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ARTICLE 523 Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject
property and could thus enjoy the fruits and rentals.
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such NO. Article 523 states that possession is the holding of a
constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It thing or the enjoyment of the right.
is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual In the case presented possession was never acquired by
possession of the land sold. the petitioner. It therefore had no rights to rent.

FACTS: Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to

Equatorial since there was failure to deliver the property to
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was
two 2-storey buildings at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, even rescinded.
and covered by TCT No. 18529.
The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that
On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease belonged to the owner of the property producing it by right
with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20 years. The lease covered a of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time
portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission
building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which by final judgment should belong to the owner of the
respondent used as Maxim Theater. property during that period.

Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, “one
second Lease with Carmelo for another portion of the of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
latter’s property this time, a part of the second floor of the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the
two-storey building, and two store spaces on the ground other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its
floor. In that space, Mayfair put up another movie house equivalent.”
known as Miramar Theater. The Contract of Lease was
likewise for a period of 20 years.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer
acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him “in any of the
Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
refusal to purchase the subject properties. Sadly, on July manner signifying an agreement that the possession is
30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject transferred from the vendor to the vendee.” This right is
properties were sold by Carmelo to Equatorial Realty transferred, not by contract alone, but by tradition or
Development, Inc. for eleven million smackers, without their delivery. There is delivery if and when the thing sold “is
first being offered to Mayfair. placed in the control and possession of the vendee.”

As a result of the sale of the subject properties to While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized
Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing sold, such
Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It
Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific is nullified by the failure of the vendee to take actual
performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and possession of the land sold.
Equatorial. Tsk tsk.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a
petition questioning the CA decision. What happened is that For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery
the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money of property or title, and transfer of control or custody to the
back and asserted that Mayfair have the right to purchase buyer.
the lots for 11 million bucks.

Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited

with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand withholding) payment
for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after
Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution, Equatorial
demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable
compensation for the Mayfair’s continued use of the subject
premises after its lease contracts expired. Remember that
Mayfair was still occupying the premises during all this
dela Cruz. While petitioner admitted that he declared the
property for taxation purposes only in 1957, he had
ARTICLE 524 possessed the property beginning 1953 at the very latest,
when he leased the same to Epigenio Dilag, who in turn
G.R. No. 94490 August 6, 1992 possessed the same until respondent Dimaano, Jr. entered
upon the property in 1972. The possession of the property
JOSE DE LUNA, petitioner, by Dilag since 1953 redounds to the benefit of petitioner,
vs. since Article 524 of the CC provides that possession may
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SANTIAGO G. be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
ZAMBALES; JUAN DIMAANO, JR. and GERINO On the other hand, respondent Dimaano, Jr. had
DOBLE, respondents.
failed to prove that Agustin Dequiña, Jr. possessed the
property prior to his possession, much less the ownership
of the latter over said property. While Agustin Dequiña, Jr.
testified that he is a co-owner of the disputed property,
This was a petition for review on certiorari by petitioner
there is nothing to support this self-serving claim; neither
Jose de Luna from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
does his testimony support the defense's theory that he had
G.R. SP No. 12922 1 which affirmed the reversal made by the
prior possession of the property. The mere fact that Agustin
Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales. In his complaint filed on
Dequiña, Sr. had declared the subject for taxation purposes
February 7, 1972 before the Municipal Trial Court, petitioner
from 1908 up to 1945 did not constitute possession
alleged that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land
thereof, 7 nor is it proof of ownership
with an area of 30,856 square meters, located in Babon San
Juan, Botolan, Zambales, since 1938. That on December 18
Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
and 19, 1971, defendants Octavio Daclison, Oscar Crispin, and
Agustin Dequiña, Jr. was the owner of the disputed
private respondents Juan Dimaano, Jr. and Gerino Doble
property since there is no evidence whatsoever to support
entered the land and began plowing it; and that said defendants
such a conclusion.
fenced the land with barbed wire on January 15 and 16, 1972
and began planting sugar cane on February 5 and 6, 1972, [G.R. No. 127608. September 30, 1999]
despite his objections. Petitioners prayed that the defendants be
ordered to vacate the land and pay him the amount of P45.00 GUADALUPE S. REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
monthly per hectare until possession thereof would be APPEALS and JUANITA L. RAYMUNDO, respondents.
transferred to him, with litigation expenses and costs. For his
part, defendant Dimaano, Jr. raised as his special and
affirmative defense that petitioner was not the owner of the Petitioner Guadalupe S. Reyes sold to respondent
property, alleging instead that the owner thereof was Agustin Juanita L. Raymundo on 21 June 1967 one-half (1/2) of a
300 - square meter lot located at No. 4-F Calderon St.,
Dequiña, Jr., Dimaano, Jr. contended that the property was
Project 4, Quezon City, denominated as Lot 8-B,
originally owned by Agustin Dequiña, Sr., who had declared the for P10,000.00. Consequently, a new title, TCT No.
property in his name for taxation purposes in 1906 was 119205, was issued for the whole lot in the name of original
succeeded by his son Agustin Dequiña, Jr. when the same was owner Guadalupe S. Reyes and vendee Juanita L.
leased to defendant Dimaano, Jr. Raymundo in equal shares. On 24 September 1969
petitioner sold her remaining interest in the property to
The trial court was rendered decision in favor of petitioner, respondent for P15,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of
ordering the defendant to pay the petitioner the amounts of absolute sale, Exh. "E,"[1] and TCT No. 149036 was issued
in the name of respondent in lieu of TCT No. 119205. Since
P12,312.00 representing actual damages and P5,000.00 as
1967 the house standing on the property subject of the
costs of the suit. But this was reversed by Regional Trial Court second sale was being leased by the spouses Mario
of Iba, Zambales. Palacios and Zenaida Palacios from petitioner. In
December 1984 petitioner allegedly refused to receive the
Hence appealed. rentals thus prompting the Palacios spouses to file on 13
March 1985 a petition for consignation before the
Issue: Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. However, the
Palacioses ejected from the premises but managed
Whether or not Agustin Dequina Jr was the real owner in somehow to return. A contempt case was filed by petitioner
possession of an unregistered parcel of land. against her lessees, respondent intervened and claimed
ownership of the entire 300 - square meter property as well
as the existence of a lease contract between her and the
Palacios spouses supposedly dated 17 March 1987 but
retroactive to 1 January 1987. On 23 August 1987
petitioner filed a complaint against respondent before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for cancellation of TCT
No. Petitioner has shown that he had prior No. 149036 and reconveyance with damages.
possession of the property. The prior possession of
petitioner was established by the testimony of his The trial court found that the second deed of sale
witnesses, notably of his tenant Epigenio Dilag and Victor was indeed simulated as it held that since the date of its
execution respondent allowed petitioner to exercise
ownership over the property by collecting rentals from the damages, P10,000.00 as attorneys fees, and to pay the
lessees until December 1986. It was only in 1987 when costs, is REINSTATED and ADOPTED.
respondent intervened in the contempt case that she
asserted ownership thereof. Likewise, the trial court CHAN SUI BI, JOHNNY C. ONG, BOBBY C. ONG,
sustained petitioner's claim that she was only prevailed PHILLIP C. ONG, HOMER C. ONG, DAVID C. ONG,
upon to transfer the title to the whole lot to respondent in HELEN C. ONG-MAYPA, AND GLENN C. ONG, as
order to obtain a loan from the GSIS which, after all, did not substituted widow and children of the late Jose C. Ong
materialize. in his personal capacity, ROBSON ONG, and DAVID C.
ONG, as Special Administrator of the Intestate Estates
Respondent Court of Appeals however held of Uy Hian and Ong Chuan, RTC-Iloilo Sp. Procs. Nos.
otherwise. It ruled that as between a notarized deed of sale 2647 and 2370*, petitioners,
earlier executed and the agreement of 10 January 1970
contained in a private writing, the former prevailed. It also vs.
found that petitioners cause of action had prescribed since COURT OF APPEALS, SOFIA DALIPE, ROLANDO D.
the complaint should have been filed either within ten (10) ONG, SPOUSES LORENZO D. ONG AND VILMA TAN-
years from 1969 as an action to recover title to real ONG, SPOUSES EDDIE D. ONG AND LIZA TE-ONG,
property, or within ten (10) years from 1970 as an action HENRY D. ONG, YELSON D. ONG, WILSON D. ONG,
based on a written contract. The appellate court further ASUNCION ONG-JARDIOLIN, MA. LOURDES ONG, LAS
found that petitioners cause of action was barred by laches TRES ESTRELLAS TEXTILES CO., GOLDEN GATE
having allowed respondent to stay in possession of the lot REALTY CORPORATION, AND GOLDEN PORTALS
in question for eighteen (18) years after the execution of the INDUSTRIES, INC., respondents.
second deed of sale.
Hence this appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the property remained to be in actual
possession of Guadalupe Reyes.
G.R. No. L-27976 December 7, 1982
Yes. Actual possession of land consists in the THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as vs.
those a party would naturally exercise over his own ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
property.[7] It is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of
land should himself occupy the property as someone in his G.R. No. L-27977 December 7, 1982
name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of
real estate has possession, either when he himself is THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
physically in occupation of the property, or when another vs.
person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such ANSELMA AVENGOZA, ET. AL., defendants-appellees.
occupancy.[8] This declaration is conformably with Art. 524
of the Civil Code providing that possession may be
exercised in ones own name or in the name another. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

