United States Air Force Aircraft Accident Investigation Board Report

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

BOARD REPORT
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413

United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron
57th Wing
Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada
LOCATION: Nevada Test and Training Range

DATE OF ACCIDENT: 4 April 2018
BOARD PRESIDENT: Brigadier General Case A. Cunningham
Conducted IAW Air Force Instruction 51-503
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413

Nevada Test and Training Range
4 April 2018
On 4 April 2018, the mishap pilot (MP), flying a F-16CM, tail number (T/N) 91-0413, assigned to
the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron, the “Thunderbirds,” 57th Wing, Nellis
Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), engaged in a routine aerial demonstration training flight at
the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) near Creech AFB, NV. During the training flight,
at approximately 1029 local time, the mishap aircraft (MA) impacted the ground and fatally injured
the MP, without an ejection attempt.
The mishap mission was planned and authorized as a practice of a Thunderbirds aerial
demonstration in the south part of the NTTR. The mishap flight was a formation of six F-16CMs
(Thunderbirds #1-6), the standard Thunderbirds aerial demonstration flight. Thunderbird #4 was
the MA/MP. During the High Bomb Burst Rejoin, an aerial maneuver near the scheduled end of
the aerial demonstration training flight, the MP flew the MA for approximately 22 seconds in
inverted flight between 5,500 and 5,700 feet above ground level. During this time, the MP
experienced a change in force due to acceleration measured in multiples of the acceleration of
gravity felt at the earth’s surface (G), between -0.5 to -2.06 G’s. While experiencing -2.06 G’s in
inverted flight, the MP initiated a descending half-loop maneuver (Split-S). After five seconds in
the Split-S, the MP attained a maximum +8.56 G’s. The MP experienced G-induced loss of
consciousness (G-LOC) and absolute incapacitation at the end of that five-second period.
For approximately the next five seconds, the MP remained in a state of absolute incapacitation and
made no deliberate flight control inputs as the MA accelerated toward the ground. Approximately
one second prior to ground impact, the MP began deliberate flight control inputs as he transitioned
from absolute to relative incapacitation. The MA impacted the ground at 57 degrees nose low with
89 degrees of left bank and the MP was fatally injured on impact, without an ejection attempt.
The Accident Investigation Board (AIB) President found by a preponderance of evidence the cause
of the mishap was the MP’s G-LOC during the Split-S portion of the High Bomb Burst Rejoin
maneuver. Additionally, the AIB President found by a preponderance of evidence two factors
substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the MP’s diminished tolerance to +G’s induced by the
physiology of the MP’s exposure to –G’s (“Push-Pull Effect”) and (b) an associated decrease in
the effectiveness of the MP’s Anti-G straining maneuver under those conditions.
Under 10 U.S.C. § 2254(d) the opinion of the accident investigator as to the cause of, or the factors
contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, if any, may not be considered as
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may such information be
considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions
or statements.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND STATEMENT OF OPINION
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413
4 April 2018
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................... iii
SUMMARY OF FACTS ................................................................................................................ 2
1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE ...........................................................................................2
a. Authority .........................................................................................................................2
b. Purpose............................................................................................................................2
2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY.....................................................................................................2
3. BACKGROUND ..................................................................................................................3
a. Air Combat Command (ACC) ........................................................................................3
b. United States Air Force Warfare Center (USAFWC).....................................................3
c. 57th Wing (57 WG) ........................................................................................................3
d. United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron (USAFADS) .............................3
e. F-16 Fighting Falcon .......................................................................................................4
f. G-Force(s) (Gravitational Force Equivalent) ..................................................................4
4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS ...................................................................................................4
a. Mission ............................................................................................................................4
b. Planning ..........................................................................................................................5
c. Preflight ...........................................................................................................................5
d. Summary of Accident .....................................................................................................6
e. Impact ............................................................................................................................10
f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE) ...............................................................12
g. Search and Rescue (SAR) .............................................................................................12
h. Recovery of Remains ....................................................................................................12
5. MAINTENANCE ...............................................................................................................13
a. Forms Documentation ...................................................................................................13
b. Inspections ....................................................................................................................13
c. Maintenance Procedures ...............................................................................................13
d. Maintenance Personnel and Supervision ......................................................................13
e. Fuel, Hydraulic, Oil, and Oxygen Inspection Analyses ................................................14
f. Unscheduled Maintenance .............................................................................................14
6. AIRFRAME, MISSILE, OR SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS ............................................14
a. Structures and Systems .................................................................................................14
b. Evaluation and Analysis ...............................................................................................14
(1) MA Data Acquisition System (DAS) ................................................................... 14
(2) MA Flight Control Surfaces.................................................................................. 14
(3) MA Engine ............................................................................................................ 15
(4) Hydraulic System .................................................................................................. 15
(5) Electrical System .................................................................................................. 15
(6) Escape System ...................................................................................................... 15
7. WEATHER .........................................................................................................................15
a. Forecast Weather ...........................................................................................................15
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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b. Observed Weather .........................................................................................................15
c. Space Environment .......................................................................................................16
d. Operations .....................................................................................................................16
8. CREW QUALIFICATIONS ...............................................................................................16
a. Mishap Pilot ..................................................................................................................16
b. Other USAFADS Pilots ................................................................................................17
9. MEDICAL ..........................................................................................................................17
a. Mishap Pilot ..................................................................................................................17
(1) MP Qualifications ...................................................................................................17
(2) MP Health ...............................................................................................................17
(3) MP Pathology .........................................................................................................17
(4) MP Lifestyle ...........................................................................................................17
(5) MP Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time ......................................................................17
b. Other Crew Members ....................................................................................................18
(1) Qualifications ..........................................................................................................18
(2) Health ......................................................................................................................18
(3) Pathology ................................................................................................................18
(4) Lifestyle ..................................................................................................................18
(5) Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time .............................................................................18
10. OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISION ..............................................................................18
a. Operations .....................................................................................................................18
b. Supervision ...................................................................................................................19
11. HUMAN FACTORS analysis............................................................................................19
a. Effects of Acceleration on the Human Body .................................................................20
b. G-LOC Physiology ........................................................................................................20
c. Protective Measures against +G’s ..................................................................................20
d. Human Response to –G’s...............................................................................................21
e. The “Push-Pull Effect” ...................................................................................................21
f. MP Exposure to –G’s, “Push-Pull Effect”......................................................................22
g. MP AGSM Effectiveness, Previous Split-S Rejoins, Physical conditioning, ATAGS .23
12. GOVERNING DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS ....................................................25
a. Publicly Available Directives and Publications Relevant to the Mishap......................25
b. Other Directives and Publications Relevant to the Mishap .........................................25
c. Known or Suspected Deviations from Directives or Publications: None. ...................26
STATEMENT OF OPINION ....................................................................................................... 27
1. Opinion Summary ...............................................................................................................27
2. Cause ...................................................................................................................................28
a. Loss of Consciousness ..................................................................................................28
3. Substantially Contributing Factors .....................................................................................29
a. “Push-Pull Effect” .........................................................................................................29
b. AGSM ..........................................................................................................................29
4. Conclusion ..........................................................................................................................30
INDEX OF TABS ......................................................................................................................... 31
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
57 WG 57th Wing k Thousand

ACC Air Combat Command KCAS Knots Calibrated Airspeed
ADCC Assistant Dedicated Crew Chief L Local Time
AF Air Force LM-Aero Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company
AFB Air Force Base MA Mishap Aircraft
AFE Aircrew Flight Equipment MF Mishap Flight
AFI Air Force Instruction MP Mishap Pilot
AFPAM Air Force Pamphlet MS Mishap Sortie
AFTO Air Force Technical Order MSL Mean Sea Level
AGL Above Ground Level NOTAMS Notices to Airmen
AGSM Anti-G Straining Maneuver NTTR Nevada Test and Training Range
AIB Accident Investigation Board NV Nevada
ARMS Aviation Resource Management System OPMAN Operations Manual
ATAGS Advanced Tactical Anti-G Suit ORM Operational Risk Management
BPO Basic Post Flight PA Public Affairs
CC Commander PR Pre Flight
COMACC Commander Air Combat Command PSI Pounds Per Square Inch
CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force RSO Range Safety Officer
DAS Data Acquisition System SAF Secretary of the Air Force
DCC Dedicated Crew Chief SAR Search and Rescue
DoD Department of Defense SC Show Center
ECSMU Enhanced Crash Survivable Memory Unit SII Special Interest Item
EP Emergency Procedure SQ Squadron
FOD Foreign Object and Debris SOF Supervisor of Flying
ft Feet TB Thunderbird
G Force Due to Acceleration Measured in TCTO Time Compliance Technical Order
Multiples of the Acceleration of TDY Temporary Duty
Gravity Felt at the Earth’s Surface TO Technical Order
G-LOC G-induced loss of consciousness T/N Tail Number
G-Ex G-Exercise TX Transition Course
HARM Host Aviation Resource Management UPT Undergraduate Pilot Training
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and USAFADS U.S. Air Force Air Demonstration
Classification System Squadron
Hg Mercury USAF U.S. Air Force
HI BB High Bomb Burst USAFWC U.S. Air Force Warfare Center
HUD Heads-Up Display Vol Volume
IAW In-Accordance With WAI Walk Around Inspection
IFF Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals
IMDS Integrated Maintenance Data System
IP Instructor Pilot
The above list was compiled from the Summary of Facts, the Statement of Opinion, the Index of
Tabs, and Witness Testimony (Tabs R and V).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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SUMMARY OF FACTS
1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE
a. Authority
On 5 April 2018, General James M. Holmes, the Commander of Air Combat Command, appointed
Brigadier General Case Cunningham to conduct an aircraft accident investigation of the 4 April
2018 mishap of an F-16 Thunderbirds aircraft at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR)
(Tab Y-3 to Y-4). On 27 April 2018, the Accident Investigation Board (AIB) convened at Nellis
Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV). A legal advisor (Lieutenant Colonel), medical member
(Major), pilot member (Captain), maintenance member (Senior Master Sergeant), and a recorder
(Technical Sergeant) were also appointed to the board (Tab Y-3 to Y-4). A subject matter expert
in Aerospace Medicine (Major) was subsequently appointed on 30 April 2018 (Tab Y-5). The
AIB was conducted in accordance with (IAW) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 51-503, Aerospace and
Ground Accident Investigations, dated 14 April 2015, and AFI 51-503, ACC Supplement,
Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations, dated 28 January 2016.
b. Purpose
IAW AFI 51-503, this accident investigation board conducted a legal investigation to inquire into
all the facts and circumstances surrounding this Air Force accident, prepare a publicly releasable
report, and obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary
action, and adverse administrative action.
2. ACCIDENT SUMMARY
On 4 April 2018, the mishap pilot (MP), flying a F-16CM, tail number (T/N) 91-0413, assigned to
the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron (USAFADS), “the Thunderbirds,” 57th
Wing, Nellis AFB, NV, engaged in a routine aerial demonstration training flight at the NTTR near
Creech AFB, NV (Tabs K-2 to K-3, K-7 and U-4). During the training flight, at approximately
1029 local time (L), the mishap aircraft (MA) impacted the ground and fatally injured the MP,
without an ejection attempt (Tabs U-4, U-17 to U-18 and X-4).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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3. BACKGROUND
a. Air Combat Command (ACC)
ACC is the primary force provider of combat airpower to America’s

