ABAKADA v.
Executive Sec (1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of
In 2005, ABAKADA GURO Party List, headed by its officers Attys. Samson
Alcantara and Ed Vincent Albano, as well as co-petitioner [then] Congressman
Francis Escudero, questioned the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337
In this case, the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337 or the RVAT Law (Revitalized
Value Added Tax Law) was put into issue. It was alleged, among others, that said law
was not duly enacted.
Apparently, the BCC further inserted several provisions to S.B. 1950, i.e., stand by
power was granted to the President to raise the valued-added tax rate. Further still, the
“No pass” provision was deleted – this provision prohibited the passing of
value-added tax to consumers.
NIRC giving the President the stand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to
12% when a certain condition is met, constitutes undue delegation of the legislative
power to tax which the respondents contend that the law is complete and leaves no
discretion to the President but to increase the rate to 12% once any of the two
conditions provided therein arise.
Issue
the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following
recognized limitations or exceptions:
the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to
determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which
the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must
prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. 49 While the
power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the
enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them,
including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation
depends.
The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of
the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or
condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.
No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of
discretion is the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the
word shall connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative
53
obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Where the law is clear and
unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no
54
choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty
which cannot be evaded by the President. Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the
word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not come into play. It is a
clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a
certain specified contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions
by a person or body other than the legislature itself.
Sema v. Comelec
The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province
of Maguindanao but it is not part of ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its
inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The
1st legislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities.
A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMM’s Organic Act and vesting it with
power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law,
the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of
Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City.
For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district
is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this
stating that status quo should be retained; however, just for the purposes of the
elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City –
this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabato’s
status as a legislative district (or part of any).
Bai Sandra Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S.
Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato
City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be
excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D
was winning – in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon
creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative
representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City – so in effect Cotabato
is being deprived of a representative in the HOR.
COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of
S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its
representation.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can
create validly LGUs.
HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city,
municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a
local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third,
there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers,
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local
government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their
jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.
Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k,
and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR.
Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k
(population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so
Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the
province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can
never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely
in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.
Garcia v. Executive Secretary
In November 1990, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 438
which imposed, in addition to any other duties, taxes and charges imposed by law
on all articles imported into the Philippines, an additional duty of 5% ad
valorem tax. This additional duty was imposed across the board on all imported
articles, including crude oil and other oil products imported into the Philippines. In
1991, EO 443 increased the additional duty to 9%. In the same year, EO 475 was
passed reinstating the previous 5% duty except that crude oil and other oil products
continued to be taxed at 9%. Enrique Garcia, a representative from Bataan, avers
that EO 475 and 478 are unconstitutional for they violate Section 24 of Article VI of
the Constitution
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact revenue bills in
Congress, the President may not assume such power by issuing Executive Orders Nos.
475 and 478 which are in the nature of revenue-generating measures.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 475 and 478 are constitutional.
HELD: Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of
appropriation, revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the
province of the Legislative rather than the Executive Department. It does not follow,
however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478, assuming they may be
characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to be exercised by the President,
that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines (Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution).
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the
President “subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose” to
fix “within specific limits” “tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . .” In this
case, it is the Tariff and Customs Code which authorized the President ot issue the
said EOs.
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Comission
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed
by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and submit their findings and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However, PTC is
not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle or render
awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such
facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts
of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity,
and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new office was
inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission
and vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:
PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers.
If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the
two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in
Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
Gancayco v. QC
The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of
Quezon City and the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local
ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and the clearing of Public
Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was able to obtain a building
permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along EDSA, in an
area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon
City Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which
orders the construction of Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was
amended to not require the properties located at the Quezon City - San Juan boundary,
and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the arcades,
moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his property, already
covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April
28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property
had to be demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did
not comply with, and so the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.”
Gancayco then filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his
property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that Ordinance no.
2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the
ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek
nullification of an ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the
presumption of constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council,
taking to note that the Mayor signed the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that
the Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to
the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal, with the contention that
the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional because the intention of the
ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and business in the commercial area, as
well as to protect the welfare of the general public passing by the area, however the
injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the ordinance is lifted.
With that decision, the MMDA and Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration,
which the CA denied, as both parties have no new issues raised. Therefore they
petitioned to the Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as
a public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish
Gancayco’s property.
HELD: The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided
that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as under Art.
694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition or property, or anything else that (1) injures of
endangers the health or safety of the others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3)
shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the
free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per
accidens. A nuisance per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons
and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. As
Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it was
implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a public
nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property. The MMDA was only to
enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not supposed
to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the
constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted.
Therefore, MMDA acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s
property, and was solely liable for the damage.
Edu v. Ericta
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well
as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an invalid exercise of the police power
for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a manifestation
that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of
the Land Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified
as an undue exercise of legislative power.
ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.
RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public
safety and order.
Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state."
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing
upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct
unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to insure
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.
The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity
of Administrative Order No. 2 issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly
approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, for being contrary
to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order,
which took effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect
reproducing what was set forth in the Act.
It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the
government, subject to the exception that local governments may over local affairs
participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the
Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness
of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature.
To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the
inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The
legislature does not abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land
Transportation Code. Republic Act No. 4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves
no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the prime
consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation
Of the power of petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate
rules and regulations to give life to and translate into actuality such fundamental
purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order No.
2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by
respondent Galo.
Arnault v. Nazareno
This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine
Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the
witnesses called to be examined by the special committee created by a Senate
resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price
to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to
reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional
right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault
to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned “until he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith.”
Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus
ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its
questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation.
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their
duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a
witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the
term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long
as to violate the witness’ right to due process of law.
Arnault v. Balagtas
This was a petition for habeas corpus filed by Jean Arnault against the Director of
Prisons, Balagtas. Arnault was incarcerated pursuant to a resolution by the Senate
finding Arnault in contempt for refusing to disclose the name of a person with
whom he transacted business in relation to a government purchase of of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates. The circumstances of Arnault's incarceration
are described in the companion case Arnaultvs. Nazareno (1950) which affirmed the
Legislature's power to hold a person in contempt for defying or refusing to comply
with an order in a legislative inquiry.
Arnault eventually divulged that he had transacted with one Jess D. Santos in
relation to the Buenavista and Tambobong deal. Upon further inquiry, the Senate,
obviously not satisfied with Arnault's explanations, adopted Resolution No. 114.
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault
has not materially changed since he was committed to prison for contempt of the
Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines, in a judgment long since
become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L.
Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having
been held to be coercive rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L.
Arnault should have given the information which he had withheld and continues
contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean
L. Arnault on the occasions above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of
the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and authority, such that , were they to
be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to conduct
investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by
any person of sufficient stubbornness and malice;
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner may be released from his Senate-imposed incarceration.
1. Whether or not the CFI has the right to review the findings of the Senate.
2. Whether or not the Senate may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a
punitive rather than as a coercive measure.
HELD:
Judicial department has no right or power or authority to do this, in the same
manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the
ascertainment of truth and in the application and interpretation of the law, in what is
known as the judicial process, because that would be in direct conflict with the
fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The
only instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there
has been a violation of a constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an
arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.

