Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita

655 SCRA 476 – Political Law – National Territory – RA 9522 is Constitutional

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted – the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms of the
third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others, that
the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their
particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties – this also
resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as “archipelagic” waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent
passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional
provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a “regime of islands” pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but
also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to acquire,
or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or
diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of territory is the
international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription and NOT the execution
of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The
area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi.
(See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.
Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired
dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as “archipelagic waters” and that we may term it as our “internal waters”,
but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself
recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise of others of
their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratly’s), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of islands
did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes
of islands, they generate their own maritime zones – in short, they are not to be enclosed within the
baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is because if we do that,
then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS – that
the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through effective
occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we exercise treaty-
based rights:
a. territorial waters – 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone – 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can enforce customs,
fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone – 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to exploit the
living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf – this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R No. 187167 August 16, 2011
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY
C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS,
ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN
ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO,
VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAÑETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE
DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER,
RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY
KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL
OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNAPINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK
FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO,
DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE
MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON.
ALBERTOROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HISCAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON.
HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States
parties over their “territorial sea,” the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this
void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus,
domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968
(Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February
1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended
continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the
location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely,
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as “regimes of islands” whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as “citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators,” 9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the
Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying the terms
of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the
baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and
national security, contravening the country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in
violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as “regime of islands” not only results
in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 14 To
buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and
included – its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS III’s
framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petition’s
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners’ alleged
lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the country’s compliance
with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners’ assertion that what
Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found
within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners’ prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily –
a) Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
b) Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality
of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and
(2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On
the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the
petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative 15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by
the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners’ locus standi as
citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly
raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature
of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing “a more direct and specific
interest” to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of
Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of
the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing
of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners. 18
Respondents’ submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its
constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and
prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, 19 and indeed, of acts of other
branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which,
while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this
nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the
issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be
reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf
Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the national territory” 21 because it discards
the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the
Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of
Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’
technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles
around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22
Petitioners’ theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating,
among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the
baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical
miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. 23 UNCLOS III was the
culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States’
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-
out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to
serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf.
Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with Article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of
the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2),
the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article
33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56)
and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within
the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be
drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with
UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the “outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.” 24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to
delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III,
and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA 9522’s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines’ Claim of Sovereignty Over
these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS III’s regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, “weakens our
territorial claim” over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIG’s (and Scarborough Shoal’s) exclusion from
the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters,” prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the configuration of the
baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each
law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis-à-vis the
Philippines’ obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely
followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to
optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS
III’s limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable
cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners’ argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation
of the Philippines’ claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners’ assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is
similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea
and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29

Extent of maritime
area using RA 3046,
as amended, taking
Extent of maritime area using RA
into account the
9522, taking into account UNCLOS III
Treaty of Paris’
(in square nautical miles)
delimitation (in
square nautical
miles)

Internal or
166,858 171,435
archipelagic waters

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive Economic
Zone

382,669TOTAL440,994586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even
extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will
have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. 30
Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that
RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text
the Philippines’ continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of
two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that “[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.”
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that “the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles,” save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125
nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal
for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably “depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.”
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to
emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the
Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we
might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: “The drawing of such
baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.” So
sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi
natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as
our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the
orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa
itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines
para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rulethat it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS III’s limits. The need to
shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became
imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of
its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some
technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is
140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the
[UNCLOS III], which states that “The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except
that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length,
up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.”
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the
baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic
survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to
Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as
prescribed by Article 47.35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of Islands’ under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121” 36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine State’s responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
“naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of
the KIG, qualifies under the category of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners’ argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines’ claim over
Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in
this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has
acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitution’s Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally
“converts” internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent
and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage
rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation
of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as “archipelagic
waters” under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water
lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed
and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth
or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed
and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects
affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the
archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the
resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international
law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine
government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating
routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed, bills drawing
nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treaty’s
limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. 44 No modern State can
validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with
customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-à-vis continental coastal
States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit
passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters
under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the
waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic
waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States’
archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of
their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. 46 Separate islands generate their own maritime
zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’
territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47
Petitioners’ invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and
State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as
mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, “do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x.”49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution.
Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of
Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional
violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII,
Section 2, paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 52), are not violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.
Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance
of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of
course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space – the exclusive economic zone – in waters previously part of the high seas.
UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone
up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other
States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines’ Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to
pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III 55 and we find petitioners’ reading
plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.
Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable
baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe
for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and
exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens
the country’s case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences
Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr.,
Portugal Perez (on leave), Mendoza, Sereno, JJ., concur.
READ CASE DIGEST HERE.
Footnotes
1Entitled “An Act to Amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as Amended by Republic Act No.
5446, to Define the Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes.”
2 Entitled “An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the Philippines.”
3 The third “Whereas Clause” of RA 3046 expresses the import of treating the Philippines as an
archipelagic State:
“WHEREAS, all the waters around, between, and connecting the various islands of the Philippine
archipelago, irrespective of their width or dimensions, have always been considered as necessary
appurtenances of the land territory, forming part of the inland waters of the Philippines.”
4 One of the four conventions framed during the first United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in
Geneva, this treaty, excluding the Philippines, entered into force on 10 September 1964.
5 UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994.
6 The Philippines signed the treaty on 10 December 1982.
7 Article 47, paragraphs 1-3, provide:
1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the
outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included the
main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land, including atolls,
is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.
2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the
total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of
125 nautical miles.
3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration
of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
8 UNCLOS III entered into force on 16 November 1994. The deadline for the filing of application is
mandated in Article 4, Annex II: “Where a coastal State intends to establish, in accordance with article 76,
the outer limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles, it shall submit particulars of such limits to
the Commission along with supporting scientific and technical data as soon as possible but in any case
within 10 years of the entry into force of this Convention for that State. The coastal State shall at the same
time give the names of any Commission members who have provided it with scientific and technical
advice.” (Underscoring supplied)
In a subsequent meeting, the States parties agreed that for States which became bound by the treaty
before 13 May 1999 (such as the Philippines) the ten-year period will be counted from that date. Thus, RA
9522, which took effect on 27 March 2009, barely met the deadline.
9 Rollo, p. 34.
10Which provides: “The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed,
the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters
of the Philippines.”
11 Entered into between the Unites States and Spain on 10 December 1898 following the conclusion of
the Spanish-American War. Under the terms of the treaty, Spain ceded to the United States “the
archipelago known as the Philippine Islands” lying within its technical description.
12 The Treaty of Washington, between Spain and the United States (7 November 1900), transferring to
the US the islands of Cagayan, Sulu, and Sibutu and the US-Great Britain Convention (2 January 1930)
demarcating boundary lines between the Philippines and North Borneo.
13 Article II, Section 7, Section 8, and Section 16.
14 Allegedly in violation of Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 and Article XIII, Section 7 of the Constitution.
15 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171, 186 (1995).
16 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Sanidad v. COMELEC, 165 Phil. 303
(1976).
17 Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 899 (2003) citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 155-156 (1995) (Feliciano, J., concurring).
The two other factors are: “the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy and a clear
disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibition.” Id.
18 Rollo, pp. 144-147.
19 See e.g. Aquino III v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA 623 (dismissing a petition
for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, not for the impropriety
of remedy but for lack of merit); Aldaba v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, 25 January 2010, 611 SCRA 137
(issuing the writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591); Macalintal v. COMELEC,
453 Phil. 586 (2003) (issuing the writs of certiorari and prohibition declaring unconstitutional portions of
Republic Act No. 9189).
20See e.g. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No.
180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77 (granting a writ of certiorari against the Philippine Senate and
nullifying the Senate contempt order issued against petitioner).
21 Rollo, p. 31.
22 Respondents state in their Comment that petitioners’ theory “has not been accepted or recognized by
either the United States or Spain,” the parties to the Treaty of Paris. Respondents add that “no State is
known to have supported this proposition.” Rollo, p. 179.
23 UNCLOS III belongs to that larger corpus of international law of the sea, which petitioner Magallona
himself defined as “a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the
exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. x x x x” (Merlin M.
Magallona, Primer on the Law of the Sea 1 [1997]) (Italicization supplied).
24 Following Article 47 (1) of UNCLOS III which provides:
An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of
the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are
included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of the land,
including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1. (Emphasis supplied)
25 Under the United Nations Charter, use of force is no longer a valid means of acquiring territory.
26 The last paragraph of the preamble of UNCLOS III states that “matters not regulated by this
Convention continue to be governed by the rules and principles of general international law.”
27 Rollo, p. 51.
28 Id. at 51-52, 64-66.
29 Based on figures respondents submitted in their Comment (id. at 182).
30 Under Article 74.
31 See note 7.
32 Presidential Decree No. 1596 classifies the KIG as a municipality of Palawan.
33 KIG lies around 80 nautical miles west of Palawan while Scarborough Shoal is around 123 nautical
west of Zambales.
34 Journal, Senate 14th Congress 44th Session 1416 (27 January 2009).
35 Rollo, p. 159.
36 Section 2, RA 9522.
37 Article 121 provides: “Regime of islands. —
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic
zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.”
38 Rollo, pp. 56-57, 60-64.
39 Paragraph 2, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution uses the term “archipelagic waters” separately
from “territorial sea.” Under UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State may have internal waters – such as those
enclosed by closing lines across bays and mouths of rivers. See Article 50, UNCLOS III. Moreover, Article
8 (2) of UNCLOS III provides: “Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with the
method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously
been considered as such, a right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in those
waters.” (Emphasis supplied)
40 Mandated under Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS III:
Article 52. Right of innocent passage. —
1. Subject to article 53 and without prejudice to article 50, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent
passage through archipelagic waters, in accordance with Part II, section 3.
2. The archipelagic State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships, suspend
temporarily in specified areas of its archipelagic waters the innocent passage of foreign ships if such
suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after
having been duly published. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 53. Right of archipelagic sea lanes passage. —
1. An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes and air routes thereabove, suitable for the continuous
and expeditious passage of foreign ships and aircraft through or over its archipelagic waters and the
adjacent territorial sea.
2. All ships and aircraft enjoy the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage in such sea lanes and air
routes.
3. Archipelagic sea lanes passage means the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the rights of
navigation and overflight in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and
unobstructed transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.
4. Such sea lanes and air routes shall traverse the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial sea and
shall include all normal passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or
over archipelagic waters and, within such routes, so far as ships are concerned, all normal navigational
channels, provided that duplication of routes of similar convenience between the same entry and exit
points shall not be necessary.
5. Such sea lanes and air routes shall be defined by a series of continuous axis lines from the entry points
of passage routes to the exit points. Ships and aircraft in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall not deviate
more than 25 nautical miles to either side of such axis lines during passage, provided that such ships and
aircraft shall not navigate closer to the coasts than 10 per cent of the distance between the nearest points
on islands bordering the sea lane.
6. An archipelagic State which designates sea lanes under this article may also prescribe traffic separation
schemes for the safe passage of ships through narrow channels in such sea lanes.
7. An archipelagic State may, when circumstances require, after giving due publicity thereto, substitute
other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes for any sea lanes or traffic separation schemes previously
designated or prescribed by it.
8. Such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes shall conform to generally accepted international
regulations.
9. In designating or substituting sea lanes or prescribing or substituting traffic separation schemes, an
archipelagic State shall refer proposals to the competent international organization with a view to their
adoption. The organization may adopt only such sea lanes and traffic separation schemes as may be
agreed with the archipelagic State, after which the archipelagic State may designate, prescribe or
substitute them.
10. The archipelagic State shall clearly indicate the axis of the sea lanes and the traffic separation
schemes designated or prescribed by it on charts to which due publicity shall be given.
11. Ships in archipelagic sea lanes passage shall respect applicable sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes established in accordance with this article.
12. If an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air routes, the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage may be exercised through the routes normally used for international navigation. (Emphasis
supplied)
41 Namely, House Bill No. 4153 and Senate Bill No. 2738, identically titled “AN ACT TO ESTABLISH THE
ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES IN THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGIC WATERS, PRESCRIBING THE
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF FOREIGN SHIPS AND AIRCRAFTS EXERCISING THE RIGHT OF
ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES PASSAGE THROUGH THE ESTABLISHED ARCHIPELAGIC SEA LANES
AND PROVIDING FOR THE ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE MEASURES THEREIN.”
42 The relevant provision of UNCLOS III provides:
Article 17. Right of innocent passage. —
Subject to this Convention, ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 19. Meaning of innocent passage. —
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal
State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of
international law.
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of the
coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the
Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the coastal State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or installations of
the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage
Article 21. Laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to innocent passage. —
1. The coastal State may adopt laws and regulations, in conformity with the provisions of this Convention
and other rules of international law, relating to innocent passage through the territorial sea, in respect of all
or any of the following:
(a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic;
(b) the protection of navigational aids and facilities and other facilities or installations;
(c) the protection of cables and pipelines;
(d) the conservation of the living resources of the sea;
(e) the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(f) the preservation of the environment of the coastal State and the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution thereof;
(g) marine scientific research and hydrographic surveys;
(h) the prevention of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of
the coastal State.
2. Such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign
ships unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.
3. The coastal State shall give due publicity to all such laws and regulations.
4. Foreign ships exercising the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea shall comply with all
such laws and regulations and all generally accepted international regulations relating to the prevention of
collisions at sea.
43 The right of innocent passage through the territorial sea applies only to ships and not to aircrafts
(Article 17, UNCLOS III). The right of innocent passage of aircrafts through the sovereign territory of a
State arises only under an international agreement. In contrast, the right of innocent passage through
archipelagic waters applies to both ships and aircrafts (Article 53 (12), UNCLOS III).
44 Following Section 2, Article II of the Constitution: “Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity
with all nations.” (Emphasis supplied)
45“Archipelagic sea lanes passage is essentially the same as transit passage through straits” to which the
territorial sea of continental coastal State is subject. R.R. Churabill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the
Sea 127 (1999).
46 Falling under Article 121 of UNCLOS III (see note 37).
47 Within the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the following rights under UNCLOS III:
Article 58. Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone. —
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight
and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine
cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic zone in
so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
xxxx
Beyond the exclusive economic zone, other States enjoy the freedom of the high seas, defined under
UNCLOS III as follows:
Article 87. Freedom of the high seas. —
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of international law. It
comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
(b) freedom of overflight;
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations permitted under international law, subject
to Part VI;
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section 2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention
with respect to activities in the Area.
48 See note 13.
49 Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 698 (1995); Tañada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 580-581 (1997).
50 G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
51 “The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and
exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.”
52“The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential use of the communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide
support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production,
and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against
foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the utilization of marine and
fishing resources.”
53 This can extend up to 350 nautical miles if the coastal State proves its right to claim an extended
continental shelf (see UNCLOS III, Article 76, paragraphs 4(a), 5 and 6, in relation to Article 77).
54 Rollo, pp. 67-69.
55 Article 47 (1) provides: “An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that within such
baselines are included the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area
of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9 to 1.” (Emphasis supplied)

Article I
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other
territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
The recently signed “Baselines Law” (RA 9522)defined the baselines of the the Philippine archipelago partly as requested by
the United Nations to clear up issues regarding territorial claims in the disputed Spratly islands and Mischief reef in the South
China Sea.
“Baselines Law” does not sit well with nations like China, who lays claim on the disputed territory.
As agreed upon in the UN Convention on the Laws of the Seas (December 10, 1982), “Coastal States have sovereign rights in
a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and
exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection”.
“Baselines Law” has strengthened the Philippines’ claim over the disputed territory because they fall within the 200-nautical
mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from the baselines of the Philippine archipelago.
Concurring opinion:
1. State the rationale (reason for being) of the provision on national territory and the newly signed “Baselines Law”.
2. Explain why the rationale is flawed.
3. Propose an amendment. Justify your proposal.
Dissenting opinion:
1. State the rationale (reason for being) of the provision on national territory and the newly signed “Baselines Law”.
2. Explain why the rationale is correct.
3. Justify why the “Baselines Law” should be implemented.

PART V

EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Article 55
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the
specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal
State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this
Convention.
Article 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the
exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:

a. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the
natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed
and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water,
currents and winds;

b. jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with regard to:
 i. the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;

ii. marine scientific research;

iii. the protection and preservation of the marine environment;

c. other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.

2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive economic
zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act
in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.

3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be exercised in
accordance with Part VI.

Article 57
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
Article 58
Rights and duties of other States
in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the
relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and
overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful
uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships,
aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this
Convention.

2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.

3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall
comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the
provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part.

Article 59
Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the
attribution of rights and jurisdiction in the exclusive
economic zone
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal State or to
other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises between the interests of the
coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of
the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
Article 60
Artificial islands, installations and structures in the
exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have the exclusive right to construct and
to authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of:

a. artificial islands;

b. installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic
purposes;

c. installations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of the rights of the coastal
State in the zone.

2. The coastal State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over such artificial islands installations and
structures, including jurisdiction with regard to customs fiscal health, safety and immigration laws
and regulations.

3. Due notice must be given of the construction of such artificial islands, installations or structures,
and permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. Any installations or
structures which are abandoned or disused shall be removed to ensure safety of navigation, taking
into account any generally accepted international standards established in this regard by the
competent international organization. Such removal shall also have due regard to fishing, the
protection of the marine environment and the rights and duties of other States. Appropriate
publicity shall be given to the depth, position and dimensions of any installations or structures not
entirely removed.

4. The coastal State may, where necessary, establish reasonable safety zones around such artificial
islands, installations and structures in which it may take appropriate measures to ensure the safety
both of navigation and of the artificial islands, installations and structures.

5. The breadth of the safety zones shall be determined by the coastal State, taking into account
applicable international standards. Such zones shall be designed to ensure that they are reasonably
related to the nature and function of the artificial islands, installations or structures, and shall not
exceed a distance of 500 metres around them, measured from each point of their outer edge, except
as authorized by generally accepted international standards or as recommended by the competent
international organization. Due notice shall be given of the extent of safety zones.

6. All ships must respect these safety zones and shall comply with generally accepted international
standards regarding navigation in the vicinity of artificial islands, installations, structures and safety
zones.
7. Artificial islands, installations and structures and the safety zones around them may not be
established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to
international navigation.

8. Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea,
the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.

How do we determine our territorial boundaries?

1.
THE 12 MILE RULE
2.
THE ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE This concept is meant that an archipelago shall be regarded as a single unit,
so that the waters around,between and connecting the islands of thearchipelago, irrespective of their breath
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the state,subjecttoitsexclusivesovereignty.

Terrestrial Domain
The terrestrial domain refers to the land mass, which may be integrate or dismembered, or partly bound
by water or consist of one whole island. It may also be composed of several islands, like the Philippines. It also
includes all the resources attached to the land.

AERIAL DOMAIN
Thisreferstotheairspaceabovethelandand waters of the State
The rules governing the high seas also apply to outer space, which is considered res communes. Under customary
international law, States have the right to launch satellites in orbit over the territorial space of other States. The
OuterSpaceTreaty,formallyknownastheTreaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, is a treaty that forms the basis of international
space law.

WHAT IS THE VERTICAL LIMIT OFTHETERRITORYOFSTATE?

The Kármán line
It lies at an altitude of 100 kilometers (62 mi) above the
Earth’s sea level and is commonly used to define the boundary between the Earth’s atmosphere and outer
space.

FLUVIAL DOMAIN
Included in its fluvial domains are as follows:
1.
Internal waters
2.
Territorialsea
3.
Exclusive Economic zone (EEZ)
4.
Sea bed
5.
Subsoil
6.
Insular shelves
7.
Other submarine areas

Internalwaters
This include all bodies of water located inside the baseline of the territory including sea, lakes, rivers, streams etc.

Territorial Sea
Out to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, the coastal stateisfreetosetlaws, regulate use, and use any resource.
T
HE PRINCIPLE OF “INNOCENT PASSAGE”

Vessels were given the right of "innocent passage “through any territorial waters, with strategic straits
allowing the passage of military craft as "transit passage", in that naval vessels are allowed to maintain postures
that would be illegal in territorial waters. “Innocent passage" is defined by the convention as passing through
waters in an expeditious and continuous manner, which is not “prejudicial tothepeace,goodorderorthe
security” of the coastal state.

THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EZZ)

Extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation has sole exploitation
rights over all natural resources. The EEZs were introduced to halt the increasingly heated clashes over fishing
rights, although oil was also becoming important.

Sea Bed

This refers to the land that holds the sea, lying beyond the sea shore, including mineral and natural resources
Insular shelves or continentalshelves
The submerged portions of a continent or offshore island, which slope gently seaward from the low waterline toa
point where there is a substantial break in grade occurs,
at which point the bottom slopes seaward at a considerableincrease in slope until the great ocean
depths are reached
Subsoil
This refers to everything beneath the surface soil and the seabed, including mineral and natural resources.
OTHER SUBMARINE AREAS
They refer to all areas under the territorial sea which includes seamount, trough, trench, basin, deep, bank shoal
and reef.

All other territories over whichthe Philippines has sovereignty

or jurisdiction…

THE PHILIPPINES’ CLAIM OVER SABBAH

Bases for the claim:

Historical BasisThe Sultanate of Sulu was granted theterritoryasaprizeforhelpingtheSultanof Brunei against his
enemies and from thenon that part of Borneo is recognized as partof the Sultan of Sulu's sovereignty .
- LEGAL CLAIM BASISThe claim was based on several historical facts and
court judgement. The lease agreement is definitely a proof otherwise there will be no basis for
any agreement if suchownership was not established at all. The contract wasbetween Sri Paduka Maulana
Al Sultan Mohammad Jamalul Alam - representing the sultanate as owner andsovereign of Sabah
 on one hand, and that of GustavusBaron de Overbeck and Alfred Dent, representing theBritish East India
Co. (then became the North Borneo Co.),on the other as lessee of Sabah, was executed on June 22,1878.
Though the British turned over the possession andgovernment of Sabah to the federation, the
Malaysianshave not remissed in paying the annual rental.

THE PHILIPPINES CLAIM OVER SPRATLY’S GROUP

OF ISLANDS

Basis for the claim over the SpratlyGroup of Islands

In 1947, TomasCloma, a Filipino adventurer anda fishing magnate, found several uninhabited and unoccupied
group of islands/islets in the South ChinaSeaThis is the principal basis for justification of islands territorial
claims by the Philippines, along with basis from 1982UNCLOSarchipelagicdoctrine. On May 11, 1956, together
with 40 men, Tomas and his brother Filemon took formal possession of the islands, lying some 380 miles west of
the southern end of Palawan and named it Freedom land.

Argument for the claim:

Res nulliusSpratly Group of Island does not belong to any state when it was claimed by Thomas Cloma.
 Within the EEZ of the Philippines in accordance with
the 1982 United Nation’s Conventions on the Laws of
the Sea UNCLOS.

FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC ) OF THE PHILIPPINES )

First Regular Session ) 'j[)

SENATE Senate Bill No. 797 INTRODUCED BY SEN. JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Constitution, Article 2, Section 15 provides: "The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health cO,nsciousness among them." Republic Act No. 7394, otherwise known as the "Consumer Act of the
Philippines," was enacted to protect the interests of the consumer, promote his general welfare, and to establish
standards of conduct for business and industry. Article 77 of this Act provides for the minimum labeling requirements
for consumer products. Genetically engineering food is a new way of producing foods -- by taking DNA from one
species and inserting it into another. Given the huge complexity of the genetic code, no one can possibly predict the
effects of adding new genes into any organism or plant. It has been reported that one genetically engineered food
supplement (tryptophan) has killed 37 North Americans and permanently disabled 1500. Many scientists feel that
these foods have not been properly tested and pose serious health risks. Consumers have a right to know whether the
food they purchase contains or was produced with genetically engineered material. Thus, the bill seeks to require the
labeling of food, meat, and poultry products that contains genetically engineered material. In view of the foregoing,
immediate enactment of this proposed measure is earnestly recommended.
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Fourteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight day of July, two thousand eight.

