACTS: Petitioner NATU filed a petition for certification election to determine the
exclusive bargaining agent of its supervisory employees. The bank (Private respondent)
moved to dismiss the petition alleging that the supervisory employees are actually
managerial employees hence prohibited from joining unions. The Med Arbiter granted
the petition but the decision was modified by the Sec. of Labor on the ground that the
following employees are deemed as managerial and/or confidential employees and are
therefore ineligible to join or form labor unions (Dept. Managers, Asst. Managers, branch
Cashiers and Controllers).

ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Managers, Assistant Managers, Branch

Managers/ OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent Bank are managerial and/ or
confidential employees hence ineligible to join or assist the union of petitioner.

RULING: The subject employees are supervisory and not managerial. As provided under
212 of the Philippine Labor Code, a Managerial employee is:

a) One vested with power to lay down and execute management policies, or to hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, and

b) One vested with both the power or prerogative.

Like Branch Managers, Cashiers and Controllers, Department Managers do not possess
the power to lay down policies nor to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. They occupy supervisory positions, charged with the duty
among others to "recommend proposals to improve and streamline operations.

On one hand, a confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate

matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the employer's property.
Therefore only the Branch Managers/OICs, Cashiers and Controllers of respondent bank
who are deemed as confidential employees are ineligible to join or assist petitioner
NATU-Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter, or join, assist or form any other
labor organization.

The disqualification of managerial employees from joining a union is due to the evident
conflict of interest as they are supposed to be on the side of the management. As to
confidential employees, their disqualification is due to the undue advantage they possess.

Branch managers/Cashiers/Controllers are all considered confidential employees and

hence disqualified from joining a labor organization. Do note that this is not applicable
to all banks in general.
VI. REFERENCES:

• Agpalo, R. E. (2009). Statutory Construction (6th ed.) Manila, Philippines: REX

Book Store
• Chua v. Civil Service Commission. Retrieved from:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1992/feb1992/gr_88979_1992.html
• Commission on Audit v. Province of Cebu. Retrieved from:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/141386.htm
• Shioji v. Harvey. Retrieved from:
http://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1922/apr1922/gr_l-
18940_1922.php
• National Assoc. of Trade Unions v. Torres. Retrieved from:
https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/dec1994/gr_93468_1994.html





























GROUP IV – Dura Lex Sed Lex

Members:
Ecleo, Ann Camille S.
Buan, Serafin
Kiram, Dats
Uayan, Jemelle

I. Concept:
A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied
in exactly the way the legislature has expressed itself clearly in the
law. The clear, unambiguous and unequivocal language of a statute
precludes the court from construing it and gives it no discretion but
to apply the law. The statue in such a case must be taken to mean
exactly what it says. Its literal meaning should be followed.
Absoluta sentential expositore non indigent. When the language of
the law is clear, no explanation of it is required.
“The law may be harsh, but it is still the law.” This principle is
expressed in the legal maxim, dura lex sed lex. Another maxim
expressive of the rule is hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ita lex
scripta est, or it is exceedingly hard but so the law is written. The
principle requires that the statute should be applied regardless of
whether it is unwise, hard or harsh. If the law is clear and free from
doubt, it is the sworn duty of the court to apply it without fear or
favor, to follow its mandate, and not to tamper with it. A decent
regard to the legislative will should inhibit the court from engaging
in judicial legislation to change what it thinks are unrealistic statutes
that do not conform to ordinary experience or practice. Nor may the
court rewrite the law under the guise of interpretation. For the duty
of the court in interpreting a statute which is ambiguous is not to
dispute its wisdom; the duty of the court is limited to inquiring into
the legislative intent and, once this is determined, to making said
intent effective. Moreover, the law is the law, and if there is a need
to change, amend or repeal it, that may be done through legislative
process, not by judicial decree.

II. Cases:

1.) Olympio Revaldo vs. People of the Philippines (G.R. No.

