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Econometrica, Vol. 71, No. 6 (November, 2003), 1695-1725
BY MARC J. MELITZ1
This paper develops a dynamicindustrymodel with heterogeneous firmsto analyze
the intra-industryeffects of internationaltrade. The model shows how the exposureto
tradewill induceonly the more productivefirmsto enter the exportmarket(while some
less productivefirmscontinue to produceonly for the domesticmarket)and will simul-
taneously force the least productivefirmsto exit. It then shows how furtherincreases
in the industry'sexposure to trade lead to additionalinter-firmreallocationstowards
more productivefirms.The paper also shows how the aggregateindustryproductivity
growthgeneratedby the reallocationscontributesto a welfare gain, thus highlightinga
benefit from trade that has not been examinedtheoreticallybefore. The paper adapts
Hopenhayn's(1992a) dynamicindustrymodel to monopolisticcompetitionin a general
equilibriumsetting. In so doing, the paper providesan extension of Krugman's(1980)
trade model that incorporatesfirm level productivitydifferences.Firmswith different
productivitylevels coexist in an industrybecause each firmfaces initialuncertaintycon-
cerningits productivitybefore makingan irreversibleinvestmentto enter the industry.
Entryinto the exportmarketis also costly,but the firm'sdecisionto exportoccursafter
it gains knowledgeof its productivity.
1. INTRODUCTION
RECENT EMPIRICALRESEARCHusing longitudinalplant or firm-leveldata from
several countries has overwhelminglysubstantiatedthe existence of large and
persistentproductivitydifferences among establishmentsin the same narrowly
defined industries. Some of these studies have further shown that these pro-
ductivity differences are strongly correlated with the establishment'sexport
status: relativelymore productiveestablishmentsare much more likely to ex-
port (even within so-called "export sectors," a substantial portion of estab-
lishments do not export). Other studies have highlighted the large levels of
resource reallocations that occur across establishmentsin the same industry.
Some of these studies have also correlatedthese reallocationswith the estab-
lishments'export status.
This paper develops a dynamicindustrymodel with heterogeneous firmsto
analyze the role of internationaltrade as a catalystfor these inter-firmreallo-
cations within an industry.The model is able to reproduce many of the most
salient patternsemphasizedby recent micro-levelstudies related to trade. The
model showshow the exposureto trade induces only the more productivefirms
to exportwhile simultaneouslyforcing the least productivefirmsto exit. Both
the exit of the least productivefirmsand the additionalexport sales gained by
1695
1696 MARC J. MELITZ
4Thisassumptionis also made in BEJK.See Helpman,Melitz, and Yeaple (2002) for an exten-
sion of the currentmodel that explicitlyconsidersthe asymmetriccountrycase when the relative
wage is determinedvia trade in a homogeneous good sector.
1698 MARC J. MELITZ
u -[fq(w)Pciw - l/p
u=A Pd&)
q(&co
_F_ 1-0,
(1) P= / p(w))1-cdw)
EJ
These aggregates can then be used to derive the optimal consumption and
expendituredecisions for individualvarieties using
q(w) Q[ p(Wi)]
(2)
r(w) - R[P )]1
2.2. Production
There is a continuum of firms, each choosing to produce a different vari-
ety w. Productionrequiresonly one factor,labor,whichis inelasticallysupplied
at its aggregatelevel L, an index of the economy'ssize. Firmtechnologyis rep-
resented by a cost function that exhibits constant marginalcost with a fixed
overhead cost. Labor used is thus a linear function of output q: 1 = f + q/q'.
