Cases in Donation:

01.Garrido u. CA, 236SCRA 450 (Capacity to sue to annul donation)

02.Puig vs. Penqflorida, 15 SCRA 276 (Donations Mortis Causa)
03.Central Philippine University, G.R. No. 112127, July 17,1995 Revocation
Non-Compliance; Resolutory Condition
04. Republic vs. Silim G.R. No. 149487, April 2,2001
05.Quilala vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 132681, Dec3ember 3, 2001
06.Heirs of Bonsato vs. CA L-6600, July 30, 1954
07.Sec. of Education vs,., Heirs if Rufino dulay, G.R. No. 164748, January 27,
2006
08.Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. CA, G.R. No. 77425, June 19,
1991.

Hypothetical Cases:

1. A donated a parcel of land to B, an illegitimate daughter of his deceased

wife before their marriage. In the deed of donation, A expressly stipulated
that B may immediately take possession of the land and derive fruits
therefrom with a further condition not to sell or transfer the land for twenty
years. After A’s death, B sold the land to C. B died within the year after the
sale. D, a sole heir of B realized that the property had already been
transferred in contravention of the conditions of the will. D then filed an
action for annulment of sale on the ground of the violation of the conditions
in the Deed. C filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that D, being only an
heir to B, does not have to the legal capacity to sue. Assume you are the
judge, how will you rule on the Motion to Dismiss?

2. Mr. X donated a parcel of land to Miss Y. The deed of donation is entitled

“Donation Inter Vivos”, notarized and Ms. Y accepted the donation in the
same instrument. The deed likewise states that Ms. Y can immediately take
possession and enjoy the fruits fully. However, Ms. Y cannot dispose of it
especially while Mr. X is alive, as the deed provides for a condition that only
he (Mr. X) can dispose of the property in his lifetime. Also, it further states
that Ms. Y can only register the donation after Mr. X’s death. Subsequently,
Mr. X died and his widow, filed an action to annul the donation contending
that the donation is a mortis causa and not intervivos. Assume, you are the
judge, how will you decide.
3. Ms. D. executed a Deed of Donation to the unborn child of Mrs. P. in the
amount of P 1 million. Unfortunately the child after birth survived for less
than 24 hours. Mrs. P. now wants to claim as heir to her unborn child. Ms.
D. now contends that the deed of donation did not become effective.
Decide.

4. Fraternity member, Mr. A. donated a parcel of land, to his fraternity “Tau

Lambda Wee” with the condition that the fraternity will construct a
fraternity house therein and name the same in his honor. The donation was
notarized and the acceptance was in the same instrument. The Deed of
Donation was not registered with the Registry of Deeds.
However, a purely commercial center was constructed therein.
Disappointed, Mr. A revoked the donation and demanded to surrender the
premises immediately. Under the circumstances, can Mr. A recover
possession of the property?

5. In 1950, Dr. Alba donated a parcel of land to Central University on

condition that the latter must establish a medical college on the land to be
named after him. In the year 2000, the heirs of Dr. Alba filed an action to
annul the donation and for the reconveyance of the property donated to them
for the failure, after 50 years, of the University to establish on the property a
medical school named after their father. The University opposed the action
on the ground of prescription and also because it had not used the property
for some purpose other than that stated in the donation. Should the
opposition of the University to the action of Dr. Alba’s heirs be sustained?
Explain.

6. In year 2010, Mr. S donated a parcel of land to Mr. P. who personally

handed to him the deed of donation in a document duly acknowledged
before the notary public. Mr. P. received it. A few days after, Mr. S. rode a
plane on his way to Hongkong. Unfortunately, the plane crashed and Mr. S.
died. Upon learning of Mr. S’s death, Mr. P. executed a deed
acknowledging before the notary public that he accepts the donation to him
by Mr. S. Has the donation become operative? Explain your answer.

7. The Deed of Donation executed by Andy in favor of his son, Bert reads as follows:
“ For and in consideration of my love to you, I hereby freely and voluntarily and irrevocably
donate to you, my son, my condominium unit located at Unit 507 Mezza Residences Aurora
Bldvd., Quezon City and covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 12345. This donation
shall take effect upon my death. In the meantime, the unit shall remain in my possession during
 my lifetime and that you, my son, cannot alienate, encumber, sell or dispose of the unit while I
am still alive” The deed also contains Bert’s acceptance and his agreement on the prohibition
of sale while his father is still alive. Is the Donation inter-vivos or mortis cause? Discuss in not
more than 5 sentences.

8. The Deed of Donation of a rice land was executed by Xander in favor of Yassi who signed his acceptance in
the same deed in the presence of each other. However, before the deed can be notarized, the donor
died. Is the donation valid or void? Why?
9. Arnold gave Maria a brand new car when they were still sweethearts. The deed of donation was specified
in the Deed of Purchase on installment for 2 years clearly specifying that Arnold purchased the car as a
gift for his undying love for Maria. The only evidence of the donation was the short note tied to a red
ribbon when the car was delivered to Maria. Maria then took possession of the car. Unfortunately, after
two years and the car was fully paid, they separated and he married Angel. In the meantime Maria
continued to use the car for 2 more years when coincidentally Arnold died. At this time Angel discovered
the existence of the car. Angel then went to Maria demanding the return of the car because according to
her there was not valid deed of donation. Maria declined. What arguments, if any, can you advise Maria
so that she may no longer be compelled to return the car?
10. Upon learning that best friend was finally pregnant after many years of trying, Agnes donated to Sally’s
unborn child the amount of 1million pesos. The donation was accepted by Sally. Unfortunately the baby
died after a few hours from birth as the baby was infected by Zika virus. After a few months, Sally
demanded from Agnes the 1 million pesos, she being an heir to her baby. Agnes refused to give Sally the
P1 million. Assume you are the lawyer of Agnes, what or how will you advise your client?
11.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150179. April 30, 2003]

HEIRS OF WILLIAM SEVILLA, NAMELY: WILFREDO SEVILLA,

WILSON SEVILLA, WILMA SEVILLA, WILLINGTON SEVILLA,
AND WILLIAM SEVILLA, JR., HEIRS OF MARIA SEVILLA,
NAMELY: AMADOR SEVILLA, JENO CORTES, VICTOR CORTES,
MARICEL CORTES, ALELEI* CORTES AND
**
ANJEI CORTES, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO SEVILLA, PETER
SEVILLA, AND LUZVILLA SEVILLA,respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

One who alleges defect or lack of valid consent to a contract by reason

of fraud or undue influence must establish by full, clear and convincing
evidence such specific acts that vitiated a party’s consent, otherwise, the
latter’s presumed consent to the contract prevails.[1]
The instant petition for review seeks to set aside the September 26,
2000 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48956,
affirming in toto the Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City,
Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4240 which declared, inter alia, the questioned
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos valid and binding on the parties.
The undisputed facts reveal that on December 10, 1973, Filomena
Almirol de Sevilla died intestate leaving 8 children, namely: William, Peter,
Leopoldo, Felipe, Rosa, Maria, Luzvilla, and Jimmy, all surnamed
Sevilla. William, Jimmy and Maria are now deceased and are survived by
their respective spouses and children.[4] Filomena Almirol de Sevilla left the
following properties:

PARCEL I:

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 653 situated at General Luna St., Dipolog City,
with an area of about 804 square meters, more or less, duly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. (T-6671)-1448 [in the name of Filomena Almirol de
Sevilla, Honorata Almirol and Felisa Almirol] and assessed at P31,360.00
according to Tax Dec. No. 018-947;

PARCEL II:

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 3805-B situated at Olingan, Dipolog City, with
an area of about 18,934 square meters, more or less, duly covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6672 and assessed at P5,890 according to Tax Dec. No.
009-761;

PARCEL III:

A parcel of land known as Lot No. 837-1/4 situated at Magsaysay Street, Dipolog
City, with an area of about 880 square meters more or less, duly covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6064 and assessed at P12,870.00 according to
Tax Dec. No. 020-1078;

PARCEL IV:
A parcel of residential land known as Lot No. 1106-B-3 situated at Sta. Filomena,
Dipolog City, with an area of 300 square meters, more or less, assessed at
P3,150.00 according to Tax Dec. No. 006-317;

Commercial building erected on Parcel I above-described; and residential building

erected just at the back of the commercial building above-described and erected on
Parcel I above-described;[5]

Parcel I, Lot No. 653, is the paraphernal property of Filomena Almirol de

Sevilla which she co-owned with her sisters, Honorata Almirol and Felisa
Almirol,[6] who were both single and without issue. Parcels II, II and IV are
conjugal properties of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla and her late husband
Andres Sevilla.[7] When Honorata died in 1982, her 1/3 undivided share in
Lot No. 653 was transmitted to her heirs, Felisa Almirol and the heirs of
Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, who thereby acquired the property in the
proportion of one-half share each.
During the lifetime of Felisa and Honorata Almirol, they lived in the
house of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, together with their nephew,
respondent Leopoldo Sevilla and his family. Leopoldo attended to the
needs of his mother, Filomena, and his two aunts, Honorata and Felisa.[8]
Felisa died on July 6, 1988.[9] Previous thereto, on November 25, 1985,
she executed a last will and testament devising her 1/2 share in Lot No.
653 to the spouses Leopoldo Sevilla and Belen Leyson.[10] On August 8,
1986, Felisa executed another document denominated as “Donation Inter
Vivos” ceding to Leopoldo Sevilla her 1/2 undivided share in Lot No. 653,
which was accepted by Leopoldo in the same document.[11]
On September 3, 1986, Felisa Almirol and Peter Sevilla, in his own
behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, executed a
Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, identifying and adjudicating the 1/3 share of
Honorata Almirol to the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla and to Felisa
Almirol.[12]
Thereafter, respondents Leopoldo, Peter and Luzvilla Sevilla obtained
the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-6671)-1448, over Lot
No. 653, and the issuance of the corresponding titles to Felisa Almirol and
the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla. However, the requested titles for
Lot Nos. 653-A and 653-B, were left unsigned by the Register of Deeds of
Dipolog City, pending submission by Peter Sevilla of a Special Power of
Attorney authorizing him to represent the other heirs of Filomena Almirol de
Sevilla.[13]
On June 21, 1990, Felipe Sevilla, Rosa Sevilla, and the heirs of William,
Jimmy and Maria, all surnamed Sevilla, filed the instant case against
respondents Leopoldo Sevilla, Peter Sevilla and Luzvilla Sevilla, for
annulment of the Deed of Donation and the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition,
Accounting, Damages, with prayer for Receivership and for Partition of the
properties of the late Filomena Almirol de Sevilla.[14] They alleged that the
Deed of Donation is tainted with fraud because Felisa Almirol, who was
then 81 years of age, was seriously ill and of unsound mind at the time of
the execution thereof; and that the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition is void
because it was executed without their knowledge and consent.[15]
In their answer,[16] respondents denied that there was fraud or undue
pressure in the execution of the questioned documents. They alleged that
Felisa was of sound mind at the time of the execution of the assailed deeds
and that she freely and voluntarily ceded her undivided share in Lot No.
653 in consideration of Leopoldo’s and his family’s love, affection, and
services rendered in the past. Respondents further prayed that Parcels II,
III, and IV be partitioned among the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla in
accordance with the law on intestate succession.
On December 16, 1994, a decision was rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte, Branch 6, upholding the
validity of the Deed of Donation and declaring the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition unenforceable. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, summing up the evidence for

both the plaintiffs and the defendants, the Court hereby renders judgment:

1) Declaring the questioned Deed of Donation Inter Vivos valid and binding,
and, therefore, has the full force and effect of law;

2) Declaring the questioned Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition as unenforceable as

yet as against the other heirs, as it lacks the legal requisites of Special Power of
Attorney or any other appropriate instrument to be executed by the other heirs who
were not made parties thereto;

3) Finding the parties herein entitled to the partition of Parcel II, III, IV as
designated in the Complaint, in equal shares, and, as to Lot No. 653 designated as
Parcel I, it shall be divided equally into two, between defendant Leopoldo Sevilla
on one hand, and, collectively, the Heirs of William Sevilla, Heirs of Jimmy
Sevilla, Heirs of Maria Sevilla, Felipe Sevilla, Leopoldo Sevilla, Peter Sevilla,
Luzvilla Sevilla-Tan, on the other hand, as well as the two buildings thereon in
proportionate values;

4) Directing the parties, if they can agree, to submit herewith a project of

partition, which shall designate the share which pertains to the heirs entitled
thereto, that is, the particular and specific portions of the properties subject of the
partition;

5) Directing defendant Peter Sevilla to pay and/or collect from the parties the
amounts corresponding to each one entitled or liable thereto, as recorded in the
Statement of Accounts, except for defendant Leopoldo Sevilla who is found by the
Court to have incurred only an overdraft of P5,742.98 and not P33,204.33 as
earlier computed therein.