170589, April 16, 2009)

Facts:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession
of premium hardwood lumber in violation of Section 68 of the
Forestry Code. He explained further that the lumber were intended
for the repair of his dilapidated house.
 Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner violated the Forestry Code

Ruling:
Petitioner failed to present Bug-os, Bolo, and Tenio to attest
to the fact that they sought prior DENR permission before cutting
the trees and sawing them into lumber. The trial court further stated
that the Forestry Code is a special law where criminal intent is not
necessary. Mere possession of forest products without the proper
documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law
may be harsh but that is the law.

2.) People vs Suriaga (G.R. No. 123779. April 17, 2002)

Facts:
On January 22, 1995, accused Ruben Suriaga and Rosita
Dela Cruz, being private individuals, conspiring together, kidnap
and take away Nicole Ramos, a 2-year old female child, without the
consent of her parents Johnny Ramos and Mercedita Ramos for
the purpose of extorting ransom from the latter in the amount of
P100,000.00. Accused Joel Isidera, having learned of the
kidnapping and without having participated therein either as
principal or accomplice, take part subsequent to its commission by
assisting the principal accused, by accompanying and driving for
accused Ruben Suriaga to the place where the pay-off was made.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

Ruling:
The Court finds accused Ruben Suriaga guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom defined
and penalized under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH. Undoubtedly, the elements of
kidnapping for ransom have been sufficiently established by the
prosecution considering the following circumstances: 1) appellant, a
private individual, took the young Nicole without personally seeking
permission from her father; 2) appellant took the girl and brought
her to a shanty where Rositas sister lived, located at the NAWASA
Squatters Area, Ideal Subdivision, Quezon City, without informing
her parents of their whereabouts; 3) he detained the child and
deprived her of her liberty by failing to return her to her parents
 overnight and the following day; and 4) he demanded a ransom of
P100,000.00 through telephone calls and gave instructions where
and how it should be delivered. For failure of the prosecution to
prove the guilt of accused Rosita Dela Cruz and Joel Isidera
beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby acquitted.

3.) People vs Flores (G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010)

Facts:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1995 at barangay D
Alarcio, municipality of Laoac, province of Pangasinan and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, hit and stab DOMINGO FLORES
with the use of a stone and knife, inflicting injuries. Before dying the
victim told his father that the accused was the offender which
confirmed by her daughter who said that she saw the accussed
entered their kitchen go straight to her fathers room and killed her
father.

Issue:
Whether or not Molina is guilty of murder?

Held:
Yes, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused
Romeo Molina y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659
otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law, the offense having
been committed with the attendant aggravating circumstance of
dwelling and hereby sentences him with the ultimum supplicium of
death to be executed pursuant to Repbulic Act No. 8177 known as
the Lethal Injection Law and to pay the heirs of the victim Domingo
Flores in the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity; P40,000.00 as
actual damages; P200,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the
costs.
Finally, it is said:
Dura lex, translated as the law is harsh, but it is still the law.

4.) Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christenten vs

CFI of Rizal (G.R. No. L-30576 February 10, 1976)
Facts:
Sometime in May, 1967, a three-day old baby was given by
a lawyer to petitioning spouses for adoption. Later the child was
baptized, and the names of said spouses appeared in the baptismal
records as the child’s parents. The lawyer, on the other hand,
received the infant from its unwed mother who told the former to
look for a suitable couple who would adopt the child, and never
 reveal her the mother’s identity because she wanted to get married
and did not want to destroy her future. In the petition for adoption,
the lawyer as the child’s de facto guardian or loco parentis gave the
written consent required by law.
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the
consent given is improper and falls short of the expressed
requirement of the Civil Code that the consent must be given by the
parents, guardian or person in charge of the to be adopted.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Velasquez qualified to give written
consent to the adoption
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal
order, holding that the child’s unidentified mother be declared as
having abandoned the child so that there is no more legal need to
require her written consent and that the consent given by the
de facto who exercised patria potestas over the abandoned child
was sufficient. The lower court cleanse its hands by seeking refuge
to the legal maxim, dura lex sed lex, “While this old adage generally
finds apt application in many other legal cases, in adoption of
children, however, this should be softened so as to apply the
law with less severity and with compassion and humane
understanding, for adoption is more for the benefit of the
unfortunate children, particularly those born out of wedlock, than for
those born with a silver spoon in their mouths.”

