Article VIII Digests

Article VIII Case Digests
Constitutional Law I
G-Notes | C-2020
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Teodoro Santiago, Jr. vs Miss Juanita Bautista

Facts:
 P was a pupil in Grade six at the public school named Sero Elementary School in Cotabato City. As the school year was about
to end, a Committee on the Rating of Students for Honor was constituted for the purpose of selecting the honor students of its
graduating class. After the deliberations of Rs, the committee adjudged Socorro Media, Patricia Liñgat, and P as first, second,
third honors, respectively.
 Three days before their graduation, P sought the invalidation of the ranking of the honor students. According to P, he was a
consistent honor pupil from Grade I to Grade V while Liñgat has never been a close rival of P, while Medina was coached and
tutored during the vacation of 1964, resulting in the fair lead he obtained.
 He further cites instances wherein there are unjust and discriminating abused committed by Rs against P, for the purpose of
pulling him down.
 P filed the present petition of certiorari before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N judicial function can be exercised in this case
H/R:
 No.
o Certiorari is a special civil action instituted against any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions.
 In order that certiorari may be invoked, the following circumstances must exist:
 There must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or property and said controversy is
brought before a tribunal, board or officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights
and obligations.
o Judicial action is an adjudication upon the rights of parties who appear or are brought
before the tribunal by notice or process, and upon whose claims some decision or judgment
is rendered.
 The tribunal, board, or officer before whom the controversy is brought must have the power and
authority to pronounce judgment and render a decision on the controversy construing and applying
the laws to that end.
o Judicial power has been defined as:
 Authority to determine the rights of persons or property by arbitrating between
adversaries in specific controversies at the instance of a party thereto
 Authority vested in some court, officer or persons to hear and determine when the
rights of persons or property or the propriety of doing an act is the subject matter
of adjudication
 Power conferred upon a public officer, involving the exercise of judgment and
discretion in the determination of questions of right in specific cases affecting the
interest of persons or property, as distinguished from ministerial power or
authority to carry out the mandates of the law
 Implies the construction of laws and the adjudication of legal rights
 The tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the sovereign power which belongs to
the judiciary, or at least, which does not belong to the legislative or executive department.
o It is evident, upon the foregoing authorities, that the so-called committee on the rating of students for honor whose
actions are questioned in this case exercised neither judicial nor quasi-judicial functions in the performance of its
assigned task.
o Even if it is to be assumed that judicial intervention might be sought, the order of dismissal must be sustained for the
failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 65, Section 1.
Ruling:
 Petition dismissed.
G-Notes | C-2020
Ferdinand Marcos vs Secretary Raul Manglapus
Facts:
 P was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent People Power revolution and was forced into exile in Hawaii.
 President Aquino’s ascension to power after the non-violent people power revolution has not been unchallenged, as there were
events that awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanaticism and blind
loyalty of their followers in the country:
o Armed threats to the Government (failed Coup of Gregorio Honasan)
o Communist insurgency and the secessionist movement in Mindanao
o Takeover of Channel 7 by rebel troops
 Economic woes were also present, as there is an accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to P and his
cronies have left the economy devastated.
 P, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.
o President Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of
government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has
stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of P and his family.
 P filed the instant petition for mandamus and prohibition.
o M: order Rs to issue travel documents to P and his family
o P: enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision
Issue:
 W/N the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided
to bar their return
H/R:
 No.
o The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by Ps show that the framers intended to widen the scope of
judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them.
 It would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1, defining judicial power,
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
o SC held that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from the oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing
in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the National Security Adviser, wherein Ps and Rs were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President’s decision.
 The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away
the gains achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse.
Ruling:
Leo Echegaray vs Secretary of Justice

Facts:
 January 4, 1999: SC issued a TRO, staying the execution of P scheduled on the same day. R assailed the issuance of the TRO,
arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
 This is a motion for reconsideration, filed by the Rs.
Issue:
 W/N the SC has jurisdiction even after the finality of judgment
H/R:
 Yes.
o The finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case. By finality of the judgment,
what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final,
the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.
 There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same.
G-Notes | C-2020
 The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latter terminates becomes final.
o The power to control the execution of the decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction, and cannot be subject of
substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
o Rs submission that the SC has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of P is untenable.
 If this is to be accepted, this diminishes the independence of the judiciary.
 Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, the courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their
final decisions.
Ruling:
 MR dismissed.
US vs President Richard Nixon

Facts:
 A result of a grand jury indictment against 7 defendants. R was named as one of the unindicted co-conspirator and was ordered
by the District Court upon subpoena, to produce certain tapes, memoranda, and other writings related to specific meetings
associated with the scandal.
 R, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash subpoena.
 The court thereafter issued an order for an in-camera examination of the subpoenaed material, having rejected the contentions
that the dispute between him and the Special Prosecutor was non-justiciable as an intra-executive conflict and that the judiciary
lacked authority to review the President’s assertion of executive privilege.
 The Special Prosecutor then filed in this Court a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
 W/N the SC has jurisdiction to issue the subpoena
H/R:
 Yes.
o R’s counsel argues that the federal courts should not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of Government.
 It has also been argued that the present dispute is essentially a jurisdictional dispute within the Executive
branch which he analogizes to a dispute between two congressional committees.
o SC held that the mere assertion of a claim of an intra-branch dispute has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction;
justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry.
o Congress has also vested in the Special Prosecutor the power to contest the invocation of executive privilege in the
process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these specially-delegated duties.
Ruling:
 Petition granted.
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs COMELEC

Facts:
 Congress passed RA 8046 which authorized R to conduct a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and
allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the ARMM.
 Congress enacted further RA 8436, authorizing R to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting
votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
 R adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections, and resolved to conduct biddings for the
three phases of its Automated Election System:
o Voter Registration and Validation System
o Automated Counting and Canvassing System
o Electronic Transmission
 President Arroyo issued EO 172, which allocated the sum of P2.5 B to fund the AES for the 2004 elections. Upon the rquest
of R, she authorized the release of an additional P500 M. Subsequently, R issued an Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to
Bid.
 Five individuals and entities, including herein Ps wrote a letter to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr., protesting the
award of the Contract to Mega Pacific Consortium due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had
G-Notes | C-2020
been conducted. Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements, they sought
a re-bidding.
o COMELEC Chairman Abalos, speaking through Atty. Jaime Paz, rejected the protest and declared that the award
would stand up to the strictest scrutiny.
 P filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of R
H/R:
 Yes.
o In terms of bidding:
 the certifications from DOST fail to divulge in what manner and by what standards or criteria the condition,
performance and/or readiness of the machines were re-evaluated and re-appraised and thereafter given the
passing mark.
 The COMELEC awarded the Contract to the winning bidder partly on the basis of the operation of the ACMs
running a base software, which was nothing but a sample or a demo software, and not the actual one that
would be used on Election Day.
 COMELEC also allowed MPC to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so.
Moreover, the Contract was eventually awarded to MPC. The law on public bidding has been further
desecrated by allowing the winner bidder to change and alter the subject of the contract (software), in effect,
allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding.
o In terms of awarding:
 There was no sign whatsoever of any joint venture agreement, consortium agreement, memorandum of
agreement, or business plan executed among the members of the purported consortium.
 It follows that during the bidding process, COMELEC had no basis at all for determining that the
alleged consortium really existed and was eligible and qualified, and that the arrangements among
the members were satisfactory and sufficient to ensure compliance with the contract.
Ruling:
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN and Personal Data Sheet or CV of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and
Employees of the Judiciary
Facts:
 Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the SALN of
the Justices of the SC for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet or the CV of the Justices of
the SC for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.
o Karol Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the the CA
Justices for the same purpose.
 Then Associate Justice Minita Chico-Nazario submitted its Memorandum and its Resolution, recommending the creation of a
Committee on Public Disclosure that would take over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect
to requests for copies of, or access to personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
 It was the consensus of the Justices of the Courts and the various judges associations that while the Constitution holds dear the
right of the people to have access to matters of concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary.
 P filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N the SALN of the Justices be accessed via the right to information
H/R:
 Yes.
o Article III, Section 7 is relevant in the issue of public disclosure of SALN and other documents of public officials:
 The right of people to information on matters of public information shall be recognized. Access to official
records x x x shall be afforded the citizen, subject to limitations as may be provided by law.
o Under a republican system of government, governmental institutions and agencies operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people.
G-Notes | C-2020
o The right of information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service; it is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as
in checking abuse in government.
o Like all constitutional guarantees, the right of information, with its companion right of access to official records, is
not absolute.
 People’s right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to limitations provided
by law.
 Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations:
o National security matters and intelligence information
o Trade secrets and banking transactions
o Criminal matters
o Other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially
known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available
to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed-door Cabinet meetings and
executive sessions of houses of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court
o While no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject
to regulation.
 RA 6713
o SC notes the valid concerns that there may be possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access
to such personal information and their publications.
 Custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with such motives.
Ruling:
In the Matter of Proceedings for Disciplinary Action against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta
Facts:
 Eva Illustre wrote threatening letters to Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina Herrera, Isagani Cruz, and Florentino Feliciano,
all members of the First Division of the SC.
 The same letter also stated that a press conference with TV and radio coverage would be held, in an attempt to disparage the
SC regarding her petition.
 Atty. Wenceslao Laureta’s participation might be that she likely wrote the threatening letters sent to the Justices in Illustre’s
name.
 After having lost her case before the SC, Rs filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Tanodbayan; complaint dismissed.
Issue:
 W/N the Members of the SC acted in bad faith in its Minute Resolution
H/R:
 No.
o Illustre has lost three times in court, and by virtue of res judicata, the Escolin Decision and the Javellana Resolution
served as final judgment of the case.
 Rs still took take case to the Tanodbayan, and charging the Justices with having rendered an unjust extended
Minute Resolution with deliberate bad faith.
 It follows that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that
such a collective decision is unjust cannot prosper; nor can RPC, Article 204 be applicable, as this
refers to individual judges, not collective bodies like divisions.
o To subject to the threat of investigation and prosecution a judge, more so a Member of the Supreme Court, for official
acts done by him in good faith and in the regular exercise of official duty and judicial functions is to subvert and
undermine that very independence of the judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive.
o Resolutions of the SC as a collegiate court, whether en banc or a division, speak for themselves and are entitled to full
faith and credence and are beyond investigation or inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled
bills of the legislature.
o To allow litigants to go beyond the Court’s Resolution and claim that the members acted with deliberate bad faith and
rendered an unjust resolution would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness of such collegiate
acts and resolutions.
G-Notes | C-2020
Ruling:
 Illustre held in contempt; Atty. Laureta found guilty of grave professional misconduct
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity

