G.R. Nos.

106288-89 May 17, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TIRSO ACOL Y BARNUBAL and PIO BOSES Y DOLFO, defendants, PIO BOSES, appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

MELO, J.:

Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger
jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the felonious asportation, but for
possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which were instrumental
in the commission of the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)

Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal from the trial court's judgment (p.
23, Rollo) inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from incarceration (p. 5, Brief for the
Accused-Appellant, p. 60, Rollo ) thereby abating any review of his culpability for the misdeed.

The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the
morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the
vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other
companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes
interchange where the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the
jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the
Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio
to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene
Araneta who went with the responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was
wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to
accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to
different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were
apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber
revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were
identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.

To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification
(Exhibit I) issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed
firearm holders.

On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them,
proferring a general denial.

Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that after establishing his residence at
Pasay City for about six months, he engaged in the business of vending "balut". During the incident
in question, he recalled that while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly acosted him, took
his money, "balut" and "penoy", and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was forced to
confess ownership of one gun which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the
hold up.

For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having resided in Metro Manila for about two
months, recollected that he spent the night at his cousin's house in Parañaque on September 28,
1990, and that he left Parañaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According to
him, the jeepney he was then riding developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was
arrested for no apparent reason. When he was brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into
admiting possession of the other gun. Just like his co-accused, he too, denied knowledge of the hold
up.

The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general denials, observing:

As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the accused, the line of
defense they have adopted is one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms
and ammunition in question were found in their persons in the early morning of
September 29, 1989. They also denied the truth of the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado,
Percival Tan, and Rene Araneta. The defense however did not cite any valid reasons
for the Court not to give credence to the testimonies. In the circumstance, the Court
is constrained to consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-serving. In the
face of the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court can only take
their denials with the proverbial grain of salt. Verily, it is simply hard for the Court to
believe that the accused are simple provincial who are lost in the big city; that
accused Pio Boses who is a resident of Pasay City, does not know well-known
places in Metro Manila such as the South Super Highway and the Fort Bonifacio-
Nichols interchange; that he did not know the streets where he plied his trade as a
balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be true when he himself admitted that from 7:00
p.m. of September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in the street in the area and
yet he never claimed he had ever lost his way.

The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is convinced that he lied on the
witness stand. He claimed that he was in the place where he was arrested because
he had just come from the residence of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the passenger
jeepney he had boarded on his way home just happened to break down at that place.
In the mind of the Court this alibi of the accused is too much of a coincidence, and
too convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In this connection, the Court
notes his testimony on cross examination that he was unable to get in touch with his
relatives, including Genny Acol, for possible assistance and to get Genny Acol to
corroborate his testimony, because the latter had already left for the province and
that none of his other relatives knew that he had been charged in this case. But when
queried how he was able to say this, he testified that he had written to his uncle and
that he received a reply letter from him and that it was from this reply letter of his
uncle that he learned that Genny Acol had already left for the province. This
testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it accomplished anything, helped convinced the
Court that he is given to lying. For sure, if he had written to his uncle and that the
latter had replied to him, it is plain that he must have informed his uncle about the
case and that the latter knew about the case and the fact that he was in jail and
needed help. In any event, established jurisprudence dictates that between the
positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the denials of the accused the
Court must place its reliance on the former. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence also
indicates that greater weight must be given to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses when they are officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124 SCRA
906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).
 (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial below, thus obviating
any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had appealed and thereafter escaped, he would
be considered as having abandoned his appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section
8, Rule 124, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).

With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation of innocence by claiming that the
trial court below erred:

. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO

BOSES TO REOPEN THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS
WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS
DEFENSE THEREBY AMOUNTING TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

II

. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO

BOSES AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES
OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES.

III

. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS

"E", "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS
ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A
SEARCH WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST THEM.

IV

. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING

THAT EXHIBITS "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES USED
BY THE ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.

(p. 1, Appellant's Brief; p. 60, Rollo.)

But the appeal leaves much to be desired.

It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accused- appellant can not feign denial of
due process where he had the opportunity to present his defense, through his own narration on the
witness stand (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Gonzales
vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the People, the
omission of a party to present witnesses to corroborate the principal basis for exculpation, on
account of the witnesses' admitted tardiness in arriving in court, is a puerile proposition to support re-
opening of the case.

