Jann Claudine M.

Amago 4 – B

RULE 52 and 53 – MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND NEW TRIAL

1. Cuenca vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. no. 109870, December 1, 1995

Facts:

On July 6, 1994, the petitioner filed a pleading entitled "SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL WITH MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL” setting forth, in relation to the motion for new trial in view of the denial by the Court of Appeals of the petition
for review of the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming his conviction for violation of the "Trust Receipts Law" (Presidential Decree No.
115). The Motion for New Trial shall be grounded on newly discovered evidence and excusible ( sic) negligence, and shall be supported
by affidavits of:

(i) an officer of private complainant corporation who will exculpate petitioner;

(ii) an admission against interest by a former officer of the owner of Ultra Corporation (the Corporation that employed
petitioner), which actually exercised control over the affairs of Ultra; and
(iii) the petitioner wherein he will assert innocence for the first time and explain why he was unable to do so earlier.

The Court in its July 27, 1994 Resolution, among other things, granted the substitution but denied the motion for leave to file
motion for new trial, "the petition having been already denied on February 9, 1994." Notwithstanding, petitioner on August 8, 1994 filed
a "MOTION TO ADMIT ATTACHED MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL", and a "MANIFESTATION AND SECOND MOTION TO ADMIT" on August
17, 1994. The Court thereafter required the Solicitor General to comment on said motion and manifestation within ten (10) days from
notice, in a Resolution dated September 7, 1994. In the Comment filed after three (3) extensions of time were given by the Court, the
Solicitor General himself recommends that petitioner be entitled to a new trial, proceeding from the same impression that a certain
Rodolfo Cuenca's (petitioner's brother) sworn statement is an admission against interest which may ultimately exonerate petitioner from
criminal liability.

Issue: Whether or not the Motion for New Trial should be granted by the court

Ruling: YES.

According to the Solicitor General, ordinarily, it is too late at this stage to ask for a new trial. However, the sworn statement of
Rodolfo Cuenca is a declaration against his own interests under Section 38, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court and it casts doubt on the
culpability of his brother Edilberto Cuenca, the petitioner. Hence, the alleged confession of guilt should be given a hard look by the Court.
The People is inclined to allow petitioner to establish the genuineness and due execution of his brother's affidavit in the interest of justice
and fair play.
Although in "Goduco v. CA" (14 SCRA 282 [1965]) decided some twenty (20) years ago, this Court ruled that it is not authorized
to entertain a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial predicated on allegedly newly discovered evidence the rationale of which being:
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, in an
appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court, the latter has no jurisdiction to entertain a motion for new trial on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, for only questions of fact are involved therein. The rule now appears to have been relaxed, if not abandoned, in
subsequent cases like "Helmuth, Jr. v. People" and "People v. Amparado"
In both cases, the Court, opting to brush aside technicalities and despite the opposition of the Solicitor General, granted new
trial to the convicted accused concerned on the basis of proposed testimonies or affidavits of persons which the Court considered as
newly discovered and probably sufficient evidence to reverse the judgment of conviction. Being similarly circumstanced, there is no
nagging reason why herein petitioner should be denied the same benefit. It becomes all the more plausible under the circumstances
considering that the "People" does not raise any objection to a new trial, for which reason the Solicitor General ought to be specially
commended for displaying once again such statesmanlike gesture of impartiality. The Solicitor General's finest hour, indeed.

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RULE 59 – RECEIVERSHIP

2. Descallar vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. no. 106473, July 12, 1993

Facts:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the decision dated July 19, 1992 of the Court of Appeals, granting the
respondent’s petition for receivership and denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration thereof.
On August 1, 1991, the respondent realtor, Camilo Borromeo, filed a civil action against the petitioner for the recovery of 3
parcels of land and the house built thereon in possession of the petitioner and registered in her name under TCT nos. 24790, 24791, and
24792 of the Registry of Deeds of Mandaue. Borromeo alleged that he purchased the property from Wihelm Jambrich, an Australian
national and former lover of the petitioner for many years until he left her for another woman. In her answer, the petitioner alleged that
the property belongs to her as she is the registered owner thereof; that Borromeo’s vendor, Wihelm Jambrich is an Austrian, hence, not
qualified to acquire or own real properties in the Philippines. He has no title, right or interest which he may transfer to the respondent.
On March 5, 1992, the respondent asked the trial court to appoint a receiver for the property during the pendency of the case.
Despite the petitioner’s opposition, the judge granted the application for receveirship and appointed her clerk of court as receiver. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in appointing a receiver for real property registered in the name of the
petitioner in order to transfer its possession from the petitioner to the court-appointed receiver

Ruling: YES.