Facts:
 Shortly after the promulgation of the SC decision in Vinuya vs Executive Secretary (the Vinuya decision), the case involving
the Filipino comfort women during the Japanese occupation, an MR was filed, asserting that the Vinuya decision was
plagiarized from different sources, and that the true intents of the plagiarized sources were twisted by the ponente, Justice
Mariano del Castillo, to suit the arguments laid down in the decision.
 In response to this controversy, the faculty of UP College of Law came up with a statement entitled Restoring Integrity:
Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” (Restoring Integrity Statement), which statement alleged plagiarism against Justice
del Castillo, treating the same not only as an established fact, but as a truth. The statement was posted online and at the College’s
bulletin board and was submitted to the SC.
 SC ruled against the UP faculty; MR filed by UP Law professors Tristan Catindig and Carina Laforteza.
Issue:
 W/N UP Law Faculty should be cited for contempt
H/R:
 No.
o Established jurisprudence tells us that the incidents of contumacious speech and/or behavior directed against the Court
on the part of a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the
Court.
Ruling:
 MR denied.
Manila Electric Company vs Pasay Transportation Company

Facts:
 Ps requested the members of the SC, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon which certain transportation
companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of P and the compensation to be paid to P by such transportation. This
relates to the validity of Act 14461, Section 11 and to the legal right of the members of the SC, sitting as board of arbitrators,
to act on the petition.
 Act 1446, Section 11 provides:
o Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence,
over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said
use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority
of whom shall be final.
 When the petition of P was filed in SC, it was ordered that P be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the
transportation companies, one of which is R.
Issue:
 W/N the members of the SC can sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as asked of them by P
H/R:
 No.
o The Supreme Court represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power, and judicial
power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the SC, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should
not sanction usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act.
 The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or
to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.
1 An Act granting a franchise to Charles Swift to construct, maintain, operate an electric railway x x x
G-Notes | C-2020
 The Organic Act provides that the SC shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such
additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law.
Ruling:
 Petition denied.
Commissioner Antonio Noblejas, Land Registration vs Secretary Claudio Teehankee, Justice

Facts:
 P is the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by RA 1151. Section
2 of the said Act states that the Commissioner is declared entitled to the same compensation, emoluments and privileges as
those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance.
 R coursed to P a letter, requiring him to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against P for approving or
recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of
the areas covered by the original titles.
o P replied, that as he enjoyed the rank, privileges, emoluments and compensation of a CFI Judge, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a CFI Judge, and the papers relative to his case should be submitted
to the SC for action.
 P received a communication signed by the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, whereby, based on findings, P
was hereby suspended upon receipt, pending investigation.
 P filed a petition before the SC, reiterating the contentions advanced in his letter to R, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse
of discretion.
o R admits the fact, but denied that P exercises judicial functions or that P may be considered a CFI Judge within the
purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of Court.
Issue:
 W/N the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the SC, in view of the conferment upon him by the
Statutes mentioned of the rank and privileges of the CFI Judge
H/R:
 No.
o Judiciary Act, Section 67 states that:
 No district judge shall be removed from office xx x x
 Nowhere it is claimed or shown that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or
in fact, a member of the Judiciary at all.
o Ps assertion that the grant of privileges of a CFI Judge includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the
Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its recommendation, is untenable.
 Even if the Legislature intended to include in the general grant of privileges the right to be investigated by
the Supreme Court and to be suspended upon the recommendation, it would result to a violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Ruling:
Director of Prisons vs Ang Cho Kio

Facts:
 R had been charged, tried, and convicted of various offenses committed in the Philippines and was sentenced to suffer penalties
for a total of 45 years’ imprisonment. After serving 6.5 years of his sentence, R was granted conditional pardon by the President
of the Philippines, on the condition that R will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his release and never return to this
country.
o R accepted the conditions of his pardon and left for Taipeh.
 Almost after 7 years, R arrived at the Manila International Airport, travelling under the name Ang Ming Huy. He had a 72-
hour stopover in Manila. Friends of R invited him to stay longer in the Philippines.
 R was identified by inspector in the Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to Taipeh.
 With his identity having been established, R was arrested and the immigration authorities conducted an investigation regarding
his presence in the Philippines. The immigration authorities did not allow R to proceed with his trip to Honolulu.
 The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of
the sentence that were imposed on him for having violated the conditions of his pardon.
G-Notes | C-2020
 R filed for MR; Executive Secretary failed to act on MR; P filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus with CFI Rizal,
impleading P as respondents; CFI Judge dismissed petition; P appealed to CA; CA denied appeal.
 The majority opinion of the CA decision contains the recommendation that R be sent out at once from this country and that he
be allowed to leave Muntinlupa Prisons under guard only when he has been booked for outward flight at the Manila
International Airport so as to avoid the possibility of any further violation of his conditional pardon.
 Solicitor-General filed with the CA an MR, praying for the deletion of the recommendation, to allow R to leave the country.
Issue:
 W/N the recommendations of the CA justices are valid
H/R:
 No.
o The recommendatory power of the courts are limited to those expressly provided in the law.
 RPC, Article 5:
 Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision x x x
o The recommendation in the majority opinion is not authorized under the provision of the RPC. CA was not called
upon to review any sentence imposed on R, as the petition is a habeas corpus.
 It may be said that the recommendation embodied in the majority decision simply represents the private
opinion of the three justices.
 SC held that the better practice should be that the decision should contain only opinion that is
relevant to the question that is before the court.
Ruling:
Juanito Mariano Jr. vs COMELEC

Facts:
 Ps assail RA 78592, Section 51 on the grounds that it attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective
officials, disregarding the terms previously served by them, colliding with Article VI, Section 7 and Article X, Section 8.
Issue:
 W/N the challenge to the constitutionality of the questioned law is with merit
H/R:
 No.
o SC held that it cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51.
 Requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law:
 Actual case or controversy
 Question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party
 Constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
 Decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself
o Ps have far from complied with these requirements, as the petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent
events.
 Ps merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Ruling:
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs COMELEC

Facts:
 Congress enacted RA 7227 which provided for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone. The same law likewise created P to
implement the declared national policy of converting the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
 In 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the Philippine government. Immediately, P
commenced the implementation of its task
2 An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati
G-Notes | C-2020
 In a municipal resolution (Pambayang Kapasyahan 10), the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of
the municipality of Morong as parts of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accordance with RA 7227 3. Private R filed a
petition with SB Morong to annul the municipal resolution:
o Petition stated that conditions have to be met before Morong would have to agree to be included as part of the SSEZ:
 Giving back of the virgin forests to Bataan; exclude Grande Island in the SSEZ; allow every city of Morong,
Hermosa, Dinalupihan to establish own SEZ, etc.
 Petition remained unacted by the Municipality of Morong; Private R resorted to their power of initiative under the LGC of
1991 by soliciting the required number of signatures. Unknown to private R, the Vice-Mayor and Presiding officer of SB
Morong wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for initiative/referendum
as it would promote divisiveness; R en banc denied petition for initiative of P.
 P filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
o C: disallowance of the initiation of a local initiative
o M: command R to schedule the continuation of the signing of petition and thereafter set a date for the initiative
Issue:
 W/N there is an existence of an actual case or controversy
H/R:
 Deliberating on the issue, the Court agrees with private R that the municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage; it is not yet
an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people
have voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations may be enforced or
implemented thereunder.
o At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
 Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
Ruling:
 Petition granted; initiative is the main subject
Senator Wigberto Tañada vs Senator Edgardo Angara

Facts:
 Following WWII, global financial leaders held a conference to discuss global economy. This eventually led to the establishment
of the three great institutions:
o International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
o International Monetary Fund
o International Trade Organization
 ITO failed to materialize. Instead, there was the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round that
the WTO was established.
 The World Trade Organization is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and barriers.
 Ps filed a case, assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Issue:
 W/N the instant petition presents a justiciable controversy
 W/N there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of R in giving its concurrence via Senate Resolution 97
H/R:
 Yes.
o Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only
the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
 Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before the
Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
o The jurisdiction of the SC to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set out in the Constitution:
3
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
G-Notes | C-2020
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving right which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
 None.
o By grave abuse of discretion, it must be such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be a grave abuse of discretion as when the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be patent and so
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
 Failure on the part of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition.
Ruling:
Alfredo Tano vs Governor Salvador Socrates

Facts:
 The Sangguinang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance 15-92 entitled An Ordinance Banning the Shipment
of all Live Fish and Lobster outside Puerto Princesa City x x x
 To implement the said ordinance, then Acting Mayor Amado Lucero issued Office Order 23, which required any person
engaged or intending to engage in any business, trade, occupation, calling or profession or having in his possession any of the
articles for which a permit is required to be had, to obtain first a Mayor’s and authorizing and directing to check or conduct
necessary inspections on cargoes containing live fish and lobster being shipped out from Puerto Princesa.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution 33, a Resolution prohibiting the
catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms.
 Rs implemented the said ordinances, thereby depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of
Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood as well as the marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and
trade.
o Ps were even charged criminally, in violation of the aforementioned enactments.
 Without seeking redress from the concerned LGUs, Ps directly invoked the original jurisdiction of the SC by filing the present
petition.
Issue:
 W/N the enactments deprived Ps of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their
trade, in violation of Article XII, Section 2 and Article XIII, Sections 2 and 7
o Article XII, Section 2: The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth x x x
o Article XIII, Section 2: promotion of social justice
o Article XIII, Section 7: the State shall protect subsistence fishermen x x x
 W/N the instant petition for declaratory relief could be filed with the SC directly
H/R:
 No.
o The ground available for such motions do not constitute an offense because the ordinances in questions are
unconstitutional.
 Even assuming that Ps have a cause of action ripe for certiorari, there has been a clear disregard of the
hierarchy of courts, and no special and important reasons or exceptional and compelling circumstance has
been adduced why direct recourse to the SC should be allowed.
 While SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari x x x, such
concurrence gives Ps no unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
o Hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should serve as a general
determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
o After a scrutiny of the challenged Ordinances and the provisions of the Constitution, SC held Ps’ contentions baseless.
 There is absolutely no showing that any of the Ps qualifies as a subsistence or marginal fishermen:
 A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his
harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the
cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible
minimum for his livelihood.
o One of the Ps is self-described as a private association composed of Marine Merchants.
G-Notes | C-2020
o Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen; it merely recognizes that the
State may allow cooperative fish farming with priority to subsistence fishermen.
o SC adds that the ordinances find full support under RA 7611, known as the Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan
Act.
 It is clear that the objectives of the subject ordinances are:
 Establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein
 Protect the coral in the marine waters
 No.
o There is clear disregard of the hierarchy of courts, with no special and important reason or exceptional and compelling
circumstance has been adduced why direct recourse to the SC should be allowed.
 The concurrence of jurisdiction with RTC and CA should not be taken as according to parties seeking any of
the writs an absolute unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application will be directed.
 As mentioned earlier, hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs.
o It has been ruled that the disregard of the hierarchy of courts must be put to a halt, not only
because of the imposition upon the precious time of the SC, but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded to the lower court, the proper forum under the rules of procedure.
Ruling:
In re Subpoena of Acting Director Aleu Amante