An example of actual possession of real property German G. Vilgera for defendant-appellant.

by an owner through another is a lease agreement whereby
the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and
enjoyment of the thing leased.[9] The Palacios spouses have Facts: Facts: Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho, a Chinese, his
been the lessees of petitioner since 1967 occupying the wife AnselmaAvengoza and the latter's mother
house erected on the property subject of the second GavinaAvengoza, were charged in Criminal Case No. 6201
sale. Petitioner was in actual possession of the property of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur with
through the Palacioses and remained so even after the violation of Commonwealth Act No. 108, as amended, in
execution of the second deed of sale. It was only in 1987 -
the information which reads:
when respondent asserted ownership over the property and
showed a lease contract between her and the Palacioses
dated 17 March 1987 but effective 1 January 1987 - that "That during the period comprised between July 19, 1954
petitioners possession was disturbed. Moreover, the fact and April 1957, in the Municipalities of Libmanan and
that respondent was able to secure a title in her name did Sipocot, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within
not operate to vest ownership upon her of the property. the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
AnselmaAvengoza and Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho,
the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals of 19 July 1996 ordering the being Chinese citizens, who as such are barred from
dismissal of the complaint of petitioner Guadalupe S. Reyes acquiring private agricultural lands in the Philippines and
and the Resolution of 22 October 1996 denying with deliberate intent to defraud, mislead, and for the
reconsideration are SET ASIDE. The Decision of the evident purpose of evading Section 5 of Article XIII of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, of 29 May Philippine Constitution did then and there willfully,
1992 cancelling and declaring null and void TCT No.
unlawfully and feloniously and for their own bene-fits and
149036, as well as the second deed of sale dated 24
September 1969 between petitioner and private respondent for profits, utilize as a dummy their co-accused
Juanita L. Raymundo, ordering the latter to reconvey the GavinaAvengoza, a Filipino citizen, who in turn deliberately
property subject of the second deed of sale to petitioner, allowed and permitted herself to be used as such dummy in
and further ordering private respondent to pay
petitioner P25,000.00 as actual and exemplary
the acquisition and sale of private agricultural land The trial court allowed defendants to withdraw their plea,
described as follows, to wit: admitted and found defendants' motion to quash
meritorious, and ordered the dismissal of the two cases,
'Six parcels of land situated in the municipality of Sipocot, with costs de oficio. Reason for the dismissal is principally
province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, embraced in and predicated on the trial court's opinion that defendant
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 3105, 3323, 3338, 3348, AnselmaAvengoza has validly reacquired her Philippine
3621 and 3223 of the said municipality. citizenship.

'One (1) parcel of land situated in the municipality of From the said order, the plaintiff appealed to this Court and
Libmanan, province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, claimed that the trial court has committed the following
embraced in and covered by Tax Declaration No. 6979 of errors:
said municipality.'
by making it appear in the instruments of conveyance that
the said GavinaAvengoza was the real purchaser, when in "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
truth and in fact, the true vendees are the alien-accused ACCUSED, ANSELMA AVENGOZA, BY EXECUTING AN
AnselmaAvengoza and Go Gam, as a result of which the OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE
latter were able to possess and own real properties and PHILIPPINES AND REGIS-TERING IT WITH THE LOCAL
have profited themselves by the aid of their co-accused CIVIL REGISTRY OF SIPOCOT, CAMARINES SUR HAD
In Criminal Case No. 6643 of the same court,
AnselmaAvengoza was charged together with Rafaela "II.
Alfante of violation of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No.
108 in an information which reads: "THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT,
"That on or about the 12th day of February 1950 in the BY REPATRIATION, ANSELMA AVENGOZA"S TITLE
municipality of Sipocot, province of Camarines Sur, OVER THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS PURCHASED BY
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable GAVINA AVENGOZA FOR HER AND HER HUSBAND,
Court, accused Rafaela Alfante, who is a Filipina citizen BECAME LAWFUL AND VALID AS OF THE DATE OF
and being then the owner of a private agricultural land THEIR CONVEYANCE OR TRANSFER TO HER AND
registered under original certificate of Title No. 289 situated HER ALIEN HUSBAND; AND IN CONCLUDING THAT AS
in said municipality and the ownership of which is expressly A RESULT OF SAID REPATRIATION THE CRIMINAL
reserved by the Constitution or the laws to the citizens of ACTS COMMITTED BY HER AND HER HUSBAND, AND
the Philippines, did, then and there knowingly, willfully, THOSE WHO AIDED THEM TO POSSESS THOSE
unlawfully and feloniously cede, transfer and convey by LANDS, HAD BEEN EXTINGUISHED."
way of deed of sale said property to accused
AnselmaAvengoza, a Chinese citizen and who, knowingly We find merit in this appeal. Records show that defendant
aids, assists or abets in the consummation or per-petration AnselmaAvengoza merely executed an oath of allegiance
of the aforementioned sale, then an alien by reason of to the Philippine Republic, filed it with the Office of the
lawful marriage with Go Gam alias Luistro Sancho, a Municipal Treasurer of Sipocot, Camarines Sur on October
Chinese citizen, who as such is barred from acquiring 18, 1966, and the trial court considered it sufficient for her
private agri-cultural lands in the Philippines. to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation. Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 63 provides that would-be repatriate
All the accused pleaded not guilty and the two cases were should show by con-clusive evidence that he or she has the
tried jointly. qualifications to be so repatriated. Without such conclusive
proof, he or she has to file with the proper Court of First
While the cases were pending in the lower court, the Instance a petition for repatriation.
accused GavinaAvengoza and Go Gam alias Luistro
Sancho died; thus trial continued only as regard Issue: Whether or not Avengoza who reacquired Philippine
AnselmaAvengoza and Rafaela Alfante. Citizenship by repatriation may acquire a possession of the
Counsel for the said accused subsequently filed a motion
for leave to withdraw their plea of not guilty and to be
permitted to file a motion to quash, alleging that accused
AnselmaAvengoza had reacquired her Philippine No.
citizenship by repatriation, by reason whereof the criminal
liability of said accused and that of the remaining defendant Pertinent sections of Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:
Rafaela Alfante, if any, was thereby extinguished; and that
the issue in the criminal cases had thus been rendered
moot and academic. "Section 2. How Citizenship may be reacquired:
"2. By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air dangerous precedent as any alien woman married to a
Corps: Provided That a woman who lost her citizen-ship by Chinese citizen can easily 'acquire' Philippine citizenship
reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in upon the death of her Chinese husband by merely
accordance with this Act after the termination of the marital executing an oath of allegiance to the Republic and filing
status: the same with the local civil registry even if she does not
possess the required citizenship." Defendant
"Sec. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the AnselmaAvengoza became an alien by reason of her lawful
necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth (now marriage to a Chinese citizen; however, this does not
Republic) of the Philippines and registration in the proper necessarily mean that she was a Filipino citizen previous to
civil registry. such marriage. Thus, she should first prove her citizenship
previous to her marriage and as there is no conclusive
"Sec. 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary proof of this matter on record, this question must be
regulations for the proper enforcement of this Act." judicially determined before she can be legally repatriated.

And, the Rules and Regulations issued by the Depart-ment Further, even Filipino citizens can be criminally liable under
of Justice on July 1, 1937, pursuant to Section 5 of the anti-dummy law; and, aliens violating said law are not
Commonwealth Act No. 63 governing the reacquisition of exempted from criminal liability upon becoming a Filipino
Philippine citizenship, provide: citizen.

"Rule 3. Any person who has lost his or her Philippine Finally, the sales in favor of alien AnselmaAvengoza,
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events: through a dummy, of various parcels of land are void for
being contrary to public policy. And, like an alien who
'1. By having been declared, by competent authority, a
became a naturalized Filipino citizen, her repatriation did
deserter of the Philippine Army, Navy, or Air corps in time
not exempt her from criminal liability for violation of the Anti-
of war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty
Dummy Law.
has been granted; and

'2. In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a

foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her husband's
country, she acquires his nationality.'