All firmsshare the same fixed cost f > 0 but have differentproductivitylevels
indexed by (p> 0. For expositional simplicity,higher productivityis modeled
as producinga symmetricvariety at lower marginalcost. Higher productivity
may also be thoughtof as producinga higher qualityvarietyat equal cost.7Re-
gardless of its productivity,each firm faces a residualdemand curvewith con-
stant elasticity o- and thus chooses the same profit maximizingmarkupequal
to o-/(o- - 1) = 1/p. This yields a pricing rule
(3) wP)=
p'P
where w is the common wage rate hereafter normalizedto one. Firm profit is
then
(4) r(SP)=R(PP)U-l
On the other hand, the ratios of any two firms'outputs and revenues only de-
pend on the ratio of their productivitylevels:
q((pi)
(6)() q(P2) )
(SPj
P2
r(SPj)
r(P2)
(SD
1f
2
2.3. Aggregation
An equilibriumwill be characterizedby a mass M of firms (and hence M
goods) and a distribution i(q') of productivitylevels over a subset of (0, ox).
In such an equilibrium,the aggregateprice P defined in (1) is then given by
p=f p(p)1-'Mt((p)d( p
(7) = [ f 00
1(
(J~~~-1
P=M-'T1p((), R=PQ=Mr(p),
Q = Ml/Pq(P), H = M1T(4),
"0Thiscaptures the fact that firms cannot know their own productivitywith certaintyuntil
they startproducingand selling their good. (Recall that productivitydifferencesmay reflect cost
differencesas well as differencesin consumervaluationsof the good.)
"The increasedtractabilityaffordedby this simplificationpermitsthe detailed analysisof the
impactof trade on this endogenousrangeof productivitylevels and on the distributionof market
shares and profitsacross this range.
1702 MARCJ. MELITZ
r = r(9)= [ S((p )1
] r((p*), T= [ S?* 1 - -(* )
LP J L j j'
The zero cutoff profit condition, by pinning down the revenue of the cutoff
firm, then implies a relationshipbetween the average profit per firm and the
cutoff productivitylevel:
(10) T(QD*)= r(o*) = of T = fk(p*),
where k(p*) = [-(p*)Ip*10-1 - 1.
(11) Ve = PinV - fe = 8
T - Tfe
If this value were negative, no firm would want to enter. In any equilibrium
where entry is unrestricted,this value could further not be positive since the
mass of prospectiveentrantsis unbounded.
(ZeroCutoffProfit) (FreeEntry)
Le Mefe =-fe=MiTH.
pin
15The ZCP curve need not be decreasingeverywhereas representedin the graph. However,
it will monotonicallydecrease from infinityto zero for Sp*E (0, +oo) as shown in the graph if
g(Xp)belongs to one of severalcommonfamiliesof distributions:lognormal,exponential,gamma,
Weibul,or truncationson (0, +oo) of the normal,logistic,extremevalue, or Laplacedistributions.
(A sufficientcondition is that g(Gp)$p/[1
- G(p)] be increasingto infinityon (0, +oo).)
IMPACTOF TRADE 1705
(14) W=P-1 M p1 -
161tis importantto emphasize that this result is not a direct consequence of aggregationand
marketclearingconditions:it is a propertyof the model's stationaryequilibrium.Aggregate in-
come need not necessarilyequal the paymentsto all workers,since there maybe some investment
income derivedfrom the financingof new entrants.Each new entrantraises the capitalfe, which
providesa randomreturnof iT(<p)(if (p > (p*)or zero (if 'p < 'p*) in everyperiod. In equilibrium,
the aggregatereturnH equals the aggregateinvestmentcost Le in every period-so there is no
net investmentincome (this would not be the case with a positive time discountfactor).
1706 MARCJ. MELITZ
non-tariff barriers to trade. Regardless of their origin, these costs are most
appropriatelymodeled as independent of the firm'sexportvolume decision.18
When there is uncertaintyconcerningthe exportmarket,the timingand sunk
nature of the costs become quite relevant for the export decision (most of the
previouslymentioned costs must be sunk prior to entry into the export mar-
ket). The strong and robust empirical correlations at the firm level between
export status and productivitysuggest that the export market entry decision
occurs after the firmgains knowledgeof its productivity,and hence that uncer-
tainty concerningthe export markets is not predominantlyabout productivity
(as is the uncertaintyprior to entry into the industry).I therefore assume that
a firm who wishes to export must make an initial fixed investment, but that
this investment decision occurs after the firm's productivityis revealed. For
simplicity, I do not model any additional uncertaintyconcerning the export
markets.The per-unittrade costs are modeled in the standardiceberg formu-
lation, whereby i > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order for 1 unit to
arriveat destination.
