LICEO DE CAGAYAN UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

GROUP FINAL OUTPUT

SYMPOSIUM ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNEMNT SSYTEMS AS

EXPERIENCED BY SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE ASEAN REGION

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE SUBJECT

STATES, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY (MMPM 180)

SUBMITTED TO:

DR. ERNESTO O. ILAGO

PROFESSOR
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROGRAM

SAMPLE CERTIFICATE

REPORTS

GROUP 1: HONG KONG

GROUP 2: SINGAPORE

GROUP 3: TAIWAN

GROUP 4: SOUTH KOREA

GROUP 5: INDONESIA

DOCUMENTATIONS
 SYMPOSIUM ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNEMNT SSYTEMS AS EXPERIENCED
BY SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE ASEAN REGION

August 12, 2018

9:00 A.M. – 3:00 P.M.
Liceo de Cagayan University

PROGRAME

PART I: PRELIMINNARIES
Arrival and Registration

PART II: PROGRAM PROPER

Prayer:

National Anthem: Video Presentation

Opening Message: Dr. Ernesto A. Ilago

Sequence/Presentation Proper:
GROUP 1: HONG KONG
 ABADAY, VIXTER
 MILVAR, AMELIA
 VILLANUEVA, RYAN CLOYD

GROUP 2: SINGAPORE
 APARECIO, HANNAH RHEA
 LONCION-BATISTIL, MADELONE
 MANACPO, REINA
 MINGUS, MARJORIE

GROUP 3: TAIWAN
 LLOREN, ARMI MURIEL
 MAGASILANG, CARDAWI
 MORGA, PAULA MAE
 SYPIECCO, MARIA LOURDES

GROUP 4: SOUTH KOREA

 BURDEOS, ZAIRA
 CATIPAY, JOENENA
 PADAYHAG, JUNE PAUL
 RANQUE, MARY JOAN

GROUP 5: INDONESIA
 BARRA, JACLAINE LENNOR
 GATINAO, ANNA LOREN
 GO, NEIL WILLIAM
 LANGI, JAMAISA
Distribution of Certificates
Pictorials
 Liceo de Cagayan University
School of Graduate Studies
Rodolfo N. Pelaez Blvd.,
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City

Presents this

CERTIFICATE OF
RECOGNITION

to

For the invaluable service, support, cooperation and dedication as Presenter and
Resource Person during the Symposium on Special Problems of
Government Systems as Experienced by Selected Countries in the Asean
Region” in partial fulfillment for the requirements of the subject States,
Government and Society (MMPM 180), First Trimester, SY 2018

Given this 12th day of August 2018 at School of Graduates, Lieo de Cagayan
University, R.N. Pelaez Blvd., Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines.

Ernesto O. Ilago, D.M. Dr. Chona V. Palomares, D.M. RN

Professor Dean, School of Graduate Studies
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS OF HONG KONG

BY GROUP I

Abaday, Vixter
Milvar, Amelia
Villanueva, Ryan Cloyd
Brief History
Modern-day Hong Kong is best known for its sprawl of skyscrapers, a bustling financial
hub off the southern coast of mainland China and a regional conduit for trade. But the
territory was once a quiet backwater of rural hamlets and fishing communities, where
mountainous terrain dominated sparse human settlement. (hongkongfp.com, 2017)
Cited on the article from Hong Kong Free Press (2007), remnants of the early settlers in
Hong Kong reveals the life existence as far back as the Stone Age. In the year 206 BC
and 220 AD, it has thought that Hong Kong was part of the Chinese Empire under the
Han dynasty which sooner results to the migration and growth of the settlers of the Han
Chinese in Hong Kong. Along with the Han Chinese settlers are the boat-dweller
communities which was thought to be originated from southern China.

The economic condition of Hong Kong can be described as booming understanding that
it is part of China. Its business from the harbor makes the island as progressive since it
serves as a silk road to Asia, Africa and Middle East. It is said to be that the business on
the market is rich on food, textile, silk and spices to plants. (AMBergh Education, 1998)
Attracting western countries, the business industry gets more progressive until in the
year 1840, Hong Kong was been attacked by Britain and reached Beijing, China
threatening the entire country, resulting to launch the First Opium War. (The Economist
Newspaper Limited , 1997)
To make resolution and peace agreements with the British colonizers, China ceded
Hong Kong to Britain resulting to be a colony for 99 years. (The Economist Newspaper
Limited , 1997)
In the year 1967, social movements and political agenda were voiced out by the people
having the advocacy of “Anti-Colonial” to the British government in Hong Kong. In due
time, due to the expiration of the agreement, Hong Kong was then handed back to China
but with great influenced from the British colony which results to the dismay and dislike
of the Chinese people. (BBC, 2018)
By the time it was handed back to China, the city of Hong Kong had partially elected its
government officials and retained an independent judiciary which until this time is still
being practiced. (BBC, 2018)
As a result, Hong Kong is now experiencing political reforms and social movements
because of the negative impact of declining people from their right to suffrage since
democracy is being practiced in the city. (BBC, 2018)
PROBLEMS IN HONG KONG
Written on the online article from The New York Times Company (2017) by Keith
Bradsher, when Hong Kong returned to Chinese rule two decades ago, the city was
seen as a model of what China might one day become: prosperous, modern,
international, with the broad protections of the rule of law.

Moreover, there was anxiety about how such a place could survive in authoritarian
China. But even after Beijing began encroaching on this former British colony’s
freedoms, its reputation as one of the best-managed cities in Asia endured.

The trains ran on time. Crime and taxes were low. The skyline dazzled with ever taller
buildings.

Those are still true. Yet as the 20th anniversary of the handover approaches, the
perception of Hong Kong as something special — a vibrant crossroads of East and West
that China may want to emulate — is fading fast. (Keith Bradsher, 2017)
Hong Kong has no social problems, only political problems. Or to be more accurate,
Hong Kong has no social problems that cannot be solved, only political problems that
are too hot to handle. (Perry Lam, 2015)

According to Jeffie Lam of the South China Morning Posts Publishers Ltd. (2017), he
reveal a statistical data the satisfactory rate of the people on Hong Kong’s political
situation. As far as the data is concerned, people are more disgruntled with the city’s
political situation than ever, according to a University of Hong Kong survey, with the
young and more educated most unhappy.

In the latest study by the university’s public opinion program between December 19 and
December 22, the overall dissatisfaction rate hit 69 per cent, up one point from June,
and the highest since the survey was first conducted in 1992. Only one in 10 people said
they were satisfied.

The dissatisfaction rating hit 80 per cent among respondents aged 18 to 29, compared
with 65 per cent for those aged 50 or above.

The survey found that Hongkongers’ net satisfaction – the difference between the
satisfaction rate and dissatisfaction rate – on livelihood, economic and political
conditions all continued to be negative.

They were most unhappy with the political atmosphere as the survey recorded a minus
59 per cent net satisfaction rate.

According to Hong Kong University's Public Opinion Program (HKUPOP), Lam is

entering the job with a comparatively strong rating of 54.0 -- higher than Leung when he
got the role -- but she faces a series of major political problems that repeatedly
bedeviled her predecessors. (James Griffiths & Kristie Lu Stout, CNN, 2017)

Carrie Lam, the new chief executive of Hong Kong faces challenges as she follows the
offcuts of the previous administration. As she took the office, to name a few, these are
the problems which she need to resolve: chronic housing shortages, growing income
inequality, resistance to major infrastructure projects, and increased economic
competition from mainland cities, and failures on the educational system of the city.
(Maeve Whelan-Wuest & Richard C. Bush, 2017)

As a focused on this paper, this will only highlight the problem on the educational system
of Hong Kong. According to The New York Times Company, the city experiences more
on test-based assessment leaving students ill equipped and incompetent to compete
against those students in the mainland China. Until now, it haven’t experiences any
education reform. (Keith Bradsher, 2017)

PROBLEM ON THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

According to Hong Kong Economic Journal Company Ltd., in the latest Global
Competitive Report published by the World Economic Forum, Hong Kong ranked No. 7
among the 140 economies assessed. You may say Hong Kong has done a good job in
the highly competitive global marketplace. Yet, there is a lot to learn from the top-ranked
countries, such as Switzerland and Singapore. (Paul Baile, 2015)It is also critical for us
to perform a self-assessment and identify key problem areas. Among them, the
education system is one of the key areas that deserve a deeper examination. Despite
the fact that Hong Kong has a high secondary school enrollment rate (99.3 percent), its
enrollment rate for tertiary education only ranked 30th. The city scored 4.8 for the quality
of its education system, 20th out of the 140 economies. (Paul Baile, 2015)

The outcomes of the education system were reflected in the scores for several other
aspects. Innovativeness, for instance, is an area where Hong Kong is not performing.
Ethical behavior of firms and technological readiness were also areas of concern. (Paul
Baile, 2015)

Encrypted from the article of The New York Times Company, Bradsher (2017) explained
that big international companies and banks now aggressively recruit mainland Chinese
instead of local residents, who speak Cantonese instead of the Mandarin used on the
mainland and who often lack the connections to win deals and thrive there.

The language issue is a challenge for Hong Kong’s education system, which tries to
teach three of them — English, as well as Mandarin and Cantonese. This produces
many graduates with weaker English and Mandarin than those from the mainland’s top
schools. (Keith Bradsher, 2017)

But efforts to address the problem get caught in the city’s fractious politics, with
suspicions that Beijing wants to undermine local identity or limit the West’s influence.

At the same time, the government has resisted proposals to ease the culture of high-
pressure testing, a source of much public dissatisfaction. Instead, it tried to introduce
“patriotic” material into the curriculum, appeasing Beijing while angering parents and
students. (Keith Bradsher, 2017)

Mentioned from the discussion from the thoughts of people towards the learners from
Hong Kong, reflects that the government must intervene on such problem and address it
to ease up the status and could level-up in the condition of the society otherwise could
help in resolving other problems in Hong Kong. As the common notion says adopted by
the common people, “education is the key to success”.

Reiterating a statement from the discussion, the government resisted proposals to ease
the culture of high-pressure testing. This concern was being addressed by the
government because of the reason that their educational system makes the testing
assessment as their focus of development rather than developing the competencies and
the skills of the students.

As Paule Baile (2015) expresses his opinion, too much testing, not enough practical
experience.
The design of our education system lacks a solid philosophical foundation. In fact,
strategies and tactics seem to have built upon technical aspects.

The concern seems to be what has to be included in the curriculum rather than why it is
being considered for inclusion in the first place.

There is no clear indication of the expected learning outcomes for each grade in school,
and content is not aligned. (Hong Kong Economic Journal Comp. Ltd., 2015)
Moreover, Jaw Ji (2017) enumerated some of the strengths and weakness of the
educational system in Hong Kong. Below are the list:

Strengths
 Highly qualified teachers.
 Strong focus on English language.
 Strong focus on STEM subjects.
 Usually conveniently located.
 Good extracurricular activites.
 Large access to private tutors.

Weaknesses
 Those who can't speak Cantonese are often left behind unless they can
afford expensive international schools.
 Incredibly expensive.
 Very grade focused approach.
 High suicide rate.
 Students are expected to have extra tuition.
 Lack of space for sports and recreation.
 Very poor history, geography and religious studies (most Hong Kong people
would struggle to compare Islam and Hinduism or name one city in Africa).
 Big gap between private and state schools.
 Don't teach enough practical skills for those wishing to do manual jobs.
 Ugly uniforms.

According to a political consultant and a former associate director of the Asia

Pacific Media Network at UCLA, Alice Wu (2017) says many Hong Kong youngsters
feel depressed and hopeless in large part due to the city’s high-pressure, elitist
education system, which classifies students early by test scores and leaves under-
performers to languish.

Cited from the article in South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd., (2017), every year,
right around the beginning of summer break, a significant portion of the Hong Kong
population engages in an extreme sport called breath-holding – when students waiting
for secondary school placement or Diploma of Secondary Education exam results and
their parents are put through the torture of holding their breath and sleep deprivation.

The decline in mental health among children in Hong Kong, and parents being pushed to
breaking point, have made headlines, but the government has done too little. (Alice Wu,
2017)

Furthermore, the education system does not fully prepare students for the world
outside of school or after graduation, and that world is most definitely not their oyster.
When even university graduates find themselves stuck with limited career options, on
the “slow track” on the job and earning ladders, what happens to those deemed under-
performers from the get-go? Hong Kong is said to have developed a “youth problem”.

If the system doesn’t brand and label the learners at such a tender age, instill social
stigmatization along with the warped values attached to test scores so early on in life,
then perhaps our children would not be suffering the early onset of hopelessness,
frustration and disillusionment.
Most of the people thinks that hard work pays off. They say it’s not about the test scores.
Yet, the educational system Hong Kong is all about a very narrow set of test scores.
They say Hong Kong is a pluralist society, but their elitist education system proves
otherwise. They say young people are supposed to dream, but students barely have
enough time to sleep, let alone dream. The learners are given too much lip service and
not enough of the real tools and opportunities they need for life outside of campuses.
(Alice Wu, 2017)

“Hong Kong’s education system needs more heart and soul ware”

Students are judged by numbers, not by their talents, passions, or character. And yet,
we’re still trying to figure out why our youths have issues with their identity.

It’s not the lack of “Chinese-ness” in the curriculum that is the crux of the problem. No
amount of national education or youth development programs can address the “youth
problem” unless people stop labelling their students, reducing them to mere test-takers
and feeding them institutionalized hypocrisy. (Alice Wu, 2017)

The students aren’t failing the city, people are failing them.

REFORMS AND RESOLUTIONS

Make Other Approaches More Widely Available

It is interesting that there is a sincere market demand from parents for International
Baccalaureate programs or international schools, which place a greater emphasis on
active learning through practical experience rather than testing and spoon feeding.
(Paule Baile, 2015)

These are not the mainstream, for sure, and the supply of spaces for pupils is limited.
And thus, tuition fees have been driven up to a level that families in general cannot
afford.

The current model of education emphasizes homework, memorizing without

comprehending and examinations to stratify “classes of students”. Students are given
too much pressure, which prevents the enjoyment of learning.

While the government is trying to promote lifelong learning, the system is undermining
students’ interest and desire to learn. (Paule Baile, 2015)

The Forgotten Role of Play in Learning

Children are deprived of their right and privilege to play and to socialize with other kids.
Play is often regarded as evil and an unnecessary luxury.

It is not rare for parents to have the impression that playing and having fun will affect
children’s concentration and in turn affect their ability to learn. In reality, play, although it
may seem purposeless, is an important part of children’s growth. (Hong Kong Economic
Journal Comp. Ltd., 2015)

Stacy Barrows of Century City Physical Therapy says neuroscience research has shown
that play is an introduction to exploratory learning. Our adaptive behavior stems from
problem solving in play and in our imaginary world. Taking away the time properly
devoted to play implies the reduction of opportunities to develop the skills critical for
problem solving. (Hong Kong Economic Journal Comp. Ltd., 2015)

A recent report by the American Academy of Pediatrics advises making play a significant
part of a child’s life — to nurture happiness, development, education and parent-child
bonding. (Hong Kong Economic Journal Comp. Ltd., 2015)

Play is so important in child development that it’s been recognized by the United Nations
High Commission for Human Rights as a right of every child.

Education Reform is high on the Political Agenda

Farzana Aslam (2017) says attempts to overhaul the school system still prize the rote
learning that does not equip our children for workplaces of the future

Recent calls for the government to scrap the Territory-wide System Assessment (TSA)
for Primary Three pupils resulted only in a move to replace it with a Basic Competency
Assessment that the government says is much improved. (South China Morning Post
Publishers Ltd., 2017)

However, this fails to address the concerns of many parents and children, and is
misplaced in the context of the rapidly changing nature of work. Continuous assessment
does not foster a love of learning; instead, it motivates through fear of failure. Creative
and critical thinking is stifled in favor of rote learning. The system rewards children who
are good at taking tests, punishing those who are not.

“Continuous assessment does not foster a love of learning;

instead, it motivates through fear of failure”

The cruel irony is that the world of work is changing so rapidly that much of what our
children are being taught in school – delivered by an education system designed
decades ago – will simply be irrelevant when they enter the workforce.

In order to address concerns about the well-being of their children in the local education
system, how students learn needs to become as important as what they learn.

PROBLEM ON INDEPENDENCE
Hong Kong never really gained independence. Hong Kong was first ceded as a crown
colony to the United Kingdom from the Qing Empire in 1841 during the First Opium War.
In 1984 the British and government signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration which
stated that the sovereignty of Hong Kong should be transferred to the PRC on July 1,
1997, and Hong Kong should enjoy a “high degree of autonomy” under the “One
Country, Two Systems Policy” principle.
Under the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the socialist PRC would let Hong Kong’s
previous capitalist system and its way of life would remain unchanged for the period of
50 years or until 2047.
Since 2003, Beijing’s growling encroachment has led Hong Kong to become increasingly
integrated as part of China. Hong Kong’s freedom and core values were perceived to
have been eroded as a result.
Reasons that have been cited in favor of independence cited in favor of
independence include:
Right to self-determination: Hong Kong people have the right to determine their own
future as stated in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Hong Kong
was on the UN list of Non-Self Governing Territories, which are given the right to achieve
independence, before it was taken down on the request of the PRC in 1972.

Lack of legitimacy of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law: Hong
Kong people were barred from the negotiating process over the Sino-British Joint
declaration and most Hon Kong people were also absent from drafting the Hong Kong
Basic Law.