"Anyone wishing to reacquire his or her Philippine

citizenship by repatriation under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 63, shall file an application with any
Court of First Instance setting forth his name and surname;
[G.R. No. 95815. March 10, 1999]
his present and former places of residences; his
occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether single
or married, in the case of deserter of the Army, Navy, or Air
Corps, and if married, the name, age, and birth place, and SERVANDO MANGAHAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON.
residence of his wife and each of the children. In the case COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES SIMEON
of a woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by reason of and LEONORA CAYME, respondents.
her marriage to an alien, the applicant shall state the date
and place of her marriage, the nationality of her former
husband, and the cause of the dissolution of the marriage. This is a petition for review on certiorari under
The petition must be supported by the affidavit of at least Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
two persons stating that they are citizens of the Philippine decision of the Court of Appeals[1] dated May 25,
Islands, and that said peti-tioner, in their opinion, has all the 1990[2] and the Court of Appeals Resolution of October 12,
1990,[3] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
qualifications necessary to be re-patriated. If after the
hearing the court believes in view of the evidence taken An agricultural land with an area of 15.0871
that the petitioner has all the qualifications required by hectares possessed by spouses Rodil whom the latter sold
Commonwealth Act No. 63, it shall require the peti-tioner to the said parcel of land to the spouses, Pablo Simeon and
Leonora Cayme, for Seven Thousand (P7,000.00) Pesos,
take in open court the follow-ing oath of allegiance: x xx
as evidenced by the affidavit[7] executed by the former in
'and shall order the registration of such oath in the proper favor of the latter in the presence of the herein petitioner,
civil registry through the clerk of court." Servando Mangahas. the spouses Rodil had already
applied for subject tract of land with the Bureau of Lands
Defendant Avengoza's sole evidence on record to support which application was not acted upon even until the
her repatriation is her oath of allegiance to the Republic of aforesaid sale. It was also shown that petitioner, Servando
the Philippines. No evidence has been presented to show Mangahas, had been in possession thereof by virtue of the
conclusively that she has the right to be repatriated under agreement between him and the spouses Rodil, allowing
him (petitioner) to occupy and cultivate the said parcel of
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63. As aptly stated by
land.[11] For allowing him to occupy and cultivate the same,
the Solicitor General in his brief, "to sustain the findings of petitioner Servando Mangahas paid the amount
the trial court on this point would establish a very of P7,000.00 to the Rodils, as mentioned in the Kasulatan
ng Pagtanggap ng Salapi[12] Twelve (12)hectares of the GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA
property were then developed into a fishpond, ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT,
two (2) hectares planted to rice and one (1) hectare used MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG,
as tumana with a house erected thereon. LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO
Petitioner was permitted by the private MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO
respondents to continue possessing and working on the ALEJO, respondents.
same land, even after the sale, upon the request of the
private respondents themselves because they were then Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under
busy in their palay business. partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to
them, are estopped from questioning the title to partition
In due time, the parties went to trial which culminated allotted to another party.
in the rendition by the court a quo of its decision of
November 14, 1986, in favor of the plaintiffs (now the FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for the recovery of
private respondents), disposing as follows: possession and damages alleging that they are the owners
of lot no. 1639-D which was originally part of lot no. 1639
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby which was covered by OCT no. 67 issued in the names of
rendered: Hermogenes Olis, Pascual Olis, Bartolome Maglucot,
Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot. Subsequently, Tomas
and respondent's predecessor-in-interest filed a petition to
(a) Declaring the plaintiffs to be the absolute and registered subdivide the lot into six portions and was granted. Then in
owners of the land in question covered by and described in 1963, respondents rented portions of lot 1639-d paying
OCT No. P-6924 (Free Patent NO. 576411) of the Office of rentals therefore. They likewise built houses on their
the Register of Deeds for the Province of Occidental corresponding leased lots. However, in 1992, they stopped
Mindoro; paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot.
Petitioners maintained that there was a valid partition and
(b) Ordering defendant and all persons claiming under him that the respondents are estopped from claiming to be co-
to remove their respective houses constructed thereon, and owners of the subject lot in view of their agreement in 1946
to deliver the possession of the land in question together and ruled that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied
with all the improvements thereon unto the plaintiffs; upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence to partition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are estopped from
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum questioning the title to partition.
of P5, 000. 00 as and for attorneys fees; and
HELD: YES. Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected
(d) Ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit. to take under partition, and who took possession of the
portion allotted to them, are estopped from questioning the
title to partition allotted to another party. Here, respondents
Issue: already occupied the lots in accordance with the sketch
Whether or not spouses Cayme was the real plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed.
owner in possession of the agricultural land. They cannot now be heard to question the possession and
ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive
Held: possession of lot 1639-d also in accordance with the sketch
plan. Also, the payment of rentals reveals that respondents'
Yes. The defendant-appellants grantor or possession of the land is that of a holder and not as owner
predecessor in interest (Severo Rodil) took possession of thereof. One who possess as a mere holder acknowledges
the property, subject matter of the litigation, on April 1955 in another a superior right which he believes to be
(Exhibit F for the plaintiff-appellees and exhibit 5 for the ownership. Hence, petitioners were in possession of the
defendant). Since the complaint in the case at bar was filed subject lot in the concept of an owner from 1952 up to the
on February 25, 1985,[23] the requirement of at least thirty time the present action was commenced. Petition was
years continuous possession has not been complied with granted.
even if We were to tack Rodils period of possession. xxx[24]
As found by the lower court below, petitioner had
admitted,[25] contrary to his disclaimer, that the possession
of the spouses Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his
supposed title, commenced only in April 1955. Petitioner
can not now feign ignorance of such judicial admission
which he has resolutely repudiated in his present
petition.[26] Acquisition of ownership under the law on
prescription cannot be pleaded in support of petitioners
submission that subject land has ipso jure become his
private property.
The court has found that the petitioner is a person
whose credibility is much in doubt. On the other hand, the
respondents Leonora and Simeon Cayme to be
straightforward and credible. She has convincingly shown
to this court, through her testimony and the supporting
documentary evidence, that she is in fact the rightful owner
of the property in dispute.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Issue: Whether or not the Republic should pay Reyes the
represented by Romeo T. Acosta value of the Improvements he introduced on the property.
Held: Danilo Reyes was in possession of the land since
(formerly Jose D. Malvas),
1970. Article 524 states that possession may be exercised
Director of Forest Management in one’s own name or in that of another. And Reyes made
Bureau, Department of improvements thereon which must be given the opportunity
Environment and Natural to enjoy the fruits of his labor on the land which he honestly
Resources, believes was legally his. He was not aware that his
certificate of title which was derived from OCT No. P-2388
Petitioners, issued in 1957 by the government itself in the name of
Regina Castillo contained legal infirmity, otherwise he
-versus- would not have expoused (sic) himself from the risk of
being ejected from the land and losing all improvements
thereon. Any way, if the court will grant the motion for the
defendants (sic) Danilo Reyes to remove his improvements
BALLOCANAG, Presiding Judge, on the disputed property, it will not prejudice Augusto
Branch 41, Marte, otherwise, as the court sees it, he will immensely
[benefit] from the toils of Danilo Reyes.
Regional Trial Court,
Pinamalayan, Petition DENIED and DIRECTED the RTC to
determines the actual improvements introduced on the
Oriental Mindoro and DANILO
subject land, their current value and the amount of the
REYES, expenses actually spent by Reyes and DIRECTED the
DENR-BFD to pay private respondent the value of such
Respondents. actual improvements he introduced on the subject land.

