PIL WEEK 7
or otherwise of a private law character, in which the state has chosen to engage, or whether the
IMMUNITY
Private or commercial conduct of States
I Congresso del Partido [1981] 3 WLR 328 (ABRIGO)
FACTS: In 1973, two ships, The Marble Islands and The Playa Larga, were carrying sugar to Chile on
behalf of Cubazucar, a Cuban State enterprise. After a coup in Chile, The Playa Larga (essentially
owned by Cuba) was ordered to return to Cuba with most of her sugar unloaded, and The Marble
Islands (essentially chartered to Cuba) was ordered to Vietnam where the sugar was sold. The
plaintiffs, who were owners of the sugar, brought an action in rem (1.e. to hold the ship) against I
Congreso, a ship also owned by Cuba, Cuba claimed State immunity. The case was decided at
common law, the issue arising before the 1978 Act. The House of Lords rejected the plea of immunity
in respect of both ships: in regard to The Playa Larga because at all times the actions of Cuba were as
owners and not by virtue of sovereign authority, and in regard to The Marble Islands (Lords Wilberforce
and Edmund Davies dissenting) because the sale of the sugar to Vietnam was made under Cuban law,
being analogous to conversion in the law of torts, and not by virtue of the sovereign authority of Cuba.
ISSUE:
Whether the restrictive doctrine of immunity may be applied as matter of UK common law
HELD: Yes.
The House of Lords confirmed that the restrictive doctrine of immunity may be applied as matter of UK
common law. Cases that mark the progression from absolute to restrictive immunity in the UK have
been omitted as they are now largely of historical interest.
LORD WILBERFORCE: When therefore a claim is brought against a state... and state immunity is
claimed, it is necessary to consider what is the relevant act which forms the basis of the claim:is this,
under the old terminology, an act jure gestions' or is it an act jure imperii' is it...a 'private act' or is it a
'sovereign or public act,' a private act meaning in this context an act of a private law character such as
a private citizen might have entered into. It is upon this point that the arguments in these appeals is
focused....
The activities of states cannot always be compartmentalised into trading or governmental activities;
and what is one to make of a case where a state has, and in the relevant circumstances, clearly
displayed, both a commercial interest and a sovereign or governmental interest? To which is the critical
action to be attributed? Such questions are the more difficult since they arise at an initial stage in the
proceedings and, in all probability, upon affidavit evidence. This difficulty is inherent in the nature of the
'restrictive' doctrine, introducing as it does an exception, based upon a certain state of facts, to a plain
rule. But as was said in the Empire of Iran case…
The fact that it is difficult to draw the line between sovereign and non-sovereign state activities is no
reason for abandoning the distinction. International law knows of other similar difficulties... The
distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign state activities cannot be drawn according to the
purpose of the state transaction and whether it stands in a recognizable relation to the sovereign duties
of the state. For, ultimately, activities of state, if not wholly then to the widest degree, serve sovereign
purposes and duties, and stand in a still recognizable relationship to them. Neither should the
distinction depend on whether the state has acted commercially. Commercial activities of states are not
different in their nature from other non-sovereign state activities....
Under the 'restrictive' theory the court has first to characterise the activity into which the defendant
state has entered. Having done this, and (assumedly) found it to be of a commercial, or private law,
character, it may take the view that contractual breaches, or torts, prima facie fall within the same
sphere of activity. It should then be for the defendant state to make a case... that the act complained of
is outside that sphere, and within that of sovereign action....
The conclusion which emerges is that in considering, under the 'restrictive' theory whether state
immunity should be granted or not, the court must consider the whole context in which the claim
against the state is made, with a view to deciding whether the relevant act(s) upon which the claim is
based, should, in that context, be considered as fairly within an area of activity, trading or commercial,
relevant act(s) should be considered as having been done outside that area, and within the sphere of
governmental or sovereign activity.
Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co [1995] 1 WLR 1147 (ANDAL)
FACTS:
At the time of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and subsequent occupation, the Iraqi government
ordered its national airline, the Iraqi Airways Company ("IAC"), to appropriate the aircraft, equipment
and parts inventory of the Kuwait Airways Corporation ("KAC"). KAC brought an action against IAC in
the U.K. for damages as a result of the appropriation of its property. After lengthy proceedings, the
U.K. courts awarded judgment against IAC for over $1 billion Canadian. KAC then had the Republic of
Iraq joined as a second defendant in order to claim costs of the actions in the U.K. The U.K. High Court
of Justice made a further order
requiring Iraq to pay $84 million Canadian in costs. KAC sought to have the costs order recognized in
Quebec.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sovereign Immunity Act was applied, and if it did, whether or not the actions by Iraq fell
into the "commercial activity" exception in that Act.
HELD
The Court held that all actions by a foreign state are prima facie entitled to protection under the Act,
and that the onus was on KAC in this case to show that the actions of Iraq fell within one of the Act's
exceptions. The only exception argued in this case was the "commercial activity" exception. The Court
held that it was not enough to determine whether the acts complained of were authorized or desired by
Iraq, but rather that the nature of the acts must be examined to carefully ensure a proper legal
characterization. To do so, it is necessary that the findings of fact made by the British judge be
accepted. In this case, the U.K. court found that Iraq, the sole proprietor of IAC, controlled and funded
IAC's defence throughout the proceedings and participated in the commercial litigation in the hope of
protecting its interest in IAC. In doing so, it was responsible for numerous acts of forgery, concealing
evidence, and lies. While the initial seizure of the aircraft was a sovereign act, the U.K. litigation in
which Iraq intervened concerned the retention of the aircraft, which was unconnected to the seizure of
the aircraft. Therefore, the actions fell within the exception, and Iraq could not rely on the protection of
the SIA.
Personal immunities
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) (1999) 2 AII
ER 97 (BACANI)
FACTS: On October 1998, General Augusto Pinochet, the 82-year old former general and dictator of
Chile, was arrested in London by the Metropolitan Police at the request of a Spanish magistrate. Thus
began a saga with profound implications for the substance, enforcement, and public perception of
international law. Pinochet was accused by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzon of having, in the
decades following his 1973 violent overthrow of the democratically elected government of President
Salvador Allende, authorized or at least knowingly permitted the torture, disappearance, and taking as
hostage of thousands of people. His victims included not only Chilean citizens, but also citizens of
other countries, including the United Kingdom and Spain. His crimes were alleged to have formed part
of an international conspiracy to track down and murder opponents of his military regime in Chile, the
United States, and elsewhere.
Some of the crimes, most notably the acts of torture, were “crimes under international law”—
perpetrators of which may be prosecuted by any state regardless of their nationality, the nationality of
their victims, or the country in which the acts were committed. For this reason, at the time of Pinochet’s
arrest, there appeared to be no obstacle to his extradition nor any apparent impediment to his
prosecution in the United Kingdom.
However, Pinochet’s lawyers argued that, as Chilean head of state during the period in which most of
the alleged crimes were committed, Pinochet was immune from the jurisdiction of the British courts,
1
including its extradition procedures. By doing so, the lawyers forced British judges, first in the Divisional
Court and then in the House of Lords, to choose between two very different views of international law.
ISSUE: Whether Pinochet, being the former Chilean head of state, is entitled to personal immunity
from this suit
HELD: NO.
Senator Pinochet as a former head of state enjoys immunity rationae materiae in relation to acts done
by him in relation to his official function as such. However, organization of state torture is not an act
committed in his official function. The commission of a crime which is an international crime against
humanity and jus cogens cannot be a state function. The principle of individual responsibility for
international criminal conduct has become an accepted part of international law.
The notion of continued immunity for ex-heads of state is inconsistent with the provisions of the Torture
Convention which provides that the international crime of torture can only be committed by an official or
someone in official capacity. Since the immunity applies also to officials who carried out the functions
of the state, if torture is treated as official business sufficient to justify the immunity, then no party
would be held liable and the structure of universal jurisdiction over torture committed by officials is
rendered abortive. Thus, Senator Pinochet was not acting in any capacity which gives rise to immunity
rationae materiae since authorized and organized torture are contrary to international law.