Unrepresentativeness of the Hong Kong Government: The Chief Executive of Hong

Kong is elected by the 1200-member Election Committee which is dominated by Beijing
and does not the general will of the Hong Kong people.

Chinese encroachment on Hong Kong’s autonomy: Chinese government’s growing

encroachment on the Hong Kong’s management on its own political, economic, and
social affairs and failed to deliver free election as promised in The Basic Law.
Hong Kong’s distinct identity: Majority of the people ae Cantonese speakers and write
traditional Chinese and English with heavy influence of western culture.

PROBLEM ON NON UNITY OF HONG KONG DEMOCRATIC REFORM

Public opinion in Hong Kong is divided. Some call for the preservation of Hong
Kong’s current system, while others push for fundamental reforms of the Basic Law.
A poll conducted by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in June 2017 found that
11.4 percent of people supported or strongly supported the idea of an independent
Hong Kong after 2047, but less than 3 percent believed such an outcome would be
possible.

The political system still does not adequately represent the wide array of
perspectives held by the Hong Kong population. The widening generational gap and
mounting economic inequality—Hong Kong has one of the world’s highest levels
of income inequality —have intensified political divisions. Younger generations have
developed political grievances because they feel they are not reaping the benefits of
their city’s wealth and face stiff competition from the influx of mainlanders. The
influence of mainland money also exacerbates the divide between socioeconomic
classes.

Other public opinion surveys indicate that Hong Kong residents are increasingly
dissatisfied with the Hong Kong SAR government, and trust in the Hong Kong and
Beijing governments is warning . Over the years, all chief executives have been
unpopular.
Hong Kong’s legislative body, made up of lawmakers both elected by geographical
constituencies and selected by functional constituencies (representatives from
social, industrial, and commercial sectors), as well as the chief executive’s election
committee, disproportionately prioritize business interests and are generally loyal to
Beijing. The political scene has traditionally been split, dominated by two major
factions: pan-democrats, who call for incremental democratic reforms, and pro-
establishment groups, who are, by and large, pro-business supporters of Beijing.
Pro-establishment forces have typically been more dominant in Hong Kong politics.

Pan-democrats overwhelmingly advocate for the gradual implementation of political

reform and a pragmatic, measured approach to Beijing. Pan-democrats recognize
that Hong Kong cannot force Beijing into reforms that could contradict or undermine
Beijing’s central authority.

RECOMMENDATION

Democratic reforms are more likely to be successful when a change in Hong Kong is
also beneficial to the mainland and to all the constituent. As a result, even Hong
Kong’s more progressive political groups are largely more conservative than the
student protesters who are demanding full-fledged democracy.
The Hong Kong government must reconcile these opposing political forces while
maintaining the city’s stability.

What will happen to Hong Kong after 2047?

In such scenario , Hong Kong will almost certainly be fully integrated into the People’s
Republic of China. It will lose its status as SAR and probably combined with Shenzen,
Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Zhuhai and Macau. Instead of “Hong Kong” outsiders will start
referring it to it more as Chinese do. “Xianggang” or the “Guang-Shen-Gang-Ao”

REFERENCES
AMBergh Education (nd). Information about Hong Kong!. Solna Torg 19, SE-171 45
Stockholm, Solna, Sweden. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
http://www.ambergh.com/learn- chinese/hong-kong/about-hong-kong

Aslam, F. (2017). Hong Kong’s education system is still failing to prepare children for
the future. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. Retrieved August 11, 2018.
Available at
https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/2084395/hong-kongs-
education- system-still-failing-prepare-children

Baile, P. (2015). What is wrong with our education system? Hong Kong Economic
Journal Company Limited. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
http://www.ejinsight.com/20151009-what-is-wrong-with-our-education-system/
BBC. (2018). Hong Kong profile – Timeline. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-16526765

Bradsher, K. (2017). ONCE A MODEL CITY, HONG KONG IS IN TROUBLE. The New
York Times Company. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/world/asia/hong-kong-china-handover.html

Hong Kong Free Press. (2017). A brief history of Hong Kong: From quiet backwater
to modern- day metropolis. Community & Education HKFP History Hong
Kong. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/06/29/brief-history-hong-kong- quiet-
backwater-modern-day-metropolis/

Ji, J. (2017).What are the strengths and weaknesses of Hong Kong's education
system?
Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at https://www.quora.com/What-are-the-
strengths- and-weaknesses-of-Hong-Kongs-education-system

Lam, J. (2017). Dissatisfaction at Hong Kong’s political situation hits record high. South
China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2059002/dissatisfaction-
hong- kongs-political-situation-sinks-new-low

Lam, P. (2015). HONG KONG’S POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARE SIMPLY TOO HOT TO
HANDLE. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. Retrieved August 11, 2018.
Available at https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1892402/hong-
kongs- political-problems-are-simply-too-hot-handle

The Economist Newspaper Limited. (2018). 1898 and all that—a brief history of Hong
Kong. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
https://www.economist.com/special/1997/06/26/1898-and-all-that-a-brief-history-
of- hong-kong

Wuest, M.W. & Bush, R. (2017) Inside the struggle for China’s “two systems” in Hong Kong.
The Brookings Institution. Retrieved August 11, 2018. Available at
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/07/27/inside-the-
struggle-for- chinas-two-systems-in-hong-kong/

Wu, A. (2017). Hong Kong’s ‘youth problem’ is really the failure of its test-focused
education system. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. Retrieved August 11,
2018. Available at https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/2102690/hong-kongs-youth- problem-really-failure-its-test-focused
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS OF SINGAPORE
 BY GROUP 2

Aparecio, Hannah Rhea

Loncion-Batistil, Madelone
Manacpo, Reina
Mingus, Marjorie
 BRIEF BACKGROUND

Spanning 42 kilometers from east to west and 23 kilometers north to

south, Singapore is a small yet densely populated places on the world map. With
almost 4.5 million people living in around 697 sq km, Singapore is a city-state
packed with a great variety of people and culture with a unique form of
government.

I. People
Singaporeans or Singapore people are citizens of the city-state of
Singapore – a multi-racial and multi-cultural country with ethnic Chinese, Indians,
and Malays historically making up the vast majority of the population, hailing from
various ethnic groups of China, India, and the Malay Archipelago.

In 1819, the port of Singapore was established by Sir Stamford Raffles,

who opened the port to free trade and free immigration on the south coast of the
island. Many immigrants from the region settled in Singapore. By 1827, the
population of the island was composed of people from various ethnic groups.

According to the 2006 Asia Barometer survey, a majority of Singaporeans

identify themselves as "Singaporean", while a small percentage prefer to identify
with their racial group. Currently, the population of Singaporeans stands at
3,439,200 and the population of overseas Singaporeans stands at 214,700.

In 2017 survey estimate population is 5,612,300, consists as shown in the

table below:

No. of
Population Population
urban
Region (2010 (2017
planning
Census) estimate)
areas

Central 24 929,082 na

East 6 692,290 na

North 7 504,920 na

North-East 7 747,216 na

West 11 893,739 na

Total resident population - 3,767,247 3,965,800

 Approximate non-resident
– 1,305,000 1,646,500
population

Approximate total population 55 5,076,700 5,612,300

II. Territory
It lies one degree (137 kilometres or 85 miles) north of the equator, at the
southern tip of the Malay Peninsula, with Indonesia's Riau Islands to the south
and Peninsular Malaysia to the north. Singapore's territory consists of one main
island along with 63 other islets.

Figure 1. Map of Singapore

Singapore consists of 63 islands, including the main island, Pulau Ujong.

There are two man-made connections to Johor, Malaysia: the Johor–Singapore
Causeway in the north and the Tuas Second Link in the west. Jurong Island,
Pulau Tekong, Pulau Ubin and Sentosa are the largest of Singapore's smaller
islands. The highest natural point is Bukit Timah Hill at 163.63m (537ft).

Ongoing land reclamation projects have increased Singapore's land area

from 581.5 km2 (224.5 sq mi) in the 1960s to 721.5 km 2 (278.6 sq mi) in 2018, an
increase of some 23% (130 km2). The country is projected to grow to 766
km2(300 sq mi) by 2030. Some projects involve merging smaller islands through
land reclamation to form larger, more functional islands, as has been done with
Jurong Island.

Figure 2. Map of Singapore

III. Government
Singapore is a sovereign republic, after becoming independent from
Malaysia on 9 August 1965. The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore lays
down the fundamental principles and basic framework for the three organs of
state, namely, the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary.

Singapore is a democratic parliamentary republic city state. The head

of state is the non-executive president who is directly elected for a term of six
years. The head of government is the prime minister, who is the leader of the
majority party and is appointed by the president. Cabinet is appointed by the
president on the advice of the prime minister from amongst members of the
unicameral parliament. Parliament consists of 84 popularly elected members
(MPs), elected either from the nine single-member constituencies or the 14 group
representation constituencies. A further six may be nominated to parliament with
speaking rights and voting rights on all resolutions not pertaining to finances or
the constitution. Elections are based on universal suffrage of those over 21 years
of age. Following the 2015 national election, 23.8% of MPs were women.

Figure 3. Three Branches of Government in Singapore

Executive authority of Singapore. The executive authority of Singapore

shall be vested in the President and exercisable subject to the provisions of this
Constitution by him or by the Cabinet or any Minister authorized by the Cabinet.
The Legislature may by law confer executive functions on other persons.

Legislature of Singapore. The legislative power of Singapore shall be

vested in the Legislature which shall consist of the President and Parliament.

The judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and

in such subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time
being in force.

The Elected President. The President is the head of state of Singapore

and is elected for a six-year term.

The Elected Presidency was introduced in 1991. It effectively expanded

the role of the President from being merely ceremonial in nature, to one that
gives the President some custodial and discretionary powers. This means that
the President has actual powers. In practice however, the Cabinet has general
control over the Government and its policies. The President also has to exercise
his powers in accordance with the advice of Cabinet or a minister acting under
the Cabinet’s general authority.

The President acts as a custodian or “second key” over Singapore’s rich

financial reserves built up by the Government. He has the power to block
attempts by the Government to draw down on past reserves he deems to be
against Singapore’s interests. This safeguard mechanism was triggered for the
first time in 2009. At that time, the Government had wanted to use past reserves
to fund special policies to reduce the effects of the global financial crisis. Then-
President Mr. S. R. Nathan gave his approval for the drawdown of $4.9 billion of
past reserves. This was mostly used to fund the Jobs Credit Scheme, which was
aimed at saving jobs.

The President also plays a gatekeeper-role in decisions made under the

Internal Security Act and Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (“MRHA”). Take
the MRHA for example. If an order to restrain someone is made under the
MRHA, the President may step in to cancel or change the order if the Cabinet
does not agree with the recommendations made by the Presidential Council for
Religious Harmony.

Finally, the President has a role to play in ensuring the Government

remains corruption-free. This is because the director of the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”) may conduct certain investigations with the
President’s assent. This is even if the Prime Minister or his Cabinet does not
agree. The President also has the power to veto some key appointments in the
public service.

Council of Presidential Adviser. The Constitution requires the President

to consult the Council of Presidential Advisers (CPA) when exercising some of
his powers. The Council is made up of six members and two alternate members.
Among the six, the President appoints two members; two are the Prime
Minister’s nominees, one is the Chief Justice’s nominee and one is the nominee
of the Chairman of the Public Service Commission. This system of appointment
ensures the Council as a whole will be as neutral as possible, and not be overly
influenced by one particular branch. The Council is appointed for a six-year term.

Presidential Council for Minority Rights. This council is not elected

and its main function is to scrutinize most of the bills passed by Parliament to
ensure that they do not discriminate against any racial or religious community.

Decision-making. The powers of the President of Singapore may be

divided into three categories:
 Figure 4. Decision-making Process of the President

While these powers were introduced in 1991, several subsequent changes

were introduced in 1996 to allow Parliament to overrule certain decisions made
by the President. What is needed is support from two-thirds majority of
Parliament.

Cabinet. The Cabinet and the President together form the Executive
branch of the Government. The Cabinet is made up of the Prime Minister and
other Ministers. The Prime Minister, like all Cabinet Ministers, is a Member of
Parliament. To become Prime Minister, he has to be appointed by the President.
In so deciding, the President selects the person who is likely to command the
confidence of the majority of the Members of Parliament. Our current Prime
Minister is Mr. Lee Hsien Loong.

The President, on the Prime Minister’s advice, appoints the other

members of the Cabinet, i.e. the Ministers (Article 25). Members of the Cabinet
are not allowed to hold any office of profit or actively engage in commercial
enterprise (Article 33). Parliamentary Secretaries and Ministers of State are not
part of the Cabinet, though they are part of the Executive.

Collective responsibility of the Cabinet. Article 24(2) states that every

member of the Cabinet is collectively responsible to Parliament. What is
collective responsibility of the Cabinet? This has been taken to mean that the
Cabinet must speak with one voice, and that internal Cabinet discussions are
kept confidential. This is so that a united front can be presented to the public.
Additionally, the concept of collective responsibility entails that the whole of
Cabinet is responsible for the decisions made. In practical terms, under the
Westminster system, the convention has been that the whole Cabinet resigns if a
confidence vote is tabled in Parliament and lost by the Government.
Executive Branch. Executive power lies in the hands of the Cabinet,
which is made up of the Prime Minister of Singapore (the head of Government)
and other Ministers. At the same time, the Prime Minister and Ministers are also
Members of Parliament (Mps).
 The office of the Attorney-General is provided for under Article 35. Broadly
speaking, the Attorney-General performs two main functions. First, the Attorney-
General is the Government’s legal officer. This means he provides the
Government with legal advice, drafting and vetting its contracts, and represents
the Government in its civil lawsuits.

Second, the Attorney-General is also the Public Prosecutor with relation to

criminal offences. He decides who to charge and what specific offences to
charge them with. In making his decision, the Attorney-General takes into
account many factors. This power to decide is called “prosecutorial discretion”,
and it is a very wide power indeed. No one, not even the judiciary, can interfere
with the Attorney-General’s decision-making here, unless there are clear
breaches of constitutional rights.

Their current Attorney-General is Mr. Steven Chong, SC.

Legislature. Parliament is the law-making body in Singapore. The

Singapore Parliament is based on the Westminster model, which was inherited
from the British. It is unicameral (i.e. there is only one chamber, no upper house).

The make-up of Parliament. Based on the British Westminster model of

Parliament, members of Parliament are the elected representatives of the
people. They speak on behalf of the people in debating and passing laws.
However, departing from the British system, Singapore has introduced two
innovations to allow people who were not democratically elected to be members
of Parliament. The Speaker of Parliament oversees all sittings of Parliament and
ensures they are conducted in an orderly manner. To do so, the Speaker acts
impartially and fairly towards all Mps.

Elected members. These members are elected through general

elections.

Appointed members. In the Singapore Parliament, apart from elected

members, there are two types of appointed members — Non-Constituency
Members of Parliament (NCMPs) and Nominated Members of Parliament.

Non-Constituency Members of Parliament are the “best losers” from the

Opposition in a general election. This means among all the Opposition members
who lost in the elections, those with the highest percentages of votes will get to
be NCMPs. This scheme was introduced in 1984 to ensure the representation in
Parliament of a minimum number of MPs not from the ruling party. The
Constitution states there can be a maximum of nine NCMPs.

There are currently three NCMPs: Mr. Gerald Giam and Mr. Yee Jenn
Jong from the Workers’ Party, and Mrs. Lina Chiam from the Singapore People’s
Party.
 Nominated Members of Parliament are not members of any political party,
and they do not participate in elections. They are hence able to speak in
Parliament in a non-partisan manner. NMPs are typically individuals who have
distinguished themselves in the field of arts, culture, the sciences, business,
industry, the professions, social or community service or the labour movement.
NMPs are nominated by a Special Select Committee of Parliament chaired by
the Speaker of Parliament and appointed by the President. The Constitution
states that there can be a maximum of nine NMPs, with each term lasting two
and a half years.

Government Parliamentary Committees (GPCs) are made up of PAP

backbenchers, and each GPC examines the policies and proposed legislation of
a particular ministry. One of the aims of having GPCs is to allow PAP
backbenchers to participate more in the policy-making process. GPCs are not
legislated, and is a scheme established and implemented by the PAP.

In 2010, a group of MPs led by GPC Chair for Community Development,

Youth and Sports tabled a Private Members’ Bill to amend and update the
Maintenance of Parents Act. The Bill was eventually passed. A significant
moment indeed, as this was only the second ever Private Member’s Bill to be
passed as law!

The Lawmaking Process. Before a law is passed, the draft that is

debated in Parliament is called a Bill. All bills must go through three readings in
Parliament and receive the President’s assent to become an Act of Parliament
(i.e. part of the law in Singapore)

Figure 5. The Law-making Process

The Judiciary is the counter-majoritarian check. What is that? Democracy
is rule of majority. In Singapore, Members of Parliament are popularly elected
through elections. This may result in a situation which some call the “tyranny of
the majority”, where since the Government is elected by the majority, their policy
decisions will inadvertently favour the majority.

The Judiciary, on the other hand, is not elected. It has a duty to act as a
check on both the Executive and the Legislature.
 How does the Judiciary check on the Executive and the Legislature? For
the Executive, the Judiciary ensures that it acts within the powers conferred to it
by law and by Parliament. This means that if, for example, an officer from a
Ministry acts beyond the powers given to him by a particular law, the Judiciary
can hold him accountable.