warfighting commands (Tab CC-3). To support global implementation of
national security strategy, ACC operates fighter, bomber, reconnaissance,
battle-management and electronic-combat aircraft (Tab CC-3). It also
provides command, control, communications and intelligence systems, and
conducts global information operations (Tab CC-3). ACC’s mission is to
support global implementation of national security strategy (Tab CC-3).
ACC operates over 1,300 aircraft across 34 wings and 19 bases, comprising
over 94,000 active duty and civilian personnel (Tab CC-3).
b. United States Air Force Warfare Center (USAFWC)
The USAFWC’s mission is to develop innovative leaders and full spectrum

capabilities through responsive, realistic, and relevant testing; tactics
development; and advanced training across all levels of war (Tab CC-6). The
USAFWC ensures deployed forces are well trained and well equipped to
conduct integrated combat operations (Tab CC-6). The USAFWC oversees
the operations of four wings, two named units and one detachment, comprised
of 11,000 personnel located in 23 states and 37 different locations (Tab CC-6).
c. 57th Wing (57 WG)
The 57 WG provides advanced aerospace training to world-wide combat air

forces and showcases aerospace power to the world while overseeing the
dynamic and challenging flying operations at Nellis AFB (Tab CC-8). The
57 WG is comprised of seven distinct organizations; manages all flying
operations at Nellis AFB; and conducts advanced aircrew, space, logistics
and command and control training through the United States Air Force
(USAF) Weapons School, Red Flag, and Green Flag exercises (Tab CC-8).
The Wing additionally supports the USAFWC’s test/evaluation activities and
showcases air power through the “Thunderbirds” airshows (Tab CC-8).
d. United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron

(USAFADS)
The USAFADS, also known as the Thunderbirds, performs precision aerial

maneuvers demonstrating the capabilities of Air Force high performance
aircraft to people throughout the world (Tab CC-13). The squadron exhibits
the professional qualities the Air Force develops in the people who fly,
maintain and support these aircraft (Tab CC-13).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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e. F-16 Fighting Falcon
The F-16 is a compact multi-role fighter aircraft (Tab CC-16). It is highly

maneuverable and has proven itself in air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack
(Tab CC-16). It provides a relatively low-cost, high performance weapon
system and air demonstration capabilities for the United States and allied
nations (Tab CC-16).
f. G-Force(s) (Gravitational Force Equivalent)
Fighter aircrew routinely experience changes in force due to acceleration measured in multiples of
the acceleration of gravity felt at the earth’s surface, abbreviated as “G” or G-Forces, as a result of
maneuvers during flight (Tab BB-62 to BB-63). When a high-speed fighter aircraft turns in any
direction, the velocity of the aircraft changes along that path and the pilot seated in the aircraft
experiences the same acceleration based on velocity and radius of the turn (Tab BB-64). That
acceleration and the changes in G can be either positive (+G) or negative (–G) (Tab BB-64).
Fighter aircraft instruments measure +G (felt as heaviness in the aircraft seat) and
–G (felt as lightness in the aircraft seat) in numerical units of G’s (Tab BB-16 and BB-64). This
report will refer to G’s when referencing the numerical units and the letter “G” only when referring
generally to G-Force (Tab BB-16, BB-47 to BB-57 and BB-60 to BB-71). For example, +1.7 G’s
refers to a force due to acceleration that is equivalent to 1.7 times the acceleration of gravity felt
at the earth’s surface (Tab BB-62). Much of the research used in the writing of the report refers
to measurements of G in the z axis, or up and down (head to foot) axis, but for the sake of simplicity
and since the other axes are not relevant to the investigation, the report text omits reference to the
specific axis throughout (Tab BB-63).
4. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
a. Mission
The mishap flight (MF) was a formation of six F-16CMs, the standard Thunderbirds aerial
demonstration flight (Tabs K-2, K-6, V-14.13 and DD-3). The Thunderbirds “Diamond
Formation” consisted of Thunderbird #1 (TB1), Thunderbird #2 (TB2), Thunderbird #3 (TB3) and
Thunderbird #4 (TB4) as depicted in Figure 1 (Tabs K-2, V-14.5, V-14.7, and BB-24). TB4, also
known as the “Slot” pilot or position, was the MP/MA (Tabs K-2 and V-14.5). The solos, the
aircraft flying independently of the Diamond Formation in the aerial demonstration, consisted of
Thunderbird #5 (TB5) and Thunderbird #6 (TB6) and comprised the rest of the MF (Tabs K-2, V-
2.4 and V-14.5).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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Figure 1: Diamond Formation (Tab BB-24).
The planned mission was to conduct a Thunderbirds practice aerial demonstration (Tabs K-7, V-
2.5 to 2.6, V-13.4 and V-14.7). Planned mission tasks included practice aerial demonstration
maneuvers on takeoff from Nellis AFB, a departure to a south area of the NTTR, and a practice of
the “High Show” version of the Thunderbirds aerial demonstration (Tabs K-7, U-4, V-6.5 and V-
14.13). In the High Show, the Thunderbirds perform a series of aerial demonstration maneuvers
requiring cloud ceilings higher than 8,000 feet above the ground level (AGL) and visibility greater
than five miles (Tab BB-43). The planned mission culmination was a return to Nellis AFB for
landing (Tabs K-7 and V-14.7). The Thunderbirds operations officer authorized the mission on
an Aviation Resource Management System (ARMS) Fighter Flight Authorization Form (Tab K-
2).
b. Planning
TB1 conducted the preflight brief at approximately 0800L (Tab V-14.11). The brief was
conducted IAW USAFADS standards and AFI 11-2F-16V3, F-16 Operations Procedures (13 Jul
2016) (Tabs V-14.11, BB-5 and BB-22). The brief covered mission objectives, operational risk
management (ORM), current and forecasted weather, notices to airmen (NOTAMS), emergency
procedures (EPs), special interest items (SIIs), and the lineup card mission materials (Tabs K-6 to
K-18, V-2.3, V-2.11, V-4.7, V-5.8, V-13.8 and V-14.11 to 14.12). TB6 was in charge of collecting
the ORM data for the mission and collecting any personal safety factors for the flight (Tab V-4.7,
V-7.7 and V-14.11). The overall ORM for the mission was briefed as “Green” (Tab K-6). The
MP gathered and briefed the weather, NOTAMS, and made the lineup card for the MF during the
MF brief (Tab V-2.3, V-14.2 and V-14.11). This included writing the applicable timing data such
as takeoff and landing and the airspace times (Tabs K-7 and V-2.3). The weather and NOTAMS
supported the planned mission for that day (Tabs F-2, K-11 to K-18 and V-7.9). The brief was
conducted in a timely manner, IAW squadron standards, with approximately 20 minutes until the
MF pilots were to go out (“step”) to the flight line and their aircraft (Tabs V-2.11, V-5.9, V-14.12,
V-14.22 and BB-22).
c. Preflight
The MP “stepped” to the MA with the other pilots of the MF, at approximately 0905L, where the
MP donned his CSU-22/P Advanced Technology Anti-G Suit (ATAGS) (Tabs K-7 and V-11.6).
The ATAGS is a pant-like garment consisting of bladders that fill with air from the aircraft to put
pressure on the abdomen, thighs, and calves during an increase in +G’s to increase a pilot’s
tolerance to +G’s and help prevent G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC) (Tab BB-70). Once
the MP was in the cockpit, the Dedicated Crew Chief (DCC) assisted the MP with connecting his
ejection seat harness and ATAGS to the aircraft (Tab V-9.3). The MP appeared in good spirits,
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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and correctly zipped his ATAGS (Tab V-5.8 and V-9.5 to V-9.6). TB1 then directed the MF to
complete preflight checks prior to taking off (Tab V-2.17). During these checks, the pilots tested
their ATAGS system via a button in the cockpit (Tab V-2.17, V-5.12, V-6.14, V-7.10 to V-7.11
and V-14.18).
d. Summary of Accident
The MF departed Nellis AFB at approximately 0950L (Tab U-4). The Diamond Formation
coordinated with Nellis Tower for a Diamond Loop on takeoff while TB5 and TB6 took off as
single ship aircraft (Tabs BB-26 and DD-7). The Diamond Loop is an aerial demonstration
maneuver where the Diamond Formation performs a loop immediately after takeoff and was
executed IAW the 57 WG Supplement to Air Combat Command Instruction (ACCI) 11-
USAFADS Volume 3, Operational Procedures-Thunderbirds, 3 January 2018 (Tabs Z-6 and BB-
26 to BB-27). The MF then proceeded toward the northwest and entered the NTTR (approximately
12 miles north of Creech AFB as depicted in Figure 2) at approximately 0956L (Tabs K-7, Q-5,
Z-3, Z-6 and DD-7).
Figure 2: South NTTR (Tab Z-3)
The Range Safety Officer (RSO), equipped with a UHF/VHF radio, primarily served as a safety
monitor and supervised the recording of the practice with video equipment for debriefing purposes
(Tabs V-13.8 to V-13.9 and BB-22). Three enlisted personnel from the Thunderbirds accompanied
the RSO to the NTTR to film the practice, record the timing, and provide communications
expertise (Tabs V-13.8 to V-13.9 and BB-23). These personnel were located in a tower on the
practice range to observe the practice demonstration (Tab V-13.7 to V-13.9). Upon reaching the
area, the RSO radioed the MF the weather and the status of Creech AFB runways (Tab Z-6). The
RSO reported the winds calm, with few clouds at 16,000 feet AGL and scattered clouds at 19,000
feet AGL, with an altimeter setting of 30.06 inches of mercury (Tab Z-6). The MF then setup to
practice the High Show version of the Thunderbirds aerial demonstration (Tabs K-7 and V-14.13).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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The practice area in the NTTR provides a similar appearance to an airfield typically used in aerial
demonstrations, with a visible marker on the ground for show center (SC), as depicted in Figure 3
(Tabs V-14.6 and BB-44). The first aerial demonstration maneuver the MF executed on the NTTR
was the Diamond Cloverloop Opener to begin the High Show practice (Tabs V-14.13 and BB-43).
During this maneuver, the Diamond Formation accomplished their G-Exercise (G-Ex) to assess
ATAGS operation and personal tolerance for +G’s (Tabs V-2.18, V-5.13 and BB-58 to BB-59).
Because of the nature of the public demonstration, the Thunderbirds are not required to execute a
stand-alone G-Ex, as authorized by an ACC waiver permitting deviation from AFI 11-2F-16V3
(Tab BB-58 to BB-59). This deviation permitted pilots to conserve fuel for the demonstration and
maintain flight safety (Tab BB-58). The Data Acquisition System (DAS) also recorded three
separate instances where the MP was previously greater than +4 G’s on the date of the mishap,
with one instance as high as +7.9 G’s (Tab DD-8). Based on witness testimony and Heads Up
Display (HUD) audio recordings, the MP did not announce problems with his ATAGS inflation
or personal tolerance for +G’s prior to the mishap (Tabs V-6.17, V-14.21, and DD-8).
Figure 3: Typical Airfield Layout (Tab BB-44).
The practice aerial demonstration was uneventful, with only minor deviations up until and
including the High Bomb Burst Cross near the planned end of the sortie (Tabs V-2.12, V-14.15
and DD-4). After the High Bomb Burst Cross (Figure 4) at 1028:18L, the Diamond Formation
maneuvered to join back together in the High Bomb Burst Rejoin, as depicted in Figure 5 (Tabs
V-14.7 to V-14.8, Z-4, Z-5, BB-34 and BB-37). The objective of the High Bomb Burst Rejoin, an
aerial demonstration maneuver performed by the Thunderbirds in the F-16 for the past 35 years,
was to have the entire Diamond Formation together by SC (Tab V-8.9 and V-13.6). Just after the
High Bomb Burst Cross, the MP was traveling on a heading of 175 degress, 414 knots calibrated
airspeed (KCAS, the airspeed measurement available to the pilot in the cockpit) and 3,284 feet
mean sea level (MSL, the altitude measured above sea level available to the pilot in the cockpit)
(Tab DD-7). This MSL equates to approximately 300 feet AGL, based on the varying terrain
elevation (Tab DD-7).
Figure 4: High Bomb Burst Cross (Tabs Z-4 and BB-34). Figure 5: High Bomb Burst Rejoin (Tabs Z-5 and BB-37).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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After the diamond formation passed each other IAW Figure 4, TB1 made the prescribed radio call
to initiate the High Bomb Burst Rejoin at 1028:24L, shown in Figure 5 (Tabs N-3, BB-36 and
DD-8). The MP then executed an ascending half-loop, also known as an Immelmann (Figure 6),
by selecting engine power at maximum afterburner and pulling back on the control stick, achieving
+7.9 G’s in the pull (Tabs Z-7 and DD-7). The MP arrived at the top of the Immelmann at
1028:38L, inverted, heading north, 312 KCAS, and 8,616 feet MSL, as depicted in Figure 6 (Tab
Z-8).
Figure 6: MP Immelmann Maneuver during HI BB Rejoin (Tab Z-8)

