1

RUSSIA IN SYRIA: TACTICAL MASTERSTROKE, STRATEGIC RISK

Since early September, Russia has been bolstering its military presence in Syria, moving beyond supporting regime
forces and playing an increasingly direct combat role. On September 30, Russian aircraft began attacking rebel
positions, primarily those of anti-government forces but also elements of ISIS. The move caught the West by surprise,
has encouraged the regime and has forced Washington to accept Moscow’s role in Syria. However, it also raises the risk
of escalation or humiliation – or both – and locks Russia into this volatile and dangerous region.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS
The timing of the Russian move is hardly coincidental, but instead reflects and indicates the strategic imperatives behind
it:

• Fighting ISIS: The professed reason for the deployment of Russian forces is not entirely false, although it is the
least important as far as Moscow’s motivations are concerned. Initially, Russia regarded the rise of ISIS as a boon,
both because it distracted Washington and drew out militants from the northern Caucasus. Now, though, it is
becoming alarmed at its continued rise and the prospect of fighters returning home (some to Russia) with new
experience and allies from the wider jihadist movement. This is therefore seen as an opportunity to strike at the
militants safely away from Russian territory.

• Balancing Tehran: Iran and Russia are allies of convenience against ISIS, yet Moscow considers Tehran a regional
rival. Russia works through the regular Syrian military while the Iranians have created a parallel militia force,
supported by their Hezbollah proxies. This means that if the regime falls, Moscow is left without a foothold in
Syria – but Tehran retains an independent military presence.

• Supporting Assad: The immediate trigger for this intervention was a series of military setbacks that left Moscow
concerned that the regime could break on the battlefield or fragment at home. Russia’s move in Syria is not
expected to radically alter the balance of power on the ground, but rather to stop the buildup of momentum
against Assad and provide breathing space for his forces to regroup, rearm and reconsolidate.

• Breaking the Diplomatic Deadlock: The primary driver has, ironically enough, nothing to do with Syria. Rather,
Putin saw injecting himself into the Syrian question in a way Washington could not ignore – just before he made a
rare trip to the United Nations – as a way of forcing the West to deal with him. Whether it considers him a potential
ally against ISIS, or a potential spoiler to be placated, the hope is to parlay this into some relaxation of sanctions
or latitude over Ukraine.

ABOUT US
Wikistrat is the world’s first crowdsourced consultancy. It leverages a global network of subject-matter experts
via a patent-pending “Collaborative Competition” methodology to provide a variety of analytic services. Scenario
generation, policy planning, risk assessment and red-teaming exercises are conducted by Wikistrat on a real-
time, interactive online platform.
 2

NEXT STEPS
Considering the multi-vector motivation behind Moscow’s adventure, it will have to balance a series of priorities:

• Maintain the tempo of attacks. Putin needs to demonstrate that this is not a brief demonstration of capability
and by extension that the West cannot simply hope to wait him out.

• Help rebuild the Syrian military. Moscow does not wish to attempt to fight this war on the ground – it would be
all but impossible for it to deploy a substantial expeditionary force in any case – and so it is going to strengthen
the regime’s army as much as it can with both new weapons and training.

• Extend intelligence and planning support. As part of the process, Russian intelligence support will be stepped
up as drones, aerial reconnaissance and satellite imagery supplement the signals interception also being provided.
Russian officers are also playing a greater role within the Syrian Defense Ministry and general staff.

• Consolidate political authority in Damascus. The more the Russians are integrated into the Syrian planning
and command structures, the more power they acquire. This is not just an essential response to having allowed
Tehran virtually free reign to dominate Damascus in recent years – it also opens up strategic options if it begins to
appear that the West might be willing to contemplate a grand bargain.

• Explore options for a post-Assad Syria. While loudly proclaiming their support for Assad, there is a sense in
Moscow that he badly misplayed his hand and may be a lost cause. Moscow will seek to develop options that
would allow him a safe exit – perhaps to exile in Russia – and to let a new leadership emerge that is similarly close
to Moscow yet able to make overtures to some rebels and the West.

• Deny Syria to the West as much as possible. Russia seeks not only to maximize its own options in Syria, but to
minimize those of the West – not least to reinforce the point that Moscow needs to be involved in any strategic
discussions about the region’s future. The continued influx of advanced surface-to-air systems and presence of
Su-30 interceptor jets, as well as an upgrade for Syrian air defense radars, are part of an anti-access/area denial
effort intended to prevent the West from enforcing a no-fly zone or striking targets close to (or in) government
centers.

