Revue Internationale de Philosophie

FREGE'S SENSE AND REFERENCE RELATED TO RUSSELL'S THEORY OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

Author(s): S. O. WELDING
Source: Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 25, No. 97 (3), L'ÉGALITÉ (1971), pp. 389-402
Published by: Revue Internationale de Philosophie
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 VARIÉTÉ

FREGE'S SENSE AND REFERENCE RELATED

TO RUSSELL'S THEORY
OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS

by S. O. WELDING

A discussion about Frege's distinction between the Sense and the

Reference of an expression involves topical questions, since Frege's
argument still prevails in most contributions on expressions desig
nating an object in such a way that it is almost generally assumed,
e.g. by Carnap, Church and Quine, — as opposed to Russell -—
that definite descriptions or descriptive expressions should be con
sidered as names.
I wish to show that Frege's distinction between the Sense and the
Reference of an expression is logically inconsistent. This becomes ob
vious, I think, if Frege's conception of the sense of an expression is in
quired precisely in view of Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions.

If we assert of the bisecting lines of a triangle "the point of inter

section of a and b is the same as the point of intersection of b and c",
we have then, according to Frege, two different designations of the
' '
same point expressed in the point of intersection of a and b and
' '
the point of intersection of b and c (x). The difference between these

(1) On Sense and Reference (for short : SB), p. 26. The translations are taken from :
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of G. Frege, ed. by P. Geach and M. Black,
2ndedn 1960. (I refer to the pagination of the first German edition which is added in the
English translation and in both German editions : G. Frege, Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung.
Fünf logische Studien, hrsg. v. G. Patzig, 3. Aufl. Göttingen 1969 : G. Frege, Kleine Schriften,
hrsg. v. I. Angelelli, Darmstadt, 1967).

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390 S. O. WELDING

expressions (or signs) "corresponds to a difference in the mode of

of that which is designated" — in this case of the
presentation
point in question.
"It is natural, now, to think of there being connected with a sign
(name, combination of words, letter), besides that
sign to which the

refers, whichmay be called the reference of the sign, also what I should
like to call the sense of the sign, wherein the mode of presentation is
contained. In our example, accordingly, the reference of the expres
'
sions 'the point of intersection of a and b and 'the point of intersection
of b and c' would be the same, but not their senses. The reference
of 'evening star' would be the same as that of 'morning star', but
not the sense" (2).

It is important, I think, to note that Frege does not pay attention

to the fact that a proper name — according to common use of
— is or consists in what an '
language object is called ; for, if the
morning star' is merely the name of an object, it would not follow
that the object in question is a star and that it is visible in the morning.
We can only infer this, if'the morning star' is not considered to name
but to describe a single object. Thus, if an expression is said to be a
proper name, we should conclude, that it has no sense or mode
'
of presentation of that which is designated. If, then, the morning
star' and 'the evening star' were names for the same object, it would
not be correct to expound that the difference between
these expres
sions or signs "corresponds a
to difference in the mode of presentation
of that which is designated" ; i.e. we cannot maintain, then, that
both expressions have a different sense. This difficulty about proper
names becomes obvious, as I shall discuss below, since Frege suggests
that every designation of a single object should be simply called a
proper name.

An expression or proper name expresses its sense (3) or has a sense

(i.e. the mode of presentation of that which is designated) and has a

reference (i.e. it refers to the object which is designated by that ex
pression or proper name).

(2) SB, p. 26 f. Obviously, there is a lapsus linguae in Frege's argument : he actually

speaks here about 'the evening star' and 'the morning star', since 'evening star', etc.,
would designate, according to Frege, a concept and not an object.

(3) SB, p. 31 : see below.

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 frege's sense and reference 391

"The regular connexion between a sign, its sense, and its reference
is of such a kind that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and
to that in turn a definite reference, while to a given reference (an object)
there does not belong only a single sign" (4).

Thus, Frege seems to think that this correspondence holds for any
sign or expression designating one object. This view, however, is
not made explicit, since Frege asserts, on the one hand, that "The sen
se of a proper name is grasped by everybody, who is sufficiently fami
liar with the language or totality of designations to which it (seil,
"
the sense of the proper name in question) belongs. and he explaines,
on the other hand, that

"In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions

as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the

following : the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great.

Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence "Aris
totle was born in
Stagira" than will a man who takes as the sense of
the name : the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira.
So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense

may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical

structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect

language" (5).

