No Judul Jurnal Hipotesis

1. There is a positive and significant relation

between the gender diversity of
the board and the tax planning

2. There is a positive and significant relation

Demographic Diversity in the Board and CTP in between the high presence of
1 American Firms independent directors and corporate tax
planning

3. There is a negative and significant relation

between the board size and the
corporate tax planning

Hypothesis 1 (H1): There is an association

between TP activities
and frm value

Hypothesis 2 (H2a): The effects of positive

(negative) TP and
frm value would be strengthened
(weakened) by the magnitude of
The Effect of the Tax Planning to Firm Value the proportion of the board member
2 directors of 40-50 years old.
with Moderating Board Diversity

Hypotheses 2b (H2b): The effects of positive

(negative) TP and
frm value would be strengthened
(weakened) by the large of the
proportion of the board members directors
of the Chinese ethnics
in the company.

Female Directors and Tax Aggressiveness of
Listed Banks in Nigeria
3 board size
Demographic characteristics of
the board of directors’ structure
and tax avoidance
4 significantly associated with tax avoidance
5 The board of directors and the corporate tax
planning:
Empirical Evidence from Tunisia
Hypotheses 2c (H2c): The effects of positive
(negative) TP and
frm value would be strengthened
(weakened) by the magnitude
of the proportion of the board members
directors which education/
study background in economics and
business.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation
between female
directors and tax aggressiveness in Nigerian
banks
Hypothesis 2: The association between
female director and
tax aggressiveness will be positively
influenced by the relative
H1. The presence of female directors on
corporate boards is significantly associated
with
tax avoidance
H2. The size of director’s board is
1. The size of the board is negatively
correlated with tax planning
5 The board of directors and the corporate tax
planning:
Empirical Evidence from Tunisia
2. The presence of independent directors is
positively associated with corporate
tax planning

3. Duality is negatively associated with

corporate tax planning
4. The diversity of the board is associated
negatively with corporate tax planning

5. The firm’s profitability is associated

positively with corporate tax planning

Board of Director Gender and Corporate Tax

6 Aggressiveness: All else being equal, female presence on the

An Empirical Analysis directors reduces the likelihood of corporate tax aggressiveness.

Roman Lanis 1 • Grant Richardson 2 • Grantley

Taylor
7 Outside Directors, Corporate Social Responsibil : The interaction effect between the proportio

This study also provides robust and generalizable evidence whic

TREN PENGHINDARAN PAJAK PERUSAHAAN

MANUFAKTUR DI INDONESIA YANG
8 TERDAFTAR DI BEI TAHUN 2001-2014
Secara garis besar tren penghindaran pajak perusahaan manufaktur meningkat dari 2001 sam
 Variabel
Kesimpulan Metode Penelitian
Dependent Independen

Langkah 1: check
❌ the appropriate DIV(it): % wanita di board
model of estimation

Langkah 2: specify
whether the fixed
effect or the random
effect
✅ ETR IND(it): % direktur independen
should be
considered in
estimating model
parameters

Langkah 3:
estimating the
❌ BSI(it): board size = log total direktur
coefficients of our
Firstly, we variables
found evidence
of positive
relationship
between TP
and frm
value. Secondly,
we found
evidence that
board diversity
(AGE
and BSTUDY of
member
director) could
increase the
positive
influence of TP
into frm value,
except for
MINORITY
could
decrease the
positive
influence of TP
into frm value. MVE TP (tax planning)
Finally, the (market AGE (Usia)
results of the value MINORITY (Ras/Golongan minoritas)
sensitivity test equity) BSTUDY (Latar belakang pendidikan)
with the full
model and the
full sample
suggested that
TP had robust
positive effect
in increasing
frm
value, then the
moderating
influence of
board diversity
(BSTUDY
and MINORITY)
on the
relationship
 in increasing
frm
value, then the
moderating
influence of
board diversity
(BSTUDY
and MINORITY)
on the
relationship
between TP
and frm value
was consistent
but other
variables of
board diversity
(AGE) are
not consistent

the women
presence in
board
of directors has
a negative but
insignificant
effect on
managerial tax
aggressiveness
in banks
effective tax rates (ETRs DIV(it): % wanita di board

the size of the

board has a
positive
moderating
effect on the
tax
aggressiveness
of female
occupied
boards
within the
banking
industry

first hypothesis
is accepted at 5
percent level
(1) FEMALE: is a dummy variable, takes the value of 1 if women are present in boar
BTD, ETR composition, 0 otherwise.
(2) BOSIZE: board size is defined as the number of board members
the second
hypothesis is
accepted at the
0.05 level

