Modern Approaches

to
Legal Reasoning

General Information
Modern Approaches to Legal Reasoning

The aim of this course is to introduce the students to the basic methods and
techniques in legal reasoning, and to some modern normative theories of legal
reasoning. The course, which deals mainly but not exclusively with statutory law,
should be of interest to law students in general, as the judge’s methodological
considerations will influence his reasoning and, therefore, his decisions, especially in
hard cases.

The first part of the course (seminars 1-5) is devoted to an analysis of the so-called
legal method, that is, the familiar “bag of tricks” that includes the principles of
statutory interpretation, the modalities of decision (analogy, argumentum e contrario,
liberal interpretation etc.) the concepts ratio decidendi and stare decisis, conflict-
solving maxims such as lex superior, lex posterior, and lex specialis, and more. This
part of the course also includes a discussion of the relevance of general theories of
law (such as natural law theory and legal positivism) to the theory and practice of
legal reasoning, and a discussion of the judicial activism/restraint debate.

Because the legal method turns out to be rather indeterminate, legal scholars have
developed general, normative theories of legal reasoning that aim to give the judge
the kind of concrete guidance he needs when faced with a hard case. The second part
of the course (seminars 6-10) treats some of these theories. Employing a distinction
between principled and pragmatic approaches to legal reasoning, we examine Neil
MacCormick’s positivistic and Ronald Dworkin’s anti-positivistic theory of legal
reasoning as examples of the principled approach; and we study William Eskridge’s
dynamic approach to statutory interpretation as an example of the pragmatic
approach. To determine whether any of these theories can actually give the judge the
kind of concrete guidance he needs, we apply each theory to cases decided by the
European Court of Justice and the Supreme Courts in Germany, England, and the
United States, respectively.

Instruction: Seminar attendance is compulsory, and the students are expected to

participate actively in the seminars.

Examination: The exam is a take-home exam. The students will be asked to analyze a
case decided by one of the courts mentioned above, and to answer the usual type of
questions concerning the content of the reading materials.

2
Modern Approaches to Legal Reasoning: Syllabus
Lectures:

(1) Introduction to Legal Reasoning

(2) Normative Theories of Legal Reasoning

Seminars:

(1) Statutory Interpretation. (Read MacCormick, “Argumentation”; Spaak,

Sections 3.1-2. Analyze Caminetti; Bock.

(2) Case-Law Analysis: Ratio Decidendi and Stare Decisis. (Read Goodhart, “The
Ratio Decidendi of a Case”; Stone, “The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi.” Analyze
Hines. Background Reading: MacCormick, “Why Cases Have Rationes”; Spaak,
Section 2.2).

(3) Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. (Read Hart, “Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals”; Radbruch, “Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law.”
Analyze The Border Guard Case (BverGe 95, 96). Background Reading: Spaak,
Sections 2.3-4)

(4) The Process of Discovery and the Process of Justification. (Read Anderson,
“Discovery and Justification”; Gräns, “Some Aspects of Judicial Decision Making”)

(5) Activism and Restraint: The Case of the European Court of Justice. (Read
Arnull, “The European Court”; Hartley, “The European Court”; Tridimas, “The Court
of Justice.” Analyze Haegeman; Sevince. Background Reading: Herman, “Quot
Judices tot Sententiae”)

(6) Principled and Pragmatic Decision-Making. (Read Wechsler, “Neutral

Principles”; Grey, “Legal Pragmatism.” Analyze Shelley and Brown. Background
Reading: Spaak, Sections 3.5-6).

(7) Neil MacCormick’s Theory of Legal Reasoning. (Read MacCormick,

“Artificial Reason”; “Argumentation”; “Coherence”; “On Legal Decisions”. Analyze
Bock Laundry. Background Reading: Spaak, Chaps. 4).

(8) Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Legal Reasoning. (Read Dworkin, “Hard Cases”;
“How To Read the Civil Rights Act”; “Statutes.” Analyze Weber and the Sex Change
Case. Background Reading: Spaak, chap. 5).
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(9) William Eskridge’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation. (Read Eskridge,
“Dynamic Statutory Interpretation”; Eskridge & Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation”
Sections II-III. Analyze Weber. Background Reading: Spaak, chap. 6).