It is surprising how vaguely Frege speaks of the sense of an actual

proper name, viz. that something might be taken as its sense. If we
establish with Frege the sense of 'Aristotle' as : the teacher of Alex
ander the Great who was born in Stagira, then Mr. Margolis is right
in arguing (8) that the statement "Aristotle is the teacher of Alexan
der the Great who was born in Stagira" would become analytic and
could not be different in kind from "Aristotle is Aristotle". It was
indeed decisive for Frege to distinguish between the two statements
"a = a" and "a = b" in such a way that the mode of presentation of
' '
that which is designated by a should be different from that one de
signated by 'b' (7).
I think Frege is mistaken in his view that it is possible to avoid
variations of the sense of an actual proper name, since he should

(4) SB, p. 27.

(5) SB, p. 27 note.

(6) J. Margolis, On Names : Sense and Reference, in : American Philos. Quarterly, Vol. 5

(1968), p. 210.

(7) SB, p. 25 f : cf. Margolis, loc. cit.

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392 S. O. WELDING

have realized that an actual proper name does not express any sense ;
for, if we say that e.g. '2 + 2', '2 X 2' and 'the positive square root
of 16' (8) have the same reference, but that they do not have or ex
press the same sense, we should conclude, then, that the actual
proper name '4', does not express any sense. We might take some
'
thing as the sense of 4 ', but it is by no means clear why it should have
only one sense : its sense could be e.g. 2 + 2, 2 X 2, the positive square
root of 16, etc. Let us suppose that 2 + 2 were the sense of '4',
' '
we should say, then, that the sense of 2 + 2 is (identical with)
the sense of'4'. This amounts to saying that an expression like '2 +
'
2 expresses its sense, which also belongs to an expression that does
not express any sense.

According to Frege's exposition we should conclude that, on the

one hand, there exists a one-one relation between a (descriptive)
expression and its sense, if the sense is expressed by the very ex
pression (9), and that, on the other hand, there exists a one-many
relation between an (indescriptive) expression or actual proper name
and its sense. We could simply say that an expression designating one
object has either one and only one sense or more than one, namely
that one we choose to take (10). Thus, it is evident that an actual
proper name or indescriptive expression should be distinguished
from a descriptive expression, if it is true that both kinds of expres
sions cannot have the same relation to their senses. Since an actual
proper name such as 'Aristotle' or '4' cannot give us any (at least
not any precise) information about the object it refers to, it is not
right then to assume that such a name has a sense which "is grasped
by everybody, who is sufficiently familiar with the language", as it
does not express any sense. Frege is mistaken to claim, as I think
he does, that the difference of a sign or expression designating one

(8) Analogous examples are used by Frege. Cf. Function and Object (FB), p. 14 (transi,
in : Geach and Black) : cf. below.

(9) I neglect here that the same sense can be expressed in natural languages by different
' ' '
expressions. Cf. SB, p. 2 7. (' The murderer of Caesar and that one who murdered Caesar
would be different expressions
which express the same sense).
(10) Although A. Church determines — in accordance with Frege — that an expres
sion expresses its sense, he does not realize any logical difference with regard to (actual)

proper names. (Cf. A. Church, An Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Vol. 1, 2nd edn.,
1956, p. 6).

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 frege's sense and reference 393

object corresponds always to a difference of sense or mode of presen

tation of that which is designated : this is not the case, as we should
observe in "Pierre Loti is Louis Marie Julien Viaud" or "5 = V".
Of course, the right use of an actual proper name presupposes that
the object called by this name could be described definitely. But
from this it does not follow that one of these definite descriptions of
that object could be taken as the sense of this actual proper name.
Frege seems to think only of descriptive expressions, i.e. of ex
pressions which express their senses, and not of actual proper names,
when he displays the sense of an expression e.g.

"It may perhaps be granted that every grammatically well-formed

expression representing a proper name always has a sense" (u).

"A proper name must have at least a sense (as I use that word) ;
otherwise there would be an empty sequence of sounds and it would
not be right to call it a name. For scientific use it should be expected
of a proper name that it has also a reference ; i.e. that it refers to or

designates an object. Thus, it is by mediation of sense, and by this only,

that a proper name refers to an object" (12).

Frege explicitly establishes the following terminology :

"A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) expresses

its sense, stands for or designates its reference. By means of a sign we

express its sense and designate its reference" (ls).