YES. The Senate may continue to keep Petitioner incarcerated.

2. YES. The legislature may hold a person in contempt or incarcerate him as a

1. NO. In the first place, the CFI did NOT have the right to review the findings of punitive measure.

the Senate. In the above quoted resolution, the Senate in stating that petitioner “has
Although the resolution studiously avoids saying that the confinement is a
failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he
punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the truth, the
gave the amount of P440,000” and that the situation of petitioner “has not materially
intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact
charged since he was committed to prison”, clearly shows that the Senate believes
partly punitive. This may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that
that Arnault was still trying to deceive them. The CFI on the other hand arrogated
petitioner's acts were arrogant and contumacious and constituted an affront to the
unto itself to review such finding and held that Arnault satisfactorily answered the
Senate's dignity and authority.
questions of the Senate in its investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong deal.

The legislature has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses. This power is
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
followed. It assumed that courts have the right to review the findings of legislative
incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or necessary to effectuate said power.
bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation, or interfere with their
How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to
proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process. The
base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and
authority? The legislative department should not be constrained to look to the courts
whenever for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy
with which it is faced.
The exercise of the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and contumacious
witness should be supreme and is not subject to judicial interference, except when
there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of
arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations.
The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the
petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and the petitioner is hereby ordered
to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the
petitioner-appellee.
Bengzon v. Senata Blue Ribbon Com
It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez and his wife together with the
Marcoses unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo
Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among others, control over some of the biggest
business enterprises in the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell
Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that
Lopa took over various government owned corporations which is in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee. After committee
hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and
that his allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege hour upon which he
insisted to have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and
Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and
require their attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in
excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury,
and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer for
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted. immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a
similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee then set an initial
HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained
hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto. SCB stressed that there were
no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look
cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry, thus posting
into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as “The
a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words, the purpose of the inquiry to
be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out whether or not the
ISSUE:
relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
Whether or not the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group.
upon the judicial powers vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the
foregoing cases.
contemplated inquiry by the SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is
not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
RULING:
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo
Yes. The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution,
Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
as initiated in the privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to
Act”, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
denounce the illegal practices committed by a foreign bank in selling unregistered
legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died
foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said speech "to immediately
during the pendency of this case.
conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, so as to prevent the occurrence of a similar

SCB v. Senate Committee on Banks fraudulent in the future."

FACTS: The mere filing of a criminal or administrative complaint before a court or a

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislation. The
Metro Manila for selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry
Regulation Code (RA 8799). Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to is an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an
administrative investigation.
The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which may
or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish
for contempt, the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot
penalize violators even there is overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability.
Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or remedial legislation, respondent
Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy whatever
irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in
its Report a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear
liable. At best, the recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such
Report would only be persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and
the courts to determine the liabilities of the offender.
Senate v. Ermita
In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail Project as
well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to conduct a public
hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the alleged overpricing in the
NRP. The investigating Senate committee issued invitations to certain department
heads and military officials to speak before the committee as resource persons.
Ermita submitted that he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said
hearing due to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted the said
requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were already made and
scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of executive
departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the
executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief
superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of
the PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security officials who
in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive
privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President, from
appearing in such hearings conducted by Congress without first securing the
president’s approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the Senate
committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite EO 464, the
scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel attending. For defying
President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved
from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464’s
constitutionality was assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties
of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
functions in the implementation of laws. anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in
contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine the validity
the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and
of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish Section 21 from Section 22
22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The Congress’ power of inquiry is expressly
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to
recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. Although there is no
the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the
Congress’ oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the
legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with
appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22
process to enforce it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for
information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do
department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of
possess it.
privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is
heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the
closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a
President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also,
official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas,
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The requirement then
to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in
the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself
or by the Executive Secretary.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are
implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as
imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department
heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances,
Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is ‘in aid of legislation’ under Section 21, the appearance
is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
Neri v. Senate
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s
Republic of China. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
On the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the
NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent
a letter to the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The
SBRC cited Neri for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by mandamus and prohibition to obtain from respondents the full text of the JPEPA,
the presidential communications privilege. including the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto. Particularly, Congress
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of
through the House Committee are calling for an inquiry into the JPEPA, but at the
the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
same time, the Executive is refusing to give them the said copies until the
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
negotiation is completed.
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence.
o Issue: Whether or not the President can validly exclude Congress, exercising its
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under power of inquiry and power to concur in treaties, from the negotiation process
the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being
a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And Treaty-making power of the President