(Depicted 17:28:38 Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) was L+7 hours)
At 1028:44, TB1 made the prescribed radio call to signal that he was beginning his 5/8 of a loop
before rolling to wings level (Half Cuban Eight) to point south towards SC, as depicted in Figure
5 (Tabs N-4 and BB-37). At this point TB2 and TB3 made the prescribed radio calls indicating
they were visual with TB1 before they initated their rejoins (Tabs N-4 and BB-37). IAW the 57
WG Supplement to ACCI 11-USAFADS Volume 3, the MP followed with his prescribed radio
call to announce he was visual with TB1 and provide his altitude and airspeed parameters: “4’s
Gotcha, 4’s on top 85 [8,500 feet MSL], 400 [400 KCAS]” (Tabs N-4 and BB-37). This altitude
and airspeed met the minimum requirements for the MP to safely perform the descending half loop
(Split-S) to rejoin with TB1, as depicted in Figure 5 (Tabs V-8.6 to V-8.7, Z-5, BB-37 and DD-
7).
At 1028:56L, TB1 made the prescribed radio call as he reached his maximum altitude during his
Half Cuban Eight (Tabs N-4 and BB-38). Two seconds later at 1028:58L, the MP selected idle
engine power and pushed forward on the control stick to attain -2.06 G’s, with a resulting 2,250
feet per minute climb at five degrees nose high (Tab DD-7). One second later, the MP began his
Split-S maneuver as depicted in Figure 7 by pulling the nose of the MA down towards TB1 (Tabs
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8
V-13.11 and DD-5). The MP continued this manuever and achieved a maximum of +8.56 G’s at
1029:03L (Tab DD-7).
Figure 7: Beginning of Split-S Manuever with TB1’s Approximate Flight Path for Reference
(Tab DD-5).
Based on the DAS data, the MP stopped providing deliberate flight control inputs at 1029:04L, as
depicted in Figure 8 (Tabs Z-9 and DD-8). This left the aircraft 68 degrees nose low, 30 degrees
left bank, accelerating through 356 KCAS, and rapidly descending through 6,556 feet MSL, with
a 38,500 feet per minute descent rate (Tab DD-8). This descent continued until 1029:08L, when
the MP began to increase engine power and pulled back on the control stick at 1029:09L (Tab DD-
8). At that point, the MA was at 415 KCAS, 3,452 feet MSL (406 feet AGL), 60 degrees nose
low, and 65 degrees left bank (Tab DD-8). Based on F-16 dive recovery procedures, once the
aircraft descended below 2,300 feet AGL at that dive angle, a safe recovery above the ground was
not possible (Tab DD-6 to DD-7).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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Figure 8: Deliberate Flight Control Inputs Stop (Tab Z-9).
e. Impact
At 1029:10L, the MA impacted the ground at 419 KCAS, 57 degrees nose low, 89 degrees left
bank, and a descent rate of 39,750 feet per minute with maximum control stick input and high
engine power setting, as depicted in Figure 9 (Tabs U-4 and Z-10). The RSO made the radio call
“4, recover” just as the MA impacted the ground (Tabs Z-11 and V-13.12). Both the RSO and
TB6 called “Knock it off” on the radio to cease demonstration maneuvers (Tabs N-4, V-2.13,
V-14.15 and DD-8). The MA impact resulted in the MP’s fatal injuries (Tab X-4).
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Figure 9: Last Recorded Data recorded approximately .343 seconds before impact (Tab Z-10).
The MA carried no weapons, external fuel tanks, or stores (Tabs U-4 to U-5 and DD-8). The
terrain of the practice area is flat with low shrubs and some rising terrain surrounding the practice
“runway” (Tab U-5). The MA debris field was south-southeast of the impact site, as depicted in
Figure 10 (Tab U-6).
Figure 10: Impact Site and Debris Field (Tab U-6).
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11
f. Egress and Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE)
Based on recorded audio and analysis of the canopy on impact, the MP did not attempt ejection
(Tab U-18). The impact destroyed the ejection seat and only fragments were recovered so no
inspection was possible (Tab U-18). There were no overdue inspections for any of the MP’s flight
equipment (Tab H-9). The MP was current and qualified in the Aircrew Flight Equipment (AFE)
continuation training, to include 120-day fit check, Egress, and Hanging Harness (Tab T-4 to T-
7). All AFE personnel were qualified on the equipment (Tab H-9). After completion of the
Diamond Loop on Takeoff, the MP completed a Foreign Object Damage (FOD) check to ensure
he was properly strapped in and to ensure no debris impeded aircraft operations during inverted
flight (Tabs V-8.12 and Z-6). The MP did not mention any issues over the radio when he
performed his FOD check (Tab Z-6).
g. Search and Rescue (SAR)
At 1029L, the RSO and TB6 made the “Knock-It-Off” call to stop the maneuvering for the practice
aerial demonstration (Tabs N-4, V-2.13 and V-14.15). TB5 immediately climbed to a safe altitude
over the impact site to search for a parachute (Tabs V-2.13 and Z-11). At that time, the RSO called
Creech Tower to inform them of the mishap and to send emergency services (Tab Z-11).
Approximately one minute after the impact, TB1 cleared TB5 and TB6 to return to Nellis AFB,
due to being low on fuel (Tabs V-5.11 and Z-11). Shortly after that, TB1 cleared TB2 and TB3 to
return to Nellis AFB while TB1 continued to orbit over the impact site and assumed duties as the
on-scene commander (Tabs V-5.11 and Z-11).
At 1033L, Nellis-Creech Fire Dispatch Center received notification via primary crash phone of an
aircraft accident (Tab FF-4). Fire Department crews immediately dispatched to the flight line and
Thunderbirds practice area (Tab FF-4). After determining that no aircraft were landing at Creech
AFB, the crash recovery team traveled to the range and arrived at the crash scene at 1108L (Tab
FF-4). The team included the Fire Chief, four different fire trucks, an ambulance, a rescue vehicle
and associated personnel (Tab FF-4). The initial response time to the impact site was 35 minutes,
with travel over approximately 14 miles on improved and unimproved surfaces (Tab FF-4). After
arrival at the crash site, the Fire Chief notified his crew to don personal protective equipment,
including self-contained breathing apparatus, and search the impact site for an ejection seat,
parachute and/or signs of life (Tab FF-4). After ensuring the site was safe for follow on recovery
actions and determining the MP had not survived the mishap, the crash recovery team suspended
activities due to darkness at 1956L and left the mishap site under guard by Security Forces (Tab
FF-4). The crash recovery team did not report any difficulties as a result of weather, time of day,
topography, or civilians at the crash site (Tab FF-3 to FF-7).
h. Recovery of Remains
A team of experts from Nellis-Creech Fire Emergency Services recommenced recovery efforts at
0845L on 5 April 2018 (Tab FF-5). At 1430L, recovery teams departed the mishap site with the
MP’s remains and arrived at the Nellis AFB Medical Center by 1630L (Tab FF-5).
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5. MAINTENANCE
a. Forms Documentation
The Air Force Technical Order (AFTO) 781 series of forms collectively document maintenance
actions, inspections, servicing, configurations, status, and flight activities (Tab BB-73). The
AFTO 781 forms in conjunction with the Integrated Maintenance Data System (IMDS) provide a
comprehensive database used to track and record maintenance actions and flight activity, and to
schedule future maintenance (Tab BB-74 to BB-75).
A comprehensive review of the active AFTO 781 forms and IMDS revealed no discrepancies,
overdue inspections, or overdue Time Compliance Technical Orders (TCTOs) that would ground
the MA from flight operations (Tab HH-3). A thorough review of the active AFTO 781 forms and
IMDS historical records for the 40 days preceding the mishap revealed no recurring maintenance
problems (Tab HH-3). Additionally, the MA was operating as designed, and there was no
indication of mechanical, structural, or electrical failure that would have contributed to the mishap
(Tab HH-3).
b. Inspections
The Pre-Flight (PR) Inspection and Basic Post-Flight (BPO) Inspection include visually examining
the aerospace vehicle and operationally checking certain systems and components “to ensure no
serious defects or malfunctions” exist (Tab HH-3). Phase inspections are a thorough inspection of
the entire aerospace vehicle (Tab HH-3). Walk-Around Inspections (WAI) are an abbreviated PR
Inspection and are completed as required prior to launch IAW the applicable Technical Orders
(TOs) (Tab HH-3).
The total airframe operating time of the MA at takeoff of the mishap sortie (MS) was 6661.0 hours
(Tab D-7). Since its last phase inspection on 26 June 2017, the MA flew 262.4 hours (Tab D-2).
The last PR/BPO inspection occurred on 3 April 2018 at 1530L with no discrepancies noted (Tab
D-7). A WAI occurred on 4 April 2018 at 0730L with no discrepancies noted (Tab D-7). Prior to
the mishap, the MA had no relevant reportable maintenance issues and all inspections were
satisfactorily completed (Tab HH-3).
c. Maintenance Procedures
A review of the MA’s active and historical AFTO 781 series forms and IMDS revealed all
maintenance actions complied with standard approved maintenance procedures and TOs (Tab HH-
3).
d. Maintenance Personnel and Supervision
The USAFADS Maintenance Team performed all required inspections, documentations, and
servicing for the MA prior to flight (Tab HH-3). A detailed review of maintenance activities and
documentation revealed no errors (Tab HH-3). Personnel involved with the MA’s preparation for
flight had proper and adequate training, experience, expertise, and supervision to perform their
assigned tasks (Tab HH-3).
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e. Fuel, Hydraulic, Oil, and Oxygen Inspection Analyses
Due to the nature of impact, all fluid samples were destroyed and not testable (Tab HH-3). DAS
data obtained from the MA indicated that the fuel system, hydraulic system and engine were all
operating and responding to the MP’s inputs at the time of impact (Tab U-10 to U-13). The
samples from the oil and hydraulic fluid recovered from the servicing carts were not analyzed,
based on information from a technical report and DAS data indicating that all systems were
operating normally (Tab HH-3).
f. Unscheduled Maintenance
Unscheduled maintenance is any maintenance action taken that is not the result of a scheduled
inspection and normally is the result of a pilot-reported discrepancy (PRD) during flight operations
or a condition discovered by ground personnel during ground operations (Tab HH-3). There were
no unscheduled maintenance actions since the last scheduled inspection (Tab HH-3).
6. AIRFRAME, MISSILE, OR SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS
a. Structures and Systems
The MA impacted the ground at 57 degrees nose low and 89 degrees left bank into a dry desert
with sparse vegetation (Tab U-4). The majority of the MA was broken into pieces ranging in size
from a few inches to a few feet (Tab U-5). The largest debris recovered was part of the right wing
(Tab U-5). The impact crater measured 33 feet wide, 19 feet long and 3 feet deep (Tab U-5). The
debris field was mainly southeast of the impact crater, measuring 1,750 feet by 2,250 feet (Tab U-
5).
b. Evaluation and Analysis
(1) MA Data Acquisition System (DAS)
The DAS includes the Enhanced Crash Survivable Memory Unit (ECSMU), which contains non-
volatile memory (Tab U-7 to U-8). The ECSMU contains 320MB of flash memory protected by
an armored housing assembly for crash protection (Tab U-8). The ECSMU contains flight data
such as analog inputs, discrete inputs, and message/warning data (Tab U-8 and U-9). The DAS
operated as expected until impact of the MA (Tab U-4).
(2) MA Flight Control Surfaces
All the primary and secondary flight controls liberated from the MA at impact (Tabs U-5 and HH-
3). Both wings and one horizontal tail were partially intact (Tab U-5). One rotary actuator that
controls leading edge flap movement was still connected to the wing structure (Tab U-15). The
DAS data and the position of the leading edge flap rotary actuator confirm the flight controls were
responding appropriately to the MP’s inputs at the time of the mishap (Tab U-16).
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(3) MA Engine
The engine was completely broken up on impact (Tab HH-3).
(4) Hydraulic System
The hydraulic system supplies hydraulic pressure at 3,000 pounds per square inch (psi), +/- 50 psi
(Tab U-10). There are two systems, Systems A and B, that generate pressure from two engine
driven hydraulic pumps (Tab U-10). The two systems operate simultaneously and independently
to supply pressure to the primary and secondary flight controls should one system fail (Tab U-10).
Both flight control accumulators were recovered from the mishap site (Tab U-10). Upon
disassembly, there were witness marks left by the pistons in both accumulators, indicating there
was hydraulic fluid and pressure on the piston (Tab U-11 to U-12). The witness marks indicate
the position the piston was in at the time of impact (Tab U-11 to U-12). Based on the DAS data
and the physical evidence of the accumulators, both hydraulic systems were pressurized and
providing hydraulic power at the time of impact (Tab U-12).
(5) Electrical System
After a thorough search, neither the generator nor any electrical bus components were located in
order to perform a physical analysis (Tab U-14). The DAS data showed that the electrical system
was supplying power to the aircraft systems and functioning at the time of impact (Tab U-14).
(6) Escape System
The MA is equipped with an ejection seat actuated by the pilot pulling the ejection handle located
on the forward part of the seat (Tab U-17 to U-18). Once this occurs, the canopy liberates from
the aircraft and the ejection seat leaves the aircraft milliseconds later (Tab U-17 to U-18). The
largest piece of the canopy was recovered several hundred feet away from the impact site, in line
with the debris field (Tab U-18). It had an accordion crush pattern indicating the canopy was
secure to the MA at impact (Tab U-18). The ejection seat was destroyed and only fragments were
discovered (Tab U-18). The DAS data did not record a “canopy open” in-flight warning (Tab U-
18). The MP did not initiate ejection within the period of recorded data (Tab U-18).
7. WEATHER
a. Forecast Weather
On 4 April 2018, forecast for NTTR South had winds out of the south at nine knots and a broken
ceiling at 20,000 feet AGL, with good visibility (Tab F-2). The forecast weather did not include
precipitation (Tab F-2).
b. Observed Weather
The RSO provided an updated weather status once the MF flew into the range airspace (Tab Z-6).
The RSO reported calm winds, greater than 10 miles of visibility, a few clouds at 14,000 feet AGL,
a broken ceiling at 19,000 feet AGL, and an altimeter setting of 30.07 inches of mercury, which
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15
was substantially similar to the actual recorded weather at Creech AFB (Tabs F-3 and Z-6). The
RSO did not observe or report any precipitation (Tabs F-3 and Z-6).
c. Space Environment
Not Applicable.
d. Operations
The MF was operating within prescribed weather requirements for the High Show and pilot
weather minimums (Tabs BB-43 and T-8).
8. CREW QUALIFICATIONS
a. Mishap Pilot
The MP was a current and qualified aerial demonstration pilot (Tabs G-5, T-8 and DD-7). With
training dating back to 2008, the MP completed Air Force Undergraduate Pilot Training (UPT)
and Introduction to Fighter Fundamentals (IFF), obtained initial qualification training in the F-16,
and completed two overseas assignments (Tab T-3). The MP completed the Four-ship flight lead
upgrade and Instructor Pilot Upgrade, and then he was selected to transition to the F-35 (Tab T-
3). Upon selection for the Thunderbirds, the MP attended the F-16 Transition Course (TX) in 2017
and completed the Thunderbirds 70-ride upgrade syllabus with “slightly above average”
performance (Tabs G-2 to G-3, G-5, T-8, V-2.4, V-4.3, V-7.3, and V-14.4). The MP was a current
and qualified F-16 pilot during his time with the Thunderbirds and displayed a high degree of
aptitude for a slot pilot in his first year (Tabs G-5 and V-4.3).
The MP was current and qualified as an experienced Thunderbirds flight lead (more than 500 hours
in the F-16), Operations Supervisor and weather category two pilot (can fly instrument approaches
with weather better than or equal to clouds at 300 feet AGL and visibility of 1 NM) (Tab T-8).
His total flight time was 1,441.0 hours, with 310.9 of those hours as an instructor (Tab G-12).
On the day of the mishap, the MP’s recent flight time in the F-16CM was as follows: (Tab G-6)
MP Hours Sorties
Last 30 Days 24.4 20
The MP’s most recent flight prior to the mishap was on 3 April 2018 (Tab V-6.7 to V-6.8). The
MP executed the High Show version of the demonstration including the High Bomb Burst Rejoin
(Tab V-6.7 to V-6.8). HUD evidence indicated that he completed the High Bomb Burst Rejoin
successfully no less than 29 times prior to the mishap (Tabs DD-3 and GG-5 to GG-6).
The MP became a member of the Thunderbirds after a competitive and rigorous selection process
(Tab V-14.5). He was an “inspirational” leader who was always positive and put others before
himself (Tab V-1.2, V-2.2, V-4.2, V-5.2, V-6.2, V-10.2 and V-11.2). His extended pre-service
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16
flight familiarity made him a “highly experienced” and “highly capable” pilot who excelled in his
transition to the Thunderbirds (Tab V-2.3, V-5.3, V-6.3, V-8.2, V-13.3 and V-14.3 to V-14.4). In
fact, the merger between his positive personality and pilot skills made him a “perfect fit for the
Thunderbirds mission” to recruit, retain, and inspire (Tab V-2.2, V-4.2, V-6.2 and V-14.3). A
member of his squadron summed up the MP as “just a beautiful human being” (Tab V-10.2).
b. Other USAFADS Pilots
There were no other qualification issues relevant to this investigation (Tabs T-8 and DD-8).
9. MEDICAL
a. Mishap Pilot
(1) MP Qualifications
At the time of the mishap, the MP was medically qualified for flying duty and required no
aeromedical waivers (Tab X-3).
(2) MP Health
The MP received his most recent periodic health assessment (PHA) on 12 July 2017, and the PHA
revealed there were no disqualifying medical conditions (Tab X-3).
(3) MP Pathology
Of the tested muscle tissue samples, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner Toxicology reported
“None Detected” for ethanol or illicit substances to include amphetamines, barbiturates,
benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opioids, phencyclidine, sympathomimetic amines, acid,
neutral, and alkaline extractable drugs by immunoassay, gas chromatography/full scan-mass
spectrometry, and liquid chromatography mass spectrometry (Tab X-4). The muscle sample also
indicated “None Detected” for carbon monoxide (Tab X-4). A cyanide analysis was not
performed, as no specimen was suitable for testing (Tab X-4).
The MP sustained injuries on impact of the MA that resulted in his immediate death (Tab X-4).
(4) MP Lifestyle
Upon review of multiple witness testimonies and inspection of available personal belongings, no
lifestyle factors were found to be causal or contributory to the mishap (Tab X-3). The medical
record documented regular time dedicated to physical fitness (Tabs V-2.20 to V-2.21, V-3.7,
V-7.13 and X-3).
(5) MP Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time
Due to the nature of the mishap, no 72-hour and 7-day histories preceding the mishap were
available to fully evaluate activities, behaviors, sleep and nutritional habits (Tab X-3). Numerous
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17
witnesses testified that the MP appeared well rested and ready to fly on the day of the mishap (Tab
V-2.9, V-4.10, V-5.8, V-6.8 to V-6.9 and V-14.11).
b. Other Crew Members
(1) Qualifications
There were 15 enlisted personnel and five officers from the unit, in addition to the MP, who were
involved with the mishap and performed maintenance, crew chief, or flying duties on 4 April 2018
(Tab X-5). Of these 20 individuals, all were medically qualified for duty and had no disqualifying
medical conditions (Tab X-5).
(2) Health
The medical review of the records of the 20-team members revealed no evidence of medical
conditions or medication use that could have negatively affected the performance of the MP on
the day of the mishap or contributed to the mishap in any way (Tab X-5).
(3) Pathology
The toxicological examinations tested for carbon monoxide, ethanol, amphetamines, barbiturates,
benzodiazepines, cannabinoids, cocaine, opiates, and phencyclidine (Tab X-5). All members were
negative for carbon monoxide, ethanol and illicit drugs (Tab X-5).
(4) Lifestyle
Based on witness interviews and medical records review, there was no evidence of lifestyle habits
that could have negatively affected the duty performance of the Thunderbirds team members
involved or on duty during the mishap (Tab X-5).
(5) Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time
A review of the 72-hour and 7-day history of both the USAFADS Director of Operations and the
MA DCC revealed no evidence to suggest there were any abnormalities that could have
substantially contributed to the mishap (Tabs R-4, R-11 to R-17, and GG-7).
10. OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISION

a. Operations
The scheduled hours of work per duty day in combination with the intensity of work and the
number of days worked sequentially (Ops Tempo) for the USAFADS is high (Tab V-6.4 and V-
14.6). The number of sorties the MP had during the past 30 days provides evidence for this fact
(Tab G-6). However, during the time of the mishap, a majority of the squadron was coming off a
week-long break (Tab V-2.8, V-3.3, V-4.9, V-5.6, V-7.5 and V-14.9). During the flight brief, TB1
stressed that the practice demonstration was a training environment for risk mitigation
considerations (Tab V-2.11 and V-14.12).
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b. Supervision
TB1 did not note anything out of the ordinary for the members of the squadron (Tab V-14.11 to
V-14.12). The ORM process in the squadron identified the risk for the flight to be in the “Green”
and TB1 assessed the operational risk as being on the low end of the spectrum, with no additional
supervision approval required for the flight (Tabs K-6, V-2.10 and V-14.11).
Other supervisory measures implemented included the RSO (Tab BB-23). The RSO acted similar
to the Supervisor of Flying (SOF) role (Tab BB-23). The RSO ensured two-way radio
communication at all times and ensured the demonstration airspace was clear of traffic, thereby
acting as an overall Safety Observer for the demonstration (Tabs V-13.3 to V-13.4 and BB-23).
The 57 WG Supplement to ACCI 11-USAFADS Volume 3 prescribes a maxium “target” G of