According to Frege it is possible to form an expression like 'the

celestial body most distant from the Earth' or 'the least rapidly con
vergent series' (14), which have a sense, but yet we do not know,
whether the former expression has a reference, whereas we can show

that the latter has none. Frege wants to exclude from science and
logic expressions or proper names that have no reference (15).
Strictly speaking, it is questionable to maintain that the expression
'the least rapidly convergent series' has a sense but no reference, if

(11) p. 28.
SB,
Ausführungen über Sinn und Bedeutung,
(12) in : G. Frege, Nachgelassene Schriften, be
arbeitet, eingeleitet usw. v. H. Hermes u.a., Bd. 1, Hamburg 1969, p. 135 (my trans
lation).
(13) SB, p. 31. In this case Black prefers to translate 'bedeutet' not by taking 'refers
to' but 'stands for'.

(14) SB, p. 28.

(15) Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (GG), I, p. 9 note 3 and p. 19 f. Cf. below.

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394 S. O. WELDING

the sense of an expression is said to be the mode of presentation of

that which is designated, since we have to admit that there is not
such a single object which could be designated by this mode of pre
sentation. Frege does not give any further explanation for the cor
respondence between the sense and the reference of the same ex

pression. It is not clear how it could

be possible by mediation of
sense that an expression refers to (or designates) one object. On the
contrary, this question will be even more difficult to answer, when
we take into considerations Frege's distinction between concept
and object.

II

According to Frege
a criterion for a well-formed grammatical
expression designating an object can be found in the singular definite
article which accompanies a concept-word (16). If an indefinite
article or the plural article or one of the words 'all', 'some', 'no'
stands in front of a concept-word, the expression in question desig
nates a concept (17).
Hence Frege determines a concept by its predicative nature (18)
which is more easily recognized, when we express e.g. the sentence
"all mammals have red blood" in "whatever is a mammal has red
blood" or in "if anything is a mammal, it has red blood".

"We say in brief, taking

may 'subject' and 'predicate' in the gramma
tical : A concept
sense is the reference of a predicate ; an object is

something that can never be the whole reference of a predicate, but

can be the reference of a subject" (19).

Since the predicative use of a concept-word (expression) is conclu

sive to the effect that this expression designates a concept, Frege

(16) On Concept and Object (BG), p. 195, in : The Transi., ed. by Geach and Black. Cf.
Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Gdl.), § 51 (transi, by J. L. Austin, 2nd edn. 1953). Exceptions
to this rule are for instance : "the horse is a
four-legged animal" and "the Turk besieged
Vienna". Vide BG, p. 196.

(17) Gdl., § 51 and BG, p. 198.

(18) The predicative nature of a concept is explained as a (propositional-) function
with one argument. A function is (per def.) in need of supplementation. Cf. FB, p. 6
and p. 14-17 transi, in op. cit.

(19) BG, p. 198. I changed 'linguistic' (sprachlich) to 'grammatical'.

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 frege's sense and reference 395

'
feels obliged to suppose "the three words the concept horse'
do designate an object, but on that very account, they do not desig
nate a concept..." (20) and "... the concept horse is not a con
cept" (21). Frege thinks that we are here confronted by an awkward
ness of language, i.e. language is here in a predicament, since we
would usually say that the city of Berlin is a city or the volcano Vesu
vius is a volcano.
He comments the sentence "the concept man is not empty"
as follows :

"Here the first three words are to beregarded as a proper name;

which can no more be used predicatively than 'Berlin' or 'Vesu
vius'" (22).

Hence, according to Frege, it depends only on the predicative use

of an expression, whether it designates a concept or not. If, then,
an expression is deprived of its predicative use, we should ask : why
have we to infer that this expression designates an object ? What
kind of object is it supposed to be ? Is there any reason for stating
that there is a correspondence between the sense and the reference
of such an expression or proper name ?

According to Frege's we
should analyse the sentence
account,
"the concept round square is empty" as follows : the first
four words are to be regarded as a proper name which designates
an object. It is hard to understand what kind of object could be
designated by this expression. We should take into consideration
that we express "the same thought" in the sentence "there is no
round square" and in "the concept round square is empty".

"In the sentence "there is at least one square root of 4" we have an

assertion, not about (say) the definite number 2 nor about -2, but about
a concept, square root of 4 ; viz. that it is not empty. But if
I express the same thought thus : "The concept square root

He thinks that
(20) BG, p. 196. In later life Frege denies this strange conclusion.

we are misled by the use of the definite singular article to the effect that we believe that
such an expression is a proper name for an object. (Cf. Nachgelassene Schriften, p. 257,
288 f : 1914 or 1924/25, resp.). Frege does not refer to any explanation suggested by
Russell in his theory of definite descriptions.
(21) BG, p. 196 f.