Facts:
 A criminal complaint was filed by complainants Lozano for the alleged violation by retired SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr, and
retired Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Issue:
 W/N the Ombudsman has authority to issue a subpoena duces tecum for compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production
of documents and information relating to matters under its investigation
H/R:
 No.
o A first step in considering whether a criminal complaint is within the authority of the Ombudsman to entertain is to
consider the nature of the powers of the SC.
 SC, by constitutional design, is supreme in its task of adjudication; judicial power is vested solely in the
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
 The said constitutional scheme cannot be subverted through a criminal complaint that seeks to revive
and re-litigate matters that have been long been laid to rest by the Court.
o Such criminal complaint is a collateral attack on a judgment of the SC that, by
constitutional mandate, is final and already beyond question.
o As held in In re Wenceslao Laureta, SC unequivocally ruled that insofar as the SC and its Divisions are concerned, a
charge of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is unjust cannot
prosper, and that parties cannot re-litigate in another forum the final judgment of the SC.
o Consistent with the nature of the power of the SC under the constitutional scheme, only the SC – not the Ombudsman
– can declare an SC judgment to be unjust.
o A criminal complaint based on the legal correctness of the official acts of Justices of the Supreme Court cannot prosper
and should not be entertained; this is not to say that Members of the Court are absolutely immune from suit during
their term, for they are not.
 The Constitution provides that the appropriate recourse against them is to seek their removal from office if
they are guilty of culpable violation of the Constitution, and high crimes, or betrayal of public trust; only
after removal can they be criminally proceeded against for their transgressions.
Ruling:
 Atty. Lozano and Lozano-Endriano ordered to explain in writing why they should be penalized as members of the Bar.
Atty. Romulo Macalintal vs PET

Facts:
G-Notes | C-2020
 P questions the constitution of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution:
o The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 While P concedes that the SC is authorized to promulgate its own rules for the purpose, he chafes at the creation of a purportedly
separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the
constitutional mandate.
Issue:
 W/N P has locus standi
 W/N PET essentially performs a judicial power
H/R:
 None.
o P has simply alleged a generalized interest in the outcome of the case, and this is contrary to the well-settled actual
and direct injury test where a petitioner must have a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained,
or will sustain directly injury as a result.
 Yes.
o The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Article VIII, Section 1. Consistent with the presidential system of
government, the function of dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties
or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable is apportioned to the courts of justice.
o The 1987 Constitution expanded judicial power to include the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies which
are legally demandable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government; the power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
o The set-up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as essentially
an exercise of judicial power.
 It is beyond cavil that when the SC, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power, as the landmark case of Angara vs Electoral Commission held:
 It would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels.
o The present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof.
Ruling:
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
Maria Elena Malaga vs Manuel Penachos, Jr.

Facts:
 The Iloilo State College of Fisheries, through its Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee, caused the publication in the
Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of the Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. Said notice
announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would
be received and opened on December 12, 1988, 3PM.
 Ps, respectively doing business under the name of the BE Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-
qualification documents at 2pm of December 2, 1988. Jose Occeña also submitted his PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988.
o All of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having been
submitted after the 10AM cut-off time.
 Ps filed a complaint before RTC Iloilo against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. Ps
claimed that although they had submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to accept them, resulting
in their non-inclusion to the list of pre-qualified bidders.
 RTC Judge Lebaquin issued a TRO, prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project.
 Rs filed a motion to lift the TRO, on the ground that the Court was prohibited from issuing ROs, preliminary injunctions as
mentioned in PD 1818:
G-Notes | C-2020
o Section 1: No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction, on
preliminary infrastructure projects, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource development project of the
government x x x
 Ps argued against the applicability of PD 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and
separate existence and was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision.
 CA lifted the TRO; Ps appealed before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N the ISCOF is covered under PD 1818
H/R:
 Yes.
o The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality:
 Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some, if not all, corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term
includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and GOCCs.
 Chartered institutions refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested
by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives.
o This term includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the
state.
o It is clear from the above provisions that ISCOF is a chartered institution, and is therefore covered by PD 1818.
o There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality:
 It was created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of
the government of effecting the socio-economic life of the nation.
 The Treasurer of the Republic also is the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and
expenses to be audited by the COA.
 Heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon the
request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment x x x
 An additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury, and it was
also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state college would be included in the General
Appropriations Law.
o Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said decree, as there are
at least two irregularities committed by the PBAC that justified the injunction of the bidding and the award of the
project:
 PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of the bids, only to change these deadlines
without prior notice to prospective participants.
 The new schedule caused the disqualifications of the Ps.
 PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book forms for
the project to be bid 30 days before the bidding.
 These were issued 10 days before the bidding.
Ruling:
SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature
below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Radiowealth vs Auditor-General Manuel Agregado

Facts:
 The Clerk of the SC certified that the purchases of a Webster Teletalk Model 206A and 6 Webster Telephone Speakers and its
installation on the second and third floor of the Malacañan Annex which houses the SC were of urgent character and necessary
to public service.
 CL Dacanay, Chairman of the Property Requisition Committee appointed by the President, disapproved the purchase and
installation as contrary to EOS 298 and 302 and the policy adopted by the Cabinet, discontinuing open market purchases.
 P, as vendor of the equipment, took the matter up to R with the request that the payments be approved. R refused to countersign
the warrant for payment.
G-Notes | C-2020
 P filed the present petition for review before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N the Judicial Department could make purchases without the prior approval of the Executive Department
H/R:
 Yes.
o The distribution of powers is a fundamental maxim of constitutional law and essential to the separation of the three
branches of government.
o R argues that the court’s independence is limited to the exercise of judicial functions, and that purchase of property
does not belong to the said category.
 As mentioned in the case of Tarlac vs Gale:
 The judiciary has the power to maintain its existence, and whatever is reasonably necessary to that
end.
 The judiciary may not be deprived of any of its essential attributes and none of them may be
seriously weakened by the act of any person or official.
o Contrary to R’s theory, the prerogatives of this Court which the Constitution secures against interference includes not
only the powers to adjudicate causes but all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice.
 Without the power to provide itself with appropriate instruments for the performance of its duties, the express
powers with which the Constitution endows it would become useless.
o In the requisition for fixtures, equipment and supplies, both the executive and the judicial departments are on the same
footing.
 It stands to reason that the Chief Executive has no more authority to encroach on the SC in the choice of the
instruments needed to carry on its functions that the court has to dictate to the executive what, when, and
how to get his.
o Section 2041 of the Revised Administrative Code regulates the purchase of government supplies.
 Sections 2041-2044 speak of departments, bureaus, and offices.
 They do not speak of the legislature or the SC, and it is the Court’s understanding that they were not
intended to embrace either of these branches of the government.
o No one denies the power of the Auditor-General to audit expenditures of funds or property held in trust by the
government or the provinces or municipalities thereof.
 However, it cannot be pretended that the said authority is absolute.
 It cannot invade the court’s independence.
Ruling:
Retired Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon vs Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon

Facts:
 1953: RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of SC and CA Justices who have rendered at least 20 years
service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of 70 years or who
resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. Further, the retired Justice shall receive during the residue
of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
 RA 1797 amended RA 910, and provided that:
o Section 3-A: In case the salary of SC or CA Justices is increased or decreased, such salary shall, for the purposes of
this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a Justice who as of June 12, 1954 had ceased to
be such to accept another position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office.
Provided, any benefits that have already accrued prior shall not be affected thereby.
 President Marcos issued PD 644, repealing RA 1797 and RA 3595, Section 3-A, which authorized the adjustment of the pension
of the retired SC, CA Justices and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the
AFP to the prevailing rates of salaries.
 Under PD 1638, the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of officers and enlisted men was restored by President
Marcos. A later decree was also issued which provided for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the AFP.
 While the adjustment of retirement pensions for members of the AFP was restored, that of the retired SC and CA Justices were
not.
o Realizing the unfairness of discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions,
Congress approved a bill for the re-enactment of the repealed provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595.
G-Notes | C-2020
 In the explanatory note of House Bill 16297 and Senate Bill 740, the legislature saw the need to re-enact the
said laws to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the
Constitutional Commissions.
 President Aquino, however, vetoed HB 16297 on the ground that according to her, it would erode the very foundation of the
Government’s policy on standardization of compensation, as mentioned in RA 6758 or the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. She also added that the Government should not grant distinct privileges to a select group of officials
whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment.
 Prior to the instant petition, Retired CA Justices Barcelona, Enriquez, Reyes, and Lood filed a letter/petition, asking the SC for
a readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with RA 1797 and reasoning out that PD 644 did not become law as it
failed the valid publication requirement.
o SC acted favorably on their requests for readjustment.
 Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for 1992 certain appropriations for the
Judiciary, intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due to the retired SC and CA Justices.
 President Aquino vetoed portions of the General Appropriations Bill which provided for the pensions of the retired justices in
the judiciary. She explained that such portions are already deemed vetoed when she vetoed HB 16297.
 The present petition was filed before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N the veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution
H/R:
 Yes.
o Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government
and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge
of their functions.
o Fiscal autonomy also means freedom from outside control.
 The imposition of restriction and constraints on the manner of allocation and utilization of the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate
of the Constitution, but especially as regards the SC, of the independence and separation of powers upon
which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.
o In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its
funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.
 Pursuant to the Constituional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds
allocated to it in the appropriations law. In addition, the Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to
augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
o Article VI, Section 25(5) also allows the Chief Justice of the SC to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
 In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which related to the use of savings for augmenting items for the
payment of pension differentials, are clearly in consonance with the above-stated pronouncements of the SC.
 The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciary’s
appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on fiscal autonomy.
SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or
in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the
Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those
involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at
least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
G-Notes | C-2020
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court sitting en banc.
Governor Carlos Fortich vs Executive Secretary Renato Corona