G.R. No. 194538 November 27, 2013

FACTS: Danilo Reyes bought the subject land with 162,500
sq.m. at Brgy Banus, Pimanalayan, Oriental Mindoro from
Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced MORETO MIRALLOSA and all persons claiming rights
improvements and planted Mangoes, Mandarin citrus, and and interests under him, Petitioner,
Guyabanos. Also, the title of the land transferred in his vs.
name. Unfortunately, It turned out that the subject land is CARMEL DEVELOPMENT INC., Respondent.
part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro and therefore,
not subject to any disposition or acquisition under any Facts:
existing law and is not transferable.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of Respondent Carmel Development, Inc. was the
petitioner, filed a complaint for “ Cancellation of Title and/or registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the
Revision” that the issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Pangarap Village located at Barrio Makatipo, Caloocan
is spurious, fictitious, and irregularly issued on account of City.[7] The property has a total land area of 156 hectares
the subject title was part of the Timberland of Oriental and consists of three parcels of land registered in the name
Mindoro per Bureau of Forest Department (BFD) Land of Carmel Farms, Inc. under Transfer Certificate of Title
Classification Map; that the said land are entirely inside the (TCT) Nos. (62603) 15634, (62605) 15632 and (64007)
140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm Lease Agreement No. 15807.[8] The lot that Moreto Millarosa (petitioner) presently
175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte; that the subject land occupies is Lot No. 32, Block No. 73 covered by the titles
cannot be subject of any disposition or acquisition under above-mentioned.
the law.
On 14 September 1973, President Ferdinand
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that Reyes TCT No.
Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 293 (P.D.
45238 are null and void and ordered to surrender the
293),[10] which invalidated the titles of respondent and
owner’s duplicate copy of the said title and to vacate the
declared them open for disposition to the members of the
premises. Reyes then appealed the RTC Decision to the
Malacañang Homeowners Association, Inc. (MHAI).
Court of Appeal (CA), apparently, Motion for
Memorandum Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 293, this
Reconsideration was DENIED.
Certificate of Title is declared invalid and null and void ab
Thus, on February 4, 1998, Reyes filed a Motion[11] to initio.
Remove Improvements Introduced by Defendant Danilo D.
On 29 January 1988, P.D. 293 declared to be
Reyes on the Property which is the Subject of Execution in
unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts citing the
Accordance with Rule 39, Section 10, paragraph (d) of the
case of Roman Tuason and Remedio V. Tuason, Attorney-
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (motion).[12] There he
in-fact, Trinidad S. Viado v. The Register of Deeds,
averred that: he occupied in good faith the subject land for
Caloocan City, Ministry of Justice and the National
around thirty years; he had already spent millions of pesos
Treasurer[14] (Tuason). On 17 February 1988, the Register
in planting fruit-bearing trees thereon; and he employed
of Deeds then cancelled the Memorandum inscripted on
many workers who regularly took care of the trees and
respondent's title,[15] eventually restoring respondent's
other plants.
ownership of the entire property.
RTC dismissed the said complaint in the assailed
Joint Order and ruled in favor of Reyes, finding Rule 39,
Section 10, paragraph (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Whether or not Moreto Millarosa was not in
Procedure. possession of the land and is not a builder of good faith.
Held: in good faith and hence free from liability for damages.
Francisco was then and for a long time had been in
Yes. With the determination of who was the lawful possession of the land, and there can be no question that
and registered owner of the property in question, the owner for purposes of such possession the deed of sale marked
necessarily enjoyed or had a better right to the possession Exhibit 4 was a good and sufficient title. It appears that in
and enjoyment there.[34] Hence, petitioner had no right to spite of the consolidation of ownership in appellant and the
the continued possession of the property.[35] Neither could issuance of a transfer certificate of title in his name in 1937,
he be considered a builder in good faith who could avail he never attempted to exercise possessory rights over the
himself of the benefits under Article 448 of the Civil property or paid taxes thereon, nor did he demand its
Code.[36] From the moment P.D. 293 was declared possession from appellee. The judgment appealed from is
unconstitutional and the title to the property restored to modified in the sense that defendant-appellee, as
respondent, petitioner could no longer claim good administrator of the estate of the deceased Maximo
faith.[37] Thus, as provided under Article 449, petitioner Francisco, is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum of
loses what he would be building, planting, or sowing without P200.00 yearly, starting from 1951 until the restoration of
right of indemnity from that time. Upon perusal of the the possession of the land to said appellant.
records, however, we hold that petitioner is not a builder in
good faith. A builder in good faith is "one who builds with
the belief that the land he is building on is his, or that by
some title one has the right to build thereon, and is ignorant
of any defect or flaw in his title."[67] Since petitioner only [G.R. No. 111737. October 13, 1999]
started occupying the property sometime in 1995 (when his
predecessor-in-interest executed an Affidavit in his favor),
or about seven years after Tuason Ruling was
promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
effect of that ruling Furthermore, Respondent Carmel PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
Development Inc. retained its ownership over the said land. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES
G.R. No. L-13343 December 29, 1962 PIEDA, respondents.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, SR., plaintiff-appellant,
vs. Respondent spouses Pieda (PIEDAS) are the
SOFRONIO FRANCISCO as Administrator of the Estate registered owners of a parcel of land (Lot 11-14-1-14)
of MAXIMO FRANCISCO, defendant-appellee. situated at barangay Astorga Dumarao, Capiz containing
an area of 238,406 square meters, more or less, and
Facts: covered by Homestead Patent No. 0844 and Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1930. On March 7, 1972, the
Exequiel Ampil, now deceased, was the registered PIEDAS mortgaged the above described parcel of land to
owner of the land in question under Original Certificate of petitioner, Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to
Title No. 2497 issued way back on May 25, 1918, Exhibit B- secure their agricultural loan in the amount of P20,000.00.
1. On March 24, 1924, Exequiel Ampil executed a deed of The PIEDAS failed to comply with the terms and conditions
sale covering the land in favor of defendant Maximo of the mortgage compelling DBP to extrajudicially foreclose
Francisco for the sum of P1,500, Exhibit 4. Sometime on February 2, 1977. The PIEDAS offered to redeem the
thereafter, the defendant took possession of the premises foreclosed property by offering P10,000.00 as partial
which, upon his death, was continued by his heirs up to the redemption payment and this amount was accepted by
present, publicly and in the concept of owner. DBP. DBP sent the PIEDAS another letter informing them
that pursuant to P.D. 27, their offer to redeem and/or
October 21, 1933, Exequiel Ampil was indebted to repurchase the subject property could not be favorably
various creditors, to wit: (1) China Banking Corporation — considered for the reason that said property was tenanted.
P11,995.00, (2) Philippine National Bank — P9,000.00, (3) However, Acting Register of Deeds of Capiz through
Don Wenceslao Trinidad — P10,000.00, total — Ramon Buenaflor ordering DBP to cancel and restore the
P31,395.00. The payment of this indebtedness was title in the name of the PIEDAS.
guaranteed by the plaintiff Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., on the
date Exequiel Ampil executed a document entitled "Venta On December 21, 1981, the PIEDAS filed the
Condicional", Exhibit D-1 which was the conveyance to be instant complaint against DBP for cancellation of certificate
absolute upon the fulfillment of certain conditions specified of title and/or specific performance, accounting and
therein. damages. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the PIEDAS
stating that DBP violated the stipulation in the Sheriffs
On December 10, 1936, plaintiff filed an affidavit Certificate of Sale which provided that the redemption
consolidating ownership over the land in question together period is five (5) years from the registration thereof in
with five other parcels by virtue of the fact that the consonance with Section 119[9] of CA No. 141[10]. DBP
conditional sale of October 21, 1933 between him and should therefore assume liability for the fruits that said
Ampil had become absolute (Exhibits C and C-1). property produced from said land considering that it
prematurely took possession thereof.
Issue: Whether or not Sofronio Francisco has not acted in
bad faith in taking a possession over the said land. DBP appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not DBP was a possessor in good faith.
The trial court adjudged plaintiff the rightful owner
of the disputed land and ordered defendant to deliver its
possession to him, but found defendant to be a possessor
Held: Yes. DBP also alleges that the mere fact that DBP surviving spouse, SeveroManeclang, through his
took possession and administration of the property does not counsel, Atty. TeofiloGuadiz, no such notice was sent
warrant a finding that DBP was in bad faith. First, records to the heirs of Margarita.
show that the PIEDAS consented to and approved the
takeover of DBP. Second, Sec. 7[17] of Act No. On September 9, 1949, despite the absence of notice to the
3135[18] allows the mortgagee-buyer to take possession of heirs, the intestate court issued an Order granted
the mortgaged property even during the redemption Feliciano’s petition.
period. Third, DBPs act of consolidating the title of the
property in its name does not constitute bad faith as there is Following the order Oscar Maneclang, the new
no law which prohibits the purchaser at public auction from administrator executed a deed of sale in favor of the City of
consolidating title in its name after the expiration of the one Dagupan, represented by its mayor, a portion consisting of
(1) year redemption period reckoned from the time the 4,415 square meters of the lot. This sale was approved by
Certificate of Sale was registered; and neither is there any the intestate court on 15 March 1954.
law or jurisprudence which prohibits the PIEDAS from
exercising their right of redemption over said property within The City of Dagupan immediately took possession of the
five (5) years even if title is consolidated in the name of the land and constructed thereon a public market. It has been
purchaser. DBP also could not have been in bad faith when in continuous and uninterrupted possession of the property
it denied the PIEDAS offer to redeem the property since the since the construction of the market. Some other parcels of
denial was premised on Opinion No. 92 of the Minister of land belonging to the intestate estate were sold by the
Justice series of 1978 which stated that said land was administrator pursuant of the same authority previously
covered under P.D. 27 and could not be the subject of granted.
foreclosure proceedings.
On 28 September 1965, the new judicial administrator of
A possessor in good faith is one who is not aware the intestate estate, Adelaida S. Maneclang, daughter of
that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw, the late Margarita filed with the Court of First Instance of
which invalidates it.[23] Good faith is always presumed, and Pangasinan an action for the annulment of the sales
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor made by the previous administrator pursuant to the
rests the burden of proof.[24] It was therefore incumbent on order cancellation of titles, recovery of possession and
the PIEDAS to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its damages against the vendees Juan T. Baun and
title i.e. the nullity of the foreclosure. This, they failed to do. AmparoBaun, etc and the City of Dagupan.
Citing the case of Maneclang vs. Baun,[34] the court held
that when a contract of sale is void, the possessor is Issue: Whether or not City of Dagupan was a
entitled to keep the fruits during the period for which it held possessor in good faith and may retain its possession
the property in good faith. Good faith of the possessor over the said land.
ceases when an action to recover possession of the
property is filed against him and he is served summons Held:
therefore.[35] In the present case, DBP was served Yes, but only until to recover the the amounts of
summons on June 30, 1982.[36] By that time, it was no P100,000.00 (the cost of Perez Public Market) and
longer in possession of the disputed land as possession P6,493.05 (5/9 of the purchase price of the property). It was
thereof was given back to the PIEDAS after the foreclosure not incumbent upon them to go beyond the order to find out
of DBP was declared null and void on February 22, 1982. if indeed there was a valid motion for authority to sell.
Otherwise, no order of any court can be relied upon by the
G.R. No. L-27876 April 22, 1992 parties. Under Article 526 of the Civil Code, a possessor in
good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his
ADELAIDA S. MANECLANG, in her capacity as title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it;
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late furthermore, mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
Margarita Suri Santos, plaintiff-appellee, law may be the basis of good faith. Accordingly, its
vs. possession in good faith must be considered to have lasted
JUAN T. BAUN and AMPARO S. BAUN, ET AL., up to that date. As a possessor in good faith, it was entitled
defendants. CITY OF DAGUPAN, defendant-appellant. to all the fruits of the property and was under no obligation
to pay rental to the intestate of Margarita for the use
Pursuant to Article 546 of the Civil Code, the City
On June 12, 1947, Margarita Suri Santos died of Dagupan may retain possession of the property until it
intestate, leaving several parcels of land containing 7,401 shall have been fully reimbursed the value of the building in
square meters more or less. She was survived by her the amount of P100,000.00 and 5/9 of the purchase price
husband Severo Maneclang and 9 children. On July 30, amounting to P6,493.05
1947, a petition for the settlement of her estate was filed by
Hector S. Maneclang, one of her legitimate children, with
the Court of First Instance at Dagupan City, Pangasinan. At ARTICLE 528
the time of the filing of the petition, 7 of her 9 children were
below the age of 18 but no guardian ad litem was appointed
by the court for the minor children. G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991