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v Belgium), ICJ Report (2002)
(CRUZ)
FACTS:
On 17 October 2000, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) filed an Application instituting
proceedings against Belgium concerning a dispute over an international arrest warrant issued on 11
April 2000 by a Belgian examining judge against the acting Congolese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr.
Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, seeking his detention and subsequent extradition to Belgium for alleged
crimes constituting “grave violations of international humanitarian law”. The arrest warrant was
transmitted to all States, including the DRC, which received it on 12 July 2000.
The Belgian law provides for universal jurisdiction in the case of grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions, crimes against humanity and other serious offenses. Relying on this law, a Belgian judge
issued an international arrest warrant for the foreign minister of the D.R.C (P) on the premise of grave
violations of humanitarian laws to be tried in Belgium. The Belgium law also denotes that any immunity
which is conferred by an individual’s official capacity does not curtail the application of universal
jurisdiction.
The DRC also filed a request for the indication of a provisional measure seeking “an order for the
immediate discharge of the disputed arrest warrant”. Belgium, for its part, called for that request to be
rejected and for the case to be removed from the List. In its Order made on 8 December 2000, the
Court, rejecting Belgium’s request for the case to be removed from the List, stated that “the
circumstances, as they [then] presented themselves to the Court, [were] not such as to require the
exercise of its power, under Article 41 of the Statute, to indicate provisional measures”.
The arrest warrant was circulated internationally and the International Criminal Police Organization
(Interpol) was also notified. This action of Belgium was therefore the basis of D.R.C. (P) suit against it
at the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.). The D.R.C. (P) asserted that the warrant against its foreign
minister was a clear violation of international law because Belgium purported by this act to exercise
jurisdiction over its foreign minister.
D.R.C. (P) also claimed that its minister should also enjoy immunity equivalent to that enjoyed by
diplomats and heads of states. In addition to this, the plaintiff also sought an order of provisional
measures of protection on the ground that the warrant effectively curtailed the foreign minister from
leaving the D.R.C. (p). The I.C.J. thus gave its judgment on this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign minister is suspected of humanitarian violations, does such a minister
enjoy full immunity from criminal jurisdiction in another state’s court?
HELD: YES.
In its Judgment of 14 February 2002, the Court rejected the objections raised by Belgium and declared
that it had jurisdiction to entertain the application of the DRC. With respect to the merits, the Court
observed that, in the case, it was only questions of immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the
inviolability of an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs that it had to consider, on the basis, moreover,
of customary international law.
Where a foreign minister is suspected of humanitarian violations and even war crimes, such a minister
enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction in another state’s court. Acting as the state’s
representative in international meeting and negotiations, travelling internationally and overseeing the
smooth running of the state’s diplomatic activities are duties which a foreign minister performs. The
foreign minister also has the power to bind the state in the course of his duties and he must be in
constant communication with his state and its diplomatic missions around the world as well as with
representatives of other states. Hence, because of the office he holds and not because of his person, a
minister is recognized under international law as a representative of the state.
Drawing from this submission, it can therefore be established that an acting Minister of Foreign Affairs
enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability so that he or she may not be hindered in
the discharge of his or her duties. The safety nest provided by this immunity is regardless of whether
the purported crimes were committed in the minister’s “official or private”capacity and regardless of
when the offense occurred. Hence on this premise, the argument of Belgium that immunities is not
applicable to foreign ministers when they are accused of committing war crimes or crimes against
humanity is nullified.
However and with much emphasis, immunity from jurisdiction which a serving minister enjoys does not
imply that such minister take pleasure for the crimes he or she commits of have committed. As
jurisdictional immunity is procedural, so too is criminal responsibility a matter of substantive law, so that
jurisdictional immunity does not operate to exempt the minister who may under certain circumstances,
be held accountable for his crimes.
The minister may thus be brought before the courts in his/her own state and may lose his/her immunity
once his/her state waives it. The minister also do not enjoy such immunity after he vacates office and
may subsequently be charged for acts committed prior to or subsequent to the time he/she was in
office as well as in respect of acts committed during the time he/she was in office in a private capacity.