+7.5 G’s for all Thunderbirds maneuvers (Tab BB-25). A “target” is a parameter a Thunderbird
pilot will attempt to achieve in the performance of a manuever (Tab BB-25). Maneuvers designed
with a target G less than the aircraft flight control limits of approximately +9 G’s allows for a
safety margin if the pilot requires more performance from the aircraft (Tabs V-2.19, V-4.12, V-
5.14 to V-5.15, V-6.15 to V-6.16, V-7.12, V-8.20 to V-8.21, V-14.19 to V-14.20, and BB-25). A
maximum target G also provides a guard against G-LOC while not restricting the pilot from
maneuvering at higher +G’s for safety of flight reasons (Tab BB-25). If a Thunderbird pilot
exceeds +7.5 G’s in a maneuver, 57 WG Supplement to ACCI 11-USAFADS Volume 3 requires
the debrief of the maneuver to address maneuver set-up and energy management (Tab BB-25).
While witness testimony illustrates it was not uncommon for Thunderbirds pilots to exceed +7.5
G’s due to the dynamics of the aerial demonstration, the evidence also illustrates supervisors
enforced the required debrief standard (Tab V-2.19, V-3.6, V-4.12, V-5.15, V-6.15 to V-6.16, V-
7.12, V-8.20 to V-8.21 and V-14.19 to V-14.20). Flight briefings leading up to and on the day of
the mishap included discussions on G awareness, and the organizational culture supported any
pilot’s decision or request to stop an aerial demonstration practice for problems with G tolerance
(Tab V-2.18 to V-2.19, V-4.12, V-6.15, V-7.12, V-8.19 and V-14.19).
11. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS
Loss of Consciousness (Sudden or prolonged onset)
The AIB considered all human factors as prescribed in the Department of Defense Human Factors
Analysis and Classification System 7.0 (DoD HFACS 7.0) and found this mishap involved a Loss
of Consciousness (Sudden or prolonged onset) (Tab BB-45 to BB-46). This human factor falls
under the “physical and mental state”/physical problem (PC300) area of DoD HFACS 7.0, and
refers to the mental and physical states of individuals that can result in unsafe situations (Tab BB-
46). Specifically, PC304, Loss of Consciousness, is a factor when the individual has a loss of
functional capacity or consciousness due to G-induced loss of consciousness (G-LOC), seizure,
trauma, or any other cause (Tab BB-46).
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a. Effects of Acceleration on the Human Body
The acceleration due to gravity on earth is a constant designated as “g,” and it is equivalent to 9.81
meters/second squared (Tab BB-62). “G,” on the other hand, is the force experienced by a person
due to acceleration measured in multiples of the acceleration of gravity felt at the earth’s surface
(Tab BB-63). A person standing on their feet on earth therefore experiences a force of +1 G (Tab
BB-63). The opposite of +1 G is -1 G, the equivalent to a person standing on their head (Tab GG-
4).
Sustained acceleration in the +G direction occurs very often during advanced aerobatic maneuvers,
and it has received a great deal of research and attention (Tab BB-64). When a pilot experiences
+G acceleration, blood flow in the body will tend to pool in the abdomen and lower extremities,
leading to cerebral hypoxia, or lack of oxygen in the brain (Tab BB-66). The eyes and brain are
very susceptible to low oxygen levels, and as cerebral blood pressure drops, visual, and then
neurologic symptoms develop, which can lead to G-LOC (Tab BB-67).
b. G-LOC Physiology
G-LOC occurs when cerebral blood pressure and oxygen delivery to the brain are insufficient to
maintain consciousness (Tab BB-67). Brain tissue has a 4-6 second oxygen reserve and G-LOC
may occur if the brain does not receive oxygenated blood before its oxygen reserve is completely
consumed (Tab BB-18). G-LOC is divided into two periods: absolute and relative incapacitation
(Tab BB-67). Absolute incapacitation lasts anywhere from 2-38 seconds and is defined by
unconsciousness (Tab BB-67). Convulsive flailing of the arms and legs can occur in up to 70%
of subjects towards the end of absolute incapacitation (Tab BB-18 and BB-67). As G-LOC occurs,
aircrew rapidly or over a few seconds unloads to +1 G due to a lack of deliberate flight control
inputs during the period of absolute incapacitation, and remain there until the beginning of relative
incapacitation (Tab BB-19). Relative incapacitation lasts anywhere from 2-97 seconds and is the
period when the pilot regains consciousness “at which point the aircrew may initiate aggressive
control inputs in an attempt to recover the aircraft” (Tab BB-19 and BB-67).
c. Protective Measures against +G’s
Physiological stresses due to +G’s are well known by pilots and there are multiple training tools
used to help pilots overcome the effects of +G’s, including education on G-protection, proper wear
of the ATAGS, performing an Anti-G Straining Maneuver (AGSM), and executing a G-Ex prior
to high +G’s flight (Tab BB-6, BB-11, and BB-70 to BB-71).
The AGSM includes forcefully exhaling against a closed glottis (back of the throat) while
simultaneously tensing leg, arm, and abdominal muscles (Tab BB-70). The purpose of the AGSM
is to increase cerebral blood pressure, thereby preventing G-LOC (Tab BB-70). A properly
executed AGSM will give pilots the greatest protection against +G’s, conferring about +3 G’s of
extra protection (Tab GG-4 to GG-5).
A properly fitted ATAGS confers about +2 to +2.5 G’s of additional protection for pilots and
aircrew who are fitted or re-fitted every 120 days to maintain optimum performance (Tabs V-1.2
and BB-70). Physical conditioning is also a key point of +G’s protection, given that the muscle
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tensing phase of the AGSM is very fatiguing, and pilots need to have optimum physical
conditioning, especially in the lower extremities, in order to maintain G-endurance (Tabs BB-70
and GG-4 to GG-5). Pilots are also taught to maintain optimum cardiovascular and aerobic fitness
to optimize G-tolerance (Tab BB-12).
Executing a G-Ex prior to high +G flight is intended to test personal +G tolerance and assess
ATAGS inflation, while also conferring additional physiological protection in the form of a
cardiovascular reflex (also known as a baroreceptor reflex) (Tab BB-6 to BB-7, BB-58 to BB-59,
and BB-66). When the body is subjected to greater than +1 G, a drop in cranial blood pressure
results (Tab BB-18). Pressure receptors in the carotid arteries and aorta sense this drop in blood
pressure and send signals to the brain to increase heart rate, contractility, and total peripheral
vascular resistance to compensate (Tab BB-66). This cardiovascular reflex takes approximately
10-15 seconds to manifest itself, and lasts for about 10-15 minutes (Tab BB-18). The resultant
increase in blood pressure gives the pilot approximately an additional +1 G of tolerance (Tab BB-
18).
d. Human Response to –G’s
–G is relatively defined as any G less than +1 G, including zero G (Tab BB-64). During any –G
maneuver, blood flows rapidly headward, increasing cerebral blood pressure (Tab BB-68 to BB-
69). The carotid and aortic baroreceptors sense this increase and rapidly respond by reducing the
heart rate and widening the blood vessels in the periphery of the body (Tab BB-48 to BB-49, BB-
66, and BB-68 to BB-69). This response is scaled based on the intensity of the –G’s experienced,
meaning higher –G’s result in lower heart rates (Tab BB-56 and BB-68). Symptoms of –G
exposure include congestion in the head and face, headache, and reddening of vision (Tab BB-68
to BB-69). Humans are less tolerant to –G’s than +G’s, and significant cerebral impairment and
damage can occur with sustained –G’s, especially more than –3 G’s (Tab BB-69). Apart from
avoiding –G’s, there are no known countermeasures to counter the resulting physiological effects
(Tab BB-69). Some aerobatic pilots report the only way to compensate for sustained –G’s is to
relax during the maneuver to avoid further cerebral blood pressure increases (Tab BB-69). If a
pilot attempted an AGSM in the –G regime, the result would be a further increase in cerebral blood
pressure and a magnification of the symptoms (Tab GG-5).
e. The “Push-Pull Effect”
Pilots experience negative impacts when a period of –G flight precedes a pull to the +G regime,
known as the “Push-Pull Effect” (Tab BB-56 and BB-69). Because of the peripheral (lower body)
widening of blood vessels and accompanying lowered blood pressure that occurs during –G’s, a
pilot’s +G tolerance after sustained –G’s will be greatly reduced (Tab BB-48). Whereas pilots
confer an extra +1 G of protection through the cardiovascular reflex following a +G pull (as during
the G-Ex), this protection is cancelled out if the pilot sustains –G’s for several seconds (Tab BB-
18 and BB-48). When a pilot rapidly transitions from sustained –G flight to +G flight within
several seconds, the body is still in a low blood pressure and low heart rate regime, resulting in a
rapid drop in cerebral blood pressure (Tab BB-69). The carotid and aortic baroreceptors will
eventually respond to the lowered cerebral blood pressure caused by the initial +G pull, but this
response takes about eight to ten seconds (Tab BB-69). This eight to ten second period is
approximately two to six seconds longer than the cerebral oxygen reserves (Tab BB-69).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