III. Sources:

1.) Agpalo, R. E. (2009). Statutory construction. Manila, Philippines: Rex

Book Store.
2.) People vs Flores (G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010)
3.) People vs Suriaga (G.R. No. 123779. April 17, 2002)
4.) Revaldo vs People (G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009)
5.) Robin Francis Radley Duncan and Maria Lucy Christenten vs CFI of Rizal
(February 10, 1976).

GROUP 5

AGUSTIN, Nikka Carmela
BULOSAN, Gel Camille
ELICA, Anthony
REMETRE, Maria Corazon


GENERAL RULE

- if the statute is CLEAR, PLAIN and FREE from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

- Verba legis

- Index animi sermo est – speech is the index of intention

- Words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express
its intent or will.

- Verba legis non est recedendum – from the words of a statute
there should be no departure

- What is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to
those matters outside its scope.

JURISPRUDENCE

National Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission
(G.R. No. 127718, March 2, 2000)

In the case of National Federation of Labor v NLRC, the Supreme Court
used “verba legis” in resolving the issue of whether or not the former
employees of Patalon Coconut Estate are entitled to separation pay.

The use of the word "may," in a statute, denotes that it is DIRECTORY
in nature and generally permissive only.

Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity,
it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

Republic of the Philippines v. Carlito Lacap/Carwin Construction (G.R.
No. 158253, March 2, 2007)

The respondent sought to collect payment for the completed project.
The DPWH prepared the Disbursement Voucher, however, the DPWH
withheld payment from respondent after the COA disapproved the
final release of funds on the ground that the contractor’s license of
respondent had expired at the time of the execution of the contract.

Section 35 of Republic Act No. 4566
(Contractor’s License Law)

Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or
attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to
construct … within the purview of this Act … use an expired or revoked
certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and
shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than
₱500.00 but not more than ₱5,000.00.

The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is
that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation.

This rule, derived from the maxim Index animi sermo est (speech is the
index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intention
or will and preclude the court from construing it differently.

The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est
recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.



Luis Yangco vs. Court of First Instance of the City of Manila (G.R. No.
10058, January 6, 1915)

ISSUE
Whether or not the term “RESIDES” in Section 572 of the Code
of Civil Procedure is applicable in the case?

Section 572 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

“When a person liable to be put under guardianship, according to the
provisions of this chapter, resides without the Philippine Islands, and
has estate therein, any friend of such person, or anyone interested in
his estate, in expectancy or otherwise, may apply to the judge of Court
of First Instance in any province in which there is any estate of such
absent person, for the appointment of a guardian, and if, after notice
given to all interested, in such manner as such court orders, by
publication or otherwise, and a full hearing and examination, it
appears proper, a guardian for such absent person may be appointed;
and every guardian appointed under this section shall have the same
powers, and perform the same duties with respect to the estate of the
ward found within the Philippine Islands, and with respect to the
person of the ward, if he shall come to reside therein, as are
prescribed with respect to any other guardians appointed under this
chapter.”

RULING

The Court stressed that “There is no need for interpretation or
construction of the word in the case before us. Its meaning is so clear
that interpretation and construction are unnecessary. Our simple duty
is to leave untouched the meaning with which the English language
has endowed the word; and that is the meaning which the ordinary
reader would accord to it on reading a sentence in which it was found.
Where language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as
to give them the color of a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful.

That which has caused so much confusion in the law, which has made
it so difficult for the public to understand and know what the law is
with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the
unwarranted interference by judicial tribunals with the English
language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the
legislature ought to have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily have,
cutting, trimming, fitting, until lawyers themselves are unable to
advise their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract
until it has been submitted to some court for its "interpretation and
construction.”


Francisco vs. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, November
10, 2003)

In the context of the Constitution, Verba Legis means that whenever
possible, words employed thereat are given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed.

Words found in Constitutional provisions are couched to express the
objectives sought to be attained.

This is based on the postulate that the people and the framers mean
what they say.

Citing Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, the Court stated
that it is only when the plain meaning is not clear that resort to
extrinsic aids must be availed of.

In the Factual Context of Francisco, the Supreme Court mainly used
the verba legis rule to determine a single issue:

Whether or not the word “initiate”, as used in Sec. 3 of Art. 11 is to be
construed in its plain meaning.