Although the size of a country relative to the rest of the world (which con-
stitutes its tradingpartners)is left unrestricted,I do assume that the world (or
trading group) is comprised of some number of identical countries. This as-
sumption is made in order to ensure factor price equalizationacross countries
and hence focus the analysison firm selection effects that are independent of
wage differences.19In this model with trade costs, size differencesacross coun-
tries will induce differencesin equilibriumwage levels. These wage differences
then generate further firm selection effects and aggregateproductivitydiffer-
ences acrosscountries.20I therefore assume that the economy under studycan
trade with n > 1 other countries (the world is then comprised of n + 1 > 2
countries). Firms can export their productsto any country,althoughentry into
each of these export marketsrequiresa fixed investmentcost of fex > 0 (mea-
sured in units of labor). Regardlessof export status, a firmstill incursthe same
overheadproductioncost f.
ables. Each firm's pricing rule in its domestic market is given, as before, by
PdAO) = W/pP = l/ptp. Firms who export will set higher prices in the for-
eign markets that reflect the increased marginalcost T of serving these mar-
kets: PjGO) = TIP9? = TPdP). Thus, the revenues earned from domestic sales
and exportsales to any given countryare, respectively,rd(p) = R(Pp(p)f-l and
r.jo) = r`'rd(p), where R and P denote the aggregate expenditure and price
index in every country.The balance of paymentscondition implies that R also
representsthe aggregaterevenue of firmsin any country,and hence aggregate
income. The combined revenue of a firm,r(p), thus depends on its export sta-
tus:
rd(O) if the firmdoes not export,
(15) r(p) = rd(p) + nr(>p) = (1 + nrl-rl)rd(p)
if the firmexportsto all countries.
(16) 7d ( T
rd(_p)-t (<)_ rx(9) f
0J 0J
A firm who produces for its domestic market exports to all n countries if
7rx(wp)> 0. Each firm'scombined profit can then be written: r(<p)=-7Td(P) +
max{0,nrx (>p)}.Similarly to the closed economy case, firm value is given
by v(>p) = max{O, 1T(p)/6}, and (p*= inf>p : v(>p) > 01 identifies the cutoff
productivitylevel for successful entry. Additionally, (p*= inf{>p:(p> (p*and
Wrx(>p)> 01 now represents the cutoff productivitylevel for exporting firms.
If (P*= (0*,then all firms in the industryexport. In this case, the cutoff firm
(with productivitylevel (p*= qp*)earns zero total profit (1T(p*) = lTd(p*) +
frlx(cp*) = 0) and nonnegative export profit (-rx(>p*) > 0). If qp*> p*, then
some firms (with productivitylevels between (p*and qp*)produce exclusively
for their domestic market. These firms do not export as their export profits
would be negative. They earn nonnegative profits exclusivelyfrom their do-
mestic sales. The firmswith productivitylevels above (p*earn positive profits
from both their domestic and export sales. By their definition,the cutoff levels
must then satisfy d(fp*) =0 and rx(p ) = 0.
This partitioningof firmsby exportstatuswill occur if and only if r-lfx > f
the trade costs relativeto the overheadproductioncost mustbe above a thresh-
old level. Note that, when there are no fixed export costs (fx = 0), no level of
variablecost i > 1 can induce this partitioning.However, a large enough fixed
export cost fx > f will induce partitioningeven when there are no variable
trade costs. As the partitioningof firmsby exportstatus (withinsectors) is em-
piricallyubiquitous,I will henceforthassume that the combinationof fixed and
variable trade costs are high enough to generate partitioning,and therefore
that rO-lfx > f. Although the equilibriumwhere all firms export will not be
22inone case, only the new entrantswho exportexpend resourcesto cover the full investment
cost fex. In the other case, all exportingfirms expend resources to cover the smaller amortized
portion of the cost fx = 8fex. In equilibrium,the ratio of new exportersto all exportersis 8 (see
Appendix),so the same aggregatelaborresourcesare expendedin either case.
