Plato's Problem in the Parmenides

Author(s): Maximilian Beck

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr., 1947), pp. 232-236
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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 NOTES AND DOCUMENTS
PLATO'S PROBLEM IN THE PARMENIDES
BY MAXIMILIAN BECK

Therehas been muchembarrassment overPlato 's Parnmenides.Interpre-

tations have wavered between two extremes. In formertimes the Neo-
Platonistsin particularpraised thisdialogue as themostprofoundof Plato's
works,revealingthesupranaturalnatureof theEns realissimum,the highest
goal of mystics,of theology,and metaphysics.1 Today ratherthe opposite
tendencyprevails: The dialogue is consideredto be at best an exercise in
the formalisticart of dialectics,and more frequentlya satirical exhibition
of the Eleatic or Megarian dialecticswhichrefutesitselfin the dialogue by
the self-contradictorynonsenseof its results.2
Both these tendenciesof interpretationseem to me very unsatisfactory.
As to the first,it is not the metaphysicalOne and Being with which the
dialogue deals. This becomesobviouswhen Socrates introducesthe radical
distinctionbetweenuniversal ideas and particular real things (129). He
deals withthe one and the manyon the same level as he deals withthe ideas
of similarityand dissimilarity,rest and motion,etc. Then the dialogue
shiftsentirelyfromthe metaphysicalproblemof Parmenidesto the discus-
sion of the conceptsand ideas of one and being,whose relationshipto each
otherthereafterformsthe propersubject matter. The reader is firstmisled
by Parmenides' expressremarksthathe wantsto discusshis own hypothesis.
This is held to referto the One of his philosophywith its full cosmicimpli-
cations. But verysoon it becomesobviousthatParmenidesis here interested
onlyin an entirelyformalor logical discussionof the one as an abstractand
mathematicalconcept. The one and being he refersto are taken in their
most general meaning,applicable equally to the cosmic principle of Par-
menides' metaphysicsas well as to the one and being of everythingelse; it
is simply one as number,unity, and identity-irrespectiveof what it is
whosenumber,unity,or identityit indicates.
1 "The Neo-Platonistsvalued it [Plato's Parmenides] as a treasuryof the most
profoundtruthsand mysteries;theyelevatedit to a sacred documentfull of divine
revelations. Plotinus, Proclus and Syrianus found their entiretheosophyimplicit
in the conceptswhichformthesubject matterof the dialogue. Again in the fifteenth
century,duringthe renaissanceof the philosophyof Plato and Plotinus, Marsilius
Ficinus, the famous translatorof Plato, adhered to the view of Proclus. He held
that Plato had presentedin this dialogue the whole of Christiantheologyand that
one should prepare oneself for its study through fasting." J. H. Kirchmann,
Plato's Dialog Parmenides,iibersetztund erliiutert(Leipzig, 1882), p. VIII and IX.
2 "More than any other Platonic work of any considerable compass, the

Parmenides bears throughoutthe stamp of being an 'occasional' composition. Its

purpose is to 'have fun' withMonistswho regardthe sensibleas illusion,and nothing
more." A. E. Taylor,Plato, the Man and his Work (New York, 1936).
232
 PLATO S PROBLEM IN THE PARMENIDES 233

To be sure,thereare in the dialogue ambiguitiesof language and primi-

tive turnsof thoughtnot yet recognizedby Plato, whichmay enable one to
finda mysticalmeaningin some passages, but only if they are read with a
preconceivedmind and taken out of their context. The very sober and
abstract meaning of the dialogue cannot be hidden from any one who is
used to reading textswith regard to theirliteral meaning.
Now,as to themorerecenttendencyto look at the dialog-ueas an exereise
in dialectics or as an involuntaryself-exhibition of Parmenides-there are'
too manyfactswhichrendersuch an interpretation veryimprobable.
First, there are many examples which demonstratehow Plato proceeds
when he is describinga case of involuntaryself-refutation;they are very
different in form,and they never culminatein such obviouslyself-contra-
dictoryabsurditiesas are here exhibited. And then, everythingwe know
makes it highlyimprobablethat Plato had such disrespectfor Parmenides
as to permithimto display Parmenidesspeakinglike a fool. And even if it
had been Plato's intentionto ridiculethe Eleatic or the Megarian dialectics
-he would certainlyhave chosensomeone else as its representative.
And finally,thereis not the slightestsign in the dialogue of that humor
of whichPlato always proves himselfthe great master. On the contrary,
gravityand seriousnesscharacterizethis dialogue more than many others-
for instance,take Socrates' confessionthat he is troubledby the problem
whetherthereexistideas even of commonand mean things,and Parmenides'
reproachfor makingsuch unphilosophicaldifferentiations.3
The importanceof the problemsand the seriousnesswithwhichtheyare
treated render it highlyimprobablethat in its main part the dialogue,is
intendedto exhibita speciallyskillfulexercisein the art of dialectics.
But if the metaphysicalpurportand the merelyformalistictendencyare
denied, what then is the proper subject matter of the dialogue? And is
thereany at all whichwill include both the introductoryfirstpart and the
main portionof the dialogue?
The suggestionI wish to make is that Plato set himselfthe following
problemin his dialogue: The theoryof Methexis-the assertionthat many
particularthingscan partakeof one idea-encounters greatdifficulties, which
cease as soon as the differencebetween an idea and its realization in many
species and individuals is no longer considered from the point of view of
thenumericaldifferentiation of theone and the many. In otherwords, ideas
not only exist beyond space and time,rest and motion,divisibilityand in-
divisibility,mental subjectivityand physical objectivity,but they have an
existenceof theirown,an ideal existence,whichis also beyondnumberand
even beyondthe numberone.
It does not make sense to say that justice is what it is once or twice or
many times; it is what it is beyond all number. Althoughit is objectively
3 130,C-E.
234 MAXIMILIAN BECK