The order of receivership tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The appointment of a receiver is not proper where the rights
of the parties (one of whom is in possession of the property), are still to be determined by the trial court. Relief by way of receivership
is equitable in nature, and a court of equity will not ordinarily appoint a receiver where the rights of the parties depend on the
determination of adverse claims of legal title to real property and one party is in possession. (Calo, et al. vs. Roldan, 76 Phil., 445). Only
when the property is in danger of being materially injured or lost, as by the prospective foreclosure of a mortgage thereon for non-
payment of the mortgage loans despite the considerable income derived from the property, or if portions thereof are being occupied by
third persons claiming adverse title thereto, may the appointment of a receiver be justified (Motoomul vs. Arrieta, 8 SCRA 172).
In this case, there is no showing that grave or irremediable damage may result to respondent Borromeo unless a receiver is
appointed. The property in question is real property, hence, it is neither perishable or consummable. Even though it is mortgaged to a
third person, there is no evidence that payment of the mortgage obligation is being neglected. In any event, the private respondent's
rights and interests, may be adequately protected during the pendency of the case by causing his adverse claim to be annotated on the
petitioner's certificates of title.
Another flaw in the order of receivership is that the person whom the trial judge appointed as receiver is her own clerk of court.
This practice has been frowned upon by this Court:
The respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in connection with the appointment of a receiver. The instant case is similar
to Paranete vs. Tan, 87 Phil. 678 (1950) so that what was there said can well apply to the actuations of the respondent judge. "We hold
that the respondent judge has acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the order above adverted to. That order, in effect, made
the clerk of court a sort of a receiver charged with the duty of receiving the proceeds of sale and the harvest of every year during the
pendency of the case with the disadvantage that the clerk of court has not filed any bond to guarantee the faithful discharge of his duties
as depositary; and considering that in actions involving title real property, the appointment of a receiver cannot be entertained because
its effect would be to take the property out of the possession of the defendant, except in extreme cases when there is clear proof of its
necessity to save the plaintiff from grave and irremediable loss of damage, it is evident that the action of the respondent judge is
unwarranted and unfair to the defendants.
During the pendency of this appeal, Judge Dadole rendered a decision in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 upholding Borromeo's claim
to Descallar's property, annulling the latter's TCTs Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 and ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to
issue new ones in the name of Borromeo. This circumstance does not retroactively validate the receivership until the decision (presumably
now pending appeal) shall have attained finality.

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RULE 65 – CERTIORARI

3. Fortich vs. Corona

G.R. no 131457, April 24, 1998

Facts:

This case involves a land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and
Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 of the
Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop Producer
and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994. In October, 1991, during the existence
of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed
the land value at P2.38 million. When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that
the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor
Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on August 11, 1995 and had it
transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on
September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in
the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. NQSRMDC filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and cancellation of title, damages
and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on
May 19, 1997, restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the possession of the
subject land.
Meanwhile, an Order was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for
having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP
decision had already become final and executory. On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously identified by respondent DAR as
agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to
issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring
and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by reviving
and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997. Thus, petitioners
further allege, respondent then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the
subject Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly with the Court of Appeals
in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court

Ruling: NO.

In order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of
judgment and an error of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued
by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction. This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of any quasi-judicial agency exercising
quasi-judicial functions, including the Office of the President, may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for
review within fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution, whether the appeal involves questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
However, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present petition contains
an allegation that the challenged resolution is patently illegal and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his (respondent

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Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction when said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which
had long become final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of
judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set aside the assailed resolution
is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section
1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require.