Republic Act No. 9522 March 10, 2009

AN ACT TO AMEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 5446, TO DEFINE THE ARCHIPELAGIC BASELINE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3046, entitled "An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea
of the Philippines", as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5446, is hereby amended to read as
follows:

Section 1. The baselines of the Philippines archipelago are hereby defined and described
specifically as follows:

Basepoint Station Location World Geodetic System of 1984 Distance

Number Name (WGS 84) Coordinates to next
basepoint
(M)

Latitude (N) Longitude (E)

1 PAB-01 Amianan Is. 21º6’57.73" 121º57’27.71" 70.08

2 PAB-02 Balintang Is. 19º57’38.19" 122º9’46.32" 99.17

3 PAB-04 Bigan Pt. 18º18’35.30" 122º20’19.07" 71.83

4 PAB-05A Ditolong Pt. 17º7’16.30" 122º31’28.34" 1.05

5 PAB-05B Ditolong Pt. 17º6’14.79" 122º31’43.84" 0.39

6 PAB-05 Ditolong Pt. 17º5’51.31" 122º31’42.66" 3.29

7 PAB-06 Spires Is. 17º2’36.91" 122º31’3.28" 9.74

8 PAB-06B Digollorin Pt. 16º59’18.03" 122º27’56.61" 3.51

9 PAB-06C Digollorin Rk. 16º49’56.11" 122º26’50.78" 2.40

10 PAB-07 Divimisa Pt. 16º47’38.86" 122º26’4.40" 30.94

11 PAB-08 Dinoban Pt. 16º18’44.33" 122º14’06.69" 116.26

12 PAB-10A Tinaga Is. 14º29’54.43" 122º57’51.15" 80.29

13 PAB-11 Horodaba Rk. 14º6.29.91" 124º16’59.21" 0.54

14 PAB-12 Matulin Rk. 14º6.10.40" 124º17’26.28" 96.04

15 PAB-13 Atalaya Pt. 12º41’6.37" 125º3’53.71" 6.79

16 PAB-13A Bacan Is. 12º36’18.41" 125º8’50.19" 5.52

17 PAB-14 Finch Rk. 12º32.33.62" 125º12’59.70" 0.80

18 PAB-14A Cube Rk. 12º31.57.45" 125º13’32.37" 4.90

19 PAB-14D NW Manjud Pt. 12º28’36.42" 125º17’12.32" 1.30

20 PAB-15 SE Manjud Pt. 12º27’37.51" 125º18’5.23" 7.09

21 PAB-16A S Sorz Cay 12º21’41.64" 125º23’7.41" 5.68

22 PAB-16B Panablihon 12º17’27.17" 125º27’0.12" 5.21

23 PAB-16C Alugon 12º13’21.95" 125º30’19.47" 1.94

24 PAB-16D N Bunga Pt. 12º11’48.16" 125º31’30.88" 0.54

25 PAB-17 E Bunga Pt. 12º11’20.67" 125º31’48.29" 5.71

26 PAB-18A SE Tobabao Is. 12º6’7.00" 125º34’11.94" 83.94

27 PAB-19C Suluan Is. 10º45’16.70" 125º58’8.78" 56.28

28 PAB-19D N Tuason Pt. 9º49’59.58" 126º10’6.39" 57.44

29 PAB-20A Arangasa Is. 8º53’16.62" 126º20’48.81" 40.69

30 PAB-21B Sanco Pt. 8º13’11.53" 126º28’53.25" 30.80

31 PAB-22 Bagoso Is 7º42’45.02" 126º34’29.08" 12.95

32 PAB-22C Languyan 7º29’49.47" 126º35’59.24" 0.54

33 PAB-23 Languyan 7º29’16.93" 126º35’59.50" 0.76

34 PAB-23B Languyan 7º28’30.97" 126º35’57.30" 1.2

35 PAB-23C N Baculin Pt. 7º27’29.42" 126º35’51.31" 10.12

36 PAB-24 Pusan Pt. 7º17’19.80" 126º36’18.26" 1.14

37 PAB-24A S Pusan Pt. 7º16’14.43" 126º35’57.20" 63.28

38 PAB-25B Cape San Agustin 6º17’14.73" 126º12’14.40" 1.28

39 PAB-25 Cape San Agustin 6º16’8.35" 126º11’35.06" 67.65

40 PAB-26 SE Sarangani Is. 5º23’34.20" 125º28’42.11" 0.43

41 PAB-27 Pangil Bato Pt. 5º23’21.80" 125º28’19.59" 3.44

42 PAB-28 Tapundo Pt. 6º21’55.66" 126º25’11.21" 3.31

43 PAB-29 W Calia Pt. 5º21’58.48" 125º21’52.03" 0.87

44 PAB-30 Manamil Is. 5º22’2.91" 125º20’59.73" 1.79

45 PAB-31 Marampog Pt. 5º23’20.18" 125º19’44.29" 78.42

46 PAB-32 Pola Pt. 6º9’8.44" 124º15’42.81" 122.88

47 PAB-33A Kantuan Is 6º26’47.22" 122º13.34.50" 29.44

48 PAB-34A Tongguil Is. 6º2’33.77" 121º56’36.20" 2.38

49 PAB-35 Tongquil Is 6º1’8.51" 121º54’41.45" 1.72

50 PAB-35A Tongquil Is. 6º0’17.88" 121º63’11.17" 85.94

51 PAB-38A Kirapusan Is 5º12.8.70" 120º41’38.14" 55.24

52 PAB-39 Manuk Manka Is. 4º47’39.24" 119º51’58.08" 43.44

53 PAB-40 Frances Reef 4º24’53.84" 119º14’50.71 0.61

54 PAB-40A Frances Reef 4º25’3.83" 119º14’15.15" 15.48

55 PAB-41A Bajapa Reef 4º36"9.01" 119º3’22.75" 6.88

56 PAB-42A Paguan Is. 4º42’52.07" 119º1’44.04" 8.40

57 PAB-43 Alice Reef 4º45’55.25" 119º3’15.19" 2.28

58 PAB-44 Alice Reef 4º47’5.36" 119º5’12.94" 18.60

59 PAB-45 Omapoy Rk. 4º55’10.45" 119º22’1.30 23.37

60 PAB-46 Bukut Lapis Pt. 5º2’23.73" 119º44’18.14" 44.20

61 PAB-47 Pearl Bank 5º46’35.15" 119º39’51.77" 75.17

62 PAB-48 Bagnan Is. 6º5’58.41" 118º26’57.30" 8.54

63 PAB-48A Taganak Is 6º4’14.08" 118º18’33.33" 13.46

64 PAB-49 Great Bakkungaan 6º11’4.65" 118º6’54.15" 3.97

Is.
65 PAB-50 Libiman Is. 6º13’39.90" 118º3’52.09" 5.53

66 PAB-51 Sibaung Is. 6º17’43.99" 118º0’5.44" 41.60

67 PAB-52 Muligi Is. 6º52’14.53" 118º23’40.49" 75.06

68 PAB-53 South Mangsee Is. 7º30’26.05" 117º18’33.75" 26.00

69 PAB-54 Balabac Is. 7º48’30.69" 116º59’39.18" 6.08

70 PAB-54A Balabac Great Reef 7º51’27.17" 116º54’17.19" 1.18

71 PAB-54B Balabac Great Reef 7º52’19.86" 116º53’28.73" 2.27

72 PAB-55 Balabac Great Reef 7º54’36.35" 116º53’16.64" 5.42

73 PAB-60 Ada Reef 8º2’0.26" 116º54’10.04" 10.85

74 PAB.61 Secam Is. 8º11’18.36" 116º59’51.87" 30.88

75 PAB-62 Latua Pt. 8º87’56.37" 117º15’51.23" 7.91

76 PAB-63 SW Tatub Pt. 8º44’17.40" 117º20’39.37" 11.89

77 PAB-63A W Sicud Pt. 8º53’32.20" 117º28’15.78" 13.20

78 PAB-64 Tarumpitao Pt. 9º2.57.47" 117º37’38.88" 81.12

79 PAB.64B Dry Is. 9º59’22.54" 118º36’53.61" 82.76

80 PAB-65C Sinangcolan Pt. 11º13’19.82" 119º15’17.74" 74.65

81 PAB-67 Pinnacle Rk. 12º19’35.22" 119º50’56.00 93.88

82 PAB-68 Cabra Is 13º53’24.45" 120º1’5.86" 115.69

83 PAB-71 Hermana Mayor Is. 15º48’43.61" 119º46’56.09" 9.30

84 PAB-72 Tambobo Pt. 15º57’61.67" 119º44’55.32" 12.06

85 PAB-72B Rena Pt. 16º9’57.90" 119º45.15.76" 0.25

86 PAB-73 Rena Pt. 16º10’12.42" 119º45’11.95" 6.43

87 PAB-74 Rocky Ledge 16º16’34.46" 119º46’19.50" 0.65

88 PAB-74A Piedra Pt. 16º37’12.70" 119º46’28.62" 1.30

89 PAB-75 Piedra Pt. 16º18’29.49" 119º46’44.94" 1.04

90 PAB-75C Piedra Pt. 16º19’28.20" 119º47’7.69" 0.63

91 PAB-75D Piedra Pt. 16º20’4.38" 119º47’20.48" 80.60

92 PAB-76 Dile Pt. 17º34’24.94" 120º20’33.36" 6.86

93 PAB-77 Pinget Is. 17º41’17.56" 120º21’2.20" 14.15

94 PAB-78 Baboc Is. 17º55’4.13" 120º24’40.56" 35.40

 95 PAB-79 Cape Bojeador 18º29’32.42" 120º33’42.41" 1.77

96 PAB-79B Bobon 18º30’52.88" 120º34’55.35" 58.23

97 PAB-80 Calagangan Pt. 19º10’14.78" 121º12’52.64" 98.07

98 PAB-82 Itbayat Is. 20º43’15.74" 121º46’57.80" 25.63

99 PAB-83 Amianan Is 21º7’17.47" 121º56’43.85" 0.08

100 PAB-84 Amianan Is. 21º7’18.41" 121º56’48.79" 0.25

101 PAB-85 Amianan Is. 21º7’12.04" 121º57’3.65" 0.44

Section 2. The baseline in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and
jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the Philippines consistent
with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596; and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal.

Section 3. This Act affirms that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion, sovereignty and jurisdiction
over all portions of the national territory as defined in the Constitution and by provisions of applicable laws
including, without limitation, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, as amended.

Section 4. This Act, together with the geographic coordinates and the chart and maps indicating the
aforesaid baselines, shall be deposited and registered with the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Section 5. The National Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA) shall forthwith produce and
publish charts and maps of the appropriate scale clearly representing the delineation of basepoints and
baselines as set forth in this Act.

Section 6. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be provided in a supplemental
budyet or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law.

Section 7. If any portion or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid the other portions or
provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 8. The provisions of Republic Act No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, and all other
laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and issuances inconsistent with this Act are hereby amended or
modified accordingly.
Section 9. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in any
two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved

(Sgd.) PROSPERO C. NOGRALES (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Speaker of the House of President of the Senate
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2699 and House Bill No. 3216 was finally passed by the
Senate and the House of Representative on February 17, 2009.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP (Sgd.) EMMA LIRIO-REYES

Secretary General Secretary of Senate
House of Represenatives

Approved: MAR 10, 2009

(Sgd.) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was
filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National
capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease
and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result
in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and
set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the
country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which
will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right
of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to
protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the
full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon
the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by
their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her
parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES,
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V.
PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor,
represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA,
minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA,
JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their
parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN,
all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO
and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their
parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA,
minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and
IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their
parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of
the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which
the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and
"inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a
cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock
and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for
the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently
ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The
same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that
they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment
be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
—

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine
cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that
in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the
size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare
and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource
productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing
velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and
agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares
of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0
million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex
"A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares
per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the Philippines will be
bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of
this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet
unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff
minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and
unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March
2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
 18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of
the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is
desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity
and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full
and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14,
Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law —
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action
to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued
rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the
complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action against him and
that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves
a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in
the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations,
according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time —
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement
or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately
cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case
No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this
matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines.
Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule
against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree
with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they
are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-
equal branches of the Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself
belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil
and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether
for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by
the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they
are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but
parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily

carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore,
sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well
as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization
of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall
be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof
makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the
policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of
our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
 fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity
of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as
future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were
issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b)
to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c)
to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-
being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect
the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology;
hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that
the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the
ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that
happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be
adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may
thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the
cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive
and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion,"
which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us
was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his
motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses
according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest
and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan
vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to
whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right;
nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which
the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public
welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or
irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national
interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a
law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing
the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
 The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion
of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the
other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to
be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class"
here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether
now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court
may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may
be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy,
as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right —
to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand,
a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

 (vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned
above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part
of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is
not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power
in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect
of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements
or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings
below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof
of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession
agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege,
as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed
wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my
mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles
laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the
territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to
be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class"
here involved — membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether
now or in the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court
may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may
be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy,
as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right —
to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand,
a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned
above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part
of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right — a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution —
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is
not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power
in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted,
to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect
of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable
norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments — the legislative and
executive departments — must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements
or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings
below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof
of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession
agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege,
as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed
wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision
issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 164; 186.

2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

Scarborough Shoal and KIG are regime of Islands

Article 12 the national economy and patrimony Section 1. The goals of the
national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income,
and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced
by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the
key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the under-privileged. The
State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices. In the
pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be
encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership. Section 5. The State,
subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies
and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to
their ancestral lands to ensure their the applicability of customary laws
governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent
of ancestral domain.economic, social, and cultural well-being. The Congress
may provide for

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

SEC 1.

The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a
sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people;
and an expanding productivity as the key raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given
optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar
collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of their ownership.

SEC. 2.

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical of
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions
to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote
the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

SEC. 3.

Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses which
they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or
acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant. Taking into account the
requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform,
the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired,
developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefore.

SEC. 4.

The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and national
parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national parks shall
be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall provide, for such
period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and watershed areas.

SEC. 5
The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,
shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic,
social, and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

SEC. 6.
The use of property bears a social function, and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.
Individuals and private groups, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall
have the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises, subject to the duty of the State to
promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
SEC. 7.
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.

SEC. 8.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has
lost its Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.

SEC. 9.
The Congress may establish an independent economic and planning agency headed by the President, which
shall, after consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various public sectors, and local government
units, recommend to Congress, and implement continuing integrated and coordinated programs and policies for
national development.
Until the Congress provides otherwise, the National Economic and Development Authority shall function as
the independent planning agency of the government.

SEC. 10.
The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest
dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas
of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities.

SEC. 11.
No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be
granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of
the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall
any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity
participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing
body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the
executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the Philippines.

SEC. 12.
The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods,
and adopt measures that help them competitive.

SEC. 13.
The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.

SEC. 14.
The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall
be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for
the national benefit.
The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed
by law.

SEC. 15.
The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of cooperatives as instruments for
social justice and economic development.

SEC. 16.
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special
charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.

SEC. 17.
In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency
and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately
owned public utility or business affected with public interest.

SEC. 18.
The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and operate vital industries and,
upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government.

SEC. 19.
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.

SEC. 20.
The Congress shall establish an independent central monetary authority, the members of whose governing
board must be natural-born Filipino citizens, of known integrity, and patriotism, the majority of whom shall
come from the private sector. They shall also be subject to such other qualifications and disabilities as may
be prescribed by law. The authority shall provide policy direction in the areas of money, banking, and credit.
It shall have supervision over the operations of banks and exercise such regulatory powers as may be
provided by law over the operations of finance companies and other institutions performing similar functions.
Until the Congress otherwise provides, the Central Bank of the Philippines, operating under existing laws,
shall function as the central monetary authority.

SEC. 21.
Foreign loans may only be incurred in accordance with law and the regulation of the monetary authority.
Information on foreign loans obtained or guaranteed by the Government shall be made available to the
public.

SEC. 22.
Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be considered inimical to the
national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law.

Land Titles And Deeds Case Digest: Oh Cho V. Director Of Lands (1946)
Oh Cho vs Director of Lands
G.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

FACTS:

Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly,
continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for registration of this
land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he was
an alien.

ISSUEs:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:

Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act.

All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and
of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that
the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish
conquest.

The applicant does not come under the exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.

Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien
disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain.

Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registration had they applied for the
same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition precedent, which was not complied with by
the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This possessory right was what was
transferred to Oh Cho, but since the latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by
prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over public land by prescription.

DOCTRINE IN OWNERSHIP OF LANDS

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Director of Lands vs. IAC

219 SCRA 339

Under the Regalian doctrine all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the state.

Oh cho vs. Director of Lands

75 Phil. 890 [1946]

The standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless
acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an
accupant and his predecessors since the time of immemorial, for such possession would justify
the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest.

Cruz vs. Secretary

G.R. No. 135385
Dec. 6, 2005

Nature of Possession by Natives

Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of lands in public domain. The right of the
native does not include natural resources, what is given is priority rights, not exclusive rights.
State not preclude from into agreements with private entities.

De Ocampo vs. Arlos

G.R. No. 135527
October 19, 2000

Under the Public Land Act as amended, only titles to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain may be judicially confirmed. Unless a public land is reclassified and declared as
such, occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long ago, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.

Lee Hong Hok vs. David

150-C Phil. 542 [1972]

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from
the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state.
 Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos
Jan 23, 2006

Alienable land of public domain is limited to agricultural land. Homestead patent is one of the
modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for agricultural purposes.

Jacinto vs. Director of Lands

49 Phil. 853

Friar lands under the Friar Lands Law (Act No. 1120). They are intended to be sold to actual
settlers and occupants.

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. Inc. vs. Judge Bercilles

66 SCRA 481

The City Council of Cebu, through resulting in its transformation into a patrimonial property.
The charter of City of Cebu (R.A. 3857) had authorized the City Council to close any road and
street, etc. and allowing the City to use the withdrawn property from public use, for any other
lawful purpose.

See: Article 422, 423, 424, 426 of the Civil Code

KRIVENKO DOCTRINE

Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds

44 Off. Gaz. 471

Aliens have no right to acquire any public or private land or private agricultural, commercial, or
residential lands (except by hereditary succession).

EXCEPTION TO KREVINKO DOCTRINE

Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals

239 SCRA 341

Non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private land or to lands of the public domain,
except by way of legal succession as general rule.

But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified
Filipino citizen?

If the land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers
it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the
transferee is rendered valid.

De Castro vs. Tan

A residential lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an
extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a
naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled to
recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the property of a
naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.

RIGHTS OF THE NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO WHO HAVE LOST THEIR

CITIZENSHIP TO ACQUIRE LANDS

Under R.A. 8179, former natural-born Filipino citizens may acquire land under this following:

1.) 5,000 sq. m. - Urban Lands

2.) 3,000 sq. m. - Agricultural Lands

For bRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946

OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo for
appellant.
Vicente Constantino for appellee.
Ferrier, Gomez and Sotelo and J. T. Chuidian as amici curiae.

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment decreeing the registration of a residential lot located in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Province of Tayabas in the name of the applicant.

The opposition of the Director of Lands is based on the applicant's lack of title to the lot, and on his
disqualification, as alien, from acquiring lands of the public domain.

The applicant, who is an alien, and his predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the lot from 1880 to filing of the application for registration on
January 17, 1940.

The Solicitor General reiterates the second objection of the opponent and adds that the lower court,
committed an error in not declaring null and void the sale of the lot to the applicant.

The applicant invokes the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), or should it not be applicable to the
case, then he would apply for the benefits of the Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141).

The applicant failed to show that he has title to the lot that may be confirmed under the Land
Registration Act. He failed to show that he or any of his predecessors in interest had acquired the lot
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, under the laws, orders and decrease
promulgated by the Spanish Government in the Philippines, or by possessory information under the
Mortgaged Law (section 19, Act 496). All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant below to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of
the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest.
(Cariño vs. InsularGovernment, 212 U.S., 449; 53 Law. Ed., 594.) The applicant does not come under the
exception, for the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessors in interest begun in 1880.

As the applicant failed to show title to the lot, the next question is whether he is entitled to decree or
registration of the lot, because he is alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain
(sections 48, 49, C.A. No. 141).

As the applicant failed to show the title to the lot, and has invoked the provisions of the Public Land
Act, it seems unnecessary to make pronouncement in this case on the nature or classifications of the
sought to be registered.

It may be argued that under the provisions of the Public Land Act the applicant immediate predecessor
in interest would have been entitled to a decree of registration of the lot had they applied for its
registration; and that he having purchased or acquired it, the right of his immediate predecessor in
interest to a decree of registration must be deemed also to have been acquired by him. The benefits
provided in the Public Land Act for applicant's immediate predecessors in interest should comply with
the condition precedent for the grant of such benefits. The condition precedent is to apply for the
registration of the land of which they had been in possession at least since July 26, 1894. This the
applicant's immediate predecessors in interest failed to do. They did not have any vested right in the
lot amounting to the title which was transmissible to the applicant. The only right, if it may thus be
called, is their possession of the lot which, tacked to that of their predecessors in interest, may be
availed of by a qualified person to apply for its registration but not by a person as the applicant who is
disqualified.

It is urged that the sale of the lot to the applicant should have been declared null and void. In a suit
between vendor and vendee for the annulment of the sale, such pronouncement would be necessary, if
the court were of the opinion that it is void. It is not necessary in this case where the vendors do not
even object to the application filed by the vendee.

Accordingly, judgment is reversed and the application for registration dismissed, without costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., concurring:

Oh Cho, a citizen of the Republic of China, purchased in 1938 from Antonio, Luis and Rafael Lagdameo
a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, which has been in the
continuous, public, and adverse possession of their predecessors in interest as far back as 1880. on
June 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for the registration of said parcel of land. The Director of Lands
opposed the application because, among other grounds, the Constitution prohibits aliens from
acquiring public or private agricultural lands.

One of the witnesses for the applicant, on cross-examination, expressly admitted that the land in
question is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into an orchard or garden. Rodolfo Tiquia,
inspector of the Bureau of Lands, testifying as a witness for the government, stated that the land,
notwithstanding the use to which it is actually devoted, is agricultural land in accordance with an
opinion rendered in 1939 by the Secretary of Justice. The pertinent part of said opinion, penned by
Secretary Jose Abad Santos, later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, is as follows:

1. Whether or not the "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XII, of the Constitution may
be interpreted to include residential, commercial or industrial lots for purposes of their
disposition.

1. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of
the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term "agricultural public lands" had,
therefor, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase
"agricultural public lands" means those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither
timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in many
subsequent cases. (Montano vs. Ins. Gov't 12 Phil., 572, 574; Santiago vs. Ins. Gov't., 12, Phil.,
593; Ibañes de Aldecoa vs. Ins. Gov't., 13 Phil., 159; Ins. Gov't., vs. Aldecoa & Co., 19 Phil., 505,
516 Mercado vs.Collector of Internal Revenue, 32 Phil., 271, 276; Molina 175, 181;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560, 564; and Ankron vs. Government of the
Philippines, 40 Phil., 10, 14.)

Residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.

Viewed from the another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the lands is the test (Odell vs. Durant 62 N. W., 524;
Lerch vs. Missoula Brick & Tile Co., 123 p., 25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the land
to cultivation for agricultural or not (State vs.Stewart, 190, p.,129).

Judge Pedro Magsalin, of the Court First Instance of Tayabas, rendered a decision on August 15, 1940,
overruling the opposition without must explanation and decreeing the registration prayed for the
applicant. The Director of Lands appealed from the decision, and the Solicitor General appearing for
appellant, maintains that the applicant, not being a citizen of the Philippines, is disqualified to buy or
acquire the parcel of land in question and that the purchase made in question and that the purchase
made in 1938 is null and void.

This is the question squarely reversing to us for decision. The majority, although reversing the lower
court's decision and dismissing the application with we agree, abstained from the declaring null and
void the purchase made by Oh Cho in 1938 as prayed for the appellant. We deem it necessary to state
our opinion on the important question raised, it must be squarely decided.

The Solicitor General argued in his brief as follows:

I. The lower court erred decreeing the registration of the lot in question in favor of the applicant
who, according to his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.

(a) The phrase "agricultural land" as used in the Act of the Congress of July 1, 1902, in the
Public Land Act includes residential lots.

In this jurisdiction lands of public domain suitable for residential purposes are considered
agricultural lands under the Public Land Law. The phrase "agricultural public lands" has well
settled judicial definition. It was used for the first time in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill. Its means those public lands acquired form Spain which are
neither mineral nor timber lands (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 572; Ibañes de
Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands,
40 Phil., 10). In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme Court, in defining
the meaning and scope of that phrase from the context of the sections 13 and 15 of that Act,
said:

The phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926) means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral timber lands.

xxx xxx xxx

"We hold that there is to be found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after careful consideration of the question we are
satisfied that only definition which exists in said Act is the definition adopted by the
court below. Section 13 say that the Government shall "make and rules and regulations
for the lease, sale, or other dispositions of public lands other than timber or mineral
lands," To our minds that is only definition that can be said to be given agricultural
lands. In other words, that the phrase "agricultural lands" as used in Act No. 926 means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. . . ."
Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, 178, 182, emphasis added.)

"This phrase "agricultural public lands" was subsequently used in Act No. 926, which is the first
public land law of the Philippines. As therein used, the phrase was expressly given by the
Philippine Commission the same meaning intended for it by Congress as interpreted in the case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government,supra. This is a self-evident from a reading of section 1, 10, 32,
and 64 (subsection 6 of Act No. 926). Whenever the phrase "agricultural public lands" is used in
any of said sections, it is invariably by the qualification "as defined by said Act of Congress of
July first, nineteen hundred and two."

"More specially, in the case of Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, supra, the Supreme
Court held that a residential or building lot, forming part of the public domain, is agricultural
land, irrespective of the fact that it is not actually used for purposes of agriculture for the simple
reason that it is susceptible of cultivation and may be converted into a rural estate, and because
when a land is not mineral or forestal in its nature it must necessarily be included within the
classification of a agricultural land. Because of the special applicability of the doctrine laid
down in said case, we quote at some length from the decision therein rendered:

"The question set up in these proceedings by virtue of the appeal interposed by counsel for
Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa, is whether or not a parcel of land that is susceptible of being
cultivated, and ceasing to be agricultural land, was converted into a building lot, is subject to
the legal provisions in force regarding Government public lands which may be alienated in favor
of private individuals or corporations. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation ; for this reason, where land is not
mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification
of agriculture land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but
because it was originally agricultural and may again become so under other
circumstances; besides the Act of Congress (of July 1, 1902) contains only three
classifications, and makes no special provision with respect to building lots or urban
land that have ceased to be agricultural land. . . .
 xxx xxx xxx

"From the language of the foregoing provisions of the law, it is deduced that, with the
exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by
State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and,
provided they are not destine to the use of public in general or reserved by the
Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical
person; and considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to which
they are accorded, they are called agricultural lands, urbans lands and building lots
being included in this classification for the purpose of distinguishing rural and urban
estates from mineral and timber lands; the transformation they may have undergone is
no obstacle to such classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them
into rural estates." (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government 13 Phil., 161, 163 164, 165,
166; emphasis added.).