In regard to the second ascription aired by the accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that
the court a quoshould have relied more on the explanation offered by the defense rather than giving
credence to the testimony of the People's witnesses. For one thing, accused- appellant asseverates
that they could not have been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering
that it was then still dark when the accused boarded the jeep, up to the time they were apprehended.
But counsel for accused-appellant concedes that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it
was not well lighted (p. 12, Brief for Accused-Appellant) which does not entirely foreclose positive
identification of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their victims and were thus seated
within the closed quarters of the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the prosecution that Rene
Araneta's jacket was one of the items which was asported, that it was worn by one of the felons, and
that the jacket was recognized by Rene Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters (p. 7, Brief for
Accused-Appellant). To lessen the impact of the affirmative statements uttered against accused-
appellant, it is argued that the immediate propensity of a criminal is to move out from the scene of
the locus criminis and not merely to walk casually within the vicinity. We said in People vs.
Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September 1, 1993) that indeed, there can be no legal dispute to the legal
proposition that flight from the scene of the felony is one of the indicia of a guilty conscience, but it is
equally true, we proceeded to say, that culprits, in exceptional cases, have become bolder by
returning to the scene of the crime to feign innocence. At any rate, it has been repeatedly stressed
by this Court that the factual findings of the trial court and the conclusions drawn therefrom are
accorded utmost respect since the magistrate at the court of origin had the first hand impression of
the demeanor and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs.
Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, we are of the view that the
search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the
requisite warrant prior to arrest:

When an offense has in fact been committed, and the has

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it;

inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just
been robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772
[1992]). And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental
thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms
were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle
imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90
Phil. 771 [1948]) that:

. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the

offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties as
police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus
delicti.

Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the
lower court must be modified to read only as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the slight modification that the
proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further, the court orders the forfeiture of the
firearms and other incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine National Police to be disposed
of in accordance with law.

No pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-

appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN

ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED
HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some
three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the
hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a
piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others
had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest
until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN
INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The search conducted on Gerente's person was
likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident to
lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk
and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of
arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed
and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in
Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual
being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer
and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."

3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. —

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr.
Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one
person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the
concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does
not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to
commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions
conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a
hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness
for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence,
the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.

4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General
correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs.
Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch
172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum; and also found him guilty of
Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive
portion of the appealed decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal
Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as
minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor
mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as
funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The
accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25,
Rollo.)

Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila. The Information reads:

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and control
dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a transparent plastic bag which are
considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)

The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged
with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the
same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:

"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together
with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary investigation has not yet
been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and
with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow
block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting
serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana
in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution
witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about their intention
to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si
Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin
'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August
24, 1990.)

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m.
of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the
killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and
Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he fell, Totoy
Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to
a place behind the house of Gerente.

At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station
received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials
that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard
and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There
they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They
were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she
pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked
appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette
foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.

Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and
Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.

On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin
Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.

When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the
two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of
Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.

In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and

2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite
the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in
violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried
marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers.
We do not agree.

The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were
valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.

Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"

"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had
killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime,
they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers
had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening
to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of
facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without
a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the
law as his two companions did.

In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1)
day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon
the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:

"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of
his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the
shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances."

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident
to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:

"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure
of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed
and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in
Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the individual
being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer
and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr.
Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted by one
person only.

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow
block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the
other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime,
the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony
of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace,
that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused
his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was
moved by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not
err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.

Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as
civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with
our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity
awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)

Terry v. Ohio

No. 67

Argued December 12, 1967

Decided June 10, 1968

392 U.S. 1

Syllabus

A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling

for many years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a
street corner. He saw them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times.
Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a
corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly.
Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the officer followed them and saw
them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store. The officer
approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The
men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down
his outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a
pistol. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat,
took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He
patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's
outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz
(since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or
under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were
taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with carrying

Page 392 U. S. 2

concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial
court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search
incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that
petitioner and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted,
and that the officer, for his own protection, had the right to pat down their outer clothing
having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The court distinguished
between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer
clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. Petitioner and
Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional
question" was involved.

Held:

1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places,"
and therefore applies as much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or
elsewhere. Pp. 392 U. S. 8-9.