The Supreme Court said yes. Initiate, by its ordinary use, means “to
begin” or “to commence”.

This is confirmed by the records of the Constitutional Convention of
the 1987 Constitution, where the framers expressly concurred when
called to comment, that to initiate means to start or begin, and the
Case for Impeachment STARTS with the filing of the complaint, not the
1/3 vote of affirmation of Congress.

This meaning ascribed to the word “initiate” cannot be overturned by
Congress’ power to promulgate its own rules on impeachment, as such
power still comes from the Constitution, and Congress cannot curb or
curtail what the Constitution provides.









28 July 2018

Submitted by: Escorpiso, Charmaine D.V.
Pagunsan, Darlene Lou
Pagalilauan, Vic
Viray, Ron

Report on “Reddendo Singula Singulis”

I. Concept

The “reddendo singula singulis” principle means that the antecedent and the
consequences must be read distributively to the effect that each word is to be
applied to the subject to which it appears by context most properly relate and to
which it is most applicable. It is a latin term which means “referring each to each”.

II. Application

It is a secondary source of statutory construction which is used on the
interpretation of associated words and phrases in a statute. The words and phrases
shall be applied to the subjects to which they appear by context most appropriately
related and to which it is most applicable.

III. Jurisprudence

G.R. L-14859
King et. al. vs. Hernaez et. al. (March 31, 1962)

Facts: On January 1, 1957, Macario Kind, a naturalized Filipino citizen
acquired the ownership of a business establishment known as "Import Meat
and Produce", a grocery wholesale and retail business from Philippine Cold
Stores, Inc. in the business, 12 Filipinos and 3 Chinese citizens were
employed. After three weeks of his acquisition, King sought permission from
the President of the Philippines to retain the services of the three Chinese
employees pursuant to Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act 108. The Secretary
of Commerce and Industry recommended to the President the disapproval of
King's request on the ground that aliens may not be appointed to operate or
administer a retail business under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1180 and so
King’s request was disapproved. King and the three Chinese employees filed
a petition for declaratory relief, injunction and mandamus on August 25,
1958 against the Secretary of Commerce and Industry and the Executive
Secretary before the Court of First Instance of Manila which the lower court
granted. Respondent then claimed that the grant was erroneous since the
Petitioners has already committed breach of a statute.

Issue: Whether or not Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 as amended by
R.A. No. 134 prohibits the employment of aliens in both control and non-
control positions in retail establishment?

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The nationalization of retail
trade is for the purpose of protecting national interest as grave abuses may
exist through the predominance of aliens in the retail trade business. This
has been embodied in R.A. No. 1180 which provides for the nationalization of
retail trade as it must be wholly owned by a Filipino citizen or controlled by
Filipino citizens. The constitutionality of R.A. No. 1180 was already upheld in
the case of Ichong vs Hernandez.

In the case at bar, Section 2-A of Commonwealth Act No. 108 as amended by
R.A. No. 134 was being questioned as the petitioners contend that non-
control positions as being held by the three Chinese employees should not be
construed as one of the employment banning aliens. The Supreme Court
ruled in the application of the principle of reddendo singular singulis which
means “referring each to each”. They hold that the language of the Anti-
Dummy Law bans aliens' employment in both control and non-control
positions. The words management, operation, administration and control,
followed by and blended with the words "whether as an officer, employee or
laborer therein", signify the legislative intent to cover the entire scale of
personnel activity so that even laborers are excluded from employment, the
only exemption being technical personnel whose employment may be
allowed with the previous authorization of the President. Thus, the
antecedents "management, operation, administration and control" and the
consequents "officer, employee, and laborer" should be read distributively to
the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by
context most properly relate and to which it is most applicable whereas in
this case it pertains to officer, employee or laborer therein.

