Running head: PORTFOLIO ARTIFACT 5 SPECIAL EDUCATION 1

Portfolio Artifact 5: Special Education

Marilyn Gonzalez

Dr. Isbell

EDU 210

November 18, 2017

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Debbie Young is a high school principal with previous experience as both a special

education teacher and assistant principal. She is approached by the parents of Jonathan, a tenth-

grade student with severe disabilities that necessitate constant care by a specially trained nurse.

These disabilities include a profound mental disability, spastic quadriplegia, and a seizure

disorder. Jonathan’s parents wish to enroll Jonathan in a school in Young’s school district, which

is known to be affluent and progressive. Young denied the request, citing fiscal concerns and

stating that placement within the school is not the most appropriate for Jonathan.

The first case presented in favor of Jonathan’s placement in Young’s school district is

Mills v Board of Education of District of Columbia (1972). This case, decided by the district

court of DC, concerns a group of students with disabilities who were expelled or otherwise

barred from school with no alternative provisions made for them. The court held that no child

who is eligible for a public education "[…] shall be excluded from a regular public school

assignment" unless the student is provided an adequate alternative. Furthermore, the court also

found that schools could not cite financial reasons as a basis for denying special education

students a free and appropriate education (Mills v Board of Education of DC, 1972). In regards

to Jonathan's case, Young did not offer an alternative to Jonathan's parents but merely refused to

place him in her district. Moreover, by citing fiscal concerns as a basis for denying Jonathan's

parents, Young is violating the standard set by Mills v Board of Education of DC (1972).While

Young's financial concerns may be valid, under the scope of this case she cannot deny Jonathan

an education based on the severity of his disabilities.

Cedar Rapids Community School District v Garret F (1999) is the second case presented

in favor of Jonathan's placement in Young's school district. This case, decided by the United
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States Supreme Court, concerns a student identified as Garret F. Like Jonathan, Garret had a

physical disability that rendered him wheelchair bound and in need of a specially trained

individual to aid him. The school, in this case, did not wish to accept financial responsibility for

these services, which were essential to Garret's academic success. The Supreme Court, in this

case, held that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA, 1975, 2004) required the

district to provide Garret these services, as they are defined as related services under this

legislation. This parallels Jonathan's case, as the cost of providing Jonathan related services was

part of why Young denied Jonathan's placement in her school district. Based on the findings of

this case, which upheld the standard set by IDEA, Jonathan is entitled to a free and appropriate

education regardless of the cost of related services. Moreover, this also ties into the previously

outlined case, which strengthens the argument that Jonathan is eligible for appropriate placement

within Young’s school district.

The first case presented in favor of Young’s decision to refuse Jonathan’s placement is

McLaughlin v Holt Public Schools (2001). This case, decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals, pertains to an elementary student named Emma McLaughlin, whose parents sought

appeal after grappling with the school system over Emma's placement. The district maintained

that it would finance Emma's accommodations, as outlined in her IEP, in her neighborhood

school as opposed to a school outside her neighborhood. This was despite the school outside her

neighborhood being deemed the most appropriate. The court found in this case that a student

could receive services outside of their neighborhood school "if another school in the district,

rather than the neighborhood school, offered the program the student needed" (Underwood,

2006, p.155). In regards to Jonathan’s case, Young’s decision to refuse placement in her district

could be defensible if there were another district that could better provide services for Jonathan.
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Under the scope of this case, while Jonathan is certainly entitled to FAPE under IDEA, he is not

necessarily entitled to placement in his neighborhood school. Young’s decision, while perhaps

upsetting to Jonathan’s parents, is not necessarily a violation of the stipulations outlined in

IDEA.

Beth B v Van Clay 65 (2002) is the second case presented in favor of Young’s decision to

refuse Jonathan placement in her district. This case, decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, concerns a student (Beth) who is severely mentally and physically disabled. Like

Jonathan, Beth required assistance from a specially trained individual. Additionally, her primary

method of communication was via eye gaze. Beth was placed in a self-contained program,

despite her parents’ objections. The court, in this case, maintained that the school officials

possessed an “expertise that we cannot match” and upheld the school’s placement decision (Beth

B v Van Clay, 2002). Similarly, Young has extensive experience as both a special education

teacher and administrator. The findings of this case set a precedent that courts will defer to the

experts in such cases, which bolsters Young’s assertion that the school is not an appropriate

placement for Jonathan. Like Beth, Jonathan may require placement in a self-contained program.

If Young’s school does not have the fittings for such an accommodation, then it can reasonably

be argued that the school is not the appropriate environment for Jonathan.

Based on the court cases reviewed and given the information at hand, I believe that a

court would side with Jonathan and his parents. While a certain level of expertise can be

reasonably attributed to Young, it is not known why she feels the school is not an appropriate

placement for Jonathan. Absent this information, it can only be deduced that the real concern

behind Jonathan’s placement is financial. Denial based on fiscal reasons violates FAPE under the

scope of Mills v Board of Education of District of Columbia (1972). Additionally, these

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monetary concerns revolve around related services, which are protected by IDEA and reinforced

by the findings of Cedar Rapids Community School District v Garret F (1999). Moreover,

Young’s flat-out refusal to place Jonathan in her district does not constitute providing an

appropriate alternative to placement as outlined in both Cedar Rapids Community School District

v Garret F (1999) and McLaughlin v Holt Public Schools (2001). If Young had instead given

Jonathan an assessment and IEP that outlined appropriate placement, her decision could have

been more reasonably defended.

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References

Beth B. v Van Clay 65, 126 F.Supp.2d 532 (2002). (n.d.). Retrieved November 16, 2017 from
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-7th-circuit/1250134.html

Cedar Rapids Independent School District v Garrett F., 526 U.S. 66 (1999). (n.d.). Retrieved
November 16, 2017 from http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-supreme-court/526/66.html

McLaughlin v Holt Public Schools, 133 F.Supp.2d 994 (2001). (n.d.). Retrieved November 16,
2017 from http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-6th-circuit/1253429.html

Mills v Board of Education of District of Columbia, 348 F.Supp.866 (1972). (n.d.). Retrieved
November 16, 2017 from https://www.leagle.com/decision/19721214348fsupp86611090

Underwood, J., & Webb, L. (2006). School Law for Teachers: Concepts and Applications. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Merrill Prentice Hall.