The International criminal courts may also try the minister where they have the jurisdiction to do so.
Functional Immunity
Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) 34 EHRR 273 (DE JESUS)
FACTS:
● Mr. Sulaiman Al-Adsani is a dual British/Kuwaiti national was severely tortured in Kuwait in
1991. In addition to repeated beatings, his head was held underwater in a swimming pool
containing corpses, then dragged into a small room where mattresses soaked in petrol were
set on fire, as a result of which Mr. Al-Adsani suffered burns covering 25 percent of his body
surface.
● Article 14 of the Convention against Torture provides that “Each State Party shall ensure in
its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable
right to fair and adequate compensation.”
● With no prospect of a domestic remedy in Kuwait, Mr. Al-Adsani instituted civil proceedings
in England for compensation and joined the Government of Kuwait. On 15 December 1992
he obtained a default judgment against the individual responsible, but was not, however,
granted leave to serve the writ on the Kuwaiti Government. This was on the basis that the
State Immunity Act, 1978 shielded the Kuwaiti Government from civil suits, even suits which
relate to torture.
● Mr. Al-Adsani applied to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that UK courts, by
granting immunity from suit to the Government of Kuwait, failed to secure enjoyment of his
right not to be tortured and denied him access to court contrary to Articles 3, 6(1) and 13 of
the Convention.
● The Grand Chamber declared the application admissible on 1 March 2000.
2
 international law. Italy disagreed, stating that the underlying acts were violations of jus cogens and
ISSUE: W/N the government of Kuwait failed to secure the enjoyment of his right which constitutes a therefore gave it the right to strip Germany from its immunity. Greece joined the proceedings as one of
breach of Art. 3, 6(1), and 13 of the Convention, YES the Italian judgments concerned a declaration of enforceability by an Italian court of a Greek judgment
that ordered Germany to pay compensation to victims of the Distomo massacre (in Greece). This
RULING: declaration led to measures of constraint on German property in Italy.
● On the alleged violation of Article 6(1), the Court unanimously recognised that Article 6(1)
was applicable to the circumstances, and noted that immunity was not a substantive right The Court rejected Italy's claims and fully agreed with Germany's points. State immunity is part of
but at most a procedural bar on the national courts’ power to determine the right. customary international law, and the fact that the underlying acts (the WWII crimes) were violations of
● By a narrow majority of 9 votes to 8, the Court held that the grant of sovereign immunity to a jus cogens did not deprive Germany from its jurisdictional immunity.
State in civil proceedings pursues the legitimate aim of complying with international law, and
maintained that unlike criminal cases, it is unable to discern any firm basis for concluding Importantly, though, the Court notes that while the current judgment confirms jurisdictional immunity of
that a State no longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where states, this does not in any way alter the possibility to hold individuals criminally responsible for certain
acts of torture are alleged. acts.

Diplomatic immunities
US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Iran (USA v Islamic Republic of Iran), ICJ Report (1980)
(GORDON)
FACTS
On 4 November 1979 there was an armed attack by Iranian students on the United States Embassy in
Tehran and they overtook it. The students, belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's
Line, did this as an act of support to the Iranian Revolution. More than sixty American diplomats and
citizens were held hostage for 444 days (until January 20, 1981). Some of the hostages were released
earlier, but 52 hostages were held hostage until the end. Although Iran had promised protection to the
U.S. Embassy, the guards disappeared during the takeover and the government of Iran did not attempt
to stop it or rescue the hostages. The U.S. arranged to meet with Iranian authorities to discuss the
release of the hostages, but Ayatollah Khomeini (the leader of the Iranian Revolution) forbid officials to
meet them. The U.S. ceased relations with Iran, stopped U.S. exports, oil imports, and Iranian assets
were blocked.
ISSUE: W/N Iran should ensure the restoration of the U.S. embassy in Tehran to U.S.
possession, release the hostages, and afford diplomatic officials full protections as afforded by
international law
On 23 December 2008, Germany filed an application instituting proceedings against Italy before the
International Court of Justice, arguing that "[i]n recent years, Italian judicial bodies have repeatedly
disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany as a sovereign State", thus violating international
law.