(b) Under the Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act), the
phrase (Public Land Act), the phrase "public agricultural land" includes lands of
the public domain suitable for residential purposes.

"Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution, reads as follows:

"All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant lease, or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources,
with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated . . ." (Emphasis
added.).

"Under the above-quote provision, the disposition exploitation, development or utilization of the
natural resources, including agricultural lands of the public domain is limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to the corporations or associations therein mentioned. It also clearly appears
from said provision that natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, are
not subject to alienation.

"On November 7, 1936, or more than one year after the adoption of the Constitution,
Commonwealth Act No. 141, known as the Public Land Act, was approved. Under this Act the
lands of the public have been classified into three divisions: (a) alienable or disposable, (b)
timber, and (c) mineral lands. The lands designated alienable or disposable correspond to lands
designated in the Constitution as public agricultural lands, because under section 1, Article XII,
public agricultural lands are the only natural resources of the country which are the only natural
resources of the country which are subject to alienation or deposition.

"Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 provide that the alienable or disposable public lands
shall be classified, according to use or purposes to which they are destined, into a agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial, etc., lands. At first blush it would seem that under this
classification residential land is different from agricultural land. The difference however, is more
apparent than real. 'Public agricultural land ' as that phrase is used in the Constitution means
alienable lands of the public domain and therefore this phrase is equivalent to the lands
classified by the Commonwealth Act No. 141 as alienable or disposable. The classification
provided in section 9 is only for purposes administration and disposition, according to the
purposes to which said lands are especially adopted. But notwithstanding this of all said lands
are essentially agricultural public lands because only agricultural public lands are subject to
alienation or disposition under section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. A contrary view would
necessarily create a conflict between Commonwealth Act No. 141 and section 1 of Article XII of
the Constitution, and such conflict should be avoided , if possible, and said Act construed in the
light of the fundamental provisions of the Constitution and in entire harmony therewith.

"Another universal principles applied in considering constitutional question is, that an

Act will be so construed, if possible, as to avoid conflict with the Constitution, although
such a construction may not be the most obvious or natural one. "The Court may resort
to an implication to sustain a statute, but not to destroy it." But the courts cannot go
beyond the province of legitimate construction, in order to save a statute; and where the
meaning is plain, words cannot to be read into it or out of it for that purpose." ( 1
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 135, 136.)

"In view of the fact that more than one than one year after the adoption of the Constitution the
National Assembly revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
a compilation of the laws relative to the lands of the public domain and the amendments
thereto, form to the Constitution.

"Where the legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such
a revision is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised
conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102; emphasis added.)

"By the way of illustration, let us supposed that a piece or tract of public land has been
classified pursuant to section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as residential land. If, by reason
of this classification, it is maintained that said land has ceased to be agricultural public land, it
will no longer be subject to alienation or disposition by reason of the constitutional provision
that only agricultural lands are alienable; and yet such residential lot is alienable under section
58, 59, and 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations mentioned in section 1, Article XII of the Constitution. Therefore, the classification
of public agricultural lands into various subdivisions is only for purposes of administration,
alienation or disposition, but it does not destroy the inherent nature of all such lands as a public
agricultural lands.

"(c) Judicial interpretation of doubtful clause or phrase use in the law, controlling.

"The judicial interpretation given to the phrase "public agricultural land" is a sufficient authority
for giving the same interpretation to the phrase as used in subsequent legislation, and this is
especially so in view of the length of time during which this interpretation has been maintained
by the courts. On this point Sutherland has the following to say:

"When a judicial interpretation has once been put upon a clause, expressed in a vague
manner by the legislature, and difficult to be understood, that ought of itself to be
sufficient authority for adopting the same construction. Buller J., said: "We find solemn
determination of these doubtful expressions in the statute, and as that now put another
construction has since prevailed, there is no reason why we should now put another
construction of the act on account of any suppose change of convenience." This rule of
construction will hold good even if the court be opinion that the practical erroneous; so
that if the matter were res integra the court would adopt a different construction. Lord
Cairns said: "I think that with regard to statutes ... it is desirable not so much that the
principle of the decision should be capable at all times of justification, as that the law
should be settled, and should, when once settled, be maintained without any danger of
vacillation or uncertainty. "Judicial usage and practice will have weight, and when
continued for a long time will be sustained though carried beyond the pair purport of the
statute."(II Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 892, 893.) .

"An important consideration affecting the weight of contemporary judicial construction is

the length of time it has continued. It is adopted, and derives great force from being
 adopted, soon after the enactment of the law. It may be, and is presumed, that the
legislative sense of its policy, and of its true scope and meaning, permeates the judiciary
and controls its exposition. Having received at that time a construction which is for the
time settled, accepted, and thereafter followed or acted upon, it has the sanction of the of
the authority appointed to expound the law, just and correct conclusions, when reached,
they are, moreover, within the strongest reasons on which founded the maxim of stare
decisis. Such a construction is public given, and the subsequent silence of the
legislature is strong evidence of acquiescence, though not conclusive. . . . (II Lewis
Sutherland Statutory Construction, pp. 894, 895.)

"Furthermore, when the phrase "public agricultural land" was used in section 1 of Article XII of
the Constitution, it is presumed that it was so used with the same judicial meaning therefor
given to it and therefor the meaning of the phrase, as used in the Constitution, includes
residential lands and another lands of the public domain, but excludes mineral and timber
lands.

"Adoption of provisions previously construed — ad. Previous construction by Courts. —

Where a statute that has been construed by the courts of the last resort has been
reenacted in same, or substantially the same, terms, the legislature is presumed to have
been familiar with its construction, and to have adopted it is part of the law, unless a
contrary intent clearly appears, or a different construction is expressly provided for; and
the same rule applies in the construction of a statute enacted after a similar or cognate
statute has been judicially construed. So where words or phrases employed in a new
statute have been construed by the court to have been used in a particular sense in a
previous statute on the same subject, or one analogous to it, they are presumed, in the a
absence of clearly expressed intent to the contrary, to be used in the same sense in the
statute as in the previous statute." (59 C.J., 1061-1063.).

"Legislative adoption of judicial construction. — In the adoption of the code, the

legislature is presumed to have known the judicial construction which have been placed
on the former statutes; and therefore the reenactment in the code or general revision of
provisions substantially the same as those contained in the former statutes is a
legislative adoption of their known judicial constructions, unless a contrary intent is
clearly manifest. So the fact that the revisers eliminated statutory language after it had
been judicially construed shows that they had such construction in view." (59 C. J.,
1102.)

"II. The lower court erred in not declaring null and void the sale of said land to the appellant
(appellee).

"Granting that the land in question has ceased to be a part of the lands of the public domain by
reason of the long continuous,, public adverse possession of the applicant's predecessors in
interest, and that the latter had performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and were entitled to a certificate of title under section 48, subsection (b), of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, still the sale of said land of December 8, 1938, to the applicant as evidenced by Exhibits
B and C, was null and void for being contrary to section 5, Article XII of the Constitution, which
reads as follows:

"Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred

or assignedexcept to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain of the Philippines."

"The applicant, being a Chinese citizen, is disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain (section 1, Article XII of the Constitution; section 12, 22, 23, 33, 44, 48, Commonwealth
Act No. 141 ), and consequently also disqualified to buy and acquire private agriculture land.
 "In view of the well settled judicial meaning of the phrase public agricultural land,' as
hereinbefore demonstrated, the phrase 'private agricultural land,' as used in the above quoted
provision, can only mean land of private ownership, whether agricultural, residential,
commercial or industrial. And this necessarily so, because the phrase 'agricultural land used in
the Constitution and in the Public Land Law must be given the same uniform meaning to wit,
any land of the public domain or any land of private ownership, which is neither mineral or
forestal.

"A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statute, unless a different intention appears. ... Where words have being long used in a
technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have
been adopted by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute
in which they are used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such
statute should be construed according to the sense may vary from the strict literal
meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction., p. 758.) .

"This interpretation is in harmony with the nationalistic policy, spirit and purpose of our
Constitution and laws, to wit, `to conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,' as
solemnly enunciated in the preamble to the Constitution.

"A narrow and literal interpretation of the phrase 'private agriculture land' would impair and
defeat the nationalistic aim and general policy of our laws and would allow a gradual, steady,
and unlimited accumulation in alien hands of a substantial portion of our patrimonial estates, to
the detriment of our national solidarity, stability, and independence. Nothing could prevent the
acquisition of a great portion or the whole of a city by subjects of a foreign power. And yet a city
or urban area is more strategical than a farm or rural land.

"The mere literal construction of section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed
to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that
intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible be so read as
to conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be
ascertained from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious
purpose of the law should not be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words." (II
Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp. 721, 722.)

"We conclude, therefore, that the residential lot which the applicant seeks to register in his
name falls within the meaning of private agricultural land as this phrase is used in our
Constitution and, consequently, is not subject to acquisition by foreigners except by hereditary
succession."

The argument hold water. It expresses a correct interpretation of the Constitution and the real intent of
the Constitutional Convention.

One of our fellow members therein, Delegate Montilla, said:

The constitutional precepts that I believe will ultimately lead us to our desired goal are; (1) the
complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources; (2) the nationalization of our
commerce and industry compatible with good international practices. With the complete
nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given
birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands. ... Lands and natural resources are
immovable and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of
possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
nationalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when
we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what
 kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in
those of foreigner? (2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592.).

From the same book of Delegate Aruego, we quote:

The nationalization of the natural resources of the country was intended (1) to insure their
conservation for Filipino posterity; (2) to serve as an instrument of national defense, helping
prevent the extension into the country of foreign control through peaceful economic
penetration; and (3) to prevent making the Philippines a source of international conflict with the
consequent danger to its internal security and independence.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . In the preface to its report, the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and
other natural resources said;

"International complications have often resulted from the existence of alien ownership of land
and natural resources in a weak country. Because of this danger, it is best that aliens should be
restricted in the acquisition of land and other natural resources. An example is afforded by the
case of Texas. This state was originally province of Mexico. In order to secure its rapid
settlements and development, the Mexican government offered free land to settlers in Texas.
Americans responded more rapidly than the Mexicans, and soon they organized a revolt against
Mexican rule, and then secured annexation to the United States. A new increase of alien
landholding in Mexico has brought about the desire a prevent a repetition of the Texas affair.
Accordingly the Mexican constitution of 1917 contains serious limitation on the right of aliens to
hold lands and mines in Mexico. The Filipinos should profit from this example."

xxx xxx xxx

It was primarily for these reasons that the Convention approved readily the proposed principle
of prohibiting aliens to acquire, exploit, develop, or utilize agricultural, timber, and mineral lands
of the public domain, waters minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines. For the same reasons the
Convention approved equally readily the proposed principle of prohibiting the transfer of
assignment to aliens of private agricultural land, save in the case of hereditary succession. (2
Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, pp. 604, 605, 606.).

All the foregoing show why we, having been a member of the Constitutional Convention, agree with
Solicitor General's position and concur in the result in this case, although we would go as far as the
outright pronouncement that the purchase made by appelle is null and void.

BRIONES, M., con quien estan conformes PARAS y TUASON, MM., disidente:

El solicitante en este expediente pide el registro del solar de que se trata como terreno de propiedad
privada, y tan solo con caracter supletorio invoca las disposiciones del capitulo 8.º de la Ley No. 2874
sobre terrenos publicos (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 3.)

Por su parte el Director de Terrenos se opone a la solicitud en virtud de tres fundamentos, a saber: (1)
porque ni el solicitante ni sus predecesores en interes pueden demonstrar titulo suficiente sobre dicha
parcela de terreno, no habiendose adquirido la misma ni por titulo de composicion con el Estado bajo
la soberania de España, ni por titulo de informacion posesoria bajo el Real Decreto de 13 de Febrero
de 1894; (2) porque el citado solar es una porcion de los terrenos de dominio publico pertenecientes al
Commonwealth de Filipinas; (3) porque siendo el solicitante un ciudadano chino, no esta capacitado
bajo las disposiciones de la Constitucion de Filipinas para adquirir terrenos de caracter publico o
privado (idem, pags. 5 y 6).
Tanto el solicitante como el Director de Terrenos practicaron sus pruebas ante un arbitro nombrado
por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Tayabas. Con vista de tales pruebas, el Juez Magsalin, del
referido Juzgado, dicto sentencia a favor del solicitante, de la cual transcribimos las siguientes
porciones pertinentes:

La representacion del opositor Director de Terrenos trata de probar por medio del testimonio
del Inspector del Buro de Terrenos que, el terreno objeto de la solicitud es parte del dominio
publico y ademas el solicitante es ciudadano chino, pero dicho testigo afirmo que el terreno
objeto de la presente solicitud es un solar situado dentro de la poblacion del municipio de
Guinayanga, Tayabas, y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales fuertes y careciendo de
merito esta oposicion debe desestimarse la misma.

Por tanto, previa desestimacion de la oposicion del Director de Terrenos, se adjudica con sus
mejoras la parcela de terreno objeto de la presente solicitud descrito en el plano Psu-109117, a
favor del solicitante Oh Cho, ciudadano chino, mayor de edad, casado con Yee Shi, y residente
en el municipio de Guinayanga, Tayabas, Islas Filipinas. (Decision, pag. 8, Record on Appeal.)

De lo transcrito se infiere de una manera forzosa lo siguiente: (a) que el tribunal inferior desestimo de
plano la oposicion del Director de Terrenos fundada en el supuesto de que el solar cuestionado es
parte del dominio publico; (b) que el mismo tribunal rechazo el otro fundamento de la oposicion, esto
es, que siendo el solicitante ciudadano chino esta incapacitado bajo nuestra Constitucion para
adquirir terreno, ya publico, ya privado, aunque sea un solar de caracter urbano; (c) que, segun el fallo
del Juez a quo, no siendo publico el terreno cuestionado, es necesariamente terreno privado.

El Director de Terrenos, no estando conforme con la sentencia, apelo de ella para ante el Tribunal de
Apelacion y hace en su alegato dos señalamientos de error, ninguno de los cuales pone en tela de
juicio la calidad de privado del terreno cuestionado. El apelante no plantea ninguna cuestion de hecho;
plantea solo una cuestion de derecho. Por eso que en la reconstitucion de este expediente — el
original se quemo durante la guerra — no ha habido necesidad de incluir las notas taquigraficas ni las
pruebas documentales, y de hecho hemos considerado y decidido este asunto sin dichas notas y
pruebas. El abogado Constantino, del apelado, en la audiencia para la reconstitucion de los autos, hizo
esta manifestacion; "In view also of the fact that the questions involved here are only questions of law,
this representation waives the right to present the evidence presented in the trial court . . . ." Por su
parte, el Procurador General, al explanar el caso en representacion del apelante Director de Terrenos,
principia su alegato con la siguiente declaracion:

This appeal is a test case. There are now several cases of exactly the same nature pending in
the trial courts.

Whether or not an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name is
the only question raised in this appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
which sustained the affirmance and decreed the registration of the said property in favor of the
applicant who, by his own voluntary admission, is a citizen of the Chinese Republic. This
question is raised in connection with the constitutional provision that no private agricultural
land shall be transferred or assigned to foreigners except in cases of hereditary succession.
(Pags. 1, 2, alegato del apelante.)

Habiendose apelado de la sentencia para ante el Tribunal de Apelacion ¿por que se elevo este asunto
al Tribunal Supremo, ante el cual ya estaba pendiente aun antes de la guerra, y sin resolverse durante
la ocupacion japonesa? La razon no consta especificamente en autos, pero como no se trata de una
alzada del Tribunal de Apelacaion a la Corte Suprema, la unica explicacion que cabe es que aquel, la
percatarse de que en la apelacion no se planteaba mas que una cuestion de derecho, ordeno, como
era de rigor, el traslado del asunto a esta Corte por ser de su jurisdiccion y competencia.

Hemos estimado necesario sentar las anteriores premisas porque las mismas sirven de base a la
argumentacion que a seguida vamos a desenvolver para fundamentar esta disidencia.
I. De lo expuesto resulta evidente que el Director de Terrenos se ha opuesto al registro solicitado,
entre otros fundamentos, porque el terreno es publico; que el tribunal inferior ha desestimado este
fundamento por "carecer de merito," fallando que el terreno es privado; que el Director de Terrenos, en
su apelacion ante nosotros, no cuestiona esta conclusion del Juez a quo, sino que dando por admitido
que el terreno es de propiedad privada, arguye, sin embargo, que bajo la seccion 5, Articulo XII de la
Constitucion de Filipinas el solicitante, por ser extranjero, no puede adquirir terreno agricula privado,
estando incluido en este concepto un solar urbano como el de que se trata en este expediente.
Planteado el asunto en tales terminos ¿puede esta Corte considerar y resolver un punto no contendido
entre las partes — un punto que esta firme y definitivamente resuelto y no es objeto de apelacion?
Dicho de otra manera: ¿puede esta Corte, como hace la mayoria en su opinion, revocar una
conclusion del tribunal-inferior que no esta discutida en el alegato del apelante? ¿Podemos, en buena
ley procesal, declarar publico el terreno en cuestion por nuestra propia iniciativa, cuando el mismo
Procurador General, que representa al Estado, admite en su alegato el caracter privado del solar, y
solo suscita una cuestion, de derecho, a saber: que bajo nuestra Constitucion ningun acto traslativo
de dominio a favor de un extranjero es valido, asi se trata de predio urbano, porque la frase "terreno
agricola privado" qe se contiene en la Constitucion abarca no solo las fincas rusticas sino tambien las
urbanas? Y, sobre todo, ¿podemos, en equidad y justicia, considerar y revisar un punto que no solo no
esta discutido por las partes, pues lo dan por admitido y establecido, sino que es de derecho y
de hecho al propio tiempo? ¿Que base tenemos para hacerlo cuando no tenemos delante las pruebas
tanto testificales como documentales? Nuestra contestacion es, en absoluto, negativo.

La competencia de esta Corte para revisar las sentencias de los tribunales inferiores, de las cuales se
ha interpuesto apelacion, se basa en el principio de que dicha competencia, en su ejercicio, tiene que
limitarse a las cuestiones controvertidas, y esto se determina mediante el señalamiento de errores que
el apelante hace en su alegato. El articulo 19 del antiguo reglamento de los procedimientos en este
Tribunal Supremo decia en su primer parrafo lo siguiente:

Anexo al alegato del apelante y en pliego separado, se acompañara una relacion de los errores
de derecho que han de discutirse. La especificacion de cada uno de estos errores se hara por
parrafos separados, con toda claridad, de una manera concisa, y sin incurrir en repeticiones, y
seran numerados por orden correlativo.

El articulo 20 del mismo reglamento preceptuaba:

Ningun error de derecho fuera del relativo a competencia sobre la materia de un litigio, sera
tomado en consideracion como no se halle puntualizado en la relacion de los errores y
presentado como uno de los fundamentos en el alegato.

Interpretando estas disposiciones reglamentarias, la Corte hizo en el asunto de Santiago contra

Felix (24 Jur. Fil., 391), los siguientes pronunciamientos doctrinales:

1. APELACION; EFECTO DE DEJAR DE PRESENTAR RELACION DE ERRORES; REGLA

FIRMEMENTE ESTABLECIDA. — Es regla establecida por la jurisprudencia de los Tribunales de
estas Islas, en virtud de repetidas y uniformes sentencias de esta Corte, la de que si en una
apelacione el recurrente dejare de hacer señalamiento de los errores en que haya incurrido el
Tribunal inferior, y se limitare a discutir cuestiones de hecho en general, no es posible que este
Tribunal pueda considerar ni revisar la resolucion adversa a la parte apelante, por el motivo de
haberse dictado contra la ley y el peso de las pruebas, sino que es necesario que se señale y se
especifique el error o errores que determinaron la decision apelada que el apelante califica de
ilegal e injusta.

2. Id.; Id.; Regla Igual a la Adoptada por los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos. — Igual doctrina
legal se halla en observancia en los Tribunales de los Estados Unidos de America del Norte,
toda vez que una manifestacion general de que el Juzgado erro en dictar sentencia a favor de
una de las partes, no es suficiente como base para que la Corte pueda revisar la sentencia
apelada, pues que a no ser que la apreciacion hecha por un Juez de los hechos alegados y
 probados en juicio sea manifestamente contraria al resultado y peso de las pruebas, el Tribunal
de alzada suela aceptar el juicio y criterio del Juez sobre las cuestiones de hecho, y no procede
revocar sin motivo fundado la sentencia apelada. (Enriquez contraEnriquez, 8 Jur. Fil., 574;
Capellania de Tambobong contra Antonio, 8 Jur. Fil., 693; Paterno contra la Ciudad de Manila, 17
Jur. Fil., 26)" (Santiago contra Felix, 24 Jur. Fil., 391.)

Esta doctrina se reitero posteriormente en los siguientes asuntos: Tan Me Nio contra Administrador de
Aduanas, 34 Jur. Fil., 995, 996; Hernaez contra Montelibano, 34 Jur. Fil., 1011.

La regla 53, seccion 6, del actual reglamento de los tribunales, dispone lo siguiente:

SEC. 5. Questions that may be decided. — No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over
the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors and properly
argued in the brief, save as the court, at its option, may notice plain errors not specified, and
also clerical errors.

No se dira que la cuestion de si el terreno cuestionado es publico o privado, considerada y resuelta

por la mayoria en su decision sin previo señalamiento de error ni apropiada argumentacion en el
alegato del Procurador General, esta comprendida entre las salvedades de que habla la regla arriba
transcrita porque ni afecta a la jurisdiccion sobre la materia del litigio, ni es un "plain error," o "clerical
error."

Se notara que en el antiguo reglamento no habia eso de "plain errors not specified" (errores patentes o
manifiestos no especificados en el alegato). Pero ¿cabe invocar esta reserva en el caso que nos ocupa
Indudablemente que no, por las siguientes razones: (a) los autos no demuestran que el Juez a
quo cometio un error patente y manifiesto al declarar en su sentencia que el terreno no es publico sino
privado; no tenemos mas remedio que aceptar en su faz la conclusion del Juez sentenciador sobre
este respecto por la sencilla razon de que no tenemos ante nosotros las pruebas ni testificales ni
documentales, y, por tanto, no hay base para revisar, mucho menos para revocar dicha conclusion,
habiendose interpretado esta reserva en el sentido de que solo se puede tomar "conocimiento judicial
del error palpable con vista de los autos y procedimientos"; (b) aun admitiendo por un momento, a los
efectos de la argumentacion, que Su Señoria el Juez padecio error palpable al sentar dicha conclusion,
como quiera que el Procurador General no suscita la cuestion en su alegato debe entenderse que ha
renunciado a su derecho de hacerlo, optando por fundamentar su caso en otros motivos y razones;
por tanto, no estamos facultados para considerar motu proprio el supuesto error, pues evidentemente
no se trata de un descuido u oversight del representante del Estado, sino de una renuncia deliberada,
y la jurisprudencia sobre el particular nos dice que "el proposito subyacente, fundamental de la
reserva en la regla es el de prevenir el extravio de la justicia en virtud de un descuido." He aqui
algunas autoridades pertinentes:

Purpose of exception as to plain errors. — The proviso in the rule requiring assignments of
error, permitting the court, at its option, to notice a plain error not assigned, "was and in
intended, in the interest of justice, to reserve to the appellate court the right, resting in public
duty, to take cognizance of palpable error on theface of the record and proceedings, especially
such as clearly demonstrate that the suitor has no cause of action." Santaella vs. Otto F. Lange
Co. (155 Fed., 719, 724; 84 C. C. A., 145).

The rules does not intend that we are to sift the record and deal with questions which are of
small importance, but only to notice errors which are obvious upon inspection and of a
controlling character. The underlying purpose of this reservation in the rule is to prevent the
miscarriage of justice from oversight. Mastvs. Superior Drill Co. (154 Fed., 45, 51; 83 C. C. A.
157).

II. Hasta aqui hemos desarrollado nuestra argumentacion bajo el supuesto de que la calidad de
privado del terreno litigioso no es controversia justiciable en esta instancia por no estar suscitada la
cuestion en el alegato del Procurador General ni ser materia de disputa entre las partes en la apelacion
pendiente ante nosotros; por lo que, consiguientemente, no estamos facultados para revisar, mucho
menos revocar motu proprio la conclusion del tribunal a quo sobre el particular. Ahora vamos a
laborar bajo otro supuesto — el de que el Procurador General haya hecho el correspondiente
señalamiento de error y la cuestion este, por tanto, propiamente planteada ante esta Corte Suprema
para los efectos de la revision. La pregunta naturalmente en orden es la siguiente: ¿cometio error el
Juez a quo al declarar y conceptuar como privado el terreno en cuestion, o es, por el contrario,
acertada su conclusion a este respecto? Somos de opinion que el Juez no cometio error, que el
terreno de que se trata reune las condiciones juridicas necesarias para calificarlo como privado y
diferenciarlo de una propiedad de dominio publico, y que, por tanto, el solicitante tiene sobre la
propiedad un titulo confirmable bajo las disposiciones de la Ley de Registro de Terrenos No. 496.