real, it does not existas pure idea even once,that is, not even as a singleone.
Only its realizationin particularthingscan be counted. And even if it has
notfoundany realizationin any singlecase of individualization,thisdoes not
matter;as idea it existsnevertheless, and this even beyondthe numberone.
It is the identity,the samenessof an idea containedin and contrasted
with its innumerableconcreterealizations,which is misinterpretedas nu-
mericalsinglenessor unity. But the strikingcharacterof an idea is that it
is not a single being but universal. Only its realizationexists many times,
but it does not existitselfevenonce, as a particularthing. Yet nevertheless
it does exist,and it is extremelydifficult to definethispoint: to be something
in itself,decisivelydistinguishedfromeverythingelse; and morethan that,
to be the proper root of everydifferentiation-butto be, at the same time,
not only a-temporaland a-spatial but also a-numeral.
There is nothingin the entire dialogue that would suggest a polemical
attitude of Parmenides against the theoryof Methexis. On the contrary,
thereare manyindicationsthat clearlyshowthat Parmenideswants to make
Socrates consciousof the difficulties involvedin this theory,and at the same
timewantsto make him capable of overcomingthem.4
How does he try to do so? First, after Socrates has introducedhis
theoryof ideas, Parmenides presses him hard to abandon his satisfaction,
whichdoes not take all the consequencesinto consideration. Then, afterhe
has broughtSocrates to despair because now the latter does not see a way
out of the difficulties, Parmenides widens the horizon of being, at first
directly,beyond the concept of only temporal,spatial and numerical ex-
istence. The a-numericalexistenceof ideas, as merelyqualitativeidentities,
is expressedby stressing,on the one hand, the differenceof the one from
4 Compare passageslike133 A, B, and 135 A, B, C. I cannotunderstand how
passageslike the followingcould be harmonized withthe commonopinionthat
Parmenides' taskin thisdialogueis to refutePlato'sthesisof ideas:
"And yet,Socrates,"said Parmenides, "thesedifficultiesand manymorebe-
sidesare inseparablefromtheideas,if theseideas of thingsexistand we declare
thateach of themis an absoluteidea. Therefore, he whohearssuchassertions is
confusedin his mindand arguesthattheideas do not exist,and evenif theydo
existcannotby anypossibility be knownby man; and he thinksthatwhathe says
is reasonable,and,as I was sayingjust now,he is amazingly hardto convince.Only
a manof verygreatnaturalgiftswillbe able to understand thateverything has a
classandabsoluteessence, andonlya stillmorewonderful mancan findoutall these
factsand teachanyoneelse to analyzethemproperlyand understand them." "I
agreewithyou,Parmenides," said Socrates,"forwhatyou say is verymuchto my
mind." "But on theotherhand,"said Parmenides, "if anyone withhis mindfixed
on all theseobjectivesand otherslikethese,deniestheexistence of ideas of things
and doesnotassumean idea underwhicheachindividual thingis classed,he willbe
quiteat a loss,sincehe deniesthattheidea of eachthingis alwaysthesame,and in
thiswayhe willutterly destroythepowerof carrying on discussion.You seemto
havebeenwellawareof this"(135 A, B, C).
 PLATO S PROBLEM IN THE PARMENIDES 235