For the Legislature, the Judiciary ensures that the laws passed by it are
consistent with the Singapore Constitution. Remember, Singapore functions on
the basis of constitutional supremacy. Everyone, including Parliament when
passing laws, has to act consistently with its provisions. Hence, the Judiciary can
strike down laws which it deems inconsistent with the Constitution.

The Judiciary’s other main function is to decide the outcome of disputes

between individuals, and disputes between individuals and the Government.

In order to perform these functions well, it is important for the Judiciary to

be independent from the other branches. To achieve this, there are several legal
safeguards in place.

1. Security of tenure — an existing high court

judge cannot be removed from office unless strict
specific criteria (such as mental or physical disability)
are met. This prevents the removal of a judge by
members of the Executive or Legislature because
he/she may have made a decision against their favor.

2. Remuneration — a judge’s pay cannot be

adjusted to his/her disadvantage after being
appointed. This is to prevent the other branches from
cutting or increasing a judge’s pay depending on how
they decide cases.

3. Immunity from civil suits — a judge is immune

from personal civil law suits in respect of any act that
he does in his capacity as a judge. This protection
does not extend to acts done outside his/her capacity
as a judge. Nonetheless, it gives the judge peace of
mind to decide cases without fear of being sued.

4. Constitutional and Legislative measures

protecting respect and support — in particular, the
conduct of a judge cannot be discussed in Parliament
by the Legislature unless specific conditions are met.

5. Contempt of court — the court has the power to

punish individuals for contempt. What is contempt?
 This includes acts suggesting that a judge is biased,
or making direct unsubstantiated accusations about
the judiciary. The offence of contempt of court is there
to maintain public confidence in the judiciary and the
administration of justice.

Conclusion. Singapore has been one of the progressive country in asia.

The form of government has been effected to them, Philippine government must
learn how the people of Singapore dealt with the form of government they have.
There will be pros and cons in every action that any government or people do it is
how we can accept the change. The advantages of this kind of government may
be a quicker legislative action because the executive branch is chosen from the
parliament majority party and prime minister is accountable to the parliament and
can be removed anytime by a vote of no confidence. The disadvantages are
close connection between the executive and legislative branches and absence of
the clear separation of power provides less protection against government
control and less protection by rule of majority.

IV. Sovereignty

Sovereignty is the full right and power of a governing body over itself,
without any interference from outside sources or bodies.

On 16 September 1963, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak

were merged and Malaysia was formed. The issues of the merger were: (1)
Racial tensions increased as the Chinese in Singapore disdained being
discriminated against by the federal policies of affirmative action; (2) There were
also other financial and economic benefits that were preferentially given to
Malays; (3) The state and federal governments also had conflicts on the
economic front; and (4) The Bank of China branch of Singapore was closed by
the Central Government in Kuala Lumpur as it was suspected of funding
communists.

Republic of Singapore Independence Act was established on August 9,

1965 when Singapore was expelled from the federation.

During the independence, Singapore’s pressing problems were

unemployment, housing, education, and the lack of natural resources and land.

Singapore joined UN on September 21, 1965 for the recognition of its

sovereignty.

V. Constitution
 Constitution is the fundamental and organic law of a nation or state,
establishing the conception, character, and organization of its government, as
well as prescribing the extent of its sovereign power and the manner of its
exercise, or a specific statute containing provisions that serve those purposes.

In Singapore, the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore is the supreme

law.

The sources of constitutional law may be grouped into two categories: (1)
legally-binding sources and (2) non-binding sources.

Legally-binding sources include the text of the Constitution, judicial

interpretation of the constitution, and other acts of the parliament.

The text of the Singapore Constitution was a patchwork of provisions

drawn from three statutes: the Constitution of the State of Singapore 1963, the
Federal Constitution of Malaysia made applicable to Singapore by the Republic
of Singapore Independence Act 1965, and the Republic of Singapore
Independence Act itself.

The judicial interpretation of the Constitution refers to the body of

case law decided by the courts interpreting the Constitution, and laying down
fundamental constitutional principles which are not expressly mentioned in the
Constitution. Thus, there must be a purposive interpretation should be adopted
in interpreting the Constitution to give effect to the intent and will of Parliament.
On the other hand, there is also the generous approach to constitutional
interpretation, which to interpret the Constitution based on prevailing social
conditions.

Other acts of the Parliament are empowered by the Constitution to

enact laws for certain purposes.

The non-binding sources of constitutional law in Singapore are the

following:

1. Soft constitutional law - refers to a written set of non-binding

precepts which exert some degree of legal influence in the
realm of constitutional law. It can also serve as principles of
engagement between institutions. This includes non-binding
instruments containing recommendations, government white
papers, declarations, and informal rules like circulars or self-
regulating codes of conduct.

2. Constitutional conventions - unwritten political customs which

aid the smooth operation of the government. They are
characterized as "rules of constitutional behavior" which are
 "binding by and upon those who operate the Constitution", but
are not legally enforceable.

3. Public international law - defined in the Statute of the

International Court of Justice as "evidence of a general practice
accepted as law". Singapore adopts a dualist rather than a
monist view of law which means that public international law
must first be incorporated into domestic law.

The Grundnorm problem, in Singapore, means that it is Parliament,

rather than the Constitution, which is supreme. This arises from the fact that the
Constitution, which is supposed to be logically prior to the power of Parliament to
legislate, was enacted by Parliament on 22 December 1965 through the Republic
of Singapore Independence Act.

Constitution's Articles can be amended with the support of more than two-
thirds of all the Members of Parliament, or by national referendum by at least
two-thirds of the total number of votes cast.

VI. Rule of Law

There are two categories of the conception of the doctrine: (1) thin
conception of the rule of law and (2) thick conception of the rule of law.

Thin conception of the rule of law refers to the rule of law is fulfilled by
adhering to formal procedures and requirements, such as the stipulations that all
laws be prospective, clear, stable and constitutionally enacted, and that the
parties to legal disputes are treated equally and without bias on the part of
judges.

The key principles associated with the thin conception of the rule of law
include: judicial independence, natural justice, the availability of judicial review,
and the accessibility of justice.

Meanwhile, thick conception of the rule of law entails the notion that in
addition to the requirements of the thin rule, it is necessary for the law to conform
with certain substantive standards of justice and human rights.

VIII. Culture

The culture of Singapore is a combination of Asian and European cultures.

Influenced by Malay, South Asian, East Asian, and Eurasian cultures, Singapore
has been dubbed as a country where "East meets West", "Easy Asia" and
"Garden city".
 Once a British colonial trading post, Singapore today is a thriving global
financial hub and is described as one of Asia’s economic “tigers.” This densely-
populated high-income city state has maintained exemplary economic
performance.

In 2016, it ranked the best investment destination in Asia. For several

years, the country has taken up the runners-up spot in being adjudged the
easiest country to do business in the world. It also ranked 6th on the Global
Innovation Index in 2016.

The island nation’s population consists of around 74% Chinese, 13%

Malays and 9% Indians.

By 2020, Singapore is expected to have a total of 188,000 millionaires —

which means that 1 in 30 Singaporeans will be a millionaire, signifying high
potential for individual philanthropy.

After gaining independence in 1963, Singapore has rapidly transformed

from a low-income country to a high-income country by virtue of its trade and
workforce.

In the early 1970s, Singapore reached full employment and joined the
ranks of Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan a decade later as Asia’s newly
industrializing countries. Manufacturing and services sectors remain strong and
are the twin pillars of Singapore’s economy.

Singapore has several distinct ethnic neighborhoods, including Kampong

Glam, Geylang Serai, Chinatown and Little India. Both Geylang Serai and
Kampong Glam are the focal points of the Malays in Singapore.

A Malay Heritage Centre in Kampung Glam showcases the history and

cultural exposure of the Malays, which are indigenous to the land. Both areas
feature an annual month long Hari Raya Bazaar, during the fasting month of
Ramadan. And is patronized by Malays and also other races.

Little India is known and patronized by all races within the population for
its thalis-- South Indian "buffets" that are vegetarian and served on the traditional
banana leaves.

These neighborhoods are accessible by public transport, especially by

Mass Rapid Transit (MRT).

The Singapore Botanic Gardens is one of three gardens, and the only
tropical garden, to be honored as a UNESCO World Heritage Site.
 Singaporean cuisine is also a prime example of diversity and cultural
diffusion in Singapore, for example, traditionally Malay hawker stalls selling also
Tamil food. Chinese stalls may introduce Malay ingredients, cooking techniques
or entire dishes into their range of catering.

This continues to make the cuisine of Singapore significantly rich and a

cultural attraction. Singaporeans also enjoy a wide variety of seafood including
crabs, clams, squid, and oysters. One favorite dish is the stingray barbecued and
served on banana leaf and with sambal (chilli).

Many Singaporeans are bilingual. Most speak Singaporean English and

another language, most commonly Mandarin, Malay, Tamil or Singapore
Colloquial English (Singlish). Thus, most Singaporeans are effectively bilingual,
especially the youths in today's society.

There are four main languages in usage in Singapore. The 'national'

language of Singapore is Bahasa Melayu.

Malay is used in the national anthem, national motto and military parade
drill commands. Tamil is an official language as a majority of South Asians in
Singapore are ethnic Tamils from India and Sri Lanka.

Singapore has a diverse music culture that ranges from rock and pop to
folk and classical.

Gardens and gardening have a special place in Singaporean culture as

well as in politics. Historically this is all officially attributed to Lee Kuan Yew who
apparently spearheaded this philosophy in 1963.

IX. Economical and Social Structure

The economy of Singapore is a highly developed capitalist mixed

economy. While government intervention is kept at a minimum, government
entities such as the sovereign wealth fund Temasek control corporations
responsible for 60% of GDP.

The economy of Singapore is also a highly developed free-market

economy. Singapore's economy has been ranked as the most open in the world,
7th least corrupt, most pro-business, with low tax rates (14.2% of Gross
Domestic Product, GDP) and has the third highest per-capital GDP in the world
in terms of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). APEC is headquartered in
Singapore.

Government linked companies play a substantial role in Singapore's

economy. Sovereign wealth fund Temasek Holdings holds majority stakes in
several of the nation's largest companies, such as Singapore Airlines, SingTel,
ST Engineering and MediaCorp.

The Singaporean economy is a major Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

outflow financier in the world. Singapore has also benefited from the inward flow
of FDI from global investors and institutions due to its highly attractive investment
climate and a stable political environment.

The economy of Singapore ranks 2nd overall in the Scientific American

Biotechnology ranking in 2014, with the featuring of Biopolis.

Singapore also has a strategic port which makes it more competitive than
many of its neighbors in carrying out such entrepot activities. Singapore's trade to
GDP ratio is among the highest in the world, averaging around 400% during
2008–11. The Port of Singapore is the second-busiest in the world by cargo
tonnage.

Singapore relies heavily on foreign talent across all social strata, and
foreign guest workers utterly dominate certain occupations. For example, there
are approximately 243,000 Foreign Domestic Workers (FDWs) in Singapore, live-
in maids from regional developing countries, who provide domestic services,
including child and elder care. As another example, foreign workers, mainly from
southern Asia, dominate the manual labor aspects of the construction industry.

Upon independence from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore faced a small

domestic market, and high levels of unemployment and poverty.70 percent of
Singapore's households lived in badly overcrowded conditions, and a third of its
people squatted in slums on the city fringes. Unemployment averaged 14
percent, and half of the population was illiterate.

In response, the Singapore government established the Economic

Development Board to spearhead an investment drive, and make Singapore an
attractive destination for foreign investment.

Singapore's savings and investment rates rose among the highest levels
in the world, while household consumption and wage shares of GDP fell among
the lowest.

As a result of this investment drive, Singapore's capital stock increased 33

times by 1992, and achieved a tenfold increase in the capital-labor ratio.

Living standards steadily rose, with more families moving from a lower-
income status to middle-income security with increased household incomes.
During a National Day Rally speech in 1987, Lee Kuan-Yew claimed that (based
on the home ownership criterion) 80% of Singaporeans could now be considered
to be members of the middle-class.
 Singapore followed a policy of individualizing the social safety net. This led
to a higher than average savings rate and a very sustainable economy in the
long run. Without a burdensome welfare state or its likeliness, Singapore has
developed a very self-reliant and skilled workforce well versed for a global
economy.

As of 8 June 2013, Singapore's unemployment rate is around 1.9% and

the country's economy has a lowered growth rate, with a rate of 1.8% on a
quarter-by-quarter basis—compared to 14.8% in 2010.

Singapore is considered a global financial hub, with Singapore banks

offering world-class corporate bank account facilities. In the 2017 Global
Financial Centers Index, Singapore was ranked as having the third most
competitive financial center in the world after London and New York City (and
alongside cities such as Hong Kong, Tokyo, San Francisco, Chicago, Sydney,
Boston, and Toronto).

Singapore is aggressively promoting and developing its biotechnology

industry. Hundreds of millions of dollars were invested into the sector to build up
infrastructure, fund research and development and to recruit top international
scientists to Singapore. Leading drug makers, such as GlaxoSmithKline (GSK),
Pfizer and Merck & Co., have set up plants in Singapore.

Singapore is the pricing center and leading oil trading hub in Asia. The oil
industry makes up 5 per cent of Singapore's GDP, with Singapore being one of
the top three export refining centers in the world. In 2007 it exported 68.1 million
tons of oil.

The oil industry has led to the promotion of the chemical industry as well
as oil and gas equipment manufacturing. Singapore has 70 per cent of the world
market for both jack-up rigs and for the conversion of Floating Production
Storage Offloading units. It has 20 per cent of the world market for ship repair,
and in 2008 the marine and offshore industry employed almost 70,000 workers.

The Singaporean government also owns 90% of the country's land, as

well as housing in which 80% of the population lives.

Singapore's total trade in 2014 amounted to S$982 billion. Despite its

small size, Singapore is currently the fifteenth-largest trading partner of the
United States.

Malaysia is Singapore's biggest trading partner, with bilateral trade roughly

91 billion US dollars in 2012, accounting for over a fifth of total trade within
ASEAN. Singapore’s trade with major trading partners such as Malaysia, China,
Indonesia and South Korea increased in 2012, while trade with EU27, United
States, Hong Kong and Japan decreased in 2012. Since 2009, the value of
exports exceeds imports for Singapore’s trade with China.

Singapore Economic Development Board (EDB) continues to attract

investment funds on a large-scale for the country despite the city's relatively high-
cost operating environment. The US leads in foreign investment, accounting for
40% of new commitments to the manufacturing sector in 2000.

Singapore's largely corruption-free government, skilled workforce, and

advanced and efficient infrastructure have attracted investments from more than
3,000 multinational corporations (MNCs) from the United States, Japan, and
Europe.

But his is where it all ends – Singapore has a “First World economy” and
“First World costs” but everything else is “Third World”. And Singapore thus have
Third World income inequality – we are the most unequal country among the
developed countries.

In 2000, Singapore had a workforce of about 2.2 million. The country has
the largest proficiency of English language speakers in Asia, making it an
attractive place for multinational corporation.

The Singapore Government has stressed the importance of co-operation

between unions, management and government (tripartism), as well as the early
resolution of disputes. There has been only one strike in the past 15 years.

In 2000, there were about 600,000 foreign workers in Singapore,

constituting 27% of the total work force. The government imposes a foreign
worker payable by employers for low end workers like domestic help and
construction workers 2007 the government introduced a Workfare Income
Supplement (WIS) scheme to supplement wages of low-skilled workers.

Singapore is one of the world’s wealthiest countries per capita, but its Gini
coefficient (a standardized measure of inequality) is unusually high among
developed countries. Com Care provides a small amount of income support to
profoundly poor citizen households in Singapore.

Public transport is well supported, and fares are low or, in some cases,
zero.

Starting especially in the 2000s, the Monetary Authority of Singapore

(MAS) introduced progressively tighter limits on credit and debt, to try to prevent
Singaporeans from becoming too deeply indebted.
 The government's total expenditure as a percentage of GDP ranks among
the lowest internationally and allows for a competitive tax regime. Singapore
government debt is issued for investment purposes, not to fund expenditure.

Personal income taxes in Singapore range from 0% to 22% for incomes

above S$320,000. There are no capital gains or inheritance taxes in Singapore.
Singapore's corporate tax rate is 17% with exemptions and incentives for smaller
businesses. Singapore has a single-tier corporate income tax system, which
means there is no double-taxation for shareholders.

Singapore introduced Goods and Services Tax (GST) with an initial rate of
3% on 1 April 1994, increasing government's revenue by S$1.6 billion (US$1b,
€800m) and establishing government finances. The taxable GST was increased
to 4% in 2003, to 5% in 2004, and to 7% in 2007.

As of 2014, Temasek holds S$69 billion of assets in Singapore,

accounting for 7% of the total capitalization of Singapore-listed companies.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore is Singapore's central bank and

financial regulatory authority.

Exchange Rates:
1 SGD =0.732008USD
US Dollar1 USD = 1.36610 SGD
1SGD =39.1697PHP
(as of 2018-07-19 01:52 UTC)
 SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE
GOVERNMENT SYSTEM OF SINGAPORE

I. The Problem of Political Succession

The decades of unique development have largely been enhanced by

political stability in Singapore. Smooth political succession, when the Prime
Minister was chosen several years prior to taking office, has nearly become the
trademark of the city-state. Today, however, 4 years before Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong’s planned retirement the selection of the ideal successor is hindered
by several factors, which might also influence the future of the country.