Afirmase en la decision de la mayoria que el solicitante no ha podido demostrar que el o cualquiera de

sus causantes en derecho adquirio el lote del Estado mediante compra o concesion bajo las leyes,
ordenanzas y decretos promulgados por el Gobierno Español en Filipinas, o en virtud de los tramites
relativos a informacion posesoria bajo la ley hipotecaria en tiempo de España. De esto la mayoria saca
la conclusion de que el terreno cuestionado no es privado porque, segun su criterio, "todos los
terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (Gobierno Español, se quiere decir), ya mediante
compra, ya por concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico"; y citando como autoridad el asunto clasico
de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular la ponencia no admite mas excepcion a la regla que el caso en
que un terreno ha estado en la posesion del ocupante y de sus predecesores en interes desde tiempo
inmemorial, pues semejante posesion justificaria la presuncion de que el terreno nunca habia sido
parte del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun antes de la conquista española."

Lo que, en primer lugar, no parece correcto es la seguridad con que en la ponencia se afirma que el
terreno no se adquirio bajo la soberania española en virtud de cualquiera de los modos conocidos en
la legislacion de entonces, pues como no tenemos delante las pruebas, no hay naturalmente manera
de comprobar la certeza de la proposicion. Si se tiene en cuenta que el Director deTerrenos se opuso a
la solicitud de registro por el fundamento de que el terreno es de dominio publico, y que el tribunal
inferior desestimo este fundamento, la presuncion es que la calidad de privado del terreno se probo
satisfactoriamente, presuncion que queda robustecida si se considera que el Procurador General, al
sostener la apelacion del Gobierno, no discute ni cuestiona en su alegato la conclusion de que el
referido terreno es de propiedad particular.

Por otro lado, la mayoria parece dar un caracter demasiado absoluto y rigido a la proposicion de que
"todos los terrenos que no fueron adquiridos del Gobierno (en tiempo de España), mediante compra o
por concesion, pertenecen al dominio publico." Interpretando estrictamente la ley, esta Corte Suprema
denego el registro solicitado en el celebre asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular que cita la
mayoria en su opinion, por eso mismo que se acentua en la ponencia — por el fundamento de que
Cariño no pudo demostrar titulo de compra, concesion o informacion posesoria expedido por el
Gobierno en tiempo de España, siendo por consiguiente el terreno parte del dominio publico. Pero al
elevarse el asunto en grado de apelacion a la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos, la misma revoco
la sentencia de esta Corte, declarando el terreno como propiedad privada y decretando su registro a
nombre del solicitante. En la luminosa ponencia del Magistrado Holmes se sientan conclusiones que
proclama el espiritu liberal de aquel gran jurista y reafirman con vigor democratico los derechos de
propiedad de los nativos de estas Islas sobre sus predios en contra del concepto y teoria feudales de
que la Corona de España era la dueña absoluta hasta del ultimo palmo de tierra y de que ningun
habitante podia ser dueño de nada, a menos que tuviese en sus manos un titulo o papel expedido por
aquel Gobierno. He aqui lo que dice el Magistrado Holmes:

We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below — namely, whether the
plaintiff owns the land. The position of government, shortly stated, is that Spain assumed,
asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far it saw fit to permit private
titles to be acquired; that there was no prescripcion against the Crown, and that, if there was, a
decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to make the title good; that
the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land;
 that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so that the plaintiff has no rights that
the Philippine Government is bound to respect.

If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the Crown
of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the treaty of Paris, to which the United
States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's case is at an end.
It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees,"embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands
were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward
people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to those in the same zone of
civilization with themselves. It is true, also that, in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and
that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute
power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United
States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a
question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign shall insist upon the
theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall recognize actual
facts, are matters for it to decide. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, p. 596.)

Mas adelante se dice lo siguiente en la citada sentencia de la Corte Suprema Federal:

It is true that, by section 14, the Government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands were some, but not all, spanish conditions
has been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than 16 hectares of public lands
actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13, 1898. But this section
perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation was of land admitted to be
public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and under such circumstances as
to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were owners at that date.We hesitate to
suppose that it was intended to declare every native who had not a paper title a trespasser, and
to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat.

xxx xxx xxx

If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that
it was bas by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older
decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty clearly
that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant. In other
words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into
trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton vs.Murciano
(3 Phil., 537), while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the
exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and
the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact
was that titles were admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this
recognition in their books.

Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in (3 Phil., 546):
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription." It may be that this means
possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is admitted. As prescription, even
against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain, we see no sufficient reason for
hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in regard to lands over which Spain
had only a paper sovereignty.

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means may
prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
 recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to
convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger,
if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of
the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want
of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, as not to
confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
The royal decree of February 13, 1894, declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment
under the decree of 1880, for which adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed
as a confiscation, but as the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never
was disturbed. This same decree is quoted by the court of land registration for another
recognition of the common-law prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable
Crown land.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of opinion that law and justice require that
the applicant should be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the
practice and belief of those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined
interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain. (U. S. Supreme Court Reports, Vol. 212, pp.
597-599.)

Resulta evidente de la jurisprudencia sentada en el citado asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular
que cualquiera que fuese la teoria acerca del superdominio feudal que la Corona de España asumia
sobre todos los terrenos en Filipinas, en la practica y en la realidad se reconocia que el mero lapso de
tiempo en la posesion (20 o 30 años, segun el caso) podia establecer y de hecho establecia derechos
privados de propiedad por justaprescripcion, y el titulo presuntivo asi adquirido era para todos los
efectos equivalente a una concesion expresa o un titulo escrito expedido por el Gobierno. Pero de
todas maneras — parafraseando lo dicho por el Magistrado Holmes — aun suponiendo que España
tenia semejante soberania o superdominio feudal sobre todas las tierras en este archipielago, y que
contra otras naciones los Estados Unidos, al suceder a España, afirmaria dicha suberania, de ello no
se sigue que contra los habitantes de Filipinas el Gobierno americano (ahora la Republica filipina)
tomaria la posicion de que España tenia tal poder absoluto. Historicamente se sabe que el cambio de
soberania tuvo el efecto de liquidar muchas instituciones y leyes españolas que vinieron a ser
obsoletas, arcaicas en el nuevo estado de cosas, e incompatibles con el espiritu del nuevo regimen.
No habia ninguna razon para que este cambio no produjese tambien sus saludables efectos en las
normas juridicas del regimen de la propiedad sobre la tierra. Parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado
Holmes, y aplicando la doctrina al presente caso, no hay razon por que, medinate "una refinada
interpretacion de una casi olvidada ley de España," se considere como terreno publico lo que
evidentemente, bajo todos los conceptos y normas, es un terreno privado.

La jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto de Cariño contra el Gobierno Insular ha venido a establecer la

norma, la autoridad basica en los asuntos de registro ante nuestros tribunales. Al socaire de su
sentido y tendencia genuinamente liberal se han registrado bajo el sistema Torrens infinidad de
terrenos privados. En casos mucho menos meritorios que el que nos ocupa se ha reconocido por
nuestros tribunales el caracter o condicion de propiedad privada de los terrenos sobre que versaban
las solicitudes, aplicandose no las habilitadoras y supletorias clausulas de las leyes sobre terrenos
publicos — primeramente la Ley No. 926, despues la No. 2874, y finalmente la No. 141 del
Commonwealth — sino las disposiciones mas estrictas de la Ley No. 496 sobre registro de terrenos
privados, bajo el sistema Torrens. No existe motivo para que esa tendencia liberal y progresiva sufra
una desviacion en el presente caso.

Pero aun bajo la legislacion española interpretada estrictamente, creemos que el terreno en cuestion
es tan privado como el terreno en el asunto de Cariño, si no mas. Segun la sentencia del inferior — el
unido dato para este examen, pues ya se ha dicho repetidas veces que no tenemos delante las
pruebas — "el terreno objeto de la presente solicitud era primitivamente de Capitana Gina y que esta
estuvo en posesion desde el año 1880, despues paso a ser de Francisco Reformado hasta el año 1885,
mas tarde o sea en 1886 fue de Claro Lagdameo, a la muerte de este le sucedio en la posesion su
viuda Fortunata Olega de Lagdameo, esta en 1929 lo vendio a sus tres hijos Antonio, Luis y Rafael
appellidados Lagdameo, segun los Exhibitos F y G, y estos ultimos a su vez lo vendieron en 1938 al
solicitante Oh Cho, segun los Exhibitos B 1-y C-1." " ... Este terreno es un solar residencial dentro de
la poblacion del municipio de Guinayangan, Tayabas, y en el mismo existe una casa de materiales
fuertes que ocupa casi todo el terreno ..." (Pieza de Excepciones, pag. 8).

Como se ve, por lo menos desde 1880 habia un conocido propietario y poseedor del terreno — la
Capitana Gina. Ahora bien, coincide que el 25 de Junio de aquel año que precisamente cuando se
expidio el Decreto "para el ajuste y adjudicacion de los terrenos realengos ocupados indebidamente
por individuos particulares en las Islas Filipinas." Si bien es cierto que el objeto del Decreto o ley era
el ordenar que se cumpliesen y practicasen los procedimientos de ajuste y registro descritos en el
mismo, y en tal sentido el requirir que cada cual obtuviese un documento de titulo o, en su defecto,
perder su propiedad. Tambien es cierto que en el Decreto se expresaban ciertas salvedades que
paracian denotar que estos tramites formanes no eran de rigurosa aplicacion a todo el mundo. Una de
dicha salvedades, por ejemplo, proveia (articulo 5) que, para todos los efectos legales, "todos aquellos
que han estado en posesion por ciento periodo de tiempo serian considerados como dueños — para
terreno cultivado, 20 20 años sin interrupcion, es suficiente, y para terreno no cultivado, 30 años." Y el
articulo 6 dispone que "las partes interesadas no incluidas en los dos articulos anteriores (los
articulos que reconocen la prescripcion de 20 y 30 años) podran legalizar su posesion, y
consiguientemente adquirir pleno dominio sobre dichos terrenos, mediante procedimientos de ajuste
y adjudicacion tramitados de la siguiente manera." Esta ultima disposicion parece indicar, por sus
terminos, que no es aplicable a aquellos que ya han sido declarados dueños en virtud del simple
transcurso de cierto lapso de tiempo (Vease Cariño contra Gobierno Insular, supra, 598).

No consta en la sentencia del inferior que Capitana Gina se haya acogido a las disposiciones del
referido Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880, obteniendo un documento de titulo para legalizar su
posesion, pero tampoco consta positivamente lo contrario, pues no tenemos ante nosotros las
pruebas. Pero aun suponiendo que no se hayan cumplido los tramites formales prescritos en el
Decreto, de ello no se sigue que el terreno no era ya privado entonces, pues la presuncion es que no
hubo menester de semejante formalidad porque la Capitana Gina o sus causantes en derecho ya
habian sido declarados dueños del predio por el mero transcurso de un lapso de tiempo, a tenor de las
salvedades de que se ha hecho mencion. Esta presuncion es tanto mas logica cuanto que el articulo 8
del Decreto proveia para el caso de partes que no solicitaban dentro del plazo de un año el ajuste y
adjudicacion de terrenos de cuya posesion disfrutaban indebidamente, y conminaba que el Tesoro
"reasumira el dominio del Estado sobre los terrenos" y vendera en subasta la parte que no se reserva
para si; y no solo no consta en autos que la posesion de Capitata Gina o de sus causahabientes en
derecho se haya considerado jamas como ilegal o que el Estao y sus agentes hayan adoptado y
practicado contra ellos las diligencias y procedimientos de que trata el cittado articulo 8 del Decreto,
sino que, por el contrario, consta en la sentencia que desde Capitana Gina en 1880 hubo sucesivas
transmisiones de derechos primeramente a Francisco Reformado en 1885 y despues a Claro
Lagdameo en 1886, y a la muerte de este ultimo a su viuda Fortunata Olega de Lagdameo, de quien
pase el titulo en virtud de compraventa a sus hijos Antonio, Luis y Rafael apellidados Lagdameo, y la
ultima transaccion sobre el solar tuvo lugar en fecha bastante reciente, en 1938, cuando los
ultimamente nombrados lo vendieron a Oh Cho el solicitante en el presente expediente de registro. De
todo lo cual se deduce que el solar en cuestion fue considerado siempre como propiedad privada —
por lomenos alli donde la memoria alcanza — desde 1880 hasta que fenecio la soberania americana en
Filipinas, y que ni el Estado ni sus agentes se entrometieron jamas en el hecho de su posesion
exclusiva, continua y publica a titulo de dueño por diferentes personas no solo bajo el Decreto de 25
de Junio de 1880 tantas veces mencionado, sino aun bajo el Decreto de 13 de Febrero de 1894
(informacion posesoria) que fue practicamente el ultimo decreto expedido en las postrimerias de la
soberania española en relacion con el ajuste y adjudicacion de terrenos realengos o publicos. Y no se
diga que ello habria sido por inadvertencia de las autoridades, particularmente del Fisco, porque
tratandose de un solar situado en la misma poblacion de Guinayangan, uno de los pueblos mas
antiguos de la provincia de Tayabas, es indudable que si no reuniera las condiciones y requisitos para
ser conceptuado como propiedad privada y la posesion de sus ocupantes sucesivos fuese indebida e
ilegal, ya los agentes del Fisco y Tesoro lo hubiesen prestamente confiscado a tenor del articulo 8 ya
citado del Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880 (Vease Cariño contra Gobierno Insular, ut supra 598.) El que
nada de esto haya acontecido es la mejor prueba de que en tiempo de España los diferentes y
sucesivos ocupantes de este solar ya tenian titulo dominical perfecto, y es sencillamente absurdo,
ridiculo que ahora, al cabo de 66 años, se declare publico el terreno; y todo ¿por que y para que —
para rendir sometimiento, repitiendo de nuevo la sutil ironia del Magistrado Homles, a la "refinada
interpretacion de una casi olvidada ley de Espana." Y resulta mas la futilidad de este tardio tributo a un
anacronismo, a una momia juridica de un pasado cada vez mas remoto, si se considera que cuando el
Magistrado Homes pronuncio su sentencia a todas luces libera y progresiva (23 de Enero de 1909)
estabamos tan solo a escasamente 10 años desde la caida de la soberania española en Filipinas
mientras que ahora que se intenta una radical desviacion del surco trazado por la solida reja de dicha
sentencia estamos ya casi a medio siglo de distancia, con pleno dominio republicano sobre el
territorio nacional. Esto no debiera preocuparnos si no fuese porque esta decision de ahora puede ser
interpretada como una abrogacion de tantos precedentes moldeados en la turquesa de la doctrina
holmesiana, y al propio tiempo como la demarcacion del punto de partida de una nueva ruta en
nuestra jurisprudencia sobre registro de terrenos.

Sin embargo, en la opinion de la mayoria se dice que el solicitante no puede alegar con exito que su
lote es terreno privado porque la posesion de su primer predecessor (Capitana Gina) comenzo solo en
1880, mientras que en el asunto de Cariño contra El gobierno Insular, es exige como requisito la
posesion desde tiempo inmemorial, posesion que, segun la mayoria. "justificaria la presuncion de que
el terreno nunca habia sido parte del dominio publico, o que habia sido propiedad privada aun antes
de la conquista española." No parece sino que se quiere señalar una fecha, un año, como norma para
determinar la inmemorialidad del comienzo posesorio. Pero ¿que fecha, que año seria este? ¿1870,
'60, '50? ¿No seria suficiente v. gr. 1875, '65, o '55? En el asunto de Cariño la fecha conocida y
recordada de la posesion inicial podia fijarse alrededor de la mitad del siglo pasado, o sea 1849, pues
segun las pruebas, Cariño y sus antecesores habian poseido el terreno algo mas de 50 años hasta el
tratado de Paris — Abril 11, 1899. En el presente caso, desde Capitana Gina hasta que el solicitante
presento su solicitud de registro el 17 de Enero, 1940, habian transcurrido 60 años; de suerte que en
cuanto al tiempo de la posesion ambos casos son identicos. Con una ventaja a favor del presente
caso, a saber: mientras en el asunto de Cariño las tierras objeto de la solicitud eran pasto, en gran
parte, y solo cultivadas unas cuantas porciones, en el que nos ocupa el lote es urbano, sino en uno de
los pueblos mas antiguos de Filipinas, con una casa de materiales fuertes enclavada en el. Es innegabl
que la posesion de un solar urbano es mas concreta, mas terminante y mas adversa a todo el mundo,
sin excluir el Estado.

Pero aun limitandonos a la posesion bajo la soberania española para los efectos de la calificacion del
terreno como propiedad privada, todavia se puede sosener que el presente caso es tan bueno si no
mejor que el de Cariño. En el asunto de Cariño el punto de partida conocido es alrededor de 1849; en
el nuestro, 1880, en que comenzo la posesion de Capitana Gina, segun la sentencia apelada. Pero esto
no quiere decir que antes de Capitana Gina el solar no fuese ya finca urbana, habida por algun otro
como propiedad particular. Hay que tener en cuenta que se trata de un solar ubicado en la poblacion
de Guinayangan, uno de los mas antiguos en Tayabas. No tenemos delante la fecha exacta de la
fundacion de dicho pueblo, y no tenemos tiempo ahora para hacer investigacion historica. Pero
afortunadamente hemos logrado salvar de la devastacion causada por la reciente guerra una parte
sustancial de nuestra biblioteca privada, y uno de los libros salvados es el celebrado Diccionario
Geografico, Estadistico e Historico de las Islas Filipinas publicado en Madrid por Fr. Manuel Buzeta y
Fr. Felipe Bravo en 1950, segun el pie de imprenta, de dos volumenes. En el 2.º tomo, pp. 70 y 71, se da
una descripcion del pueblo de Guinayanga, con buena copia de datos historicos, geograficos, sociales
y economicos. Comienza la descripcion de esta manera: "Pueblo con cura y gobernadorcillo, en la Isla
de Luzon, provincia de Tayabas, dioc, de Nueva caceres"; . . "tiene como unas 1,500 casas, en general
de sencilla construccion, distinguiendose como de mejor fabrica la casa parroquial y la llamada
tribunal de justicia, donde esta la carcel. ." Considerando que podemos tomas conocimiento judicial
de que en tiempo de España el municipio y la parroquia eran la culminacion de un lento y largo
proceso de civilizacion y cristianizacion, podemos, por tanto, presumir que mucho antes de 1850 —
50, 70 o 100 años — el pueblo de Guinayangan ya era una unidad geografiva, civil y espiritual, en toda
regla, y con caracteres definitivos de viabilidad urbana. Tambien cabe perfectamente presumir que sus
habitantes poseian sus respectivos solares a titulo de dueños, al igual que lo que ocurria en otros
municipios debidamente organizados. No cabe presumir que el Estado les permitiera ocupar
indebidamente sus solares, sin que tomase contra ellos la accion de que habla el articulo 8 del referido
Decreto de 25 de Junio de 1880; y ya hemos visto que no consta en autos que el solar en cuestion
haya sido jamas confiscado por los agentes del Fisco o Tesoro, o declarada ilegal la posesion sobre el
mismo, a tenor de lo ordenado en el mencionado Decreto. Asi que desde cualquier angulo que se vea
el presente asunto, cae perfectamente bajo las normas de posesion inmemorial establecidas en el
asunto de Cariño.

III. Demostrado ya que el terreno en cuestion es privado, resulta forzosa la conclusion de que el
solicitante tiene derecho a que se confirme su titulo bajo las disposiciones de la Ley de Registro de
Terrenos No. 496, de acuerdo con el sistema Torrens. Es doctrina firmemente establecida en esta
jurisdiccion que un extranjero tiene perfecto derecho a que se registre a su nombre un terreno
privado, bajo el sistema Torrens, y que las disposiciones de la ley de terrenos publicos son
inaplicables a terrenos privados (veanse Agari contra Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas, 42 Jur. Fil., 150;
Tan Yungquip contra Director de Terrenos, 42 Jur. Fil., 134; Central Capiz contra Ramirez, 40 Jur. Fil.,
926). En el primer asunto citado el solicitante era un japones llamado Ichisuke Agari y la solicitud se
estimo por tratarse de un terreno privado, adquirido en tiempo de España mediant composicion con el
estado. En el segundo asunto el solicitante era un chino y se estimo la solicitud por la misma razon,
habiendose probado una posesion conocida y recordada de 30 a 40 años con anteriorida a la
presentacion de la solicitud, es decir, un tiempo mas corto que el del presente caso. Lo propio sucedio
en el tercer asunto citado, siendo españoles los dueños de la finca. Confirmese, por tanto, la sentencia
apelada.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112567. February 7, 2000]

THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO
L. CARIO, respondents.

DECISION

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed
the decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC NO. B-
467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cario, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, a petition[1] for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of
land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco,
who died on February 15, 1911,[2] and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and
sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.[3]
In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cario, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of
an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa
Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot
No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.[4]

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management),
disclosed:

"x x x

1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is
situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described
on plan Psu-108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre; and
that the same is agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are
sugarcane, bamboo clumps, chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of
light materials;

2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation,
riverbed, park and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and
conflict;

3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila
squatters nor any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application
and no patent or title has been issued therefor;

4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of
the land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa
Lauchangco as mentioned on the Extra judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which
applicant requested that said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case;
and that said land is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359
in the name of the petitioner;

x x x"[5]

With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only
oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record,
the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:

"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation
of title to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral
Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality
of Cabuyao, province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND
SIX HUNDRED FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant
AQUILINO L. CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino with residence
and postal address at Bian, Laguna.

After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.

SO ORDERED."[6]

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:
 I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS
NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN
THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY
CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT

HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[7]

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration[8] at bar is under the Land Registration Act.[9] Pursuant to said Act, he
who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title
since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase;
and informacion possessoria or possessory information title, which would become a titulo gratuito or
a gratuitous title.[10]

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single
muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership.[11] The Court has therefore no other recourse,
but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA
No. 141), as amended, private respondents petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of
evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to
prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,[12] as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the
law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:

"Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of first Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

x.................x.................x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter." (Emphasis
supplied)

Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant
can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to
constitute a grant from the State.[13]
Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases
is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. InDirector of
Lands vs. Agustin,[14] this Court stressed that:

" x x x The petitioner is not necessarily entiled to have the land registered under the
Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the
registration of his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the
satisfaction of the court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply because there is no
opposition offered. Courts may, even in the absence of any opposition, deny the
registration of the land under the Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts
presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which he is
attempting to have registered."[15]

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public
agricultural lands may be granted judicial recognition.[16]

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs.
Lee:"[17]

"x x x Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than
the utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by
its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private
ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming,
there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our
polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its right over the same as dominus. x x x"[18]

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title. [19]

In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject
parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his
petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he
theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral
assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that
his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.

Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[20]

From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering
Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and
his brother, Severino Carino. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969
declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax
Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of
Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.[21]
It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for
subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any
sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of
private respondent and not in the name of his parents.[22]

The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts
that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's predecessor-
in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[23] the
Court ratiocinated thus:

"This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked
certain facts of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case
(People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its
judgment on a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97 SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88;
Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al., G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is
an exception to the general rule that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final
and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal to this Court.

and-

x x x in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering
such a pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The
Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as
such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision."[24]

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the
original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never
declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the private respondent. Tax receipts and tax
declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of
ownership.[25] In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:[26]

"x x x if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for
the first time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax
receipts and declarations, of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title
over the property."[27]

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in
possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner", by which
characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere
conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the
private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged
possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without
more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor. [28]

In a case,[29] this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law; holding as follows:

"Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the
alleged twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda
 Vinluan which supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of
the application, was open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners.
This burden, private respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The
bare assertion that the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in
possession of the property for more than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's
declaration is hardly the 'well-nigh incontrovertible' evidence required in cases of this
nature. Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown
the nature of such possession. x x x"[30]

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,[31] the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied
on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

"We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de
dueno. Although they claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they
declared it for tax purposes only in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their
application in 1973, the lot was still cogon land or already cultivated land.

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peaflor, to testify on his alleged possession of the
land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was
presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners.

xxx

On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that

they have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain."[32]

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,[33] amending Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public
land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest
occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only
establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.

The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private
respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.[34] To reiterate, under the
Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.[35] Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
basic rights over the same as dominus.[36]

Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for
registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueno for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,[37] the Court is of the opinion, and so
finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the pubic domain not
registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional
Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly
described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and
power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 171631

Petitioner,

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

-versus- CARPIO-MORALES,*

PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ.

AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R.

DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ,and
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by
JOSE R. DELA PAZ,

Respondents. Promulgated:
 November 15, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents application for
registration and confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan,
Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz,
and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City
an application for registration of land [3] under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529)
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land
with an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212
and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for
registration, respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of attorney
showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-
00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on
January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's
Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18,
1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namataydated March
10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public
land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig,
Metro Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by
virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob[4] dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo
dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from
their deceased parent Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of aSinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay [5] dated March 10, 1979. In their application,
respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been
in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse possession of the same, in the concept of
owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of
possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, adverse,
continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept of an owner even
before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of the
application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented
documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among
others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a
period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax
declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or alleged in the
application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the
land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain
belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
was no other oppositor to the application.

On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default [6] against the whole world
except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of
their application.

In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for
registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R.
dela Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-
000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing
Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less, situated at
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree.

After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes
and other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be
accordingly undertaken.

SO ORDERED.[7]

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. [8] The CA, in its Decision dated
February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled
that respondents were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property through themselves andtheir predecessors-in-
interest. The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-
interest, who have been in actual, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in
the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were
able to present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant petition raising
the following grounds:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND
NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS'
NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN
THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN. [9]

In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in
the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was
unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show actual or constructive possession and occupation
over the subject land in the concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the
subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The
subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian Doctrine.

In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific
acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and
uninterrupted possession of the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated
1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance issued by the
Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up to date in their payment of real
property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations appearing on the survey plan of
the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable
portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the
petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review
under Rule 45.