On 2 September 1949, Pedro M. Feliciano, the IGNACIO WONG, petitioner,

administrator of the intestate estate filed a petition asking vs.
the court to give him the authority to dispose of so much of HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding Judge, Court of
the estate that is necessary to meet the debts enumerated First Instance of Davao del Sur, Branch V and MANUEL
in the petition. While notice thereof was given to the MERCADO, respondents.
A perusal of the records of the case shows that
Possession in good faith ceases once defects in title are petitioner received private respondent's complaint for
made known to the possessor by extraneous evidence or forcible entry with summons on November 29, 1976 (Rollo,
by suit for recovery by the owner; interruption takes place p. 46). His good faith therefore ceased on November
upon service of summons. 29,1976. Accordingly, the computation of the payment of
monthly rental should start from December, 1976, instead
of August, 1976.

FACTS: G.R. No. L-32531 August 31, 1977

Mr. Giger sold to Plaintiff Mr. Mercado a piece of property JOSE O. BARRIOS (deceased) (substituted by son
(situated at Colongan, Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur) for the Joselito Barrios), petitioner,
price of P3,500 under the terms of a pacto de retro. vs.
Mr.Mercado paid land taxes and planted coconut trees but and VICENTE B. VILLACIN, respondents.
failed to erect signs of occupancy, nor did he establish a
hut. He spent much of his time away at his place of Facts: A certain Lorenzo Montano was the original
business where he ran a store. He visited the land registered owner of a large tract of land with an area of
occasionally only to make copra. Other than this, the place 188,212 sq. meters, more or less, situated in Barrio Mabini
resembled a ghost town. Cadiz, Negros Occidental. However, prior to March 25,
Mr Wong happened to chance upon the land, and finding 1960, the area in controversy was part of the forestal zone
no one occupying the same, purchased the property from andon the same day was released from the forestal zone
Mr. Giger. Thereupon, he obtained a TCT, established a and declared part of the disposable patrimony of the State.
hut, populated the place with laborers and fenced the A certain Graciano Lamis entered the same and from then
property. on, was known to be in continuous and uninterrupted
possession and occupation thereof, continuing the
cultivation of the land begun by the Alegres (defendants in
Mr. Mercado returned to the property and was dismayed to Civil Case No. 223).
find his land occupied. He had the incident blottered and
filed for forcible entry against Mr. Wong. He also demanded
rentals. Unfortunately, the MTC ruled in favor of Mr. Wong, On September 6, 1962, Lorenzo Montano sold her
stating that the latter was in open, actual, prior and land to the petitioner herein as a consequence of which her
continuous possession. On appeal, the CFI reversed and Original Certificate of Title was cancelled and in lieu thereof
ruled for Mr. Mercado stating that he had taken possession Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-33012 was issued in the
of the property much earlier and that Mr. Wong is the actual name of petitioner, Jose O. Barrios, by the Register of
intruder. Mr. Wong took the case to the CA which ruled Deeds of Negros Occidental. On the other hand, Lamis also
against him. sold all his rights and interests in the controverted area and
(interesting note: Wong says Mercado was a mere laborer all the improvements found therein to respondents Villacins,
who was tolerated to gather fruits. How thick faced is that?) the sale being unsupported by any kind of evidence of title
of the vendor, Lamis.
Petitioner received information that his land was
Whether or not Ignacio Wong was a possessor in good being sold by one Valentine Botas, whom he erroneously
faith. thought to be the vendor, to Mayor Heracleo Villacin, Sr. of
Cadiz City and the father of herein respondents. Petitioner
HELD:No. thru his lawyer, sent a letter to Mayor Villacin informing the
later of the true ownership of the land.
It is clear that possession passed from vendor William
Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of There being non-compliance with said demand,
the first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the later petitioner filed Civil Case No. 472 before the Municipal
sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner failed to pass Court against the Mayor for forcible entry. The inferior Court
the possession of the property because there is an dismissed the complaint upon agreement of the parties and
impediment — the possession exercised by private for the purpose of filing the proper pleading before the
respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at competent court. Hence, this appealed.
the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. It should be noted that possession Issue: Whether or not the Court erred in in holding the
acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in respondent buyers and possessors in good faith of the land
the case and from the moment facts exist which show that in dispute.
the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code). Possession
Held: Several facts, as disclosed by the records and taken
in good faith ceases from the moment defects in the title
together, are reasonably suspicious to have put the
are made known to the possessors, by extraneous
respondents Villacins in inquiry as to the alleged rights of
evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
the vendor, Lamis, over the area in controversy.
owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact from which it
can be deduced that the possessor has knowledge of the
defects of his title or mode of acquisition, it must be Firstly, when respondents bought the land from Lamis, the
considered sufficient to show bad faith. latter could not and did not at any time produce any title or
application to said land.
Well settled is the rule that, said accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of
Henry Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry
The law protects to a greater degree a Yu.The RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner
purchaser who buys from the registered GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
owner himself. Corollarily, it requires a Section 9(e), Republic Act 8484 (Access Device
higher degree of prudence from one who Regulation Act of 1998).On appeal,the CA affirmed
buys from a person who is not the
petitioner’s conviction.Petitioner assails the validity of the
registered owner, although the land
object of the transaction is registered. Information and claims that he was not informed of the
While one who buys from the registered accusation against him. He explains that though he was
owner does not have to look behind the charged with “possession of an access device fraudulently
certificate of title, one who buys from one applied for,” the act of “possession,” which is the gravamen
who is not the registered owner is of the offense, was not alleged in the Information.
expected to examine not only the
Certificate of Title bull all factual Issue: Whether or not the Information is valid
circumstances necessary, for him to
determine if there are any flaws in the considering the act of “possession,” which is the gravamen
title of the transferor, or in his capacity to of the offense, was not alleged in the Information
transfer the land.
Held:In the Information filed before the RTC, it was clearly
Secondly, petitioner sent letters to the father of the stated that the accused is petitioner “Mark Soledad y
respondents informing him of the true ownership of the Cristobal a.k.a. Henry Yu/Arthur.” It was also specified in
aforesaid land. the preamble of the Information that he was being
charged with Violation of R.A. No. 8484, Section 9(e)
Thirdly, respondents herein knew of the case of forcible for possessing a counterfeit access device or access
entry brought by petitioner against their father, Mayor device fraudulently applied for. In the accusatory portion
Villacin, Sr., under the impression that the latter was the thereof, the acts constituting the offense were clearly
vendee, such knowledge was a warning to them. narrated in that “*petitioner+, together with other persons*,+
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defrauded private
Considering these facts, We are constrained to hold that complainant by applying [for] a credit card, an access
the respondents cannot now come to this Court claiming device defined under R.A. [No.] 8484, from Metrobank
the benefit of being purchasers of registered land in good
faith. Article 528 is clear: Possession acquired in good faith Card Corporation, using the name of complainant Henry
does not lose this character except in the case and from the C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently obtained
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not from him, and which credit card in the name of Henry
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or Yu was successfully issued, and delivered tosaid
wrongfully. accused using a fictitious identity and addresses of Henry
Yu, to the damage and prejudice of the real Henry Yu.”
the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed Moreover, it was identified that the offended party was
and another one is entered declaring the Villacins to be private complainant Henry Yu and the crime was
purchasers s and possessors n bad faith without tight to committed on or about the 13th day of August 2004 in the
limit to that built planted or sown by them on the land,
further ordering said respondents to restore, possession of City of Las Piñas. Undoubtedly, the Information contained
the land to the petitioner and to pay to the petitioner all the necessary details of the offense committed,
liquidated damages in the amount of P18,000.00 per year sufficient to apprise petitioner of the nature and cause
beginning 1964 until the time same is restored to the of the accusation against him. As aptly argued by
possession of the respondent's Villacin's shall also pay the respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office
petitioner the amount of P3,000.00 for and as attorney's of the Solicitor General, although the word “possession”
fees plus costs.
was not used in the accusatory portion of the Information,
the word “possessing” appeared in its preamble or the first
G.R. No. 184274 February 23, 2011
paragraph thereof. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s
contention, he was apprised that he was being charged
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, with violation of R.A. No. 8484, specifically section 9(e)
thereof, for possession of the credit card fraudulently
applied for.
Facts: Facts: That on or about August132004, or prior Even if the word “possession” was not repeated in the
thereto, in Las PiñasCity, the above-named accused, accusatory portion of the Information, the acts
conspiring and confederating with each other, constituting it were clearly described in the statement “*that
unlawfully and feloniously defraud complainant HENRY the+ credit card in the name of Henry Yu was successfully
YU by applying a credit card from METROBANK CARD issued, and delivered to said accused using a fictitious
CORPORATION, using the name of complainant Henry identity and addresses of Henry Yu, to the damage and
C. Yu and his personal documents fraudulently prejudice of the real Henry Yu.” Without a doubt, petitioner
obtained from him, and which credit card in the name was given the necessary data as to why he was being
of Henry Yu was successfully issued and delivered to prosecuted.
Whether or not Dela Rosa were in possession of property
notwithstanding their absence from the same.