6) Dismissing the plaintiffs’ claim for damages, which is not proved with
sufficient evidence, and defendants’ counterclaim, on the same ground.

7) With costs de oficio.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[17]

Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners contended

that the Deed of Donation should be declared void and that Lot No. 653
should be divided equally among them. Respondents, on the other hand,
posited that the trial court erred in declaring the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition unenforceable against the other heirs of Filomena Almirol de
Sevilla who were not parties to said Deed.
On September 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
assailed decision of the trial court.[18] Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied on August 30, 2001.[19]
Hence, the instant petition based on the following assignment of errors:

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

AS VOID AB INITIO THE DEED OF DONATION EXCUTED BY FELISA
ALMIROL IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT LEOPOLDO SEVILLA CEDING TO
HIM ONE HALF PORTION OF LOT 653, DIPOLOG CADASTRE, IT HAVING
BEEN EXECUTED WITH FRAUD, UNDUE PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE;
 THAT THE APPELLATE COURT GREATLY ERRED IN NOT ORDERING
THE PARTITION OF LOT 653, DIPOLOG CADASTRE EQUALLY AMONG
THE EIGHT (8) HEIRS OF FILOMENA, HONORATA AND FELISA, ALL
SURNAMED ALMIROL.[20]

To resolve the issue raised in the instant petition for review, the validity
of the donation inter vivos executed by Felisa Almirol in favor of Leopoldo
Sevilla must first be determined.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously
of a thing or right in favor of another who accepts it.[21] Under Article 737 of
the Civil Code, the donor’s capacity shall be determined as of the time of
the making of the donation. Like any other contract, an agreement of the
parties is essential,[22] and the attendance of a vice of consent renders the
donation voidable.[23]
In the case at bar, there is no question that at the time Felisa Almirol
executed the deed of donation she was already the owner of 1/2 undivided
portion of Lot No. 653. Her 1/3 undivided share therein was increased by
1/2 when she and Filomena inherited the 1/3 share of their sister Honorata
after the latter’s death. Hence, the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot No.
653 is considered a present property which she can validly dispose of at
the time of the execution of the deed of donation.[24]
Petitioners, however, insist that respondent Leopoldo Sevilla employed
fraud and undue influence on the person of the donor. This argument
involves appreciation of the evidence.[25] The settled rule is that factual
findings of the trial court, if affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to
great respect.[26] There are exceptional circumstances when findings of fact
of lower courts may be set aside[27] but none is present in the case at
bar. Indeed, neither fraud nor undue influence can be inferred from the
following circumstance alleged by the petitioners, to wit –

A. That Felisa Almirol lived with respondent Leopoldo Sevilla in the residential
house owned by petitioners and respondents;

B. That the old woman Felisa Almirol was being supported out of the rentals
derived from the building constructed on the land which was a common fund….

C. That when Felisa Almirol was already 82 years old, he [Leopoldo Sevilla]
accompanied her in the Office of Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr., for the purpose of
executing her last will and testament…
D. That in the last will and testament executed by Felisa Almirol, she had
devised in favor of respondent Leopoldo Sevilla one-half of the land in question;

E. That respondent Leopoldo Sevilla not contented with the execution by Felisa
Almirol of her last will and testament, had consulted a lawyer as to how he will be
able to own the land immediately;

F. That upon the advice of Atty. Helen Angeles, Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte, Dipolog City, Felisa Almirol executed a
Deed of Donation, hence, the questioned Deed of Donation executed in his favor;

G. That the subject matter of the Deed of Donation was the one-half portion of
Lot 653, Dipolog Cadastre, which was willed by Felisa Almirol, in favor of
respondent Leopoldo Sevilla in her last will and testament;

H. That at the time of the execution of the Deed of Donation, Lot No. 653,
Dipolog Cadastre, was not yet partitioned between petitioners and respondents they
being heirs of the late Filomena and Honorata, all surnamed Almirol;

I. That after the execution of the Deed of Donation, respondent Peter Sevilla
and the late Felisa Almirol were the only ones who executed the Deed of Extra-
judicial Partition over Lot 653, Dipolog Cadastre, the petitioners were not made
parties in the said Deed of Extrajudicial Partition;

J. That on the basis of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed of

Donation, respondent Leopoldo Sevilla caused the subdivision survey of Lot 653,
Dipolog Cadastre, dividing the same into two (2) lots, adjudicating one-half of the
lot in his favor and the other half in favor of respondents peter Sevilla and Luzvilla
Sevilla, and to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla himself;

K. That only two persons knew the actual survey of the land, petitioner Felipe
Sevilla and respondent Leopoldo Sevilla himself, the rest of the co-owners were
not even notified;

L. That on the basis of the Extrajudicial Partition, Deed of Donation, the

approved subdivision plan, respondent Leopoldo Sevilla filed a petition for
issuance of the corresponding titles for the two lots, but the Register of Deeds of
Dipolog City refused to issue the corresponding titles for the two lots to respondent
Leopoldo Sevilla so that up to this moment … the two tiles were left unsigned by
the Register of Deeds.[28]
 There is fraud when, through the insidious words or machinations of
one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract
which, without them, he would not have agreed to.[29] There is undue
influence when a person takes improper advantage of his power over the
will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The
following circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family,
spiritual and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person
alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental
weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.[30]
Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove. We have consistently applied the ancient rule that
if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts on which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.[31] In the instant case, the self-serving testimony of the petitioners
are vague on what acts of Leopoldo Sevilla constituted fraud and undue
influence and on how these acts vitiated the consent of Felisa
Almirol. Fraud and undue influence that vitiated a party’s consent must be
established by full, clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, the latter’s
presumed consent to the contract prevails.[32] Neither does the fact that the
donation preceded the partition constitute fraud. It is not necessary that
partition should first be had because what was donated to Leopoldo was
the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa in Lot No. 653.
Moreover, petitioners failed to show proof why Felisa should be held
incapable of exercising sufficient judgment in ceding her share to
respondent Leopoldo.[33] As testified by the notary public who notarized the
Deed of Donation, Felisa confirmed to him her intention to donate her share
in Lot No. 653 to Leopoldo. He stressed that though the donor was old,
she was of sound mind and could talk sensibly. Significantly, there is
nothing in the record that discloses even an attempt by petitioners to rebut
said declaration of the notary public.
Clearly, therefore, the courts below did not err in sustaining the validity
of the deed of donation.
Anent the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition, we find that the same is
void ab initio and not merely unenforceable. In Delos Reyes v. Court of
Appeals,[34] which is a case involving the sale of a lot by a person who is
neither the owner nor the legal representative, we declared the contract
void ab initio. It was held that one of the requisites of a valid contract under
Article 1318 of the Civil Code is the consent and the capacity to give
consent of the parties to the contract. The legal capacity of the parties is an
essential element for the existence of the contract because it is an
indispensable condition for the existence of consent. There is no effective
consent in law without the capacity to give such consent. In other words,
legal consent presupposes capacity. Thus, there is said to be no consent,
and consequently, no contract when the agreement is entered into by one
in behalf of another who has never given him authorization therefor unless
he has by law a right to represent the latter.[35]
In the case at bar, at the time Felisa executed the deed of extra-judicial
partition dividing the share of her deceased sister Honarata between her
and the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla, she was no longer the owner
of the 1/2 undivided portion of Lot No. 653, having previously donated the
same to respondent Leopoldo Sevilla who accepted the donation in the
same deed. A donation inter vivos, as in the instant case, is immediately
operative and final.[36] As a mode of acquiring ownership, it results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and
the donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. And once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
Evidently, Felisa did not possess the capacity to give consent to or
execute the deed of partition inasmuch as she was neither the owner nor
the authorized representative of respondent Leopoldo to whom she
previously transmitted ownership of her undivided share in Lot No.
653. Considering that she had no legal capacity to give consent to the deed
of partition, it follows that there is no consent given to the execution of the
deed, and therefore, there is no contract to speak of. As such, the deed of
partition is void ab initio, hence, not susceptible of ratification.
Nevertheless, the nullity of the deed of extra-judicial partition will not
affect the validity of the donation inter vivos ceding to respondent Leopoldo
Sevilla the 1/2 undivided share of Felisa Almirol in Lot No. 653. Said lot
should therefore be divided as follows: 1/2 shall go to respondent Leopoldo
Sevilla by virtue of the deed of donation, while the other half shall be
divided equally among the heirs of Filomena Almirol de Sevilla including
Leopoldo Sevilla, following the rules on intestate succession.
Finally, we note that the name of Rosa Sevilla, daughter of Filomena
Almirol de Sevilla, and one of the plaintiffs herein, was omitted in the
dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision.[37] Her name should therefore
be included in the dispositive portion as one of the heirs entitled to share in
the properties of the late Filomena Almirol de Sevilla.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48956, affirming in toto the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 4240, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The Deed of Extra-judicial Partition
dated September 3, 1986 is declared void, and the name of Rosa Sevilla is
ordered included in the dispositive portion of the trial court’s judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

*
Also spelled as Alili in the Petition.
**
Also spelled as Anggie in the Petition.
[1]
Cenido v. Apacionado, 376 Phil. 801, 816-817 (1999), citing Centenera
v. Palicio, 29 Phil. 470, 485-486; (1915); also cited in Tolentino, Civil
Code, vol. 4, p. 475; see also Palmares v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil.
664 (1998); Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108245, 25
November 1994, 238 SCRA 397, 408 [1994]; Cu v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 75504, 2 April 1991, 195 SCRA 647, 657; Civil Code,
Articles 1337 and 1338.
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., and concurred in
by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr. (Rollo, p. 23)
[3]
Penned by Judge Milagros JB. Marcaida (Records, p. 164).
[4]
TSN, October 6, 1992, p. 8; 5 April 1993, p. 3.
[5]
Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 37-38.
[6]
Transfer Certificate of Title of Lot No. 653, Exhibit “A”, Folder of Exhibits,
p. 1.
[7]
TSN, 6 October 1992, p. 9.
[8]
TSN, 7 September 1993, pp. 5-6.
[9]
Exhibit “Q”, Death Certificate, Folder of Exhibits, p. 103.
[10]
Exhibit “1”, “Katapusang Panugon”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 146; Exhibit
“2”, English translation of Exhibit “1”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.
[11]
Exhibit “8”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 155.
[12]
Exhibit “9”, Folder of Exhibits, p. 157.
[13]
TSN, October 6, 1992, pp. 4-5.
[14]
Complaint, Records, p. 1; Amended Complaint, Records, p. 35.
[15]
Amended Complaint, Records, pp. 39-40.
[16]
Records, p. 21.
[17]
Records, p. 191.
[18]
Rollo, p. 23.
[19]
Rollo, p. 18.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[21]
Civil Code, Article 725.
[22]
Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 edition, p.
349.
[23]
Civil Code, Article 1330 in relation to Article 732.
Article 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
Article 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed
by the general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in this Title.
[24]
Id., Articles 750 and 751.
Art 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the
donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in
usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all
relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by
law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced on petition of any person affected.
Article 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose
at the time of the donation.
[25]
Non v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 538, 543 (2000).
[26]
British Airways v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121824, 29 January 1998,
285 SCRA 450, 461, citing Meneses v. Court of Appeals, 316 Phil.
210 (1995).
[27]
Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102526-31, 21 May 1998, 290
SCRA 330, 341, citing Engineering & Machinery Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 322 Phil. 161 (1998).
[28]
Petition, Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[29]
Civil Code, Article 1338.
[30]
Civil Code, Article 1337.
[31]
Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266, 21
December 1999, 321 SCRA 393, citing Belen v. Belen, 13 Phil. 202,
206 (1909) cited in Martin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 82248, 30
January 1992, 205 SCRA 591 (1992).
[32]
Supra, note 1.
[33]
Non v. Court of Appeals, supra, note 26.
[34]
372 Phil. 522, 534-535 (1999)
[35]
Id., citing Tolentino, “Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines,” Vol. IV, p. 445 citing 8 Manresa 646;
Bumanlag vs. Alzate, G.R. No. L-39119, 14 September 1986, 144
SCRA 480; Mindanao Academy vs. Yap, 121 Phil. 204 (1965);
Estoque v. Pajimula, 133 Phil. 55 (1968); Segura v. Segura, G.R. No.
L-29320, 19 September 1988, 165 SCRA 368; Frias v. Esquive, G.R.
No. L-24679, 30 October 1975, 167 SCRA 487; Civil Code, Articles
1317 and 1453.
[36]
Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 Phil. 245, 255 (1977).
[37]
Complaint, Records, p. 1; Amended Complaint, Records, p. 35; TSN, 6
October 1992, p. 8.