(10) Comparing and Evaluating the Theories of MacCormick, Dworkin, and

Eskridge I: Statutory Interpretation. Analyze Caminetti, Holyfield.

(11) Comparing and Evaluating the Theories of MacCormick and Dworkin II:
Constitutional Interpretation and Case-Law Analysis. Analyze Lochner; London
Tramways.

4
Literature

Textbook:

Spaak, Torben, Guidance and Constraint: The Action-Guiding Capacity of Theories

of Legal Reasoning (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2007).

Articles:

Anderson, Bruce, “The Problematic Nature of Discovery and Justification,” in Bruce

Anderson, “Discovery” in Legal Decision-Making (Dordrecht: Springer Verlag,
1998) pp. 3-36. [Seminar 4]
Arnull, Anthony, “The European Court and Judicial Objectivity: A Reply to
Professor Hartley,” Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996) pp. 411- [Seminar 5]
Dworkin, Ronald, “Hard Cases,” in Taking Rights Seriously. 2d. ed. (London:
Duckworth, 1978) pp. 81-130 [Seminar 8]
-, “How To Read the Civil Rights Act,” in A Matter of Principle (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985) pp. 316-31. [Seminar 8].
-, “Statutes.” Excerpt from Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986) pp. 313-354.
Eskridge, William N. Jr., “Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,” University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 135 (1987) pp. 1479-1555 [Seminar 9]
Eskridge, William N., Jr. & Frickey, Philip P. “Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning,” Stanford Law Review 42 (1990) pp. 321-84. [Seminar 9]
Goodhart, Arthur L., “Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” Yale Law Journal
40 (1930) pp. 161-83. [Seminar 2]
Grey, Thomas C., “What Good is Legal Pragmatism?”, in Michael Brint & William
Weaver (eds) Pragmatism in Law and Society (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991)
pp. [Seminar 6]
Gräns, Minna, “Some Aspects of Legal Decision Making in Light of Cognitive
Consistency Theories,” in Peter Wahlgren & Mauro Zamboni (eds) Perspectives
on Jurisprudence. Essays in Honour of Jes Bjarup (Stockholm: Juridiska
fakulteten vid Stockholms universitet, 2005) pp. 100-22. [Seminar 4]
Hart, H. L. A., “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” Harvard Law
Review 71 (1958) pp. 593-600, 615-21 (excerpt). [Seminar 3]
Hartley, Trevor C. “The European Court, Judicial Objectivity and the Constitution of
the European Union,” Law Quarterly Review 112 (1996) pp. 95-109. [Seminar 5]
Herman, Shael, “Quot judices tot sententiae: A Study of the English Reaction to
Continental Interpretive Techniques,” Legal Studies 11 (1981) pp. 165-89.
[Seminar 1]
MacCormick, Neil, “Argumentation and Interpretation in Law,” Ratio Juris 6 (1993)
pp. 16-29. [Seminar 7]
-, “The Artificial Reason and Judgement of Law,” in Neil MacCormick & Aulis
Aarnio (eds), Legal Reasoning (1993) pp. 167-82. [Seminar 7]
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-, “On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences: From Dewey to Dworkin,” New
York University Law Review 58 (1983) pp. 239-58. [Seminar 7]
-, “Coherence in Legal Justification,” in W. Krawietz et al. (eds) Theorie der Normen
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1984) pp. 37-53 [Seminar 7]
-, “Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are,” in Laurence Goldstein (ed.)
Precedent in Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) pp. 155-82. [Seminar 2]
Mackie, John, “The Third Theory of Law,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 7 (1977)
pp. 3-16. [Seminar 8]
Radbruch, Gustav, “Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law,” Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 1 (2006) pp. 1-11. [Seminar 3]
Stone, Julius, “The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi,” Modern Law Review 22 (1959) pp.
597-620. [Seminar 2]
Tridimas, Takis, “The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism,” European Law Review
21 (1996) pp. 199-210. [Seminar 5]
Wechsler, Herbert, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” Harvard Law
Review 73 (1959) pp. 1-35. [Seminar 7]