By an Order of 4 July 2011, the Court authorised Greece to intervene in the case as a non-party, in so
far as this intervention was limited to the decisions of Greek courts which were declared as enforceable
in Italy.
In multiple civil suits between 2004 and 2008, Italian courts have found Germany responsible for
crimes against humanity and/or war crimes committed by the German Reich during WWII, thereby
ordering Germany to pay compensation to Italian plaintiffs, who had fallen victim to such crimes.
Reference is made to, among others, Ferrini v. Germany (Supreme Court, Italy, 11 March 2004);
Mantelli v. Germany (Court of Cassation, Italy, 29 May 2008); and The Prosecutor v. Max Josef Milde
(Supreme Court, Italy, 21 October 2008). Additionally, concerning the Distomo massacre that was
committed in Greece, the Florence Court of Appeal had declared enforceable a judgment rendered by
the First Instance Court of Livadia, Greece that ordered Germany to pay compensation; hence, it
allowed the Greek claimants to enter a legal charge against Villa Vigoni, property of the German State
in the province of Como, Italy.

HELD: Yes
Iran had violated and was still violating obligations owed by it to the United States under conventions in
force between the two countries and rules of general international law, that the violation of these
obligations engaged its responsibility, and that the Iranian Government was bound to secure the
immediate release of the hostages, to restore the Embassy premises, and to make reparation for the
injury caused to the United States Government. The Court reaffirmed the cardinal importance of the
principles of international law governing diplomatic and consular relations. It pointed out that while,
during the events of 4 November 1979, the conduct of militants could not be directly attributed to the
Iranian State — for lack of sufficient information — that State had however done nothing to prevent the
attack, stop it before it reached its completion or oblige the militants to withdraw from the premises and
release the hostages. The Court noted that, after 4 November 1979, certain organs of the Iranian State
had endorsed the acts complained of and decided to perpetuate them, so that those acts were
transformed into acts of the Iranian State.
Key Cases
Germany v Italy (Jurisdictional Immunities of the State), ICJ Judgment of 3 February 2012
(IGOT)
FACTS: Between 2004 and 2008, Italian courts had issued a number of judgments in which plaintiffs,
victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the German Reich during WWII, were
awarded damages against Germany.
Ultimately, in 2008, Germany filed an application instituting proceedings against Italy before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), arguing that "[i]n recent years, Italian judicial bodies have
repeatedly disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany as a sovereign State", thus violating
Germany did not dispute the substance of the facts. However, it did consider that Italy had violated
international law. By exercising jurisdiction over Germany, Italy had violated the principle that one state
cannot and should not exercise jurisdiction over (the acts of) another state. This principle is based on
the notion of sovereignty and, thus, the (legal) equality of all states.
Italy, on the other hand, emphasised that the underlying crimes - crimes against humanity and war
crimes - are violations of jus cogens, law that is binding upon states regardless of any treaty. And since
jus cogens rules always prevail over any inconsistent international law rule, and considering the
principle of jurisdictional immunity of states does not have jus cogens status, the latter rule of immunity
must give way. Additionally, Italy was of the standpoint that state agents, including state armies, do not
join immunity for torts or delicts occasioning death, injury or damage committed on the terrirory of
another state.
ISSUE:Do states enjoy full jurisdictional immunity before foreign domestic courts for acts
committed by their armed forces in the course of conducting an armed conflict?
HELD:
Specific legal rules and provisions
Art. 38 of the ICJ Statute.
Art. 11 of the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes.
Art. 12 of the UN Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property.
The Court commenced with Italy's argument that there is a "territorial tort exception" in international
customary law that excludes state acts from jurisdictional immunity if they take place on the territory of

3
another state. This claim is rejected, as the Court could not find any support for it in both (the history
of) treaty law and international customs.
Then the Court turned to the other argument, holding that the underlying acts were violations of jus
cogens and that they, thus, allowed for denial of immunity. This claim was rejected as well:
Firstly, though the Court acknowledged that the facts were indeed grave violations of international law,
there it found no support for denying state immunity. It emphasised that this says nothing about
individual criminal responsibility and the possibility to deny individual immunity (paras. 81-91).