The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases in which the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly
void. The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed illegal act may file a verified petition (for
certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:

SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation,
board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise
provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court have original concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in
that, if the challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, the petition must be
filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves
the act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided by law
or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al., through now
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:

This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts , which may issue the writ, enforceable in any
part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals,
although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs was
restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according
to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be
directed.

But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it if compelling reasons,
or the nature and importance of the issues rose, warrant. This has been the judicial policy to be observed. Pursuant to said judicial policy,
we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to
promptly put an end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of the
magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, the assailed resolution is wholly void and requiring
the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.

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RULE 70 – FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

4. San Miguel Wood Products, Inc. vs. Tupas

A.M. No. MTJ – 93892, October 25, 1995

Facts:

On June 3, 1993, respondent judge rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 424-B-92, in favor of the plaintiffs therein and against
herein complainant. The parties received their copies of the decision on June 14, 1993. Within the reglementary period to appeal, the
plaintiffs filed a "Motion for Immediate Execution," which was opposed by complainant.
On June 24, 1993, while the motion for immediate execution was pending in the MTCC, complainant filed a "Notice of Appeal
and Approval of Cash/Supersedeas Bond" to stay the execution of the June 3, 1993 Decision. The notice of appeal and the supersedeas
bond were approved by respondent judge. On September 3, 1993, complainant deposited with the clerk of court the sum of Eight
Thousand Pesos (P8,000.00), the rentals due from June 6, 1993 to October 5, 1993. The records disclose that the plaintiffs filed a
"Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending Appeal," dated June 30, 1993, in the MTCC. The supplemental motion was opposed by
complainant in its "Comment or Opposition to Supplemental Motion for Execution Pending Appeal," but respondent judge issued a special
order, granting plaintiffs' motion for a writ of execution pending appeal.
Complainant now accuses respondent judge of grave partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the
law for granting the motion for writ of execution pending appeal. Complainant contends that, upon perfection of its appeal on July 16,
1993, respondent judge lost its jurisdiction over the case. Thus, the Special Order, dated August 11, 1993, ordering the issuance of the
writ of execution pending appeal, is null and void. Complainant argues, further, that the issuance of the July 16, 1993 Order should be
considered as a denial of the motion for execution pending appeal filed by the plaintiffs. Furthermore, complainant points out that the
rule governing execution of judgment in ejectment cases is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, not Section 2 of Rule 39, the
provision relied upon by respondent judge. Complainant also assails the immediate implementation of the writ of execution by respondent
City Sheriff.
The present administrative complaint at bar to the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation and ruled
that Judge Tupas had, therefore, NO jurisdiction and authority to issue his Special Order of August 11, 1993; He should have dismissed
all of the plaintiffs' motion for execution pending appeal because Section 8, Rule 70 and not Section 2, Rule 39 is what is applicable as
this is an ejectment case.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Tupas acted with grave partiality, serious misconduct, abuse of authority and/or ignorance of the law

Ruling: YES.

This is an ejectment case, hence, the applicable rule is Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It states:
Sec. 8. Immediate execution of judgment. How to stay the same. — If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution
shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant, to stay execution, files a sufficient bond,
approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) and to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and
unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under
the contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist.
All money so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited in the provincial or city treasury, and shall be held there until the
final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds
of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the
payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the
plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment
appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal from taking its
course until the final disposition thereof on its merits.

Respondent judge missed the foregoing rule when it applied Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In stark contrast, under
section 8 of Rule 70, it is not necessary to show good reasons for the immediate execution of the judgment against the
defendant. The judgment is executed immediately in favor of the plaintiff, as a matter of right, to prevent further damage arising from
the loss of possession.