23Afirmwould earn strictlyhigherprofitsby also producingfor its domestic marketsince the
associatedvariableprofitrd (, ) /vo is alwayspositive and the overheadproductioncost f is already
incurred.
1710 MARCJ. MELITZ
6.2. Aggregation
= (p*) and
Using the same weighted average function defined in (9), let Op
Px = P( p*)denote the averageproductivitylevels of, respectively,all firmsand
exportingfirmsonly. The averageproductivityacross all firms, (p,is based only
on domestic market share differences between firms (as reflected by differ-
ences in the firms'productivitylevels). If some firms do not export, then this
average will not reflect the additional export shares of the more productive
firms. Furthermore,neither (pnor s, reflect the proportion r of output units
that are "lost"in export transit. Let 0, be the weighted productivityaverage
that reflects the combined market share of all firms and the output shrinkage
linked to exporting.Again, using the weighted average function (9), this com-
bined averageproductivitycan be written:
1 - ]r-l
ft= f [MO l + nMx(Tls1 )x-]}
6.3. EquilibriumConditions
As in the closed economy equilibrium,the zero cutoff profit condition will
imply a relationshipbetween the averageprofitper firm - and the cutoff pro-
ductivitylevel sp*(see (10)):
lTd(cP) =0 rld(cP) = fk(fp
fO v(9 x) = xk
rx(T
where k()p) = [ p 0-1_ 1 as was previouslydefined.The zero cutoff profit
condition also implies that (P*can be written as a function of (p*:
=fTf
r r((px)
(19 (9x ) fx fX
(19) -p =7 IT
1-or
iV=lf T
rd(p*) 0f f
Using (18), Trcan therefore be expressed as a function of the cutoff level p*:
(20) 7r = iTd(p) + pxn7TxG(px)
+ pxnfxk(>p*)
=f k(Gp*) (ZCP),
where p*, and hence Px, are implicitlydefined as functions of p0using (19).
Equation (20) thus identifies the new zero cutoff profit condition for the open
economy.
25Inother words, the aggregateequilibriumin any countryis identical to one with M, repre-
sentativefirmsthat all share the same productivitylevel f .
1712 MARC J. MELITZ
As before, v1= Eto(l - 6)ti7. = 7r/6 representsthe present value of the av-
erage profit flows and ve = pinv - fe yields the net value of entry. The free entry
condition thus remains unchanged: ve = 0 if and only if 7r = 6felpin. Regard-
less of profit differences across firms (based on export status), the expected
value of future profits,in equilibrium,must equal the fixed investmentcost.
(21) =R
r L
26Because'pt factorsin the outputlost in exporttransit(from r), it is possible for ' , to be lower
than (pa when T is high and f, is low. It is shown in the Appendix that any productivityaverage
that is based on a firm'soutput "at the factorygate"must be higherin the open economy.
27Recallthat the averageprofit X must be higherin the open economy equilibrium.
1714 MARC J. MELITZ
firm's share of its domestic market (since R also represents aggregate con-
sumer expenditurein the country). The impact of trade on this firm'smarket
share can be evaluatedusing the followinginequalities(see Appendix):
rd((p) < ra(p) < rd(p) + nrX(p) Vp > f
The first part of the inequalityindicates that all firms incur a loss in domestic
sales in the open economy. A firm who does not export then also incurs a
total revenue loss. The second part of the inequalityindicates that a firmwho
exports more than makes up for its loss of domestic sales with export sales
and increasesits total revenues.Thus, a firmwho exportsincreasesits share of
industryrevenues while a firm who does not export loses market share. (The
market share of the least productive firms in the autarkyequilibrium-with
productivitybetween SDa and p*-drops to zero as these firmsexit.)