Facts:
 In the MR, both respondents and intervenors pray that the case be referred to the Court en banc. They further contend that
inasmuch as the MR was resolved by a vote of 2-2, the required number to carry a decision (3) was not met. Consequently, the
case should be referred to and be decided by the SC en banc, relying on Article VIII, Section 4(3):
o Article VIII, Section 4(3): x x x when the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc x x x
Issue:
 W/N Rs are correct
 W/N the 2-2 Resolution is valid
H/R:
 No.
o A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4 reveals the intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases,
on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are
resolved.
 The word decided must refer to cases, while the word resolved must refer to matters, applying the rule of
reddendo singular singulis
o With the aforesaid rule of construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for deicison
whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the
required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of an MR; the second sentence of the aforequoted provision
speaks only of cases and not matter.
 No.
o SC maintains that the Resolution is void, considering that the decision of the Office of the President has already
become final and executory even prior to the filing to the MR which became the basis of the 2-2 Resolution.
Ruling:
 MRs denied with finality.
People vs Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Garcia Bernardino

Facts:
 Rs filed separate MRs of the SC’s decision which affirmed the judgment of RTC, Baguio City, finding them guilty of rape
and acts of lasciviousness.
 R Dy submits that the SC’s decision should have been merely recommendatory, in view of the provision of Article VIII,
Section 5 (2)(d) which provides that the SC sitting en banc has jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed
is reclusion perpetua or higher. Further, Dy contends that SC Circular 2-89 which provides that death penalty cases shall be
within the jurisdiction of the Court en banc is incongruous and incompatible with the aforementioned constitutional provision.
Issue:
 W/N SC’s decision is only recommendatory
H/R:
 No.
o SC held that the contention of Dy is misleading:
 Under Article VIII, Section 4 (1), the SC may sit en banc, or in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. At present, it is made up of three divisions. However, the divisions of the SC are not to be
considered as separate and distinct courts.
 Actions considered in any of these divisions and decisions rendered therein are, in effect, by the
same Tribunal; the divisions are not to be considered as separate and distinct courts, but as divisions
of one and the same court.
Ruling:
 MR denied with finality.
G-Notes | C-2020
People vs Gerry Hermida Ebio
Facts:
 R was charged with rape before RTC Sorsogon; private complainant is his 11-year old daughter, Dory. When arraigned, R pled
not guilty. However, at the first hearing of the case, R, through counsel, withdrew his plea of not guilty and changed it to guilty.
To avoid in improvident plea, RTC inquired on the voluntariness of his plea, informed him of the meaning of his admission of
the crime charged and the penalty for it; R persisted on his plea of guilty.
 The prosecution evidence shows that Dory Ebio is the daughter of R. She testified that in the evening of April 21, 2000, she
was preparing to sleep in the sala, together with her 3 younger sisters and their grandmother. R arrived in their house at about
10 PM and proceeded to the room and fixed the bed. Thereafter, he approached and told her to transfer to the bedroom because
they were already crowded in the sala; R was drunk.
 Armed with a six-inch long bladed instrument, R ordered her to undress and threatened to kill her if she would not comply.
Afraid of the threat, she took off her shorts and underwear. Soon after, R and Dory had sexual intercourse. After, Dory remained
inside the room, crying.
 The following day, Dory reported the incident to her grandmother, who accompanied Dory to the police authorities.
Subsequently, Dory executed a sworn statement and a written complaint, charging R with rape. Dory revealed that the incident
was the third occasion that she was raped by the appellant.
 The trial court rendered its judgment, and found R guilty of qualified rape. Considering however his open repentance, the Court
has recommended for an executive clemency as to the penalty is excessive.
 The Public Attorney’s Office filed MR on the ground that the Court lacked a quorum when the case was deliberated as it
appeared that the Decision was signed only by seven justices.
Issue:
 W/N seven justices would constitute a quorum in a 14-member court
H/R:
 Yes.
o The term quorum has been defined as that number of members of the body which, when legally assembled in their
proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business.
o The Constitution is clear on the quorum when the Court meets by Division. There should be at least three members
present for the Division to conduct its business.
 There is similar pronouncement, however, when the Court meets en banc.
 Article VIII, Section 4 does not expressly state the number of Justices required to be present to
constitute a quorum of the Court en banc.
 Deliberations of the 1987 Constitution are also silent on what constitutes a quorum when the Court
is composed of only 14 members.
Ruling:
 Case resubmitted.
Atty. Romulo Macalintal vs PET

Facts:
 P questions the constitution of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution:
o The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
 While P concedes that the SC is authorized to promulgate its own rules for the purpose, he chafes at the creation of a purportedly
separate tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the
constitutional mandate.
Issue:
 W/N the PET is constitutional
H/R:
 Yes.
o SC has reiterated that the SC acting as the PET from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in Article VII, Section 4 is
sound and tenable.
 Section 4: The SC, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
G-Notes | C-2020
o It has also been evident from the discussion of the Constitutional Commission that the grant of jurisdiction to the SC
has been provided for.
 What the commissioners have done is to constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on
the separation of powers because the power being given to the SC is a judicial power.
 It is beyond cavil that when the SC, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election
contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power.
Ruling:
 MR dismissed.
David Lu vs Paterno Lu Ym Sr.

Facts:
 The three consolidated stemmed from the complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution
filed before RTC Cebu City by P against R and sons and Ludo and LUYM Development Corporation.
 A decision of the RTC ruled in favor of P, annulling the issuance of the shares of stock subscribed and paid by R; appeal of the
RTC decision remains pending with the appellate court.
 Several complaints arising from the complaint reached the Court through the present three petitions:
o First petition: P assailed the CA resolution for dismissing their complaint for its incomplete signatory in the certificate
of non-forum shopping, and consequently annulling the placing of the subject corporation under receivership pendent
lite, the Court found the issue to have been mooted by the admission of the RTC of P’s Amended Complaint. Both
parties admitted the mootness of the issue and that the trial court had already rendered a decision on the merits of the
case; it was also added that the Amended Complaint stands since R availaed of an improper mode to assail the
admission of the Amended Complaint.
o Second petition: it was ruled that the issue was mooted by the amendment of the complaint and by the trial court’s
decision on the merits; there was nothing more to enjoin.
o Third petition: the Court found no merit on R’s argument, of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of the correct RTC
docket fees.
Issue:
 W/N the Resolution in the present cases have already become final
H/R:
 No.
o According to SC, the Internal Rules of the SC states that the Court en banc shall act on the following matters and
cases:
 (i): cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by a Division may be modified or
reversed
 (m): x x x other division cases that, in the opinion of at least three Members of the Division who are voting
and present, are appropriate for transfer to the SC en banc
 (n): cases that the SC en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its attention
o The present cases fall under at least three types of cases for consideration by the SC en banc.
o P contends that the assailed Resolution in the present cases have already become final, since a second MR is prohibited
except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons.
 The contention, SC held, misses an important point. The doctrine of immutability of decisions applies only
to final and executory decisions.
 Since the present cases may involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or
principle, the judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional,
hence, it can never become final.
Ruling:
 MR granted.
Republic vs Major General Carlos Garcia

Facts:
 Civil Case 193 was a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties filed by P against R, before the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution which ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against
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the properties of the Garcias upon the filing of a P 1M attachment bond; P posted the required attachment bond to avoid delay
in the issuance of the writ.
 P filed a motion for partial reconsideration after, claiming that it was exempt from filing an attachment bond and praying for
the release thereof.
 In a Resolution, Sandiganbayan ruled that there was nothing in the Rules of Court that exempted the Republic from filing an
attachment bond. Moreover, it reexamined Tolentino vs Carlos which was invoked by the Republic to justify the claimed
exception.
 Sandiganbayan denied P’s motion. P filed for MR; MR denied; P filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it rejected the Republic’s claim of exemption from the filing
of an attachment bond
H/R:
 Yes.
o Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure state that the Republic need not give this security as it is presumed to be
always solvent and able to meet its obligations.
o Unlike the old Code of Civil Procedure which exempted the State to file an attachment bond in the presumption that
the State is always solvent, the Rules of Court I modified the provisions governing attachment. Moreover, the present
Rules of Civil Procedure is noticeably explicit in its requirement that the party applying for should file a bond.
o The Sandiganbayan’s Resolution was clearly contrary to Tolentino. Worse, the Sandiganbayan transgressed the
Constitution and arrogated upon itself a power that it did not by law possess.
 All courts must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of this Court.
 Tolentino has not been superseded or reversed; thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to
form an important part of our legal system.
o SC held that it was wrong for the Sandiganbayan to declare that Tolentino needed to be
carefully reexamined in the light of the changes that rule on attachment had undergone
through years.
o Article VIII, Section 4(3) provides:
 Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no
case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained,
the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court
in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting
en banc.
 The Constitution mandates that only the SC sitting en banc may modify or reverse a doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division.
o Any court, the Sandiganbayan included, which renders a decision in violation of this
constitutional precept exceeds its jurisdiction.
 Therefore, the Sandiganbayan could not have validly reexamined, much less
reversed, Tolentino. By doing something it could not validly do, the
Sandiganbayan acted ultra vires and committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
In re Letters of Atty. Estelito Mendoza

Facts:
 As resolved by the Court en banc, a re-raffle of the FASAP vs PAL case was done.
 As designated by the Article VIII, Section 4(3), the Court acts either en banc or through 3 divisions of 5 members each.
o The first arrangement involves all fifteen members of the court, and cases which the en banc may take cognizance of
are defined by Article VIII, Section 4(2) and by the Internal Rules of the SC.
o All other cases are assigned to one of the three Divisions.
 A rule 45 petition for review on certiorari of a CA Decision involving a labor dispute, such as the main
FASAP case, is cognizable by a Division.
 The first step in the assignment of a case filed with the SC is the determination or classification of whether it is properly an En
Banc or a Division case. The case is then listed with the others filed in the same period, in the order in which they were filed
G-Notes | C-2020
for random assignment; said process is supervised by two Raffle Committees, one for En Banc and another for Division cases.
The Raffle Committees have 3 members each, chaired by the two most senior associate justices, with the four other slots
occupied by the next 4 associate justices in the order of their seniority.
 Membership in the 3 Divisions of the Court is also determined by seniority. When a Member departs from the Court, the
memberships in the Divisions also change as a result of the change in seniority of the remaining justices.
o Thus, a Member who stays in the Court for a significant period of time will periodically be re-assigned to different
Divisions.
 The rules also provide that a case follows its ponente when he or she transfers to another Division.
 PAL, in its first MR, argued that the intention of the Constitution is for cases or matters heard by the Division to be decided
or resolved with the concurrence of a Majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the
case and voted thereon.
o PAL concluded that the constitutional requirement may not have been met because those who participated in the
issuance of the September 7, 2011 Resolution – Justices Brion, Mendoza and Perez – had never taken part in the
resolution of any matter in connection with the instant case, while Justice Bersamin was designated only one day
before the September 7, 2011 Resolution was voted upon.
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall
not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
William Marbury vs James Madison