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 It is settled that to stay the execution of judgment of an inferior court, the losing defendant in an ejectment case must: (a)
perfect his appeal; (b) file a supersedeas bond; and (c) make a periodic deposit of the rentals due or the reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the property during the pendency of the appeal. These requisites must concur.
In the case at bar, complainant filed his appeal on time and deposited the required supersedeas bond in the inferior court, but
it failed to comply with the third requisite as related above. As borne by the records, the rentals accruing for the months of June, July
and August were deposited only on September 3, 1993. Upon its failure to meet the third requisite prescribed under the rules, the
plaintiffs have the right to move for execution of the judgment appealed from. The order of execution, however, has to be issued by the
appellate court, in this case the Regional Trial Court, since the respondent judge had lost his jurisdiction over the ejectment case after
the appeal to the RTC had been perfected. In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, the respondent judge showed gross
ignorance, albeit without any malice or corrupt motive.

RULE 8 – MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN A PLEADING

5. Consolidated Bank vs. Del Monte Motor Works

G.R. no. 143338, July 29, 2005

Facts:

CBTC filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money against Sps Morales fora P1Million loan that was extended to the latter,
as evidenced by a promissory note, where the Morales defaulted in the payment thereof. CBTC attached to its complaint a photocopy of
the promissory note supposedly executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and
statement of account. During the trial, CBTC presented Lavarino, then the manager of its Collection Department. Lavarino stated that
Morales obtained the loan, but failed to pay a single monthly installment on this loan, CBTC a demand letter. Lavarino also identified the
following exhibits for CBTC: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit A; petitioners
20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit B; Tolentino’s letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and marked as Exhibit C;
and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents marked as Exhibit D. CBTC made its formal offer of evidence. However,
as the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found, CBTC instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory
note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E. The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E.
Del Monte filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s order admitting into evidence Exhibit E,
claiming that it was immaterial, irrelevant, was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. Del Monte insists that Exhibit E was not
properly identified by Lavarino who testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioner’s exhibits, one of
which was Exhibit E. Further, as there were markings in Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E, the latter could not possibly be
considered an original copy of Exhibit A. Respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that with the
exclusion of Exhibits A and E, petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged indebtedness.

Issue: Whether or not the exclusion of the evidence was proper

Ruling: NO.

The respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and
the loan documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his “denial under oath,”
stating that the “promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does
not bind him and that it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses. Respondent’s denials do not
constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to
deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.: This means that the defendant must declare under oath that
he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a
plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.
Respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there was no need for
petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness and
execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present
the original of said note. Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a
document copied in a complaint, the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant.

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RULE 16 – MOTION TO DISMISS

6. Galindo vs. Heirs of Roxas

G.R. no. 147969, January 17, 2005

Facts:

In a dispute regarding ownership of the land between heirs of persons who entered into a transaction a long time ago, Reginald
Roxas alleges that he is the representative of the legitimate heirs of Marciano A. Roxas. The Galindo contended that the complaint did
not allege that the heirs have authorized Reginald to file against her in their behalf. In the RTC, only one Galindo is the defendant. Now,
in their petition before the SC, they are now joined by other Galindos. The respondent, Roxas, contended that they are not proper parties
as they were not there during the action in the RTC and the petition in the CA.

Issue: Are the other Galindos proper parties, considering that they were not there during the case in the RTC and the petition in the
CA?

Ruling: YES, THEY ARE PROPER PARTIES.

In fact, they should have been impleaded from the very start. While we agree with the respondents’ premise that the
petitioners herein, except petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera, were not parties-defendants in the RTC and parties-petitioners in the CA,
and, as a general rule, are not proper parties as petitioners in this case, the Court finds and so holds that they are indispensable parties
and should be impleaded as parties-petitioners in this case.
The general rule is that only those parties in a case and their privies and successors-in-interest are bound by the order or
decision of the trial court. Persons or entities who are not parties to the case are not and should not be bound or adversely affected by
the said order or decision; otherwise, they will be deprived of their right to due process. Since the petitioners, except petitioner Juanita
Galindo Rivera, were not parties in the RTC and in the CA, they are not bound by the assailed orders of the RTC and the decision of the
CA against petitioner Juanita Galindo Rivera; hence, they are not the proper parties to appeal from and assail the said orders of the RTC
and the decision of the CA.
It bears stressing, however, that the respondents, the plaintiffs in the RTC, sought the nullification of the “Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Urbano Galindo and/or the Deceased Gregorio Galindo with Waiver of Rights” executed by all
the petitioners in which they adjudicated unto themselves as co-owners thereof the rights and interests which they claimed the deceased
Urbano Galindo had over Lot 1048 covered by TCT No. 335593(M) which was issued to and under the name of petitioner Juanita Galindo
Rivera on the basis of the said deed, and the retention of TCT No. T-2145 under the names of the heirs of Gregorio Galindo. Thus, all
the petitioners, who executed the said deed, are indispensable parties as parties-defendants in the RTC and as parties-petitioners in the
CA under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and should have been impleaded by the respondents in their complaint. Without the
presence of the said petitioners as defendants, the trial court could not validly render judgment and grant relief to the respondents. The
failure of the respondents to implead all the petitioners as parties-defendants constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the
appellate court’s exercise of judicial power over the said cases and rendered any orders or judgments rendered therein a nullity. The
absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present. The RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