The petition is meritorious.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court
is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of
are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[10] It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all
over again, unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of
support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.[11]

In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the
subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable
and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.[12] These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing
evidence.[13]

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable
public domain.[14] The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership),
who must prove that the land subject of theapplication is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of
the application (or claim) is alienable ordisposable.[15]

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084[16] (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot
Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic
Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres with the following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.

Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.

In Republic v. Sarmiento,[17] the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic
engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that this survey is inside
the alienable and disposable area, Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3,
1968 by the Bureau of Forestry, is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence
to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.

Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,[18] the Court held that:

 In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from
the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while
the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the
DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said
plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed.
Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,[19] the Court held that the applicant
bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that
he must present a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it
is within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further,
the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required
by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable
zone.Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to
establish that the subject land are part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as still inalienable
public domain.[20]

Anent respondents possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records
failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the
subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant
of the adjacent lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents predecessors-in-
interest' possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose,
who was born on March 19, 1939, [21] testified that since he attained the age of reason he
already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to them. [22]Amado testified that he
was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject property since 1950, [23] and on about the same
year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the subject land.[24]

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to
when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this
case. While Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo
and Ester, who earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was
presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in
possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It
is a rule that general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of
possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.[25]An applicant in a land registration case cannot
just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but must impress thereto the
facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership and possession of the land.[26]

Respondents earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of
their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only
prove possession since said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious
possession by respondents and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fideclaim of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or earlier.[27] Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject properties in the concept
of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest
started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule
that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to
possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or
of their predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are
merely indicia of a claim of ownership.[28]
 The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of
the disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel
of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square
meters situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE
LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all surnamed DE
LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the earth
even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been consolidated
because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11, 1965, by
Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The
land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009.
According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya
Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge
Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through
the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by
virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under claim of
ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land
was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was
enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who recalled
the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the
realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that
year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909
and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous
and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its
affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and
its payment of taxes on the land. 8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia
mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931,
in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on
November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the
said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its
payment of annual taxes thereon.9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of 1902
which provided that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both surveyed
and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration, occupation and
 purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of
the United States, or of said islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions
of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the land sought
to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the
applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not alienable and
registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. The Court of
Appeals correctly declared that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims of
Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of
plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining
locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was
recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the Kelly claims ha
subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had
made improvements on the June Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935.
It had submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet
introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological
mappings, geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June
Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.

The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in 1931,
and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are
within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of Atok
having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935,
they were removed from the public domain and had become private properties of Benguet
and Atok.

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was
perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the
Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel v. Apacible and
Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area
from the public domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his
location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to
deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were
exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The
reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral
perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
 reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location
and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as
against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v.
Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate
the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial
ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with
the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there is a valid location of a
mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the
property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co.,
171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present
and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the
surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim,
except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode
locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until
patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director of
the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold
Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to
secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his
possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements of the
mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even the government
of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become
the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof without due process
of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made subject to
existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of
the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at
least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the government established
under this Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural lands,
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development
or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within lands set
apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be
 valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby declared to
be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their respective locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force
removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against
even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a
patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of
ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by
acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar,
for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves had
acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged
possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the
evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We
defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of discretion or without
sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property asagricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and they were
claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they
seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that
she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less protest, the
same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of the
surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-known
principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath
and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as
mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the mining
locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may interfere with the
operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the
farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing
line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural
and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or
completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as
forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely mineral — once the mining claims were
perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be
so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by
those who were unlawfully occupying the surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of government established under the Constitution.
 SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the ownership
of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or under the
surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all
areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded and excepted from
all such patents.

SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included within all
areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit of the
State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public
and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other
than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his
ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could be
used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once
minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time, such use may
be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including
the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken
therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their
respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the
time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by
virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining
companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of the trial
court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Classification of Properties
March 4, 2016fundamentals of property ownership

CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTIES ACCORDING TO WHOM IT BELONGS

The New Civil Code expressly classified property according to ownership by this article:

Article 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

What are properties of public dominion?

 Public dominion or property owned by the State (or its political subdivisions) in its public or sovereign capacity and intended
for public use and not for the use of the State as a juridical person.

Article 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by
the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth;

Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public
works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.

*These subdivisions, however cannot register as their own any part of the public domain unless it can be proved that the grant
thereof has been made or possessed under the concept of an owner. They have no authority to control or regulate properties of
public domain for they are under the authority of Congress.

What are the kinds of properties of public dominion?

1. Property intended for public use or which can be used by everybody and others of similar character

2. Property which is not for public use but intended for public serviceor those which can be used only by duly authorized
persons, such as government buildings and vehicles

3. Property intended for the development of national wealth such as minerals, coal, oil, forest, and other natural resources

Further, under the 1987 Constitution (Section 3 Article XII) Lands of the public domain are classified into:

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according
to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. x x x

1. Agricultural

2. Forest or timber

3. Mineral lands
4. National parks

Examples of public dominion: 1987 Constitution: agricultural, forest, timber, national parks, mineral lands, water, minerals,
oils, coal, petroleum, sources of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, flora, fauna, roads, canals, rivers, banks, shores and others
similar in character. Agricultural land is the only alienable and disposable land of the government

What are the characteristics of properties of public domain?

1. It is beyond the commerce of man

2. It cannot be acquired by prescription

3. It cannot be registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title

4. It cannot be levied upon by execution nor can be attached.

What are properties of private ownership?

Private ownership or property owned by the State in its private capacity, and is known as patrimonial property. It may also be
owned by private persons, either individually or collectively.

Here are the provisions of the law which point out to this classification:

Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.

*Patrimonial property is the property of the State owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity, i.e., the property is not
intended for public use, or for some public service, or for the development of the national wealth.

Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

*Under Article 422 there must be a formal declaration by the executive or possibly legislative department of the government
that the property of the State is no longer needed for public use of for public service; otherwise, the property continues to be
property of public dominion notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for such use or service.
 Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use
and patrimonial property. (343)

*The political subdivisions of the national government may also own properties in their private capacity.

Article 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces,
cities, and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or
collectively.

What are the differences between public domain and patrimonial properties?

 Public dominion cannot be acquired by prescription, even by city or municipality.

 Patrimonial property of the State may be the subject of acquisition through prescription.

 Public lands become patrimonial property upon express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial and declaration that these are already alienable and disposable.

 And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public domain begin to run.

 113 of the Civil Code: All things that are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that the
property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

How are lands of public domain reclassified?

A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to classify public
lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. x x x

*The Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.

Article XII, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution states:

 Sec 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead or grant.

*The Constitution has laid down a prohibition for private corporations or associations to own lands of public domain but may
enjoy such only by lease in accordance to the terms expressly provided in the abovementioned section.

Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

*Under Article 422 there must be a formal declaration by the executive or possibly legislative department of the government
that the property of the State is no longer needed for public use of for public service; otherwise, the property continues to be
property of public dominion notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for such use or service.

What lands may not be declared open to disposition or concession?

 Those which have been reserved for public or quasi-public uses;

 Those which have been appropriated by the government;

 Those which have become private property like the friar lands and the ancestral lands under the IPRA Law

 The Revised Forestry code also provides that no land of the public domain 18% in slope or over shall be classified as
alienable and disposable;

 Submerged lands like the waters (sea or bay) above them are part of the inalienable natural resources.

What are the classification of lands under the Constitution?

 Classification under 1935 Constitution- Agricultural, forest or timber

 Classification under 1973 Constitution- Agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber and
mineral lands

 Classification under 1987 Constitution- Agricultural, forest, timber and national parks

 All others under the 1987 Constitution are patrimonial property

 No public land can be acquired except by a grant from the State

 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Tenth Congress

Republic Act No. 8371 October 29, 1997

AN ACT TO RECOGNIZE, PROTECT AND PROMOTE THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS CULTURAL COMMUNITIES/INDIGENOUS
PEOPLE, CREATING A NATIONAL COMMISSION OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE, ESTABLISHING IMPLEMENTING MECHANISMS,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:

a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development;

b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well
being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain;

c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;

d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human
rights and freedoms without distinctions or discriminations;

e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee
respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and
opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population and

f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring
maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/IPs, in order to render
such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these
rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, their rights to their ancestral domains.

CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs,
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects
or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals, corporations, and which are necessary to
ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral land, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and
other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas,
bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but
from which their traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and
clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under
claims of individual or traditional group ownership,continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure
or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered
into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;

c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of possession and ownership of
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated in accordance with this law;

d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands;

e) Communal Claims - refer to claims on land, resources and rights thereon, belonging to the whole community within a
defined territory

f) Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and
continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;

g) Free and Prior Informed Consent - as used in this Act shall mean the consensus of all members of the ICCs/IPs to; be
determined in accordance with their respective customary laws and practices, free from any external manipulation,
 interference and coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and scope of the activity, in a language an process
understandable to the community;

h) Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by
self-ascription and ascription by other, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and
defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed customs, tradition
and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-
indigenous religions and culture, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise
include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country,
at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment
of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who
may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains;

i) Indigenous Political Structure - refer to organizational and cultural leadership systems, institutions, relationships, patterns
and processed for decision-making and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, Council of Elders,
Council of Timuays, Bodong Holder, or any other tribunal or body of similar nature;

j) Individual Claims - refer to claims on land and rights thereon which have been devolved to individuals, families and clans
including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies and tree lots;

k) National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the office created under this Act, which shall be under the
Office of the President, and which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation
of policies, plans and programs to recognize, protect and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs;

l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held
under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have
been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest;

m) Nongovernment Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization that has been organized primarily for the
delivery of various services to the ICCs/IPs and has an established track record for effectiveness and acceptability in the
community where it serves;

n) People's Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization of members of an ICC/IP which is accepted as
representative of such ICCs/IPs;

o) Sustainable Traditional Resource Rights - refer to the rights of ICCs/IPs to sustainably use,manage, protect and conserve a)
land, air, water, and minerals; b) plants, animals and other organisms; c) collecting, fishing and hunting grounds; d) sacred
sites; and e) other areas of economic, ceremonial and aesthetic value in accordance with their indigenous knowledge, beliefs,
systems and practices; and

p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have
occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law
or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.

CHAPTER III
RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands/domains shall include such concepts of territories which cover
not only the physical environment but the total environment including the spiritual and cultural bonds to the area which the ICCs/IPs
possess, occupy and use and to which they have claims of ownership.

Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all
resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally
holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot
be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.

Section 6. Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands and domains shall consist of all areas generally belonging to
ICCs/IPs as referred under Sec. 3, items (a) and (b) of this Act.

Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs t their ancestral domains shall be
recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:
 a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by
ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains;

b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold
the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural
resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for
the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interfere with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

c. Right to Stay in the Territories- The right to stay in the territory and not be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated
without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent domain. Where relocation is
considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take place only with the free and prior informed
consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever possible, they shall be guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral
domains, as soon as the grounds for relocation cease to exist. When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement
or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at
least equal to that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and future development.
Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully compensated for any resulting loss or injury;

d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the State shall endeavor
to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life support system: Provided, That the
displaced ICCs/IPs shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands until such time that the normalcy and safety of such
lands shall be determined: Provided, further, That should their ancestral domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of the
previous settlements are not possible, displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which they have been
resettled: Provided, furthermore, That basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them to ensure that their needs are
adequately addressed:

e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into the domains;

f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated systems for the
management of their inland waters and air space;

g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been reserved for
various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service; and

h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area where the land is
located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice
whenever necessary.

Section 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. - The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs, to their ancestral lands shall be
recognized and protected.

a. Right to transfer land/property. - Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights to/among members of
the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.

b. Right to Redemption. - In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any agreement or
devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,or is transferred for an
unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem the same within a period not
exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer.

Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. - ICCs/IPs occupying a duly certified ancestral domain shall
have the following responsibilities:

a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting
the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;

b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded areas and other
development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable remuneration; and
 c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations for its effective
implementation.

Section 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. - Unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of any portion of the ancestral
domain, or any violation of the rights herein before enumerated, shall be punishable under this law. Furthermore, the Government shall
take measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs from taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure
ownership, possession of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs.

Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native Title
shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.

Section 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act
496. - Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to individually-owned ancestral lands who, by themselves or through
their predecessors-in -interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since the
immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the
members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of Commonwealth Act
141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for agricultural,
residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or more, are hereby classified
as alienable and disposable agricultural lands.

The option granted under this Section shall be exercised within twenty (20) years from the approval of this Act.

CHAPTER IV
RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE AND EMPOWERMENT

Section 13. Self-Governance. - The State recognizes the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to self-governance and self-determination and
respects the integrity of their values, practices and institutions. Consequently, the State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs to freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Section 14. Support for Autonomous Regions. - The State shall continue to strengthen and support the autonomous regions created
under the Constitution as they may require or need. The State shall likewise encourage other ICCs/IPs not included or outside Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordillera to use the form and content of their ways of life as may be compatible with the fundamental rights defined
in the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and other internationally recognized human rights.

Section 15. Justice System, Conflict Resolution Institutions and Peace Building Processes. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to
use their own commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and other
customary laws and practices within their respective communities and as may be compatible with the national legal system and with
internationally recognized human rights.

Section 16. Right to Participate in Decision -Making. - ICCs/IPs have the right to participate fully, if they so choose, at all levels of
decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies through procedures determined by them as well as to
maintain and develop their own indigenous political structures. Consequently, the State shall ensure that the ICCs/IPs shall be given
mandatory representation in policy-making bodies and other local legislative councils.

Section 17. Right to Determine and Decide Priorities for Development. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to determine and decide
their own priorities for development affecting their lives, beliefs, institutions, spiritual well-being, and the lands they own, occupy or use.
They shall participate in the formulation,implementation and evaluation of policies, plans and programs for national, regional and local
development which may directly affect them.

Section 18. Tribal Barangays. - The ICCs/IPs living in contiguous areas or communities where they form the predominant population
but which are located in municipalities, provinces or cities where they do not constitute the majority of the population, may form or
constitute a separate barangay in accordance with the Local Government Code on the creation of tribal barangays.

Section 19. Role of Peoples Organizations. - The State shall recognize and respect the role of independent ICCs/IPs organizations
to enable the ICCs/IPs to pursue and protect their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means.

Section 20. Means for Development /Empowerment of ICCs/IPs. - The Government shall establish the means for the full
development/empowerment of the ICCs/IPs own institutions and initiatives and, where necessary, provide the resources needed
therefor.
 CHAPTER V
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs. - Consistent with the equal protection clause of the Constitution
of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights including the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due
recognition of their distinct characteristics and identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges
enjoyed by the rest of the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational and
other rights and privileges available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall likewise ensure that the employment of
any form of force of coersion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by law.

The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution and relevant international
instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no provision in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in
the diminution of rights and privileges already recognized and accorded to women under existing laws of general application.

Section 22. Rights during Armed Conflict. - ICCs/IPs have the right to special protection and security in periods of armed conflict.
The State shall observe international standards, in particular, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, for the protection of civilian
populations in circumstances of emergency and armed conflict, and shall not recruit members of the ICCs/IPs against their will into
armed forces, and in particular, for the use against other ICCs/IPs; not recruit children of ICCs/IPs into the armed forces under any
circumstance; nor force indigenous individuals to abandon their lands, territories and means of subsistence, or relocate them in special
centers for military purposes under any discriminatory condition.

Section 23. Freedom from Discrimination and Right to Equal Opportunity and Treatment. - It shall be the right of the ICCs/IPs to
be free from any form of discrimination, with respect to recruitment and conditions of employment, such that they may enjoy equal
opportunities as other occupationally-related benefits, informed of their rights under existing labor legislation and of means available to
them for redress, not subject to any coercive recruitment systems, including bonded labor and other forms of debt servitude; and equal
treatment in employment for men and women, including the protection from sexual harassment.

Towards this end, the State shall within the framework of national laws and regulations, and in cooperation with the ICCs/IPs
concerned, adopt special measures to ensure the effective protection with regard to the recruitment and conditions of employment of
persons belonging to these communities, to the extent that they are not effectively protected by the laws applicable to workers in
general.

ICCs/IPs shall have the right to association and freedom for all trade union activities and the right to conclude collective bargaining
agreements with employers' conditions. They shall likewise have the right not to be subject to working conditions hazardous to their
health, particularly through exposure to pesticides and other toxic substances.

Section 24. Unlawful Acts Pertaining to Employment. - It shall be unlawful for any person:

a. To discriminate against any ICC/IP with respect to the terms and conditions of employment on account of their descent.
Equal remuneration shall be paid to ICC/IP and non-ICC/IP for work of equal value; and

b. To deny any ICC/IP employee any right or benefit herein provided for or to discharge them for the purpose of preventing
them from enjoying any of the rights or benefits provided under this Act.

Section 25. Basic Services. - The ICC/IP have the right to special measures for the immediate, effective and continuing improvement
of their economic and social conditions, including in the areas of employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation,
health and social security. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous women, elderly, youth,
children and differently-abled persons. Accordingly, the State shall guarantee the right of ICCs/IPs to government 's basic services
which shall include, but not limited to water and electrical facilities, education, health and infrastructure.

Section 26. Women. - ICC/IP women shall enjoy equal rights and opportunities with men, as regards the social, economic, political and
cultural spheres of life. The participation of indigenous women in the decision-making process in all levels, as well as in the
development of society, shall be given due respect and recognition.

The State shall provide full access to education, maternal and child care, health and nutrition, and housing services to indigenous
women. Vocational, technical, professional and other forms of training shall be provided to enable these women to fully participate in all
aspects of social life. As far as possible, the State shall ensure that indigenous women have access to all services in their own
languages.

Section 27. Children and Youth. - The State shall recognize the vital role of the children and youth of ICCs/IPs in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. Towards this end, the State
shall support all government programs intended for the development and rearing of the children and youth of ICCs/IPs for civic
efficiency and establish such mechanisms as may be necessary for the protection of the rights of the indigenous children and youth.
Section 28. Integrated System of Education. - The State shall, through the NCIP, provide a complete, adequate and integrated
system of education, relevant to the needs of the children and Young people of ICCs/IPs.

CHAPTER VI
CULTURAL INTEGRITY

Section 29. Protection of Indigenous Culture, traditions and institutions. - The state shall respect, recognize and protect the right
of the ICCs/IPs to preserve and protect their culture, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of
national plans and policies.

Section 30. Educational Systems. - The State shall provide equal access to various cultural opportunities to the ICCs/IPs through the
educational system, public or cultural entities, scholarships, grants and other incentives without prejudice to their right to establish and
control their educational systems and institutions by providing education in their own language, in a manner appropriate to their cultural
methods of teaching and learning. Indigenous children/youth shall have the right to all levels and forms of education of the State.

Section 31. Recognition of Cultural Diversity. - The State shall endeavor to have the dignity and diversity of the cultures, traditions,
histories and aspirations of the ICCs/IPs appropriately reflected in all forms of education, public information and cultural-educational
exchange. Consequently, the State shall take effective measures, in consultation with ICCs/IPs concerned, to eliminate prejudice and
discrimination and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among ICCs/IPs and all segments of society. Furthermore,
the Government shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. The State
shall likewise ensure the participation of appropriate indigenous leaders in schools, communities and international cooperative
undertakings like festivals, conferences, seminars and workshops to promote and enhance their distinctive heritage and values.

Section 32. Community Intellectual Rights. - ICCs/IPs have the right to practice and revitalize their own cultural traditions and
customs. The State shall preserve, protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures as well as the right
to the restitution of cultural, intellectual, religious, and spiritual property taken without their free and prior informed consent or in violation
of their laws, traditions and customs.

Section 33. Rights to Religious, Cultural Sites and Ceremonies. - ICCs/IPs shall have the right to manifest, practice, develop teach
their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to maintain, protect and have access to their religious and
cultural sites; the right to use and control of ceremonial object; and the right to the repatriation of human remains. Accordingly, the State
shall take effective measures, in cooperation with the burial sites, be preserved, respected and protected. To achieve this purpose, it
shall be unlawful to:

a. Explore, excavate or make diggings on archeological sites of the ICCs/IPs for the purpose of obtaining materials of cultural
values without the free and prior informed consent of the community concerned; and

b. Deface, remove or otherwise destroy artifacts which are of great importance to the ICCs/IPs for the preservation of their
cultural heritage.

Section 34. Right to Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Practices and to Develop own Sciences and Technologies. - ICCs/IPs
are entitled to the recognition of the full ownership and control and protection of their cultural and intellectual rights. They shall have the
right to special measures to control, develop and protect their sciences, technologies and cultural manifestations, including human and
other genetic resources, seeds, including derivatives of these resources, traditional medicines and health practices, vital medicinal
plants, animals and minerals, indigenous knowledge systems and practices, knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora, oral
traditions, literature, designs, and visual and performing arts.

Section 35. Access to Biological and Genetic Resources. - Access to biological and genetic resources and to indigenous knowledge
related to the conservation, utilization and enhancement of these resources, shall be allowed within ancestral lands and domains of the
ICCs/IPs only with a free and prior informed consent of such communities, obtained in accordance with customary laws of the
concerned community.

Section 36. Sustainable Agro-Technical Development. - The State shall recognize the right of ICCs/IPs to a sustainable agro-
technological development and shall formulate and implement programs of action for its effective implementation. The State shall
likewise promote the bio-genetic and resource management systems among the ICCs/IPs and shall encourage cooperation among
government agencies to ensure the successful sustainable development of ICCs/IPs.

Section 37. Funds for Archeological and Historical Sites. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the right to receive from the national
government all funds especially earmarked or allocated for the management and preservation of their archeological and historical sites
and artifacts with the financial and technical support of the national government agencies.

CHAPTER VII
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (NCIP)
Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities /Indigenous Peoples (NCCP). - to carry out the policies
herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP), which shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of
the ICCs/IPs and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.

Section 39. Mandate. - The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with due regard to their beliefs,
customs, traditions and institutions.

Section 40. Composition. - The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President and shall be composed of
seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines from a list of recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas: Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II;
the rest of Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western
Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners
shall be women.

Section 41. Qualifications, Tenure, Compensation. - The Chairperson and the six (6) Commissioners must be natural born Filipino
citizens, bonafide members of ICCs/IPs as certified by his/her tribe, experienced in ethnic affairs and who have worked for at least ten
(10) years with an ICC/IP community and/or any government agency involved in ICC/IP, at least 35 years of age at the time of
appointment, and must be of proven honesty and integrity: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be the
members of the Philippine Bar: Provided, further, That the members of the NCIP shall hold office for a period of three (3) years, and
may be subject to re-appointment for another term: Provided, furthermore, That no person shall serve for more than two (2) terms.
Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired term of the predecessor and in no case shall a member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity: Provided, finally, That the Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the Salary Standardization Law.

Section 42. Removal from Office. - Any member of the NCIP may be removed from office by the President, on his own initiative or
upon recommendation by any indigenous community, before the expiration of his term for cause and after complying with due process
requirement of law.

Section 43. Appointment of Commissioners. - The President shall appoint the seven (7) Commissioners of the NCIP within ninety
(90) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Section 44. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the NCIP shall have the following powers, jurisdiction and function:

a) To serve as the primary government agency through which ICCs/IPs can seek government assistance and as the medium,
thorough which such assistance may be extended;

b) To review and assess the conditions of ICCs/IPs including existing laws and policies pertinent thereto and to propose
relevant laws and policies to address their role in national development;

c) To formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects for the economic, social and cultural development of the
ICCs/IPs and to monitor the implementation thereof;

d) To request and engage the services and support of experts from other agencies of government or employ private experts
and consultants as may be required in the pursuit of its objectives;

e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;

f) Subject to existing laws, to enter into contracts, agreements, or arrangement, with government or private agencies or entities
as may be necessary to attain the objectives of this Act, and subject to the approval of the President, to obtain loans from
government lending institutions and other lending institutions to finance its programs;

g) To negotiate for funds and to accept grants, donations, gifts and/or properties in whatever form and from whatever source,
local and international, subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines, for the benefit of ICCs/IPs and administer
the same in accordance with the terms thereof; or in the absence of any condition, in such manner consistent with the interest
of ICCs/IPs as well as existing laws;

h) To coordinate development programs and projects for the advancement of the ICCs/IPs and to oversee the proper
implementation thereof;

i) To convene periodic conventions or assemblies of IPs to review, assess as well as propose policies or plans;
 j) To advise the President of the Philippines on all matters relating to the ICCs/IPs and to submit within sixty (60) days after the
close of each calendar year, a report of its operations and achievements;

k) To submit to Congress appropriate legislative proposals intended to carry out the policies under this Act;

l) To prepare and submit the appropriate budget to the Office of the President;

m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of permit, lease, grant, or any other similar authority for the
disposition, utilization, management and appropriation by any private individual, corporate entity or any government agency,
corporation or subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the ancestral domain taking into consideration the consensus
approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;

n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various offices within the Commission:

o) To promulgate the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of this Act;

p) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be directed by the President of the Republic of the Philippines; and

q) To represent the Philippine ICCs/IPs in all international conferences and conventions dealing with indigenous peoples and
other related concerns.

Section 45. Accessibility and Transparency. - Subject to such limitations as may be provided by law or by rules and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto, all official records, documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, as well as
research data used as basis for policy development of the Commission shall be made accessible to the public.

