34. Gonzalo v John Tarnante, Jr.

GR no 160600

Facts: Domingo (Gonzalo), owner of Gonzalo Construction, was awarded a contract by

the DPWH to improve the Sadsadan-Mabay-an Section of the Mountain Province-
Benguet Road, with a contract price of P7, 014,963.33. He then subcontracted to John
(Tarnate) the supply of labor and materials under the latter’s company, JNT Aggregates,
with a stipulation that John would pay to him 8% and 4% of the contract price after
John’s first and second billing on the project. Domingo also executed a Deed of
Assignment whereby he assigned to John 10% (equivalent to P233,526.13) of the total
collection from the DPWH for the project, and authorized him to use the official receipts
of Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents for the collection of the 10%
retention fee and encashment of checks.
The Deed of Assignment was submitted to the DPWH on April 15, 1999. When
John was processing the issuance of the check for the payment of the retention fee, he
learned that Domingo had unilaterally rescinded the Deed of Assignment and executed
an affidavit of cancellation of deed of assignment dated April 19, 1999. The
disbursement voucher for the 10% retention fee also showed that it was released to
Domingo. When he failed to collect from Domingo the amount, John then filed an
action against him to collect the 10% retention fee for breach of contract and moral
damages. Domingo admitted the execution of the deed of assignment, but averred that
the project was not fully implemented because it was cancelled by the DPWH; the deed
could not stand alone because it was only a product of the contract he executed with the
DPWH; and John, being fully aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the contract
and the deed of assignment, could not got to court with unclean hands to invoke his
right under the deed or its product.

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC?

HELD: The CA did not err in affirming the RTC.

Civil law : doctrine of pari delicto

Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.1594, which provides: Assignment and Subcontract.

he contractor shall not assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract or make any other
disposition of the contract or any part or interest therein except with the approval of the
Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public
Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the case may be. Approval of the subcontract
shall not relieve the main contractor from any liability or obligation under his contract
with the Government nor shall it create any contractual relation between the
subcontractor and the Government.

45. Geluz vs CA, July 20, 1961

FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present
husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her
parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant.
After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then
employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be
inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than
two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her
sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the
defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in
consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this
time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he
did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and
award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

ISSUE:
Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child?

Held: Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received,
no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a
cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by
its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no
answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato
habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits
such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the
following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.

47. Continental Steel v. Montaño, G.R. NO. 182836 , Oct.13, 2009 603 SCRA
621

Facts: In January 2006, the wife of Rolando Hortillano had a miscarriage which caused
the death of their unborn child. Hortillano, in accordance with the collective bargaining
agreement, then filed death benefits claim from his employer, the Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation which denied the claim. Eventually, the issue was submitted
for arbitration and both parties agreed to have Atty. Allan Montaño act as the
arbitrator. Montaño ruled that Hortillano is entitled to his claims. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of Montaño.
On appeal, Continental Steel insisted that Hortillano is not entitled because under
the CBA, death benefits are awarded if an employee’s legitimate dependent has died; but
that in this case, no “death” has occurred because the fetus died inside the womb of the
mother, that a fetus has no juridical personality because it was never born pursuant to
Article 40 of the Civil Code which provides a conceived child acquires personality only
when it is born; that the fetus was not born hence it is not a legitimate dependent as
contemplated by the CBA nor did it suffer death as contemplated under civil laws.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the fetus is a legitimate dependent?
2. Whether or not a person has to be born before it could die?
HELD:
1. Yes. In the first place, the fact of marriage between Hortillano and his wife was
never put in question, hence they are presumed to be married. Second,
childrenconceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate. Hence,
the unborn child (fetus) is already a legitimate dependent the moment it was conceived
(meeting of the sperm and egg cell).
2. No. Death is defined as “cessation of life”. Certainly, a child in the womb has life.
There is no need to discuss whether or not the unborn child acquired juridical personality
– that is not the issue here. But nevertheless, life should not be equated to civil
personality. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may
be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have
acquired juridical personality could die. In this case, Hortillano’s fetus had had life
inside the womb as evidenced by the fact that it clung to life for 38 weeks before the
unfortunate miscarriage. Thus, death occurred on a dependent hence Hortillano as an
employee is entitled to death benefit claims as provided for in their CBA.

55.) People Vs. Borromeo 133 SCRA 106

Facts: At high noon on July 3, 1981, the four year old niece of Susana & Elias Borromeo
told Matilde Taborada (mother of Susana) that Susana was screaming because Elias was
killing her. Taborada told her to inform her son, Geronimo Taborada. Geronimo, in
turn, told his father and together, they went to Susana’s hut. There they found Susana’s
lifeless body next to her crying infant and Elias mumbling incoherently still with the
weapon in his hands. The accused-appellant, Elias, said that because they were legally
and validly married, he should only be liable for “homicide” and not “parricide”. He
thinks such because there was no marriage contract issued on their wedding day and
after that. However, in his testimony, he admitted that the victim was his wife and that
they were married in a chapel by a priest.

Issue: Does the non-execution of a marriage contract render a marriage void?

Held: In the view of the law, a couple living together with the image of being married,
are presumed married unless proven otherwise. This is attributed to the common order
of society. Furthermore, the validity of a marriage resides on the fulfillment or presence
of the requisites of the marriage which are : legal capacity and consent. The absence of
the record of such marriage does not invalidate the same as long as the celebration and
all requisites are present.

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in constant violation of decency and law.
(Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216). And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage
exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the
celebration thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of
the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4
SCRA 849). The appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the indemnity increased from
12,000 to 30,000

67.) Borja-Manzano vs. Sanchez

AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 200

FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been
married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four
children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with
Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that
both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to know that
the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for
seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and
had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who
both have an existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for
5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.

HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to
marry each other. Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated
in their marriage contract that they are both “separated” is an impediment that would
make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe the tie of a
subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

68.) NIÑAL vs. BAYADOG (328 SCRA 122)

Ninal vs Bayadog 328 SCRA 122, March 14,2000
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3
children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by
Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog
got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they
had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of
Pepito’s marriage after his death?
HELD: The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license.
They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved
to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit,
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma
had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights.
It can be questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested
party may attack a void marriage

117.) Republic vs. Tango (G.R. No. 161062)

In 1987, Ferventino Tango, respondent, and Maria Jose Villarba were married in
civil rites. Tango and Villarba had only spent a night together and had been intimate once
when Villarba told Ferventino that she and her family will soon be leaving for the USA.
Villarba assured Tango that the former will file a petition so that the latter can live with
her in the USA and in the event that the petition is denied, Villarba promised to return to
the Philippines to live with Tango. Thereafter, Villarba and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
Tango and Villarba kept in touch for a year before Villarba stopped responding to Tango’s
letters. Tango had inquired from Villarba’s uncle of Villarba’s whereabouts but it turned
out that even the latter’s relatives had no idea. Tango solicited the assistance of a friend
in Texas, but to no avail. Finally, Tango sought the aid of his parents in Los Angeles and
his aunt in Seattle, but again, to no avail.

This prompted Tango to file a petition before the RTC for the declaration of
presumptive death of Villarba under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC issued an
Order declaring Villarba presumptively dead. On appeal by the Republic of the
Philippines, the CA affirmed the RTC’s order.

ISSUE:

Whether Tango has established a basis to form a well-founded belief that his absent
spouse is already dead

HELD:

By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding

shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal
can be had of the trial court’s judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes
without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be
filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To
be sure, even if the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

From the decision of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This
is because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely
errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In light of the foregoing, it would be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the

issues raised by petitioner. The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final
on some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice
to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of
the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. None of the exceptions
obtains here to merit the review sought.