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
SPOUSES ALBERTO GARRIDO AND
COLOMA DAGURO,
Petitioners,
-versus- G.R. No. 101262
September 14, 1994
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
RUFINO AND CONRADA
SUPLEMENTO,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Tomas Hingco, a widower, originally owned Lot 209 of the
Dingle
Cadastre, Iloilo, He married Consolacion Rondael, a
widow, who had
a daughter Magdalena Rondael. In 1947 he donated one
half (1/2) of
Lot 209 to his stepdaughter Magdalena subject to the
condition that she could not sell, transfer or cede the same.
When he died,
Consolacion inherited the remaining half of Lot 209 which,
in turn,
was inherited by Magdalena upon the death of
Consolacion.
Consequently, the entire Lot 209 was registered in the
name of
Magdalena Rondael, married to Lorenzo Daguro, under
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-13089.
chanroblespublishingcompany
In 1973 Magdalena sold a portion of Lot 209 (Lot 209-B)
to Mariano
Platinos and Florida Macahilo. The remaining portion (Lot
209-A)
with an area of 343 square meters is the subject of this
litigation. chanroblespublishingcompany
In 1976 Lorenzo Daguro died. Magdalena then filed before
the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo a petition to cancel the lien
prohibiting her
from disposing of Lot 209-A because she needed money
for her
subsistence and medical expenses as she was then in her
80’s.
Besides, she was sickly.[1] Her deposition on oral
examination in
connection with her petition was taken on 24 January
1979.[2]
On 17 August 1978, during the pendency of her petition,
Magdalena
executed a Conditional Deed of Sale of Lot 209-A in favor
of
respondent spouses Rufino and Conrada Suplemento
“subject to the
lien subsisting and annotated on the face of the Certificate
of Title.”[3]
Magdalena agreed to bear the cost of the cancellation of the
lien and
respondents to be bound thereby as long as it subsisted,
with the
understanding that in the event the lien was not cancelled,
the
amount already paid would be refunded. It was further
stipulated that
“out of the Nineteen Thousand (P19,000.00) consideration
only
Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos shall be paid pro rata
monthly for
ten (10) years and to convene (commence?) one (1) year
from the date
of this Deed.”[4]
chanroblespublishingcompany
On 24 January 1979 the petition for cancellation of
encumbrance was
denied for the reason that the ground cited for the
cancellation was
not one of these allowed by Sec. 112 of Act 496 and that
Magdalena
failed to produce the deed of donation which contained the
alleged
restriction. Nonetheless, on 19 July 1979 Magdalena
executed with
the conformity of her husband a Deed of Absolute Sale
covering Lot
209-A in favor of respondents, spouses Rufino and
Conrada
Suplemento.[5] The deed was notarized on the same date.
On 13 April 1982, Magdalena died. On 2 December 1982
TCT No. T-108689 was
issued in the name of the Suplementos.[6]
chanroblespublishingcompany
Magdalena had two (2) daughters but only one is still
living, Coloma
Daguro, married to Alberto Garrido, the spouses being the
petitioners
herein. They were based in Davao City and would visit
Magdalena
only on occasions. In February 1984, Alberto Garrido
visited the
Suplementos in the house where Magdalena used to live.[7]
He wanted
to find out if the taxes on the house were being paid. In
reply,
respondents showed him the Deed of Absolute Sale signed
by his
parents-in-law and it was only then that he came to know
that Lot
209-A no longer belonged to his in-laws.
chanroblespublishingcompany
On 28 October 1985 petitioners Coloma Daguro and
Alberto Garrido
filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City for
annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot 209-A,
reconveyance
and damages claiming that the deed was fictitious since
Magdalena’s
signature thereon “appears to have been traced” and
Lorenzo
Daguro’s signature was likewise a forgery since he died
prior to the
execution thereof, or on 9 October 1976.[8]
chanroblespublishingcompany
The trial court, relying on the deposition of Magdalena on
24 January
1979, found that she wanted to sell and did in fact sell Lot
209-A to
the Suplementos. In addition, the court found that the
genuineness of
Lorenzo Daguro’s signature was not germane to the
validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale as said signature was not necessary
to convey
title to the paraphernal property of Magdalena. To
petitioners’ credit,
it held that no evidence was adduced by respondents to
show
payment of any installment of the balance of the purchase
price to
Magdalena before her death or to her heir, Coloma. Thus,
judgment
was rendered on 19 October 1988 declaring the sale of 19
July 1979
valid but ordering the Suplementos to pay petitioners
P16,000.00
with legal rate of interest until fully paid.[9]
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling
of the
Iloilo trial court in its decision of 27 February 1991[10] and
denied
reconsideration on 29 July 1991.[11]
chanroblespublishingcompanyPetitioners contend that the
appellate court erred in holding that they
have no personality to assail the Absolute Deed of Sale and
the
genuineness of the signature of Magdalena Rondael.
chanroblespublishingcompany
Petitioners assert that the issue raised in the trial court was
whether
Magdalena Rondael could sell the property despite the
prohibition in
the deed of donation. In ruling that they were incapacitated
to
question the non-observance of the condition, respondent
court went
beyond the issue, hence, exceeded its jurisdiction.
chanroblespublishingcompany
We find for respondents. Petitioners have no personality to
question
the violation of the restriction because they are not heirs of
the donor.
When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions
imposed by
the donor, it is the donor who has the right to impugn the
validity of

the transaction affecting the donated property, conformably

with Art.
764 of the Civil Code, which provides that the right to
revoke may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor and may be exercised
against the
heirs of the donee, and the action prescribes four years after
the
violation of the condition. chanroblespublishingcompany
Petitioners, lack to capacity of question the non-compliance
with the
condition is intimately connected with the issue regarding
the validity
of the sale on account of the prohibition in the deed of
donation.
Thus, we have established the rule that an unassigned error
closely
related to an error properly assigned, or upon which the
determination of the question properly assigned is
dependent, may be
considered by the appellate court.[12]
chanroblespublishingcompany
Petitioners also submit that the finding of the appellate
court that the
signature of Magdalena Rondael in the Deed of Absolute
Sale is
genuine has been overtaken by events. In a letter dated 1
August 1991,
the Regional Director of the NBI, Iloilo City, furnished the
Iloilo City
Prosecutor with a copy of NBI Questioned Document
Report No. 413-
791 dated 23 July 1991, purporting to show that the
questioned
signature as well as the standard/sample signatures of the
deceased
Magdalena Rondael were not written by one and the same
person,[13]
hence, a forgery. chanroblespublishingcompany
Admittedly, the NBI report was never adduced before the
lower
courts; in fact, it is presented for the first time and only
before this Court. Obviously, this is not a newly discovered
evidence within the
purview of Sec. 1, par. (b), Rule 37, of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners
should have thought of having the signature of Magdalena
Rondael
on the deed of sale examined when the case was still with
the trial
court. Nothing would have stopped them from doing so.
Hence, it is
now late, too late in fact, to present it before this Court.
chanroblespublishingcompany
Petitioners’ reliance on the NBI report as basis for new trial
on the
ground of “newly discovered evidence” is a mistake. In the
first place,
the rule is explicit that a motion for new trial should be
filed before
the trial court and within the period for appeal. In the
second place,
in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly
regarded
as “newly discovered” for the purpose of granting new trial,
the
following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence had been
discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been
discovered
and produced during trial even with the exercise of
reasonable
diligence; and, (c) the evidence is material and not merely
corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such
weight that if
admitted would probably alter the result.[14] At the pith of
these
requirements is that what is essential is not so much the
time when
the evidence offered first sprang into existence nor the time
when it
first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it;
rather,
that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
producing or locating such evidence before or during trial
but had
nonetheless failed to secure it. The NBI report does not
qualify as
newly discovered evidence because the second requirement
was not
complied with. Petitioners did not exercise reasonable
diligence in
procuring such evidence before or during trial. By their
own
admission, the Fiscal sought NBI assistance only after the
trial of the
case. They could have done so themselves when their case
was tried.
Besides, when the City Prosecutor requested the NBI for a
handwriting examination in connection with petitioners’
criminal
complaint for falsification against respondents, the initial
response of
the NBI was: “no definite opinion can be rendered on the
matter due
to lack of sufficient basis necessary for a scientific
comparative
examination.”[15] From there it can be deduced that
petitioners did
not submit adequate documents before the NBI at the first
instance,
thus showing their want of reasonable diligence in
procuring the
evidence they needed for a new trial.
Chanroblespublishingcompany We accord finality to the
finding of respondent court, supported as it
is by substantial evidence, that the alleged discrepancy
between the
signature of Magdalena Rondael appearing on the Deed of
Absolute
Sale and her signature on the Conditional Deed of Sale,
petition to
cancel the annotation prohibiting the sale of the donated
property,
petitioners’ reply to opposition,[16] transcript of her
deposition dated
24 January 1979, and the deed of sale of Lot 209-B, does
not exist.
Having alleged forgery, petitioners had the burden of proof.
Here,
they utterly failed. They even attached to their complaint
five receipts
purportedly signed by Magdalena but, except for one which
was
signed “Magdalena Rondael,” said receipts were signed
“Magdalena
Daguro.”[17] Besides, there is no showing that the
signatures presented
as bases for comparison are themselves genuine. On the
other hand,
the Deed of Absolute Sale is a notarized document which
carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document
with respect
to its due execution. chanroblespublishingcompany
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of
the Court
of Appeals of 27 February 1991 as well as its resolution
denying
reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED.
chanroblespublishingcompany
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave. chanroblespublishingcompany
chanroblespublishingcompany
[1] Exh. “4;” Records, pp. 181-183.
[2] Exh. “7;” Records, pp. 189-195.
 [3] Exh. “1;” Records, p. 176.
[4] Ibid. chanroblespublishingcompany
[5] Exh. “5;” Records, pp. 178-179.
[6] Exh. “6;” Records, p. 180.
[7] Magdalena stated in her deposition that respondents,
who were her second

03. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112127 July 17, 1995

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REMEDIOS FRANCO,
FRANCISCO N. LOPEZ, CECILIA P. VDA. DE LOPEZ,
REDAN LOPEZ AND REMARENE LOPEZ, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY filed this petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
which reversed that of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City
directing petitioner to reconvey to private respondents the
property donated to it by their predecessor-in-interest.
Sometime in 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., who was
then a member of the Board of Trustees of the Central
Philippine College (now Central Philippine University [CPU]),
executed a deed of donation in favor of the latter of a parcel of
land identified as Lot No. 3174-B-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-
1144, then a portion of Lot No. 3174-B, for which Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-3910-A was issued in the name of the
donee CPU with the following annotations copied from the deed
of donation —
1. The land described shall be utilized by the CPU
exclusively for the establishment and use of a medical
college with all its buildings as part of the curriculum;
2. The said college shall not sell, transfer or convey to
any third party nor in any way encumber said land;
3. The said land shall be called "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS", and the said college shall be under
obligation to erect a cornerstone bearing that name.
Any net income from the land or any of its parks shall
be put in a fund to be known as the "RAMON LOPEZ
CAMPUS FUND" to be used for improvements of
said campus and erection of a building thereon. 1
On 31 May 1989, private respondents, who are the heirs of Don
Ramon Lopez, Sr., filed an action for annulment of donation,
reconveyance and damages against CPU alleging that since 1939
up to the time the action was filed the latter had not complied
with the conditions of the donation. Private respondents also
argued that petitioner had in fact negotiated with the National
Housing Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated property
with another land owned by the latter.
In its answer petitioner alleged that the right of private
respondents to file the action had prescribed; that it did not
violate any of the conditions in the deed of donation because it
never used the donated property for any other purpose than that
for which it was intended; and, that it did not sell, transfer or
convey it to any third party.
On 31 May 1991, the trial court held that petitioner failed to
comply with the conditions of the donation and declared it null
and void. The court a quo further directed petitioner to execute a
deed of the reconveyance of the property in favor of the heirs of
the donor, namely, private respondents herein.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which on 18 June
1993 ruled that the annotations at the back of petitioner's
certificate of title were resolutory conditions breach of which
should terminate the rights of the donee thus making the
donation revocable.
The appellate court also found that while the first condition
mandated petitioner to utilize the donated property for the
establishment of a medical school, the donor did not fix a period
within which the condition must be fulfilled, hence, until a
period was fixed for the fulfillment of the condition, petitioner
could not be considered as having failed to comply with its part
of the bargain. Thus, the appellate court rendered its decision
reversing the appealed decision and remanding the case to the
court of origin for the determination of the time within which
petitioner should comply with the first condition annotated in
the certificate of title.
Petitioner now alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: (a) in
holding that the quoted annotations in the certificate of title of
petitioner are onerous obligations and resolutory conditions of
the donation which must be fulfilled non-compliance of which
would render the donation revocable; (b) in holding that the
issue of prescription does not deserve "disquisition;" and, (c) in
remanding the case to the trial court for the fixing of the period
within which petitioner would establish a medical college. 2
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear perusal of the
conditions set forth in the deed of donation executed by Don
Ramon Lopez, Sr., gives us no alternative but to conclude that
his donation was onerous, one executed for a valuable
consideration which is considered the equivalent of the donation
itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a burden equivalent to the
value of the donation. A gift of land to the City of Manila
requiring the latter to erect schools, construct a children's
playground and open streets on the land was considered an
onerous donation. 3 Similarly, where Don Ramon Lopez donated
the subject parcel of land to petitioner but imposed an obligation
upon the latter to establish a medical college thereon, the
donation must be for an onerous consideration.
Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, on conditional obligations,
the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of
those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the
event which constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person
donates land to another on the condition that the latter would
build upon the land a school, the condition imposed was not a
condition precedent or a suspensive condition but a resolutory
one. 4 It is not correct to say that the schoolhouse had to be
constructed before the donation became effective, that is, before
the donee could become the owner of the land, otherwise, it
would be invading the property rights of the donor. The
donation had to be valid before the fulfillment of the
condition. 5 If there was no fulfillment or compliance with the
condition, such as what obtains in the instant case, the donation
may now be revoked and all rights which the donee may have
acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.
The claim of petitioner that prescription bars the instant action
of private respondents is unavailing.
The condition imposed by the donor, i.e., the building of a
medical school upon the land donated, depended upon the
exclusive will of the donee as to when this condition shall
be fulfilled. When petitioner accepted the donation, it
bound itself to comply with the condition thereof. Since the
time within which the condition should be fulfilled
depended upon the exclusive will of the petitioner, it has
been held that its absolute acceptance and the
acknowledgment of its obligation provided in the deed of
donation were sufficient to prevent the statute of limitations
from barring the action of private respondents upon the
original contract which was the deed of donation. 6
Moreover, the time from which the cause of action accrued for
the revocation of the donation and recovery of the property
donated cannot be specifically determined in the instant case. A
cause of action arises when that which should have been done is
not done, or that which should not have been done is done. 7 In
cases where there is no special provision for such computation,
recourse must be had to the rule that the period must be counted
from the day on which the corresponding action could have been
instituted. It is the legal possibility of bringing the action which
determines the starting point for the computation of the period.
In this case, the starting point begins with the expiration of a
reasonable period and opportunity for petitioner to fulfill what
has been charged upon it by the donor.
The period of time for the establishment of a medical college
and the necessary buildings and improvements on the property
cannot be quantified in a specific number of years because of the
presence of several factors and circumstances involved in the
erection of an educational institution, such as government laws
and regulations pertaining to education, building requirements
and property restrictions which are beyond the control of the
donee.
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its
nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a period was
intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code applies, which provides that the courts may fix the
duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself
cannot be demanded until after the court has fixed the period for
compliance therewith and such period has arrived. 8
This general rule however cannot be applied considering the
different set of circumstances existing in the instant case. More
than a reasonable period of fifty (50) years has already been
allowed petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply with the
condition even if it be burdensome, to make the donation in its
favor forever valid. But, unfortunately, it failed to do so. Hence,
there is no more need to fix the duration of a term of the
obligation when such procedure would be a mere technicality
and formality and would serve no purpose than to delay or lead
to an unnecessary and expensive multiplication of
suits. 9 Moreover, under Art. 1191 of the Civil Code, when one
of the obligors cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him,
the obligee may seek rescission and the court shall decree the
same unless there is just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.
In the absence of any just cause for the court to determine the
period of the compliance, there is no more obstacle for the court
to decree the rescission claimed.
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation herein is basically
a gratuitous one, doubts referring to incidental circumstances of
a gratuitous contract should be resolved in favor of the least
transmission of rights and interests.10 Records are clear and facts
are undisputed that since the execution of the deed of donation
up to the time of filing of the instant action, petitioner has failed
to comply with its obligation as donee. Petitioner has slept on its
obligation for an unreasonable length of time. Hence, it is only
just and equitable now to declare the subject donation already
ineffective and, for all purposes, revoked so that petitioner as
donee should now return the donated property to the heirs of the
donor, private respondents herein, by means of reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Br. 34, of 31 May 1991 is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals of 18
June 1993 is accordingly MODIFIED. Consequently, petitioner
is directed to reconvey to private respondents Lot No. 3174-B-1
of the subdivision plan Psd-1144 covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-3910-A within thirty (30) days from the finality
of this judgment.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I agree with the view in the majority opinion that the donation in
question is onerous considering the conditions imposed by the
donor on the donee which created reciprocal obligations upon
both parties. Beyond that, I beg to disagree.
First of all, may I point out an inconsistency in the majority
opinion's description of the donation in question. In one part, it
says that the donation in question is onerous. Thus, on page 4 it
states:
We find it difficult to sustain the petition. A clear
perusal of the conditions set forth in the deed of
 donation executed by Don Ramon Lopez, Sr., give us
no alternative but to conclude that his donation
was onerous, one executed for a valuable
consideration which is considered the equivalent of
the donation itself, e.g., when a donation imposes a
burden equivalent to the value of the donation . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Yet, in the last paragraph of page 8 it states that the
donation is basically a gratuitous one. The pertinent portion
thereof reads:
Finally, since the questioned deed of donation
herein is basically a gratuitous one, doubts referring
to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous
contract should be resolved in favor of the least
transmission of rights and interest . . . (emphasis
supplied)
Second, the discussion on conditional obligations is
unnecessary. There is no conditional obligation to speak of in
this case. It seems that the "conditions" imposed by the donor
and as the word is used in the law of donations is confused with
"conditions" as used in the law of obligations. In his annotation
of Article 764 of the Civil Code on Donations, Arturo M.
Tolentino, citing the well-known civilists such as Castan, Perez
Gonzalez and Alguer, and Colin & Capitant, states clearly the
context within which the term "conditions" is used in the law of
donations, to wit:
The word "conditions" in this article does not refer to
uncertain events on which the birth or extinguishment
 of a juridical relation depends, but is used in the
vulgar sense of obligations or charges imposed by the
donor on the donee. It is used, not in its technical or
strict legal sense, but in its broadest sense. 1 (emphasis
supplied)
Clearly then, when the law and the deed of donation speaks of
"conditions" of a donation, what are referred to are actually the
obligations, charges or burdens imposed by the donor upon the
donee and which would characterize the donation as onerous. In
the present case, the donation is, quite obviously, onerous, but it
is more properly called a "modal donation." A modal donation is
one in which the donor imposes a prestation upon the donee.
The establishment of the medical college as the condition of the
donation in the present case is one such prestation.
The conditions imposed by the donor Don Ramon Lopez
determines neither the existence nor the extinguishment of the
obligations of the donor and the donee with respect to the
donation. In fact, the conditions imposed by Don Ramon Lopez
upon the donee are the very obligations of the donation — to
build the medical college and use the property for the purposes
specified in the deed of donation. It is very clear that those
obligations are unconditional, the fulfillment, performance,
existence or extinguishment of which is not dependent on any
future or uncertain event or past and unknown event, as the Civil
Code would define a conditional obligation. 2
Reliance on the case of Parks vs. Province of Tarlac 3 as cited on
page 5 of the majority opinion is erroneous in so far as the latter
stated that the condition in Parks is a resolutory one and applied
this to the present case. A more careful reading of this Court's
decision would reveal that nowhere did we say, whether
explicitly or impliedly, that the donation in that case, which also
has a condition imposed to build a school and a public park upon
the property donated, is a resolutory condition. 4It is incorrect to
say that the "conditions" of the donation there or in the present
case are resolutory conditions because, applying Article 1181 of
the Civil Code, that would mean that upon fulfillment of the
conditions, the rights already acquired will be extinguished.
Obviously, that could not have been the intention of the parties.
What the majority opinion probably had in mind was that the
conditions are resolutory because if they are not complied with,
the rights of the donee as such will be extinguished and the
donation will be revoked. To my mind, though, it is more
accurate to state that the conditions here are not resolutory
conditions but, for the reasons stated above,
are the obligations imposed by the donor.
Third, I cannot subscribe to the view that
the provisions of Article 1197 cannot be applied here. The
conditions/obligations imposed by the donor herein are subject
to a period. I draw this conclusion based on our previous ruling
which, although made almost 90 years ago, still finds
application in the present case. In Barretto vs. City of
Manila, 5 we said that when the contract of donation, as the one
involved therein, has no fixed period in which the condition
should be fulfilled, the provisions of what is now Article 1197
(then Article 1128) are applicable and it is the duty of the court
to fix a suitable time for its fulfillment. Indeed, from the nature
and circumstances of the conditions/obligations of the present
donation, it can be inferred that a period was contemplated by
the donor. Don Ramon Lopez could not have intended his
property to remain idle for a long period of time when in fact, he
specifically burdened the donee with the obligation to set up a
medical college therein and thus put his property to good use.
There is a need to fix the duration of the time within which the
conditions imposed are to be fulfilled.
It is also important to fix the duration or period for the
performance of the conditions/obligations in the donation in
resolving the petitioner's claim that prescription has already
barred the present action. I disagree once more with the ruling of
the majority that the action of the petitioners is not barred by the
statute of limitations. There is misplaced reliance again on a
previous decision of this Court in Osmeña vs. Rama. 6 That case
does not speak of a deed of donation as erroneously quoted and
cited by the majority opinion. It speaks of a contract for a sum of
money where the debtor herself imposed a condition which will
determine when she will fulfill her obligation to pay the creditor,
thus, making the fulfillment of her obligation dependent upon
her will. What we have here, however, is not a contract for a
sum of money but a donation where the donee has not imposed
any conditions on the fulfillment of its obligations. Although it
is admitted that the fulfillment of the conditions/obligations of
the present donation may be dependent on the will of the donee
as to when it will comply therewith, this did not arise out of a
condition which the donee itself imposed. It is believed that the
donee was not meant to and does not have absolute control over
the time within which it will perform its obligations. It must still
do so within a reasonable time. What that reasonable time is,
under the circumstances, for the courts to determine. Thus, the
mere fact that there is no time fixed as to when the conditions of
the donation are to be fulfilled does not ipso facto mean that the
statute of limitations will not apply anymore and the action to
revoke the donation becomes imprescriptible.
Admittedly, the donation now in question is an onerous donation
and is governed by the law on contracts (Article 733) and the
case of Osmeña, being one involving a contract, may apply. But
we must not lose sight of the fact that it is still a donation for
which this Court itself applied the pertinent law to resolve
situations such as this. That the action to revoke the donation
can still prescribe has been the pronouncement of this Court as
early as 1926 in the case of Parks which, on this point, finds
relevance in this case. There, this Court said,
[that] this action [for the revocation of the donation] is
prescriptible, there is no doubt. There is no legal
provision which excludes this class of action from the
statute of limitations. And not only this, the law itself
recognizes the prescriptibility of the action for the
revocation of a donation, providing a special period of
[four] years for the revocation by the subsequent birth
of children [Art. 646, now Art. 763], and . . . by reason
of ingratitude. If no special period is provided for the
prescription of the action for revocation for
noncompliance of the conditions of the donation [Art.
647, now Art. 764], it is because in this respect the
donation is considered onerous and is governed by the
law of contracts and the general rules of prescription. 7
More recently, in De Luna v. Abrigo, 8 this Court reiterated the
ruling in Parks and said that:
 It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code,
actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance
of the conditions of the donation. However, it is Our
opinion that said article does not apply to onerous
donations in view of the specific provision of Article
733 providing that onerous donations are governed by
the rules on contracts.
In the light of the above, the rules on contracts and the
general rules on prescription and not the rules on
donations are applicable in the case at bar.
The law applied in both cases is Article 1144(1). It refers to the
prescription of an action upon a written contract, which is what
the deed of an onerous donation is. The prescriptive period is ten
years from the time the cause of action accrues, and that is, from
the expiration of the time within which the donee must comply
with the conditions/obligations of the donation. As to when this
exactly is remains to be determined, and that is for the courts to
do as reposed upon them by Article 1197.
For the reasons expressed above, I register my dissent.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
upheld, except its ruling that the conditions of the donation are
resolutory.
Padilla, J., dissents

Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 23.
2 Rollo, p. 8.
3 City of Manila v. Rizal Park Co., 53 Phil. 515
(1929).
4 Parks v. Province of Tarlac, 49 Phil. 142 (1926).
5 Ibid.
6 Osmeña v. Rama, 14 Phil. 99 (1909).
7 Arturo M. Tolentino, The Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1986 Ed., Vol. IV, p. 42.
8 Concepcion v. People, 74 Phil. 63 (1942).
9 Tiglao v. Manila Railroad Co., 52 O.G., p. 179.
10 Art. 1378, Civil Code.
DAVIDE, JR. J., dissenting:
1 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines535, vol. 2 [1983].
2 Article 1179.
3 49 Phil. 142 [1926].
4 Id. at 145-146.
5 7 Phil. 416 [1907].
 6 14 Phil. 99 [1909].
7 Parks vs. Province of Tarlac, supra note 3, at 146.
8 181 SCRA 150 [1990].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132681. December 3, 2001]

RICKY Q. QUILALA, petitioner, vs. GLICERIA

ALCANTARA, LEONORA ALCANTARA, INES
REYES and JOSE REYES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a “Donation
of Real Property Inter Vivos” in favor of Violeta Quilala over a
parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, containing an area of
94 square meters, and registered in her name under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 17214 of the Register of Deeds for
Manila.
The “Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos” consists of two
pages. The first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is
signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as donor,
Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses.[1] The
second page contains the Acknowledgment, which states merely
that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary
public and acknowledged that the donation was her free and
voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand margin of
the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the
witnesses, and on the right-hand margin the signatures of
Violeta Quilala and the other witness.[2] The Acknowledgment
reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES )
QUEZON CITY ) S.S.
Before Me, a Notary Public, for and in the City of Quezon,
Philippines, this 20th day of Feb. 1981, personally appeared
CATALINA QUILALA, with Residence Certificate No.
19055265 issued at Quezon City on February 4, 1981, known to
me and to me known to be the same person who executed the
foregoing instruments and acknowledged to me that the same is
her own free and voluntary act and deed.
I hereby certify that this instrument consisting of two (2) pages,
including the page on which this acknowledgement is written,
has been signed by CATALINA QUILALA and her
instrumental witnesses at the end thereof and on the left-hand
margin of page 2 and both pages have been sealed with my
notarial seal.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, in the City of
Quezon, Philippines, this 20th day of Feb., 1981.
 (SGD.) NOTARY
PUBLIC
Until December 31, 1981
(illegible)
DOC NO. 22;
PAGE NO. 6;
BOOK NO. XV;
SERIES OF 1981.
The deed of donation was registered with the Register of
Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and
TCT No. 143015 was issued in the name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta
Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky
Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala.
Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina’s
only surviving relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate, dividing and adjudicating unto themselves the above-
described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against
petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar of Deeds of
Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the
donation inter vivos, and for the cancellation of TCT No.
143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. 84-26603 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 17. Subsequently, respondents withdrew their
complaint as against Guillermo T. San Pedro and he was
dropped as a party-defendant.
The trial court found that the deed of donation, although
signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a
notary public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there
was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a public
instrument, thus rendering the donation null and
void. Furthermore, the trial court held that nowhere in Catalina’s
SSS records does it appear that Violeta was Catalina’s
daughter. Rather, Violeta was referred to therein as an adopted
child, but there was no positive evidence that the adoption was
legal. On the other hand, the trial court found that respondents
were first cousins of Catalina Quilala. However, since it
appeared that Catalina died leaving a will, the trial court ruled
that respondents’ deed of extrajudicial settlement can not be
registered. The trial court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiffs Gliceria Alcantara, Leonarda Alcantara, Ines Reyes
and Juan Reyes and against defendant Ricky A. Quilala, as
follows:
1. Declaring null and void the deed of donation of real
property inter vivos executed on February 20, 1981 by Catalina
Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala (Exhs. A as well as 11 and
11-A.);
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 143015 in the name of Violeta Quilala
and to issue a transfer certificate of title in the name of the
Estate of Catalina Quilala;
3. Dismissing the complaint insofar as it seeks the registration
of the deed of extrajudicial settlement (Exhs. B and B-1.) and
the issuance by the Register of Deeds of Manila of a transfer
certificate of title in the names of the plaintiffs; and
4. Dismissing the counterclaim of defendant Ricky A. Quilala.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid decision. On July 30, 1997,
the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the
complaint for lack of cause of action without prejudice to the
filing of probate proceedings of Catalina’s alleged last will and
testament.[4]
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATION:
(3) DISMISSING the complaint for lack of cause of action
without prejudice to the filing of the necessary probate
proceedings by the interested parties so as not to render nugatory
the right of the lawful heirs.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court
of Appeals denied on February 11, 1998.[5] Hence, this petition
for review, raising the following assignment of errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING
THAT THE DEED OF DONATION OF REAL
PROPERTY INTER-VIVOS IS NOT REGISTRABLE.
 B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON
UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT’S RULING
THAT VIOLETA QUILALA IS NOT THE
DAUGHTER OF CATALINA QUILALA.[6]
The principal issue raised is the validity of the donation
executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta. Under Article 749 of
the Civil Code, the donation of an immovable must be made in a
public instrument in order to be valid,[7] specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy. As a mode of acquiring ownership, donation
results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the
donor to the donee,[8] and is perfected from the moment the
donor knows of the acceptance by the donee,[9] provided the
donee is not disqualified or prohibited by law from accepting the
donation. Once the donation is accepted, it is generally
considered irrevocable,[10] and the donee becomes the absolute
owner of the property.[11] The acceptance, to be valid, must be
made during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.[12] It
may be made in the same deed or in a separate public
document,[13] and the donor must know the acceptance by the
donee.[14]
In the case at bar, the deed of donation contained the number
of the certificate of title as well as the technical description as
the real property donated. It stipulated that the donation was
made for and in consideration of the “love and affection which
the DONEE inspires in the DONOR, and as an act of liberality
and generosity.”[15] This was sufficient cause for a
donation. Indeed, donation is legally defined as “an act of
liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or
right in favor of another, who accepts it.”[16]
 The donee’s acceptance of the donation was explicitly
manifested in the penultimate paragraph of the deed, which
reads:
That the DONEE hereby receives and accepts the gift and
donation made in her favor by the DONOR and she hereby
expresses her appreciation and gratefulness for the kindness and
generosity of the DONOR.[17]
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor,
donee and their witnesses affixed their signature. However, the
Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only
the donor, Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for
Violeta’s failure to acknowledge her acceptance before the
notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private
instrument, i.e., the first page of the instrument. We disagree.
The pertinent provision is Section 112, paragraph 2 of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, which states:
Deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, powers of
attorney and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting
registered or unregistered land, executed in accordance with law
in the form of public instruments shall
be registrable: Provided, that, every such instrument shall be
signed by the person or persons executing the same in the
presence of at least two witnesses who shall likewise sign
thereon, and shall be acknowledged to be the free act and deed
of the person or persons executing the same before a notary
public or other public officer authorized by law to take
acknowledgment. Where the instrument so
acknowledged consists of two or more pages including the page
whereon acknowledgment is written, each page of the copy
which is to be registered in the office of the Register of Deeds,
or if registration is not contemplated, each page of the copy to
be kept by the notary public, except the page where the
signatures already appear at the foot of the instrument, shall be
signed on the left margin thereof by the person or persons
executing the instrument and their witnesses, and all the pages
sealed with the notarial seal, and this fact as well as the number
of pages shall be stated in the acknowledgment. Where the
instrument acknowledged relates to a sale, transfer, mortgage or
encumbrance of two or more parcels of land, the number thereof
shall likewise be set forth in said acknowledgment.”
(underscoring ours).
As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on
which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor
and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and
the other witness on the right-hand margin. Surely, the
requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses
should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not
absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that
each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the
parties. The requirement is designed to avoid the falsification of
the contract after the same has already been duly executed by
the parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on
each page of the instrument to certify that he is agreeing to
everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature
is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the
wrong side of the page, that does not invalidate the
document. The purpose of authenticating the page is served, and
the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed
substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the
donee before the notary public does not also render the donation
null and void. The instrument should be treated in its
entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and
a public document in another part. The fact that it was
acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed of
donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the
donee was not mentioned by the notary public in the
acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the
conveyance that should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary
act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which
contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is
explicitly set forth on the first page of the notarized deed of
donation, was made in a public instrument.
It should be stressed that this Court, not being a trier of facts,
can not make a determination of whether Violeta was the
daughter of Catalina, or whether petitioner is the son of
Violeta. These issues should be ventilated in the appropriate
probate or settlement proceedings affecting the respective
estates of Catalina and Violeta. Suffice it to state that the
donation, which we declare herein to be valid, will still be
subjected to a test on its inofficiousness under Article 771,[18] in
relation to Articles 752, 911 and 912 of the Civil
Code. Moreover, property donated inter vivos is subject to
collation after the donor’s death,[19] whether the donation was
made to a compulsory heir or a stranger,[20] unless there is an
express prohibition if that had been the donor’s intention.[21]
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
GRANTED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment is rendered
dismissing Civil Case No. 84-26603.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, p. 94.
[2]
Ibid., p. 95.
[3]
CA Rollo, pp. 33-34; penned by Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr.
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion,
concurred in by Associate Justices Jesus M. Elbinias and Ramon
A. Barcelona; CA Rollo, pp. 175-178.
[5]
Penned by Associate Jesus M. Justice Elbinias, concurred in
by Associate Justices Minerva G. Reyes and Ramon A.
Barcelona; CA Rollo, p. 196.
[6]
Rollo, p. 25.
[7]
Duque v. Domingo, 80 SCRA 654 [1977].
[8]
Civil Code, Article 712.
[9]
Civil Code, Article 734.
[10]
Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals, 185 SCRA 489 [1990].
The exceptions to irrevocability are: officiousness, failure of the
donee to comply with charges, and ingratitude.
[11]
Tanpingco v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652 [1992]; Quijada v. CA,
299 SCRA 695 [1998].
[12]
Civil Code, Article 746.
[13]
Civil Code, Article 749, second par.
[14]
Abellera v. Balanag, 37 Phil. 865 [1918];
Alejandro v. Geraldez, 78 SCRA 295 [1977].
[15]
Rollo, p. 94.
[16]
Civil Code, Article 725.
[17]
Ibid.
[18]
Donations which in accordance with the provisions of Article
752, are inofficious, bearing in mind, the estimated net value of
the donor’s property at the time of his death, shall be reduced
with regard to the excess; but this reduction shall not prevent the
donations from taking effect during the life of the donor, nor
shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits.
For the reduction of donations the provisions of this
Chapter and of Articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern.
[19]
Civil Code, Book III, Title IV, Chapter 4, Section 5.
[20]
Vda. de Tupas v. Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental,
144 SCRA 622 [1986].
[21]
De Roma v. Court of Appeals, 152 SCRA 205 [1987].

06. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6600 July 30, 1954
HEIRS OF JUAN BONSATO and FELIPE
BONSATO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSEFA UTEA, ET
AL., respondents.
Benedict C. Balderrama for petitioners.
Inocencio Rosete for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of
Appeals holding two deeds of donation executed on the first day
of December, 1939 by the late Domingo Bonsato in favor of his
brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, to be
void for being donations mortis causa accomplished without the
formalities required by law for testamentary dispositions.
The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Case No. 8892) on June 27, 1945, by respondents
Josefa Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife
Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their complaint (for annulment
and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949,
Domingo Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced
and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of donations
(Exhibits 1 and 2) in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of
his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively, transferring to them
several parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 5652,
12049, and 12052, situated in the municipalities of Mabini and
Burgos, Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been
duly accepted in the same act and documents. Plaintiffs likewise
charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack
of the requisite formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and
Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations made in
their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past
services rendered by them to the late Domingo Bonsato; that the
same were executed freely without the use of force and violence,
misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal
of the case and for damages in the sum of P2,000.
After trial, the Court of First Instance rendered its decision on
November 13, 1949, finding that the deeds of donation were
executed by the donor while the latter was of sound mind,
without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of
donation inter vivos without any condition making their validity
or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor; but as the
properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been
acquired during the coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife
Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an
undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described
therein.
Thereupon the plaintiffs duly appealed to the Court of Appeals,
assigning as primary error the holding of the court below that
the donations are inter vivos; appellants contending that they
were mortis causa donations, and invalid because they had not
been executed with the formalities required for testamentary
disposition.
A division of five of the Court of Appeals took the case under
consideration, and on January 12, 1953, the majority rendered
judgment holding the aforesaid donations to be null and void,
because they were donations mortis causaand were executed
without the testamentary formalities prescribed by law, and
ordered the defendants-appellees Bonsato to surrender the
possession of the properties in litigation to the plaintiffs-
appellants. Two Justices dissented, claiming that the said
donations should be considered as donations inter vivos and
voted for the affirmance of the decision of the Court of First
Instance. The donees then sought a review by this Court.
The sole issue submitted to this Court, therefore, is the juridical
nature of the donations in question. Both deeds (Exhs. 1 and 2)
are couched in identical terms, with the exception of the names
of the donees and the number and description of the properties
donated. The principal provisions are the following.
ESCRITURA DE DONATION
Yo, Domingo Bonsato, viudo de Andrea Nacario, mayor de
edad, vencino y residente del municipio de Agno,
Pangasinan, I.F., por la presente declaro lo siguiente:
Que mi osbrino Felipe Bonsato, casado, tambien mayor de
edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I.F., en consideracion
de su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente
hagor y otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable
consumada a favor del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos
parcelas de terreno palayero como se describe mas abajo.
(Description omitted)
Que durante su menor de edad de mi citado sobrino Felipe
Bonsato hasta en estos dias, siempre me ha apreciado y
estimado como uno de mis hijos y siempre ha cumplido
todas mis ordenes, y por esta razon bajo su pobriza sea
movido mi sentimiento para dar una recompensa de sus
trabajos y aprecios a mi favor.
Que en este de 1939 el donante Domingo Bonsato ha
entregado a Felipe Bonsato dichos terrenos donados y
arriba citados pero de los productos mientras vive el
donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueño y la
parte como inquilino tomara Felipe Bonsato.
Que en vista de la vejez del donante, el donatorio Felipe
Bonsato tomara posesion inmediatamente de dichos
terrenos a su favor.
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor
dicha donancion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos
los derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueño
absoluto de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y
gravamen y pueda ejercitar su derecho que crea
conveniente.
En Testimonio de todo lo Cual, signo la presente en Agno,
Pangasinan, I.F., hoy dia 1.0 de Diciembre, 1939.

Domingo (His
thumbmark) Bonsato

Yo, Felipe Bonsato, mayor de edad, casado, Vecino de

Mabini, Pangasinan, I.F., declaro por la presente que acepto
la donacion anterior otorgado por Domingo Bonsato a mi
favor.
 (Sgd.) Felipe Bonsato

SIGNADO Y FIRMADO EN PRESENCIA DE:

(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Illegible

The majority of the special divisions of five of the Court of

Appeals that took cognizance of this case relied primarily on the
last paragraph, stressing the passage:
Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor
dicha donacion . . .
while the minority opinion lay emphasis on the second
paragraph, wherein the donor states that he makes "perfect,
irrevocable, and consummated donation" of the properties to the
respective donees, petitioners herein.
Strictly speaking, the issue is whether the documents in question
embody valid donations, or else legacies void for failure to
observe the formalities of wills (testaments). Despite the
widespread use of the term "donations mortis causa," it is well-
established at present that the Civil Code of 1889, in its Art.
620, broke away from the Roman Law tradition, and followed
the French doctrine that no one may both donate and retain
("donner at retenir ne vaut"), by merging the erstwhile
donations mortis causa with the testamentary dispositions, thus
suppressing said donations as an independent legal concept.
ART. 620. Donations which are to become effective upon
the death of the donor partake of the nature of disposals of
 property by will and shall be governed by the rules
established for testamentary successions.
Commenting on this article, Mucius Scaevola (Codigo Civl,
Vol. XI, 2 parte, pp. 573, 575 says:
No ha mucho formulabamos esta pregunta: Subsisten las
donaciones mortis causa como institucion independiente,
con propia autonomia y propio compo jurisdiccional? La
respuesta debe ser negativa.
xxx xxx xxx
Las donaciones mortis causa se consevan en el Codigo
como se conserva un cuerpo fosil en las vitrinas de un
Museo. La asimilacion entre las donaciones por causa de
muerte y las transmissiones por testamento es perfecta.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th ed.), Vol. V. p. 83, expresses
the same opinion:
"La disposicion del articulo 620 significa, por lo tanto: 1..o,
que han desaparecido las llamas antes donaciones mortis
causa por lo que el Codigo no se ocupa de ellas en
absoluto; 2.o, que toda disposicion de bienes para despues
de la muerte sigue las reglas establecidas para la sucesion
testamentaria.
And Castan, in his Derecho Civil, Vol. IV (7th Ed., 1953), p.
176, reiterates:
(b) Subsisten hoy en nuestro derecho las donaciones mortis
causa? De lo que acabamos de decir se desprende que las
 donaciones mortis causa han perdido en el Codigo Civil su
caracter distintivo y su naturaleza y hay que considerarlos
hoy como una institucion suprimida, refundida en el legado
... . Las tesis de la desaparcion de las donaciones mortis
causa en nuestro Codigo Civil, acusada ya precedentemente
por el pryecto de 1851 puede decirse que constituye una
communis opinion entre nuestros expositores, incluso los
mas recientes.
We have insisted on this phase of the legal theory in order to
emphasize that the term "donations mortis causa" as commonly
employed is merely a convenient name to designate those
dispositions of property that are void when made in the form of
donations.
Did the late Domingo Bonsato make donations inter vivos or
dispositions post mortem in favor of the petitioners herein? If the
latter, then the documents should reveal any or all of the
following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the
death of the transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that
the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil.,
108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided
for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed (Bautistavs. Sabiniano, G. R.
L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should
survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of
donation, Exhibits 1 and 2, executed by the late Domingo
Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his
lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce ("de los
productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que
corresponde como dueño"), a reservation that would be
unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained
with the donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that
the donor could revoke the donations; on the contrary, the deeds
expressly declare them to be "irrevocable", a quality absolutely
incompatible with the idea of conveyances mortis causa where
revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent that a
testator can not lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation
(Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New Civil Code, Art. 828).
It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the
phrase "that after the death of the donor the aforesaid donation
shall become effective" (que despues de la muerte del donante
entrara en vigor dicha donacion"). However, said expression
must be construed together with the rest of the paragraph, and
thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the
donor's death, the donation will take effect so as to make the
donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from
all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the
donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits of the land
donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance
that would disappear upon the donor's death, when full title
would become vested in the donees.
 Que despues de la muerte del donante entrara en vigor
dicha donacion y el donatario Felipe Bonsato tendra todos
derechos de dichos terrenos en concepto de dueño absoluto
de la propiedad libre de toda responsibilidad y gravamen y
puede ejercitar su derecho que crea conveniente.
Any other interpretation of this paragraph would cause it to
conflict with the irrevocability of the donation and its
consummated character, as expressed in the first part of the
deeds of donation, a conflict that should be avoided (Civ. Code
of 1889, Art. 1285; New Civil Code, Art. 1374; Rule 123, sec.
59, Rules of Court).
Que mi sobrino FILIPINO BONSATO, casado, tambien mayor
de edad, vecino de Agno, Pangasinan, I. F., en consideracion de
su largo servicio a Domingo Bonsato, por la presente hago y
otorgo una donacion perfecta e irrevocable consumada a favor
del citado Felipe Bonsato de dos parcelas de terreno palayero
como se describe mas abajo.
In the cases held by this Court to be transfers mortis causa and
declared invalid for not having been executed with the
formalities of testaments, the circumstances clearly indicated the
transferor's intention to defer the passing of title until after his
death. Thus, in Cariño vs. Abaya, 70 Phil., 182, not only were
the properties not to be given until thirty days after the death of
the last of the donors, but the deed also referred to the donees as
"those who had been mentioned to inherit from us", the verb "to
inherit" clearly implying the acquisition of property only from
and after the death of the alleged donors. In Bautista vs.
Sabiniano, 49 Off. Gaz., 549; 92 Phil., 244, the alleged donor
expressly reserved the right to dispose of the properties
conveyed at any time before his death, and limited the donation
"to whatever property or properties left undisposed by me during
my lifetime", thus clearly retaining their ownership until his
death. While in David vs. Sison, 42 Off. Gaz. (Dec, 1946) 3155,
the donor not only reserved for herself all the fruits of the
property allegedly conveyed, but what is even more important,
specially provided that "without the knowledge and consent of
the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any
way", thereby denying to the transferees the most essential
attribute of ownership, the power to dispose of the properties.
No similar restrictions are found in the deeds of donation
involved in this appeal.
That the conveyance was due to the affection of the donor for
the donees and the services rendered by the latter, is of no
particular significance in determining whether the deeds
Exhibits 1 and 2 constitute transfers inter vivos or not, because a
legacy may have identical motivation. Nevertheless, the
existence of such consideration corroborates the express
irrevocability of the transfers and the absence of any reservation
by the donor of title to, or control over, the properties donated,
and reinforces the conclusion that the act was inter vivos. Hence,
it was error for the Court of Appeals to declare that Exhibits 1
and 2 were invalid because the formalities of testaments were
not observed. Being donations inter vivos, the solemnities
required for them were those prescribed by Article 633 of the
Civil Code of 1889 (reproduced in Art. 749 of the new Code,
and it is undisputed that these were duly complied with. As the
properties involved were conjugal, the Court of First Instance
correctly decided that the donations could not affect the half
interest inherited by the respondents Josefa Utea, et al. from the
predeceased wife of the donor.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the
Court of First Instance is revived and given effect. Costs against
respondents.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
Jugo, Bautista Angelo, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
________________________________________

07. FIRST DIVISION

THE SECRETARY OF G.R. No. 164748

EDUCATION and DR. BENITO
TUMAMAO, Schools Division Present:
Superintendent of Isabela,
Petitioners,
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chai
rperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

HEIRS OF RUFINO DULAY, Promulgated:

SR., represented by IGNACIA
VICENTE, RUFINO DULAY, January 27, 2006
JR., SUSANA DULAY,
ADELAIDA DULAY,
LUZVIMINDA DULAY and
CECILIA DULAY,
Respondents.
x------------------------------------ -------
-------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
78314 which affirmed the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, in Civil Case
No. 35-2397.
 The spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente were
the owners of a parcel of land located in Rizal, Santiago, Isabela,
with an area of 29,002 square meters. The lot was covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. P-6776.

On August 3, 1981, the spouses Dulay executed a deed of

donation[3] over a 10,000-square-meter portion of their property
in favor of the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports [DECS]). The
deed provided, among others:

That for and in consideration of the benefits

that may be derived from the use of the above
described property which is intended for school
purposes, the said DONORS do by by (sic) these
presents TRANSFER AND CONVEY by way of
DONATION unto the DONEE, its successors and
assigns, the above property to become effective upon
the signing of this document.[4]

The property was subdivided. On April 13, 1983,

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-143337[5] covering the
portion identified as Lot 8858-A was issued in the name of the
Ministry of Education and Culture, represented by Laurencio C.
Ramel, the Superintendent of Schools of Isabela. However, the
property was not used for school purposes and remained idle.
 Sometime in 1988, the DECS, through its Secretary,
started construction of the Rizal National High School building
on a parcel of land it acquired from Alejandro Feliciano. The
school site was about 2 kilometers away from the land donated
by the spouses Dulay.

In a letter[6] to the DECS Secretary dated August 19, 1994,

the spouses Dulay requested that the property be returned to
them considering that the land was never used since 1981, or a
period of more than 13 years. On
August 28, 1994, the Barangay Council of
[7]
Rizal, Santiago City issued Resolution No. 39 recognizing the
right of the donors to redeem the subject parcel of land because
of the DECS’ failure to utilize it for the intended purpose. It
further resolved that theRizal National High School no longer
needed the donated land “considering its distance from the main
campus and [the] failure to utilize the property for a long period
of time.”