21
f. MP Exposure to –G’s, “Push-Pull Effect”
During the High Bomb Burst Rejoin, the MP experienced a sustained 22 second –G regime, with
an increase in –G’s to a maximum of –2.06 G’s in the last two seconds of that period further
intensifying the physiological effects of –G flight (Tab GG-5 to GG-6). The MP then transitioned
to a +G regime within one second and took approximately five seconds to achieve +8.56 G’s (Tab
GG-6). The DAS data shows a reduction in control stick pull and a lack of deliberate flight control
inputs following the attainment of +8.56 G’s (Tab GG-6). The five-second duration of increasing
+G to a max of +8.56 G’s put the MP into the G-LOC regime due to reduced blood flow to the
brain (Tab BB-67). With the lack of deliberate flight control inputs, the MA rapidly unloaded to
a +1 G flight regime, as expected during a period of absolute incapacitation (Tabs BB-67 and GG-
6). Five seconds later, a pull back on the control stick with simultaneous throttle advancement
was recorded approximately one second prior to impact, providing evidence of a transition from
absolute to relative incapacitation (Tabs BB-67 and GG-6). The pertinent mishap times are listed
below and illustrated in Figure 11:
a. 1028:22L: Beginning of Immelmann (Max +7.9 G’s)

b. 1028:36L: Beginning of inverted flight (with 22 sec duration neg G’s)
c. 1028:56L: -0.90 G’s recorded
d. 1028:58L: Maximum –G’s: -2.06 G’s
e. 1028:59L: +3.61 G’s (5.67 G’s/sec)
f. 1029:00L: +6.23 G’s (2.62 G’s/sec)
g. 1029:01L: +7.75 G’s (1.52 G’s/sec)
h. 1029:02L: +8.34 G’s (0.58 G’s/sec)
i. 1029:03L: Max +G’s: +8.56 G’s (0.21 G’s/sec)
j. 1029:04L: Beginning of period of no deliberate flight control inputs
k. 1029:09L: Beginning of renewed flight control inputs
l. 1029:10L: Impact
(Tab GG-6).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

22
Figure 11. Data Extracted by Medical Member from Mishap Data
(Gz terminology represents measurements of G in the z axis, generally) (Tab Z-7)
g. MP AGSM Effectiveness, Previous Split-S Rejoins, Physical conditioning, ATAGS
A properly executed AGSM confers about +3 G’s of additional +G tolerance (Tab GG-4). The
MP underwent USAF standard centrifuge training, in 2009, IAW AFI 11-404, Attachment 3, and
was graded as average on both his initial and +9.0 G’s qualifications (Tabs BB-13 and GG-5). The
MP’s centrifuge video recordings from those qualifications contained average AGSM performance
(Tab GG-3). The MP’s physiological records were current at the time of the mishap (Tab G-8).
The MP was trained to begin muscle tensing prior to pulling the aircraft into high –G maneuvers
(Tab GG-5). Given the –G flight dynamics prior to the mishap maneuver, a properly executed
AGSM would have increased the MP’s cerebral blood pressure while under –G’s, and it would
have exacerbated the negative physiological effects of that condition (Tab GG-5). The MA impact
destroyed the HUD tape, making a review of the AGSM used during the mishap maneuver
impossible (Tab GG-5).
The AIB obtained 39 HUD tapes recorded during the January-March 2018 training season,
including 29 High Bomb-Burst Rejoin maneuvers, 17 of which included audio from the intercom
of the MP during flight (Tab GG-5 to GG-6). The audio recordings of the MP’s AGSM were
average with a slightly fast AGSM breath exchange (approximately every 1-2 seconds vs.
recommended 3 seconds) (Tab GG-5). The MP underwent a routine HUD tape review by the
Thunderbirds Flight Surgeon on 24 March 2018, which noted an adequate AGSM (Tab GG-6).
Table 1 shows the analysis of the recorded High Bomb Burst Rejoins (Tab GG-5 to GG-6).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