After Singapore gained its independence in 1959 and seceded from

Malaysia in 1965, the predictability of the political power has nearly become the
trademark of the city-state. Keeping the rules of parliamentary democracy, the
right centre People’s Action Party (PAP) has won all the elections since 1959 and
has been considered the only government party in the history of the country,
obtaining 83 of the 89 mandates available at the last election held in 2015. Over
the past decades the policy of the party has allowed for the handling of
Singapore’s economic and social issues as well as the unique development of
the country. However, the stability of the political system has not only been
ensured by the reign and broad authorisation of the governing party: the country
has only had three prime ministers so far, and a decision on political succession
was passed far earlier, which ensured the smooth transfer of power and the
reassurance of economic agents. Nevertheless, although Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong does not plan to govern the country after the elections in 2021, the
Singaporean leadership has met with several difficulties finding the appropriate
successor, which might significantly influence the future of the country, too.

Selecting the Appropriate Person. According to the official opinions, the

Singaporean electoral system offers an opportunity to the talented, as members
of parliament might get into the government depending upon their results; and
thereafter it is also decided who is suitable to fulfil the main position. The future
prime minister will not be selected by his predecessor but the next-generation
leaders on the basis of consensus. As everyone is aware of the responsibility, the
party cannot be characterised with fights within the party, neither does the elite in
power rival for the prime ministerial position.

It is a fact that in Singapore the People’s Action Party takes the reforming
of the political leadership seriously, and politicians undergo a well-established
selection process, which also has negative aspects all the same. Most leaders
come from the public service and the armed forces, so the chances of outsiders
are limited. Since the party has no formal requirements regarding the election of
the future prime minister, the decision is passed in private, behind closed doors,
and one cannot exactly know who have decision rights in this issue. According to
certain opinions, greater publicity would be essential in the 21 st century, in view of
the fact that the general public has no voice in electing the prime minister.

Electing the Second and Third Prime Ministers. Being most

prestigious at global level, Lee Kuan Yew was Prime Minister of Singapore
between 1959 and 1990. The eminent statesman, however, refrained from
naming his successor; he only provided for the selection of 5 ministers but let the
younger generation decide. Although Lee Kuan Yew did not espouse the election
of the later successor Goh Chok Tong, he respected the decision made by the
leadership in 1984 from beginning to end. After becoming Deputy Prime Minister
in 1984, Goh gradually took over the lead of the country in the following 5 years,
until Lee officially resigned in 1990.

Some people suppose that Goh Chok Tong’s mandate as Prime Minister is
only a temporary solution as Lee Kuan Yew is believed to have arranged that
position for his son. Lee Hsien Loong, who is the eldest son of the late Prime
Minister, became Member of Parliament in 1984 and was Deputy Prime Minister
from 1990 until his rise to power in 2004. In 2003 Goh announced his resignation
but his successor had already been found long before. As we can see,
successors had several years to arrange the smooth transfer of power in both
cases, so Singapore’s political, economic and social stability as well as its global
power was hardly affected by the new Prime Minister’s taking office.

Lee Hsien Loong’s Plans. The current Singaporean Leadership –

headed by the Prime Minister – tried to make thorough arrangements in the
question of succession as before, but his plans were foiled by chance in several
cases. After the parliamentary elections held in 2015, Lee pointed out that the
rejuvenation of the leadership will already be an urgent priority when setting up
the next cabinet. After his announcement of resignation after the 2021 elections,
the leadership tried to find his successor, too. Lee pointed out several times that
he would let the next-generation leaders actually choose the person; at the same
time, he presumably tries to use his influence on behalf of the candidate favoured
by him.

In early 2016, 54-year-old Minister for Finance and Chairman of the

Committee on the Future Economy was considered the ideal candidate among
the fourth-generation politicians, but Heng got a stroke and needed immediate
surgery in May 2016. Despite his fast recovery (in August he already returned to
his position) his rise to power seems unlikely for health reasons.

Still, the preparation for the succession allows no delay, as the Prime
Minister also suffers from various health problems. Diagnosed with lymphoma in
the early 1990s he received chemotherapy, and in 2015 he was operated on for
cancer of the prostate gland. However, in August 2016 he became unwell while
delivering his annual speech on the state of the nation, and finally his doctors
found serious dehydration. Although this case seems to have had no significant
consequences, Lee confirmed that finding a prime minister candidate is a priority.

Current Alternatives. According to the analysts, several persons in the

Singaporean cabinet might come into question as the prospective prime minister
besides Heng Swee Keat. Their common characteristic feature is, however, that
they have relatively inconsiderable political experience as they got connected
with politics only a few years ago. Minister for National Development Lawrence
Wong, Minister in prime Minister’s Office Chan Chun Sing and Minister for Social
and Family Development Tan Chuan-Jin all became known in the 2011 elections.
However, in accordance with the Prime Minister’s intention, the latter became
Chairman of the Parliament in 2017, which is evaluated as degradation according
to some opinions. Minister for Education (Higher Education and Skills) Ong Ye
Kung, who was Principal Private Secretary of Lee Hsien Loong, and Minister for
Education (Schools) Ng Chee Meng entered into politics in 2015.

Figure 6. Fourth-generation Singaporean political leaders,

all having a good chance of the prime ministerial position.

As is generally accepted politically, if no ideal candidate is found in the

next few years and if it is the interest of the country, Lee Hsien Loong will have
the opportunity to stay in his office temporarily, although the promotion of the
current Deputy Prime Ministers has greater possibilities. Both Tan Chee Hean
and Tharman Shanmugaratnam are experienced politicians; the latter person
would be an ideal choice in all respects, only his Indian origin may create an
obstacle, as according to the general political opinion most of the Chinese would
not accept him as the primary leader.

Despite the numerous opportunities, it seems certain that the next prime
minster will be chosen from the members of the present cabinet, which the Prime
Minister himself has also confirmed in a recent interview.

Dynastic ideals. When Singapore’s present Prime Minister took office,

many people supposed that Lee Kuan Yew wished to pass on the leading of the
country to his own family members, and in the summer of 2017 the question of
the Lee dynasty came to light again. The internal strife broken out in the Lee
family, which has negatively affected the Prime Minister’s prestige, too, might
also influence the political future of the country. The Prime Minister’s siblings
Lee Wei Ling and Lee Hsien Yang accused their elder brother of not fulfilling their
father’s last will because he refused to demolish the family home. In addition,
they stated that the Prime Minister misused his power when he prepared the
transfer of power for his son Li Hongyi. However, the person concerned, who
works for the Governmental Technological Agency, denied having political
ambitions.

Figure 7. Lee’s family tree and chronology of family dispute.

Lee Hsien Yang has even raised the intention of going abroad, saying that
he is not safe in the country any longer owing to his elder brother’s position. The
scandal has decreased the prestige of the name Lee; what is even more, the
drawbacks of the Singaporean political system have also come to the
foreground. Therefore, it can be stated that it is not only the leaders of the
country but also the future of the city state that can be influenced by the case
negatively, especially in this stage of the political succession process.
 Challenges of the Singaporean Policy. Finding the ideal prime minister
candidate is also difficult because the country has to face significant problems
both in domestic and foreign political terms. In the past, political stability used to
grant the confidence of foreign investors, and economic development was
spectacular and predictable. In today’s Singapore, however, besides political
succession several other uncertainty factors have arisen, too. The Singaporean
economy is under more and more severe pressure from China and other ASEAN
States. The slowing down of economy, the stagnation of productiveness, the
ageing population, the influx of foreign migrant labour force and the development
issues of transport infrastructure have confronted the government with conditions
that it cannot find an ideal solution to. The political efforts, which have been
applied for several decades, do not bring the desired effects any longer, so
reforms are of pressing necessity. However, according to certain opinions,
Singapore’s future can be granted by its leading role fulfilled in the 4th industrial
revolution, that is, if it manages to promote the development+3t of not only the
city state but the development of the entire Southeast Asia through the
digitalisation, during which social and economic issues could also be handled.

In foreign political terms, the relationship with China and the United States
is decisive. As the Lee Hsien Loong Government has tried to counter the
Chinese efforts the relationship of the two countries is not free from tension,
while Beijing’s economic dominance can be felt more and more.

After all, it is not hard to see why the selection of Singapore’s next prime
minister is pressing since, in addition to being expected to pass on earlier
traditions, he also has to wrestle with the new challenges of the 21 st century and
maintain the political stability of the country.

II. Highly-paid Singaporean Officials and Bureacrats Gets Richer

AFP reported: “Singapore’s ministers are among the world’s highest paid,
earning millions of dollars annually as the government benchmarks their wages
against salaries of chief executive officers and other top earners in the country.”
The government says such earnings prevent corruption and help attract and
retain talent. Opposition parties have decried the amount of ministerial
compensation and compared their wages to those of ordinary Singaporeans who
are facing a rising cost of living and depressed wages as a result of an influx of
foreign workers.

Seah Chiang Nee wrote in The Star, “Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew often
says that giving high salaries to government ministers and officials is the best
way to keep graft at bay. Even a junior minister in Singapore earns more than
$1mil a year, with the Prime Minister and other senior leaders making at least
twice the amount. By comparison, the US President earns US$400,000 or about
S$700,000.”
 Seth Mydans wrote in the New York Times, “Singapore’s pay system was
created in 1994 by the nation’s founding prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew. It pegged
the salaries of government ministers and top civil servants to the money they
might earn at the top of the private sector. Under that formula, ministers are to be
paid two-thirds of the median of the top eight earners in each of six professions:
accounting, law, banking, engineering, multinational companies and local
manufacturing.”

“It is true that Singapore has one of the most efficient and corruption-free
governments in the world.” Transparency International, a private monitoring
agency, recently listed it as the fifth most corruption-free nation of 163 surveyed.
It is Asia’s second-richest country after Japan. The first Prime Minister Lee said it
could well afford to pay its leaders top dollar. The average Singaporean earns
roughly $3,000 a month, and the government has voiced concern over a
widening gap between rich and poor. The ministers’ pay was approved three
months before the sales tax is to be increased by 2 percent.

In 2007,Seth Mydans wrote in the New York Times, “How much money
does it take to keep a government minister in Singapore happy?” The
government says a million dollars is not enough, and it announced a 60 percent
increase in ministers’ salaries, to an average of $1.9 million Singapore dollars, or
about $1.3 million, by next year. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s pay will jump
to about $2 million — five times the $400,000 earned by President Bush. “In this
nation where the bottom line truly is the bottom line, the argument goes, you
have to pay to get them and you have to pay to keep them clean.”

“If we don’t do that, in the long term the government system will slowly
crumble and collapse,” Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean told reporters last
month. “Corruption will set in, and we will become like many other countries, and
face the problems that many other countries face,” The Straits Times,
Singapore’s largest-circulation newspaper, quoted him as saying. In announcing
the pay increases, Mr. Teo, who also oversees the civil service, said: “We don’t
want pay to be the reason for people to join us. But we also don’t want pay to be
the reason for them not to join us, or to leave after joining us.”

Defending the system against an unusual public yelp of pain, Mr. Lee,
whose title was minister mentor, painted a horrifying picture of a Singapore
governed by ministers who earn no more than ministers elsewhere. “Your
apartment will be worth a fraction of what it is,” he said. “Your jobs will be in peril,
your security will be at risk, and our women will become maids in other people’s
countries.”

Talk of the pay raise drew criticism here that included letters to
newspapers and an online petition that has more than 800 signatures. “I am sure
Enron and Worldcom paid more than top dollar for their top executives, and look
where their companies are now — six feet under,” Mohamad Rosle Ahmad wrote
to the editor of The Straits Times. The elder Mr. Lee said naysayers needed a
reality check. “I say you have no sense of proportion; you don’t know what life is
about,” he said. “The cure to all this talk is really a good dose of incompetent
government,” he added. “You get that alternative, and you’ll never put Singapore
together again.” The Straits Times quoted him as saying his current salary as
minister mentor was about $1.8 million.

Some Singaporeans suggested that other motivations should also come

into play for government jobs. “What about other redeeming intangibles such as
honor and sense of duty, dedication, passion and commitment, loyalty and
service?” asked Hussin Mutalib, a political science professor at the National
University of Singapore, in a Straits Times online forum. Carolyn Lim, a
prominent writer, suggested in an essay that Singapore needed a little more
heart to go along with its hard head. “To see a potential prime minister as no
different from a potential top lawyer, and likely to be enticed by the same
stupendous salary, would be to blur the lines between two very different
domains,” she wrote. The minister mentor Lee brushed aside such concerns.
“Those are admirable sentiments,” he said. “But we live in a real world.”
CORE PRINCIPLES OF SINGAPORE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong laid out five guiding principles for
Singapore's political system as he set the scene for changes to schemes such as
the Non-Constituency Member of Parliament (NCMP) and Elected Presidency.

It is not possible for any political system to guarantee stability and

prosperity forever, he told MPs when he joined the debate on the President's
Address. "But we can make such a happy outcome more likely if we design our
system carefully and correctly around (these) core principles."

Ensuring a high-quality government. Mr Lee said the system must

enable Singapore to have "a high-quality government" that is accountable,
honest, competent and effective. With no natural resources or a hinterland, one
of Singapore's key competitive advantages has been - and always must be -
excellence and integrity in Government.

Singapore would not exist today if it had not had a first-class Government
that could foresee and avoid problems, seize opportunities and mobilise the
people, he added. "We cannot afford ever to be paralysed, gridlocked or
become dysfunctional, like some other countries," he said.

Keeping politics open and contestable. Second, Singapore's political

system must be open and contestable, with free and fair elections that are not
"forbiddingly expensive" for people to contest.
 Keeping money out of politics is one of the greatest things Singapore has
done to keep its system open, said Mr Lee.

He noted that at last year's general election, political parties here spent
just $7.1 million altogether, less than $3 per voter. In contrast, candidates in the
United States presidential election in 2012 raised and spent US$7 billion (S$10
billion), or about US$20 per American.

He also stressed the need to avoid the "money politics" seen in many
countries, where money changes hands for votes.

Maintaining government accountability. The third guiding principle is

that Singapore's system must foster accountability, both in Parliament and at the
ballot box. This is so that the Government is always kept on its toes, and will
always be motivated to look after the interests of Singaporeans.

Parliament must be a serious forum where big issues are discussed and
the Government's actions scrutinised and debated. And voters must be able to
judge the Government - re-electing it if it does well or withholding support if it
does not. "So we must have a system where the Government does not, over
time, become complacent, go soft, or even worse, become corrupt."

Upholding a multi-racial society. Fourth, the system must uphold

Singapore's multiracialism, which is fundamental to the country's identity, said Mr
Lee.

Political parties must be made to seek a broad-based, multiracial

consensus and pursue moderate policies that benefit Singaporeans regardless of
race, language or religion. The political system must similarly discourage parties
from being set up along racial or religious lines, or championing the interests of
one race or religion over others.

Having stabilisers in the system. The fifth principle is that the system
must have in-built stabilisers. Said Mr Lee: "The Government has to be
responsive to the will of the people, but at the same time also has to have
safeguards in case the country is swept off course by a transient public mood, or
an erratic government - which can happen."

Other countries have an Upper House in Parliament or regional

governments, such that "no single point can cause the whole system to fail", he
noted. Singapore is too small to have that. But it still needs stabilisers, especially
to protect the reserves and the integrity of the public service - two critical
elements to assure the country's future.

The lack of safeguards could allow a profligate government to drain the

reserves. Mr Lee pointed to Australia, which had built up significant surpluses a
decade ago. But when the elections arrived, the competing parties tried to outdo
each other with expensive policy proposals. "Today, the funds for the future have
disappeared... They're back where they were all within 10 years."

As for the public service, Mr Lee said: "The whole of our excellence in
government, competence, the performance of the country, depends on the
integrity and the ability of the individuals in the key posts in the public service."
These include judges, central bankers, the Accountant-General, the
Commissioner of Police and the heads of statutory boards.

"Once corrupt persons get into key positions, that's the end," he added -
not just because of what they do alone, but because they "subvert and corrupt
the system".

To protect both the reserves and the public service, Singapore's system
thus needs "a second key" - the Elected Presidency.

After setting out the principles, Mr Lee outlined the suggested changes,
such as expanding the NCMP scheme, having smaller Group Representation
Constituencies and more single-seat wards, and setting up a Constitutional
Commission to look at the Elected Presidency.

Mr Lee said he was raising these issues now, just after Singapore's 50th
anniversary, so the country is able "to go into the next 50 years with the best
chance of making a success".

"We have to have a system where all the political parties... have to fight
hard, stay lean and be responsive to the people, and win the right to govern
afresh in each election, a system where Parliament will always be the place to
debate and to decide important policies, where alternate views will always have
a place.”

"The opposition will never be shut out and the Government will be held to
account, so that the Government of the day - whoever that may be - is always
kept on its toes."

SINGAPORE'S VISION 2030

Vision 2030 is a joint project led by the Ministry of Culture, Community and
Youth (MCCY) and Sport Singapore (then known as the Singapore Sports
Council). Vision 2030 presents a plan for how sports can best serve Singapore in
the coming decades.