❌ ETR DUA: dummy, 1 if the CEO is chair, 0

otherwise
 ETR

❌ DIV: % women directors

✅ IND: % independant directors

✅ BSI: Natural Logarithm of the number of

directors

✅ ETR1 Total tax exp PFEMBOD : % wanita di board

f corporate tax aggressiveness. ETR2 Cash taxes paid divided by pre-tax accounting income

BTG1 Pre-tax accounting income less taxable income (in whic

expense and current foreign tax expense divided by the s

 The book-tax
gap residual,
calculated
using the
method
developed
by Desai and
Dharmapala
(2006)
Independent
BTG2 variable
 our results indi 1. Deskriptif naratif corporate tax aggressiveness (TAG)
2. Regretion model 3 proxy measure board of director independence and CSR performance (OUTD

(SHELTER)
which
captures
particularly
aggressive
forms of tax
d generalizable evidence whic
3. Firm Level Regretio practices SHELTER PROB=
OUTDIR as the proportion of board members who are non-em

discretionar
y booktax
differences
(DD_BT), a
larger value
of DD_BT
represents a
higher level
of tax
aggressivene
ss We measure CSRPERF based on CSR data gathered from the K
e cash effective tax rate (CASHETR) which captures the consequences of broad tax aggre

1. metode purposive
sampling dimana
pengambilan sampel
dilakukan sesuai
dengan
kriteriakriteria
yang telah
an manufaktur meningkat dari
ditetapkan
2001 sampai 2014. Hal
ETRini dapat dilihat
ETR dihitung
dari nilai
dengan
ETR dan
cara
CETR
membagi beban pajak penghasilan dengan laba
2. Pengukuran
Penghindaran Pajak.
Dalam penelitian ini,
model penghindaran
pajak
yang digunakan
adalah ETR dan Cash
ETR CETR Cash ETR merupakan jumlah kas pajak yang dibayarkan dibagi dengan tota

3. Deskripsi statistik
untuk masing-
masing proksi
penghindaran pajak
yaitu mean,
median, nilai
maksimum, nilai
minimum dan
standar deviasi dari
nilai ETR dan CETR
(Semakin kecil nilai
ETR, CETR dan BTD
maka
semakin besar
perusahaan tersebut
dalam penghindaran
pajak)
 Sampel
Kontrol Jumlah Tahun Total

ROA(it)

SIZ(it): firm size = log total 300 1996-2009 4200

aset (ROE)

BVE (Book value equity)

PBTI(Pre book tax income)
EM (Earnings
management)
LEV (Leverage) 221 2010=2011 442
CAPINT (Capital intensity)
BDS (Board director size)
DUM_IND (Industry
dummy)
 firm size (SIZE), financial
performance
(ROA), capital intensity 2012-
(CINT), and leverage 11 33
2014
(LEV);
independent board (INDB)
and board size (BSIZE)

Firm size measured as the logarithm of firm’s total sales

verage measured as the total debts divided by total assets
calculated as dividing net income by market value of the corporate
equity 2012-2016 505
h opportunities, defined as the market value of equity divided by book
value of equity
D : Industry dummy to control for industry fixed effect

ROA 32 2000- 255

2007
 32 2000- 255
2007
SEC: SECTSERVit = 1 if the
company operates in the
service sector, 0
otherwise; SECTINDUSit =
1 if the company operates
in the industrial sector, 0
otherwise.

BODI The proportion of

board of members who
are independent directors 418 2006-2009 1672

PETHDIVBOD The
proportion of directors
serving on the board with
an ethnically diverse
background

PFINEXPBOD The
proportion of directors
serving on the board with
financial experience

AGEDIRBOD The average

age of directors serving
on the board
CEOTENURE The number
of years that the CEO has
served as a director

CEODUAL A dummy
variable, coded 1 if the
roles of chairman and
chief executive officer are
performed by the same
person,
otherwise 0

REM The total

performance-based
remuneration paid to key
management personnel
(total at-risk cash bonus
remuneration and

total equity-based
remuneration paid to key
management personnel)
divided by total
remuneration paid to key

management personnel

MTOBOD The total

proportion of corporate
stock owned by insiders
(e.g., managers) who
serve on the board
BLOCKHLD The total
proportion of ordinary
share capital of
blockholders who hold at
least 5 % of outstanding
shares and are not
affiliated with
management

BIG4AUDIT A dummy
variable, coded 1 if the
firm uses a big four
external auditor,
otherwise 0

SIZE The natural logarithm

of total assets
LEV Long-term debt
divided by total assets

CINT Net property, plant,

and equipment divided by
total assets

RDINT R&D expenditure

divided by total assets
INVINT Inventory divided
by total assets

FGNOPS A dummy
variable, coded 1 if the
firm has a subsidiary firm
or business operation in a
foreign country, otherwise
0