represented herein by his Heirs/Substitutes, namely, Held.
ANASTACIA RUMARATE, CELSO RUMARATE, MARINA Yes, Dela Rosa were in possession of property. In a
RUMARATE, ROMEO RUMARATE, GUILLERMO forcible entry case, the principal issue for resolution is mere
RUMARATE, FIDEL RUMARATE, MERLINDA physical or material possession (possession de facto) and
RUMARATE, MARISSA RUMARATE, CLEMENCIA not juridical possession (possession de jure) nor ownership
RUMARATE, SANCHO RUMARATE and NENITA of the property involved.
RUMARATE, Petitioners,
vs. In the case at bar, Dela Rosa continued visiting the
HILARIO HERNANDEZ, JOAQUIN HERNANDEZ, property even if they resided in Manila, and that constitutes
SALVADOR HERNANDEZ, BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ, maintenance of possession. Improving the house were also
LEONORA HERNANDEZ-LAZA, VICTORIA acts of dominion indicating possession
QUEZON PROVINCE, Respondents. [G.R. No. 128177. August 15, 2001]

Facts: Spouses Rumarate filed an action for re-

conveyance of real property and quieting of title against the
Heirs of Spouses Hernandez. Rumarate averred that HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE
Santiago Guerrero orally bequeathed his rights over a lot to HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
him in 1929. Thereafter, took possession of the land, built a BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA
house and planted on it. A quitclaim was also executed by ABALOS, respondents.
Santiago in their favor in 1960. In 1970, Rumarate Facts: · Adriano Soriano originally owned a 24,550 square
discovered that Spouses Hernandez were able to obtain a
title over the disputed lot but he did not file a case meter land in Pangasinan. Such property was leased to
immediately. The respondent Heirs of Hernandez claimed Spouses de Vera for 15 years and Adriano†™s son,
that Santiago sold the lot to them in 1964 but were not able Roman was caretaker thereof. · When Adriano died, his
to take possession of the land heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement which subdivided
the land into two lots: Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. Lot
No. 60052 was assigned to Lourdes, Candido and the heirs
of Dionisia while Lot No. 8459 was assigned to Francisca,
Librada, Elocadio and Roman. · In 1971, Spouses Abalos
acquired Lot 60052 (sold by Lourdes, Candido and the
heirs of Dionisia) and ¾ of Lot/ 8459 (sold by Elocadio,
Francisca and Librada). · In 1968, the de Vera spouses
G.R. No. 147549 October 23, 2003 ousted Roman Soriano as caretaker. Roman then filed a
case with the agrarian court for reinstatement and
JESUS DELA ROSA and LUCILA DELA reliquidation; however, the agrarian court approved his
ROSA, petitioners, ejectment. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, agrarian
vs. court†™s decision was reversed. · But prior to the
SANTIAGO CARLOS and TEOFILA execution of the said decision, the parties entered into a
PACHECO, respondents.
post-decisional agreement wherein the de Vera spouses
allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the
termination of the lease in 1982. The agrarian court
Dela Rosa filed a complaint for forcible entry, alleging that
they are the owners of a house and lot in Bulacan by virtue approved such agreement. · In 1976, Spouses Abalos
of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed between Dela Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan
and Carlos. They also asserted that they renovated the an application for registration of title over Lot No. 60052
house and occupied it from 1996 to present, and that they and three-fourths (3/4) pro-indiviso of Lot No. 8459. The
built a fence to separate the property from the road. trial court granted their application. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed. On petition for review filed with the
Subsequently however, Carlos built a house of strong Supreme Court by Roman Soriano, it was denied for lack of
materials on a vacant lot of the property through stealth and merit. · On July 15, 1983, Roman filed with the RTC an
without their knowledge and consent. On the other hand,
action for annulment of document and/or redemption,
respondents averred that they had been occupying the lot
in the concept of a co- owner since birth. ownership and damages, docketed as Civil Case No.
159568. Spouses Abalos moved to dismiss on the grounds
of red judicata among others but was denied. · In 1984,
11 years after the approval of the post-decisional
agreement between Roman Soriano and the spouses de occupied by one claiming to be an agricultural tenant,
Vera, Spouses Abalos (substituting Spouses de Vera) filed pending a declaration that the latter†™s occupancy was
with the agrarian court a motion for execution of said post- unlawful. While the issue of ownership of the subject land
decisional agreement which allowed Roman Soriano to has been laid to rest in the final judgment of the land
sub-lease the property. Roman moved to suspend but was registration court, the right of possession thereof is, as yet,
denied. Roman filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of controverted. This is precisely what is put in issue in the
Appeals. · Roman Soriano died on December 11, 1985 security of tenure case filed by Heirs of Roman before the
and he was represented by his heirs. · Civil Case No. DARAB. Although private respondents have been declared
159568 was amended to include Juanito Ulanday as party- titled owners of the subject land, the exercise of their rights
defendant for having purchased part of the property from of ownership are subject to limitations that may be imposed
Spouses Abalos. But the amended complaint was by law. The Tenancy Act provides one such limitation.
dismissed as such altered the cause of action. Upon Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and
reconsideration, the dismissal was set aside and Spouses they have the right to work on their respective landholdings
Abalos were ordered to file their Answer. Spouses filed once the leasehold relationship is established. The exercise
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of of the right of ownership, then, yields to the exercise of the
Appeals docketed as C.A. GR SP No. 22149. · Court of rights of an agricultural tenant. However, the status as
Appeals denied Roman†™s petition for certiorari. His tenant has not yet been declared by the DARAB. In keeping
heirs then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the with judicial order, we refrain from ruling on whether
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. 93401. · In 1990, the petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property
Court of Appeals also denied the petition for certiorari and Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts.
prohibition filed by Spouses Abalos, ruling the land There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one person is
registration court did not err to refuse the rule of res completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited
judicata. Spouses Abalos then filed with the Supreme Court by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. 99843. confers certain rights to the owner, among which are the
· In 1991, the Supreme Court held in G.R. 93401to grant right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other
the petition filed by the Heirs of Roman. · On June 22, persons from possession thereof. On the other hand,
1993, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the denial possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
of the Court of Appeals in C.A. GR SP No. 22149, and enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually
consequently, Civil Case No. 15958Â for annulment of and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
document and/or redemption, ownership and damages, Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in
was ordered dismissed. · On October 18, 1993, Heirs of the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. A
Roman filed with the Department of Agrarian Adjudication person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled
Board DARAB cases for †œSecurity of Tenure with to possession. The possession may be in the hands of
prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary another either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have
Injunction†•. · The decision of the land registration improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived
court was partially executed: Lot No. 8459-A assigned to without due hearing. He may have other valid defenses to
Heirs of Roman, and Lots No. 60052 and 8459-B assigned resist surrender of possession. A judgment for ownership,
to Spouses Abalos. Heirs of Roman appealed to CA. CA therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a
affirmed the partition but reversed order directing the necessary incident.
issuance of a writ of possession on the ground of pendency
of Civil Case No. 15958. · On November 15, 1993, the
trial court in compliance with the decision of the Supreme [G.R. No. 82680. August 13, 1994.]
Court in G.R. No. 99843, dismissed Civil Case No. 15958.
Spouses Abalos then moved for the issuance of an alias NICANOR SOMODIO, Petitioner, v. COURT
writ of execution and/or writ of possession to place them in OF APPEALS, EBENECER PURISIMA and FELOMINO
AYCO, Respondents.
possession of Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459-B. However,
said motion was held in abeyance until and after DARAB
Case No. 528-P-93 for security of tenure with prayer for
status quo, has been resolved. Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a
Issue: Whether Spouses Abalos having won the land Transfer of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mangubat, the
registration case can effectively eject Heirs of Roman who possession of a residential lot located at General Santos
City. Nicanor Somodio, petitioner, contributed one-half of
are possessors thereof, whose security of tenure rights are
the purchase price. Mabugat then executed an Affidavit of
still pending determination before the DARAB? Trust expressly recognizing the right of Somodio over ½
undivided portion of the lot.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held that a judgment in a
land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the
Somodio and Mabugat partitioned the property into two
possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are
portions, with the former taking the western part. After the
still pending determination before the DARAB. Stated partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and
differently, the prevailing party in a land registration case planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees, and other fruit
cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being bearing trees.
He also began construction of a structure with a dimension
of 22 by 18 feet on his lot. Due to his work, he was In June 1979, petitioner Colito T. Pajuyo (Pajuyo)
transferred to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and left the paid P400 to a certain Pedro Perez for the rights over a
unfinished structure to the care of his uncle. Somodio 250-square meter lot in Barrio Payatas, Quezon
allowed Ayco, respondent to transfer his hut to petitioner’s City. Pajuyo then constructed a house made of light
lot. materials on the lot. Pajuyo and his family lived in the
house from 1979 to 7 December 1985.