Facts:
 William Marbury was appointed a justice of the peace, a minor judicial officer, in the District of Columbia, by President Adams
a few days before President Jefferson took office after defeating Adams in the election. His appointment was signed by now-
Chief Justice of the SC, John Marshall. Oddly, neither Adams nor Marshall delivered the commission to Marbury before they
left office. President Jefferson instructed respondent Madison to withhold delivery of the commissions of the newly-appointed
judges, including that of Marbury.
 Marbury filed the present petition of mandamus, compelling Madison, Jefferson’s Secretary of State, to deliver his commission.
Issue:
 W/N Marbury has the right to the commission he demands
 W/N a mandamus is the appropriate legal remedy
H/R:
 Yes.
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o In order to determine his entitlement to the commission, it becomes necessary to inquire whether he has been appointed
to the office.
 Based from the facts of the case, since Marbury’s commission was signed by the president and sealed by the
secretary of state, he is to be considered appointed.
 Article 2d, Section 2d, together with Section 3d, of the US Constitution states that the president
shall nominate and appoint ambassadors, public ministers, and consuls, and other officers whose
appointments are not provided for, and shall commission all the officers of the US.
o To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by
law, but violative of a vested legal right.
 Yes.
o It is a plain case of a mandamus, to compel respondents to deliver the commission.
 The act to establish the judicial courts of the US authorizes the SC to issue writs of mandamus to any
appointed courts or persons holding office under the authority of the US.
 The secretary of state, being a person holding an office under the authority of the US, is precisely
within the description.
o In the distribution of power, it has been declared that the SC shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, public ministers and consuls, and those which a state shall be a party.
 This has been replicated under Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the 1987 Constitution.
o It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.
 NOTE: The issuance of a mandamus as an original action was outside the constitutional boundaries of the Supreme Court
before; petition was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
o To enable the SC to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission

Facts:
 P and the private Rs were candidates voted for the positions of member of the National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas.
 P was proclaimed as member-elect of the National Assembly, and subsequently, took his oath of office.
 December 3, 1935: National Assembly passed Resolution 8, confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.
 December 8, 1935: Private R Ynsua filed an election protest against P before the Electoral Commission of the National
Assembly.
 December 9, 1935: Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution, providing that it will not consider any election protest
that was not submitted on or before December 9.
 P filed a motion to dismiss, but was denied by the Electoral Commission; P filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
 W/N the Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting the December 9 Resolution
H/R:
 Yes.
o P argues that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly, and that Resolution 8 is valid.
o SC held that the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive,
the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. Moreover, the Constitution is a definition of the powers
of government.
 Who is to determine the nature, scope, and extent of such powers?
 The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary to allocate constitutional
boundaries.
o The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies.
o In the case at bar:
 National Assembly confirmed, through a resolution, the election of P to the National Assembly.
 Electoral Commission has, by a resolution, adopted a resolution which fixed the date for the filing of protests.
G-Notes | C-2020
 Here is then presented an actual controversy involving a conflict of a grave constitutional nature
between the National Assembly and the Electoral Commission.
o The nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter
to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
 SC held that it is of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the case, it has
jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy.
 No.
o The Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner, notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by Resolution 8 of
the National Assembly.
o From the deliberations of the Constitutional Convention, it is evident that the purpose was to transfer exclusive
jurisdiction from the houses as sole judges to an independent and impartial tribunal – the Electoral Commission.
 The eventual grant of power to the Electoral to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained originally in the legislature.
 The express lodging of the said power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the
exercise of the same power by the National Assembly.
Ruling:
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Facts:
 The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter, or exchange of goods and properties, as well as on the sale or exchange
of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or properties sold, bartered or
exchanged or of the gross receipts from the sale or exchange of services. o RA 77163 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
 P assails that constitutionality of RA 7716.
Issue:
 W/N RA 7716 is regressive, oppressive and confiscatory and that it violates vested rights protected under the Contract Clause
H/R:
 No.
o There is no justification for passing upon the claims that the law violates the rule that taxation must be progressive.
 SC held that regressivity is not a negative standard for the courts to enforce. What Congress is required by
the Constitution to do is evolve a progressive system of taxation.
o Petitioners lacked empirical data to base the conclusion that the VAT is regressive in the sense that it will hit the poor
and middle-income group in society harder than it will the rich.
o Petitioners also argued that the imposition of VAT on the sales and leases of real estate by virtue of contracts entered
into prior to the effectivity of the law would violate the constitutional provision that no law impairing the obligation
of contracts shall be passed.
 In truth, the Contract Clause has never been though as a limitation on the exercise of the State’s power of
taxation, save only for tax exemptions.
o The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of
a concrete record.
o It does not add anything, therefore, to invoke the duty to justify SC’s intervention in what is essentially a case that at
best is not ripe for adjudication.
 The duty must still be performed in the context of a concrete case or controversy, as Article VIII, Section
5(2) clearly defines the SC’s jurisdiction in terms of cases, and nothing but cases.
Ruling:
Eugene Tan vs Delegate Diosdado Macapagal

G-Notes | C-2020
Facts:
 Petitioners assail the validity of the Laurel-Leido Resolution which deals with the range of authority of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, and to declare that the Convention is without power, under Article XV, Section 1 of the Constitution and RA 6132
to consider, discuss, and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of
government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution, with the Convention being merely empowered to
propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein.
 SC dismissed the petition; petitioners filed MR; MR denied; petitioners filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N petitioners have locus standi
 W/N the SC has jurisdiction over the case
H/R:
 None.
o There was no cause for legitimate resentment, and no direct injury mentioned by the petitioners.
 None.
o During the time of filing, the case was not yet ripe for adjudication:
 There was not yet a finalization of any resolution that would radically alter the 1935 Constitution.
 As long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on, there is no room for the interposition of
judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the courts are devoid of jurisdiction.
 Article VIII, Section 5(2) states that the SC may provide final judgments and orders of the lower courts.
Ruling:
 MR dismissed.
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks
Facts:
 Act 2706, as amended by Act 3075 and Commonwealth Act 180, sought to regulate the ownership of private schools in the
country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may
be granted the right to own and operate a private school. Also, the law gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to
ascertain standards that must be followed by private schools. Lastly, it also provides that the Secretary of Education can and
may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
 Petitioner assails the constitutionality of Act 2706, as amended by Act 3075 and Commonwealth Act 180 on the grounds that:
o They deprive owners of schools and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due
process of law.
 Petition contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution,
and any law requiring previous governmental approval amounts to censorship of previous restraint.
o They deprive parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency.
o Their provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education unlimited discretion and power to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power.
 The law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise discretion.
 The power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
Issue:
 W/N there is a justiciable controversy
H/R:
 None.
o With regards the first ground, none of the petitioners have cause to present the issue, because all of them have permits
to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
 They have suffered no wrong under the terms of law; they are in no need of relief.
 Mere apprehensions that the Secretary of Education might under the law withdraw the permit of one
of the petitioners do not constitute a justiciable controversy.
Ruling:
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Dean Jose Joya vs PCGG

Facts:
 Then-PCGG Chairman Mateo Caparas wrote President Corazon Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed
Consignment Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods
International, Inc. concerning a scheduled sale of 82 Old Masters Paintings, and antique silverware seized from Malacañang
and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila, alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives
and cronies.
 Then President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Macaraig, authorized Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment
Agreement, allowing Christie’s of New York to auction off the subject art pieces for an in behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines.
o According to the Consignment Agreement, PCGG shall consign to Christie’s for sale at public auction the 82 Old
Masters Paintings, as well as the silverware, and such other property.
 COA submitted to President Aquino its audit findings and observations on the Consignment Agreement, assailing the authority
of PCGG Chairman Caparas’ to enter into the Consignment Agreement, that the contract was highly disadvantageous to the
government, among others.
 PCGG, through its new Chairman David Castro, wrote President Aquino, defending the Consignment Agreement and refuting
the allegations of COA Chairman Domingo.
 The present petition was filed before the SC. Meanwhile, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled, and the proceeds
were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issue:
 W/N the instant petition complies with the legal requisites for the SC to exercise its power of judicial review over the case
H/R:
 No.
o There are four legal requisites for judicial inquiry:
 The question must be raised by the proper party.
 There must be an actual case or controversy.
 The question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
 The decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case.
o Petitioners, as artists deeply concerned with the protection of the country’s artistic wealth, allege that they have been
deprived of their right to public property without due process of law, with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the
art pieces.
 However, they similarly point out that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of
the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit, non-stock corporation
established to promote non-Philippine arts.
 Similarly, it was alleged that the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from
friends and dignitaries during their silver wedding anniversary – an occasion personal to them.
o Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the same have been publicly owned, the
petitioners do not possess any legal right.
o Also, the criteria for a mandamus suit has not been fulfilled:
 A writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right to be enforced and the duty of the
state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
 In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent
officials.
Ruling:
Retired Police General Levy Macasiano vs National Housing Authority

Facts:
 RA 7279 was approved. The constitutionality of Sections 28 (Eviction and Demolition) and 44 (Moratorium on Eviction and
Demolition) are challenged in the instant petition on the ground, among others, that the provisions deprive the government and
private property owners of their property without due process of law and without compensation.
 Solicitor-General filed his Comment, maintaining that the instant petition is devoid of merit for non-compliance with the
essential requisites of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law. Further, OSG contends that there is no
G-Notes | C-2020
actual case or controversy, and that the petitioner is not the proper party to question the Act, as he does not state that he has
property ‘being squatted upon’.
Issue:
 W/N the requisites for the exercise of judicial review have been met
H/R:
 No.
o It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first two fundamental requisites are absent.
 There is no actual controversy.
 The petitioner is not likewise a proper party; as a consultant of the DPWH under a contract for consultancy,
he is not vested with authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public
domain, much less on private lands.
 Petitioner also does not claim that he is an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be
affected by the challenged provisions of RA 7279.
Ruling:
Juanito Mariano vs COMELEC

Facts:
 Ps assail RA 78544, Section 51 on the grounds that it attempts to alter or restart the 3-consecutive term limit for local elective
officials, disregarding the terms previously served by them, colliding with Article VI, Section 7 and Article X, Section 8.
Issue:
 W/N Article X, Section 51 of RA 7854 is constitutional
H/R:
 Challenge cannot be entertained.
o Petitioners have far from complied with the requirements before a litigant could challenge the constitutionality of a
law:
 There must be an actual case or controversy.
 The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party.
 The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.
 The decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
o With regards the first requirement, the petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in the coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that
he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
o With regards the second requirement, petitioners are residents of Taguig, save for Mariano. As such, they are not also
the proper parties to raise the abstract issue.
Juan Antonio Oposa vs DENR Secretary Fulgencio Factoran