Vision 2030 began with this question: “How can Sports best serve
Singapore in the coming decades?” In a quest to discover the answer to this,
Sport Singapore met with more than 500 people for face to face discussions, and
obtained the views of another 60,000 through online means. Sport Singapore
met with sport leaders, urban planners, educators, corporate decision makers,
volunteers, senior citizens, stay home mums and wanted to hear about the role
of Sports in their lives, why they played the sports they did and whether they
wanted to play more.

In all, Sport Singapore received some 300 unique ideas on how Sports
could be used as a national strategy to shape the nation. These ideas allowed
Sport Singapore to appreciate ways in which Singaporeans live, think and see
the role of Sports in their lives and in society. These ideas were then categorised
and crystallised into 20 recommendations to be implemented as the pillars of
Vision 2030.

Serving as Singapore’s road map for sport, Vision 2030 is best told as the
story of how Sports can be used as a strategy to develop healthy and resilient
people; forge strong united communities; build robust core values; create shared
memories, strengthen friendships as well as building a dynamic society and
economy.

By its very nature, sports develops the attributes that Singaporeans want
and need to compete in the evolving global conditions: a winning spirit, a respect
for teamwork, a commitment to leadership and even a love of country. These are
principles that Singapore needs to be firmly rooted, not just in athletes but
throughout the society, the workforce, the professionals, the educators, the policy
planners and the uniformed and public service officers.

The Vision is based on four ideas:

1. Future ready through sports. Playing sports makes us happier

and healthier. Sportsmen and women learn useful life skills of
perseverance, discipline and teamwork. It prepares boys for
National Service, and all children for the rigours and responsibilities
of business life.

2. Sports without boundaries. Sports without boundaries is about

making sports facilities and initiatives more affordable and making
best use of existing facilities. It is also about promoting sports to
Corporates and individuals as a means to support social initiatives
that improve communities.

3. Sports as a National Language. Sports unites us, encouraging a

mix of ethnicities to work towards a common goal. Our sporting
heroes embody the Singapore Spirit, inspiring and uniting the
nation.
 4. Organizing for success. To achieve and extend our sporting
success, we need to look start looking outside the sporting
community. Organising for Success is about reaching out to the
business community and individuals for sponsorship, volunteering
and partnership opportunities.

Sports as a national strategy can stimulate positive, deeply embedded

values for Singaporeans and their nation. Perhaps most importantly, playing a
sport encourages qualities such as tenacity, discipline and a respect for
teamwork. These qualities will help strengthen Singaporeans, their organizations
and the nation, and help them live better through sports.

Sports will be used as a strategy for individual development, community

bonding and nation building in the next two decades. Vision 2030 will incorporate
considerations of Singapore‘s future challenges, including an ageing population;
the pressure of living in an increasingly urban environment; higher expectations
from individuals regarding the quality of life and a shrinking workforce with rising
demands regarding job satisfaction.

Mr Chan Chun Sing, Acting Minister for Community Development, Youth &
Sports, said, “Sports can be used as a strategy for individual character
development to prepare our people for a more complex and competitive
environment. It can be a way for busy people to find balance; for the silver
generation to age actively; for youth to be engaged and learn life skills. On the
community front, sports can be a powerful tool to bond communities across
genders, races and religions. Sports can also be used to build national pride,
unite and ignite our people as we move forward as one.”

A Vision 2030 Steering Committee, consisting of a cross section of society,

was formed to lead the discussion, consider proposals and recommend policy
development based on the ideas and feedback generated by the sporting
community and the public at large.

Recommended strategies in seven broad areas will be formulated by the

committee:
1. Generation Z
2. Balance to the Rhythm of an Urban Lifestyle
3. Silver Generation
4. Spirit of Singapore
5. Future Ready
6. Futurescape
7. Organising for Success
 Singapore Sports Council Chief Executive Officer Lim Teck Yin said, “We
want the public to participate actively in co-creating Vision 2030 because we
believe everyone has a stake in it. This brings us to the next lap for sports – by
everyone, for everyone, and with everyone. The process is just as important as
the final product (sports plan), and we intend to continue this journey with all
stakeholders even after the plan has been developed.”

“As the national agency overseeing sports development in Singapore, we

are very excited with what will come out of the Vision 2030 exercise. With this
new approach towards sports planning, we hope the true value of sports can be
felt in all quarters of society and not just amongst sports enthusiasts.”
 REFERENCES
Hays, J. (2013). Bureaucracy and Local Government in Singapore. Retrieved August 17, 2018,
from http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Singapore/sub5_7c/entry-3759.html

Heng, J. (2016, January 28). PM sets out core principles for Singapore political system.
Retrieved August 17, 2018, from https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-sets-out-
core-principles-for-singapore-political-system

https://www.mlaw.gov.sg/our-legal-system.html

https://www.parliament.gov.sg/organisation-structure

"Transparency International — Corruption Perceptions Index 2005". Archived from the

original on 19 June 2006. Retrieved 13 April 2006.

"Corruption Surveys and Indices". Transparency International website. Archived from the
original on 8 December 2005. Retrieved 22 April 2006.

"Governance Indicators: 1996-2004". World Bank website. Retrieved 22 April 2006.

MCCY. (2014, April 01). Vision 2030. Retrieved August 17, 2018, from
https://www.mccy.gov.sg/Topics/Sports/Articles/Vision_2030.aspx

Peter, K. (2018, February 19). The problem of political succession in Singapore. Retrieved
August 10, 2018, from http://www.geopolitika.hu/en/2018/02/19/the-problem-of-political-
succession-in-singapore/

Singapore Athletics. (2011, July 24). Sports Plan for All, By All. Retrieved August 17, 2018, from
http://www.singaporeathletics.org.sg/vision-2030

Solutions, EIU digital. "Democracy Index 2016 - The Economist Intelligence

Unit". www.eiu.com. Retrieved 2017-11-30.
to:a b "Singapore". Freedom House. Retrieved 5 November 20

Sport Singapore. (n.d.). Vision 2030. Retrieved August 17, 2018, from
https://www.sportsingapore.gov.sg/about-us/vision-2030

Worthington, Ross (2002). Governance in Singapore. Routledge/Curzon. ISBN 0-7007- 1474-X.

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS OF TAIWAN

BY GROUP 3
Lloren, Armi Muriel C.
Magasilang, Cardawi M.
Morga, Paula Mae J.
Sypiecco, Maria Lourdes M.
BRIEF HISTORY
April 17, 1895 – Qing Dynasty of China admits defeat in First Sino-Japanese War
officially cedes Taiwan Province and a few areas to the empire of Japan in the Treaty of
Shimonoseki.
October 10, 1911 – Chinese Revolutionaries under Sun Yat-Sen overthrow the Qing
dynasty Gov’t and established ROC in Nanjing.
April 12, 1927 – Chinese Civil war begun.
1936 – Japanese invade Manchuria Region of China.
World War 2 - Chinese Civil war resume, more people join the communist.
October 1, 1949 – Mao Zedong declares the new Communist People’s Republic of
China.
1949 – Nationalist comeback and halt advance in Taiwan – Battle of Kuningtou
1950s – Korean War Starts, USA comes and starts protecting Taiwan.
For four decades – ROC continued to claim for the only legitimate Government of all
China. PROC claimed the same.
1992 – meeting between the representatives from ROC and PROC. Consensus of 1992
–One China Consensus
This day – as long as Taiwan continues to use the “ROC” as its official name, Beijing
can’t claim that Taiwan is seeking independence as a sovereign state. Both the PROC
and ROC don’t want to aggravate each other due to the prospect of war.

GOVERNMENT OF TAIWAN
REPUBLIC OF CHINA
Type of Government : Constitutional Democracy
-authority of the majority is limited by legal and institutional means so that the rights of
individuals and of the minorities are respected.
-the President is the head of state

FIVE BRANCHES OF TAIWAN’S GOVERNMENT

I. EXECUTIVE YUAN
The Executive Yuan is in the charge of the Premier.
In practice, the system resembles a semi-presidential system with a uniquely strong
presidency, as the President may appoint the Premier, the head of government, without
the consent of the legislature.
However, the ROC's political system does not fit traditional models. The Premier is
selected by the President without the need for approval from the Legislature, but the
Legislature can pass laws without regard for the President, as neither he nor the Premier
wields veto power.
The Executive Yuan is headed by a President (often translated as premier), and has
a Vice President (vice premier), and twelve cabinet ministers, various chairpersons of
commissions. The vice premier, ministers and chairpersons are appointed by the
President of the Republic of China on the recommendation of the premier.
II. LEGISLATIVE YUAN
Although sometimes referred to as a "parliament", under Sun's political theory, is
a branch of government with the power to amend the constitution and formerly to elect
the President and Vice President.
III. JUDICIAL YUAN
The Judicial Yuan is the ROC's highest judiciary.
The Judicial Yuan has a President and a Vice President, each of whom is nominated
and, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan, appointed by the President of the
Republic.
IV. CONTROL YUAN
Based on the traditional Chinese censorate, the Control Yuan is an investigatory
agency that monitors the other branches of government.

V. EXAMINATION YUAN
The Examination Yuan is in charge of validating the qualification of civil servants in
the Republic of China. As a special branch of government under the Three Principles of
the People. The concept of the Examination Yuan is based on the old Imperial
examination system used in Imperial China.
Three Principles
Mínzú - “nationalism“
Mínquán – “democracy’
Mínshēng - "the People's welfare/livelihood"

ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
Taiwan consists of provinces and special municipalities.
The provinces are "streamlined", with very little direct function.
Each province is however subdivided into cities and counties.
There are 6 special municipalities (Kaohsiung, New Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, Taipei and
Taoyuan), 3 cities (Chiayi, Hsinchu and Keelung) and 13 counties.
 STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY OF CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

CHALLENGES FACING TAIWAN

Keeping Beijing at Arm’s Length
While ties between China and Taiwan grow more entwined, opinion polls in
Taiwan consistently show that more Taiwanese have come to identify themselves as
Taiwanese and not Chinese over the past two decades. More than half are against
eventual reunification—Beijing’s goal. Meanwhile, China sometimes shows its thinning
patience with the status quo and increases pressure for reunification.
Military and Cyber threats
China keeps 1,400 missiles pointed at Taiwan, the island’s defense ministry
says. Cyber hacking attempts from China against government targets occur daily,
according to

Taiwan’s Ministry of Science and Technology. By 2020, Taiwan’s Ministry of National

Defense predicts China will be capable of fending off foreign intervention if the Chinese
military tries to invade the island. Taiwan’s defense spending has remained flat, drawing
concern from the U.S., a security partner.
China’s Economic Impact
China is the largest destination for Taiwan’s exports, having supplanted the U.S.
a decade ago, and is also the largest source of tourists to Taiwan. With so much growth
dependent on Beijing, economists are concerned that as China’s economy slows, so will
Taiwan’s. Taipei has attempted to diversify, signing bilateral trade agreements while
trying to join regional trade blocs, such as the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Luring Businesses Back
Offshoring production has led to an outflow of jobs and investments. More than
half of what Taiwan counts as exports—from PCs and smartphone components to shoes
—are made in factories abroad, mostly in China. Although costs in China are rising,
many Taiwanese manufacturers say they will stay there, or relocate to Southeast Asia,
not move back to Taiwan where land and labor costs are still relatively high.
Bridging a Wealth and Opportunity Gap
While the economy has been growing in recent years, data show youth
joblessness remains elevated and wages, while high compared with China, have barely
grown over the past decade. Grievances culminated in the student-led Sunflower
Movement in 2014, which led to a halt of a trade-in-services pact with China, and the
ruling Nationalist Party’s loss in November’s local elections.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS OF SOUTH
KOREA

BY GROUP 4

BURDEOS, ZAIRA M.
CATIPAY, JOENENA P.
PADAYHAG, JUNE PAUL M.
RANQUE, MARY JOAN D.
Official Name: The Republic of Korea
Origin of the name: Korean, meaning high serenity
Provinces and Cities: 8 Provinces, 1 special autonomous province, 6 metropolitan cities
and 1 capital metropolitan city

South korea is officially known as the Republic of korea and is located in the southern
part of korea peninsula which neighbors china in the west and Japan in the east.
The land area covers 99,392 sq meters and has a population of 51.16 million
The largest city and capital is Seoul
Under the constitution the state is also referred to as sixth Republic of South Korea.
The country has its first election at 1948 and operates under a powerful presidential
system.

Political system

South Korea is a presidential representative democratic republic, specified by the

constitution. Legislative power is vested in both the government and the National
Assembly.
Head of state is the President, the president is also the chairman of the cabinet, the chief
executive of the government, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
If the National Assembly votes against a presidential decision, it will be declared void
immediately. Head of government is the Prime minister.

Government of South korea

The republic of korea is a democratic republic with three principal branches of
government
1. Executive
2. Legislative
3. Judiciary

Executive
 The president is the head of the executive branch of the national assembly.
Directly elected by the people
 5 year term
 Has the power to declare martial law, state of emergency etc
 Commander in chief in the armed forces of south korea

Legislative
 Made up of the national assembly which has a total of 300 members
 Members of national assembly serve for a term of 4 years
 Main function is to pass and amend laws of the country, audit national budget
and procedures of administration
 Ratify treaties and approve states appointments

Judiciary
  Made up of the supreme courts and other tribunals distributed all over the
country
 The president appoints the Chief Justice
 Other judges are appointed by the president but upon the suggestion of the chief
justice
 Judges are liable to serve for a term of six years
 Supreme court heads the judiciary and is the final court of appeal in Korean
government.

To understand South Korea’s economic transformation in the right perspective, one has
to understand how important its big, family-owned conglomerates, known as the
chaebols, are to the economy. After the Korean War ended in 1953, the country came
under authoritarian rule, which turned out to be a blessing in disguise to some family-
owned businesses in South Korea.
Initially, loans offered under attractive terms and restrictions on imports gave a head start
to some of these firms, with a few of them such as Samsung, LG, and Hyundai (which
together contribute 16% of the economy’s GDP) emerging as truly global brands in the
90s and the first decade of the present century.
Despite concerns about the chaebols monopolizing entire business sectors,
overcharging customers, and stifling innovation, it has to be acknowledged that it was
South Korea’s shipbuilders and carmakers that made the country what it is today. The
top 30 firms in South Korea account for about 70% of the economy. Moreover, the
chaebols have been able to hedge risks from currency volatility by basing some of their
factories in foreign countries. The chaebols have a presence in business categories as
diverse as consumer electronics, shipbuilding, automobiles, leisure, and tourism.

SOUTH KOREA AND THE WORLD

Nominal GDP ($) 1.410 trillion

GDP Rank 13/194

Per Capita GNI – Nominal ($) 27,090

Per Capita GNI Rank 42/213

Population Rank 27/228

Geographical Area Rank 109/257

Global Competitiveness Rank 26/144

Economic Freedom Index Rank 29/178

Human Development Index Rank 15/187

 Electronics,
Telecommunication,
Major Industries Automobile,
Production,
Shipbuilding & services

SPECIAL PROBLEMS THAT SOUTH KOREA IS CURRENTLY FACING

 POLITICAL CHALLENGE
 UNEMPLOYMENT
 MINIMUM WAGE
 LOW BIRTH RATE
 EDUCATION SYSTEM

1. POLITICAL CHALLENGES
A dual transition—to a consolidated democracy and an advanced market economy—
represents the main challenge that the Korean political and economic system currently
confronts.
During the two decades since it became a democracy, South Korea has faced
lingering problems, such as poor governance, high-level corruption, lack of
leadership, political conflict, social polarization, volatile public opinion, and lack of
consensus on major issues.

The scandal that saw the former president arrested on corruption

charges highlighted South Korea’s dependence on huge family-owned
businesses, or “chaebol,” such as Samsung.
Moon has promised to revive the flagging economy while curbing the chaebols’
power. Even if Moon achieves this mammoth task, he will still have to
tackle South Korea’s rising youth unemployment and its overreliance on an
export economy that made it vulnerable to economic retaliation.

2. UNEMPLOYMENT

With the recent oversupply and rapid expansion of high school and college graduates,
the labor market requirements mismatch that of the skills provided by the education
system. Coupled with poor school-business networks, insufficient employment service
infrastructure, asymmetric labor market information there are limited possibilities for
combining study and work.
The employment force of South Korea is indeed very competitive. An employee can be
easily replaced by a more vibrant and creative employee. There is no security of tenure.
When demand collapse, in times of economic slumps, the young are the first to be
dismissed from companies since they have no work experience. The young are more of
a disadvantage in entering the labor market as they compete with older employees with
job experience.
Apart from that, High school graduate and college dropouts have a higher rate of job
separation than college graduates. High job separation is due to the mismatch between
jobs and workers, where workers cannot attain jobs they prefer.

Kim Gwang-Suk, an economist and professor and professor at Seoul's Hanyang

University suggested that "Job creation should be by business, not the government. In
the long term, all the government should do is make an environment in which companies
can invest more.“
Kim adds that the new president should help small businesses, boost entrepreneurship,
and reform the conglomerates. On the campaign trail, Moon promised to do just that. But
the conglomerates remain the backbone of the Korean economy. It's unclear whether he
really has the will or ability to change them.

3. MINIMUM WAGE

A major focus in implementing Moon’s income-led growth agenda has been increasing
the minimum wage. The South Korean government has mandated the minimum wage
since 1989 and reviews its appropriateness every year.
But this year’s raise reached historic levels: an increase of 16.4 per cent from 6470 won
(US$6) to 7530 won (US$7) an hour. The Moon administration aims to increase the
minimum wage further to at least 10,000 won (US$9.20) by 2020.