2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the
admissibility against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure.
P.392 U. S. 12.

3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of

legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of
such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to
curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective sanction. Pp. 392 U. S. 13-15.

4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed
here. Pp. 392 U. S. 16-20.

(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. P.392
U. S. 16.

(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find
weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. P. 392 U. S. 16.

5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case

in believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable
search for weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous

Page 392 U. S. 3

regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the
absolute certainty that the individual is armed. Pp. 392 U. S. 20-27.

(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search
and seizure, that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-
spot observations of the officer on the beat is required. P. 392 U. S. 20.

(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light
of the particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable
caution is warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate. Pp. 392 U. S.
21-22.

(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious
conduct when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. P. 392 U. S. 22.

(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is

investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon. P.392 U.
S. 24.

(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly
circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. Pp. 392 U. S. 25-26.

(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable
apprehension of danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest. Pp.392
U. S. 26-27.
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited
search which he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted.
Pp.392 U. S. 27-30.

(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed. P. 392 U.
S. 28.

(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine
whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose
of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of
weapons. Pp. 392 U. S. 29-30.

7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him,
since the search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Pp. 392 U. S. 30-31.

Affirmed.

G.R. Nos. 136066-67 February 4, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BINAD SY CHUA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425,
as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of ammunitions in two separate Informations
which read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 96-5071

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control two (2) plastic bags
containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (SHABU) weighing more or less two (2) kilos and one
(1) small plastic bag containing Methamphetamine Hydrocloride weighing more or less fifteen (15)
grams, which is a regulated drug, without any authority whatsoever.

Criminal Case No. 96-5132

That on or about the 21st day of September 1996, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control twenty (20) pieces of live .22
cal. ammunitions, without first having obtained a license or permit to possess or carry the same.
Accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" on arraignment. The two cases were then jointly tried.
1awphi1.nét

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, all members of the police force of Angeles City.
Their testimonies can be synthesized as follows:

On September 21, 1996, at around 10:00 in the evening, SPO2 Mario Nulud and PO2 Emmeraldo
Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-appellant was about to deliver
drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City. The informer further reported
that accused-appellant distributes illegal drugs in different karaoke bars in Angeles City. On the
basis of this lead, the PNP Chief of Angeles City, Col. Neopito Gutierrez, immediately formed a team
of operatives composed of Major Bernardino, Insp. Tullao, Insp. Emmanuel Nunag, P02 Emmeraldo
Nunag, SP01 Fernando Go, and some civilian assets, with SPO2 Mario Nulud, as team investigator.
The group of SPO2 Nulud, PO2 Nunag and the civilian informer positioned themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting Thunder Inn Hotel. The other group acted as
their back up.

At around 11:45 in the evening, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which
just arrived and parked near the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel. After accused-appellant alighted
from the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted
him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small
transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith,
SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber
firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O
box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber firearm bullets and
the car used by accused-appellant. Afterwards, SPO2 Nulud and the other police operatives who
arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez at the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.3

When Col. Gutierrez opened the sealed Zest-O juice box, he found 2 big plastic bags containing
crystalline substances. The initial field test conducted by SPO2 Danilo Cruz at the PNP
Headquarters revealed that the siezed items contained shabu.4 Thereafter, SPO2 Nulud together
with accused-appellant brought these items for further laboratory examination to the Crime
Laboratory at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. After due testing, forensic chemist S/Insp.
Daisy Babor concluded that the crystalline substances yielded positive results for shabu. The small
plastic bag weighed 13.815 grams while the two big plastic bags weighed 1.942 kilograms of shabu.5

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version of
the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that on the night in question, he was driving the car of his wife to follow
her and his son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur
Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City to
buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approach and examine the inside
of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber
gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a
policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to
open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At
this time, the police officer’s companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just
arrived at the scene, pulled him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his
car.
1aw phi 1.nét
Thereafter, he was brought to the Salakot Police Station and was held inside a bathroom for about
fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.6

Wilfredo Lagman corroborated the story of the accused-appellant in its material points. He testified
that he witnessed the incident while he was conducting a routine security check around the premises
of the Guess Building, near Thunder Inn Hotel.7

On September 15, 1998 the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 59, rendered a
decision,8 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgement is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 96-513 for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, the accused is hereby
acquitted of the crime charged for insufficiency of evidence.

