6.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda’s constitutional

rights were not violated in obtaining the confession.
Topic V. Rights of the Accused | Custodial Investigation
ISSUES
Case No. No. 759| June 13, 1966
WON “statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police
Case Name Miranda vs. Arizona interrogation” are admissible against him in a criminal trial.

Full Case Miranda v. State of Arizona; Westover v. United States; Vignera v. RATIO DECIDENDI
Name State of New York; State of California v. Stewart1
NO. The Court held that the police had failed to first inform Miranda of his
Ponente Perlas-Bernabe, J. right to an attorney and against self-incrimination.

Digest Karl D. Custodial interrogation means questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
Prepared by a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. The very fact of custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on
Doctrine The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed individual liberty, and trades on the weakness of individuals. With this, no confession
that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be could be admissible under the Fifth Amendment 2 self-incrimination clause and Sixth
used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the Amendment right to an attorney unless a suspect had been made aware of his rights
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during and the suspect had then waived them
interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that
he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. If he could
not afford an attorney, one was to be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
RELEVANT FACTS so desired.

1. Miranda was arrested at his home by the Phoenix Police Department based on
circumstantial evidence which linked him to the kidnapping and rape of an 18-
year old woman ten days earlier.
2. He was taken in custody to a police station and was identified by the
complaining witness.
3. Miranda was then interrogated by police officers for two hours. After which,
he signed a written confession, which included the following statement:
"I do hereby swear that I make this statement voluntarily and of my own free will, with no
threats, coercion, or promises of immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights,
understanding any statement I make may be used against me."
4. Note that Miranda was not told of his right to counsel and was not advised of
his right to remain silent, nor was he informed that his statements during the
interrogation would be used against him.
5. At trial, the prosecutors offered Miranda's written confession as evidence
Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape and was sentenced to 20-30
years imprisonment on each count.
1
This is a consolidation of four cases.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at
any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking,
there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish
to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not
deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned.
Evidence obtained as a result of interrogation shall not be used against a defendant at
trial unless the prosecution demonstrated the warnings were given, and knowingly
2
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence [sic] to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
 and intelligently waived. compelled to give self-incriminating testimonies, and that custodial
interrogation is not inherently coercive.
The above comprise what we call today the Miranda Rights.

DISPOSITIVE

We reverse. From the testimony of the officers and by the admission of respondent, it is
clear that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney
and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled
to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these
warnings, the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement
which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal
rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish
constitutional rights.

Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing, the judgments of the Supreme Court Of
Arizona in No. 759, of the New York Court of Appeals in No. 760, and of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in No. 761, are reversed.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:

Justice Clark, concurring in part, dissenting in part: The "totality of

circumstances" rule should have been used which would consider whether the
police officer, prior to custodial interrogation, added the warning that the
suspect might have counsel present at the interrogation, and, further, that a
court would appoint one at his request if he was too poor to employ counsel. In
the absence of warnings, the burden would be on the State to prove that
counsel was knowingly and intelligently waived or that, in the totality of the
circumstances, including the failure to give the necessary warnings, the
confession was clearly voluntary.

Justice Harlan, dissenting: There was no adequate basis for extending the
Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the police station. Far
more important, it failed to show that the Court's new rules are well supported,
let alone compelled, by Fifth Amendment precedents. Instead, it actually
derived from quotation and analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth
Amendment, which should properly have no bearing on police interrogation.

Justice White, dissenting: The proposition that the privilege against self-
incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in
the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant
support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth
Amendment. The Fifth Amendment protects only defendants who are