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Especially after 2015 europe started not to handle this situation.( Begg,Iain(2017).) While
they don’t want refugee who are not qualified to work,on the other hand they want at least to
consider qualified ones.Eu sought a solution in order to save themself from this situation and
They signed a deal with Turkey in 20 march 2016 (European Commission - Fact
Sheet(2016).)
. These agreement has some key terms such as Visa liberalisation process, One-for-one rule
Additional financial subsidy,Turkey's EU accession negotiations and returns.According to this
agreement the promises are like that.
Turkey's EU accession negotiations: Both sides will consider Turkey's bid to join the
European bloc, with talks due by July 2016.
We have two players in this game.These players are Turkey and European Union (EU).The
goal of Eu in this game is to keep refugee influx from turkey-greece border under control,and
the goal of Turkey is to stay as a powerful country in the middle east.Each player has 2
strategies in this game.
The strategies of Eu is offer an agreement or do nothing
The strategies of Turkes is to protect its borders tight or loose border policy
In the case of 1:
In this case payoff of Turkey is (-3).And its strategy is applying loose borders.Eu’s strategy is
proposing no deal and its payoff is also (-3)
In the case of 2:
In this case payoff of Turkey is (6).And its strategy is applying loose borders.Eu’s strategy is
proposing a deal and its payoff is (-10)
In the case of 3:
In this case payoff of Turkey is (-10).And its strategy is applying tight borders.Eu’s strategy is
proposing no deal and its payoff is (6)
In the case of 4:
In this case payoff of Turkey is (4).And its strategy is applying tight borders.Eu’s strategy is
proposing a deal and its payoff is also (4)
Of course the payoffs wouldnt be identical for case 2 and 3.but to simplfy our modelling i used
the same payoffs,we can’t know their preferences.
What kind of strategy should Eu pick?
Considering each case the tight border policies are his benefits.They will prefer tight borders
than loose.And making it without any deal of course even better.But there is no incentive for
Turkey to do it.So they should pick a compelling strategy.On the other side Eu can’t have
knowledge of border security applications of Turkey by any chance and if they sign this
agreement and apply but although this Turkey doesnt apply promises of this agreement which
is ‘’Tight-borders’’.It is a big problem for Eu.This agreement and payments would be for
nothing.This is the worst case for Eu.
At this point we can pause a minute and ask ourself,Why Eu does not want refugees? Or that
is to say,tight borders..These reasons are briefly: Europe has no security as before
now,Refugees who spread all over europe distort its common culture.( Begg,Iain(2017).) and
they can’t handle the economy anymore.(Mason,P,2015.)
Thus although they pays a lot in this agreement,they want to save themselves financial burden
of syrian refugees and at least have qualified and ‘’secure’’ ones.Europe has the ‘’no deal’’
strategy as its dominant strategy.
But Turkey wouldnt pick tight border strategy by itself. What kind of strategy should Turkey
pick?
Turkey wants to stay as a powerful state in the middle east.They can use refugees as a
threat.On the other hand because of its bad economy they will want to agree this deal.Since
Turkey has the largest syrian population in europe,they don’t care any extra refugees,but the
Money that Eu offer is very incentive! So it can help with the raise in currencies very
recently.But if they would pick ‘’tight borders’’ as first option there would be no reason of
europe to make a agreement with Turkey.Loose borders is the dominant strategy of Turkey
here.
Of course game theory consist of considering the strategy of your opponent.So let’s start our
game and see what happens:
That is a normal form game with 2x2 strategies.It has one nash equlubrium and dominant
strategy equlbrium.Players are Turkey and Eu.Strategies of Turkey = (loose border,tight
border).Strategies of Eu(offering a deal,doing nothing).Payoffs were explained above.
First check what if Turkey plays loose border = Eu plays no deal
if Turkey plays tight border = Eu plays no deal.
We can see here ‘’no deal’’ is dominant strategy of Eu.
Then check what if EU plays No deal = Turkey plays loose borders.
if EU plays Offer a deal = Turkey plays loose borders.
We can conclude here ‘’ loose borders ‘’ is dominant strategy of Turkey.
The nash equlibrium and dominan strategy equlibrium = (Loose,doing nothing) = (-3,-3).
What happened in real life?
Although loose borders and no deal is the equlbrium here there has been a agreement made
between Turkey and Eu.Our modelling looks like and pretend ‘’prisoners dileamma
here’’.And Eu and Turkey are exactly at the coorperation point now.So how did this happen?
Well,we can say our game is not at equlbrium right now.It is not a stable point.And we can
see the players will not stay at this point from the news.(Independent,2017.)(Diken.2016).
We can also say these agreement made by irrational politicians.
And third possible scenario it’s a repeated ‘’prisoners dilemma’’ game.In infinite prisoners
dilemma game Players can move from Nash equlibrium,which is the only pareto optimal
point and refuse coorpeartion,to the cooperation point.That is also possible.To conclude my
idea,this point is not stable and seems like agreement remained on paper…
References:
http://www.diken.com.tr/ab-ve-turkiye-arasindaki-multeci-anlasmasi-mahkemeye-tasindi/
Osborne,S. Turkey threatens ending EU refugee deal amid diplomatic crisis with Germany
and the Netherlands(2017).
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-eu-refugee-deal-end-germany-
netherlands-dutch-diplomatic-crisis-recep-tayyip-erdogan-a7633526.html