MKTBK The market value

of equity divided by the
book value of equity
ROA Pre-tax income
divided by total assets
INVMILLS The inverse
mills ratio
INDSEC A dummy
variable, coded 1 if the
firm is represented in the
specific two-digit Global
Industry Classification
Standard
(GICS) code category,
otherwise 0

YEAR Year dummy

variable, coded 1 if the
year falls within the
specific year category,
otherwise 0

Additional variables for

first-stage probit model

PFEMBODHIGH A dummy
variable, coded 1 if
PFEMBOD is greater than
the median value of
PFEMBOD, otherwise 0

FSIZE The natural

logarithm of the market
value of equity

FEMEMP The proportion

of female employment in
the firm

FIRMDIV The total

number of business
segments

DIRLINK A dummy
variable, coded 1 if board
members serve on three
or more external boards,
otherwise 0
FIRMAGE The age of the
firm

FIRMRISK The firm beta

 TOBQ The book value of
assets less the book value
of equity, plus the market
value of equity, scaled by
the book value of assets

ce and CSR performance (OUTDIR 3 CSRPERF). 2003-2009Financial firms and utility firms were excluded from the sample because the go

board members who are non-employee directors in accordance with prior research (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Lanis & Richardson, 2011).

n CSR data gathered from the KLD database. In particular, KLD provides integer scores of strengths and concerns for approximately 80 indic
onsequences of broad tax aggressiveness practices (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010).

pajak penghasilan dengan laba sebelum pajak data laporan keuangan perusahaan manufaktur tahun 2001 sampai 2014.
dibayarkan dibagi dengan total laba sebelum pajak
 Fungsi

ETR it : α + α 1 DIV it + α 2 IND it + α 3 BSI it + ROA it + SIZ it + ε it

MVE (t+3 month)=β0+ β1TP it + β2BVEit + β3PBTIit + β4EMit + β5LEVit

+ β6CAPINTit + β7BDSit + β8DUM_INDit + ε it

MVE (t+3 month)=β0+ β1TP it + β2AGEit + β3MINORITYit +

β4BSTUDYit + β5BVEit + β6PBTIit + β7EMit + β8LEVit + β9CAPINTit +
β10BDSit + β11DUM_INDit + ε it

MVE (t+3 month)=β0+ β1TP it + β2AGEit + β3MINORITYit +

β4BSTUDYit + β5AGE*TPit + β6MINORITY*TPit + β7BSTUDY*TPit+
β8BVEit + β9PBTIit + β10EMit + β11LEVit + β12CAPINTit + β13BDSit +
β14DUM_INDit + ε it
 ETRit=β0+ β1DIV it + β2BSIZEit + β3INDEPIit + β4SIZEit + β5LEVit +
β6ROAit + β7CINTit + µit + ε it

= β0 + β1FEMALEit + β2BOSIZEit + β3SIZEit +β4LEV it +β5ROEit + β6GWTH it + IND FE + YEAR FE + εi;t

Langkah 1: verification of the appropriate model of estimation Tax

planning:
F
 F
Langkah 2: specify whether (governan
the fixed effect or the random effect should be considered in ce
estimating model parameters variables
+ control
variables)
; Effective
tax rate:
α1 + α2
Duality it
+ α3
Diversity
Langkah 3: estimating the coefficients of our variables it + α4
Board
Size it +
α5
Independ
ent
Directors
it + α6
Return on
assets it +
 Financial firms and utility firms were excluded from the sample because the government regulations they face are likely to affect their tax

nce with prior research (e.g., Beasley, 1996; Lanis & Richardson, 2011).

KLD provides integer scores of strengths and concerns for approximately 80 indicators in seven major categories: (a) community relations, (
& Heitzman, 2010).

ran keuangan perusahaan manufaktur tahun 2001 sampai 2014. Jumlah sampel penelitian ini sangat sedikit d
Penelitian ini hanya memotret tren penghind
re likely to affect their tax aggressiveness measures, thus rendering them different from the other sample firms

a) community relations, (b) corporate governance, (c) diversity, (d) employee relations, (e) environment, (f) human rights, and (g) products.

elitian ini sangat sedikit dikarenakan beberapa kriteria pengambilan sampel yang harus dipenuhi
memotret tren penghindaran pajak perusahaan manufaktur dari tahun 2001-2014. Penelitian selanjutnya dapat memperluas lagi topik-top
human rights, and (g) products.
dapat memperluas lagi topik-topik penghindaran pajak yang dihubungkan dengan bagaimana cara menekan penghindaran pajak yang sem
an penghindaran pajak yang semakin tinggi