HABAGAT GRILL V. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC.
o He claimed that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside
Judicial Notice | March 31, 2005 | Panganiban, J.
Nature of Case: Petition for Review under Rule 45
Digest Maker: MSI
SUMMARY: DMCI’s sister company filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against Habagat Grill. It alleged that Habagat Grill encroached on its
property, thereby depriving them of lawful possession. The lower court
ruled in favor of Habagat Grill, anchoring its decision on its own estimations
of the metes and bounds of the subject property in question. This Court held
that the lower court erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes and
bounds of the subject property.
DOCTRINE: Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.” Municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances
in force in the municipality in which they sit. Such notice, however, is limited
to what the law is and what it states.
FACTS:
 David M. Consunji, Inc. (DMCI) acquired and became the owner of a
residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City.
 On June 13, 1981, DMCI transferred said lot to its sister company, the
DMC-Urban Property Developers, Inc (DMC) in whose favor a TCT
was issued.
 Alleging that Louie Biraogo forcibly entered said lot and built the
Habagat Grill in December 1993, DMC filed in 1994 a Complaint for
Forcible Entry against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo.
 The Complaint contained the following allegations:
o That DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981
until December 1, 1993.
o That on December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of
strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered the lot in question
and constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally
depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to
the present.
o That the reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000 a month.
 Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in
question.
Municipal Reservation No. 1050 (through Presidential
Proclamation No. 20 which declared Times Beach a recreation
center). Thus, DMC has no cause of action against him.
 The MTC formed a team of three geodetic engineers (one each to
represent DMC, Biraogo, and DENR) to ascertain where Habagat Grill
is actually located – on the lot in question or Municipal Reservation
No. 1050. However, Biraogo’s engineer did not participate in the
surveying activities; the two others submitted a report which said that
Habagat Grill occupied 934 sqm of the lot in question.
 After necessary proceedings, the MTC in Davao City dismissed the
case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
 DMC appealed from said decision to the RTC which appealed the
lower court.
 Ruling of the CA: Granting respondent’s appeal, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the court of origin (MTC) had jurisdiction over the
Complaint for Forcible Entry.
o The CA gave greater weight to the testimony of DMC’s real
property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill had
been built on December 1, 1993.
 Testimony was credible, because he (Garcia) had
personal knowledge of the facts he had testified to --
it was his task to know such matters.
o The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other
documentary evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grill’s
construction.
o Court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject property
as part of the public domain.
 Lower court could take cognizance of a Presidential
Proclamation, but not of the situational relation
between the property covered by the Proclamation
and the land in question.
o CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting any
evidence to show the basis of the latter’s alleged authority to
build Habagat Grill on the property
 Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
ISSUE # 1: Whether the MTC has jurisdiction over the case – YES
1
  Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations
pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations demonstrate a
cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the
court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle
holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the
cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after
acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for
insufficiency of evidence.
 Pursuant to Sec. 1 of Rule 70 (“Who may institute proceedings, and
when”), DMC alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by
strategy and stealth, and (3) the date such unlawful deprivation
started, which was less than one year from the filing of the Complaint.
Considering the presence in the Complaint of all the necessary
allegations, the trial court evidently acquired jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case.
ISSUE # 2 (relevant to the topic): Whether the Trial Court erred in taking
judicial notice of the exact metes and bounds of the property – YES
 Biraogo claimed that no cause of actions was alleged by DMC since
there was no encroachment of the property in the first place. He
further claimed that DMC failed to prove that its predecessor-in-
interest has prior possession of the property.
o DMC argued that the trial court (whose decision favored
Biraogo) indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey
team that had been constituted to determine the exact location
of Habagat Grill. Respondent further averred that the trial
court erred in taking judicial notice of the metes and bounds
of the property covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20.
It posited that even though the lower court may take judicial
notice of Proclamation No. 20, it may not do so as regards the
actual metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither may it claim
knowledge of the situational relation between the land in
question and Times Beach.
 This Court agreed with respondent’s claims.
 Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.”
o Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and
introducing evidence on matters that are not ordinarily
capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the
tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunal’s
general knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
o Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the
municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which
they sit. Such notice, however, is limited to what the law is
and what it states.
 In this case, the MTC reached its conclusion favoring Habagat Grill by
going beyond what Proclamation No. 20 says. Instead of relying on
the engineer’s reports, it depended on its own estimations of the metes
and bounds of Times Beach to conclude that Habagat Grill was
necessarily inside the said recreation center.
 The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking
judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is
precisely at the core of the dispute in this case.
 Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section
2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of
the lot covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge
capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.
 Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial
courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact
metes and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on
the Report submitted by the survey team that had been constituted by
the trial court, precisely for determining the location of Habagat Grill
in relation to respondents’ lot.
NOTE: Relevant provisions
RULE 129
What Need Not Be Proved
Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice
of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. (1a)