Now consider the change in profit earned by a firm with productivityp. If
the firm does not export in the open economy, it must incur a profit loss, since
its revenue, and hence variableprofit, is now lower. The directionof the profit
change for an exportingfirm is not immediatelyclear since it involves a trade-
off between the increasein total revenue (and hence variableprofit) and the in-
crease in fixed cost due to the additionalexportcost. For such a firm (p > f),
this profitchange can be written:28
~c~u1[ + n-1
=O u-f (' I ~(c)u-1
('"] nfx'
where the term in the bracket must be positive since rd(p) + nrx(p) > ra(p)
for all q > q'*.The profit change, Ar(Gp),is thus an increasingfunction of the
firm'sproductivitylevel p. In addition, this change must be negative for the
exportingfirmwith the cutoff productivitylevel (pD:29 Therefore,firmsare par-
titioned by productivityinto groups that gain and lose profits. Only a subset
of the more productivefirmswho export gain from trade. Among firmsin this
group, the profit gain increases with productivity.Figure 2 graphicallyrepre-
sents the changes in revenue and profitsdrivenby trade.The exposureto trade
thus generates a type of Darwinianevolution within an industrythat was de-
scribed in the introduction:the most efficient firmsthrive and grow-they ex-
port and increaseboth their marketshare and profits.Some less efficient firms
still export and increase their market share but incur a profit loss. Some even
less efficient firmsremain in the industrybut do not export and incur losses of
both marketshare and profit.Finally,the least efficient firmsare drivenout of
the industry.
r((p)
(Trade)
(Autarky)
ji . ~ (x
~~~~~~~~~~,
(Trade)
(Autarky)
the old equilibriumwith n countries. I then add primes (') to all variablesand
functionswhen they pertain to the new equilibriumwith n' > n countries.
Inspection of equations (20) and (19) defining the new zero cutoff profit
condition (as a function of the domestic cutoff p*)reveals that the ZCP curve
will shift up and therefore that both cutoff productivitylevels increase with n:
p*` > (p* and fx' > qx. The increase in the number of trading partners thus
forces the least productive firms to exit. As was the case with the transition
from autarky,the increased exposure to trade forces all firms to relinquisha
portion of their share of their domestic market:rd'(p) < rd(Qp),Vp > p*.The
less productivefirmswho do not export (with Sn< Sn*') thus incura revenue and
profit loss-and the least productiveamong them exit.3"Again, as was the case
with the transitionfrom autarky,the firmswho export (with f > ` ) more than
make up for their loss of domestic sales with their sales to the new exportmar-
kets and increase their combined revenues:rd'(p) + n'rx'(p) > rd(p) + nrx(p).
Some of these firms nevertheless incur a decrease in profits due to the new
fixed export costs, but the most productivefirms among this group also enjoy
an increase in profits (which is increasingwith the firms' productivitylevel).
Thus, both market shares and profits are reallocated towards the more effi-
cient firms.As was the case for the transition from autarky,this reallocation
of market shares generates an aggregateproductivitygain and an increase in
welfare.32
so that the firmswho do not export incur both a market share and profit loss.
The more productivefirmswho exportmore than make up for their loss of do-
mestic sales with increased export sales, and the most productivefirmsamong
this group also increase their profits.As before, the exit of the least productive
firms and the market share increase of the most productive firms both con-
tributeto an aggregateproductivitygain and an increase in welfare.33
A decrease in the fixedexportmarketentrycost f, induces similarchangesin
the cutoff levels as the decrease in r. The increasedexposureto tradeforces the
least productivefirms to exit (sp*rises) and generates entry of new firms into
the exportmarket(qx decreases). These selection effects both contributeto an
aggregateproductivityincrease if the new exportersare more productivethan
the averageproductivitylevel. Although the less productivefirmswho do not
export incur both a market share and profit loss, the market share and profit
reallocationstowardsthe more productivefirms,in this case, will not be similar
to those for the previous two cases: the decrease in fx will not increase the
combinedmarketshare or profit of any firmthat alreadyexportedpriorto the
change in fx-only new exportersincrease their combined sales. However, as
in the previoustwo cases, welfare is higher in the new steady state equilibrium.