Somodio demanded Ayco to vacate the premises but to no On 8 December 1985, Pajuyo and private respondent
avail. He then filed an action for unlawful detainer with Eddie Guevarra (Guevarra) executed a Kasunduan or
damages before the MTC. Another respondent, Purisima agreement. Pajuyo, as owner of the house, allowed
entered the land and constructed a house thereon. Guevarra to live in the house for free provided Guevarra
Somodio then filed a complaint for forcible entry against the would maintain the cleanliness and orderliness of the
latter. house. Guevarra promised that he would voluntarily vacate
the premises on Pajuyos demand.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Somodio finding In September 1994, Pajuyo informed Guevarra of his
that Purisima built a house “almost on the spot where need of the house and demanded that Guevarra vacate the
Somodio’s unfinished house” stood through “stealth and house. Guevarra refused.
strategy”. The MTC also held that Somodio was the actual
Pajuyo filed an ejectment case against Guevarra with
possessor of the lot in question.
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 31
The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. CA on the other
In his Answer, Guevarra claimed that Pajuyo had no
hand, dismissed petition of Somodio and held that the latter
valid title or right of possession over the lot where the
did not “clearly and conclusively established physical, prior
house stands because the lot is within the 150 hectares set
possession over the lot.
aside by Proclamation No. 137 for socialized housing.
Guevarra pointed out that from December 1985 to
September 1994, Pajuyo did not show up or communicate
with him. Guevarra insisted that neither he nor Pajuyo has
valid title to the lot.
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
property? (only issue in ejectment cases) On 15 December 1995, the MTC rendered
its decision in favor of Pajuyo. The dispositive portion of the
MTC decision reads:

RULING: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant, ordering
Anyone who can prove prior possession de facto (physical the latter to:
possession) may recover such possession even from the
owner himself. This is true regardless of the character of a
party’s possession provided he has in his favor priority of A) vacate the house and lot occupied by the
time entitling him to stay on the property until he is lawfully defendant or any other person or persons
ejected by a person having a better right by either accion claiming any right under him;
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. B) pay unto plaintiff the sum of THREE
Accrdg. to Art. 531 of NCC, possession is acquired by HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) monthly as
material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right. reasonable compensation for the use of the
Somodio then enjoyed priority of possession because premises starting from the last demand;
Purisima entered the lot only in 1983 which is later than
Somodio’s possession fo the property. C) pay plaintiff the sum of P3,000.00 as and by
way of attorneys fees; and
In addition, Somodio’s possession over the property is not D) pay the cost of suit.
synonymous with his right of ownership over the same.
Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never Aggrieved, Guevarra appealed to the Regional Trial
determines the actual title to an estate. The MTC and Court of Quezon City, Branch 81 (RTC). the RTC affirmed
RTC’s decision are deemed reinstated. the MTC decision. Guevarra received the RTC decision on
29 November 1996. Guevarra had only until 14 December
1996 to file his appeal with the Court of Appeals. Instead of
filing his appeal with the Court of Appeals, Guevarra filed
with the Supreme Court a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Appeal by Certiorari Based on Rule 42 (motion for
[G.R. No. 146364. June 3, 2004] extension). Guevarra theorized that his appeal raised pure
questions of law. The Receiving Clerk of the Supreme
Court received the motion for extension on 13 December
1996 or one day before the right to appeal expired.

COLITO T. PAJUYO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF On 3 January 1997, Guevarra filed his petition for
APPEALS and EDDIE review with the Supreme Court.
GUEVARRA, respondents.
Pajuyo filed a motion for reconsideration of The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) held in Asian Ban Corp. v
the decision. Pajuyo pointed out that the Court of Appeals Commissioner, that the 20% FWT should not form part of
should have dismissed outright Guevarras petition for its taxable gross receipts for purposes of computing the tax.
review because it was filed out of time. Moreover, it was
Guevarras counsel and not Guevarra who signed the Solidbank, relying on the strength of this decision, filed with
certification against forum-shopping. the BIR a letter-request for the refund or tax credit. It also
filed a petition for review with the CTA where the it ordered
On 14 December 2000, the Court of Appeals issued a the refund.
resolution denying Pajuyos motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether or not Pajuyo has the better right to The CA ruling, however, stated that the 20% FWT did not
possess the disputed property. form part of the taxable gross receipts because the FWT
was not actually received by the bank but was directly
Held: Yes. Guevarra does not dispute Pajuyos prior remitted to the government.
possession of the lot and ownership of the house built on
it. Guevarra expressly admitted the existence and due The Commissioner claims that although the FWT was not
execution of the Kasunduan. Based on the Kasunduan, actually received by Solidbank, the fact that the amount
Pajuyo permitted Guevarra to reside in the house and lot redounded to the bank’s benefit makes it part of the taxable
free of rent, but Guevarra was under obligation to maintain gross receipts in computing the Gross Receipts Tax.
the premises in good condition. Guevarra promised to Solidbank says the CA ruling is correct.
vacate the premises on Pajuyos demand but Guevarra
broke his promise and refused to heed Pajuyos demand to Issue:
vacate. Guevarra turned his back on the Kasunduan on the Whether or not the FWT forms part of the gross receipts
sole ground that like him, Pajuyo is also a squatter. tax.
Squatters, Guevarra pointed out, cannot enter into a
contract involving the land they illegally occupy. Guevarra
insists that the contract is void.
Guevarra should know that there must be honor even Yes. In a withholding tax system, the payee is the taxpayer,
between squatters. Guevarra freely entered into the person on whom the tax is imposed. The payor, a
the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn separate entity, acts as no more than an agent of the
the Kasunduan after he had benefited from government for the collection of tax in order to ensure its
it. The Kasunduan binds Guevarra. payment. This amount that is used to settle the tax liability
is sourced from the proceeds constitutive of the tax base.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of
determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a right
These proceeds are either actual or constructive. Both
to physical possession of the contested
parties agree that there is no actual receipt by the bank.
property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence of
What needs to be determined is if there is constructive
Guevarras recognition of Pajuyos better right of physical
receipt. Since the payee is the real taxpayer, the rule on
possession. Guevarra is clearly a possessor in bad
constructive receipt can be rationalized.
faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different
result, as there would still be an implied promise to vacate.
The Court applied provisions of the Civil Code on actual
Pajuyos absence did not affect his actual possession and constructive possession. Article 531 of the Civil Code
of the disputed property. Possession in the eyes of the law clearly provides that the acquisition of the right of
does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every possession is through the proper acts and legal formalities
square meter of the ground before he is deemed in established. The withholding process is one such
possession.[77] One may acquire possession not only by act. There may not be actual receipt of the income
physical occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is withheld; however, as provided for in Article 532,
subject to the action of ones will.[78]Actual or physical possession by any person without any power shall be
occupation is not always necessary.[79] considered as acquired when ratified by the person in
whose name the act of possession is executed.

In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by

the payor as the withholding agent of the government,
because the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for
[G.R. No. 148191. November 25, 2003] the government. There is thus constructive receipt.