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Cases

American Cases:

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)

Caminetti v. Unites States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916)
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947)
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1988).
Green v. Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. 504 (1990)

British Cases:

London Tramways v. London County Council [1898] A.C. 375

Hines v. Birkbeck College [1985] 3 All ER 156

German Cases:

The Border Guard Case (in English translation) (BVerfGE 95, 96)

EC Cases

Haegeman (C-181/73)
Sevince (C-192/89)
The Sex Change Case (C-13/94)

A booklet containing these cases will be available at cost price at the Students’ Office
as of 3 September.

7
Modern Approaches to Legal Reasoning: Schedule

Lectures:

(1) Introduction to Legal Reasoning [Tuesday 4 September 10-15-12.00]

(2) Normative Theories of Legal Reasoning [Thursday 4 October 10.15-12.00]

Seminars:

(1) Statutory Interpretation. (Read MacCormick, “Argumentation”; Spaak. Ch.

3.1-2. Analyze Camminetti and Bock Laundry.) [Thursday 6 September 9-15-12.00]

(2) Case-Law Analysis: Ratio Decidendi and Stare Decisis. (Read Goodhart, “The
Ratio Decidendi of a Case”; Stone, “The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi.” Analyze
Hines; Holy Trinity. Background Reading: MacCormick, “Why Cases Have
Rationes”). [Monday 10 September 9-15-12.00]

(3) Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. (Read Hart, “Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals”; Radbruch, “Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law.”
Analyze The Border Guard Case (BverGe 95, 96). Background Reading: Spaak,
Ch. 2.3-4). [Thursday 13 September 9.15-12.00]

(4) The Process of Discovery and the Process of Justification. (Read Anderson,
“Discovery and Justification”; Gräns, “Some Aspects of Legal Decision Making”
[Monday 17 September 9.15-12.00]

(5) Activism and Restraint: The Case of the European Court of Justice. (Read
Arnull, “The European Court”; Hartley, “The European Court”; Tridimas, “The Court
of Justice.” Analyze Haegeman and Sevince. Background Reading: Herman, “Quot
Judices tot Sententiae”) [Thursday 20 September 9.15-12.00]

(6) Principled and Pragmatic Decision-Making. (Read Wechsler, “Neutral

Principles”; Grey, “Legal Pragmatism.” Analyze Shelley and Brown. Background
Reading: Spaak, Ch. 3.5-6). [Tuesday 9 October 9.15-12.00]

(7) Neil MacCormick’s Theory of Legal Reasoning. (Read MacCormick,

“Artificial Reason”; “Argumentation”; “Coherence”; “On Legal Decisions”. Analyze
Bock Laundry. Background Reading: Spaak, Ch. 4). [Thursday 11 October 9.15-
12.00]

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(8) Ronald Dworkin’s Theory of Legal Reasoning. (Read Dworkin, “Hard Cases”;
“How To Read the Civil Rights Act”, “Statutes” Analyze Weber and the Sex-Change
Case. Background Reading: Spaak, Ch. 5). [Monday 15 October 9.15-12.00]

(9) William Eskridge’s Theory of Statutory Interpretation. (Read Eskridge,

“Dynamic Statutory Interpretation”; Eskridge & Frickey, “Statutory Interpretation”
Sections II-III. Analyze Weber. Background Reading: Spaak, Ch. 6). [Thursday 18
October 9.15-12.00]

(10) Comparing and Evaluating the Theories of MacCormick, Dworkin, and

Eskridge I: Statutory Interpretation. (Analyze Caminetti, Holyfield.) [Tuesday 23
October 9-15-12.00]

(11) Comparing and Evaluating the Theories of MacCormick and Dworkin II:
Constitutional Interpretation and Case-Law Analysis. Analyze Lochner; London
Tramways. [Friday 26 October 9.15-12.00]