Both types of trade cost decreasesdescribedabove also help to explainanother
empiricalfeature, reportedby Roberts, Sullivan,and Tybout(1995), that some
exportbooms are drivenby the entry of new firmsinto the exportmarkets.34
9. CONCLUSION
This paper has described and analyzed a new transmissionchannel for the
impact of trade on industry structure and performance. Since this channel
works throughintra-industryreallocationsacross firms, it can only be studied
within an industrymodel that incorporates firm level heterogeneity. Recent
empiricalwork has highlightedthe importanceof this channel for understand-
ing and explainingthe effects of trade on firm and industryperformance.
The paper shows how the existence of export market entry costs drastically
affects how the impact of trade is distributedacross different types of firms.
The induced reallocationsbetween these different firms generate changes in
a country'saggregateenvironmentthat cannot be explainedby a model based
on representativefirms. On one hand, the paper shows that the existence of
such costs to trade does not affect the welfare-enhancingproperties of trade:
one of the most robust results of this paper is that increases in a country's
exposure to trade lead to welfare gains. On the other hand, the paper shows
how the export costs significantlyalter the distributionof the gains from trade
33Seefootnote 32.
340verhalf of the substantialexportgrowthin Colombianand Mexicanmanufacturingsectors
was generatedby the entryof firmsinto the exportmarkets.
IMPACTOF TRADE 1719
across firms. In fact, only a portion of the firms-the more efficient ones-
reap benefits from trade in the form of gains in market share and profit. Less
efficient firms lose both. The exposure to trade, or increases in this exposure,
force the least efficient firms out of the industry.These trade-inducedreallo-
cations towardsmore efficient firmsexplainwhy trade may generate aggregate
productivitygains without necessarily improvingthe productive efficiency of
individualfirms.
Although this model mainlyhighlightsthe long-runbenefits associatedwith
the trade-inducedreallocations within an industry,the reallocation of these
resources also obviously entails some short-runcosts. It is therefore impor-
tant to have a model that can predict the impact of trade policy on inter-firm
reallocations in order to design accompanyingpolicies that would address is-
sues related to the transitiontowardsa new regime. These policies could help
palliate the transitionalcosts while taking care not to hinder the reallocation
process. Of course, the model also clearly indicates that policies that hinder
the reallocationprocess or otherwise interferewith the flexibilityof the factor
markets may delay or even prevent a country from reaping the full benefits
from trade.
Departmentof Economics, Harvard University,Littauer Center,Cambridge,
AM 02138, U.S.A.;CEPR;and NBER.
ManuscriptreceivedApril,2002;final revisionreceivedApril,2003.
Q= L00 q((p)PM/L(p)dpJ
i 1/p
(by definitionof Q U)
[/00
rP
ro
q(p)P (J
/ 'p
M((>p)d]p
l/p
=M /pq(>P),
APPENDIX B: CLOSEDECONOMYEQUILIBRIUM
B.1. Existenceand Uniquenessof the EquilibriumCutoffLevel (p*
Followingis a proof that the FE and ZCP conditions in (12) identifya unique cutoff level *
and that the ZCP curve cuts the FE curve from above in ((, ir) space. I do this by showingthat
1720 MARC J. MELITZ
f) -C
g W) [ ( SD ) _-1] ~ ( (eD) a-1 (
k((p)g((p) ( - 1)[k((p)+ 1]
1 - G((p) f
Define
Since j((p) is nonnegativeand its elasticitywith respect to p is negative and bounded awayfrom
zero, j((p) must be decreasingto zero as p goes to infinity.Furthermore,lim,0 ]j('p)= oo since
limqp,ok(p) = oc. Therefore,j(fp) = [1 - G(>p)]k(@p)decreasesfrom infinityto zero on (0, oc).
