PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC v. HON. RUBEN D.

TORRES

As a result of published stories of abused Filipino housemaids in HongKong, DOLE Secretary issued a
department order temporarily suspending the recruitment of private employment agencies of Filipino
Domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of
deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers. PASEI, the largest national organization for private
employment and recruitment agencies, filed a petition to annul the DOLE and POEA circulars and to
prohibit implementation Due to the following reasons:

that the DOLE acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in
issuing said circulars;

2. that the assailed circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and
oppressive; and

3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative
Register were not complied with.

ISSUE:

Whether DOLE has the authority to issue the said circulars?

RULING:

Yes, Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities.

The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not

unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity
of the modern society" (

Said Administrative Order merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by
excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the
establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers
going to Hong Kong.

They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since
the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.

The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the
executive branch of Government.
SAN JUAN DE DIOS HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW et. al., petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et. al., respondents

FACTS:

Then Labor Secretary Franklin M. Drilon issued Policy Instruction No. 4 in line with R.A.
5901 which “requires that the covered hospital workers who used to work 7 days a week
should be paid for such number of days for working only 5 days or 40 hours a week”.

Petitioners filed a complaint for the expeditious implementation and payment by

respondent” Juan De Dios Hospital “. The Labor Arbiter and NLRC both dismissed their
complaints and MR was also denied. Hence, this petition.

In said Policy Instruction, it was provided that: “The Labor Code in its Article 83 adopts and
incorporates the basic provisions of RA 5901 and retains its spirit and intent which is to
shorten the workweek of covered hospital personnel and at the same time assure them of a
full weekly wage.”

ISSUE:
WON the intent of Art. 83, LCP, is that persons in subject hospitals and clinics who have
completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek are entitled to a full weekly
wage for seven days.

HELD:
No.
What Article 83 merely provides are: (1) the regular office hour of eight hours a day, five
days per week for health personnel, and (2) where the exigencies of service require that
health personnel work for six days or forty-eight hours then such health personnel shall be
entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty percent of their regular wage for
work on the sixth day.

There is nothing in the law that supports then Secretary of Labor’s assertion that “personnel
in subject hospitals and clinics are entitled to a full weekly wage for seven (7) days if they
have completed the 40-hour/5-day workweek in any given workweek”.

Also, if petitioners are entitled to two days off with pay, then there appears to be no sense
at all why Section 15 of the implementing rules grants additional compensation equivalent
to the regular rate plus at least twenty-five percent thereof for work performed on Sunday
to health personnel, or an “additional straight-time pay which must be equivalent at least to
the regular rate” ” for work performed in excess of forty hours a week.
LETRAN CALAMBA FACULTY and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN CALAMBA, INC.
FACTS: On October 8, 1992, the Letran Calamba Faculty and Employees
Association (petitioner) filed with Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a Complaint against Colegio de San
Juan de Letran, Calamba, Inc. (respondent) for collection of various monetary
claims due its members. Subsequently, these three cases were consolidated.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed both the money claims of the petitioners and
the petition to declare strike illegal filed by respondent. Both parties appealed to
the NLRC and CA who both affirmed the decision of LA.

Petitioner’s Contention: Since the pay for excess loads or overloads does not
fall under any of the enumerated exclusions in the computation of basic pay of an
employee (such as cash equivalents of unused vacation and sick leave credits,
overtime, premium, night differential, holiday pay and cost-of-living allowances);
and considering that the said overloads are being performed within the normal
working period of eight hours a day, it only follows that the overloads should be
included in the computation of the faculty members’ 13th-month pay.

Respondent’s Contention: Contrary to the asseveration of petitioner, prior

to the issuance of the DOLE Order, the prevailing rule is to exclude excess
teaching load, which is akin to overtime, in the computation of a teacher’s basic
salary and, ultimately, in the computation of his 13th-month pay.

ISSUE: Whether or not an overload must be included for the purposes of

computing the 13th month pay of a teacher.

RULING: NO. An overload pay, owing to its very nature and definition, may
not be considered as part of a teacher’s regular or basic salary, because it is being
paid for additional work performed in excess of the regular teaching load.
Overload work” is sometimes misunderstood as synonymous to “overtime work”
as this term is used and understood in the Labor Code. These two terms are not
the same because overtime work is work rendered in excess of normal working
hours of eight in a day (Art. 87, Labor Code). Considering that overload work may
be performed either within or outside eight hours in a day, overload work may or
may not be overtime work.

Any teaching load in excess of the normal or regular teaching load shall be
considered as overload and does not form part of the regular or basic pay.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended,
the normal hours of work of school academic personnel shall not exceed eight (8)
hours a day. Any work done in addition to the eight (8) hours daily
work shall constitute overtime work.

Under the Labor Code of the Philippines. To cite a few provisions:

“Art. 87 – Overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight

(8) hours a day provided that the employee is paid for the overtime
work, additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus
at least twenty-five (25%) percent thereof.”

It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other than

and added to the regular wage or basic salary, for reason of which such is
categorically excluded from the definition of basic salary under the
Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851.

Similarly, even if an overload is performed within the normal eight-hour working

day, an overload is still an additional or extra teaching work which is performed
after the regular teaching load has been completed. Hence, any pay given as
compensation for such additional work should be considered as extra and not
deemed as part of the regular or basic salary.