Facts:
 A civil case was filed before RTC Makati by minors Juan Oposa, representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Secretary Factoran. The petition alleged that judgment be rendered, ordering for the
cancellation of all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLAs) in the country, and to cease and desist from receiving or
appraising new TLAs. Petitioners also assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
 Further, petitioners alleged that they have a constitutional right, among others, to a balanced and healthful ecology under Article
II, Section 16 and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
 Factoran filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that petitioners have no cause of action against him, and that the issue raised is a
political question.
 RTC granted the motion to dismiss; petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari before the SC.
Issue:
4 An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati
G-Notes | C-2020
 W/N petitioners have a cause of action in filing a class suit
 W/N the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
H/R:
 Yes.
o The said civil case is a class suit.
 SC declared that the petitioners are numerous enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
 All the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit are present both in the civil case and in the present
petition.
o Petitioners-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
 Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
 Yes.
o SC did not agree with the RTC judge’s conclusion that the petitioners failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed.
 The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right – the right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
 The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.
Ruling:
KILOSBAYAN vs Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona

Facts:
 Pursuant to the charter of the PCSO which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and
other similar activities, PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds.
 After learning that PCSO was interested in operating an online lottery system, Berjaya Group Berhad became interested to
offer its services to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya organized with Filipino investors the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation. Eventually, a Request for Proposal was issued by the PCSO for the Lease Contract of an online lottery system.
 The Office of the President announced later on that it had given PGMC the go-signal to operate the country’s online lottery
system, the contract of which would be submitted for final clearance and approval by the Chief Executive.
 Petitioner KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Ramos, strongly opposing the setting up to the online lottery system
on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations.
 The media reported that despite the opposition, Malacañang will push through with the operation of an online lottery system
nationwide.
 KILOSBAYAN requested copies of all documents pertaining to the lottery award from Executive Secretary Guingona.
Respondent Guingona informed petitioner that the documents would be transmitted before the end of the month.
o However, on the same date, a Contract of Lease was finally executed by PCSO and PGMC.
 The President, per a press statement, approved the same.
 Considering the denial of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that only a court
injunction can stop Malacañang, and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease, KILOSBAYAN filed the present
petition.
 Petitioners submit that PCSO’s collaboration with PGMC constitutes a violation of RA 1169, Section 1(b), which prohibits
PCSO from holding and conducting charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities in collaboration or joint
venture x x x
 Respondents maintain hat the contract of lease does not violate RA 1169.
Issue:
 W/N petitioners have locus standi
 W/N the contract is valid
H/R:
 Yes.
o A party’s standing before the SC is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside
in view of the importance of the issues raised.
G-Notes | C-2020
 In line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress, and
even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate and prosecute actions
before the SC to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various
government agencies or instrumentalities.
 SC found the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public.
o The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-
being of the people even in the remotest areas of the country.
 No.
o The language of Section 1 is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes
races, lotteries and other similar activities, PCSO cannot exercise it in collaboration, association or joint venture with
any other party.
 No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed since the
privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races is a franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO.
 It is a settled rule that in all grants by the government to individuals or corporations of rights,
privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the grantee.
o A careful analysis and evaluation of the provisions of the contract and a consideration of the contemporaneous acts of
the PCSO and PGMC indubitably disclose that the contract is not in reality a contract of lease under which the PGMC
is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, but one where the statutorily proscribed collaboration, in the
least, or joint venture, at the most, exists between the contracting parties.
Ruling:
Francisco Tatad vs DOTC Secretary Jesus Garcia, Jr.

Facts:
 DOTC planned to construct an LRT line along EDSA. After prequalification and bidding, only the EDSA LRT Consortium
met the requirements prescribed by the PBAC.
 An agreement was then made between the government, through the DOTC and EDSA LRT Consortium; said Agreement was
based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme, as provided for by RA 6957, as amended by RA 7718.
o Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium shall build the facilities and shall supply the train cabs.
 Petitioners opposed the implementation of the agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a foreign corporation.
As such, it cannot own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit.
Issue:
 W/N petitioners have legal standing
 W/N the Agreement is constitutional
H/R:
 Yes.
o The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national
government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of the law.
 Yes.
o Petitioners alleged that since the EDSA LRT III is a public utility, ownership thereof is limited by the Constitution to
Filipino citizens and domestic corporations.
 SC held that what EDSA LRT Consortium owns are the rail tracks and the rolling stocks, and not a public
utility.
 While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves
constitute a public utility.
o What constitutes public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve the public.
 The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of
a public utility. However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the
facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does not operate them to
serve the public.
o While EDSA LRT Consortium is the owner of the facilities necessary to operate the EDSA LRT III, it admits that it
is not enfranchised to operate a public utility.
G-Notes | C-2020
 The mere formation of a public utility corporation does not ipso facto characterize the corporation as one
operating a public utility; the moment for determining the requisite Filipino nationality is when the entity
applies for a franchise, certificate or any other form of authorization for that purpose.
Ruling:
KILOSBAYAN vs PCSO Chairman Manuel Morato

Facts:
 As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan vs Guingona, the parties entered into negotiations for a new agreement that would be
consistent with the PCSO charter.
 PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and
accessories to PCSO, for a term of lease of 8 years.
 Petitioners seek to declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it is substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified in
the earlier case.
 Respondents question the petitioners’ standing to bring the suit, and maintain the validity of the ELA.
Issue:
 W/N petitioners are the real parties in interest
 W/N ELA is valid
H/R:
 None.
o Respondents assert that petitioners have no personal and substantial interest likely to be injured by the enforcement
of the contract; petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the ruling in the previous case sustaining their standing is
not the law of the case and therefore, the question of their standing can no longer be reopened.
o Stare decisis cannot apply; the previous ruling sustaining the standing of petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on ‘real parties in interest’ because no constitutional issues were actually involved.
o Law of the case cannot also apply; the parties are the same, but the cases are not.
o Rule on conclusiveness of judgment cannot apply as well; it has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment
or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated
claims are involved.
 No.
o Standing vs real party in interest
 The latter is more specific; must be a party who would be benefited by the judgment, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
 The former may be brought by concerned citizens, taxpayers, etc.
 Yes.
o The claims of petitioners are speculative; in any case, the presumption is that in making contracts, the government has
acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason for denying power to the government hold
true also in cases involving the validity of contracts made by it.
Ruling:
Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines and GMA Network vs COMELEC
Facts:
 In Osmeña vs COMELEC, the validity of RA 6646, Section 11(b) was upheld.
o Section 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to the COMELEC under
the Omnibus Election Code, Section 90, and Section 92 with respect to broadcast media.
 Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92 on the following grounds:
o Section 92: Comelec Time - The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the “Comelec
Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio
and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign
o It takes property without due process of law and without just compensation.
G-Notes | C-2020
o It denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws.
o It is an excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication
or information during the period of election.
 Petitioners, as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters, filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N petitioner has legal standing (TELEBAP and GMA)
 W/N Section 92 of the Omnibus Election Code is constitutional
H/R:
 No.
o Citizens are only allowed to raise a constitutional question only when it could be shown that there is a personal injury
suffered.
 Members of petitioner have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the operation of Section 92
of the Omnibus Election Code.
o With regards their interest as taxpayers, SC held that they do not have sufficient interests since the present case does
not involve the exercise of the taxing or spending power of Congress.
o As a corporate entity, petitioner also does not have standing to assert the rights of radio and television broadcasting
companies.
 Standing jus tertii5 will be recognized only if it can be shown that the party suing has some substantial relation
to the third party, or that the third party cannot assert his constitutional right, or that the right of the third
party will be diluted unless the party in court is allowed to espouse the third party’s constitutional claim.
 In the instant case, none of the circumstances is present.
o The mere fact that petitioner is composed of lawyers in the broadcast industry does not
entitle them to bring the suit in their name as representatives of the affected companies.
 Yes.
o GMA Network appears to have the requisite standing, since it operates radio and television broadcast stations in the
Philippines affected by the enforcement of the assailed law.
 GMA claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time, in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election, and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year (1998).
 Yes.
o All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign.
 The provision is conceived as beneficial for the common good, as it will help fully inform the public and the
issues in the election.
 For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election.
o Radio and television broadcasting companies, whih are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and images; they are merely given the temporary privilege of using
them.
 Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service.
o As held in PLDT vs NTC, regulation of the use and ownership of the telecommunications systems is in the exercise
of the police power of the State for the promotion of the general welfare.
o Petitioners assail the differential treatment of broadcast media.
 The government spends public funds for the allocation and regulation of the broadcast industry, which it does
not do in the case of print media.
 To require radio and television broadcast industry to provide free air time for the COMELEC Time
is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
Ruling:
Ramon Gonzales vs Chairman Andres Narvasa, Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR)
5legal classification for an argument made by a third party (as opposed to the legal title holder) which attempts to justify
entitlement to possessory rights based on the showing of legal title in another person
G-Notes | C-2020
Facts:
 The PCCR was created by President Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or
revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
 Gonzales assails the constitutionality of the PCCR on two grounds:
o PCCR is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of law.
o By creating such a body, the President is intervening in a process from which he is totally excluded by the Constitution
– the amendment of the fundamental charter.
 Gonzales filed the petition for prohibition and mandamus in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer.
 Respondents allege that with respect to the PCCR, the case has become moot and academic.
Issue:
 W/N the petition is moot
 W/N petitioner has legal standing
H/R:
 Yes.
o By the time the instant petition was filed, the PCCR was dissolved already; PCCR has ceased to exist, having lost its
raison d’etre.
o The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by
petitioner.
 Prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists.
 It is well-established that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that
is already fait accompli6.
 No.
o Petitioners have failed to show what particularized interest they have for bringing the instant suit; it has not been show
that there is a sustained injury or a danger of sustaining personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR.
 If at all, it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in the case, since the President has
allegedly encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office.
Ruling:
Raoul del Mar vs PAGCOR