2. In Criminal Case No. 96-507 for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu, accused
Binad Sy Chua is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charge and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, the instant appeal where accused-appellant raised the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ITS FOLLOWING FINDINGS:

A. THE ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT BINAD SY CHUA WAS LAWFUL;

B. THE SEARCH OF HIS PERSON AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONFISCATION OF SHABU

ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON HIM WERE CONDUCTED IN A LAWFUL AND VALID MANNER;

C. THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE CRIME CHARGED IS SUFICIENT

TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REAONABLE
DOUBT.10

Accused-appellant maintains that the warrantless arrest and search made by the police operatives
was unlawful; that in the light of the testimony of SPO2 Nulud that prior to his arrest he has been
under surveillance for two years, there was therefore no compelling reason for the haste within
which the arresting officers sought to arrest and search him without a warrant; that the police officers
had sufficient information about him and could have easily arrested him. Accused-appellant further
argues that since his arrest was null an void, the drugs that were seized should likewise be
inadmissible in evidence since they were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizures and arrest.

Accused-appellant’s argument is impressed with merit.

Although the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to
great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, however, this rule is not a hard and fast one.
It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of
witnesses deserves the utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the
prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of
their testimonies. The only exception is if there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have
affected the case.11

In the case at bar, there appears on record some facts of weight and substance that have been
overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court which casts doubt on the guilt of
accused-appellant. An appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes
the review of the penalty and indemnity imposed by the trial court.12 We are clothed with ample
authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find that their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused
shall be considered.13 This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be
presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

First, with respect to the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made upon
accused-appellant, the court a quo made the following findings:

Accused was searched and arrested while in possession of regulated drugs (shabu). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects x x x allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. x x x x

While it is true that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal affects (sic) of the accused, however, under the circumstances of the case,
there was sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.

xxxxxxxxx

In the present case, the police received information that the accused will distribute illegal drugs that
evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there
was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a "stop and frisk".14

A thorough review of the evidence on record belies the findings and conclusion of the trial court. It
confused the two different concepts of a search incidental to a lawful arrest (in flagrante delicto) and
of a "stop-and-frisk."

In Malacat v. Court of Appeals,15 we distinguished the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search

incidental to a lawful arrest, to wit:

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. At
bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any money
or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that
which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence.

xxxxxxxxx

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and
where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own
or others’ safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop-and-
frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop-and-frisk". A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer.16 (Emphasis ours)

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the "stop and frisk" principles is applicable to
justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives on
accused-appellant.

In in flagrante delicto arrests, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or
attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer.
Emphasis should be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful
arrest. Therefore it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings.17 Accordingly, for this exception to apply two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.18

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. The record reveals that when
accused-appellant arrived at the vicinity of Thunder Inn Hotel, he merely parked his car along the
McArthur Highway, alighted from it and casually proceeded towards the entrance of the Hotel
clutching a sealed Zest-O juice box. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious manner. For all
intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.

However, notwithstanding the absence of any overt act strongly manifesting a violation of the law,
the group of SPO2 Nulud "hurriedly accosted"19 accused-appellant and later on "introduced
themselves as police officers."20Accused-appellant was arrested before the alleged drop-off of shabu
was done. Probable cause in this case was more imagined than real. Thus, there could have been
no in flagrante delicto arrest preceding the search, in light of the lack of an overt physical act on the
part of accused-appellant that he had committed a crime, was committing a crime or was going to
commit a crime. As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it has been held that "reliable information"
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of
the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.21Hence, in People v. Aminudin,22 we ruled that "the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had
just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was
no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension"
(Emphasis supplied).

The reliance of the prosecution in People v. Tangliben23 to justify the police’s actions is misplaced. In
the said case, based on the information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a
surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons
who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaged in the traffic of dangerous
drugs. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was
acting suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He
acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night
of his arrest.

In the instant case, the apprehending policemen already had prior knowledge from the very same
informant of accused-appellant’s activities. No less than SPO2 Mario Nulud, the team leader of the
arresting operatives, admitted that their informant has been telling them about the activities of
accused-appellant for two years prior to his actual arrest on September 21, 1996. An excerpt of the
testimony of SPO2 Mario Nulud reveals the illegality of the arrest of accused-appellant as follows:

Q. Did the civilian informer of yours mentioned to you the name of this chinese drug pusher?

A. He is mentioning the name of Binad or Jojo Chua.

Q. And he had been mentioning these names to you even before September 21, 1996?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How long did this civilian informant have been telling you about the activities of this
chinese drug pusher reckoning in relation to September 21, 1996?