Section 46. Officers within the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the following offices which shall be responsible for the implementation of
the policies herein after provided:

a. Ancestral Domains Office - The Ancestral Domain Office shall be responsible for the identification, delineation and
recognition of ancestral land/domains. It shall also be responsible for the management of ancestral lands/domains in
accordance with the master plans as well as the implementation of the ancestral domain rights of the ICCs/IPs as provided in
Chapter III of this Act. It shall also issue, upon the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned, certification prior
to the grant of any license, lease or permit for the exploitation of natural resources affecting the interests of ICCs/IPs in
protecting the territorial integrity of all ancestral domains. It shall likewise perform such other functions as the Commission may
deem appropriate and necessary;

b. Office on Policy, Planning and Research - The Office on Policy, Planning and Research shall be responsible for the
formulation of appropriate policies and programs for ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to, the development of a Five-Year
Master Plan for the ICCs/IPs. Such plan shall undergo a process such that every five years, the Commission shall endeavor to
assess the plan and make ramifications in accordance with the changing situations. The Office shall also undertake the
documentation of customary law and shall establish and maintain a Research Center that would serve as a depository of
ethnographic information for monitoring, evaluation and policy formulation. It shall assist the legislative branch of the national
government in the formulation of appropriate legislation benefiting ICCs/IPs.

c. Office of Education, Culture and Health - The Office on Culture, Education and Health shall be responsible for the effective
implementation of the education, cultural and related rights as provided in this Act. It shall assist, promote and support
community schools, both formal and non-formal, for the benefit of the local indigenous community, especially in areas where
existing educational facilities are not accessible to members of the indigenous group. It shall administer all scholarship
programs and other educational rights intended for ICC/IP beneficiaries in coordination with the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and the Commission on Higher Education. It shall undertake, within the limits of available appropriation, a
special program which includes language and vocational training, public health and family assistance program and related
subjects.

It shall also identify ICCs/IPs with potential training in the health profession and encourage and assist them to enroll in schools
of medicine, nursing, physical therapy and other allied courses pertaining to the health profession.

Towards this end, the NCIP shall deploy a representative in each of the said offices who shall personally perform the foregoing
task and who shall receive complaints from the ICCs/IPs and compel action from appropriate agency. It shall also monitor the
activities of the National Museum and other similar government agencies generally intended to manage and preserve historical
and archeological artifacts of the ICCs /IPs and shall be responsible for the implementation of such other functions as the
NCIP may deem appropriate and necessary;

d. Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns - The Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns
shall serve as the Office through which the NCIP shall coordinate with pertinent government agencies specially charged with
 the implementation of various basic socio-economic services, policies, plans and programs affecting the ICCs/IPs to ensure
that the same are properly and directly enjoyed by them. It shall also be responsible for such other functions as the NCIP may
deem appropriate and necessary;

e. Office of Empowerment and Human Rights - The Office of Empowerment and Human Rights shall ensure that indigenous
socio- political, cultural and economic rights are respected and recognized. It shall ensure that capacity building mechanisms
are instituted and ICCs/IPs are afforded every opportunity, if they so choose, to participate in all level decision-making. It shall
likewise ensure that the basic human rights, and such other rights as the NCIP may determine, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations are protected and promoted;

f. Administrative Office - The Administrative Office shall provide the NCIP with economical, efficient and effective services
pertaining to personnel, finance, records, equipment, security, supplies, and related services. It shall also administer the
Ancestral Domains Fund; and

g. Legal Affairs Office - There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall advice the NCIP on all legal matters concerning
ICCs/IPs and which shall be responsible for providing ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in litigation involving community interest.
It shall conduct preliminary investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the ICCs/IPs against a natural or juridical person
believed to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On the basis of its findings, it shall initiate the filing of appropriate legal or
administrative action to the NCIP.

Section 47. Other Offices. - The NCIP shall have the power to create additional offices as it may deem necessary subject to existing
rules and regulations.

Section 48. Regional and Field Offices. - Existing regional and field offices shall remain to function under the strengthened
organizational structure of the NCIP. Other field office shall be created wherever appropriate and the staffing pattern thereof shall be
determined by the NCIP: Provided, That in provinces where there are ICCs/IPs but without field offices, the NCIP shall establish field
offices in said provinces.

Section 49. Office of the Executive Director. - The NCIP shall create the Office of the Executive Director which shall serve as its
secretariat. The office shall be headed by an Executive Director who shall be appointed by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines upon the recommendation of the NCIP on a permanent basis. The staffing pattern of the office shall be determined by the
NCIP subject to existing rules and regulations.

Section 50. Consultative Body. - A body consisting of the traditional leaders, elders and representatives from the women and youth
sectors of the different ICCs/IPs shall be constituted by the NCIP from the time to time to advise it on matters relating to the problems,
aspirations and interests of the ICCs/IPs.

CHAPTER VIII
DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 51. Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains. - Self-delineation shall be guiding principle in the identification and
delineation of ancestral domains. As such, the ICCs/IPs concerned shall have a decisive role in all the activities pertinent thereto. The
Sworn Statement of the Elders as to the Scope of the territories and agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs, if any, will be
essential to the determination of these traditional territories. The Government shall take the necessary steps to identify lands which the
ICCs/IPs concerned traditionally occupy and guarantee effective protection of their rights of ownership and possession thereto.
Measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs concerned to land which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly
of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

Section 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the
following procedures:

a. Ancestral Domains Delineated Prior to this Act - The provisions hereunder shall not apply to ancestral domains/lands
already delineated according to DENR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1993, nor to ancestral lands and domains
delineated under any other community/ancestral domain program prior to the enactment of his law. ICCs/IPs enactment of this
law shall have the right to apply for the issuance of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) over the area without going
through the process outlined hereunder;

b. Petition for Delineation - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the
ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

c. Delineation Paper - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members
therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs
concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine
involvement and participation by the members of the communities concerned;

d. Proof required - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other
documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs
in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:

1. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3. Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old
villages;

4. Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs
concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

5. Survey plans and sketch maps;

6. Anthropological data;

7. Genealogical surveys;

8. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;

9. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces
and the like; and

10. Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

e. Preparation of Maps - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains
Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural
features and landmarks embraced therein;

f. Report of Investigation and Other Documents - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall
be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g. Notice and Publication - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned
shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the
local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for
two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of such
publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute:
Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;

h. Endorsement to NCIP - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof.
However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence:
Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection
and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice,
copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided,
furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the contending parties
to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication
according to the selection below.

i. Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies - The Chairperson of the NCIP shall
certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, Department of the Interior and Local Government, and Department of Justice, the
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area
shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed;

j. Issuance of CADT - ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been officially delineated and determined by the NCIP shall be
issued a CADT in the name of the community concerned, containing a list of all those identified in the census; and
 k. Registration of CADTs - The NCIP shall register issued certificates of ancestral domain titles and certificates of ancestral
lands titles before the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.

Section 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands. -

a. The allocation of lands within any ancestral domain to individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants shall be
left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions;

b. Individual and indigenous corporate claimants of ancestral lands which are not within ancestral domains, may have their
claims officially established by filing applications for the identification and delineation of their claims with the Ancestral
Domains Office. An individual or recognized head of a family or clan may file such application in his behalf or in behalf of his
family or clan, respectively;

c. Proofs of such claims shall accompany the application form which shall include the testimony under oath of elders of the
community and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the areas since time
immemorial by the individual or corporate claimants in the concept of owners which shall be any of the authentic documents
enumerated under Sec. 52 (d) of this act, including tax declarations and proofs of payment of taxes;

d. The Ancestral Domains Office may require from each ancestral claimant the submission of such other documents, Sworn
Statements and the like, which in its opinion, may shed light on the veracity of the contents of the application/claim;

e. Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
cause the publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted including a translation in the native language
of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be
posted at the local, provincial, and regional offices of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation
once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the
date of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a
valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspapers and radio station are not
available

f. Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall investigate and inspect each application, and if
found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The Ancestral Domains office shall reject
any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral
Domains office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial
shall be appealable to the NCIP. In case of conflicting claims among individual or indigenous corporate claimants, the
Ancestral domains Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary
resolution of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings for the
identification or delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the Director of Lands shall represent the interest of
the Republic of the Philippines; and

g. The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and every application surveyed and delineated to
the NCIP, which shall, in turn, evaluate or corporate (family or clan) claimant over ancestral lands.

Section 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs, review existing claims
which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any
person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

Section 55. Communal Rights. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, shall be
presumed to be communally held: Provide, That communal rights under this Act shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in
Republic Act. No. 386, otherwise known as the New Civil Code.

Section 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.

Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be
allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years
renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally,
That the all extractions shall be used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 58. Environmental Consideration. - Ancestral domains or portion thereof, which are found necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined by the appropriate agencies
with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with the full and effective assistance
of the government agencies. Should the ICCs/IPs decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in
writing. The consent of the ICCs/IPs should be arrived at in accordance with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic
requirement of the existing laws on free and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately
revert to the ICCs/IPs in accordance with a program for technology transfer: Provided, further, That no ICCs/IPs shall be displaced or
relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section without the written consent of the specific persons authorized to give consent.

Section 59. Certification Precondition. - all department and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from
issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certificate shall only be issued after
a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domain Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certificate shall be
issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or
production sharing agreement while there is pending application CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop
or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

Section 60. Exemption from Taxes. - All lands certified to be ancestral domains shall be exempt from real property taxes, specially
levies, and other forms of exaction except such portion of the ancestral domains as are actually used for large-scale agriculture,
commercial forest plantation and residential purposes and upon titling by other by private person: Provided, that all exactions shall be
used to facilitate the development and improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 61. Temporary Requisition Powers. - Prior to the establishment of an institutional surveying capacity whereby it can
effectively fulfill its mandate, but in no case beyond three (3) years after its creation, the NCIP is hereby authorized to request the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) survey teams as well as other equally capable private survey teams,
through a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), to delineate ancestral domain perimeters. The DENR Secretary shall accommodate any
such request within one (1) month of its issuance: Provided, That the Memorandum of Agreement shall stipulate, among others, a
provision for technology transfer to the NCIP.

Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as
delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the
disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs
regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That in any decision, order,
award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof.

Section 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or
ambiguity in the application of laws shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 64. Remedial Measures. - Expropriation may be resorted to in the resolution of conflicts of interest following the principle of
the "common good". The NCIP shall take appropriate legal action for the cancellation of officially documented titles which were acquired
illegally: Provided, That such procedure shall ensure that the rights of possessors in good faith shall be respected: Provided, further,
That the action for cancellation shall be initiated within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally, That the action for
reconveyance shall be a period of ten (10) years in accordance with existing laws.

CHAPTER IX
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Section 65. Primary of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be
used to resolve the dispute.

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted
all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

Section 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. - Decisions of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by way of a petition
for review.

Section 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders. - Upon expiration of the period here provided and no appeal is perfected by
any of the contending parties, the Hearing Officer of the NCIP, on its own initiative or upon motion by the prevailing party, shall issue a
writ of execution requiring the sheriff or the proper officer to execute final decisions, orders or awards of the Regional Hearing Officer of
the NCIP.

Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining
to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;

b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements and other document of similar nature as
may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;

c. To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and

d. To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending therefore it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic activity.

Section 70. No restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. - No inferior court of the Philippines shall have the jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the NCIP or any of its duly authorized or designated offices in any case,
dispute or controversy to, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.

CHAPTER X
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS FUND

Section 71. Ancestral Domains Fund. - There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Ancestral Domains Fund, an initial
amount of the One Hundred thirty million pesos(P130,000,000) to cover compensation for expropriated lands, delineation and
development of ancestral domains. An amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) shall be sourced from the gross income of the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) from its lotto operation, Ten millions pesos (P10,000,000) from the gross receipts of the
travel tax of the preceding year, the fund of the Social Reform Council intended for survey and delineation of ancestral lands/domains,
and such other source as the government may be deem appropriate. Thereafter such amount shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act. Foreign as well as local funds which are made available for the ICCs/IPs through the government of the Philippines
shall be coursed through the NCIP. The NCIP may also solicit and receive donations, endowments shall be exempted from income or
gift taxes and all other taxes, charges or fees imposed by the government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

CHAPTER XI
PENALTIES

Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such
as, but not limited to, authorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall
commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in
accordance with the customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be imposed. This provision shall be without
prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws. In which case, any person who violates any provision of
this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12) years or a
fine not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such fine
and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage
may have been suffered by the latter as a consequence of the unlawful act.

Section 73. Persons Subject to Punishment. - If the offender is a juridical person, all officers such as, but not limited to, its president,
manager, or head of office responsible for their unlawful act shall be criminally liable therefor, in addition to the cancellation of
certificates of their registration and/or license: Provided, That if the offender is a public official, the penalty shall include perpetual
disqualification to hold public office.

CHAPTER XII
MERGER OF THE OFFICE FOR NORTHERN CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (ONCC) AND THE OFFICE FOR SOUTHERN
CULTURAL COMMUNITIES (OSCC)

Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC. - The Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and the Office of Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are hereby merged as organic offices of the
NCIP and shall continue to function under a revitalized and strengthened structures to achieve the objectives of the NCIP: Provided,
That the positions of Regional Directors and below, are hereby phased-out upon the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further, That
officials and employees of the phased-out offices who may be qualified may apply for reappointment with the NCIP and may be given
prior rights in the filing up of the newly created positions of NCIP, subject to the qualifications set by the Placement Committee:
Provided, furthermore, That in the case where an indigenous person and a non-indigenous person with similar qualifications apply for
the same position, priority shall be given to the former. Officers and employees who are to be phased-out as a result of the merger of
their offices shall be entitled to gratuity a rate equivalent to one and a half (1 1/2) months salary for every year of continuous and
satisfactory service rendered or the equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to them on the basis of the highest salary received. If
they are already entitled to retirement benefits or the gratuity herein provided. Officers and employees who may be reinstated shall
refund such retirement benefits or gratuity received: Provided, finally That absorbed personnel must still meet the qualifications and
standards set by the Civil Service and the Placement Committee herein created.

Section 75. Transition Period. - The ONCC/OSCC shall have a period of six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act within which to
wind up its affairs and to conduct audit of its finances.

Section 76. Transfer of Assets/Properties. - All real and personal properties which are vested in, or belonging to, the merged offices
as aforestated shall be transferred to the NCIP without further need of conveyance, transfer or assignment and shall be held for the
same purpose as they were held by the former offices: Provided, That all contracts, records and documents shall be transferred to the
NCIP. All agreements and contracts entered into by the merged offices shall remain in full force and effect unless otherwise terminated,
modified or amended by the NCIP.

Section 77. Placement Committee. - Subject to rules on government reorganization, a Placement Committee shall be created by the
NCIP, in coordination with the Civil Service Commission, which shall assist in the judicious selection and placement of personnel in
order that the best qualified and most deserving persons shall be appointed in the reorganized agency. The placement Committee shall
be composed of seven (7) commissioners and an ICCs/IPs representative from each of the first and second level employees
association in the Offices for Northern and Southern Cultural Communities (ONCC/OSCC), nongovernment organizations (NGOs) who
have served the community for at least five (5) years and peoples organizations (POs) with at least five (5) years of existence. They
shall be guided by the criteria of retention and appointment to be prepared by the consultative body and by the pertinent provisions of
the civil service law.

CHAPTER XIII
FINAL PROVISIONS

Section 78. Special Provision. - The City of Baguio shall remain to be governed by its Chapter and all lands proclaimed as part of its
townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and
titles recognized and/or required through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the effectivity of this Act shall remain
valid: Provided, further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of
this Act.

Section 79. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the
current year's appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its continued implementation
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 80. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - Within sixty (60) days immediately after appointment, the NCIP shall issue the
necessary rules and regulations, in consultation with the Committees on National Cultural Communities of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, for the effective implementation of this Act.

Section 81. Saving Clause. - This Act will not in any manner adversely affect the rights and benefits of the ICCs/IPs under other
conventions, recommendations, international treaties, national laws, awards, customs and agreements.

Section 82. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act or any portion thereof is declared unconstitutional by a competent
court, other provisions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 83. Repealing Clause. - Presidential Decree NO. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C, and all other laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 84. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen days (15) days upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 29 October 1997.

AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL LEGISLATION – ASSIGNMENT FOR SEPTEMBER 5, 2016

BY ALVIN CLARIDADES ON AUGUST 29, 2016

AGRARIAN LAW & SOCIAL LEGISLATION – ASSIGNMENT FOR SEPTEMBER 5, 2016

1. Indefeasibility of Titles

2. Case: Estribillo v. DAR, GR 159674, June 30, 2006

Part Seven- Land Tenure Improvement

1. Determination of Lease Rentals – Sec. 12, RA 6657

2. Leasehold Relationship
Cases:

1. Caballes v. DAR, GR 78214, Dec. 5, 1988

2. Gabriel v. Pangilinan, GR L-27797, Aug. 26, 1974

3. Gelos v. CA, GR 86186, May 8, 1992

Issuance: AO 2, s. 2006 – Revised Rules and Procedures Governing Leasehold Implementation in Tenanted
Agricultural Lands

1. Production-Sharing – Sec 32, RA 6657

2. Agribusiness Venture Arrangements (AVAs) in Agrarian Reform Areas per DAR AO 09-06

Part Eight – Conversion of Agricultural Lands

1. Conversion of Lands – Sec 65, RA 6657

2. Conversion of Agricultural Lands: Difference among Exemption, Conversion and Reclassification

Cases:

1. CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR 183409, June 18, 2010

2. Ros v. DAR, GR 132477, Aug. 31, 2005

3. Land Reclassification – Sec. 20 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991

Issuances:

1. MC 54, s. 1993 from the Office of the President – Prescribing the Guidelines governing Sec. 20 of RA 7160
Authorizing Cities And Municipalities to Reclassify Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses

2. DAR AO 1-02 – The 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Conversion

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159674 June 30, 2006

SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO, CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR., RONGIE D. AGUILAR, TACIANA D. AGUILAR, ARTEMIO
G. DE JUAN, ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR., EDGAR DUENAS, MARIO ERIBAL, REYNALDO C. ESENCIA,
EMMA GONZAGA, RUBEN A. IBOJO, SAMUEL JAMANDRE, HILARION V. LANTIZA, ANSELMO LOPEZ,
TERESITA NACION, CHARIE E. NASTOR, NELSON L. NULLAS, CARLITO S. OLIA, ANA PATIÑO, ROBERTO T.
PATIÑO, ANTONIO P. ROCHA, FERNANDO C. RUFINO, PATERNO P. SAIN, CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and
JOEMARIE VIBO, Petitioners,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and HACIENDA MARIA, INC., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the review and reversal of
the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals dated 27 January 2003 and 28 August 2003, respectively.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The petitioners, with the exception of two, are the recipients of Emancipation Patents (EPs) over parcels of land
located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their respective Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) and
EP numbers presented below:

Areas
Petitioners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675 1.7833

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814 2.0000

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293 0.1565

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295 3.1441

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296 4.2405

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809 3.3082

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676 3.1437

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658 4.0128

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836 2.3087

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844 2.0950

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873 1.5737

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348 2.2670

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674 4.5526

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825 0.4579

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840 4.4939

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849 2.2140

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829 3.9291

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826 2.7491

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673 1.7954

18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860 6.4266

 19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830 2.2143

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848 4.5322

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813 4.3223

22. CLAUDIO S. SAYSON, and TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880 3.7151

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827 1.31852

The two other petitioners, Emma Gonzaga and Ana Patiño, are the surviving spouses of deceased recipients of EPs
over parcels of land also located at Barangay Angas, Sta. Josefa, Agusan del Sur, with their corresponding TCT and
EP numbers identified as follows:

Areas
(Deceased) Registered Owners TCT/EP Nos.
(has.)

1. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832 4.1953

2. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-929/EP No. A-037861 3.00783

The parcels of land described above, the subject matters in this Petition, were formerly part of a forested area which
have been denuded as a result of the logging operations of respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc. (HMI). Petitioners,
together with other persons, occupied and tilled these areas believing that the same were public lands. HMI never
disturbed petitioners and the other occupants in their peaceful cultivation thereof.

HMI acquired such forested area from the Republic of the Philippines through Sales Patent No. 2683 in 1956 by
virtue of which it was issued OCT No. P-3077-1661. The title covered three parcels of land with a total area of
527.8308 hectares, to wit:

Area
Lot No.
(in hectares)

Lot No. 1620, Pls – 4 28.52

Lot No. 1621, Pls – 4 11.64

Lot No. 1622, Pls – 4 487.47

TOTAL 527.834

On 21 October 1972, Presidential Decree No. 275 was issued mandating that tenanted rice and corn lands be
brought under Operation Land Transfer and awarded to farmer-beneficiaries.

HMI, through a certain Joaquin Colmenares, requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under
the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other
occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under said law.

In 1973, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) conducted a parcellary mapping of the entire landholdings of
527.8308 hectares covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. In 1975 and 1976, the DAR approved the Parcellary Map
Sketching (PMS) and the Amended PMS covering the entire landholdings.

HMI, through its representatives, actively participated in all relevant proceedings, including the determination of the
Average Gross Production per hectare at the Barangay Committee on Land Production, and was a signatory of an
undated Landowner and Tenant Production Agreement (LTPA), covering the 527.8308 hectares. The LTPA was
submitted to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in 1977.
Also in 1977, HMI executed a Deed of Assignment of Rights in favor of petitioners, among other persons, which was
registered with the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of OCT No. P-3077-1661. The annotation in the
OCT showed that the entire 527.8308 hectares was the subject of the Deed of Assignment.

In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding
TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons.

In December 1997, HMI filed with the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of CARAGA, Region XIII, 17
petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of
its former landholdings covered by OCT No. P-3077-1661. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice
or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. The 17 petitions, which were
later consolidated, sought for the cancellation of the EPs covering the disputed 277.5008 hectares which had been
awarded to petitioners. HMI did not question the coverage of the other 250.3300 hectares under Presidential Decree
No. 27 despite claiming that the entire landholdings were untenanted and not devoted to rice and corn.

On 27 November 1998, after petitioners failed to submit a Position Paper, the RARAD rendered a Decision declaring
as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and
neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners when Presidential Decree No. 27
took effect on 21 October 1972. The Decision was based on a 26 March 1998 report submitted by the Hacienda
Maria Action Team. Petitioners’ TCTs and EPs were ordered cancelled. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Petitioners appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) which affirmed the RARAD Decision.

After the DARAB denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration, the latter proceeded to the Court of Appeals with
their Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Court of Appeals issued the following assailed Resolution:

A perusal of the petition reveals that the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping was executed by
Samuel A. Estribillo who is one of the petitioners, without the corresponding Special Power of Attorneys executed by
the other petitioners authorizing him to sign for their behalf in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and necessarily DISMISSED. 6

Petitioners filed a "Motion for Reconsideration With Alternative Prayer with Leave of Court for the Admission of
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) Granted to Petitioner Samuel Estribillo by his Co-Petitioners." The Court of Appeals
denied the motion by issuing the following assailed Resolution:

Petitioners seek the reconsideration of Our Resolution promulgated on January 27, 2003 which dismissed the
petition for certiorari.

We find no reason to reverse, alter or modify the resolution sought to be reconsidered, since petitioners have failed
to show that their belated submission of the special power of attorney can be justified as against the unequivocal
requirements set forth by Sec. 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

While it is true that the Supreme Court has recognized special circumstances that justify the relaxation of the rules
on non-forum shopping, such circumstances, however, are not present in the case at bar.

More importantly, said Rules cannot be relaxed in view of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Loquias vs. Ombudsman,
338 SCRA 62, which stated that, substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the
rules. The attestation contained in the certification [on] non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the
party who executed the same.

Since the Verification and Certification on Non-Forum shopping was executed without the proper authorization from
all the petitioners, such personal knowledge cannot be presumed to exist thereby rendering the petition fatally
defective.

Par. 2, Sec. 5 of Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended states:
"Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or
other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice x x x"

It is, thus, clear that the Motion for Reconsideration has no legal basis to support it and should be dismissed
forthwith. Moreover, granting arguendo that a special power of attorney belatedly filed could cure the petition’s
defect, the requirement of personal knowledge of all the petitioners still has not been met since some of the other
petitioners failed to sign the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 7

Petitioners now file this present Petition contending that there had been compliance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. They further reiterate their argument that the EPs are ordinary titles which become
indefeasible one year after their registration.

The petition is impressed with merit. 1awphil.net

Petitioners have sufficiently complied with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure concerning the
Certification Against Forum shopping

Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure was preceded by Revised Circular No. 28-91 and
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, which required a certification against forum shopping to avoid the filing of multiple
petitions and complaints involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and other tribunals
and agencies. Stated differently, the rule was designed to avoid a situation where said courts, tribunals and
agencies would have to resolve the same issues. Rule 7, Section 5, now provides:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. – The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint
or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously
filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in
any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is
pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading
has been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided,
upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the
undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative
and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping,
the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt as well as a
cause for administrative sanctions.