(22) BG, p. 197.

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396 S. O. WELDING

of 4 is realized", then the first six words form the proper name of an

object, and it is about this object that something is asserted" (23).

It is not clear at all how "the same thought", i.e. how existence
(or non-existence) could be asserted in both sentences, i.e. of a con
cept and an object as well (24), particularly when we take into account
that Frege regards existence (or non-existence) as a property of a
concept (25). His explanation remains unsatisfactory that "there
is Julius Caesar" is senseless, i.e. neither true nor false, whereas
"Julius Caesar is realized" has a sense but is false ;
"for the assertion that something is realized (as the word is being
taken here) can be truly made only about a quite special kind of objects,
viz. such as can be designated by proper names of the form 'the concept
F'" (20).

When we say, however, "concepts such as square root of

4 or man are not empty (are realized) ", then according to Frege,
we should suppose that we make an assertion about concepts, since
' '
concept is used predicatively : this could be expressed more dis
tinctly in the sentence "something is a concept such as square
root of 4 or man and is not empty". But as soon as we are

going to say definitely "the concept square root of 4 [the

concept man, resp.) is not empty (is realized)", Frege maintains
that we do not assert something of a concept but of a (quite special
kind of) object (27). Similar difficulties arise, when we have to analyse
the sentence "the number
2 is a prime number" we assert that an
object falls under a concept. If, however, we say definitely "the
number 2 falls under the concept prime numbe r", Frege feels
obliged to suppose that we assert a relation holding between two ob
' ' '
jects designated by the number 2 and the concept prime num
ber' (28). If this explanation were true, I wonder why this relation

(23) BG, p. 199.

(24) Since the latter is not possible, the ontological argument for the existence of God
breaks down. Vide Gdl., § 53.
(25) Cf. Gdl., § 53.
(26) BG, p. 201.
(27) Frege explains to"there is at least one square root of 4" only in his manuscrit of BG :
"One can even say that there is expressed, then, that our concept falls under a higher
' '
one, of which the only mark would be being realized (in that sense as we use this word
here)". (Vide Nachgelassene Schriften I, p. 118. My transi.).
(28) BG, p. 205.

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 frege's sense and reference 397

can be neither asserted singularly, e.g. in "Vesuvius is a volcano" or

"the number 2 is a prime number" nor generally, e.g. in "an object
falls under a concept". If, finally, this kind of an analysis of a sen
tence were logically correct, Frege's statement would prove wrong :

"If, for example, we collect under a single concept all concepts under
which there falls only one object, then the oneness (die Einzigkeit) is
the mark of this concept" (29).

Since the expression 'the oneness' cannot be used predicatively,

we ought to deny that it designates a mark of a concept, i.e. a concept.
If an expression designates a concept only when used predicatively,
we, then, have to regard the predicative nature of a concept as its
that — like a substantive in
specific quality depends entirely gram
mar — on its precise wording. Hence it should be noticed that it
is not possible to assert definitely of a concept that it falls under a
higher one, since we would not assert this but that there is a relation
between two objects, e.g. in "the concept moon of the Earth
falls under the concept oneness".
If an expression designating a concept is only distinguished from
an expression (proper name) designating an object by its use, we
should conclude, I think, that much of Frege's own exposition of
logic turns out to be incomprehensible.
It would not be right to object that Frege displayed his distinction
between concept and object independently of that between the sense
and the reference of an expression or proper name, because there is,
I think, sufficient evidence for holding that Frege thought both dis
tinctions to be part of a coherent logical theory (30).

Ill

Frege assumes that in the sentence "the concept man is not

empty" we assert something of an object. If this were true, we should
ask, why, then, do we use the singular definite article just in front of

'
(29) Gdl., § 53. I do not agree with Austin's translation from ' then onwards. I wish to
underline the definite article in front of'oneness', even if this sounds somewhat artificial.

(30) SB and are published

BG in quick succession 1892. In SB p. 27. Frege refers

already indefinitely to BG. In BG is referred to SB : p. 195 note, p. 198 n., p. 203. Refe
rence to SB in GG I : p. ix n., p. 7 n. and to BG : p. 3 n., p. 5 n.