On December 22, 1994, Rufino Dulay, Sr. passed away at

the age of 80.[8] His heirs sought the help of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Santiago City via an undated letter[9] requesting
the approval of a resolution allowing them to redeem the
donated property. The Sangguniang Panlungsod denied the
request inasmuch as the city government was not a party to the
deed of donation.[10]

On August 31, 1997, the heirs of Dulay, Sr., herein

respondents, filed a complaint for the revocation of the deed of
donation and cancellation of TCT No. T-143337 before the RTC
of Santiago City, Isabela, Branch 35, against the DECS
Secretary and Dr. Benito Tumamao, the Schools Division
Superintendent of Isabela. Respondents alleged that there was a
condition in the deed of donation: that the DECS, as donee,
utilize the subject property for school purposes, that is, the
construction of a building to house the Rizal National High
School. Respondents alleged that the DECS did not fulfill the
condition and that the land remained idle up to the
present. Respondents also averred that the donation inter
vivos was inofficious, since the late Rufino Dulay, Sr. donated
more than what he could give by will.

Petitioners, through the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), interposed the following defenses: (a) the DECS
complied with said condition because the land was being used
by the school as its technology
and home economics laboratory; (b) the donation was not
inofficious for the donors were the owners of five other parcels
of land, all located at Rizal, Santiago City; (c) the DECS
acquired the disputed property by virtue of purchase made on
December 8, 1997 by the barangay of Rizal, Santiago City in
the amount of P18,000.00 as certified by its
former Barangay Captain, Jesus San Juan;[11]and (d) the action
of the respondents had prescribed. The OSG also claimed that
students planted a portion of the land with rice, mahogany
seedlings, and fruit-bearing trees; the produce would then be
sold and the proceeds used for the construction of a school
building on the subject property.

In their Reply,[12] respondents denied that the donated land

was being used as a technology and home economics laboratory,
and averred that there were no improvements on the
property. Moreover, the fact that rice was planted on the lot was
contrary to the intended purpose of the donation. The
respondents likewise denied that the property had been sold to
the barangay. While the other properties of the late donor had
been sold, the deeds thereon had not been registered, and the tax
declarations not yet transferred in the names of the purchasers.

Thereafter, trial ensued. On March 6, 2001, an ocular

inspection of the property was conducted by the parties and their
respective counsels, including the Presiding Judge. It was
confirmed that the land was barren, save for a small portion
which was planted with palay. A demolished house was also
found in the periphery of the donated lot.[13]
 On December 26, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision
in favor of respondents. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing

considerations, the Court hereby DECLARES the
deed of donation, Exhibit “A,” executed by the late
Rufino Dulay, Sr. and his wife Ignacia Vicente over a
portion of the land covered by O.C.T. No. P-6776 and
now covered by T.C.T. No. T-143337 in the name of
the donee Department of Education and Culture as
REVOKED. The defendant DECS is ORDERED to
execute the deed of reconveyance of the land in favor
of the plaintiffs heirs of Rufino Dulay, Sr.

SO ORDERED.[14]

In revoking the deed of donation, the trial court ruled that

the donation was subject to a resolutory condition, namely, that
the land donated shall be used for school purposes. It was no
longer necessary to determine the intended “school purpose”
because it was established that the donee did not use the
land. Thus, the condition was not complied with since the
property was donated in July 1981. Moreover, the DECS did
not intend to use the property for school purposes because a
school had already been built and established in another lot
located in the same barangay, about two kilometers away from
the subject land. Finally, the trial court rejected petitioners’
contention that the donation was inofficious.

Aggrieved, the OSG appealed the decision to the CA.

On July 30, 2004, the appellate court rendered judgment

affirming the decision. The court held that the DECS failed to
comply with the condition in the donation, that is, to use the
property for school purposes. The CA further ruled that the
donation was onerous considering that the donee was burdened
with the obligation to utilize the land for school purposes;
therefore, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 764 of
the New Civil Code did not apply. Moreover, the CA declared
that a deed of
donation is considered a written contract and is governed by
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides for a 10-
year prescriptive period from the time the cause of action
accrues. According to the CA, the respondents’ cause of action
for the revocation of the donation should be reckoned from the
expiration of a reasonable opportunity for the DECS to comply
with what was incumbent upon it.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the

CA denied.

Petitioners seek relief from this Court via petition for

review on certiorari, contending that:

I.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THROUGH
THE RIZAL NATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, HAD
COMPLIED WITH THE CONDITION IMPOSED IN
THE DEED OF DONATION.

II.
RESPONDENTS’ RIGHT TO SEEK THE
REVOCATION OF THE DEED OF DONATION, IF
 THERE BE ANY, IS ALREADY BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[15]

The Court shall resolve the issues raised by

petitioners seriatim.

The donee failed to comply with

the condition imposed in the deed
of donation

The issue of whether or not petitioner DECS was able to

comply with the condition imposed in the deed of donation is
one of fact. There is a question of fact when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or
when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole
evidence considering mostly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
their relation to each other and to the whole and probabilities of
the situation.[16] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari, for the simple reason that this Court is not
a trier of facts. It is not for the Court to calibrate the evidence
on record, as this is the function of the trial court. Although
there are well-defined exceptions to the rule, nevertheless, after
a review of the records, we find no justification to depart
therefrom. Moreover, the trial court’s findings of facts, as
affirmed by the appellate court on appeal, are binding on this
Court, unless the trial and appellate courts overlooked,
misconstrued or misinterpreted facts and circumstances of
substance which, if considered, would change the outcome of
the case. The case has been reviewed thoroughly, and we find
no justification to reverse the CA decision.

Petitioners, through the OSG, maintain that the condition

(to use the property for school purposes) is not limited to the
construction of a school building, but includes utilizing it as a
technology and home economics laboratory where students and
teachers plant palay, mahogany seedlings, and fruit-bearing
trees. The OSG insists that the donee did not specify in the deed
that the property should be used for the construction of a school
building. According to the OSG, the proceeds of the harvest
were used and are still being used by the Rizal National High
School for the construction and improvement of its present
school site. Moreover, it was verified that there
was palay planted on the donated property during the ocular
inspection on the property.

In their comment on the petition, respondents dispute

petitioners’ contentions, and aver that no evidence was
presented to prove that, indeed, palay, mahogany seedlings and
fruit-bearing trees were planted on the property. Respondents
also emphasized that when the trial court inspected the subject
property, it was discovered to be barren and without any
improvement although some portions thereof were planted
with palay. Petitioners even failed to adduce evidence to
identify the person who planted the palay.
 The contention of petitioners has no merit.

As gleaned from the CA decision, petitioners failed to

prove that the donated property was used for school purposes as
indicated in the deed of donation:

We find it difficult to sustain that the

defendant-appellants have complied with the condition
of donation. It is not amiss to state that other than the
bare allegation of the defendant-appellants, there is
nothing in the records that could concretely prove that
the condition of donation has been complied with by
the defendant-appellants. In the same breadth, the
planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be
considered and could not have been the “school
purposes” referred to and intended by the donors when
they had donated the land in question. Also, the
posture of the defendant-appellants that the land
donated is being used as technology and home
economics laboratory of the Rizal National High
School is far from being the truth considering that not
only is the said school located two kilometers away
from the land donated but also there was not even a
single classroom built on the land donated that would
 reasonably indicate that, indeed, classes have been
conducted therein. These observations, together with
the unrebutted ocular inspection report made by the
trial court which revealed that the land donated
remains idle and without any improvement thereon for
more than a decade since the time of the donation,
give Us no other alternative but to conclude that the
defendant-appellants have, indeed, failed to comply
with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of
donation.[17]

In its Order[18] dated March 6, 2001, the RTC reiterated

that during the ocular inspection of the property conducted in the
presence of the litigants and their counsel, it observed that “the
land was barren; there were no improvements on the donated
property though a portion thereof was planted with palay [and a
demolished house built in 1979.]”

Moreover, petitioners failed to adduce a shred of evidence

to prove that the palay found in the property was planted by
DECS personnel or at its instance or even by students of
the Rizal National High School. No evidence was adduced to
prove that there were existing plans to use the property for
school purposes. Petitioners even debilitated their cause when
they claimed in the trial court that the barangay acquired the
property by purchase, relying on the certification of
former BarangayCaptain Jesus San Juan.

The right to seek the revocation of

donation had not yet prescribed
when respondents filed their complaint

Anent the second issue, we reject the contention of the

OSG that respondents’ cause of action is already barred by
prescription under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, or four
years from the non-compliance with the condition in the deed of
donation. Since such failure to comply with the condition of
utilizing the property for school purposes became manifest
sometime in 1988 when the DECS utilized another property for
the construction of the school building, the four-year
prescriptive period did not commence on such date. Petitioner
was given more than enough time to comply with the condition,
and it cannot be allowed to use this fact to its advantage. It must
be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as
donee, was burdened with the obligation to utilize the land
donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New
Civil Code, a donation with an onerous cause is essentially a
contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract.[19] We
fully agree with the ruling of the appellate court:
 xxx With this, [we] decline to apply the four-
year prescriptive period for the revocation of donation
provided under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and
instead apply the general rules on contracts since
Article 733 of the same Code, specifically provided
that onerous donations shall be governed by the rules
on contracts.

Corollarily, since a deed of donation is

considered a written contract, it is governed by Article
1144 of the New Civil Code, which provides that the
prescriptive period for an action arising from a written
contract is ten (10) years from the time the cause of
action accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of
the cause of action is from the expiration of the time
within which the donee must comply with the
conditions or obligations of the donation. In the
instant case, however, it must be noted that the subject
donation fixed no period within which the donee can
comply with the condition of donation. As such,
resort to Article 1197 of
 the New Civil Code is necessary. Said article provides
that if the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a
period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of
the condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred
that a period was contemplated by the donors. The
donors could not have intended their property to
remain idle for a very long period of time when, in
fact, they specifically obliged the defendant-appellants
to utilize the land donated for school purposes and
thus put it in good use. xxx[20]

In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals,[21] a

case squarely in point, we have established that the legal
possibility of bringing the action begins with the expiration of a
reasonable opportunity for the donee to fulfill what has been
charged upon it by the donor. Likewise, we held that even if
Article 1197 of the New Civil Code provides that the courts may
fix the duration when the obligation does not determine the
period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred
that a period was intended, the general rule cannot be applied
because to do so would be a mere technicality and would serve
no other purpose than to delay or lead to an unnecessary and
expensive multiplication of suits.[22]
 Altogether, it has been 16 years since the execution of the
deed of donation. Petitioner DECS failed to use the property for
the purpose specified in the deed of donation. The property
remained barren and unutilized. Even after respondents sought
the return of the property before the courts, petitioner DECS still
failed to draw up plans to use the property for school
purposes. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use for the property;
hence, the same shall be reverted to the respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78314 dated July
30, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
 SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate
Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
 MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes, with
Associate Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Rosalinda
Asuncion-Vicente, concurring; rollo, pp. 39-45.
[2]
Penned by Pairing Judge Fe Albano Madrid; id. at 77-84.
[3]
Rollo, p. 46.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 47.
[6]
Records, p. 169; Exhibit “F.”
[7]
Id. at 175.
[8]
Id. at 167; Exhibit “D.”
[9]
Id. at 172.
[10]
See Records, p. 173.
[11]
The certification reads:
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that Brgy. Rizal, Santiago City has
purchased a lot containing an area of 10,000 sq. m. at a price of
EIGHTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P18,000.00) from the late
Rufino Dulay, Sr. during my incumbency as Brgy. Captain of
said Barangay.

(Sgd.)

JESUS D. SAN JUAN

Ex-Barangay Capt.
 Rizal, Santiago City
(Records, p. 74; Annex “F.”)
[12]
Records, p. 79.
[13]
Id. at 262.
[14]
Id. at 302.
[15]
Rollo, p. 23.
[16]
Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 156
(2000), citing Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101680,
December 7, 1992, 216 SCRA 224.
[17]
Rollo, p. 43.
[18]
Records, p. 262.
[19]
Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, pp. 505-506.
[20]
Rollo, pp. 43-44 (Italics supplied).
[21]
316 Phil. 616 (1995).
[22]
Id. at 626-627.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 77425 June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.

G.R. No. 77450 June 19, 1991

THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF

IMUS, and the SPOUSES FLORENCIO IGNAO and SOLEDAD C. IGNAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE ESTATE OF DECEASED SPOUSES EUSEBIO DE CASTRO
and MARTINA RIETA, represented by MARINA RIETA GRANADOS and THERESA RIETA
TOLENTINO, respondents.

