PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, INC. vs. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 167330, September 18, 2009
DOCTRINE:
 Minute Resolution vs Decision: The former, with respect to the same
subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter
(even with the same parties and issues) is involved, the minute resolution
is not binding precedent. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of
court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision. It does not require the
certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute
resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
 The proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision.
Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which
constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of
the Court and certified by the Chief Justice. Accordingly, since petitioner
was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since petitioner’s liability for DST
on its health care agreement was not the subject matter of G.R. No.
148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute resolution in that
case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor.
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation whose primary purpose is to
establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid group practice health care
delivery system or a health maintenance organization to take care of the sick
and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the
administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the organization. On
January 27, 2000, respondent CIR sent petitioner a formal demand letter and
the corresponding assessment notices demanding the payment of deficiency
taxes, including surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996 and 1997
in the total amount of P224,702,641.18. The CTA ordered the assessment of
DST against the petitioner cancelled and set aside. However the CA reversed
such decision and held that petitioner’s health care agreement was in the
nature of a non-life insurance contract subject to DST. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but the CA denied it. Hence, petitioner filed this case.
In support of its argument, petitioner cites the August 29, 2001 minute
resolution of this Court dismissing the appeal in Philippine National Bank (G.R.
No. 148680). Petitioner argues that the dismissal of G.R. No. 148680 by
minute resolution was a judgment on the merits; hence, the Court should apply
the CA ruling there that a health care agreement is not an insurance contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC is bound by the ruling of the CA in CIR v.
Philippine National Bank that a health care agreement of Philamcare Health
Systems is not an insurance contract for purposes of the DST.
HELD: No. It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our
dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the merits of the case. When we
dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned.
As a result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute
resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply with formal and
substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of
fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on
other cases? With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues
concerning the same parties, it constitutes res judicata. However, if other
parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties and issues) is
involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent. Thus, in CIR v. Baier-
Nickel, the Court noted that a previous case, CIR v. Baier-Nickel involving the
same parties and the same issues, was previously disposed of by the Court
thru a minute resolution dated February 17, 2003 sustaining the ruling of the
CA. Nonetheless, the Court ruled that the previous case "had no bearing" on
the latter case because the two cases involved different subject matters as
they were concerned with the taxable income of different taxable years.
Besides, there are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a
minute resolution and a decision. The constitutional requirement under the first
paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts and the
law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly
applies only to decisions, not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is
signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices, unlike a decision.
It does not require the certification of the Chief Justice. Moreover, unlike
decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine Reports.
Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed,
as a rule, this Court lays down doctrines or principles of law which constitute
binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members of the Court and
certified by the Chief Justice.
Accordingly, since petitioner was not a party in G.R. No. 148680 and since
petitioner’s liability for DST on its health care agreement was not the subject
matter of G.R. No. 148680, petitioner cannot successfully invoke the minute
resolution in that case (which is not even binding precedent) in its favor.
Nonetheless, in view of the reasons already discussed, this does not detract
in any way from the fact that petitioner’s health care agreements are not
subject to DST.
MARCOS vs MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
DOCTRINE:
 The SC has held that the question, on whether in the exercise of the
powers granted by the constitution, the president may prohibit the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines is not a political question.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, but
nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for
the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum.
 There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination
thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers
intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts
of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political
questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being
questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not
substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and decide
a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
FACTS: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order
the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. The issue is basically one of
power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
The respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a
political question which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General -
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a
political question as it involves merely a determination of what the law provides
on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family impinge on or collide with the more primordial
and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its nationals, the
question becomes political and this Honorable Court cannot consider it.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question, on whether there exist factual bases for
the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return
of the Marcoses to the Philippines, is a political question which is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.
HELD: No. Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we
cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political
question which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. The present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous
constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide.
But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the
determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the
people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. The SC cannot, for
example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no
matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. The SC cannot
set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to us that the beneficiary
is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can the SC amend the Constitution
under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is
reserved to the people.
There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof
on the political question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the
scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of justice to settle all
actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established,
the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.
In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically
empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government, incorporates in the fundamental law.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR vs OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 132177, July
19, 2001
DOCTRINE: Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme
Court which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge,
or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless
of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the
fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed
of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative
matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but
also other administrative concerns. Thus, the Ombudsman must defer action
on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee where the same
arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the
scope of their administrative duties.