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398 S. O. WELDING

'concept' ? Frege explains its use by analysing the sentence "The

number 4 is none other than the result of additively combining 3
and 1":

"The definite article in front of 'result' is here logically justified only

if it is known (1) that there is such a result ; and (2) that there is no
more than one" (31).

Why should we not explain then, accordingly, that the singular

definite article in front of 'concept' is logically justified only if it is

presupposed (1) that there is such a concept ; and (2) that there is no
more than one ? When we assert something of the concept man,
we stress that there is such a concept man and that there is no
more than one, i.e. we are asserting something of exactly one or a
definite concept, as we would do of exactly one object, if we make
a statement about the result in question. It is, therefore, not suffi
cient to refer only to oneness expressed by the singular definite article
in order to suppose that the expression in question is a proper name,
as Frege thinks when he concludes : "In that case the phrase desig
nates an object, and is to be regarded as a proper name" (32). We
should further ask, whether this condition for oneness is applied to
an object, a concept or a relation (S3). The fact that Frege seems to
presuppose that this condition can only be applied to an object,
clearly shows, I think, that Frege did not really analyse what we
actually assert by using such an expression containing the singular de
finite article.
That is why I have to come back to the question : how can we main
tain that there is a correspondence between the sense of an expression
and its reference ? Or again, how does the sense of an expression me
diate its reference ? If we have to regard the sense of an expression as
the mode of presentation of that which is designated, why then,
have we to think that there can only be the presentation of an object,
and not of a concept or of a relation ?
Frege gives a casual explanation which seems to be very in
structive :

(31) BG, p. 204.

(32) BG, Cf. the previous note.

p. 204.
' '
(33) Frege precisely denies this, since the number 2 the concept prime number,
' '
and the relation of an object to the concept it falls under are regarded as proper names of
an object. Cf. BG, p. 205.

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 frege's sense and reference 399

"Instead of 'the square root of 4 which is smaller than 0' one can
also say 'the negative square root of 4'. We have here the case of a

compound proper name constructed from the expression for a concept

with the help of the singular definite article. This is at any rate permis
sible if one and only one object falls under the concept" (M).

Thus
Frege says that the singular definite article refers to one and
only one object, which exclusively falls under the concept in question.
We assert, for instance, only of one object that it falls under the con
cept negative square root of 4; i.e. for one and only
one x, x is a negative square root of 4.
Frege remarks additionally in an annotation :

"In accordance with what was said

above, strictly speaking (eigent
lich) such an expression must always be assured of reference, by means
of a special stipulation, e.g. by the convention that the number O
should be taken as its reference, when no object or more than one falls
under the concept" (S6).

Since, there is more than one object falling under the

accordingly,
concept square root
of 4, we should say that the expression
'the square root of 4' has as its reference the number 0,
i.e. there is not one and only one object which is a square root of 4.
Following this stipulation Frege should have defined the sense of
an expression as the mode of presentation of that which is said to be
designated. This would have been the decisive advance to Russell's
Theory of definite Descriptions.
There
is no doubt, however, that Frege suggests here merely a hy
pothesis which
seems to be concerned only with a certain kind of
expressions. I think we are justified in supposing that Frege was not
aware of the fundamental
importance of analysing an expression in
this way. Let us, for a moment, assume that Frege was aware of it,
then there would not arise any difficulty in explaining the difference
of "there is at least one negative square root of 4" and "there is the
negative square root of 4", since Frege would maintain that we assert
in the former sentence the existence of the concept negative
square root of 4 (i.e. that at least one object falls under this

(34) SB, p. 41. I slightly changed Black's translation ' '

following after if... In German :
"..., wenn ein Gegenstand und nur ein einziger unter den
Begriff fällt".
(35) SB, p. 42 n. This translation differs slightly from Black's version.

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400 S. O. WELDING

concept) and that we would assert in the latter sentence the existence
of the object designated by 'the negative square root of 4'. Now,
however, we should say that we state in the former sentence that at