Wa = Ma1 = P(T+f y) a.
Similarly,welfare in the open economy can also be written as a function of the new cutoff pro-
ductivitylevel (see (17)):36
D.2. Reallocations
PROOF THAT rd((p) < ra((p) < rd((p) + nr,(p) = (1 + nT1-0')rd(p): Recall that ra(p) =
((P/p*a) f-1f (V5p> (Pa) inautarkyandthatrd(p) = (p/l*)f-lyf (Vp > *) intheopeneconomy
equilibrium.This immediatelyyields rd((p) < ra((p)since * > (P. The second inequalityis a di-
rect consequenceof anothercomparativestatic involvingr. It is shown in a followingsection that
(1 + nTr`)rd(p) decreases as r increases.Since the autarkyequilibriumis obtained as the lim-
iting equilibriumas r increasesto infinity,ra((p)= lim7+,,, rd((p) = limT+00[,(1 + nr'"-f)rd((p)].
Therefore, ra(fp) < (1 + nT -"f)rd(fp) for any finite r.
D.3. AggregateProductivity
It was pointed out in the paperthat aggregateproductivity t in the open economymaynot be
higherthan (a due to the effect of the output loss incurredin exporttransit.It was then claimed
that a productivityaveragebased on a measure of output "at the factorygate"would alwaysbe
higher in the open economy.Define
as such an average where h(.) is any increasing function. The only condition imposed on this aver-
age involvesthe use of the firms'combined revenues as weights.37Let 'Pa= h-'((l/R) f0o ()
ra
x h(qp)g((p)d(p) representthis productivityaveragein autarky.Then ' mustbe greaterthan Oa-
for any increasingfunction h(.)-as the distributionr((p)g((p)/R first order stochasticallydom-
inates the distributionra(p)g((p)/R: foJr(()g(()d < fojra(5)g(5)d V8p(and the inequalityis
fa
strictVp > ).38
Increasein n: = (0/0*)d*ldn
Differentiating(C.1) with respect to n and using d@p*/dn
from (19) yields
d *
1 -fx(P*i('P*)
dn f p*j'((p*) + nfxpji'(qX)
Welfare: Recall from (D.l) that welfare per workeris given by W = p(L/af)l/(f-l)p*. Wel-
fare must therefore rise with increases in n and decreases in fx or - since all of these changes
induce an increasein the cutoff productivitylevel qo*.
f* 1 [f (P*]j((*) (P*]j((P*)xl
(p* =-
dnan Lf ) +
fx 1i j((9+)
( n)
((9
=
ffl(P*? )-1 j(P*?) 'i((. ) + n ji((' ) (using (19))
[(,P) z- ] =1 + nr (n19p*d 1]
0.
dn (D(P*)T-1L T-1 + n dn sp*
,0a- 0-0-1
[, f?- S1?g(() d +11 (using(19))
+ 1
nf,_i+
(SP*a1 1 +nT-ag(T d
since f7?
5t'-g(5t)d5/lf7bo 'tg(5t)dt] > 1 as * <qf. Hence,
-17
IT) ( +1
)[af;
~
r ~1 + ,l
0-1 +
(f*]
- (=r-i)(
+ l- a
- -
a * j
< .
Decreasein r: As was the case with the increase in n, the least productivefirms who do
not export (with sp< sp*')incurboth a revenue and profit loss. There now exists a new category
of firmswith intermediateproductivitylevels (sp`'< sp< sp*)who enter the export marketsas a
consequence of the decrease in r. The new export sales generate an increase in revenue for all
these firms,but only a portion of these firms(with productivitysp> sotwhere sp` < SDt < fp) also
increasetheir profits.Firmswith productivitylevels sp> sp*who exportboth before and afterthe
change in r enjoy a profitincreasethat is proportionalto their combinedrevenueincrease(their
fixedcosts do not change) and is increasingin their productivitylevel sp:
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