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RULE 39 – EXECUTION, SATISFACTION AND EFFECTS OF JUDGMENTS

7. Tuballa Heirs vs. Cabrera

G.R. no. 179104, February 29, 2008

Facts:

On June 21, 1991, Anastacio Tuballa filed a Complaint against Cabrera Enterprises, Incorporated (Cabrera Enterprises),
for Recovery of Possession of a parcel of sugar land. Tuballa is the registered owner of Lot No. 5697 with an area of 11.0337 hectares
located in Bondo, Siaton, Negros Oriental, covered by Free Patent No. 544264 granted on September 28, 1973 and by OCT No. FV-16880
dated October 11, 1974. Tuballa and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession and occupation of the land since time
immemorial. It was Tuballa who invested time, resources, and effort to convert the public land into private ownership. Sometime in 1982,
the men employed by Cabrera Enterprises intruded into the subject land without Tuballas consent. The laborers of Cabrera Enterprises
did not heed Tuballas protestation and admonition, prompting him to make several attempts to accost the manager of Cabrera Enterprises
but to no avail, as the manager either was always out of office or refused to meet Tuballa.
On September 30, 1994, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. Aggrieved, Cabrera Enterprises, represented
by its Manager, Agnes Cabrera, and by Raul Cabrera and Carmen Cabrera, interposed its timely appeal before the CA. On October 25,
2002, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA issued on March 7, 2003 an Entry of Judgment, stating that its
Decision dated October 25, 2002 has become final and executory on March 7, 2003.
Subsequently, Tuballa filed a Manifestation before the RTC, pointing out that there was a typographical error in the dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision, which indicated Lot No. 6597 instead of Lot No. 5697, and that the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. On January
3, 2006, the RTC issued an Order, disposing Tuballas manifestation, as follows:

After a careful study and evaluation on the pleadings at hand, the Court believes that the very issue confronting the Court is
whether or not it has the power or authority to correct or clarify the error in the Decision sought to be executed. As can be
gleaned on the records, the decision sought to be executed is not the decision of this Court but rather of the Court of Appeals.
Hence, any correction or clarification of the decision of the Court of Appeals must be addressed to the said court.

Hence, the instant petition filed by the children and heirs of Tuballa.

Issue: Whether or not the petition should be granted

Ruling: YES.

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law; and whether it be made by the court that
rendered it or by the highest court in the land.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules, and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to dispute once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must
always be maintained by those who exercise the power of adjudication. Any act, which violates such principle, must immediately be
struck down. Indeed, the principle of conclusiveness of prior adjudications is not confined in its operation to the judgments of what are
ordinarily known as courts, but it extends to all bodies upon which judicial powers had been conferred.
The only exceptions to the rule that final judgments may no longer be modified in any respect are (1) the correction of clerical
errors, (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments. Under OCT No. FV-16880,
the technical description of the land refers to Lot No. 5697, Pls-659-D and not Lot No. 6597. The RTC committed a typographical error
in its Decision when it ordered Cabrera Enterprises to vacate Lot No. 6597, Pls-659-D and turn over the possession of the same to Tuballa.
And, in accordance with the first exception to modification of final judgment mentioned earlier, this Court hereby modifies the clerical
error in the Decision of the RTC.

8|Remedial Law