RISKS FOR MOSCOW

Russian spokespeople have said that they anticipate their operation taking “several months,” but so far there has been
no hint of a clear exit strategy beyond complete victory over all rebel forces – something that is vanishingly improbable.
While the aim is to provide a period of respite for the Assad regime, it is unlikely that Russian forces will substantively
change the situation on the ground. Furthermore, serious potential risks abound:

• Russia Targeted: So far, ISIS has regarded Russia as a less serious enemy than the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies.
That may now change, leading to a resurgence of terrorist attacks inside Russia, given the number of northern
Caucasus insurgent groups now professing their allegiance to ISIS leader Al-Baghdadi.

• Stuff Happens: All wars are unpredictable – and multi-sided civil wars all the more so. There will be inevitable
setbacks for the Russians – e.g., the rebels may begin to acquire and deploy anti-air systems, or there could be
suicide bomb attacks on their bases in Tartus and Latakia. In such circumstances, will Moscow be able to maintain
its current commitment, withdraw or feel forced to escalate – thus running the risk of becoming mired in this
conflict? Perversely, unexpected successes will also pose a sudden challenge to Moscow’s will and strategy.

• Damascus Fragments: The Assad regime remains brittle. Major defections or desertions, or open rifts within the
Alawite elite, could easily send it into a spiral of fragmentation and recrimination. In those circumstances, will
Moscow back an alternative to Assad who may have a better chance of recovering the regime’s coherence? Or will
it feel forced to deploy ground troops to try and force a reconstitution of the regime?

Commercial in Confidence
Copyright © 2015, Wikistrat Inc.
All Rights Reserved. Patent Pending.
 3

OPTIONS FOR WASHINGTON

The White House was clearly surprised and irked by Putin’s move. It has reluctantly come to realize that it has neither
the practical levers nor moral authority to force Russia to withdraw, and thus faces uncomfortable choices:

• Quiet Cooperation: Although it falls short of Putin’s ambitions, there is scope for the kind of informal cooperation
enjoyed with Iran against ISIS in Iraq, not least in military deconfliction. This does in effect sanction Russia’s
intervention, but essentially does nothing more than recognize the facts on the ground and offers no rewards to
Russia for its coup de main.

• Make A Deal: Putin is clearly looking for a wider political arrangement; he might well be willing to back away
from his support for Assad in return for concessions over Ukraine. However, this would be ruinous for Washington
in terms of international and domestic credibility.

• Bind and Bleed. The temptation must be to allow Putin to overreach and become mired in Syria – not least
because the more effort committed there, the less available for his parallel Ukrainian adventure. However, given
that his priority is supporting Assad and not fighting ISIS, the outcome would also be to extend the duration of the
war and increase the polarization between ISIS and Damascus – a polarization which is squeezing out the other,
so-called “moderate” rebel forces. It also grants Putin the initiative in the region.
 4

DISCLAIMER
This report is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial, investment, economic, financial planning, trading or any other advice. You should
consult with a competent independent financial advisor before making any investment or other decisions and should independently verify information on which
you rely. The report is provided without any express or implied warranty of any kind including warranties of accuracy, completeness, or fitness for any particular
purpose. Without limitation, although we have prepared this report based on sources we believe to be reliable, legally derived, and unbiased, we can provide no
assurance with respect to the objectivity or any other aspect of its content. In addition and without limitation, this report may contain predictions, estimates or other
information that might be considered forward-looking or predictive. Such statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ
materially. We assume no obligation to update the report or any part thereof or to correct any inaccurate or outdated information and reserve the right to remove
or modify the report, in each case without notice to you or any other party. Without limitation, this report is subject to the Terms of Service posted on our internet
website at www.wikistrat.com.

ATTRIBUTIONS
[cover] This work, “cover”, is a derivative of “Bashar al-Assad” by Fabio Rodrigues Pozzebom, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Brazil license;
“Syrian people” by Beshr O, licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license; “Azaz, Syria” by Christiaan Triebert, licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license; “Vladimir Putin - 2006” by Russian Presidential Press and Information Office, released into the public domain.

Commercial in Confidence
Copyright © 2015, Wikistrat Inc.
All Rights Reserved. Patent Pending.