At present, South Korea’s liberal government is facing a public backlash over its
experiment with a higher minimum wage, part of an income-led growth strategy by
President Moon, which critics fear will do more economic harm than good.
With the minimum wage set to soar over the next year, the complaints and fears of
small business owners who are directly exposed to minimum wage and near-minimum
wage employees are emerging. Theoretical predictions on the effects of raising minimum
wages are straightforward: employment shrinks, businesses close, unemployment rises
and prices go up
The move by president Moon to increase the minimum wage was a body blow to many
businesses, especially small restaurants, convenience stores and other retailers.
Higher labor costs have left them facing a choice between raising prices and reducing
staff. Most convenience stores are run by self-employed people under franchise
agreements with the chain operators. The cost pressures could force franchisees to ax
employees and work longer hours themselves.
Unmanned shops are seen as a potential solution. Hamburger chains in South Korea,
including Lotteria, McDonald's and Burger King, have been setting up more
semiautomated outlets where customers use touch-panel devices to order and pay. All
the employees do is prepare the food and hand it over
At present, the government of South Korea Is currently trying to solve the problem
regarding the matter of increasing the minimum wage of their workers

4. LOW BIRTH RATE

At present, Korea ranks number 4 in the world for low birth rate. Korean women have
reduced the window of child bearing to about six years: Between the age of 33 and 39. It
is important to note that about 70% of South Korean women have jobs compared to 60%
of men.
The reason behind this is because Some Koreans, even while having all the financial
capabilities, simply do not want to spend their lives taking care of babies. They feel like
that time could be spent traveling and enjoying their lives.
Koreans also realize that raising babies is expensive. You need money not only for food
but also for education, clothing and extracurricular activities. When the time comes that
they would have children, they do not want to live in a rented house. Most of them prefer
to have a house before getting married.

As seen in the graph, it is very evident that from the year 1981 to 2016, South Korea’s
birth rate has indeed decreased over time
Despite all of that, some movements have occurred to encourage families to have more
children, with tax break incentives and cash bonuses as preferred strategies during the
last few years.
It should also be noted that Korea has a modern national health care system that covers
costs related to childbirth, prenatal and postnatal care. Regardless of this, the notion of
not having children is still rampant in South Korea.
 5. EDUCATION SYSTEM

With the growth of the Korean economy in the second half of the twentieth century
came a period of rapidly increasing access to educational opportunities through the
1960s and 1970s. Being deprived with education in the past, South Koreans have
placed a very high value on education.
The South Korean education system is currently a grueling, competitive and grades-
obsessed system, creating enviable results and developing academically adept
students. Yet, it has caused extreme stress and even suicide. In 2015, the South Korean
education system was named the best in the world

The Korean education system operates on a 6-3-3-4 basis. with six years of primary
schooling followed by three years of middle school, three years of high school and four
years of undergraduate education. The first nine years of schooling are compulsory for
children between the ages of six and 15. With this, Young students are forced by their
parents to enroll at different academies to enhance their talent to be more competitive
South Korean students are highly motivated to study long hours, as it has been
ingrained from a young age that the main measure of success is academic achievement.
As students possess unwavering focus to work hard now for the sake of their future,
their individual desire to get into a prestigious university is arguably higher than in any
other country in the world. Entry to a top university has conventionally led to a reputable,
stable and well-remunerated job with the government, banks, or one of South Korea’s
chaebol (A very big group of family owned businesses).
Since the college entrance exam is deemed to have lasting effects on one’s future, many
students become fixated with grades, often to an unhealthy degree. One of the extreme
repercussions of the education system is that South Korea has the second highest youth
suicide
Suicide is the no. 1 cause of death for young people between the ages of 10 and 30,29 it
is reasonable to conclude that there has been a consistent trend of high youth suicide
rates over the years. More disturbingly, Statistics Korea and the Ministry of Gender
Equality and Family reported that worry over career and academic performance is the
main reason youths aged 13-19 contemplate suicide, illustrating the impact of the
pressure created by the education system.
The South Korean education system was essential and effective in the past as the main
aim was to swiftly educate the people and bring them out of poverty. However, the
education system has become extreme, going beyond the main aim towards an arguably
meaningless and relentless pursuit for paper qualifications.
The resulting costs are dire: they are severe yet avoidable. Now that the North Korean
economy has asserted its dominant position in the world, the education system should
undertake reforms to place more emphasis on grooming workers for a global creative
economy. At the same time, enduring cultural attitudes towards studying and grades
have to be eased towards a more fluid meaning of success.

MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS OF SOUTH KOREA

 Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

 o Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose
income is less than one dollar a day
 Poorest quintile's share in national income or consumption, per
cent (WB)
 Purchasing power parities (PPP) conversion factor, local currency
unit to international dollar
o Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who
suffer from Hunger
 Population undernourished, number of people
 Population undernourished, percentage

 Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

o Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike,
will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
 Literacy rates of 15-24 years old, both sexes, percentage
 Net enrolment ratio in primary education, both sexes
 Percentage of pupils starting grade 1 reaching grade 5, both
sexes
 Primary completion rate, both sexes
 Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
o Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015
 Gender Parity Index in primary level enrolment
 Gender Parity Index in secondary level enrolment
 Gender Parity Index in tertiary level enrolment
 Seats held by men in national parliament
 Seats held by women in national parliament
 Seats held by women in national parliament, percentage
 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural
sector
 Women to men parity index, as ratio of literacy rates, 15-24 years
old

 Goal 4. Reduce child mortality

o Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five
mortality rate
 Children 1 year old immunized against measles, percentage
 Children under five mortality rate per 1,000 live births
 Infant mortality rate (0-1 year) per 1,000 live births

 Goal 5. Improve maternal health

o Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the
maternal mortality ratio
 Births attended by skilled health personnel, percentage
  Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 live births

 Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

o Target 7. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of
HIV/AIDS
 AIDS deaths
 Condom use to overall contraceptive use among currently married
women 15-49 years old, percentage
 Contraceptive use among currently married women 15-49 years
old, any method, percentage
 People living with HIV, 15-49 years old, percentage
o Target 8. Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of
malaria and other major diseases
 Tuberculosis death rate per 100,000 population
 Tuberculosis detection rate under DOTS, percentage
 Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability
o Target 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country
policies and programmes and reverse the loss of environmental
resources
 Carbon dioxide emissions (CO2), metric tons of CO2 per capita
(CDIAC)
 Consumption of all Ozone-Depleting Substances in ODP metric
tons
 Energy use (Kg oil equivalent) per $1,000 (PPP) GDP
 Land area covered by forest, percentage
 Protected area to total surface area, percentage
o Target 10. Halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable
access to safe drinking water
 Proportion of the population using improved drinking water
sources, rural
 Proportion of the population using improved drinking water
sources, total
 Proportion of the population using improved drinking water
sources, urban
o Target 11. By 2020 to have achieved a significant improvement in the
lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers
 Slum population as percentage of urban, percentage
 Slum population in urban areas

 Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development

o Target 12. Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-
discriminatory trading and financial system nationally and internationally
 Agriculture support estimate for OECD countries as percentage of
their GDP
o Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing
countries through national and international measures in order to make
debt sustainable in the long term
 Debt service as percentage of exports of goods and services and
net income from abroad
 o Target 16. In cooperation with developing countries, develop and
implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
 Ratio of youth unemployment rate to adult unemployment rate,
both sexes
 Share of youth unemployed to total unemployed, both sexes
 Share of youth unemployed to youth population, both sexes
o Target 18. In cooperation with the private sector, make available the
benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications
 Internet users
 Personal computers
 Telephone lines and cellular subscribers

SOURCE: United Nations Statistics Division

REFERENCES AND SOURCES

PDF FILES
 • Mahmoudi, K. (2017) Rapid Decline of Fertility Rate in South Korea: Causes and
Consequences. Open Journal of Social Sciences, 5, 42-55.
doi: 10.4236/jss.2017.57004.
INTERNET SOURCES
• https://www.philstar.com/world/2017/05/10/1698580/four-challenges-moon-jae-in-
south-koreas-new-president
• http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2018/05/30/0200000000AEN20180530008
800315.html
• http://news.abs-cbn.com/business/07/15/18/skoreas-minimum-wage-hike-
disappoints-workers-business
• https://www.bna.com/south-korea-increase-n73014444914/
• http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150712000307
• http://www.minimumwage.go.kr/eng/sub04.html

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS OF INDONESIA

 BY GROUP 5

Barra, Jaclaine Lennor

Gatinao, Anna Loren G.
Go, Neil William G,
Langi, Jamaisa S.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

Indonesia is a democratic country that applies a presidential system and Pancasila is the
soul of the Indonesian democracy. Pancasila is the philosophic fundamentals of the
state. Pancasila consists of five principles that are interrelated and inseparable, namely:
1. The belief in one God
2. A just and civilized humanism
3. Unity of Indonesia
4. Democratic citizenship lead by wise guidance born of representative consultation
5. Social just for all the people of Indonesia

PROVINCES
Indonesia has 33 provinces (including 2 Special Territories of Nanggroe Aceh
Darussalam and Yogyakarta) and one Special Capital Region of Jakarta (DKI). East
Timor was once part of Indonesia, but then through a referendum in 1999, East Timor
became the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste.
The population of Indonesia can be divided into two major groups: in the western region
most of the people are from the Malay ethnicity while in the eastern region there are the
Papuans originating from the Melanesian Islands. Indonesia also recognizes specific
ethnic groups that come from a certain province/area and have specific language for
example the Javanese from Central or East Java, the Sundanese from West Java or the
Batak ethnicity from North Sumatra.
In addition, there are also minority ethnicities derived from Chinese, Indian and Arabic
descendents. These people travelled as merchants through trade exchange since the
8th century BC and migrated to Indonesia. Approximately 3% of the population is from
Chinese ethnicity, although the exact percentage is not known as the last ethnicity
census was held in the 1930s.
Islam is the major religion of 85.2% of the population, designating Indonesia as the
largest Moslem country in the world. The remaining population consists of Protestants
(8.9%); Catholics (3%); Hindus (1.8%); Buddhists (0.8%) and other religion (0.3%).

POLITICS
Joko Widodo
- Born: June 21, 1961
- Seventh and current president of Indonesia
- Also known as Jokowi
- Elected in July 2014 as the first Indonesian president to not come from an elite
political or military background, he was previously the Mayor of Surakarta from
2005 to 2012, and the Governor of Jakarta from 2012 to 2014.

Wapres Jusuf Kalla

- Born: May 15, 1942
- Also known as Jusuf Kalla or JK
- vice president of Indonesia
- He was the first Indonesian Vice President to serve 2 times in a row. In his first
term, period 2004-2009, he also served as Chairperson of the Golongan Karya
Party.

As in other democratic countries, Indonesia applies the Trias Politica that recognizes the
separation of the legislative, executive and judicial bodies. The executive institution is
centralized under the president, vice president, and the cabinet of ministers. The cabinet
is a presidential cabinet in which the ministers report to the president and do not
represent the political parties.

ECONOMY
Indonesia has abundant natural resources outside Java including crude oil, natural gas,
tin, copper and gold. Despite being the second largest exporter of natural gas, Indonesia
recently has become a net importer of crude oil. The agriculture products of Indonesia
include rice, tea, coffee, spices and rubber. The major trade partners of Indonesia are
Japan, the United States of America and neighboring countries namely Malaysia,
Singapore and Australia. In the 1990’s, Indonesia’s economy experienced a set-back as
a consequence of the economy crisis that hit most Asian countries. However, the
economy is now relatively stable.

The Indonesian political system consists of three branches

 Executive branch
 Legislative branch

 Judicial branch

Executive branch of Indonesia

The executive branch consists of the president, the vice president and the cabinet. Both
the president and vice president are chosen by the Indonesian electorate through
presidential elections. They serve for a term of five years that can be extended once by
another term of five years when re-elected by the people. During these elections the
president and vice president run as a fixed, inseparable pair, which implies that the
composition of this pair is of great political strategic importance. Important matters that
are of influence include ethnic (and religious) background and (previous) social position
in Indonesian society.

Legislative branch of Indonesia

Indonesia's legislative branch is the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis

Permusyawaratan Rakyat, abbreviated MPR). It has the power to set or change the
Constitution and appoints (or impeaches) the president. The MPR is a bicameral
parliament that consists of the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan
Rakyat, abbreviated DPR) and the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan
Daerah, abbreviated DPD).

Judicial branch of Indonesia

The highest court in Indonesia's judiciary system is the independent Supreme Court
(Mahkamah Agung). It is the final court of appeal and also deals with disputes between
lower courts. A relatively new court, established in 2003, is the Constitutional Court
(Mahkamah Konstitusi), which monitors whether decisions made by the cabinet and
parliament (MPR) are in line with the Indonesian Constitution. However, most of the legal
cases in Indonesia are handled by the public courts, administrative courts, religious
courts and military courts.
Political conditions are important for those who seek to invest or engage in business
relations with Indonesia. In this section we present an overview of Indonesia's current
political composition as well as overviews of the key chapters in the country's political
history.

GENERAL POLITICAL OUTLINE OF INDONESIA

This section concerns Indonesia's current political system. It discusses the role that
religion (in particular Islam) plays in political decision-making and provides a brief outline
of Indonesia's separation of powers (trias politica), namely the executive, legislative and
judicial branches. Currently, Joko Widodo's Working Cabinet (2014-present) is in office.
It will govern up to 2019 when new parliamentary and presidential elections will be held.

These objectives include:

• an orderly, developed, peaceful and socially just society

• a competitive and innovative population
• a just democracy
• social and developmental equality among all people and all areas in the country
• to become an important global economic and diplomatic force

To achieve these targets, the government drew up three interrelated and interdependent
development plans

Indonesia’s Special Government Problems

Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s government took small steps in 2017 to
protect the rights of some of Indonesia’s most vulnerable people. In September, the
Attorney General’s Office announced that it had rescinded a job notice that not only
barred lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) applicants, but suggested
homosexuality was a “mental illness.” The government also quietly reduced its
population of Papuan political prisoners from 37 in August 2016 to between one and five
in August 2017.

But the Jokowi government has consistently failed to translate the president’s rhetorical
support for human rights into meaningful policy initiatives. Religious minorities continue
to face harassment, intimidation from government authorities, and threats of violence
from militant Islamists. Authorities continue to arrest, prosecute, and imprison people
under Indonesia’s abusive blasphemy law. Papuan and Moluccan political prisoners
remain behind bars for nonviolent expression. And Indonesian security forces continue
to pay little price for committing abuses, including unlawful killings of Papuans.

The government’s acquiescence in 2017 to generals and powerful thugs who seek to
stifle discussion of the army-led 1965-66 massacres made Jokowi’s promised
reconciliation mechanism for those atrocities appear increasingly unlikely. Jokowi and
senior police generals also advocated adopting Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s
approach to suspected drug users and dealers: shoot-to-kill orders that have been
accompanied in the Philippines by more than 12,000 summary executions of suspects.
Following a 2016 deluge of government-driven anti-LGBT rhetoric, authorities in 2017
continued to target private gatherings and LGBT individuals—a serious threat to privacy
and public health initiatives in the country.

Freedom of Religion

In March, a Jakarta court handed down five-year prison terms for blasphemy to two
leaders of the Gerakan Fajar Nusantara (Gafatar) religious community, founder Ahmad
Moshaddeq and president Mahful Muis Tumanurung; the group’s vice-president, Andry
Cahya, received a three-year sentence.

On May 9, a Jakarta court sentenced former Jakarta governor Basuki “Ahok” Purnama,
a Christian, to a two-year prison sentence for blasphemy against Islam. That conviction
followed the success of Islamist militant groups in making his blasphemy prosecution a
centerpiece of efforts to defeat him in Jakarta’s gubernatorial election in April 2017.

On August 21, Siti Aisyah, the owner of an Islamic school in Mataram, Lombok Island,
was sentenced to 30 months in prison on blasphemy for “strange teachings.” In August,
municipal governments in Java took steps to effectively shut down two mosques that
espoused the ultra-conservative Wahabhi strain of Islam—Al Arqom mosque in
Pekalongan and the Ahmad bin Hanbal mosque in Bogor—due to concerns that they
could fuel “social turmoil.”

In a landmark ruling in November, the Constitutional Court struck down a law prohibiting
adherents of native faiths from listing their religion on official identification cards. The
ruling will help protect adherents of more than 240 such religions from prosecution under
Indonesia’s dangerously ambiguous blasphemy law.

In early 2017, the Ministry of Religious Affairs drafted a religious rights bill that would
further entrench the blasphemy law as well as government decrees making it difficult for
religious minorities to obtain permits to construct houses of worship. The draft law, still
pending at time of writing, would also impose excessively narrow criteria for a religion to
receive state recognition.

Women’s and Girls’ Rights

Indonesia's official Commission on Violence against Women reports that there are
hundreds of discriminatory national and local regulations targeting women. They include
local laws compelling women and girls to don the jilbab, or headscarf, in schools,
government offices, and public spaces.

Indonesian female domestic workers in the Middle East continue to face abuse by
employers, including long working hours, non-payment of salaries, and physical and
sexual abuse. Indonesia’s ban on women migrating for domestic work in the Middle
East, imposed in 2015, has led to an increase in irregular migration of women seeking
such work, increasing the risk of abuse and exploitation.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

On April 30, police raided a private gathering of gay men in Surabaya, arrested and
detained 14 men, and subjected them to HIV tests without their consent.