***

G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988
Amadora vs Court of Appeals

Cruz, J.
Facts: Amadora was a graduating student of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. Three
days before the anticipated graduation day, a gun was fired by his classmate,
Daffon, while they were in the auditorium of their school. Amadora was hit
mortally which ended his life.
Issue: WON Article 2180 of the Civil Code applies to all schools, academic as well as
non-academic?
Held: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that “teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trade shall be held liable for the damage caused by
 their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their
custody.
The Supreme Court rules that:
Where the school is academic in nature, rather than technical or vocational,
responsibility for the tort committed by the student shall be attached to the
teacher in charge of such student, following the provision. This is the general
rule. In case of the establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, shall be held liable as the exception to the general rule. In other
words, except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the
head thereof who shall be liable for the acts of their students except where
the school is technical in nature, in which case, it is the head thereof who
shall be held liable.
Following the canons of reddendo singular singulis, ‘teachers’ refer to the
‘pupils and students’, while ‘head of establishments of arts and trades’ refer
to the ‘apprentices’.
The Court announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury
inflicted by Daffon on Amadora.
***
G.R. No. 118127. April 12, 2005
City of Manila vs. Judge Perfecto Laguio


FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a
corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging
houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel
although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a hotel. March 30,
1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, and SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited
establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and hotels from operating in the
Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill
seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid
as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or
entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use
women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can
only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the
Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City
likewise emphasized that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD:
 The Ordinance is repugnantto general laws; it is ultra vires. The Ordinance is in
contravention of the Local Government Code as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in
Section 1of the ordinance.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general
welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings.
That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health
or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per
accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is
not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.
Notably, the City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit certain
activities and establishments in another section of the Code which is reproduced as
follows:

Section 458.Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

sangguniangpanlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective
city government, and in this connection, shall:

. . .

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate

penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and
other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or
property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or pornographic
materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the welfare and
morals of the inhabitants of the city;

. . .

If it were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council the power to
prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section 1 of the Ordinance, it would have
so declared in uncertain terms by adding them to the list of the matters it may
prohibit under the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts to
lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and expand the City Councils
powers in the second and third clauses of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an
effort to overreach its prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments
may only be regulated in their establishment, operation and maintenance.
It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the establishments
themselves. That these establishments are recognized legitimate enterprises can be
gleaned from another Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or operators of massage
clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths, hotels, motels and lodging houses as
among the contractors defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also
defined amusement as a pleasurable diversion and entertainment, synonymous to
relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun; and amusement places to include theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or performances.
Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers these establishments as legitimate
enterprises and activities. It is well to recall the maxim
reddendosingulasingulis which means that words in different parts of a statute
must be referred to their appropriate connection, giving to each in its place, its
proper force and effect, and, if possible, rendering none of them useless or
superfluous, even if strict grammatical construction demands otherwise. Likewise,
where words under consideration appear in different sections or are widely
dispersed throughout an act the same principle applies
***



GR L-22160-61
People vs Tamani

FACTS: Tamani was convicted of murder and attempted murder by the lower
court on February 14, 1963. Upon receipt of a copy of this order, his
counsel subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration on March 1,
1963,which was denied. The lower court sent a copy o f t h e o r d e r o f
d e n i a l t o t h e c o u n s e l b y registered mail on July 13, 1963 through
the counsel’s wife. Counsel filed his appeal only on September 10, 1963, forty-
eight days from July2 4 t h , w h i c h i s t h e r e g l e m e n t a r y f i f t e e n - d a y period
for appeal. Appellees contend that the case should be dismissed on the
ground that t h e a p p e a l w a s f o r t y - e i g h t d a y s l a t e . T h e y invoked Sec. 6,
Rule 122 of the Rules of Court w h i c h s t a t e s t h a t a n a p p e a l m u s t b e
t a k e n within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or notice of the judgment or
order appealed from.

ISSUE: Whether the fifteen-day period should commence from the date of
promulgation of the decision?
R U L I N G : Y e s . U s i n g t h e r u l e o f r e d d e n d o singula singulis, the word
“promulgation” should be construed as referring to “judgment”, while“notice”
should be construed as referring to “order”. Tamani’s appeal is therefore
58 days late, not47, as Appellees contend; he only had a day left from the
receipt of his wife of the notice on July 13. Nonetheless, the court decided to
act u p o n t h e a p p e a l a t h a n d “ t o o b v i a t e a n y possible miscarriage of
justice”.