23
Date –G flight Max G recorded G-onset Duration Max +G
Duration –G 1-2 sec prior rate, 1st of Split-S during
to Split-S second of from Split-S
Split-S beginning
of pull to
Max +G
29 Jan 2018 22 sec -1.8 -0.9 4.5 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.7
30 Jan 2018 (1) 19 sec -2.5 +0.2 2.8 G’s/sec 4 sec +6.0
30 Jan 2018 (2) 19 sec -1.5 +0.1 2.7 G’s/sec 7 sec +6.6
31 Jan 2018 23 sec -2.2 -0.2 4.2 G’s/sec 3 sec +5.9
1 Feb 2018 (1) 16 sec -2.7 0.0 0.6 G’s/sec 6 sec +6.2
1 Feb 2018 (2) 17 sec -1.4 +0.5 2.4 G’s/sec 7 sec +5.8
2 Feb 2018 18 sec -1.6 -1.0 2.8 G’s/sec 4 sec +6.8
5 Feb 2018 (1) 23 sec -1.8 -0.8 1.9 G’s/sec 3 sec +6.8
5 Feb 2018 (2) 20 sec -2.2 -1.7 5.5 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.3
6 Feb 2018 16 sec -2.1 -0.8 3.4 G’s/sec 3 sec +6.9
15 Feb 2018 23 sec -1.9 -1.3 5.2 G’s/sec 3 sec +6.9
20 Feb 2018 (1) 19 sec -1.9 -1.0 3.6 G’s/sec 3 sec +6.3
20 Feb 2018 (2) 20 sec -1.7 -0.9 4.7 G’s/sec 4 sec +7.3
21 Feb 2018 (1) 20 sec -1.4 -0.4 4.6 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.2
21 Feb 2018 (2) 19 sec -1.9 -0.8 4.9 G’s/sec 4 sec +7.6
22 Feb 2018 19 sec -1.6 -0.3 4.9 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.6
28 Feb 2018 (1) 20 sec -2.2 -1.0 5.2 G’s/sec 4 sec +8.0
28 Feb 2018 (2) 22 sec -2.0 -0.3 5.0 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.8
5 Mar 2018 (1) 25 sec -1.6 -0.4 5.6 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.9
5 Mar 2018 (2) 23 sec -2.0 -0.4 4.2 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.0
6 Mar 2018 (1) 20 sec -1.4 -0.5 5.2 G’s/sec 4 sec +7.6
6 Mar 2018 (2) 22 sec -1.9 -0.1 5.6 G’s/sec 3 sec +8.4
7 Mar 2018 18 sec -2.1 -0.0 3.4 G’s/sec 6 sec +6.6
8 Mar 2018 (1) 21 sec -2.2 -0.7 4.2 G’s/sec 6 sec +8.0
8 Mar 2018 (2) 25 sec -1.5 +0.1 2.0 G’s/sec 4 sec +5.5
16 Mar 2018 (1) 20 sec -2.2 -1.0 5.0 G’s/sec 4 sec +8.0
16 Mar 2018 (2) 20 sec -1.5 0.0 5.8 G’s/sec 3 sec +8.5
17 Mar 2018 19 sec -2.0 -0.6 4.6 G’s/sec 3 sec +7.4
(FAA Cert)
19 Mar 2018 17 sec -2.5 -0.5 3.8 G’s/sec 3 sec +6.3
(COMACC Cert)
4 Apr 2018 22 sec -2.06 -2.06 5.67 G’s/sec 5 sec +8.56
(Mishap
Maneuver)
Table 1: MP High Bomb Burst Rejoin recorded G’s (Tabs BB-5 and GG-5 to GG-6).
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

24
Table 1 illustrates that, during the mishap maneuver, the level of the –G’s recorded in the 1-2
seconds prior to the pull for the Split-S and the maximum +G’s attained during the pull for the
Split-S was higher than any previously recorded and available Split-S maneuvers, predisposing the
MP to reduced +G tolerance due to the “Push-Pull Effect” (Tab BB-50 and BB-57). Furthermore,
the mishap Split-S did not have any recorded lessening of the –G’s prior to the control stick pull
to +G for the Split-S, as previously recorded Split-S maneuvers did (Tab GG-5).
The MP had a reputation for exceptional fitness and had executed many successful high +G
maneuvers in the weeks leading up to the mishap (Tabs V-2.20 to V-2.21, V-6.17 and GG-5 to
GG-6). Physical fitness is not protective against the physiological effects of –G’s (Tab BB-69).
The MP’s ATAGS inspections were current (Tab H-10). His ATAGS was a size Large-Long, but
based on TO 14P3-6-141, paragraph 4.1, the Table 4-1 sizing chart and the MP’s waist
circumference and height, the MP should have been in a size Medium-Long ATAGS (Tab H-10).
However, the above TO also states that a pilot may change to the next higher or lower ATAGS
size based on individual fit (Tab H-10). Given this information, the MP was within TO guidance
regarding ATAGS fit and therefore no evidence suggests the larger size ATAGS was a factor in
the mishap (Tab H-10).
On the day of the mishap, the MP’s DCC remembers the MP donning his ATAGS properly (to
include engaging the comfort zippers) (Tab V-9.6). The DCC also testified to connecting the
ATAGS to the port on the left console in the MA as the MP strapped in and checked all other
straps, connections, and switches (Tab V-9.3 to V-9.4). The MF accomplished G system tests
prior to takeoff (Tab V-2.17, V-6.14, V-7.10 to V-7.11 and V-14.18). The MP also attained +7.9
G’s in the Immelmann just prior to the mishap rejoin, with deliberate flight control inputs
thereafter, making it likely the MA’s G system was working properly during the mishap rejoin
(Tabs Z-7 and DD-7 to DD-8).
12. GOVERNING DIRECTIVES AND PUBLICATIONS

a. Publicly Available Directives and Publications Relevant to the Mishap
(1) AFI 51-503, Aerospace and Ground Accident Investigations, dated 14 April 2015
(Incorporating Change, dated 12 March 2018)
(2) AFI 11-404, Fighter Aircrew Acceleration Training Program, dated 9 June 2017
(3) AFI 11-202V3, General Flight Rules, dated 10 August 2016
(4) AFI 11-2F-16V3, F-16 Operations Procedures, dated 13 July 2016 (Incorporating
Change 1, dated 26 May 2017)
(5) AFPAM 11-419, G Awareness for Aircrew, dated 17 October 2014
NOTICE: All directives and publications listed above are available digitally on the Air Force
Departmental Publishing Office website at: http://www.e-publishing.af.mil.
b. Other Directives and Publications Relevant to the Mishap
(1) 57th Wing Supplement to ACCI 11-USAFADSV3, Operational Procedures-

Thunderbirds, dated 3 January 2018
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

25
(2) TO 00-20-1, Aerospace Equipment Maintenance Inspection, dated1 April 2016
(3) DOD Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 7.0
(4) Banks RD, Grissett JD, Turnipseed GT, et al. The “Push-Pull Effect.” Aviation,
Space, & Environmental Medicine. 1994; 65: 699-704
(5) Banks RD, Grissett JD, et al. “The Effect of Varying Time at –Gz on Subsequent
+Gz Physiological Tolerance (Push-Pull Effect).” Aviation, Space, & Environmental
Medicine. 1995; 66: 723-727
(6) Goodman LS, LeSage S. “Impairment of Cardiovascular and Vasomotor Responses
During Tilt Table Simulation of “Push-Pull” Maneuvers.” Aviation, Space, &
Environmental Medicine 2002; 73: 971-979
(7) Slungaard E, McLeod J, et al. “Incidence of G-Induced Loss of Consciousness and
Almost Loss of Consciousness in the Royal Air Force.” Aerospace Medicine and
Human Performance. 2017; 88(6) 550
(8) Davis JR, Johnson R, Stepanek J, Fogarty JA. Fundamentals of Aerospace Medicine,
4th Ed. 2008, Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Philadelphia, PA; pp. 83-95
c. Known or Suspected Deviations from Directives or Publications: None.
17 August 2018 CASE A. CUNNINGHAM

Brigadier General, USAF
President, Accident Investigation Board
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

26
STATEMENT OF OPINION
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413

Nevada Test and Training Range
4 April 2018
Under 10 U.S.C. § 2254(d) the opinion of the accident investigator as to the cause of, or the factors
contributing to, the accident set forth in the accident investigation report, if any, may not be considered as
evidence in any civil or criminal proceeding arising from the accident, nor may such information be
considered an admission of liability of the United States or by any person referred to in those conclusions
or statements.
1. OPINION SUMMARY
On 4 April 2018, the mishap pilot (MP), flying F-16CM tail number (T/N) 91-0413, assigned to
the United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron, known as the “Thunderbirds,” 57th
Wing, Nellis Air Force Base (AFB), Nevada (NV), engaged in a routine aerial demonstration
training flight at the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR) near Creech AFB, NV. During the
training flight, at approximately 1029 local (L) time, the mishap aircraft (MA) impacted the ground
and fatally injured the MP, without an ejection attempt.
The mishap mission was planned and authorized as a practice of the “High Show” version of the
Thunderbirds aerial demonstration and was flown in the Thunderbirds practice area in the south
part of the NTTR. The mishap flight (MF) was a formation of six F-16CMs (Thunderbirds #1-6),
the standard Thunderbirds aerial demonstration flight. Thunderbird #4 was the MA/MP. The
mishap occurred after the “High Bomb Burst Cross” and during the “High Bomb Burst Rejoin,”
an aerial demonstration maneuver performed by the Thunderbirds in the F-16 for the past 35 years.
During this maneuver, Thunderbird #1, the lead pilot/aircraft (TB1), executed 5/8 of a loop before
rolling to wings level (Half Cuban Eight) as the MP flew the MA above TB1 in the opposite
direction in inverted flight at no lower than the prescribed altitude of 5,500 feet above ground level
(AGL). As TB1 completed the Half Cuban Eight and continued a descent, the MP initiated a
descending half-loop (Split-S) to “rejoin” with TB1 into the Slot position (directly behind TB1) as
Thunderbird #2, the left wing pilot, and Thunderbird #3, the right wing pilot, affected their own
rejoins from their respective sides of the formation. The MP’s execution of the Split-S subjected
him to a significant force due to acceleration measured in multiples of the acceleration of gravity
felt at the earth’s surface, abbreviated as “G” or G-Force. The MA impacted the ground during
the Split-S portion of the High Bomb Burst Rejoin and fatally injured the MP, without an ejection
attempt. The two diagrams on the next page illustrate the MF’s transition from the High Bomb
Burst Cross to the High Bomb Burst Rejoin.
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

27
I find by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP’s G-induced loss of
consciousness (G-LOC) during the Split-S portion of the High Bomb Burst Rejoin. Additionally,
I find by a preponderance of evidence two factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the
MP’s diminished tolerance to +G’s induced by the physiology of exposure to –G’s (“Push-Pull
Effect”) and (b) an associated decrease in the effectiveness of the MP’s Anti-G straining maneuver
(AGSM) under those conditions.
I developed my opinion by carefully considering the standard of proof for the preponderance of
evidence and the requirements for causes and substantially contributing factors as I analyzed
available flight data, the Lockheed Martin crash report, the mishap animation created from the
Data Acquisition System (DAS), witness testimony, engineering analysis, and other information
provided by technical experts. I further studied academic research on human factors relevant to
the mishap and reviewed Air Force technical orders, regulations, and guidance.
2. CAUSE
I find by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP’s G-LOC and associated
states of absolute and relative incapacitation. During these states, the MP was unable to apply
appropriate flight control inputs to avoid the MA’s impact with the ground or attempt an ejection.
a. Loss of Consciousness
As he initiated the Split-S at 1028:59L, the MP selected idle power on the engine throttle and
pulled back on the control stick to drop the nose of the MA toward TB1 to affect the rejoin. This
operation took the MA from -2.06 G’s in inverted flight to a maximum of +8.56 G’s at 1029:03L.
Approximately one second later at 1029:04L, the MP experienced a G-LOC and stopped providing
deliberate flight control inputs with the MA at 68 degrees nose low. The MP began a period of
absolute incapacitation with the MA accelerating through 356 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS)
and rapidly descending through 6,556 feet mean sea level (approximately 3,510 feet AGL).
For approximately the next five seconds, the MP remained in a state of absolute incapacitation and
made no deliberate flight control inputs with the MA accelerating through 415 KCAS at 60 degrees
nose low and 406 feet AGL. At 1029:09L, the MP began deliberate flight control inputs as he
transitioned from absolute to relative incapacitation. The MA impacted the ground at 1029:10L
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