Revised Circular No. 28-91 "was designed x x x to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the
goal of all rules of procedure – which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible." 8 Technical rules
of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate, justice. 9 The same guidelines should still apply in interpreting
what is now Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Petitioner Samuel A. Estribillo, in signing the Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping, falls within the
phrase "plaintiff or principal party" who is required to certify under oath the matters mentioned in Rule 7, Section 5 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Such was given emphasis by this Court when we held in Mendigorin v.
Cabantog10 and Escorpizo v. University of Baguio11 that the certification of non-forum shopping must be signed by
the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not only by the legal counsel. In Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission,12 we likewise held that:

The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of petitioner. For a certification
of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed
with a special power of attorney to do so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the
dismissal of this action. (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals heavily relied on the seemingly conflicting case of Loquias v. Office of the
Ombudsman,13where this Court ruled that:

At the outset, it is noted that the Verification and Certification was signed by Antonio Din, Jr., one of the petitioners in
the instant case. We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition is defective. Section 5, Rule 7 expressly
provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certify under oath that he has not commenced any action
involving the same issues in any court, etc. Only petitioner Din, the Vice-Mayor of San Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur,
signed the certification. There is no showing that he was authorized by his co-petitioners to represent the latter and
to sign the certification. It cannot likewise be presumed that petitioner Din knew, to the best of his knowledge,
whether his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions or claims filed or pending. We find that substantial
compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance by the rules. The attestation contained in the
certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. Petitioners
must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly
be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. (Emphasis supplied)

Loquias, however, was a case involving only five petitioners seeking relief from the Resolution of the Ombudsman
charging them with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, where the above declaration "at the outset" was made
together with a determination on the lack of jurisdiction on our part to decide the Petition. 14 There being only five
petitioners in Loquias, the unreasonableness of the failure to obtain the signatures of Antonio Din, Jr.’s four co-
accused is immediately apparent, hence the remark by this Court that "[p]etitioners must show reasonable cause for
failure to personally sign the certification." In the present petition, petitioners allege that they are farmer-beneficiaries
who reside in a very remote barangay in Agusan del Sur. While they reside in the same barangay, they allegedly
have to walk for hours on rough terrain to reach their neighbors due to the absence of convenient means of
transportation. Their houses are located far apart from each other and the mode of transportation, habal-habal, is
scarce and difficult. Majority of them are also nearing old age. On the other hand, their lawyers (who are members
of a non-government organization engaged in development work) are based in Quezon City who started assisting
them at the latter part of the RARAD level litigation in 1998, and became their counsel of record only at the DARAB
level. The petitioner who signed the initiatory pleading, Samuel Estribillo, was the only petitioner who was able to
travel to Manila at the time of the preparation of the Petition due to very meager resources of their farmers’
organization, the Kahiusahan sa Malahutayong mga Mag-uugma Para sa Ekonomikanhong Kalambuan (KAMMPE).
When the Petition a quo was dismissed, petitioners’ counsel went to Agusan del Sur and tried earnestly to secure all
the signatures for the SPA. In fact, when the SPA was being circulated for their signatures, 24 of the named
petitioners therein failed to sign for various reasons – some could not be found within the area and were said to be
temporarily residing in other towns, while some already died because of old age. 15 Be that as it may, those who did
not sign the SPA did not participate, and are not parties to this petition.

The Court of Appeals merely said that the special circumstances recognized by this Court that justify the relaxation
of the rules on the certification against forum shopping are not present in the case at bar, 16 without discussing the
circumstances adduced by the petitioners in their Motion for Reconsideration. Thus, assuming for the sake of
argument that the actuation of petitioners was not strictly in consonance with Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, it should still be determined whether there are special circumstances that would justify the
suspension or relaxation of the rule concerning verification and certification against forum shopping, such as those
which we appreciated in the ensuing cases.

In General Milling Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 17 the appeal to the Court of Appeals had a
certificate against forum shopping, but was dismissed as it did not contain a board resolution authorizing the
signatory of the Certificate. Petitioners therein attached the board resolution in their Motion for Reconsideration but
the Court of Appeals, as in this case, denied the same. In granting the Petition therein, we explained that:

[P]etitioner complied with this procedural requirement except that it was not accompanied by a board resolution or a
secretary’s certificate that the person who signed it was duly authorized by petitioner to represent it in the case. It
would appear that the signatory of the certification was, in fact, duly authorized as so evidenced by a board
resolution attached to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. It could thus be said that
there was at least substantial compliance with, and that there was no attempt to ignore, the prescribed procedural
requirements.
The rules of procedure are intended to promote, rather than frustrate, the ends of justice, and while the swift
unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, it, nevertheless, must not be met at the expense of substantial
justice. Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not suppress, the cause of justice and a
deviation from the rigid enforcement of the rules may be allowed to attain that prime objective for, after all, the
dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of courts. [Acme Shoe, Rubber and Plastic Corp. vs.
Court of Appeals; BA Savings Bank vs. Sia, 336 SCRA 484].

In Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,18 the authority of petitioner’s resident manager to sign the certification
against forum shopping was submitted to the Court of Appeals only after the latter dismissed the Petition. It turned
out, in the Motion for Reconsideration, that he already had board authority ten days before the filing of the Petition.
We ratiocinated therein that:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission
thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure
of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications
against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said
signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.

In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has allowed the belated filing of the certification. In Loyola
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (245 SCRA 477 [1995]), the Court considered the filing of the certification one day after
the filing of an election protest as substantial compliance with the requirement. In Roadway Express, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, et al. (264 SCRA 696 [1996]), the Court allowed the filing of the certification 14 days before the dismissal
of the petition. In Uy v. Landbank, supra, the Court had dismissed Uy’s petition for lack of verification and
certification against non-forum shopping. However, it subsequently reinstated the petition after Uy submitted a
motion to admit certification and non-forum shopping certification. In all these cases, there were special
circumstances or compelling reasons that justified the relaxation of the rule requiring verification and certification on
non-forum shopping.

In the instant case, the merits of petitioner’s case should be considered special circumstances or compelling
reasons that justify tempering the requirement in regard to the certificate of non-forum shopping. Moreover, in
Loyola, Roadway, and Uy, the Court excused non-compliance with the requirement as to the certificate of non-forum
shopping. With more reason should we allow the instant petition since petitioner herein did submit a certification on
non-forum shopping, failing only to show proof that the signatory was authorized to do so. That petitioner
subsequently submitted a secretary’s certificate attesting that Balbin was authorized to file an action on behalf of
petitioner likewise mitigates this oversight.

It must also be kept in mind that while the requirement of the certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory,
nonetheless the requirements must not be interpreted too literally and thus defeat the objective of preventing the
undesirable practice of forum-shopping. Lastly, technical rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate
justice. While the swift unclogging of court dockets is a laudable objective, the granting of substantial justice is an
even more urgent ideal.

In Uy v. Land Bank of the Philippines,19 we, likewise, considered the apparent merits of the substantive aspect of the
case as a special circumstance or compelling reason for the reinstatement of the case, and invoked our power to
suspend our rules to serve the ends of justice. Thus:

The admission of the petition after the belated filing of the certification, therefore, is not unprecedented. In those
cases where the Court excused non-compliance with the requirements, there were special circumstances or
compelling reasons making the strict application of the rule clearly unjustified. In the case at bar, the apparent merits
of the substantive aspects of the case should be deemed as a "special circumstance" or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. x x x

There were even cases where we held that there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification against
forum shopping, but we still proceeded to decide the case on the merits. In De Guia v. De Guia, 20petitioners raised in
their Petition for Review the allowance of respondents’ Appeal Brief which did not contain a certificate against forum
shopping. We held therein that:
With regard to the absence of a certification of non-forum shopping, substantial justice behooves us to agree with
the disquisition of the appellate court. We do not condone the shortcomings of respondents’ counsel, but we simply
cannot ignore the merits of their claim. Indeed, it has been held that "[i]t is within the inherent power of the Court to
suspend its own rules in a particular case in order to do justice."

In Damasco v. National Labor Relations Commission,21 the non-compliance was disregarded because of the
principle of social justice, which is equally applicable to the case at bar:

We note that both petitioners did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping. The certifications
in their respective petitions were executed by their lawyers, which is not correct. The certification of non-forum
shopping must be by the petitioner or a principal party and not the attorney. This procedural lapse on the part of
petitioners could have warranted the outright dismissal of their actions.

But, the court recognizes the need to resolve these two petitions on their merits as a matter of social justice
involving labor and capital. After all, technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way of equitably and
completely resolving herein the rights and obligations of these parties. Moreover, we must stress that technical rules
of procedure in labor cases are not to be strictly applied if the result would be detrimental to the working woman.

The foregoing cases show that, even if we assume for the sake of argument that there was violation of Rule 7,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a relaxation of such rule would be justified for two compelling
reasons: social justice considerations and the apparent merit of the Petition, as shall be heretofore discussed.

Certificates of Title issued pursuant to Emancipation Patents are as indefeasible as TCTs issued in registration
proceedings.

Petitioners claim that the EPs have become indefeasible upon the expiration of one year from the date of its
issuance. The DARAB, however, ruled that the EP "is a title issued through the agrarian reform program of the
government. Its issuance, correction and cancellation is governed by the rules and regulations issued by the
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Hence, it is not the same as or in the same category of a
Torrens title."

The DARAB is grossly mistaken.

Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court,22 provides that certificates of title issued in administrative proceedings are
as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in judicial proceedings:

It must be emphasized that a certificate of title issued under an administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead
patent, as in the instant case, is as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial registration
proceeding, provided the land covered by said certificate is a disposable public land within the contemplation of the
Public Land Law.

There is no specific provision in the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141, as amended) or the Land Registration Act (Act
496), now P.D. 1529, fixing the one (1) year period within which the public land patent is open to review on the
ground of actual fraud as in Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529, and clothing a
public land patent certificate of title with indefeasibility. Nevertheless, the pertinent pronouncements in the aforecited
cases clearly reveal that Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, now Section 32 of P.D. 1529 was applied by
implication by this Court to the patent issued by the Director of Lands duly approved by the Secretary of Natural
Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines in accordance with law. The date of issuance of
the patent, therefore, corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases because
the decree finally awards the land applied for registration to the party entitled to it, and the patent issued by the
Director of Lands equally and finally grants, awards, and conveys the land applied for to the applicant. This, to our
mind, is in consonance with the intent and spirit of the homestead laws, i.e. conservation of a family home, and to
encourage the settlement, residence and cultivation and improvement of the lands of the public domain. If the title to
the land grant in favor of the homesteader would be subjected to inquiry, contest and decision after it has been
given by the Government through the process of proceedings in accordance with the Public Land Law, there would
arise uncertainty, confusion and suspicion on the government’s system of distributing public agricultural lands
pursuant to the "Land for the Landless" policy of the State.
The same confusion, uncertainty and suspicion on the distribution of government-acquired lands to the landless
would arise if the possession of the grantee of an EP would still be subject to contest, just because his certificate of
title was issued in an administrative proceeding. The silence of Presidential Decree No. 27 as to the indefeasibility of
titles issued pursuant thereto is the same as that in the Public Land Act where Prof. Antonio Noblejas commented:

Inasmuch as there is no positive statement of the Public Land Law, regarding the titles granted thereunder, such
silence should be construed and interpreted in favor of the homesteader who come into the possession of his
homestead after complying with the requirements thereof. Section 38 of the Land Registration Law should be
interpreted to apply by implication to the patent issued by the Director of Lands, duly approved by the Minister of
Natural Resources, under the signature of the President of the Philippines, in accordance with law. 23

After complying with the procedure, therefore, in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as
the Property Registration Decree (where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after
granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27), 24 the TCTs issued to
petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. "The certificate of title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order
for the issuance of the patent, x x x. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral
proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person."25

As we held through Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Lahora v. Dayanghirang, Jr. 26 :

The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of the certificate of title that may be
issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding
patent therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter, the land is automatically
brought within the operation of the Land Registration Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the
safeguards provided in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from its issuance, the
certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like a certificate issued in a registration
proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in Republic Act No. 6657 (the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property
Registration Decree in fact devotes Chapter IX27 on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs are, in
themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration proceedings.

The only defense of respondents, that the issue of indefeasibility of title was raised for the first time on appeal with
the DARAB, does not hold water because said issue was already raised before the RARAD. 28

The recommendation of the Hacienda Maria Action Team to have the EPs cancelled and the lots covered under the
Republic Act No. 6657,29 with the farmer-beneficiaries later on being issued with CLOAs, would only delay the
application of agrarian reform laws to the disputed 277.5008 hectares, leading to the expenditure of more time and
resources of the government.

The unreasonable delay of HMI in filing the Petition for cancellation more than 20 years after the alleged wrongful
annotation of the Deed of Assignment in OCT No. P-3077-1661, and more than ten years after the issuance of the
TCTs to the farmers, is apparently motivated by its desire to receive a substantially higher valuation and just
compensation should the disputed 277.5008 hectares be covered under Republic Act No. 6657 instead of
Presidential Decree No. 27.30 This is further proved by the following uncontested allegations by petitioners:

(i) HMI neither asked for rentals nor brought any action to oust petitioners from the farm they were
cultivating;

(ii) HMI had not paid realty taxes on the disputed property from 1972 onwards and never protested
petitioners’ act of declaring the same for realty taxation;

(iii) HMI, represented by a certain Angela Colmenares, signed the LTPA covering the entire landholdings or
the area of 527.8308 hectares, which was then represented to be rice and corn lands;
 (iv) HMI abandoned the entire landholdings after executing the Deed of Assignment of Rights in 1977.

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 73902 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The following EPs and the corresponding TCTs issued to petitioners or to their successors-in-interest are hereby
declared VALID and SUBSISTING:

Original Grantees TCT/EP Nos.

1. SAMUEL ESTRIBILLO TCT No. T-287/EP No. A-037675

2. CALIXTO P. ABAYATO, JR. TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037814

TCT No. T-829/EP No. A-027293

3. RONGIE D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-913/EP No. A-027295

4. TACIANA D. AGUILAR TCT No. T-944/EP No. A-027296

5. ARTEMIO G. DE JUAN, TCT No. T-302/EP No. A-037809

6. ESTANISLAO DELA CRUZ, SR. TCT No. T-290/EP No. A-035676

7. EDGAR DUENAS TCT No. T-949/EP No. A-037658

8. MARIO P. ERIBAL TCT No. T-952/EP No. A-037836

9. REYNALDO C. ESENCIA TCT No. T-950/EP No. A-037844

10. RUBEN A. IBOJO TCT No. T-928/EP No. A-037873

11. SAMUEL JAMANDRE TCT No. T-909/EP No. A-159348

12. HILARION V. LANTIZA TCT No. T-288/EP No. A-037674

TCT No. T-401/EP No. A-037825

13. ANSELMO LOPEZ TCT No. T-973/EP No. A-037840

14. TERESITA NACION TCT No. T-900/EP No. A-037849

15. CHARIE E. NASTOR TCT No. T-825/EP No. A-037829

16. NELSON L. NULLAS TCT No. T-396/EP No. A-037826

17. CARLITO S. OLIA TCT No. T-910/EP No. A-037673

18. ROBERTO T.PATIÑO TCT No. T-912/EP No. A-037860

19. ANTONIO P. ROCHA TCT No. T-914/EP No. A-037830

20. FERNANDO C. RUFINO TCT No. T-923/EP No. A-037848

21. PATERNO P. SAIN TCT No. T-954/EP No. A-037813

22. CLAUSIO S. SAYSON TCT No. T-891/EP No. A-037880

23. JOEMARIE VIBO TCT No. T-893/EP No. A-037827

24. MANUEL S. GONZAGA TCT No. T-920/EP No. A-037832

25. RAFAEL PATIÑO TCT No. T-297/EP No. A-037861

Costs against respondent Hacienda Maria, Inc.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 78214 December 5, 1988

YOLANDA CABALLES, petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ and BIENVENIDO
ABAJON,respondents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of an Order issued by the public respondent Ministry of
Agrarian Reform , now the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), through its then Minister, the Hon. Heherson
Alvarez, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the herein petitioner and the private respondent
and certifying the criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent as not
proper for trial.

The facts as gathered by the MAR are as follows:

The landholding subject of the controversy, which consists of only sixty (60) square meters (20 meters x 3 meters)
was acquired by the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the latter being the petitioner herein, by virtue of a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated July 24, 1978 executed by Andrea Alicaba Millenes This landholding is part of Lot No. 3109-
C, which has a total area of about 500 square meters, situated at Lawaan Talisay, Cebu. The remainder of Lot No.
3109-C was subseconsequently sold to the said spouses by Macario Alicaba and the other members of the Millenes
family, thus consolidating ownership over the entire (500-square meter) property in favor of the petitioner.

In 1975, before the sale in favor of the Caballes spouses, private respondent Bienvenido Abajon constructed his
house on a portion of the said landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00 to the owner, Andrea Millenes. The
landowner likewise allowed Abajon to plant on a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be
shared by both on a fitfy-fifty basis. From 1975-1977, Abajon planted corn and bananas on the landholding. In 1978,
he stopped planting corn but continued to plant bananas and camote. During those four years, he paid the P2.00
rental for the lot occupied by his house, and delivered 50% of the produce to Andrea Millenes.

Sometime in March 1979, after the property was sold, the new owners, Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, told Abajon
that the poultry they intended to build would be close to his house and pursuaded him to transfer his dwelling to the
opposite or southern portion of the landholding. Abajon offered to pay the new owners rental on the land occupied
by his house, but his offer was not accepted. Later, the new owners asked Abajon to vacate the premises, saying
that they needed the property. But Abajon refused to leave. The parties had a confrontation before the Barangay
Captain of Lawaan in Talisay, Cebu but failed to reach an agreement. All the efforts exerted by the landowners to
oust Abajon from the landholding were in vain as the latter simply refused to budge.

On April 1, 1982, the landowner, Yolanda Caballes, executed an Affidavit stating that immediately after she
reprimanded Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her knowledge, the latter, with
malicious and ill intent, cut down the banana plants on the property worth about P50.00. A criminal case for
malicious mischief was filed against Abajon and which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 4003. Obviously, all the
planting on the property, including that of the banana plants, had been done by Abajon. On September 30, 1982,
upon motion of the defense in open court pursuant to PD 1038, the trial court ordered the referral of the case to the
Regional Office No. VII of the then MAR for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. As a
result, the Regional Director of MAR Regional VII, issued a certification 1 dated January 24, 1 983, stating that said
Criminal Case No. 4003 was not proper for hearing on the bases of the following findings:
 That herein accused is a bona-fide tenant of the land owned by the complaining witness, which is
devoted to bananas;

That thin case is filed patently to harass and/or eject the tenant from his farmholding, which act is
prohibited by law; and

That this arose out of or is connected with agrarian relations.

From the said certification, the petitioner appealed to the then MAR, now the respondent DAR. Acting on said
appeal, the respondent DAR, through its then Minister Conrado Estrella, reversed the previous certification in its
Order 2 of February 3, 1986, declaring Criminal Case No. 4003 as proper for trial as "the land involved is a residential lot
consisting of only 60 square meters whereon the house of the accused is constructed and within the industrial zone of the
town as evinced from the Certification issued by the Zoning Administrator of Talisay, Cebu."

Upon motion for reconsideration filed by Abajon, the respondent DAR, through its new Minister, herein respondent
Heherson Alvarez, issued an Orders dated November 15, 1986, setting aside the previous Order 3 dated February 3,
1986, and certifying said criminal case as not proper for trial, finding the existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties, and that the case was designed to harass the accused into vacating his tillage.

In the summary investigation conducted by the DAR, the former landowner, Andrea Millenes, testified that
Bienvenido Abajon dutifully gave her 50% share of the produce of the land under his cultivation. The grandson of
Andrea Millenes, Roger Millenes, corroborated the testimony of the former, stating that he received said share from
Abajon. Roger Millenes further testified that the present owners received in his presence a bunch of bananas from
the accused representing ½ or 50% of the two bunches of bananas gathered after Caballes had acquired the
property. 4

From these factual findings, the DAR concluded that Abajon was a tenant of Andrea Millenes, the former owner, who
had testified that she shared the produce of the land with Abajon as truer thereof. 5 Thus, invoking Sec. 10 of RA
3844, as amended, which provides that "[T]he agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by
mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession
of the landholding"; and that "(I)n case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor," the MAR ruled that 'the new owners are legally bound to respect the tenancy, notwithstanding their
claim that the portion tilled by Abajon was small, consisting merely of three (3) meters wide and twenty (20) meters long,
or a total of sixty (60) square meters." 6

Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:

I. Respondents DAR and Hon. Heherson T. Alvarez committed "grave abuse of power and discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction" in holding that private respondent Abajon is an agricultural tenant even if he is cultivating only a
60-square meter (3 x 20 meters) portion of a commercial lot of the petitioner.

II. Public respondents gravely erred in holding that Criminal Case No. 4003 is not proper for trial and hearing by the
court. 7

We hold that the private respondent cannot avail of the benefits afforded by RA 3844, as amended. To invest him
with the status of a tenant is preposterous.

Section 2 of said law provides:

It is the policy of the State:

(1) To establish cooperative-cultivatorship among those who live and work on the land as tillers,
owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture and, as
a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development;

xxx xxx xxx

RA 3844, as amended, defines an economic family-size farm as "an area of farm land that permits efficient use of
labor and capital resources of the farm family and will produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of
living to meet a farm family's needs for food, clothing, shelter, and education with possible allowance for payment of
yearly installments on the land, and reasonable reserves to absorb yearly fluctuations in income." 8

The private respondent only occupied a miniscule portion (60 square meters) of the 500-square meter lot. Sixty
square meters of land planted to bananas, camote, and corn cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered
as an economic family-size farm. Surely, planting camote, bananas, and corn on a sixty-square meter piece of land
can not produce an income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family's basic needs.
The private respondent himself admitted that he did not depend on the products of the land because it was too
small, and that he took on carpentry jobs on the side. 9 Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the
declared policy of the law stated above.

The DAR found that the private respondent shared the produce of the land with the former owner, Andrea Millenes.
This led or misled, the public respondents to conclude that a tenancy relationship existed between the petitioner and
the private respondent because, the public respondents continue, by operation of Sec. 10 of R.A. 3844, as
amended, the petitioner new owner is subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the supposed
agricultural lessor (the former owner).

We disagree.

The essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are:

1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.

All these requisites must concur in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The absence of one
does not make an occupant of a parcel of land, or a cultivator thereof, or a planter thereon, a de jure tenant. This is
so because unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor
is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy laws. 10

Therefore, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. Certainly, it is not unusual for
a landowner to accept some of the produce of his land from someone who plants certain crops thereon. This is a
typical and laudable provinciano trait of sharing or patikim, a native way of expressing gratitude for favor received.
This, however, does not automatically make the tiller-sharer a tenant thereof specially when the area tilled is only
60, or even 500, square meters and located in an urban area and in. the heart of an industrial or commercial zone at
that. Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary
purpose of agricultural production. The circumstances of this case indicate that the private respondent's status is
more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to
have a garden of some sort at its southwestern side rather than a tenant of the said portion.

Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that the private
respondent was never a tenant of the former owner, Andrea Millenes. Consequently, Sec. 10 of RA of 3844, as
amended, does not apply. Simply stated, the private respondent is not a tenant of the herein petitioner.

Anent the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that since Abajon, is not an agricultural tenant, the
criminal case for malicious mischief filed against him should be declared as proper for trial so that proceedings in
the lower court can resume.

Notwithstanding our ruling that the private respondent is not a tenant of the petitioner, we hold that the remand of
the case to the lower court for the resumption of the criminal proceedings is not in the interest of justice. Remand to
the Municipal Court of Talisay, Cebu, would not serve the ends of justice at all, nor is it necessary, because this High
Tribunal is in a position to resolve with finality the dispute before it. This Court, in the public interest, and towards the
expeditious administration of justice, has decided to act on the merits and dispose of the case with finality. 11

The criminal case for malicious mischief filed by the petitioner against the private respondent for allegedly cutting
down banana trees worth a measly P50.00 will take up much of the time and attention of the municipal court to the
prejudice of other more pressing cases pending therein. Furthermore, the private respondent will have to incur
unnecessary expenses to finance his legal battle against the petitioner if proceedings in the court below were to
resume. Court litigants have decried the long and unnecessary delay in the resolution of their cases and the
consequent costs of such litigations. The poor, particularly, are victims of this unjust judicial dawdle, Impoverished
that they are they must deal with unjust legal procrastination which they can only interpret as harassment or
intimidation brought about by their poverty, deprivation, and despair. It must be the mission of the Court to remove
the misperceptions aggrieved people have of the nature of the dispensation of justice. If justice can be meted out
now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven? Thus, considering that this case involves a mere bagatelle the
Court finds it proper and compelling to decide it here and now, instead of further deferring its final termination.

As found by the DAR, the case for malicious mischief stemmed from the petitioner's affidavit stating that after she
reprimanded private respondent Abajon for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from the property without her
knowledge, the latter, with ill intent, cut the banana trees on the property worth about P50.00.

This was corroborated by a certain Anita Duaban, a friend of the petitioner, who likewise executed an affidavit to the
effect that she saw the private respondent indiscriminately cutting the banana trees. 12

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that "any person who shall deliberately cause to the property of
another any damage not falling within the terms of the next preceding chapter shall be guilty of malicious mischief." 13

The elements of the crime of malicious mischief are:

1. The offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

2. The damage caused did not constitute arson or crimes involving destruction;
3. The damage was caused maliciously by the offender.

After a review of the facts and circumstances of this case, we rule that the aforesaid criminal case against the
private respondent be dismissed.

The private respondent can not be held criminally liable for malicious mischief in cutting the banana trees because,
as an authorized occupant or possessor of the land, and as planter of the banana trees, he owns said crops
including the fruits thereof The private respondent's possession of the land is not illegal or in bad faith because he
was snowed by the previous owners to enter and occupy the premises. In other words, the private respondent
worked the land in dispute with the consent of the previous and present owners. Consequently, whatever the private
respondent planted and cultivated on that piece of property belonged to him and not to the landowner. Thus, an
essential element of the crime of malicious mischief, which is "damage deliberately caused to the property of
another," is absent because the private respondent merely cut down his own plantings.

