Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in
the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their
marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after
that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never
respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but
did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him
remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave
to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the
summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of
general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to respond
after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the
case to the prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family
as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged
nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual
medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could
have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical
illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five
children. Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family
and have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the
nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted
to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this
Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline
in Republic v. CA and Molina.
Bangayan vs Bangayan
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
only the properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father
was against the relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn,
filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also
asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as
administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the
declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered
properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the
seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties
in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar
and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
ISSUES:
Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a
marriage license
Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:
YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the beginning.” In this
case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage
License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local
civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls
under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family
Code which states: Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding
Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership existing
in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last
paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their March 31, 2005
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the on the ground that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
petition before the trial court even admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which respondent null and violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal
included Sally x x x.” partnership property; ordered petitioner a regular support in favor of his son in the
amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the necessity arises, and
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is
awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.
more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No.
Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon
61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties
respondent’s motion issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to
under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin with the
P20, 000.
descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC
were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin”
decision. Petitioner motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the
name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words “married to”
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under
marriage, the provisions of article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the
Article 148 of the Family Code.
Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal
3. NO. partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general rule
applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article applicable to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the ownership.
first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both
Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the by the RTC and the CA, to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the
contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their same would be covered by the co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said distribution.
existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime
of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON.
a prior marriage.In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin
JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR. being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati
and Sally just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
City, respondents
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the FACTS:
benefit of marriage.
The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological
Advertisements incapacity. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner’s wife Charmaine Felix
alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with
Buenaventura VS. CA
a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449
criminal complaint for concubinage. The petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance
of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity
of marriagebased on psychological incapacity is a prejudicial question that
should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court finds the contention of the petitioner without merit. The
pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s marriage is not a
prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered
prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the
final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case
involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but
also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
Morigo vs People
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a
while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they
became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for
work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.
Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they
just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage
with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Nolasco
FACTS:
Nolasco, a seaman, first met Janet Monica Parker in a bar in England. After that, she
lived with him on his ship for 6 months. After his seaman's contract has expired, he
brought her to his hometown in San Jose, Antique. They got married in January
1982.
After the marriage celebration, he got another employment contract and left the
province. In January 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother that 15 days
after Janet gave birth to their son, she left. He cut short his contract to find Janet.
He returned home in November 1983.
He did so by securing another contract which England is one of its port calls. He
wrote several letters to the bar where he and Janet first met, but all were returned
to him. He claimed that he inquired from his friends but they too had no news
about Janet. In 1988, Nolasco filed before the RTC of Antique a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet.
RTC granted the petition. The Republic through the Solicitor-General, appealed to
the CA, contending that the trial court erred in declaring Janet presumptively dead
because Nolasco had failed to show that there existed a well-founded belief for such
declaration. CA affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Nolasco has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
RULING:
No. Nolasco failed to prove that he had complied with the third requirement under
the Article 41 of the Family Code, the existence of a "well-founded belief" that Janet
is already dead.
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened
to 4 years; however, there is a need for judicial declaration of presumptive death to
enable the spouse present to marry. However, Article 41 imposes a stricter
standard before declaring presumptive death of one spouse. It requires a "well-
founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration
of presumptive death can be granted.
In the case at bar, the Court found Nolasco's alleged attempt to ascertain about
Janet's whereabouts too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded
belief that she was already dead.
Nolasco, after returning from his employment, instead of seeking help of local
authorities or of the British Embassy, secured another contract to London. Janet's
alleged refusal to give any information about her was too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. He did not explain why he took him 9 months to
finally reached San Jose after he asked leave from his captain. He refused to identify
his friends whom he inquired from. When the Court asked Nolasco about the
returned letters, he said he had lost them. Moreover, while he was in London, he did
not even dare to solicit help of authorities to find his wife.
The circumstances of Janet's departure and Nolasco's subsequent behavior make it
very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet was dead a well-founded one.
MARBELLA-BOBIS v. BOBIS
July 31, 2000 (G.R. No. 138509)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS
Respondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS
FACTS:
• October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled,
nullified or terminated
• January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis
• Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez
• February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy
• Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without
a marriage license
• Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration
of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage
*After petitioner sued for bigamy, it’s just when the respondent filed a declaration
of absolute nullity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy
HELD:
• A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in
the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed
In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly
entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again;
otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a
judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In
the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a
married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.
Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent
entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a
decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge.
It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question
*Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)
SSS v. Jasque vda. De Bailon, GR. No 165545
Article 41-42 Family Code
FACTS: In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon.
Fifteen plus years later, Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death
of Alice, she being an absentee. The petition was granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in
1998. Jarque then sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were
granted her. On the other hand, a certain Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is
the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned before the SSS that they
be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them who
shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil registrar through
an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the
declaration made by the RTC.
The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the RTC. SSS is
indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the
benefits obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does
not include the appellate power to review a court decision or declaration. In the
case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarque’s marriage to Clemente is still valid
because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her reappearance legally.
Alice reappeared only after Clemente’s death and in this case she can no longer file
such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer
be raised – the marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly
not collaterally – it is however impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer
a marriage to be attacked for the same has been terminated upon Clemente’s death.

They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice,
another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive
and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente
obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware
of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s
place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon
learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs.

SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to
return the same to Cecilia since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the
benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had terminated Clemente’s
marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s decision in declaring Alice to
be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS
before the Social Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however
ruled the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared
presumptively dead automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.

HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clemente’s

death. Likewise there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is
terminated upon Clemente’s death. SSS is correct in ruling that it is inutile for Alice