On May 21, police raided the Atlantis club in Jakarta, arrested 141 men, and charged 10
for holding an alleged gay sex party. Officers allegedly paraded the suspects naked in
front of media and interrogated them still unclothed, a claim the police deny.

On May 23, Aceh, Indonesia’s only province that implements Sharia, flogged two gay
men each 83 times. The two, ages 20 and 23, were found in bed together by vigilantes
who entered their private accommodation in March. This was the first caning of gay men
in Indonesia.

On June 8, government officials in Medan apprehended five “suspected lesbians” and

ordered their parents to supervise them—then shared a video of the raid and the names
of the five women with reporters.

On September 2, police and local government officials unlawfully raided the homes of 12
women in Bogor, West Java, alleging they were “suspected lesbians.” Police recorded
the women’s personal details and ordered them to relocate from the area within three
days.

Military Reform and Impunity

In August, Indonesian police and military personnel forced the cancellation of a public
workshop on financial compensation for victims of the state-sanctioned massacres of
1965-66, in which the military and military-backed militias and vigilantes killed an
estimated 500,000 to 1 million people. Victims included suspected members of the
Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), ethnic Chinese, trade unionists, teachers, activists,
and artists. Security forces “interrogated and intimidated” organizers, claiming they
lacked a permit.

On September 16, authorities prevented the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute from hosting a
seminar about the massacres. Police and military officers surrounded the compound,
preventing participants from entering the building on the pretext that the organizers
lacked a permit for the gathering.

Children’s Rights

Thousands of children continue to perform hazardous work on tobacco farms. They are
exposed to nicotine, toxic pesticides, and other dangers, which can have lasting impacts
on health and development.

The government pledged to eradicate child labor by 2022. In meetings with Human
Rights Watch in late 2016 and 2017, government officials said they had begun activities
to raise awareness about the health risks to children of tobacco farming. However,
authorities have not changed laws or regulations to protect children from hazardous
work on tobacco farms.
Disability Rights

Despite a 1977 government ban on the practice, families and traditional healers continue
to shackle people with psychosocial disabilities, sometimes for years at a time.
Enforcement of the ban has been long delayed, but in 2017 the government announced
steps to improve access to mental health services, a key component of its campaign to
eliminate shackling.

Health ministry officials claim that in 2017 the government accredited about 2,000
community health centers, certifying their capacity to respond to 155 conditions including
psychosocial disabilities, and oversaw the training of some 25,000 trainers, people who
are to in turn train primary health staff on improved responses to and community
outreach around a range of health issues, including mental health.

In April, UN Special Rapporteur on Health Dainius Pūras urged the government to scale-
up its campaign against shackling and ensure it is not replaced by other forms of
restraint that violate human rights.

Key International Actors

In September 2017, Indonesia rejected 58 human rights recommendations made by

United Nations member states as part of Indonesia’s Universal Periodic Review before
the UN Human Rights Council. The recommendations targeted issues including threats
to the rights of LGBT people, the abusive blasphemy law, and the death penalty. An
Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official responded weakly, describing the
recommendations as “hard to accept” given “Indonesian conditions.”

On July 14, Indonesia announced that it was renaming a part of the South China Sea the
“North Natuna Sea.” The newly named body of water encompasses a region of the sea
north of Indonesia’s Natuna Island that partly falls within the infamous “nine dash line,”
marking the area of the South China Sea that China claims as its own. The Chinese
government has condemned the renaming as “not conducive to the effort of the
international standardization of the name of places.”

In September, Indonesia took the initiative to provide humanitarian aid to ethnic

Rohingya refugees along the Burma-Bangladesh border. Jokowi deplored the violence
against the Rohingya and dispatched his foreign minister, Retno Marsudi, to meet with
Burmese de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi to express Indonesia’s concern about the
Rohingya’s plight.

In October, the National Security Archive, a US nongovernmental public transparency

organization, released 39 declassified documents from the US Embassy in Jakarta that
show US diplomatic personnel were fully aware of army-orchestrated mass killings as
they were unfolding in late 1965 and early 1966 in Indonesia. The documents
underscore the need for the US and Indonesian governments to fully disclose all related
classified materials to provide an accurate historical record of the killings and to provide
justice for the crimes.
 INDONESIA MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

1) Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty

2) Achieve universal primary education
3) Promote gender equality and empower women
4) Reduce child mortality
5) Improve maternal health
6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7) Ensure environmental sustainability
8) Develop a global partnership for development

The new tendency of Public Administration has positioned the state as an equal partner
for other stakeholders at local, national, and international level. Significant is the chance
for the public to be involved in decision making processes. The old style of governance
dominated development programs is no longer trusted. Instead there is an urge to
ensure direct participation of the community in conceptualizing, planning, Century
implementing, monitoring and evaluating development programs.
In Indonesian context, the decentralization process has forced central government to
give more power to local level government. Consequently, the new local government has
to have more awareness in giving more space to all development stakeholders to be
involved in development process. The process of enforcing community participation
cannot be achieved automatically; this needs a systematic approach that position
development as an integrated process which has to involve all development
stakeholders from the early stage of the program. However, in practice it is very difficult
to ask government or other development stakeholders to work together in order to reach
the designated development goals for the benefit of every stakeholders. Therefore it is
obvious that the implementation of development programs still facing many problems
related to lack of coordination among stake holders, political will of government, lack of
supporting policies, private sector awareness, university’s role, and community
participation.
After the fall of President Suharto in May 1998, Indonesia embarked on an era of
reformasi, a process of political, judicial, economic and social transition that included
constitutional changes to enhance democratization and anti-corruption, and an increase
in the devolution of power, only partly to offset separatist movements, through a big-
bang decentralization.
Over a decade later, Indonesia has emerged economically strong and remarkably stable
in political terms. Today it faces a second-generation set of challenges, to improve the
efficiency, effectiveness and integrity of public spending, raising the quality of services,
and mitigating the remaining income-related and geographic disparities in access and
outcomes. Indeed, many in Government have recognized the weaknesses of the current
system, in which “stove-piped bureaucracies that do not reward good performance or
remunerate positions fairly have long been an obstacle to the pursuit of a good
government”.
Progressive ministries, such as the Foreign Affairs (2002) and Finance (2006) have led a
Bureaucracy Reform Initiative focusing on reforming organizational structures and
procedures, HR policies and practices to achieve the often complementary objectives of:
(i) creating a clean, professional and accountable state apparatus; and (ii) creating an
efficient and effective bureaucracy that provides high quality public services. This has
been coupled with an extensive modernization program that has included the
development of new business processes and procedures, followed by the introduction of
Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs). In December 2010, a Grand
Design with a 15-year timeframe for rolling out a National Bureaucracy Reform was
signed by the President, and a Road Map was signed by the Minister for Administrative
Reform. However, vestiges of the Suharto era top down ‘command and control’ (C&C)
approach to reformasi birokrasi remain, which afford an intransience and inertia to the
politicized bureaucracy.
However, as Michael Barber, former head of the UK Prime Minister’s Delivery unit notes,
command and control can rapidly shift a service from ‘awful’ to ‘adequate’... (which) is a
major achievement...but cannot deliver ‘good’ or ‘great’.” Therein rests the challenge for
Indonesia, as an incremental change from ‘awful’ to ‘adequate’ would leave the public
sector performance lagging ever further behind the demands of such a dynamic
emerging economy.
• First wave: post crisis responses (devolution and transparency), of democratization and
the big bang decentralization in 2001 created the reform space, albeit limited by
systemic constraints, for a few local and central government institutions to innovate;
• Second wave: consolidating reform (command and control), witnessed the attempt to
tackle the systemic constraints and support broad-based reform, marked by the decree
of 2010 that mandated reform for all central and local governments; and
• Third wave: looking to move beyond ‘remunerasi’ to wider ‘reformasi’ (devolution and
transparency to quasi-markets)—the next generation systemic and agency reforms are
intended to link the Strategic Direction more closely to the performance of the public
sector, and includes a new civil service law, slated for 2012, as well as a national
framework for monitoring agency reform.
Indonesia was hit hard during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, GDP plummeted by
13%, the IDR lost 80% of its value almost wiping out the middle class. The country was
mired in a deep recession. The economic crisis exacerbated separatist tensions and
precipitated mass protests demanding a government free from corruption, collusion and
nepotism (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme or KKN), which was seen as one of the main
causes of the crisis. The crisis resulted in the fall of the authoritarian President Suharto
in May 1998 and Indonesia embarked on what has become widely known as the era
reformasi, targeting governance reforms in areas such as the constitution, the judiciary,
public financial management, and the devolution of power through decentralization in
2001. Although popular pressure served to slay the head, curiously, the body continued
to be sustained by the entrenched political and financial elite, in contrast to comparable
countries in Eastern Europe, contributing to a slow pace of reforms.

First Wave
Politically the country shifted dramatically from a ‘command-and-control’ paradigm
through a ‘big-bang’ decentralization and devolution in 2001. As the World Bank (2009)
concluded, Indonesia went from “being one of the most centralized countries in the world
in administrative, fiscal and political terms, to one of the most decentralized”.
Consequently, the administration was expected to transform from a very centralized,
hierarchical quasi-military tradition toward a more devolved and transparent institution.
Powerful state owned enterprises, such as the national oil company (PT Pertamina), the
state telecom (PT Telkom) and commercial banks like Mandiri, were also required to
start operating on a more market-oriented basis to counter the fundamental public and
corporate governance weaknesses that were among the structural causes of the crisis.
The geographically dispersed nation of 17,600 islands remained a unitary state, but
devolved considerable powers to the sub-national level, as well as abruptly transferring
2.8 million civil servants from the central to local authorities administratively (not
physically) with the aim of countering social and political issues of separatism brought
about by the economic crisis. Innovation mushroomed quietly within a number of sub-
national governments, reflecting the paradigm of ‘quasi-markets’ wherein government
‘put users…and customers… in the driving seat’. Thus, to name a few, the municipality
of Solok provided a one-stop-shop for various services to the public; the local
government of Jembrana embarked on a fee-free school system for the public; and
Sragen established a citizen friendly e-government system of public services.
Meanwhile, at the central government level, in 2002 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
commenced an organization, staffing and career management reform and the Ministry of
Finance undertook radical reforms to comply with IMF demands, passing three financial
laws between 2003 and 2004. In 2006, Sri Mulyani introduced its Bureaucracy Reform
Initiative to support ongoing Public Financial Management reforms. The focus was on
reforming organizational structures and procedures, HR policies and practices coupled
with an extensive modernization program including widespread organizational reforms
and the introduction of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs).
This phase of reform at the Ministry of Finance was considered to be relatively
successful.
Jobs were weighed, competence was factored in and remuneration was increased to
market levels. Personnel expenses at the Ministry increased by around 250 percent in
2008 (although part of this was due to accounting for funds of other agencies), while in
the Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) personnel expenses rose by 130 percent and in
Supreme Court by 110 percent, partly as a result of the new performance allowances. If
the remuneration restructure was coupled with fit and proper tests, not only to fill in the
vacant positions but also to evaluate the incumbent officials, the intended institutional
reform goals might have been achieved. However, in the end, the remuneration reform
that was aimed to justly and fairly reward jobs and positions somehow became the
definition and goal of reform rather than the performance outcomes or the agencies
themselves.

Second Wave: The Spreading of Reform

Nonetheless, bureaucracy reforms were viewed as slow and lagging behind reform
initiatives such as electoral reform and constitutional reform. Incidents of corruption were
still widespread, while a tortuous process for business approval also discouraged much-
needed investments. Reforming bureaucracy thus became a crucial issue in the pursuit
of sustaining democratic reforms, thereby driving the need for a nationally driven and
centrally coordinated process. In the second term of President Susilo Bambang
Yudoyono (2009-2014), bureaucracy reform became the first priority of the Long-term
National Development Plan (RPJP) 2010-2025. In December 2010, a Grand Design with
a 15 year timeframe for rolling out National Bureaucracy Reform was decreed by the
President, and a Road Map, was signed by the Minister for State Administration,
changing even the name of the ministry to incorporate the spirit of reform. Thus was
born the Ministry of State Apparatus and Bureaucracy Reform (KemenPAN & RB). The
approach was seen as a necessary response to the urgency of spreading the reforms
across all seventy six ministries and agencies. However, the approach had certain
limitations, namely:
• Arguably, the rise of and unreformed KemenPAN & RB, protracted the command-and-
control approach to reforms. Reform procedures and processes required by KemenPAN
& RB placed an emphasis on compliance, hence adding further layers of bureaucracy, a
phenomenon contrary to the mandate of reform.
• The reform initiative commanded nationally may have increased awareness of the
need for reforming bureaucracy. However, core functions to support reform, namely,
strategic direction; performance management; and support to build capacity, capability
and culture we’re lacking.
• Absent clear institutional and governance frameworks, execution was divorced from
strategy and complex decisions floundered in the bog of uncertainty. One of the most
contentious issues from an institutional and governance perspective remained the role of
KemenPAN & RB in directing reforms and the issue of a peer agency perceived to be
controlling reform. The role of President’s Delivery Unit (UKP4) has been thrown into
focus, specifically, the question: to whom are agencies are accountable, for delivering
reforms.
• Performance and accountability mechanisms for carrying out reforms were lacking.
Firstly, remuneration as an incentive for reform was not linked to productivity and
performance. Secondly, there was no mechanism to measure the impact and outcomes
of reform. Thirdly, without transparency, citizens are unable to follow or comment on
reform outcomes.
Overall, the civil service has been suffering from a shortage of skills and capacity to
make the reforms work; to make matters worse, where skills are available, they are often
mismatched to jobs or stifled by the regulations. Reforming agency leaders reported that
the culture of reforms was ineffective owing to the laws and regulations that served to
hamper innovation and risk taking. To address these constraints, the parliament initiated
a draft Civil Service Law aimed at modernizing the civil service system, shifting from an
archaic personnel administration approach to a strategic approach of managing the civil
service. The new law would enable recruitment of professionals to executive positions
should recruiting ministries be unable to find suitable and competent candidates within
the civil service ranks. The new law is also aimed at facilitating capacity, capability and
culture to support reform.

Third Wave of Reform: Looking to Move Beyond ‘Remunerasi’ to Wider

‘Reformasi’
Towards the end of 2011, the government was under increasing pressure to perform
better. With the end of the second term of the incumbent President drawing closer, in
2014, issues surrounding underperforming ministries and agencies have continued to
surface in the midst of what some see as a stagnating reform effort. While national
budget execution rates have remained low throughout the year, particularly for important
capital spending, in July 2011, UKP4 produced an internal evaluation, which was widely
reported, of cabinet performance that concluded that less than 50 percent of President’s
instructions had been carried out. In addition, the approval process of the draft new civil
service law had stalled as the government, in this case KemenPAN & RB, had delayed
the submission of the issues paper, the Daftar Inventarisasi Masalah (DIM), to the
parliament. Despite the lack of tangible progress with regard to public services
performance, the new performance allowances continued to be rolled out across the
national government. Between 2008 and 2011, sixteen Ministries/Agencies had been
approved and obtained the new performance allowances based on the promise of future
reform; the stated target for all central institutions is 2014, and for all local institutions,
2025. While important progress had been made in several agency specific reforms,
much less had been achieved with regard to the systemic reforms and there was no
central monitoring and evaluation process in place to ensure that the new allowances
would result in better performance. Without some demonstrable improvements in the
performance of the public sector there was a growing risk that the reforms would lose
credibility, being associated only with increasing the pay of civil servants.
In October 2011, the President announced a cabinet reshuffle marking the replacement
of the Minister for KemenPAN & RB, and the appointment of a Vice Minister, a new
position in the ministry. This action appears to have been aimed at rejuvenating strategic
leadership and direction for the reforms. As a result, discussion of the draft civil service
law subsequently recommenced, and was tabled in the parliament. At the same time, a
set of reform initiatives were ongoing within KemenPAN & RB as reflected in the
following:
i. Open selection and recruitment in January 2012 for senior positions, a practice aspired
to in the new law, and the first time this approach was followed in the ministry.
ii. A new monitoring and evaluation system for all seventy six Ministries and Agencies
and across government (see Table 1). Performance indicators and targets are being set
for 2014 both for the Government as a whole and for individual institutions, to capture
the main elements of reform. This is backed by a transparent online self-assessment
system for all institutions that will be managed and overseen by KemenPAN & RB.

Table 1 - Setting performance indicators and targets for bureaucracy reform.