thesame,and admitting,on the otherhand, thatthis qualitativesamenessor

identitydoes not have numericalexistence. "Then the one is not at all.-
Evidentlynot.-Then it has no being even so as to be one" (141, E). "The
nature of the one is surelynot the same as that of the same. That which
becomesthesame as many,becomesnecessarilymanynot one" (139, I).5
Afterthis Parmenidesdemonstratesindirectlythe indifference of ideas
to theirnumericalrealityby showingthat it is possible to deduce the most
absurd consequencesfromcontradictoryhypothesesas to the existenceor
non-existenceof numericalsingleness. It does not make any differenceto
really existingbeings,such as ideas or ideal contents,whethertheyexist as
unities or not, that is, whether"the one exists" or whether"the one does
not exist." Individual existenceis not the only possible kind of existence.
The implicationis that universalexistencealso is possible.
The problemis individual existenceas such, irrespectiveof the particu-
lar contentsto whichthat individualityof existenceis attributedor denied.
And it is sLiggestedthat it does not make sense to considerthe problemof
the participationor Methexisof many single thingsin one idea in the light
of this numericaldifference.For the idea, the content,the identical what,
in whichthe many participate,is beyondany singular existenceitself. No
idea existsin itselfas individual. Therefore,the fact that manyindividuals
can participatein it does not mean that the one idea as a numericallysingle
being is divided or multipliedin otherindividual beings which participate
in it.
It is demonstratedindirectlyin this dialogue, namely,by carryingthe
contrarythesis to absurdity,that ideas are neitherunities nor multitudes,
neitherwholesnor parts, have neithersize nor spatial nor temporalexten-
sion; ideas are beyondany quantitativecategory;theyare purelyqualitative
identities.
The consequenceof the a-numeraland even a-singularexistenceof ideas
is thatall theobjectionsParmenideshad made earlierin the dialogue against
the theoryof ideas have now completelylost their application. Neither
divisionnor multiplicationof "the one idea" is now necessaryin order to
enable many things to participate in it. Nor is there any necessityto
postulate an endless reiterationof ideas in order to explain the similarity
between particulars through a commonuniversal (the "third man" of
Aristotle). Then, too, thereis no reason for the assertionthat the absolute
ideas in themselvesand theiressentialrelationsto each otherare inaccessi-
ble to our knowledge. Such an assertionis based upon the distinctionbe-
tween the ideas in themselvesand their "likenesses" (6AotLcW'Aara)in our
physicalworld and in our knowledge;the ideas "in themselves"and their
likenessesin our world and knowledgeare consideredas singular beings-
5All the Plato quotations are taken from H. N. Fowler's translationin the
Loeb Class. Libr., London.
236 MAXIMThIAN BECK

just as if what is identical betweenthem were a particular or individual

being! But the point is that it is only the multiplerealizationof the same
idea whichdistinguishesbeings-not the idea or the likenessitself.
All perfect knowledge (episteme) is knowledge of the self-evidently
necessaryconnectionsof ideas witheach other. The self-evidentnecessityis
completelyindependentof the kind and numberof the realizationsof the
ideas concerned. It does not make any differencewhere,when,how many
timesand in what size and species the triangleexists whose trigonometrical
laws are self-evidentto me; the absolute and perfecttriangle of geometry
does not exist anyhow in our physical world; rather it "exists" in my
thinking. Nevertheless,those laws are objectivelytrue because they refer
to definitecontents,quiddities,qualities-independent of their realization
in singular beings. Only facts can be counted; while ideas-or naturae,
essences,as theyare later called-cannot be counted,since theydo not have
a singular esse existentiae. They do not have existencebesides what they
are, beyondtheiresse essentiae; theiresse has been completelyabsorbedby
theirqualitative definiteness.
It is Plato's discoverythat knowledgecan be based upon what things
are, by abstractingfromthe fact that they are. The real themehe is de-
velopingin theParmenidesis thateven singularityof being has to be denied
to ideal existence.
If this is understood,then at once the various parts of the dialogue lose
that lack of connectionwhichhas made it an easy prey of the huntersfor
mysteriesand revelations. It is, in fact, a documentof admirable sober-
mindedness. Nowhereelse has Plato refrainedso completelyfroma meta-
phoricalpresentationof his doctrineof Ideas as in the Parmenides. All the
crude misinterpretations of this doctrine,takingliterallyhis figurativetalk
of the dwellingof Ideas "in a place beyondthe sky," lose theirfoundation
in Plato's own teaching if they are confrontedwith his remarksin this
dialogue on the a-spatial,a-temporaland a-numericalcharacterof ideas.
It is the ambiguityof the word one whichrendersa soberunderstanding
of the dialogue extremelydifficult, for Plato uses this word here in different
meanings. Althoughhe distinguishesin his thoughtvery clearly between
unity and samenessor identity(139), he uses the word one in one place to
signifythe samenessof universals (159), and in anotherplace to signifythe
singularityof the particular or the "ineffable" individual (142). An op-
portunitywas here givento the Neo-Platoniststo outdo the sublimityof the
Jewish-Christian monotheismby isolatingthese phrases fromtheir context
and by substitutinga metaphysicalBeing and a theological One for the
merelyformalisticbeing and one of the text. In addition,theyhypostasized
the not of the negative copula in a sentencelike "the one is not" into an
existingNothing-and a mostviolentirrationalismwas established.
Universityof Illinois.