Facts:
 PAGCOR is a GOCC organized under PD 1869. Pursuant to Sections 1 and 10, PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the
Secretary of Justice as to whether or not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country.
 Secretary of Justice opined that the authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain games of chance or gambling extends to jai-
alai which is a form of sport or game played for bets and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a legislative franchise for
the purpose.
 Petitioner initially filed a petition for prohibition to prevent PAGCOR from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or Basque
pelota games, on the ground that the controverted act is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the Constitution or
PAGCOR’s own Charter.
 PAGCOR entered into an Agreement with Belle Jai Alai Corporation and Filipinas Gaming Entertainment Totalizator
Corporation wherein it was agreed that BELLE would provide the facilities which PAGCOR would handle and manage.
 Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for certiorari, questioning the validity of said Agreement on the ground that PAGCOR
is without jurisdiction, legislative franchise, authority or power to enter into such Agreement for the opening and operation of
jai-alai games.
 A petition for injunction was later filed by Federico Sandoval and Michael Defensor, seeking to enjoin PAGCOR from
operating the jai-alai for being patently illegal, having no basis in the law or the Constitution.
 Petitioners are suing as taxpayers and in their capacity as members of the House of Representatives.
 Petitioners mainly contend that PAGCOR has no jurisdiction or legislative franchise or acted with grave abuse of discretion in
arrogating unto itself the authority to open jai-alai game operations in the country.
6a thing that has already happened or been decided before those affected hear about it, leaving them with no option but to
accept.
G-Notes | C-2020
 Respondents contend that petitioners have no legal standing to file a taxpayer’s suit based on their cause of action nor are they
the real parties-in-interest entitled to the avails of the suit.
Issue:
 W/N PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the right to manage and operate jai-alai
H/R:
 None.
o A party suing as a taxpayer must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation.
 In the petitions at bar, the Agreement entered into between PAGCOR and BELLE will show that all financial
outlay or capital expenditure for the operation of jai-alai games shall be provided for by the latter.
o As a member of the House of Representatives, SC held that petitioners have legal standing.
 In the instant cases, petitioners complain that the operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement by
PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive power to grant franchise.
 No.
o SC held that the charter of PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to operate and manage jai-alai.
 A historical study of the creation, growth and development of PAGCOR will readily show that it was never
given a legislative franchise to operate jai-alai.
 The scope of the PAGCOR franchise is to maintain gambling casinos, not a franchise to operate jai-
alai.
o PD 1869 does not have the standard marks of a law granting a franchise to operate jai-alai;
the said law only deals with details pertinent alone to the operation of gambling casinos.
o Tax treatment between jai-alai operations and gambling casinos are distinct from each
other.
Ruling:
 Petitions granted.
Ma. Angelina Matibag vs Alfredo Benipayo

Facts:
 February 2, 1999: COMELEC en banc appointed Matibag as Acting Director IV of the COMELEC’s Education
and Information Department (EID) by then-COMELEC Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity.
 March 22, 2001: President Arroyo appointed ad interim Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman, and Borra and Tuason
as COMELEC Commissioner. The three took their oath of office and assumed their positions. The Office of the
President submitted to the CoA on May 22, 2001 the ad interim appointments for confirmation. However, CoA did
not act on said appointments.
 June 1, 2001: President Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments of the three to the same positions and for the
same term of seven years, expiring on February 2, 2008. They took their oaths of office again. The Office of the
President transmitted on June 5, 2001 their appointments to the CoA for confirmation.
 June 8, 2001: President Arroyo renewed again the ad interim appointments of the three, because Congress adjourned
before the CoA could act on their appointments.
 In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum addressed to Matibag as Director IV of
the EID and to Cinco and Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and re-
assigning Matibag to the Law Department.
 Matibag requested to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
Matibag cited CSC Memorandum Circular 7, reminding heads of government offices that transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 – June 13, 2001. Benipayo denied the said
request.
 Matibag filed for MR; MR denied; Matibag appealed to COMELEC en banc.
o During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, Matibag filed the instant petition,
questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Matibag
claims that the ad interim appointments violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
G-Notes | C-2020
COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman
and members.
Issue:
 W/N the instant petition satisfies all the requirements before the SC may exercise its power of judicial review in
constitutional cases
H/R:
 Yes.
o Respondents assert that the petition failed to satisfy the four requisites:
 Existence of an actual and appropriate controversy
 Personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional issue
 Exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity
 Constitutional issue is the lis mota of the case
 Respondents argue that the second, third, fourth requisites are absent in the case.
o SC held the four requisites have been satisfied, since the real issue is the legality of Benipayo as COMELEC
Chairman.
Ruling:
 Petition dismissed on substantive grounds.
Atty. Romulo Macalintal vs COMELEC

Facts:
 Petitioner questions the constitutionality of the provisions RA 9189 or The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
on the following grounds:
o Section 5(d) states a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in
absentee voting is void because it dispenses of the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.
o Section 18.5 which allows COMELEC to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of
votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president is unconstitutional because
it violates the Constitution for it is only Congress who is empowered to do so.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
Issue:
H/R:
 Yes.
o Taxpayers have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute.
 SC held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds, because expenditure
of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act
constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
o Also, the challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of citizens;
transcendental significance.
Ruling:
White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Facts:
G-Notes | C-2020
 Ordinance 7774 was signed into law by Mayor Alfredo Lim; said ordinance sanctions any person or corporation
who will allow the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than
twice a day.
 Petitioners, as owners and operators of several hotels and motels, filed a complaint on the ground that the ordinance
will affect their business interests as operators and that the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their
patrons. Respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
 RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, noting that the ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual,
guaranteed and guarded by the Constitution.
 Respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the SC, which the latter referred to the CA; CA affirmed the
constitutionality of the Ordinance, reversing the decision of the RTC; Petitioners filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N the assailed Ordinance is constitutional
H/R:
 Yes.
o Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and
harm from the law or action challenged to support that party’s participation in the case.
 In the instant case, petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right
of liberty of their clients.
 SC held that based on the allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from
overbreadth.
o SC held that petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their
clients to patronize their establishments for a ‘wash-rate’ time frame.
 No.
o The test of a valid ordinance must be satisfied;
 It must not contravene the Constitution or any statute.
 It must not be unfair or oppressive.
 It must not be partial or discriminatory.
 It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
 It must be general and consistent with public policy.
 It must not be unreasonable.
o The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices: wash rate admissions and renting out
a room more than twice a day.
 The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on LGUs by the Local
Government Code.
o The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize, if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
 City asserts before the SC that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of
prostitution and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine
entry, presence and exit, thus becoming the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.
 SC held that it cannot discount other legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out
for more than twice a day.
o Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel while there is a
brownout.
o In-transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips.
o The police measure should be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights, as it prevents
legitimate use of places.
o The behavior that the Ordinance seeks to curtail is already prohibited and could be diminished simply by
applying existing laws.
G-Notes | C-2020
Ruling:
Dominador Bustos vs Judge Antonio Lucero, CFI Pampanga

Facts:
 Petitioner, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with CFI Pampanga, praying that the record of the case be
remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, court of origin.
o Petitioner prays for such, in order that petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in
connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
 The said motion was denied. Petitioner filed the present petition before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant accused’s
motion
H/R:
 No.
o After petitioner’s counsel renounced his right to present evidence, the case was forwarded to the CFI by the
justice of peace.
o There is no law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth.
 Article VIII, Section 5(5) authorizes the SC to promulgate rules x x x for the speedy disposition of
cases x x x
Ruling:
In re Cunanan
Facts:
 Congress passed RA 972, the Bar Flunkers Act. Section 1 of the assailed law provides for the respective passing
marks for 1946-1955. Section 2 provides that a bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 in any subject shall be
deemed to have passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.
 Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the practice of the legal profession and the
administration of justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the petitions for admission on the sole question of whether or not RA 972 is constitutional.
Issue:
 W/N RA 972 is constitutional
H/R:
 No.
o The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission.
 In the judicial system of our country, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility.
 The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts; it
has also been clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely judicial
function, no matter where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.
 Yes, insofar as Section 1 is concerned; Section 2 unconstitutional.
G-Notes | C-2020
Ruling:
 Section 1 constitutional; Section 2 unconstitutional.
Atty. Edwin Javellana vs DILG

Facts:
 Petitioner was an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto Divinagracia filed an
administrative case against petitioner for violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, and for oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
o The complaint alleged that Javellana has continuously engaged in the practice of law while being an incumbent
member of the City Council, without securing authority from the Regional Director of DILG, as required by DILG
Memoranda.
 Petitioner assailed the following:
o Memorandum 80-38, which stated that authority must first be secured by incumbent officials for the private practice
of law.
o Memorandum 90-81, which declared as unlawful the engagement of public officials during their incumbency private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law.
o Local Government Code of 1991, Section 90, which prohibited incumbent officials who are members of the Bar
from appearing as counsel.
 According to petitioner, the aforementioned violate Article VIII, Section 5(5).
Issue:
 W/N the aforementioned DILG Memoranda and the Local Government Code, Section 90 is violative of Article VIII, Section
5(5)
 W/N Local Government Code, Section 90 is discriminatory against the legal and medical professions
H/R:
 No.
o SC held that neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the SC’s power and authority to prescribe rules on the
practice of law.
 The aforementioned simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interests
between the discharge of their public duties and the private practice of their profession, in instances where
the law allows it.
 No.
o If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of
law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area of public service.
Ruling:
In re Petition to Disqualify Atty. de Vera

Facts:
 The election for the 16th Board of Governors was set on April 26, 2003. Later, through a Resolution, the elections were reset
to May 31, 2003, after the IBP National Convention.
 Respondent de Vera sent a letter to the IBP Board to reconsider the Resolution, as holding an election on May 31, 2003
would go against IBP By-Laws, Section 40, which provides for election protests two days after the election, and also states
that decisions of election contests shall not be announced later than May 31. IBP Board denied the request.
 After the IBP National Convention had been adjourned in May 24, 2003, petitioners filed a petition before the IBP Board
seeking for the postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003, and the
disqualification of de Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region. IBP denied the petition.
 Petitioners applied for TRO before the SC; petition granted.
o Petitioners are officers of Bukidnon and Misamis Oriental Chapter (Northern Mindanao).
 Petitioners also stressed that de Vera’s transfer of IBP membership is a misuse of the rotation rule of the IBP, and also submit
that de Vera lacks the moral aptitude, as he attacked the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations of the
constitutionality of the plunder law.
 Respondent de Vera raised new issues in his comment, arguing that the Court has no jurisdiction over the present case, as it is
only an internal matter. He also assails the legal standing of the petitioners, as qualified nominees are the only parties that can
validly lodge an election protest.
G-Notes | C-2020

Issue:
 W/N the SC has jurisdiction
 W/N the petitioners are the proper parties to bring the suit
 W/N the present petition is premature
H/R:
 Yes.
o Article VIII, Section 5(5) confers on the SC the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP.
 Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the
election of its officers.
 No.
o Petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election, as only IBP Members from Agusan
del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be nominated.
 Yes.
o In the present case, de Vera has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made
yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao.
Ruling:
Automotive Industry Workers Alliance vs Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo

Facts:
 EO 185 was promulgated, which authorized the Secretary of Labor and Employment to exercise administrative supervision
over the NLRC; supervision was transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
 Petitioners, as labor unions and taxpayers, assailed the constitutionality of EO 185 based on the legislative history:
o NLRC was an integral part of the DOLE under the administrative supervision of the Secretary of Justice.
o EO 292, issued by President Aquino, provided that the NLRC is an attached agency to the DOLE for policy and
program coordination and for administrative supervision.
o RA 6715 was enacted, declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the DOLE for program and policy
coordination only, while administrative supervision was turned over to the NLRC Chairman.
 EO 185, in authorizing the Secretary of Labor and Employment to exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC,
allegedly reverted to the pre-RA 6715 setup, amending the latter law which only Congress can do.
 Respondents, through OSG, alleged that the present petition does not pose an actual case or controversy upon which judicial
review may be exercised, as petitioners have not specifically cited how EO 185 has prejudiced or threatened to prejudice their
rights and existence as labor unions and as taxpayers. Respondents also argue that petitioners have no locus standi.
Issue:
H/R:
 None.
o Petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to
the enactment of EO 185.
 As labor unions representing their members, it cannot be said that EO 185 will prejudice their rights,
considering that the scope of the authority conferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend to the
power to review, reverse, revise, or modify the decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.
o EO 185 can only be considered as nothing more or less than a command from a superior to an inferior; its impacts is
thereby limited to the departments to which it is addressed.
 EO 185 was enacted for the efficient and economical administration of the affairs of the department to
which it is issued in accordance with the law governing the subject matter.
 Administrative in its nature, the subject order does not pass beyond the limits of the departments to which it
is directed, hence, it has not created any rights in third persons.
Ruling:
G-Notes | C-2020
Re: 2003 Bar Examinations

Facts:
 On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Vitug was apprised of a rumored
leakage in the said subject. After inquiries, Justice Vitug recommended for the nullification of the bar examination on the
subject, and that an investigation be conducted. A resolution was issued, adopting the recommendation of Justice Vitug.
 Following the issuance of the resolution, numerous petitions and motions were filed, expressing agreement to the
nullification of the bar examinations in Mercantile Law, but voicing strong reservations against the holding of another
examination on the subject.
 In a resolution, the Court, finding merit in the submissions, resolved to cancel the scheduled examination in Mercantile Law
and to allocate the fifteen percentage points among the seven bar examination subjects. In the same resolution, an
Investigating Committee was to be created.
o The Investigating Committee was tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage and the parties responsible,
as well as recommend sanctions against the same.
 After the investigation, the following were observed:
o A friend of Justice Vitug’s secretary confided that the a great number of bar examination questions were similar
with a copy she received on the eve of the examination.
o Atty. Balgos, test examiner of Mercantile Law, prepared three sets of questions which were all encoded in his
personal computer. As he did not know how to prepare the questionnaire in final form, he asked his private
secretary, Cheryl Palma, to format the questions.
o Atty. Balgos also admitted that he does not know how to operate a computer, and that it was Cheryl who opened and
closed the computer for him.
o Atty. Balgos was surprised to discover, after the reports of leakage broke out, that his computer was interconnected
with the computers of his assistant attorneys.
o Silvestre Atienza, fraternity brother of Atty. de Guzman, was responsible for interconnecting the computers,
including Atty. Balgos’ computer, without his knowledge and permission.
o Atty. Balgos questioned Atty. de Guzman, one of the assistant attorneys. The latter admitted that he downloaded the
test questions from the former’s computer and faxed a copy to his fraternity brothers. Atty. Balgos was convinced
that de Guzman was the source of the leakage of the test questions in mercantile law.
 However, he stressed that they were not tips but only possible test questions.
 The Committee found that the leaked test questions were the questioners Atty. Balgos had prepared and submitted to Justice
Vitug, and the questions constituted 82% of the questions asked in the examination in Mercantile Law, and the following
were also concluded by the Committee:
o Atty. de Guzman, who voluntarily confessed that he downloaded the test questions without Balgos’ knowledge and
consent and faxed them to other persons, was the source of the leaked test questions.
 The said acts of de Guzman constituted larceny; it was theft of intellectual property, as the test questions
were intellectual property of Atty. Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.
 Besides theft, Atty. de Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Atty. Balgos’ right to privacy of
communication, and to security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure.
 He has also transgressed various canons of the CPR.
o The following were also implicated, regarding their assistance and cooperation:
 Cheryl Palma, who was the only person who knew the password of Atty. Balgos’ computer.
 Silvestre Atienza, who was responsible for interconnecting Atty. Balgos’ computer with the other
computers.
 Members of the Beta Sigma Lambda fraternity, for the possible widespread of the leakage
o The Committee also found that the theft of the test questions could have been avoided if Atty. Balgos had exercised
due diligence in safeguarding the secrecy of the test questions he prepared.
 Unfamiliar with the use of the computer, he could’ve used a typewriter in the privacy of his home.
 The Investigating Committee recommended for the disbarment of Atty. de Guzman, and the reprimand of Atty. Balgos.
Issue:
 W/N the SC, through the Investigating Committee, has jurisdiction over the matter
H/R:
 Yes.
G-Notes | C-2020
o Article VIII, Section 5(5) has granted SC the power to promulgate rules affecting the admission to the practice of
law.
Ruling:
 Atty. de Guzman disbarred; Atty. Balgos disentitled from receiving honorarium as Examiner in Mercantile Law.
Enrique Betoy vs Board of Directors, National Power Corporation

Facts:
 EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of
the National Power Corporation.
o Section 48 created a new National Power Board of Directors.
o Section 63 provided for separation benefits to officials who would be affected by the restructuring of the electric
power industry and the privatization of the assets of the NPC.
 The same section also provided for the preference of displaced or separated personnel as a result of the
privatization, if the same are qualified.
 Pursuant to the EPIRA Law and the IRR, the NPB passed Resolution 2002-124 which resolved that all NPC personnel shall
be legally terminated on January 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. A subsequent resolution created a
transition team to manage and implement the separation program.
o As a result of the NPB Resolution, petitioner, together with thousand of his co-employees from the NPC were
terminated.
 Petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari before the SC.
Issue:
 W/N it was proper for petitioner to directly question the constitutionality of the EPIRA before the SC
 W/N Resolution 2002-124 and 2002-125 are null and void
H/R:
 No.
o Based on Article VIII, Section 5(1) and (2), the SC’s jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the RTC and the CA, does not give litigants
unrestrained freedom of choice of forum from which to seek such relief.
o It has long been established that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and call for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction; petition should already be dismissed at the outset, but
since similar petitions have already been resolved by the SC tackling the validity of subject Resolutions, as well as
the constitutionality of the EPIRA, SC held that it shall disregard the procedural defect.
 No.
o SC held that the Resolution were not concluded by a duly-constituted Board of Directors since no quorum in
accordance with Section 48 of the EPIRA existed.
Ruling:
LAMP vs Secretary of Budget and Management

Facts:
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the PDAF, as provided for in RA 9206 or the
General Appropriations Act of 2004.
 LAMP further decries the supposed flaws in the implementation of the Special Provision:
o DBM illegally made and directly released budgetary allocations out of PDAF in favor of individual Members of
Congress
o Members of Congress do not possess the power to propose, select and identify which projects are to be actually
funded by PDAF.
 According to LAMP, the situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers, because in receiving and
thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function.
o Members of Congress cannot virtually tell or dictate upon the Executive Department how to spend taxpayer’s
money.
o The authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation.
G-Notes | C-2020
 Respondents contend that the petition miserably lacked legal and factual grounds. Also, the petition cannot stand on
inconclusive media reports, assumptions and conjectures alone. Hence, the Court should decline to take judicial notice of the
supposed iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of pork barrel, is a source of dirty
money for lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations.
Issue:
 W/N the requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in the case
 W/N the implementation of PDAF by the Members of Congress is constitutional
H/R:
 Yes.
o A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.
o In the present case, petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would be adversely affected by the practice of directly allocating and
releasing funds to the Members of Congress.
 Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
 In the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
o SC is also of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest.
 No.
o In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the Court does not lose sight of the presumption of
validity accorded to statutory acts of Congress.
 To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a
doubtful, breach of the Constitution.
 In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate a law based on baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom
not only of the legislature that passed it, but also of the executive which approved it.
o Petitioners would have the SC declare the unconstitutionality of the PDAF’s enforcement based on the absence of
express provision in the GAA allocating PDAF funds to the Members of Congress and the latter’s encroachment on
executive power in proposing and selecting projects to be funded by the PDAF; these allegations lack substantiation,
as there was no convincing proof that was presented that there were direct releases of funds to the Members of
Congress.
Ruling:
CIR vs San Roque Power Corporation

Facts:
 The Resolution resolves the MRs filed by San Roque.
 Respondent prays that the rule established in the February Decision be given only a prospective effect, arguing that the
manner by which the BIR and the CTA actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an operative fact, the effects and
consequences of which cannot be erased or undone.
 CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito Mining Corporation’s judicial claim for tax credit or refund was prematurely
filed before the CTA, and should be disallowed because the BIR Ruling was issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Issue:
 W/N
H/R:
 Under the doctrine of operative fact, the general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the source of legal
rights and duties.
Ruling:
 MRs denied with finality.

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Article VIII Case Digests

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Alfredo Tano vs Governor Salvador Socrates

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Radiowealth vs Auditor-General Manuel Agregado

Retired Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon vs Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon

Governor Carlos Fortich vs Executive Secretary Renato Corona

People vs Bryan Ferdinand Dy and Giovan Garcia Bernardino

Atty. Romulo Macalintal vs PET

David Lu vs Paterno Lu Ym Sr.

Republic vs Major General Carlos Garcia

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SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

William Marbury vs James Madison

Jose Angara vs Electoral Commission

Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

Eugene Tan vs Delegate Diosdado Macapagal

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Retired Police General Levy Macasiano vs National Housing Authority

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Francisco Tatad vs DOTC Secretary Jesus Garcia, Jr.

KILOSBAYAN vs PCSO Chairman Manuel Morato

Raoul del Mar vs PAGCOR

Ma. Angelina Matibag vs Alfredo Benipayo

Atty. Romulo Macalintal vs COMELEC

White Light Corporation vs City of Manila

Dominador Bustos vs Judge Antonio Lucero, CFI Pampanga

Atty. Edwin Javellana vs DILG

In re Petition to Disqualify Atty. de Vera

Automotive Industry Workers Alliance vs Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo

Re: 2003 Bar Examinations

Enrique Betoy vs Board of Directors, National Power Corporation

LAMP vs Secretary of Budget and Management

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