A. That was about two years already.

Q. Nothwithstanding his two years personal knowledge which you gained from the civilian
informant that this chinese drug pusher have been engaged pushing drugs here in Angeles
City, you did not think of applying for a search warrant for this chinese drug pusher?

A. No, sir.

xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you accosted this Binad Chua, he was casually walking along the road near the
Thunder Inn Hotel, is that right?

A. He was pinpointed by the civilian informer that he is the chinese drug pusher that will
deliver to him also.

Q. My question Mr. Witness, is this Jojo Chua or Binad Chua the accused in this case he
alighted with a Corolla car with plate number 999, I think, he just alighted when you saw
him?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. From the car when he alighted, he casually walked towards near the entrance of the
Thunder Inn Hotel?

A. He was about to proceed towards Thunder Inn Hotel but he was pinpointed already by the
civilian informer.

Q. But he was just walking towards the entrance of the Thunder Inn Hotel?

A. Yes, sir, he is about to enter Thunder Inn Hotel.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. While he was walking, then you and PO2 Nunag pounced on him as you used pounced
on him in your affidavit?

A. Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. And you pounced on Jojo Chua before you saw that alleged small plastic bag, is that
correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And after that you also confiscated this Zesto juice box?

A. Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q. But would you agree with me that not all crystalline substance is shabu?

A. No, that is shabu and it is been a long time that we have been tailing the accused that he
is really a drug pusher.

Q. So you have been tailing this accused for quite a long time that you are very sure that
what was brought by him was shabu?
 A. Yes, sir.24

The police operatives cannot feign ignorance of the alleged illegal activities of accused-appellant.
Considering that the identity, address and activities of the suspected culprit was already ascertained
two years previous to the actual arrest, there was indeed no reason why the police officers could not
have obtained a judicial warrant before arresting accused-appellant and searching his person.
Whatever information their civilian asset relayed to them hours before accused-appellant’s arrest
was not a product of an "on-the-spot" tip which may excuse them from obtaining a warrant of arrest.
Accordingly, the arresting team’s contention that their arrest of accused-appellant was a product of
an "on-the-spot" tip is untenable.

In the same vein, there could be no valid "stop-and-frisk" in this case. A stop-and-frisk was defined
as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for
weapon(s)25 or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make initial
inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to
check the latter’s outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons.26 The apprehending police officer
must have a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officer’s experience and the surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed
about him.27 It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest
for this principle to apply.28

This principle of "stop-and-frisk" search was invoked by the Court in Manalili v. Court of Appeals.29 In
said case, the policemen chanced upon the accused who had reddish eyes, walking in a swaying
manner, and who appeared to be high on drugs. Thus, we upheld the validity of the search as akin
to a "stop-and-frisk." In People v. Solayao,30 we also found justifiable reason to "stop-and-frisk" the
accused after considering the following circumstances: the drunken actuations of the accused and
his companions, the fact that his companions fled when they saw the policemen, and the fact that
the peace officers were precisely on an intelligence mission to verify reports that armed persons
where roaming the vicinity.

The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. There was no valid "stop-and-frisk" in
the case of accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search
and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative
failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of
the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of accused-appellant. Besides, at the time of his arrest, accused-
appellant did not exhibit manifest unusual and suspicious conduct reasonable enough to dispense
with the procedure outlined by jurisprudence and the law. There was, therefore, no genuine
reasonable ground for the immediacy of accused-appellant’s arrest.

Obviously, the acts of the police operatives wholly depended on the information given to them by
their confidential informant. Accordingly, before and during that time of the arrest, the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge that accused-appellant had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime.