Furthermore, while the underlying facts are of jus cogens character, this does not conflict with the
(international customary law) principle of state immunity: the former addresses the (un)lawfulness of
certain conduct, the latter concerns procedural, jurisdictional issues (paras. 92-97)
And finally, the Court considered that "it cannot accept Italy's contention that the alleged shortcomings
in Germany's provisions for reparation to Italian victims entitled the Italian courts to deprive Germany of
jurisdictional immunity".
The protection of state immunity was essentially a procedural one. It was not a matter where the court
had a choice, and the Court of Appeal had been wrong to take to itself any discretion. Torture cannot
be justified by any rule of domestic or international law, but the question at issue was whether such a
norm conflicts with a rule which accords state immunity: ‘The jus cogens is the prohibition on torture.
But the United Kingdom, in according state immunity to the Kingdom, is not proposing to torture
anyone. Nor is the Kingdom, in claiming immunity, justifying the use of torture. It is objecting in line to
the jurisdiction of the English court to decide whether it used torture or not.’
Part I of the 1978 Act was not disproportionate as inconsistent with a peremptory norm or ius cogens of
international law and its application did not infringe the claimants’ rights under article 6 of the ECHR.
There is no evidence that states have recognised or given effect to an international law obligation to
exercise universal jurisdiction over claims arising from alleged breaches of peremptory norms of
international law, nor is there any consensus of judicial and learned opinion that they should.
The rule on immunity is well-understood and established, and no relevant exception is
generally accepted, the rule prevails.’

Hence, the Court rejected Italy's claims and held that the judgments ordering Germany to pay
compensation violated the principle of jurisdictional immunity.

Regarding the constraining measure on Villa Vigoni that was filed by the Greek claimants, the Court
stated that it was unlawfully awarded as well.

Jones v Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia [2006] 2 WLR 1424 (LANZON)

FACTS: The case concerns an action in damages brought by Jones and three other applicants, all UK
citizens, falsely accused of involvement in bombings in Riyadh in 2001 and 2002. The four allege that
they were repeatedly tortured while in prison in Saudi Arabia and that they suffered severe
psychological and physical harm as a result. Seeking aggravated and exemplary damages from Saudi
Arabia's Ministry of the Interior and the Saudi officials allegedly responsible, the applicants filed claims
of, inter alia, torture, assault and battery, trespass to the person, and unlawful imprisonment. In the
proceedings before the Court of Appeal, Saudi Arabia claimed immunity on its own behalf and on that
of its officials. The Court of Appeal agreed with the former but denied the latter; all the involved parties
appealed the decision. The House of Lords agreed with Saudi Arabia by upholding state immunity in
civil proceedings brought against a state and its officials in a different country for alleged torture.

Applicants launched proceedings in England, claiming damages against the Saudi Arabian State and
the individual State officials who had carried out or sanctioned the alleged torture. Saudi Arabia applied
to have the claims struck out on the basis that it, and its servants or agents, were entitled to immunity
and the English courts had no jurisdiction. The applicants argued that international law recognised an
exception to the principal of immunity of the State and its officials in cases of civil claims for acts of
torture; i.e. breaches of a peremptory norm of international law which prohibits torture would not attract
the protection of State immunity.

ISSUE: W/N the applicants are immune from the jurisdiction of the English courts for alleged
acts of torture

HELD: House of Lords had found in favour of Saudi Arabia and the individual State officials. It held that
section 1(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978, in conformity with international law, provided that a State
was immune from the jurisdiction of the English courts (unless the proceedings fell within one of the
specified exceptions, for example relating to commercial activities) and that such immunity extended to
its officials, servants or agents. Although international law prohibited torture and established universal
criminal jurisdiction over alleged torturers, no exception to immunity existed in respect of civil claims for
alleged torture committed in a foreign State. The House of Lords also found that there was no breach
of Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) regarding the applicants’ right of
access to a court. The applicants then brought proceedings before the European Court of Human
Rights alleging breach of their rights of access to court under Article 6(1) of the ECHR.