3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the
xxx they (petitioners) argue that the President cannot exclude Congress from the
limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
JPEPA negotiations since whatever power and authority the President has to
an appropriate investigating authority.
negotiate international trade agreements is derived only by delegation of Congress,

Akbayan v. Aquino
This is regarding the JPEPA, the bilateral free trade agreement ratified by the
President with Japan, concerning trade in goods, rules of origin, customs procedures,
paperless trading, trade in services, investment, etc.
Prior to President’s signing of JPEPA in Sept. 2006, petitioners – non-government
organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and taxpayers – sought via petition for
pursuant to Article VI, Section 28(2) of the Constitution and Sections 401 and 402
of Presidential Decree No. 1464.
The subject of Article VI Section 28(2) of the Constitution is not the power to
negotiate treaties and international agreements, but the power to fix tariff rates,
import and export quotas, and other taxes xxx.
As to the power to negotiate treaties, the constitutional basis thereof is Section 21 of
Article VII – the article on the Executive Department.
xxx
While the power then to fix tariff rates and other taxes clearly belongs to Congress,
and is exercised by the President only be delegation of that body, it has long been
recognized that the power to enter into treaties is vested directly and exclusively in
the President, subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this light, the authority of the
President to enter into trade agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D.
1464 may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power already inherent in its
office. It may not be used as basis to hold the President or its representatives
accountable to Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.
This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to enter into treaties is
unlimited but for the requirement of Senate concurrence, since the President must
still enure that all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant provisions of
the Constitution.
It follows from the above discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty negotiations. While Article VII,
Section 21 provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of the
treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of negotiations attendant to its
conclusion. Moreover, it is not even Congress as a while that has been given the
authority to concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the President,
but only the Senate.
Thus, as in the case of petitioners suing in their capacity as private citizens,
petitioners-members of the House of Representatives fail to present a “sufficient
showing of need” that the information sought is critical to the performance of the
functions of Congress, functions that do not include treaty-negotiation.
Did the respondent’s alleged failure to timely claim executive privilege constitute
waiver of such privilege?
That respondent invoked the privilege for the first time only in their Comment to the
present petition does not mean that the claim of privilege should not be credited.
Petitioner’s position presupposes that an assertion of the privilege should have been
made during the House Committee investigations, failing which respondents are
deemed to have waived it.
xxx (but) Respondent’s failure to claim the privilege during the House Committee
hearings may not, however, be construed as a waiver thereof by the Executive
branch. xxx what respondents received from the House Committee and
petitioner-Congressman Aguja were mere requests for information. And as priorly
stated, the House Committee itself refrained from pursuing its earlier resolution to
issue a subpoena duces tecum on account of then Speaker Jose de Venecia’s alleged information, because then the sole test in such controversies would be whether an
request to Committee Chairperson Congressman Teves to hold the same in abeyance. information is a matter of public concern.

The privilege is an exemption to Congress’ power of inquiry. So long as Congress
itself finds no cause to enforce such power, there is no strict necessity to assert the
privilege. In this light, respondent’s failure to invoke the privilege during the House
Committee investigations did not amount to waiver thereof.
“Showing of Need” Test
In executive privilege controversies, the requirement that parties present a
“sufficient showing of need” only means, in substance, that they should show a
public interest in favor of disclosure sufficient in degree to overcome the claim of
privilege. Verily, the Court in such cases engages in a balancing of interests. Such a
balancing of interests is certainly not new in constitutional adjudication involving
fundamental rights.
Right to information vis-a-vis Executive Privilege
xxx the Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the
right to information, a specific “showing of need” for such information is not a
relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public concern.
When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and it has
established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the party
demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that information is
vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its ability to effectively
and reasonably participate in social, political, and economic decision-making.

xxx However, when the Executive has – as in this case – invoked the privilege, and
it has been established that the subject information is indeed covered by the
privilege being claimed, can a party overcome the same by merely asserting that the
information being demanded is a matter of public concern, without any further
showing required? Certainly not, for that would render the doctrine of executive
privilege of no force and effect whatsoever as a limitation on the right to