At any rate, even if the fact of delivery of the illegal drugs actually occurred, accused-appellant’s
warrantless arrest and consequent search would still not be deemed a valid "stop-and frisk". For a
valid "stop-and-frisk" the search and seizure must precede the arrest, which is not so in this case.
Besides, as we have earlier emphasized, the information about the illegal activities of accused-
appellant was not unknown to the apprehending officers. Hence, the search and seizure of the
prohibited drugs cannot be deemed as a valid "stop-and-frisk".
Neither can there be valid seizure in plain view on the basis of the seized items found in accused-
appellant’s possession. First, there was no valid intrusion. Second, the evidence, i.e., the plastic
bags found in the Zest-O juice box which contained crystalline substances later on identified as
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber ammunition, were not
inadvertently discovered. The police officers first arrested accused-appellant and intentionally
searched his person and peeked into the sealed Zest-O juice box before they were able to see and
later on ascertain that the crystalline substance was shabu. There was no clear showing that the
sealed Zest-O juice box accused-appellant carried contained prohibited drugs. Neither were the
small plastic bags which allegedly contained crystalline substance and the 20 rounds of .22 caliber
ammunition visible. These prohibited substances were not in plain view of the arresting officers;
hence, inadmissible for being the fruits of the poisonous tree.

In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented
warrantless search, or a customs search. It cannot even fall under exigent and emergency
circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. 1a\^/phi1.net

All told, the absence of ill-motive on the part of the arresting team cannot simply validate, much more
cure, the illegality of the arrest and consequent warrantless search of accused-appellant. Neither
can the presumption of regularity of performance of function be invoked by an officer in aid of the
process when he undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution.31 In People v. Nubla,32 we clearly stated that:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for
affirming accused-appellant’s conviction because, first, the presumption is precisely just that – a
mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, xxx [it] cannot be regarded as
binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, we entertain doubts whether the items allegedly seized from accused-appellant were
the very same items presented at the trial of this case. The record shows that the initial field test
where the items seized were identified as shabu, was only conducted at the PNP headquarters of
Angeles City.33 The items were therefore not marked at the place where they were taken. In People v.
Casimiro,34 we struck down with disbelief the reliability of the identity of the confiscated items since
they were not marked at the place where they were seized, thus:

The narcotics field test, which initially identified the seized item as marijuana, was likewise not
conducted at the scene of the crime, but only at the narcotics office. There is thus reasonable doubt
as to whether the item allegedly seized from accused-appellant is the same brick of marijuana
marked by the policemen in their headquarters and given by them to the crime laboratory.

The government’s drive against illegal drugs needs the support of every citizen. But it should not
undermine the fundamental rights of every citizen as enshrined in the Constitution. The constitutional
guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so
carelessly disregarded as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty to the
constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their minds, otherwise their good
intentions will remain as such simply because they have blundered. The criminal goes free, if he
must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its
failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.35

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City,
Branch 59, in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-507 and 96-513, convicting accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua
of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P1,000,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-
appellant Binad Sy Chua is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, he is
ordered forthwith released from custody, unless he is being lawfully held for another crime.

SO ORDERED.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply
accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and
later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information
was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same
evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the
fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the
arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers
that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying
marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June
25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed
to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three
kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10who testified
that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this
finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his
clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily
arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC
headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the
investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows
while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and
that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the
marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been
any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to
have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo
for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not
discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a
result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the
other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he
said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that
he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who
had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their
credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face
and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal
record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-
appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a
medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that
opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been
set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his
release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he
was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest
of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that
they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the
time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a
third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the
arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the

coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable
sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible
trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this
information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we
have already reports of the particular operation which was being
participated by Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June
25, 1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the
coming of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days

before June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the
activities of Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of

Idel Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of

information, maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the
person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel
Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo
with marijuana was received by you many days before you received
the intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days
before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that
minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was

coming but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the
information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his
activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act
of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was

mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23,
1984, you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel
Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search
of the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield
positive result.
 Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you
do not need a search warrant anymore?

A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the
PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws
and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the
government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be
committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant
as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject
to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses,
it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest
and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of
Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team,
had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of
what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly
applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited
drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime
nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for
his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking
from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his
arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the
despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and
punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to
return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights
guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words
suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional
presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as
the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution
must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial
court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree,
to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because
there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed
by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the
individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes,
again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should
play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another,
especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-
appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be
discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NASARIO MOLINA

y MANAMAT @ BOBONG and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
BOBOY, accused-appellants.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting
the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert
those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina
y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,[4] and sentencing them
to suffer the supreme penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:

That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with
each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously was found in their
possession 946.9 grams of dried marijuana which are prohibited.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]

Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to

the accusation against them.[6] Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S.
Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an
information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.[7] The
first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week
of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed
by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him
before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came to
the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.[8]
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City any time
that morning.[9] Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same day, he called for
assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately
dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 Paguidopon
(brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 Pamplona, to proceed to the house
of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by.[10]
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were positioned
in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants passed
by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the
pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle and overtook the trisikad. [11] SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were
accosted.[12]
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to stop. At that point, accused-appellant
Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant
Molina.Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked
accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.[13] Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will
settle this.[14]SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried
marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina were
handcuffed by the police officers.[15]
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.[16] The demurrer was denied by the
trial court.[17] A motion for reconsideration was filed by accused-appellants, but this was
likewise denied. Accused-appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to file
a joint memorandum.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, [18] the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any evidence
from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence through their
counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of the offense
charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act
7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer
a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under Republic Act
8176, to be effected and implemented as therein provided for by law, in relation to
Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659.

The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the entire
records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the
automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate action as the
case may be.

SO ORDERED.[19]
 Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of the
Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-
appellants contend:
I.

THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING

BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.

THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT

HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT; AND
III.

THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT
DEATH.[20]

The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion (In Lieu of Brief), wherein
he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out
in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant
predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the
Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.[21]

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined under

Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[22] Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and
undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means
of coercing evidence as not to merit this Courts high regard as a freedom implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.[23]
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to
a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and seizures;[24] and (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search).[25]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless
search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede
the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made --- the process cannot be reversed.[26] As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court,
however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when
the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners).[27]
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a finding
that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search conducted
by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrante
delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.[28] This brings us to the issue of whether or not
the warrantless arrest, search and seizure in the present case fall within the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,[29] the Court held that in cases of in flagrante
delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge
of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As
discussed in People v. Doria,[30]probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable
cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that reliable information alone,
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the
view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,[31] it was held that
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him
as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to
apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,[32] the Court did not consider eyes... darting from
side to side ... [while] holding ... [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30 in the
morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative
of probable cause. According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the imagination could it
have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was
actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers]
presence. So also, in People v. Encinada,[33] the Court ruled that no probable cause is
gleanable from the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[34] the trial court concluded that petitioner
was attempting to commit a crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda
and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking at every person that
come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.[35] In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the
Court said:

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding the search
in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or
an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.[36]
 It went on to state that -

Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast
- an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were
nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner
and his companions were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any
commotion or trouble...

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was discovered inside the front waistline of petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming
that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. [37]

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur:
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[38]
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not
be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. It matters
not that accused-appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle this to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced
the suspicion of the arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime,
is an equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause to
effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon
(who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants to the
arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance
of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only learned
Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before
the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his
informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that
the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of
him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had
never seen him before the arrest.
 This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused-
appellants even before the arrest, to wit -
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person and how did you know that
it was Mula who handed the black bag to another person?
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when they pass
by through the street near the residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is
Gregorio Mula and the thin one is Nazario Molina[39]

The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1

Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance,
was not even aware of accused-appellants name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more
so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-appellants
identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at the time of the
arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew
appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latters illegal gambling
activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the
peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest
and the consequent search were illegal, holding that [t]he prosecutions evidence did not
show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while
he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be
ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances.[40]
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.[41]
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be
admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug
addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive,
all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the
fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
 WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of
evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants Nasario
Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, are
ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly
detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

JUDGE FELIMON ABELITA III, G.R. No. 170672

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,
CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
P/SUPT. GERMAN B. DORIA Promulgated:
and SPO3 CESAR RAMIREZ,
Respondents. August 14, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the 10 July 2004 Decision[2] and
18 October 2004 Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217
(trial court), in Civil Case No. Q-98-33442 for Damages.
 The Antecedent Facts

Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles
32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and
SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24
March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in
Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez
(respondents), accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to
proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate,
Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would
proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner
alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed
him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and
conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed
shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotguns license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3
Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he
allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him,
without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell.