Severino C. Dominguez for petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite.

Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for Sps. Ignao.
Joselito R. Enriquez for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
These two petitions for review on certiorari1 seek to overturn
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
054562 which reversed and set aside the order of the Regional
Trial Court of Imus, Cavite dismissing Civil Case No. 095-84,
as well as the order of said respondent court denying petitioner's
motions for the reconsideration of its aforesaid decision.
On November 29, 1984, private respondents as plaintiffs, filed a
complaint for nullification of deed of donation, rescission of
contract and reconveyance of real property with damages against
petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao and the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Imus, Cavite, together with the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XX, Imus, Cavite and which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 095-84 therein.3
In their complaint, private respondents alleged that on August
23, 1930, the spouses Eusebio de Castro and Martina Rieta, now
both deceased, executed a deed of donation in favor of therein
defendant Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering a
parcel of land (Lot No. 626, Cadastral Survey of Kawit), located
at Kawit, Cavite, containing an area of 964 square meters, more
or less. The deed of donation allegedly provides that the donee
shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of one
hundred (100) years from the execution of the deed of donation,
otherwise a violation of such condition would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation and the property would
revert to the estate of the donors.
It is further alleged that on or about June 30, 1980, and while
still within the prohibitive period to dispose of the property,
petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, in whose
administration all properties within the province of Cavite
owned by the Archdiocese of Manila was allegedly transferred
on April 26, 1962, executed a deed of absolute sale of the
property subject of the donation in favor of petitioners Florencio
and Soledad C. Ignao in consideration of the sum of P114,000.
00. As a consequence of the sale, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 115990 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on
November 15, 1980 in the name of said petitioner spouses.
What transpired thereafter is narrated by respondent court in its
assailed decision.4
On December 17, 1984, petitioners Florencio Ignao and Soledad
C. Ignao filed a motion to dismiss based on the grounds that (1)
herein private respondents, as plaintiffs therein, have no legal
capacity to sue; and (2) the complaint states no cause of action.
On December 19, 1984, petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of
Imus also filed a motion to dismiss on three (3) grounds, the first
two (2) grounds of which were identical to that of the motion to
dismiss filed by the Ignao spouses, and the third ground being
that the cause of action has prescribed.
On January 9, 1985, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
likewise filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he is not a
real party in interest and, therefore, the complaint does not state
a cause of action against him.
After private respondents had filed their oppositions to the said
motions to dismiss and the petitioners had countered with their
respective replies, with rejoinders thereto by private
respondents, the trial court issued an order dated January 31,
1985, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the cause of
action has prescribed.5
Private respondents thereafter appealed to the Court of Appeals
raising the issues on (a) whether or not the action for rescission
of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) has prescribed;
and (b) whether or not the dismissal of the action for rescission
of contracts (deed of donation and deed of sale) on the ground of
prescription carries with it the dismissal of the main action for
reconveyance of real property.6
On December 23, 1986, respondent Court of Appeals, holding
that the action has not yet prescibed, rendered a decision in favor
of private respondents, with the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, the Order of January 31, 1985 dismissing
appellants' complaint is SET ASIDE and Civil Case No.
 095-84 is hereby ordered REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the lower court for further proceedings.
No Costs.7
Petitioners Ignao and the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus then
filed their separate motions for reconsideration which were
denied by respondent Court of Appeals in its resolution dated
February 6, 1987,8 hence, the filing of these appeals
by certiorari.
It is the contention of petitioners that the cause of action of
herein private respondents has already prescribed, invoking
Article 764 of the Civil Code which provides that "(t)he
donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the
donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the
former imposed upon the latter," and that "(t)his action shall
prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the
condition, may be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may
be exercised against the donee's heirs.
We do not agree.
Although it is true that under Article 764 of the Civil Code an
action for the revocation of a donation must be brought within
four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the
donation, the same is not applicable in the case at bar. The deed
of donation involved herein expressly provides for automatic
reversion of the property donated in case of violation of the
condition therein, hence a judicial declaration revoking the same
is not necessary, As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals:
 By the very express provision in the deed of donation itself
that the violation of the condition thereof would render ipso
facto null and void the deed of donation, WE are of the
opinion that there would be no legal necessity anymore to
have the donation judicially declared null and void for the
reason that the very deed of donation itself declares it so.
For where (sic) it otherwise and that the donors and the
donee contemplated a court action during the execution of
the deed of donation to have the donation judicially
rescinded or declared null and void should the condition be
violated, then the phrase reading "would render ipso facto
null and void" would not appear in the deed of donation.9
In support of its aforesaid position, respondent court relied on
the rule that a judicial action for rescission of a contract is not
necessary where the contract provides that it may be revoked
and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and
conditions.10 It called attention to the holding that there is
nothing in the law that prohibits the parties from entering into an
agreement that a violation of the terms of the contract would
cause its cancellation even without court intervention, and that it
is not always necessary for the injured party to resort to court for
rescission of the contract.11 It reiterated the doctrine that a
judicial action is proper only when there is absence of a special
provision granting the power of cancellation.12
It is true that the aforesaid rules were applied to the contracts
involved therein, but we see no reason why the same should not
apply to the donation in the present case. Article 732 of the Civil
Code provides that donationsinter vivos shall be governed by the
general provisions on contracts and obligations in all that is not
determined in Title III, Book III on donations. Now, said Title
III does not have an explicit provision on the matter of a
donation with a resolutory condition and which is subject to an
express provision that the same shall be considered ipso
facto revoked upon the breach of said resolutory condition
imposed in the deed therefor, as is the case of the deed presently
in question. The suppletory application of the foregoing
doctrinal rulings to the present controversy is consequently
justified.
The validity of such a stipulation in the deed of donation
providing for the automatic reversion of the donated property to
the donor upon non-compliance of the condition was upheld in
the recent case of De Luna, et al. vs. Abrigo, et al.13 It was held
therein that said stipulation is in the nature of an agreement
granting a party the right to rescind a contract unilaterally in
case of breach, without need of going to court, and that, upon
the happening of the resolutory condition or non-compliance
with the conditions of the contract, the donation is automatically
revoked without need of a judicial declaration to that effect.
While what was the subject of that case was an onerous donation
which, under Article 733 of the Civil Code is governed by the
rules on contracts, since the donation in the case at bar is also
subject to the same rules because of its provision on automatic
revocation upon the violation of a resolutory condition, from
parity of reasons said pronouncements in De Luna pertinently
apply.
The rationale for the foregoing is that in contracts providing for
automatic revocation, judicial intervention is necessary not for
purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract
already deemed rescinded by virtue of an agreement providing
for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to
determine whether or not the rescission was proper.14
When a deed of donation, as in this case, expressly provides for
automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the
rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should
apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306
of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy, we are of
the opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation,
without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to
the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought.
Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will
be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the
revocatory act.
On the foregoing ratiocinations, the Court of Appeals committed
no error in holding that the cause of action of herein private
respondents has not yet prescribed since an action to enforce a
written contract prescribes in ten (10) years.15 It is our view that
Article 764 was intended to provide a judicial remedy in case of
non-fulfillment or contravention of conditions specified in the
deed of donation if and when the parties have not agreed on the
automatic revocation of such donation upon the occurrence of
the contingency contemplated therein. That is not the situation in
the case at bar.
Nonetheless, we find that although the action filed by private
respondents may not be dismissed by reason of prescription, the
same should be dismissed on the ground that private respondents
have no cause of action against petitioners.
The cause of action of private respondents is based on the
alleged breach by petitioners of the resolutory condition in the
deed of donation that the property donated should not be sold
within a period of one hundred (100) years from the date of
execution of the deed of donation. Said condition, in our
opinion, constitutes an undue restriction on the rights arising
from ownership of petitioners and is, therefore, contrary to
public policy.
Donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an
effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the
donee. Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the
absolute owner of the property donated. Although the donor may
impose certain conditions in the deed of donation, the same must
not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and
public policy. The condition imposed in the deed of donation in
the case before us constitutes a patently unreasonable and undue
restriction on the right of the donee to dispose of the property
donated, which right is an indispensable attribute of ownership.
Such a prohibition against alienation, in order to be valid, must
not be perpetual or for an unreasonable period of time.
Certain provisions of the Civil Code illustrative of the aforesaid
policy may be considered applicable by analogy.1âwphi1Under
the third paragraph of Article 494, a donor or testator may
prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty (20)
years. Article 870, on its part, declares that the dispositions of
the testator declaring all or part of the estate inalienable for more
than twenty (20) years are void.
It is significant that the provisions therein regarding a testator
also necessarily involve, in the main, the devolution of property
by gratuitous title hence, as is generally the case of donations,
being an act of liberality, the imposition of an unreasonable
period of prohibition to alienate the property should be deemed
anathema to the basic and actual intent of either the donor or
testator. For that reason, the regulatory arm of the law is or must
be interposed to prevent an unreasonable departure from the
normative policy expressed in the aforesaid Articles 494 and
870 of the Code.
In the case at bar, we hold that the prohibition in the deed of
donation against the alienation of the property for an entire
century, being an unreasonable emasculation and denial of an
integral attribute of ownership, should be declared as an illegal
or impossible condition within the contemplation of Article 727
of the Civil Code. Consequently, as specifically stated in said
statutory provision, such condition shall be considered as not
imposed. No reliance may accordingly be placed on said
prohibitory paragraph in the deed of donation. The net result is
that, absent said proscription, the deed of sale supposedly
constitutive of the cause of action for the nullification of the
deed of donation is not in truth violative of the latter hence, for
lack of cause of action, the case for private respondents must
fail.
It may be argued that the validity of such prohibitory provision
in the deed of donation was not specifically put in issue in the
pleadings of the parties. That may be true, but such oversight or
inaction does not prevent this Court from passing upon and
resolving the same.
It will readily be noted that the provision in the deed of donation
against alienation of the land for one hundred (100) years was
the very basis for the action to nullify the deed of d donation. At
the same time, it was likewise the controverted fundament of the
motion to dismiss the case a quo, which motion was sustained
by the trial court and set aside by respondent court, both on the
issue of prescription. That ruling of respondent court
interpreting said provision was assigned as an error in the
present petition. While the issue of the validity of the same
provision was not squarely raised, it is ineluctably related to
petitioner's aforesaid assignment of error since both issues are
grounded on and refer to the very same provision.
This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters,
even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of
the case:16 Thus, we have held that an unassigned error closely
related to an error properly assigned,17 or upon which the
determination of the question properly assigned is dependent,
will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the
failure to assign it as error.18
Additionally, we have laid down the rule that the remand of the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not
necessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute
based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in
the public interest and for the expeditious administration of
justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding
them to the trial court for further proceedings, such as where the
ends of justice, would not be subserved by the remand of the
case.19 The aforestated considerations obtain in and apply to the
present case with respect to the matter of the validity of the
resolutory condition in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent court is SET
ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
Civil Case No. 095-84 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XX,
Imus, Cavite.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1
G.R. No. 77425 was filed by petitioner Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, and G.R. No. 77450
by petitioners Florencio and Soledad C. Ignao.

2
Penned by Justice Felipe B. Kalalo, with the concurrence of Justices Floreliana Castro-
Bartolome and Esteban M. Lising.

3
Original Record, 1-9.

4
Rollo, G.R. No. 77425, 20.

5
Original Record, 71-74.

6
Rollo, G.R. No. 77425, 27-28.

7
Ibid., Id., 30.

8
Ibid., Id., 32.

9
Ibid., Id., 28.

10
Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, et al., 37 SCRA 327 (1971).

11
Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co., et al., 12 SCRA 276 (1964).

12
De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc. vs. Tan, etc., et al., 99 Phil. 1034(1956).
13
181 SCRA 150 (1990).

14
University of the Philippines vs. Angeles, etc., et al., 35 SCRA 102 (1970).

15
Art. 1144(1), Civil Code.

16
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. Employees-NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., et
al., 76 SCRA 50 (1977).

17
Philippine Commercial and International Bank vs. Court of Appeals, et al, 159 SCRA 24
(1988).

Soco vs. Militante, etc., et al., 123 SCRA 160 (1983); Ortigas, Jr. vs, Lufthansa German
18

Airlines, 64 SCRA 610 (1975).

19
Escudero, et al. vs. Dulay, etc., et al., 158 SCRA 69 (1988); Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 157 SCRA 357 (1988).