least one object, and in the latter that one and only one object falls
under the concept negative square root of 4. In a
general way Frege could have concluded, then, that in most expres
sions of the form 'the so-and-so' there is one (or more than one)
predicate asserted
of one object, i.e. that such an expression contains
a definite description of one object. But it would not follow from this
that we are describing an object in every expression of this form, as
we obviously would not do so when applying expressions such as
'the concept m a n' or generally 'the concept F\ On the contrary,
we should say that we refer definitely to one concept e.g. called
'man' as we refer to one object called 'Vesuvius' when asserting
something of Vesuvius or the object Vesuvius.
If Frege had taken his convention concerning the reference O
seriously, he could not have avoided, I think, analysing the actual
use of expressions such as 'the least rapidly convergent series', 'the
' ' '
positive square root of 2 or (say) the present King of France when
occuring in a sentence. It is precisely this problem which Russell
tried to solve in his famous Theory (36).
If we presuppose, on the other hand, in accordance with Frege
that an expression has a reference only if it designates one and only
one object, this supposition could only be logically consistent with
regard to Frege's conception of the sense of an expression, if he had
analysed the sense of an expression precisely, i.e. in correspondence
with Russell's analysis.
Frege shows clearly, why the expressions 'the square root of 2'
' '
and the positive square root of 2 fail to have a reference :

"Here there is a logical danger. For if we wanted to form from the

' '
words 'square root of 2 the proper name 'the square root of 2 we
should commit a logical error, because this proper name, in the ab
sence of further stipulation, would be ambiguous *, hence even devoid
of reference.

(3G) Russell disagrees in this point with Frege, since Russell objects that difficulties
would arise, when the reference of an expression were absent. Vide On Denoting, Mind,
Vol. XIV (1905), p. 483.
*
(Frege's note) I am taking for granted here that there exist negative and irra
tional numbers.

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 frege's sense and reference 401

If there were no irrational numbers — as has indeed been maintained

— '
then even theproper name 'thepositive square root of 2 would
be without a reference, at least by the straightforward sense of the words

(dem unmittelbaren Wortsinn nach), without special stipulation. And

if we were to give this proper name a reference expressly, the object
referred to would have no connection with the formation of the name,
and we should not be entitled to infer that it was a positive square root of

2, while yet we should be only too inclined to conclude just that" (").

I think that Frege does not realize that he is analysing here the sense
of the expressions 'the square root of 2' and 'the positive square
root of 2', in spite of the fact that he gives a correct explanation why
these expressions do not have a reference. Although Frege refers
' '
several times to On Sense and Reference it is surprising that he does
not discuss the question or mode of presentation
how the sense of
that which is designated be expressed in expressions such as
should
'the concept prime number'or 'the relation of an object to
the concept it falls under', etc. For, then, Frege would have verified
that there does not exist such a mode of presentation of an object at
all, as well as he is capable of verifying that the expression e.g.
' '
the positive square root of 2 cannot have a reference by analysing
the sense of this expression.
If, additionnally, Frege had denied that actual proper names such
as 'Aristotle' or '4' have a sense, since they express none, then Frege
would be obviously right to maintain that there is a definite corres
pondence between the sense
expression and its reference :
of an
an expression would have a sense and — eo ipso — a reference, only
if the sense of this expression consists of a definite description of one
(and only one) object. This view would, then, be only different from
Russell's in his analysis of sentences containing expressions without
reference (or with the reference O).
The essential mistake of Frege's conception of the sense and the
reference of an expression can be reduced to his deficient analysis of
the sense of an expression, since Frege employs — at least implicitly
— two
logically inconsistent criteria for holding that an expression
designates an object : It depends either on the sense or the mode of

(37) GG I, p. 19 f. (v. G. Frege, The Basic Laws of Arithmetic, transi, and ed. by M.

Furth, 1964, p. 50. I only changed 'denotation' (Bedeutung) and 'denotes' in 'reference'
and 'référés to', resp.). The German quotation is my addition.

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402 S. O. WELDING

presentation of that which is designated (and this seems always to be

an object) or on the impredicative use of an expression. Since the
use of an expression does not determine its designation (i.e. whether
it designates a concept or an object), we should rely on the former
criterion, which does not imply in all cases that such an expression
contains a definite description of an object and not (say) of a concept.
The consequences of this deficient analysis of the sense expressed
by a proper name or an expression are obvious : Frege neither can
clarify the correspondence between the sense of an expression and its
reference, nor can be avoid the adoption or postulation of objects
such as the concept man and, presumably, the concept round
square, etc.

It should be realized that the root of this doubtful view on objects

is this that Frege fails to give a logically consistent interpretation of
the singular definite article. This may explain, after all, why Frege
is not aware of the decisive difference between indescriptive expres
sions (names) and descriptive expressions. It is clear, then, I think,
that Frege was in the position that he could not give a logically
consistent analysis of the sense of an expression. Thus, it is easy to
understand that the logically correct interpretation of the definite
singular article is the most important point in Russell's Theory of defi
nite Descriptions.

University of Göttingen.

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