28
with the MA at 57 degrees nose low with 89 degrees of left bank at 419 KCAS, fatally injuring the
MP.
The five seconds of consciousness the MP experienced after initiating the pull for the Split-S
corresponds with the four to six second reserve of oxygen in the brain. The physiological impact
of the pull to +8.56 G’s drained the blood away from the MP’s brain, causing the G-LOC to occur.
The MP then stopped flying the aircraft as he entered a state of absolute incapacitation. During
this state, he was unable to maneuver the aircraft as he had in all of the other times he successfully
completed the maneuver. The transition to a period of relative incapacitation one second prior to
ground impact enabled the MP to begin deliberate flight control inputs but his condition still
included considerable confusion based on the known physiology of G-LOCs. In this short period
of relative incapacitation, the MP was unable to attempt an ejection.
3. SUBSTANTIALLY CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

I find by a preponderance of evidence two factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the
MP’s diminished tolerance to +G’s induced by the physiology of exposure to –G’s (“Push-Pull
Effect”) and (b) an associated decrease in the effectiveness of the MP’s AGSM under those
conditions.
a. “Push-Pull Effect”
The “Push-Pull Effect” results from a relaxed subject’s exposure to –G’s, the “push,” prior to the
onset of +G’s, the “pull.” Under –G conditions, the subject experiences a decrease in blood
pressure, widening of the blood vessels, and a lowered heart rate. These three factors reduce the
subject’s resting +G tolerance in an amount directly related to the magnitude and duration of the
preceding –G’s.
Prior to initiating the pull for the Split-S, the MP spent approximately 22 seconds between -0.5
G’s and -2.06 G’s during inverted flight. In the last two seconds of the 22 second period, the –G’s
increased from -0.90 G’s to -2.06 G’s before a rapid transition to a maximum of +8.56 G’s during
a five-second pull on the control stick. These actions left the MP physiologically disadvantaged
for the rapid onset of +G’s in two specific ways. First, the effects of the sustained –G’s resulted
in lowered blood pressure, widened blood vessels, and lowered heart rate, negatively affecting the
MP’s resting +G tolerance. Second, the increasing –G’s in the two seconds prior to the +G pull
further slowed the MP’s heart rate, magnifying the negative effect on his resting +G tolerance.
The resulting outcome was more vascular space created by the widened blood vessels for the blood
to flow away from the brain at the onset of the +G’s and a lowered heart rate and blood pressure
making it more difficult for the body to counter that dynamic.
b. AGSM
In preparation for the onset of +G’s during flight, aerospace physiology instructors teach pilots to
“get ahead of the +G’s” by starting the AGSM before the onset of +G’s. The AGSM involves
squeezing the muscles of the lower body along with an inhalation of air to prepare for a forced
exhalation against the back of the throat before pulling back on the control stick for rapid onset
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

29
+G’s. These actions result in an increase in blood flow to the brain, inflation of the lungs, and
increased chest pressure. A timely and well-executed AGSM places the pilot in a better position
to tolerate the physical effects caused by the increase in +G’s and can add up to +3.0 G’s to a
pilot’s resting +G tolerance. The effects of the AGSM along with the effects of an additional +2.0
to +2.5 G’s protection provided by the CSU-22/P Advanced Technology Anti-G Suit (ATAGS)
worn by the Thunderbirds pilots provides coverage up to the maximum +G capability of the F-16.
Although the cockpit video tape was destroyed in the mishap, I deduced from available evidence
that the MP’s execution of the AGSM did not provide adequate coverage for the rapid onset of
+8.56 G’s for two specific reasons. First, the physiological effects of the –G’s experienced in the
two seconds prior to the pull left the MP unable to get ahead of the rapid onset of the +8.56 G’s.
Timely execution of the AGSM would have created more pressure in the MP’s head at the same
time his body fought to lessen that pressure and would have increased the negative physiological
effects of flight in the –G regime. Second, the combination of a delayed AGSM and the decrease
in the MP’s resting +G tolerance from the “Push-Pull Effect” lessened the overall additive +G
coverage factor to compensate for the +8.56 G’s the MP experienced in the pull.
I studied 29 recorded cockpit videos of the MP’s successful execution of the Split-S portion of the
High Bomb Burst Rejoin. In these other instances, the MP countered the physiological effects of
the “Push-Pull Effect” and the +G’s of the Split-S through a combination of two techniques. First,
he decreased the –G’s in the two seconds prior to the pull for the Split-S, causing his heart rate to
increase before the pull. The decrease in –G’s also provided an opportunity to “get ahead of the
+G’s” with a timely AGSM. Second, the MP generally flew the maneuver with a lower attained
maximum +G than he experienced during the mishap. His average maximum +G in the 29
recorded cockpit video instances was +7.1 G’s. In the five other recorded instances where he met
or exceeded +8.0 G’s in the pull (none greater than the +8.56 G’s he experienced in the mishap),
a decreased –G in the two seconds prior to the pull left him better positioned for a timely and
effective AGSM.
4. CONCLUSION
I find by a preponderance of evidence the cause of the mishap was the MP’s G-LOC during the
Split-S portion of the High Bomb Burst Rejoin. Additionally, I find by a preponderance of
evidence two factors substantially contributed to the mishap: (a) the MP’s diminished tolerance
to +G’s induced by the physiology of exposure to –G’s (“Push-Pull Effect”) and (b) an associated
decrease in the effectiveness of the MP’s AGSM under those conditions.
17 August 2018 CASE A. CUNNINGHAM

Brigadier General, USAF
President, Accident Investigation Board
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

30
INDEX OF TABS
Safety Investigator Information ..................................................................................................... A
Not used .......................................................................................................................................... B
Not used ......................................................................................................................................... C
Maintenance Report, Records, and Data........................................................................................ D
Not used .......................................................................................................................................... E
Weather and Environmental Records and Data .............................................................................. F
Personnel Records .......................................................................................................................... G
Egress, Aircrew Flight Equipment, and Impact Crashworthy Analysis ........................................ H
Deficiency Reports........................................................................................................................... I
Releasable Technical Reports and Engineering Evaluations ........................................................... J
Mission Records and Data ............................................................................................................. K
Factual Parametric, Audio, and Video Data From On-Board Recorders ....................................... L
Data From Ground Radar and Other Sources ................................................................................ M
Transcripts Of Voice Communications ......................................................................................... N
Any Additional Substantiating Data and Reports .......................................................................... O
Damage Summaries ........................................................................................................................ P
AIB Transfer Documents ............................................................................................................... Q
Releasable Witness Testimony ....................................................................................................... R
Releasable Photographs, Videos, Diagrams, and Animations ........................................................ S
Personnel Flight Records Not Included In Tab G ........................................................................... T
Maintenance Report, Records, and Data Not Included In Tab D .................................................. U
Witness Testimony and Statements ............................................................................................... V
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

31
Weather and Environmental Records, and Data Not Included In Tab F .......................................W
Statements of Injury or Death and Medical Review ...................................................................... X
Legal Board Appointment Documents .......................................................................................... Y
Photographs, Videos, Diagrams, and Animations Not Included In Tab S ..................................... Z
Flight Documents .........................................................................................................................AA
Applicable Regulations, Directives, and Other Government Documents ................................... BB
Fact Sheets ................................................................................................................................... CC
Pilot Member MFR ......................................................................................................................DD
Not Used ..................................................................................................................................... EE
Nellis-Creech Fire Emergency Services Post-Incident Analysis .................................................. FF
Human Factors MFR....................................................................................................................GG
Maintenance Member MFR .........................................................................................................HH
F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413

LOCATION: Nevada Test and Training Range

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

57 WG 57th Wing k Thousand

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

1. AUTHORITY AND PURPOSE

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

a. Air Combat Command (ACC)

ACC is the primary force provider of combat airpower to America’s

b. United States Air Force Warfare Center (USAFWC)

The USAFWC’s mission is to develop innovative leaders and full spectrum

c. 57th Wing (57 WG)

The 57 WG provides advanced aerospace training to world-wide combat air

d. United States Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron

The USAFADS, also known as the Thunderbirds, performs precision aerial

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

The F-16 is a compact multi-role fighter aircraft (Tab CC-16). It is highly

f. G-Force(s) (Gravitational Force Equivalent)

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

Figure 2: South NTTR (Tab Z-3)

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

Figure 3: Typical Airfield Layout (Tab BB-44).

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

Figure 6: MP Immelmann Maneuver during HI BB Rejoin (Tab Z-8)

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

Figure 10: Impact Site and Debris Field (Tab U-6).

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

g. Search and Rescue (SAR)

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

d. Maintenance Personnel and Supervision

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

6. AIRFRAME, MISSILE, OR SPACE VEHICLE SYSTEMS

a. Structures and Systems

b. Evaluation and Analysis

(1) MA Data Acquisition System (DAS)

(2) MA Flight Control Surfaces

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

The engine was completely broken up on impact (Tab HH-3).

(4) Hydraulic System

(5) Electrical System

(6) Escape System

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

b. Other USAFADS Pilots

(5) MP Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

b. Other Crew Members

(5) Crew Rest and Crew Duty Time

10. OPERATIONS AND SUPERVISION

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

The 57 WG Supplement to ACCI 11-USAFADS Volume 3 prescribes a maxium “target” G of

11. HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS

Loss of Consciousness (Sudden or prolonged onset)

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018

c. Protective Measures against +G’s

F-16CM, T/N 91-0413, 4 April 2018