FACTS: On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, Presiding
Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pinas City, filed before
the Office of the Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries,
malicious mischief for the destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault
upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that on May 20, 1997,
at the hallway on the third floor of the Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he
requested petitioner to return the executive table he borrowed from
respondent; that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his request
but before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and
boxed him at his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his
eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and
that respondent had the incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He
prayed that criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the
petitioner. On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another Complaint
against petitioner, this time and administrative case with the Supreme Court,
docketed as Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner
from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct unbecoming
a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on the same facts as those in the
complaint filed earlier with the office of the Ombudsman.
In the Order dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman required
petitioner to file a counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte
Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme Court, praying that the Office of
the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in
abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the Office
of the Court Administrator, is already investigating what transpired on May 20,
1997. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the
Ombudsman, has the authority to make a preliminary determination of the
respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being
members of the bench, are under its exclusive supervision and control.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should defer action on
Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
HELD: Yes. The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez, this Court
resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether or not the Ombudsman must
defer action on a criminal complaint against a judge, or a court employee
where the same arises from their administrative duties, and refer the same to
the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who
were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture.
Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and
its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot
determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge,
or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty
bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it,
referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether and
administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless
of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the
fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed
of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative
authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative
matter is involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but
also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of
Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a
case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is
to deprive the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
COBARRUBIAS vs PEOPLE, G.R. No. 160610, August 14, 2009
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo,
or the dispositive part, and the body of the decision or order, the fallo prevails
on the theory that the fallo is the final order and becomes the subject of
execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or
conclusions of the court ordering nothing. However, where one can clearly and
unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. In this
case, considering the clear finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, while the two other charges for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Violation of the Omnibus Election Code require
further evidence, it is only just and proper to correct the dispositive portion to
reflect the exact findings and conclusions of the trial court.
FACTS: In 1994, petitioner Judelio Cobarrubias was charged with Frustrated
Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-5036), Homicide (Criminal Case No. 94-
5038), Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 (Criminal Case No. 24-392), and Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Criminal Case
No. 94-5037). Petitioner pleaded not guilty to all the charges and trial followed.
Presiding Judge Florentino M. Alumbres of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Pinas City, Branch 255 (trial court), issued an Order which held that he
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5036 and 94-5037, and these cases are
ordered DISMISSED. Criminal Cases Nos. 94-5038 and 24392 should be set
for further trial.
The prosecution did not appeal the trial courts Order. On 5 July 2001, petitioner
filed with the trial court a Motion for Correction of Clerical Error,[4] alleging that
in the dispositive portion of the Order, Criminal Case No. 94-5038 should have
been dismissed instead of Criminal Case No. 94-5037, which should have
been the case set for further trial. Petitioner maintained that there was a
typographical error in the dispositive portion considering that in the body of the
Order, the trial court ruled that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges for Homicide and
Frustrated Homicide. On 26 February 2002, respondent Acting Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda denied the motion, holding that the alleged error was
substantial in nature which affected the very merit of the case. Petitioner
moved for reconsideration, which respondent Judge denied on 23 July 2002.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Acting Judge Maceda, who was
assigned to the trial court after Judge Alumbres retired, erred in denying the
petitioners motion for correction, holding that the alleged error was substantial
in nature.
HELD: Yes. The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the fallo,
or the dispositive part, and the body of the decision or order, the fallo prevails
on the theory that the fallo is the final order and becomes the subject of
execution, while the body of the decision merely contains the reasons or
conclusions of the court ordering nothing. However, where one can clearly and
unquestionably conclude from the body of the decision that there was a
mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will prevail. Thus,
in Spouses Rebuldea v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court held that the
trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it corrected the dispositive
portion of its decision to make it conform to the body of the decision, and to
rectify the clerical errors which interchanged the mortgagors and the
mortgagee.
In this case, considering the clear finding of the trial court that the prosecution
failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioner in the charges
for Homicide and Frustrated Homicide, while the two other charges for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Violation of the Omnibus Election Code require
further evidence, it is only just and proper to correct the dispositive portion to
reflect the exact findings and conclusions of the trial court. Thus, in accordance
with the findings of the trial court, Criminal Case No. 94-5036 (Frustrated
Homicide) and Criminal Case No. 94-5038 (Homicide) should be dismissed,
while Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal Possession of Firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 1866) and Criminal Case No. 24-392 (Violation of
Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 7166) should be set for further trial.
Thus the SC granted the petition and ordered that the Resolutions dated 10
March 2003 and 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
72315 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The dispositive portion of the Order
dated 20 March 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 255,
is CORRECTED to conform to the body of the Order by dismissing Criminal
Case No. 94-5036 (Frustrated Homicide) and Criminal Case No. 94-5038
(Homicide), and setting for further trial Criminal Case No. 94-5037 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866) and Criminal
Case No. 24-392 (Violation of Section 261(Q) of the Omnibus Election Code
in relation to Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166).