Reforms continue to be fettered by a ‘Command and Control’ Framework

With many moving parts in motion, reforms in Indonesia may well be at risk of stagnating
or worse, going backward. While the reforms have given rise to islands of excellence,
agency based reform can only take the state so far, as long as national policies and
regulatory frameworks remain unreformed. Fragmented administrative reform efforts
results in apparatus that are more complex and render accountability more obscure.
Furthermore, KemenPAN & RB, a key coordinating institution for bureaucracy reform,
albeit arguably a relic of the former governance framework, remains largely entrenched
in the C&C paradigm despite its new leadership, and has thus far proven to be more of
an obstacle for further reform.
Performance: Administrative reform in the country is complex and multifaceted, marked
by changing structures though with increased attention being paid to improving
performance. This impacts accountability practices that encourage greater autonomy
such as relaxing rules about the mix of inputs, devolving authority to managers,
increasing discretion and encouraging entrepreneurial behavior to be more responsive to
‘client’ (stakeholder and citizen) needs. One question is whether reforms promising
greater autonomy are aligned with accountability mechanisms. ‘If management reform
rhetoric emphasizes employee discretion and autonomy, but performance reviews
emphasize rules and processes, then employees will emphasize rules and process in
their work efforts. This same dynamic applies at the corporate level also’ (Romzek
2000). In the Indonesian context, KemenPAN & RB, being in essence a rules and
process driven organization driving reforms, cannot then be expected to provide
autonomy for agencies to pursue reforms with first reforming itself.
The Indonesian case shows us that it has proven hard to link performance to results or
outcomes. As highlighted above, the new monitoring and evaluation system for
measuring the performance of agencies is only latterly being introduced, sometime after
the award of ‘performance’ pay increases for personnel that largely rewarded the
promises of agencies to improve performance. Personal performance appraisal systems
have also been introduced as part of the bureaucracy reform, with new Key Performance
Indicators (KPIs) for agencies and senior staff. However, the system has been criticized
as being overly complex, rigid and centralized with 360 performance appraisals
sometimes proving to be an effective means of sweeping out the good performers from
the agency.
Disciplinary action is centralized and managers do not have authority to penalize poor
performing staff. In addition, while a new performance budgeting system has recently
been introduced, with a complex array of over 6,400 nonfinancial performance indicators
being introduced for around 500 programs, the so-called ‘rewards and punishment’
framework introduced in 2012 has yet to demonstrate that it will adequately be linked to,
or promote, better outcomes. Too rigid an application of complex performance schemes
risks entrenching a new set of top-down compliance tools. There is thus the danger that
the central authorities will use this information selectively to enforce compliance, rather
than to encourage a more devolved model of performance, i.e. it will be another stick
with which to discipline managers.
For now, many of the agencies that are tasked to oversee the delivery of government
priorities are more focused on the more basic problems the Government has with the
disbursement of budget funds for programs, as a proxy indicator of performance. For
example, the planning ministry, Bappenas, monitors the disbursement of financing for
the Statistical Agency’s capacity building program, as a measure of performance,
compared to any outcomes that have been met. UKP4, and the Ministry of Finance also
closely measure disbursement rates for programs, in deference to more complex
measures of whether the funds spent are effective in improving the delivery of public
services. As in many other emerging economies, the availability of financing is not the
key barrier for improving public services; it is absorptive capacity, and the ability
effectively utilize financing to achieve desired outcomes. However, in the short-term at
least you are likely to get more of what is measured and perhaps less of what is wanted.
The Indonesia case is a reminder that linking performance to results in the public sector
is still a work very much in progress and incentives for public management reform are
yet to be effectively tied to productivity or performance. While a remuneration scheme for
implementing the reforms was helpful early on, to overcome some large pay differentials
and spur some general reforms, the question remains whether a ‘pay for promises’
scheme will continue to help or risk becoming a hindrance whilst the C&C model
(hopefully) gives way.
Capability Capacity and Culture: At the core of reforms is the ability to attract, select,
retain, on-board, develop, coach, redeploy, reward and exit staff. As Nunberg (2002)
observed (in a study of Indonesia and four other Asian countries), human resource
management in civil service is an issue:
‘Civil services were reasonably competent and meritocratic, but they were running on
automatic pilot, often conflating status with seniority and minimizing the role of
performance in motivating staff. With many of the strengths of the rule-based,
"mandarin" Weberian model, these administrations also had weaknesses’. In a
comparative study of civil service capacity in five countries in Asia, (Nunberg 2002)
observes that Indonesia is assessed at the lower level capacity and capability when
compared to high performers like Korea and Malaysia, and medium performers,
Philippines and Thailand. High performers have successfully shifted from a relatively
rules based merit practice to a more performance oriented practice. One of the two
complaints that Fuller (2011) repeatedly heard about Indonesia, ‘that central government
produced many plans but little action, and that an “archaic” education system had led to
a crisis in human capital’.
The Indonesian case shows us that the civil service is able to attract and select high
caliber staff. The Foreign Service for instance has an ISO certification in recruitment.
Following recruitment, in the first year of training and onboarding, deficiencies in human
resource management start to surface. Positions and remuneration are based on rank
and job content, while responsibilities remain undefined (Nunberg 2002). The best and
the brightest fail to be matched to the right jobs. There is currently a move to develop
competencies, however, jobs depth and indicator of competencies are not well defined,
thus stunting the ability to effectively link competencies to talent management functions
such as learning, career development, performance management, recruitment and
workforce planning.

Human resource management systems are yet to be integrated and logically developed
based on process models such as the employment life cycle. Bureaucracy reform efforts
also show a lack of focus on the employment life cycle process and results focused
management. Efforts focus instead on “workload analysis”, unfortunately linked to
incumbents in the job, and not to future-state ‘government-to-citizen’ processes,
positions, competencies and jobs. The former initiatives lead rather to efforts to protect
the territory of incumbents. To align internal process streamlining efforts with social
accountability measures, bureaucracy reform initiatives would do well to focus on
achieving the outcomes of government process reengineering, eliminating non-value
added internal activities, and recommending an appropriate level of skills and staffing
required for desired outcomes.
‘Span of control’ poses a peculiar issue for accountability practices that emphasize a
process rather than a performance focus, as previously established in this paper.
Administrative laws mandate the formation of uniform military style structures including
four layers of management– echelon 1, 2, 3 and 4 - between entry level and the top,
bloating the organization and creating opportunities for dysfunctional performance (Fuller
2011). Decentralization of government institutions has further bloated management
structures which are replicated at the subnational level. Lack of flexibility in
organizational design is exacerbated by the role of KemenPAN &RB in controlling
organizational design through mandatory political and legal frameworks. To transform
organizations, government agencies will need to take into consideration a holistic
approach to process analysis, skills, staffing, competencies, jobs and positions to
develop organizational designs that afford a nimble and high performing workforce. The
Indonesian government would do well to deregulate organizational design, a practice
that has dealt a crippling blow to more effectively managing accountability and decision
authority for reforms.
A culture of camaraderie and consensus-based decision making has resulted in an
inability to make tough decisions. Managers may benefit from training that emphasizes
the use of judgment within an analytical framework for complex decision making. The
central training agency (LAN) has a nine month offsite program for leadership training for
managers slated to move from echelon 2 to echelon 1. However, the course has been
criticized as entrenching old practices and serving to intensify the system of
patronage,‘baparjakat’, rather than promoting modern flexible, responsive, performance
orientated leadership. It will be crucial to rethink the role of LAN in assisting with the
reforms, rather than reinforcing the old order. Importantly Indonesia has to address the
need for developing world class leaders and managers who can face external and
internal challenges, the impact of globalization and rapid technological changes that are
driving a new socio-political environment.

The new civil service law is silent on the integration of three (3) key but fragmented
agencies that manage various elements of human resource management – BKN (Civil
Service Administration Agency), LAN (National Institute of Public Administration) and
KemenPAN & RB – while the opportunity rests to merge BKN into a restructured
KeMenPAN & RB with a more strategic role and mandate. A new and restructured LAN
must step up to the plate, collaborating with international networks of National Institutes
of Public Administration to deliver world class leadership programs. Ultimately, while the
new civil service law has the support of the parliament, it has yet to be realized; failing
which the threat of a critical deadlock looms, a crisis that diverts leadership attention.
Strategic Direction: Unless the senior leadership publicly set, and continually reinforce,
the strategic direction for the shift to a more devolved, transparent and market oriented
system, there is always the risk of the control model reasserting itself. Although reforms
rose from grassroots at the sub-national level in a democratic and decentralized
Indonesia, and in specific central ministries, the vestiges of the C&C model of reforms
and oversight have remained stubbornly in place. Even now, parts of KemenPAN & RB
continue to impose a tight grip over agencies that want to reform, for example by
needing to approve organizational restructuring, thus hindering the pace of change. In
addition, some of the agencies which initiated reforms are now engaged in centralizing
systems and power structures; LKPP (the agency in charge of procurement policies)
plans to mandate a single e-procurement system whereas functioning systems already
exist in many of the other agencies; BPK (the Supreme Audit Board) plans to centralize
audit systems and functions across agencies and ministries.
The country may need to rethink the sequencing of reforms; first reforming the
reformers.
Time is running out on the opportunity to rethink the role of key ministries such as
KemenPAN & RB to unstick reform efforts in other ministries. KemenPAN & RB may be
better positioned to enable reforms through a consultative, coordinative approach (rather
than a directive one), where it serves in the model of a ‘management consultancy’ for
other ministries, channeling expertise and knowledge of public sector reforms, rather
than retaining a firm grip reminiscent of its Suharto-era C&C model.
One of the criticisms of the reforms is that it is a contained process, run by a group of
people participating in the reforms. Citizens don’t see the benefits of the reform. The
question arises as to whom government is for. Technology is shifting boundaries
particularly in public spaces, so it is possible to redraw the lines and see how far reforms
can or should go. Increased pressure from nontraditional stakeholders in the reform
process can help push the envelope further. The new Open Government Partnership
(OGP) initiatives will provide a critical basis for aligning current reform efforts aimed at
achieving internal efficiencies to greater social and political accountability, paving the
way for a fourth wave of reforms, emphasizing D&T and quasi-markets.

Is Indonesia is Arching toward Devolution and Transparency and Quasi-Markets?

‘There are no lies, you cannot hide anymore,’ counsels the Head of the President’s
Delivery Unit, Kuntoro Mangkusubroto, as he urges the public sector to be a more
‘relevant’ performer in a rapidly globalizing world, where technological innovations are
driving greater public participation in governance, particularly meaningful in a
geographically and ethnically dispersed country such as Indonesia. The D&T space is
demand driven. Public expectations and attitudes are changing in an age where books
are bought online and delivered instantly, whereas red tape and interminably long
turnaround times remain the norm for public services. Information is pursued relentlessly
by frenzied media actors. Social configurations are seeing greater women’s
empowerment and the declining dominance of the traditional family form.
In Indonesia, the D&T stimulus has made way for the birth of Access to Public
Information
Law, which then launched Indonesia as one of eight founding member countries of a
global movement for Open Government Partnership (OGP). The OGP signals a new
wave of change and opportunities for public participation and empowerment,
underscored by better use and dissemination of data, to improve public services,
increase public integrity and more effectively manage public resources.
The D&T space provides room for being opportunistic and taking advantage of the
shifting
nature of the state to be more innovative. At the local level, decentralization reforms
originated in 2001, appreciably earlier than those initiated from the center. In 2006, the
Minister of Finance, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, used the reform space to be innovative by
introducing new procedures and technologies, paving the way for other ministries. In
2011, the Indonesian Statistical Agency (BPS) kicked off far reaching reforms for its
transformation to a knowledge and citizen focus. Agus Martowardojo, the current
Minister of Finance announced that the key issue for budgets in 2012 is transparency.
Table 2 provides an illustration of the subtle shift in the Indonesia context, indicating that
the country might be swinging towards D&T and quasi-markets:
Table 2: Shifting Nature of the Indonesian State – From Command and Control to
Devolution and Transparency.

Azra, A. n.p. Islam, Corruption, Good Governance, and Civil Society: The Indonesian
Experience, ICR 2.1, Pluto Journals (plutojournals.org)
Corruption is no doubt one of the most serious problems faced by many countries,
including Muslim countries such as Indonesia. Sometimes it might seem that the
teachings of Islam – a religion which prohibits corruption – alone do not work to prevent
Muslims from conducting such harmful acts.
One way to address the problem of corruption would be the fostering of good
governance. however, at the same time Muslims would need a vibrant and dynamic civil
society that can play a crucial role in the creation and empowerment of good
governance. In Indonesia, a majority Muslim country – in fact the largest Muslim country
in the world – a large number of Islam-based civil societies exist.
The eradication of KKN and – by the same token – the creation of good governance has
been a central issue in Indonesian public debate since the fall of President Suharto in
1998. There have been increasing demands from many sectors of Indonesian society
that the government should establish a special program for combating KKN. One of the
results towards that end is the formation of the Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi
Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK). Despite some skepticism among the wider public over
whether or not the KPK will eventually be able to combat corruption effectively, it is also
clear that the KPK has recently become an increasingly powerful means to investigate
cases of corruption among high-ranking public officials and to bring them ultimately to
justice.
On the other hand, civil society organizations have also been trying to play a greater role
towards that end, by forming, for instance, a number of ‘watchdog bodies’ – among them
the powerful Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) – in an attempt to monitor the working
of government institutions and other public offices. Since then several policies and
program have been implemented by the government. However, one has to admit that so
far not much progress has been achieved. There are several inhibiting factors that seem
to make the efforts to create good governance in Indonesia a very difficult task.

One of the biggest hurdles towards the creation of good governance is the fact that
Indonesia, as far as the political culture is concerned, has long been a ‘soft state’ in the
Weberian sense. There are some important features of Indonesian political culture within
this framework:
• The existence of a culture of ‘patron–client’ relationships among state officials and
many segments of society, particularly the business sector. This kind of relationship gave
rise to strong ‘patrimonialism’ on almost all levels of society that, in turn, manifested
itself, among other ways, in the culture of what is colloquially known a ‘ABS’ (Asal
Bapak/Ibu Senang, or ‘yes men’).
• Unclear and inappropriate practices in government and bureaucracy. There seem to be
no clear boundaries, for instance, between things that are official and those that are
personal in nature.
• Weakness in social and public ethics.
• Weakness in law enforcement, as well as low ethics, credibility, accountability and
morale of law enforcement agencies.
Furthermore, as far as Indonesia’s ‘Partnership for Governance Reform’ is concerned,
there is only very little understanding among state officials, as well as society at large, of
the concept and practice of good governance. This is not surprising, since the executive
branch of government has been the most dominant and unchallenged – and in many
cases very arbitrary – institution at the expense of society in general – from the period of
the ‘Old Order’ under President Sukarno and into the era of the ‘New Order’ (since the
late 1960s under President Suharto).
The executive branch of the government was almost without control. Therefore, when
the ideas of good governance gained momentum in post-Suharto Indonesia, there had
been no fertile ground to implant them. The government is of course only one of the
actors in governance. There are many other actors outside the executive branch of
government, including the legislative and judicative branches which play an important
role in the decision-making process. Even in a wider sense, other ‘non-governmental’
actors that also play a role in decision-making or in influencing the decision-making
process, can be referred to as ‘actors’ of governance. They are, for instance, civil society
organizations and groups, NGOs, research institutes, political parties, the military,
religious leaders, public intellectuals, and others. Above all, however, ultimately it is
again the government which is central in creating good governance.
The creation of good governance, no doubt, needs an accurate understanding of the
very concept and practice of governance. According to the concept of ‘participatory
governance’, governance basically is good governance and good order of public life for a
better shared life. Therefore, good governance is an order that makes it possible for the
public to share a better life and at the same time is free from any kind of disorder and
imbalance. Good governance includes eight major characteristics. It is
• participatory,
• consensus-oriented,
• accountable,
• transparent,
• responsive,
• effective and efficient,
• equitable and inclusive,
• and follows the rule of law.
Recommended Steps
The country’s KPK or ‘Anti-Corruption Commission’ should be strengthened, so that the
efforts to combat corruption can reach a new level. The disclosure and trials of big
corruption cases involving some high officials of Bank Mandiri, figures of the General
Election Commission (KPU), former ministers, high-level officials of Bank Indonesia,
including Aulia Pohan (father-in-law of President Yudhoyono’s son), a good number of
provincial governors, heads of districts, members of national and local parliaments, and
many more give an even stronger hope of the eradication of corruption in the country.
Despite these encouraging signs, there is still much more to be done in order to win the
war against corruption which in the end will provide a more fertile ground for the creation
of good governance.
There should be a continued scaling-up of the momentum of the efforts towards
combating corruption and creating good governance at all levels of society. Civil society
organizations and groups in Indonesia have been involved in the war against corruption
and the creation of good governance.
Acronyms:

Kemenpan RB - Kementerian Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi

Republik Indonesia (Kemenpan RB)
KKN (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme) - corruption, collusion, nepotism
IDR - Indonersian rupia rate
reformasi - Indonesian and Malay word for reformation
reformasi birokrasi - bureaucratic reform
remunerasi - remuneration
PT Pertamina - PT Pertamina (Persero) or Pertamina (was Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara, lit. 'State Oil and Natural Gas Mining Company')
PT Telkom - PT Telkom Indonesia (Persero) Tbk, commonly known as Telkom Indonesia
(stylized as Telkom Indonesıa)
Mandiri - Bank Mandiri

References:

Widianingsih, I. 2005. Understanding Contemporary Issues in Indonesian Public

Administration and Policy Through Problem Based Learning. Paper presented at
Network of Asia-Pacific Schools and Institutes of Public Administration and Governance
(NAPSIPAG) Annual Conference 2005, Beijing, PRC, 5-7 December 2005.

Horhoruw, M., Karippacheril, T.G. Sutiyono, W. & Thomas, T. n.p. Transforming the
Public Sector in Indonesia: Delivering Total Reformasi
Dr. Ilago with Group I

Dr. Ilago with Group 2

Dr. Ilago with Group 3

Dr. Ilago with Group 4 representative

Dr. Ilago with Group 5