P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of
Rosa Sia about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team
headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported
that a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in
the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked
for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident
report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters
as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly
sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his
companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioners residence, they caught up
with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a
gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the drivers seat as petitioner opened the
door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the drivers seat. The police officers
confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his men
also arrested other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the
shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed against petitioner before
this Court.[4]
 The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 10 July 2004 Decision, the trial court dismissed petitioners complaint.

The trial court found that petitioner was at the scene of the shooting incident in
Barangay Nursery. The trial court ruled that the police officers who conducted the
search were of the belief, based on reasonable grounds, that petitioner was
involved in the incident and that the firearm used in the commission of the offense
was in his possession. The trial court ruled that petitioners warrantless arrest and
the warrantless seizure of the firearms were valid and legal. The trial court gave
more credence to the testimonies of respondents who were presumed to have
performed their duties in accordance with law. The trial court rejected petitioners
claim of frame-up as weak and insufficient to overthrow the positive testimonies of
the police officers who conducted the arrest and the incidental search. The trial
court

concluded that petitioners claim for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code is
not warranted under the circumstances.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

In its 18 October 2004 Order, the trial court denied the motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

The issues in this case are the following:

1. Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search

and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;

2. Whether respondents are civilly liable for damages

under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code; and
 3. Whether the findings in the administrative case against
petitioner are conclusive in this case.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Application of Section 5, Rule 113 of the

1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure

Petitioner alleges that his arrest and the search were unlawful under Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Petitioner alleges that for the
warrantless arrest to be lawful, the arresting officer must have personal knowledge
of facts that the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner alleges that the alleged shooting incident
was just relayed to the arresting officers, and thus they have no personal knowledge
of facts as required by the Rules.

We do not agree.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private

person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur:
(1) the offender has just committed an offense; and (2) the arresting peace officer or
private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.[5]

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an

actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.[6] The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [7] A
reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with
good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[8]

Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the
arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own
eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting
incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that
petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but
when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner
initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give
chase. Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which
they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police
authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Plain View Doctrine

The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine.

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has
a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.[9] The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
(3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.[10]

In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they
caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle
when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was
reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police
officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in
seizing the firearms.

Civil Liability Under Article 32 of the Civil Code

Petitioner alleges that respondents are civilly liable under paragraphs (4) and (9) of
Article 32 of the Civil Code.

Paragraphs (4) and (9) of Article 32 of the Civil Code respectively state:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who
directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

xxxx

(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;

xxxx
In this case, it was established that petitioner was lawfully arrested
without a warrant and that firearms were validly seized from his
possession. The trial court found that petitioner was charged with
illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. We agree
with the trial court in rejecting petitioners allegation that he was
merely framed-up. We also agree with the trial court that
 respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. Hence, respondents should not be held
civilly liable for their actions.

Res Judicata Does Not Apply

Respondents raise the defense of res judicata against petitioners claim for
damages.

Res judicata has two aspects: bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment
provided under Section 47(b) and (c), Rule 39, respectively, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure[11] which provide:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a judgment or

final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxx

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which
appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.

Bar by prior judgment and conclusiveness of judgment differ as follows:

There is bar by prior judgment when, as between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case that is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute
bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the
court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
 between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a
new action or suit involving the same cause of action before the same
or other tribunal.

But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but
no identity of causes of action, the first judgment is conclusive only as
to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined and
not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res
judicata known as conclusiveness of judgment. Stated differently, any
right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and
their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject
matter of the two actions is the same.[12]

For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:

(a) the former judgment or order must be final;

(b) it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of
the case;
(c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
(d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two actions
are substantially between the same parties.[13]

While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential
facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. An
administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred
by the respondent for the commission of the acts complained of.[14] The case before
us deals with the civil liability for damages of the police authorities. There is no
identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity of causes of action is not
required in the application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment,[15] it is required that there must always be identity of parties in the first
and second cases.
There is no identity of parties between the present case and the administrative
case. The administrative case was filed by Benjamin Sia Lao (Sia Lao) against
petitioner. Sia Lao is not a party to this case. Respondents in the present case were
not parties to the administrative case between Sia Lao and petitioner. In the present
case, petitioner is the complainant against respondents. Hence, while res
judicata is not a defense to petitioners complaint for damages, respondents
nevertheless cannot be held liable for damages as discussed above.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 10 July 2004 Decision

and 18 October 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217,
in Civil Case No. Q-98-33442.

SO ORDERED.