WHEREFORE, the Order of public respondents dated November 15, 1986 is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case No.
4003, is hereby DISMISSED. Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu for
appropriate action. This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

AGRARIAN REFORM LAW

1st Semester, AY 2014-2015
ATTY. ALVIN T. CLARIDADES
Special Lecturer, PUP College of Law

COURSE OUTLINE
Part One – Overview of the Course on Agrarian Law
1. General Concepts of Agrarian Reform
2. Historical and Legal Backdrop

Part Two – Legislative Backdrop

1. RA 3844, as amended by RA 6389 – Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines
2. PD 27 – Decree Emancipating Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil
3. EO 129-A – Modifying EO 129 Reorganizing and Strengthening DAR
4. EO 228 – Declaring Full Land Ownership to Qualified Beneficiaries under PD 27
5. Proc. 131 – Instituting a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
6. RA 6657 – Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program enacted on June 10, 1988
7. Sec. 2 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700 – Declaration of Principles and
Policies
8. RA 7881 – Amending the CARP
9. RA 9700 – Strengthening the CARP
Part Three – Land Acquisition
1. Agrarian Reform Defined – Sec. 3(a), RA 6657
2. Scope of the Program – Sec. 4, RA 6657
3. Priorities of Coverage – Sec. 7, RA 6657
4. Land Acquisition: Compulsory Acquisition – Sec. 16, RA 6657
5. Land Acquisition: Voluntary Offer to Sell – Sec. 19, RA 6657
Cases:
1. Association of Small Landowners in the Phils. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, GR. No.
79310 , July 14, 1989
2. Roxas v. CA, GR No. 127876, Dec. 17, 1999
3. Corporate Landowners: Stock Distribution Option – Sec. 31, RA 6657
4. Award of Lands to Children of Landowners – Sec. 6, RA 6657
Issuance: DAR AO 2, S. 2009 – Rules and Regulations on the Acquisition and Distribution
of Agricultural Lands under RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700
Part Four – Retention, Exemption and Exclusions
1. Retention Rights – Sec. 6, RA 6657
Case: Alita vs. CA, G.R. No. 78517, February 27, 1989
Issuance: DAR AO 2, S. 2003 – 2003 Rules of Procedure on Landowners Retention Rights
2. Exemptions and Exclusions – Sec. 10, RA 6657
3. Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657, in relation to DOJ Opinion No. 44 s. 1990 and the case of
Natalia Realty v. DAR, GR No. 103302, August 12, 1993
Issuances:
1. DAR AO 13, S. 1990 – Rules and Procedures Governing Exemptions of Lands
under Sec. 10 of RA 6657
2. DAR AO 4, S. 2003 – 2003 Rules on Exemption of Lands under Sec. 3c, RA 6657
and DOJ Opinion 44 s. 1990
Cases:
1. Milestone Farms, Inc., v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 182332. February 23,
2011
2. Luz Farms v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, GR No. 86889, December 4, 1990
3. DAR v. Sutton, G.R. No. 162070. October 19, 2005
4. RA 7881 (1995) Exempting Prawn Farms and Fishponds from CARP
Issuance: DAR AO 3, S. 1995 – Rules and Regulations on the Exemption of Fishponds
from the Coverage of CARL pursuant to RA 7881
Cases:
1. Central Mindanao University v. DARAB, G.R. No. 100091. October 22, 1992
2. DAR v. DECS, G.R. No. 158228. March 23, 2004
3. Province of Camarines Sur v. CA, G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
4. Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW, G.R. No. 149548. December 4, 2009

Part Five – Land Valuation

1. Land Valuation under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to PD 27
2. PD 27 and EO 228: Valuation Formula under para. 4 of PD 27 and Sec. 2 of EO
228
3. Determination of Just Compensation – Sec. 17, RA 6657
4. Valuation and Mode of Compensation – Sec. 18, RA 6657
5. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands in Case of Landowner’s Rejection or
Failure to Reply – Sec. 16 (d) of RA 6657
6. Land Valuation and Landowner Compensation, Sec. IV-D of DAR AO 2, S. 2009
Cases:
1. Just Compensation as discussed in Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR. No. 78742, July 14, 1989
2. Land Bank of the Phils. v. Natividad, G.R. No. 127198. May 16, 2005
3. Land Bank of the Phils. vs. CA, GR No. 118712, Oct. 6, 1995
4. Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Phils., G.R. No. 170220. November 20, 2006
Issuance: Preliminary Determination of Just Compensation per Rule XIX of the 2009
DARAB Rules of Procedure
Part Six – Land Redistribution
1. Land Redistribution per Secs. 22 to 27 of RA 6657, as amended
2. Principle of affordability to the farmers
Case: Land Bank of the Phils. v. Palmares, G.R. No. 192890, June 17, 2013
3. Indefeasibility of Titles
Case: Estribillo v. DAR, G.R. No. 159674. June 30, 2006

Part Seven- Land Tenure Improvement

1. Determination of Lease Rentals – Sec. 12, RA 6657
2. Leasehold Relationship
Cases:
1. Caballes v. DAR, GR No. 78214, December 5, 1988
2. Gabriel v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. L-27797. August 26, 1974
3. Gelos v. CA, G.R. No. 86186. May 8, 1992
Issuance: AO 2, S. 2006 – Revised Rules and Procedures Governing Leasehold
Implementation in Tenanted Agricultural Lands
3. Production-Sharing – Sec 32, RA 6657
4. Agribusiness Venture Arrangements (AVAs) in Agrarian Reform Areas per DAR
AO 09-06
Part Eight – Conversion of Agricultural Lands
1. Conversion of Lands – Sec 65, RA 6657
2. Conversion of Agricultural Lands: Difference among Exemption, Conversion and
Reclassification
Cases:
1. CREBA v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 183409. June 18, 2010
2. Ros v. DAR, G.R. No. 132477. August 31, 2005
3. Land Reclassification – Sec. 20 of RA 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991
Issuances:
1. MC 54, s. 1993 from the Office of the President – Prescribing the Guidelines
governing Sec. 20 of RA 7160 Authorizing Cities And Municipalities to Reclassify
Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses
2. DAR AO 1-02 – The 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Conversion
Case: Fortich v. Corona, GR. No. 131457, April 24, 1998 – Decision, Opinion and
Resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration with the Decision of the Office of the
President (OP) on the Sumilao Case
Part Nine – Mechanisms for Program Implementation
1. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council – Secs. 41, 42, 43, 49, RA 6657
2. Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee – Secs. 44 and 45, RA 6657
3. Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee – Secs. 46 to 48, RA 6657
4. Department of Agrarian Reform – EO 129-A dated July 26, 1987
5. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) – Sec. 13, EO 129-A

Part Ten – Financing the Program

1. Funding Source per Sec. 63 of RA 6657 and Financing under Secs. 21 and 22 of
EO 229 (1987)
2. RA 8532 (1998) Providing Augmentation Fund for the CARP with an Additional
Amount of Fifty Billion Pesos
3. Additional Funding Source – Sec. 21 of RA 9700, amending Sec. 63 of RA 6657

Part Eleven – Agrarian Justice or the Resolution of Agrarian Disputes

1. Administrative Adjudication – Secs. 50-53 of RA 6657
2. DAR AO 3, S. 2003 – 2003 Rules on Agrarian Law Implementation [ALI] Cases
3. The 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure
Case: Vda. de Tangub vs. CA, UDK 9864, December 3, 1990
4. Award to Beneficiaries – Sec. 9 of RA 9700 amending Sec. 24 of RA 6657
Issuance: DAR AO 3, S. 2009 – Rules and Procedures Governing the Cancellation of
Registered CLOAs, EPs and Other Titles Issued under Any Agrarian Reform Frogram
Case: DAR v. Cuenca, G.R. No. 154112. September 23, 2004
5. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute – Sec. 19, RA 9700 amending Sec. 50-
A, RA 6657
Issuance: DAR AO 4, S. 2009 – Rules and Regulations Implementing Sec. 19 of RA 9700
(Jurisdiction on and Referral of Agrarian Disputes)
6. Special Agrarian Courts – Sec 57, RA 6657
Cases:
1. Land Bank of the Phils. v. CA, GR No. 128557, December 29, 1999
2. Land Bank of the Phils. v. Celada, G.R. No. 164876. January 23, 2006
3. Land Bank of the Phils. v. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz, G.R. No. 175175, September
29, 2008
4. Land Bank of the Phils. v. Martinez, G.R. No. 169008. August 14, 2007
5. Phil. Veterans Bank v. CA, GR No. 132767, January 18, 2000
6. Modes of Appeal/Review from the DARAB
7. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
8. Certiorari – Sec. 54 of RA 6657 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

Part Twelve – Jurisdiction on Agrarian Disputes

1. Updates on Laws on Rules of Procedure of DARAB
2. Jurisprudence on Jurisdiction over Agrarian Cases
Cases:
1. DAR v. Paramount Holdings Equities, Inc., G.R. No. 176838, June 13, 2013
2. Del Monte Phils. Inc. Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative
(DEARBC) v. Sangunay, G.R. No. 180013, January 31, 2011
Part Thirteen – Support Services
1. Support Services to Stakeholders – Secs. 36 to 29, RA 6657
2. Prohibited Acts and Omissions under Sec. 73 of RA 6657
Part Fourteen – Individual Presentation and Submission of Case Digests and Draft
Decisions

Land reform in the Philippines has long been a contentious issue rooted in the Philippines's Spanish Colonial
Period. Some efforts began during the American Colonial Period with renewed efforts during the Commonwealth,
following independence, during Martial Law and especially following the People Power Revolution in 1986. The
current law, theComprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, was passed following the revolution and recently
extended until 2014.

Much like the Philippines and other Spanish colonies in the Americas, the Spanish settlement in the Philippines
revolved around the encomienda system of plantations, known ashaciendas. As the 19th Century progressed,
industrialization and liberalization of trade allowed these encomiendas to expand their cash crops, establishing a
strong sugar industry in the Philippines on such islands and Panay and Negros.

American period[edit]
The United States of America took possession of the Philippines following the Spanish–American War in 1898 and
after putting down the subsequent rebellion in the Philippine–American War. The Second Philippine Commission,
the Taft Commission, viewed economic development as one of its top three goals. [1] In 1901 93% of the islands' land
area was held by the government and William Howard Taft, Governor-General of the Philippines, argued for a liberal
policy so that a good portion could be sold off to American investors.[1]Instead, the United States Congress,
influenced by agricultural interests that did not want competition from the Philippines, in the 1902 Land Act, set a
limit of 16 hectares of land to be sold or leased to American individuals and 1,024 hectares to American
corporations.[1] This and a downturn in the investment environment discouraged the foreign-owned plantations
common in British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina.[1]

Further the U.S. Federal Government faced the problem of much of the private land being owned by the Roman
Catholic Church and controlled by Spanish clerics. The American government—officially secular, hostile to
continued Spanish control of much of the land of the now-American colony, and long hostile to Catholics—
negotiated a settlement with the Church handing over its land.

The 1902 Philippine Organic Act was a constitution for the Insular Government, as the U.S. civil administration was
known. This act, among other actions, disestablished the Catholic Church as the state religion. The United States
government, in an effort to resolve the status of the friars, negotiated with the Vatican. The church agreed to sell the
friars' estates and promised gradual substitution of Filipino and other non-Spanish priests for the friars. It refused,
however, to withdraw the religious orders from the islands immediately, partly to avoid offending Spain. In 1904 the
administration bought for $7.2 million the major part of the friars' holdings, amounting to some 166,000 hectares
(410,000 acres), of which one-half was in the vicinity of Manila. The land was eventually resold to Filipinos, some of
them tenants but the majority of them estate owners.[2]

Commonwealth Period[edit]
During the American Colonial Period, tenant farmers complained about the sharecropping system, as well as by the
dramatic increase in population which added economic pressure to the tenant farmers' families. [3] As a result,
an agrarian reform program was initiated by the Commonwealth. However, success of the program was hampered
by ongoing clashes between tenants and landowners.

An example of these clashes includes one initiated by Benigno Ramos through his Sakdalista movement,[4] which
advocated tax reductions, land reforms, the breakup of the large estates or haciendas, and the severing of American
ties. The uprising, which occurred in Central Luzon in May 1935, claimed about a hundred lives

Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933[edit]

When the Philippine Commonwealth was established, President Manuel L. Quezon implemented the Rice Share
Tenancy Act of 1933.[5] The purpose of this act was to regulate the share-tenancy contracts by establishing minimum
standards.[5] Primarily, the Act provided for better tenant-landlord relationship, a 50–50 sharing of the crop, regulation
of interest to 10% per agricultural year, and a safeguard against arbitrary dismissal by the landlord. [5] The major flaw
of this law was that it could be used only when the majority of municipal councils in a province petitioned for it.
[5]
Since landowners usually controlled such councils, no province ever asked that the law be applied. Therefore,
Quezón ordered that the act be mandatory in all Central Luzon provinces.[5] However, contracts were good only for
one year. By simply refusing the renew their contract, landlords were able to eject tenants. As a result, peasant
organizations agitated in vain for a law that would make the contract automatically renewable for as long as the
tenants fulfilled their obligations.[5]

In 1936, this Act was amended to get rid of its loophole, but the landlords made its application relative and not
absolute. Consequently, it was never carried out in spite of its good intentions. In fact, by 1939, thousands of
peasants in Central Luzon were being threatened with wholesale eviction.[5] By the early 1940s, thousands of
tenants in Central Luzon were ejected from their farmlands and the rural conflict was more acute than ever. [5]

Therefore, during the Commonwealth period, agrarian problems persisted. [5] This motivated the government to
incorporate a cardinal principle on social justice. Dictated by the social justice program of the government,
expropriation of landed estates and other landholdings commenced. Likewise, the National Land Settlement
Administration (NSLA) began an orderly settlement of public agricultural lands. At the outbreak of the Second World
War, major settlement areas containing more than 65,000 hectares were already established. [5]

Roxas Administration[edit]
When the Philippines gained its independence in 1946, much of the land was held by a small group of wealthy
landowners. There was much pressure on the democratically elected government to redistribute the land. At the
same time, many of the democratically elected office holders were landowners themselves or came from land-
owning families.

In 1946, shortly after his induction to Presidency, Manuel Roxas proclaimed the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933
effective throughout the country.[5] However problems of land tenure continued. In fact these became worse in
certain areas.[5] Among the remedial measures enacted was Republic Act No. 1946 likewise known as the Tenant Act
which provided for a 70–30 sharing arrangements and regulated share-tenancy contracts. [5] It was passed to resolve
the ongoing peasant unrest in Central Luzon.[5]

As part of his Agrarian Reform agenda, President Elpidio Quirino issued on 23 October 1950 Executive Order No.
355 which replaced the National Land Settlement Administration with Land Settlement Development Corporation
(LASEDECO) which takes over the responsibilities of the Agricultural Machinery Equipment Corporation and the
Rice and Corn Production Administration.[6]

Ramon Magsaysay administration[edit]

President Ramon Magsaysay at the Presidential Study, Malacañan Palace

To amplify and stabilize the functions of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR), President Ramon
Magsaysay worked[7]for the establishment of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA),
[7]
which took over from the EDCOR and helped in the giving of some sixty-five thousand acres to three thousand
indigent families for settlement purposes.[7] Again, it allocated some other twenty-five thousand to a little more than
one thousand five hundred landless families, who subsequently became farmers.[7]
As further aid to the rural people,[7] the president established the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration
(ACCFA). The idea was for this entity to make available rural credits. Records show that it did grant, in this wise,
almost ten million dollars. This administration body next devoted its attention to cooperative marketing. [7]

Along this line of help to the rural areas, President Magsaysay initiated in all earnestness the artesian wells
campaign. A group-movement known as the Liberty Wells Association was formed and in record time managed to
raise a considerable sum for the construction of as many artesian wells as possible. The socio-economic value of
the same could not be gainsaid and the people were profuse in their gratitude. [7]

Finally, vast irrigation projects, as well as enhancement of the Ambuklao Power plant and other similar ones, went a
long way towards bringing to reality the rural improvement program advocated by President Magsaysay. [7]

President Ramón Magsaysay enacted the following laws as part of his Agrarian Reform Program:

 Republic Act No. 1160 of 1954 – Abolished the LASEDECO and established the National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to resettle dissidents and landless farmers. It was particularly aimed at
rebel returnees providing home lots and farmlands in Palawan and Mindanao.

 Republic Act No. 1199 (Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954) – Governed the relationship between landowners
and tenant farmers by organizing share-tenancy and leasehold system. The law provided the security of tenure
of tenants. It also created the Court of Agrarian Relations.

 Republic Act No. 1400 (Land Reform Act of 1955) – Created the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) which
was responsible for the acquisition and distribution of large tenanted rice and corn lands over 200 hectares for
individuals and 600 hectares for corporations.

 Republic Act No. 821 (Creation of Agricultural Credit Cooperative Financing Administration) – Provided small
farmers and share tenants loans with low interest rates of six to eight percent. [6]
Macapagal administration[edit]
Land Reform Code[edit]

Main article: Agricultural Land Reform Code

The Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) was a major Philippine land reform law enacted in 1963 under
President Diosdado Macapagal.[8]

The code declared that it was State policy

1. To establish owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture
and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in agriculture to industrial development;

2. To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and
practices;

3. To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive to greater productivity and
higher farm incomes;
 4. To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and agricultural wage earners;

5. To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and public land distribution; and

6. To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of genuine
strength in our democratic society.

and, in pursuance of those policies, established the following

1. An agricultural leasehold system to replace all existing share tenancy systems in agriculture;

2. A declaration of rights for agricultural labor;

3. An authority for the acquisition and equitable distribution of agricultural land;

4. An institution to finance the acquisition and distribution of agricultural land;

5. A machinery to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture;

6. A machinery to provide marketing, management, and other technical services to agriculture;

7. A unified administration for formulating and implementing projects of land reform;

8. An expanded program of land capability survey, classification, and registration; and

9. A judicial system to decide issues arising under this Code and other related laws and regulations.
Marcos administration[edit]
On 10 September 1971, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed the Code of Agrarian Reform of the Philippines into
law which established the Department of Agrarian Reform, effectively replacing the Land Authority.

In 1978, the DAR was renamed the Ministry of Agrarian Reform.

On 26 July 1987, following the People Power Revolution, the department was re-organized through Executive Order
(EO) No. 129-A.

In 1988, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law created the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program which is
also known as CARP.

Corazon Aquino administration[edit]

President Corazon Aquino envisioned agrarian and land reform as the centerpiece of her administration's social
legislative agenda. However, her family background and social class as a privileged daughter of a wealthy and
landed clan became a lightning rod of criticisms against her land reform agenda. On 22 January 1987, less than a
month before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, agrarian workers and farmers marched to the historic
Mendiola Street near the Malacañan Palace to demand genuine land reform from Aquino's administration. However,
the march turned violent when Marine forces fired at farmers who tried to go beyond the designated demarcation
line set by the police. As a result, 12 farmers were killed and 19 were injured in this incident now known as
the Mendiola massacre. This incident led some prominent members of the Aquino Cabinet to resign their
government posts.

In response to calls for agrarian reform, President Aquino issued Presidential Proclamation 131 and Executive Order
229 on 22 July 1987, which outlined her land reform program, which included sugar lands. In 1988, with the backing
of Aquino, the new Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 6657, more popularly known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law." The law paved the way for the redistribution of agricultural lands to tenant-
farmers from landowners, who were paid in exchange by the government throughjust compensation but were also
allowed to retain not more than five hectares of land. [9] However, corporate landowners were also allowed under the
law to "voluntarily divest a proportion of their capital stock, equity or participation in favor of their workers or other
qualified beneficiaries", in lieu of turning over their land to the government for redistribution. [10] Despite the flaws in
the law, the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in 1989, declaring that the implementation of the
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) provided by the said law, was "a revolutionary kind of
expropriation."[11]

Despite the implementation of CARP, Aquino was not spared from the controversies that eventually centered
on Hacienda Luisita, a 6,453-hectare estate located in the Province of Tarlac, which she, together with her siblings
inherited from her father Jose Cojuangco (Don Pepe).[12]

Critics argued that Aquino bowed to pressure from relatives by allowing stock redistribution under Executive Order
229. Instead of land distribution, Hacienda Luisita reorganized itself into a corporation and distributed stock. As
such, ownership of agricultural portions of the hacienda were transferred to the corporation, which in turn, gave its
shares of stocks to farmers.[12]

The arrangement remained in force until 2006, when the Department of Agrarian Reform revoked the stock
distribution scheme adopted in Hacienda Luisita, and ordered instead the redistribution of a large portion of the
property to the tenant-farmers. The Department stepped into the controversy when in 2004, violence erupted over
the retrenchment of workers in the Hacienda, eventually leaving seven people dead. [12]

Ramos administration[edit]
President Fidel V. Ramos speeded the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
former President Corazon Aquino in order to meet the ten-year time frame. However, there were constraints such as
the need to firm up the database and geographic focus, generate funding support, strengthen inter-agency
cooperation, and mobilize implementation partners, like the non-government organizations, local governments, and
the business community.[5] In 1992, the government acquired and distributed 382 hectares of land with nearly a
quarter of a million farmer-beneficiaries. This constituted 41% of all land titles distributed by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) during the last thirty years. But by the end of 1996, the DAR had distributed only 58.25% of
the total area it was supposed to cover. From January to December 1997, the DAR distributed 206,612 hectares.
That year, since 1987, the DAR had distributed a total of 2.66 million hectares which benefited almost
1.8 million tenant-farmers.[5]

One major problem that the Ramos administration faced was the lack of funds to support and implement the
program.[5] The Php50 million, allotted by R.A. No. 6657 to finance the CARP from 1988 to 1998, was no longer
sufficient to support the program. To address this problem, Ramos signed R.A. No. 8532 to amend the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) which further strengthened the CARP by extending the program to
another ten years.[5] Ramos signed this law on 23 February 1998 – a few months before the end of Ramos' term. [5]
Arroyo administration[edit]
On 27 September 2004, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, signed Executive Order No. 364, and the Department
of Agrarian Reform was renamed to Department of Land Reform. This EO also broadened the scope of the
department, making it responsible for all land reform in the country. It also placed the Philippine Commission on
Urban Poor (PCUP) under its supervision and control. Recognition of the ownership of ancestral domain by
indigenous peoples also became the responsibility of this new department, under the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP).[13]

On 23 August 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed Executive Order No. 456 and renamed the
Department of Land Reform back to Department of Agrarian Reform, since "the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law goes beyond just land reform but includes the totality of all factors and support services designed to lift the
economic status of the beneficiaries."[14]

When President Noynoy Aquino took office, there was a renewed push to compete the agrarian reform. The
Department of Agrarian Reform adopted a goal of distributed all CARP-eligible land by the end of Pres. Aquino's
term in 2016.[15] As of June 2013, 694,181 hectares remained to be distributed, according to DAR.[15]

Hacienda Luisita, owned by the Cojuangco family, which includes the late former President Corazón C. Aquino and
her son, current President Aquino, has been a notable case of land reform. [16]

Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program[edit]

See also: Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is the current law under which land reform is conducted. Large land-
holdings are broken up and distributed to farmers and workers on that particular hacienda. The crops grown on such
haciendas include sugar and rice. Each farmer is giving a "certificates of land ownership award" or CLOA for their
new property.[15] Under the law, a landowner can only retain 5 hectares, regardless of the size of the hacienda.
[15]
Conflict can arise between previous landowners and "beneficiaries" and between competing farmers' groups that
have conflicting claims.[15]

In December 2008, CARP expired and the following year CARPer was passed. CARPer stands for "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms". CARPer expires in 2014.

Sec. 2 RA 6657 (as amended by RA 9700) – Declaration of Principles

and Policies
Posted on June 22, 2014 by ALVIN CLARIDADES
Rate This

SECTION 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. — It is the policy of the State to pursue
a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the landless farmers
and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to
move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization, and the
establishment of owner cultivatorship of economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine
agriculture.

To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due regard to the
rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological needs of the nation, shall
be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with the opportunity to enhance their
dignity and improve the quality of their lives through greater productivity of agricultural
lands.

The agrarian reform program is founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers,
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other
farm workers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to the
priorities and retention limits set forth in this Act, having taken into account ecological,
developmental, and equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just
compensation. The State shall respect the right of small landowners, and shall provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.

The State shall recognize the right of farmers, farmworkers and landowners, as well as
cooperatives and other independent farmers’ organizations, to participate in the
planning, organization, and management of the program, and shall provide support to
agriculture through appropriate technology and research, and adequate financial
production, marketing and other support services.

The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform, or stewardship, whenever
applicable, in accordance with law, in the disposition or utilization of other natural
resources, including lands of the public domain, under lease or concession, suitable to
agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers and the rights of
indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.

The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates,
which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by law. By means of
appropriate incentives, the State shall encourage the formation and maintenance of
economic-size family farms to be constituted by individual beneficiaries and small
landowners. The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of
local communities, to the preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources,
both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through
appropriate technology and research, adequate financial, production and marketing
assistance and other services. The State shall also protect, develop and conserve such
resources. The protection shall extend to offshore fishing grounds of subsistence
fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their
labor in the utilization of marine and fishing resources.

The State shall be guided by the principles that land has a social function and land
ownership has a social responsibility. Owners of agricultural lands have the obligation to
cultivate directly or through labor administration the lands they own and thereby make
the land productive.

The State shall provide incentives to landowners to invest the proceeds of the agrarian
reform program to promote industrialization, employment and privatization of public
sector enterprises. Financial instruments used as payment for lands shall contain
features that shall enhance negotiability and acceptability in the marketplace. The State
may lease undeveloped lands of the public domain to qualified entities for the
development of capital-intensive farms, and traditional and pioneering crops especially
those for exports subject to the prior rights of the beneficiaries under this Act.