The processes of bookkeeping and accounting for interest

on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes that are
subjected to FWT are tantamount to delivery, receipt or
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, remittance. Besides, Solidbank admits that its income is
vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION, respondent. subjected to a tax burden immediately upon “receipt”,
although it claims that it derives no pecuniary benefit or
advantage through the withholding process.
Solidbank filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns
reflecting gross receipts amounting to P1,474,693.44. It
There being constructive receipt, part of which is withheld,
alleged that the total included P350,807,875.15
that income is included as part of the tax base on which the
representing gross receipts from passive income which was
gross receipts tax is imposed.
already subjected to 20%final withholding tax (FWT).

G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014

ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by his On April 26, 2011, the MTC ruled in favor of respondent[5].
Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO DUGENIA, Petitioner, It stated that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence to
vs. prove that the lot occupied by respondent was within his lot
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
titled under OCT No. RP-174 ( 13789).

Facts: The Facts Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court
of Bauang, La Union (RTC) and the case was raffled to
On October 30, 2007, petitioner AnacletoMangaser, Branch 33.
represented by his attorney-in-fact, EustaquioDugenia
(petitioner), tiled a complaint for Forcible Entry with In its August 23, 2011 Decision,[8] the RTC reversed the
Damages against respondent DionisioUgay (respondent) MTC decision and ruled in favor of petitioner.
before the Municipal Trial Court of Caba, La Union (MTC).
In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he was the Undaunted, respondent appealed to the CA.
registered owner and possessor of a parcel of land situated
in Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union, with an area of 10,632 CA Ruling
square meters and covered by OCT No. RP-174 (FP-
13787) and Tax Declaration No. 014-00707; that on The CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
October 31, 2006, petitioner, discovered that respondent Citing Quizon v. Juan,[14] it emphasized that petitioner
stealthy intruded and occupied a portion of his property by must allege and prove that he was in prior physical
constructing a residential house thereon without his possession of the property in dispute. The word
knowledge and consent; that he referred the matter to the "possession," as used in forcible entry and unlawful
Office of LupongTagapamayapa for conciliation, but no detainer cases, meant nothing more than physical
settlement was reached, hence, a certification to file action possession, not legal possession in the sense
was issued by the Lupon; and that demand letters were contemplated in civil law. The CA wrote that petitioner was
sent to respondent but he still refused to vacate the not in physical possession despite the presentation of the
premises, thus, he was constrained to seek judicial OCT No. RP-174( 13789) and his tax declarations.[15] It
remedy.[3] reiterated that when the law would speak of possession in
forcible entry cases, it is prior physical possession or
Respondent denied the material allegations of the possession de facto, as distinguished from possession de
complaint and put up the following defenses, to wit: that he jure. What petitioner proved was legal possession, not his
had been a resident of Samara, Aringay, La Union, since prior physical possession. Furthermore, the CA stated that
birth and when he reached the age of reason, he started the RTC misquoted Nuñez v. SLTEAS
occupying a parcel of land in that place then known as Sta. PheonixSolutions[16] by giving the wrong notion of what
Lucia, Aringay, La Union; that years later, this parcel of land kind of possession was contemplated in forcible entry
was designated as part of Santiago Sur, Caba, La Union cases. In other words, physical possession was the crux in
due to a survey made by the government; that he forcible entry, not possession that stemmed upon
introduced more improvements on the property by ownership.[17]
cultivating the land, and in March 2006, he put up a
"bahaykubo"; that in October 2006, he installed a fence Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,[19] dated July
made of "bolo" to secure the property; that in installing the 6, 2012, but it was subsequently denied by the CA in a
fence, he was guided by the concrete monuments which he Resolution,[20] dated December 5, 2012.
knew to be indicators of the boundaries of petitioner's
property; that while he could not locate some of the
monuments, he based the boundaries on his recollection
since he was around when these were installed; that he
knew the boundaries of petitioner's property because he
knew the extent of the "iron mining" activities done by a
company on the said property; that petitioner was never in
actual possession of the property occupied by him, and it
was only on October 31, 2006 when he discovered the WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION DATED
alleged intrusion; that it was not correct to say that be DECEMBER 5, 2012 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
refused to vacate and surrender the premises despite FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION, DENYING THE
receipt of the demand letters because in his letter-reply, he MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS VALID.[22]
assured petitioner that he would voluntarily vacate the
premises if he would only be shown to have intruded into Held:
petitioner's titled lot after the boundaries were pointed out to
him; and that instead of showing the boundaries to him, The Court finds the petition meritorious.
petitioner filed an action for forcible entry before the
MTC.[4] For a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiffs must allege
and prove: (a) that they have prior physical possession of
MTC Ruling the property; (b) that they were deprived of possession
either by force, intimidation, threat. strategy or stealth; and, Returning to the case, this Court cannot agree with the CA
(c) that the action was filed within one (1) year from the that petitioner's OCT No. RP-174(13789) and his tax
time the owners or legal possessors learned of their declarations should absolutely be disregarded. The
deprivation of the physical possession of the property.[28] issuance of an original certificate of title to the petitioner
evidences ownership and from it, a right to the possession
As a rule, the word "possession" in forcible entry suits of the property flows. Well-entrenched is the rule that a
indeed refers to nothing more than prior physical person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled
possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure to the possession thereof.[41]
or legal possession in the sense contemplated in civil law.
Title is not the issue, and the absence of it "is not a ground Moreover, his claim of possession is coupled with tax
for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an declarations. While tax declarations are not conclusive
ejectment proof of possession of a parcel of land, they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. not in his actual or constructive possession.[42] Together
Examples of these are donations, succession, execution with the Torrens title, the tax declarations dated 1995
and registration of public instruments, inscription of onwards presented by petitioner strengthens his claim of
possessory information titles and the like.[33] The reason possession over the land before his dispossession on
for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the October 31, 2006 by respondent.
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in The CA was in error in citing the case of De Grano v.
possession.[34] It is sufficient that petitioner was able to Lacaba[43] to support its ruling. In that case, the
subject the property to the action of his will.[35] Here, respondent tried to prove prior possession, by presenting
respondent failed to show that he falls under any of these only his tax declarations, tax receipt and a certification tl·om
circumstances. He could not even say that the subject the municipal assessor attesting that he had paid real
property was leased to him except that he promised that he property tax from previous years. The Court did not give
would vacate it if petitioner would be able to show the credence to his claim because tax declarations and realty
boundaries of the titled lot. tax payments are not conclusive proof of possession. The
situation in the present case differs because aside from
In the case at bench, the Court finds that petitioner presenting his tax declarations, the petitioner submitted
acquired possession of the subject property by juridical act, OCT No. RP-174(13789) which is the best evidence of
specifically, through the issuance of a free patent under ownership from where his right to possession arises.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration
with the Register of Deeds on March 18, 1987.[38] Against the Torrens title and tax declarations of petitioner,
the bare allegations of respondent that he had prior, actual,
Before the Court continues any further, it must be continuous, public, notorious, exclusive and peaceful
determined first whether the issue of ownership is material possession in the concept of an owner, has no leg to stand
and relevant in resolving the issue of possession. The on. Thus, by provisionally resolving the issue of ownership,
Rules of Court in fact expressly allow this: Section 16, Rule the Court is satisfied that petitioner had prior possession of
70 of the Rules of Court provides that the issue of the subject property.
ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of
possession if the question of possession is intertwined with When petitioner discovered the stealthy intrusion of
the issue of ownership. But this provision is only an respondent over his registered property, he immediately
exception and is allowed only in this limited instance to filed a complaint with the LupongTagapamayapa and
determine the issue of possession and only if the question subsequently filed an action for forcible entry with the MTC.
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the Instead of taking the law into his own hands and forcefully
issue of ownership.[39] expelling respondent from his property, petitioner
composed himself and followed the established legal
This Court is of the strong view that the issue of ownership procedure to regain possession of his land.
should be provisionally determined in this case. First, the
juridical act from which the right of ownership of petitioner If the Court were to follow the ruling of the CA and
arise would be the registration of the free patent and the disregard juridical acts to obtain prior possession, then it
issuance of OCT No. RP-174(13789). Apparently, the would create an absurd situation. It would be putting
Torrens title suggests ownership over the land. Second, premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title
respondent also asserts ownership over the land based on holders, who spent months, or even years, in order to
his prior, actual, continuous, public, notorious, exclusive register their land, and who religiously paid real property
and peaceful possession in the concept of an owner of the taxes thereon. They cannot immediately repossess their
property in dispute.[40] Because there are conflicting claims properties simply because they have to prove their literal
of ownership, then it is proper to provisionally determine the and physical possession of their property prior to the
issue of ownership to settle the issue of possession de controversy. The Torrens title holders would have to resort
facto. to ordinary civil procedure by filing either an
accionpubliciana or accionreinvidicatoria and undergo with compulsory counterclaim. On appeal, the Regional
arduous and protracted litigation while the intruders Trial Court (RTC), affirmed the MTC Decision with
continuously enjoy and rip the benefits of another man's modification to dismiss the complaint and counterclaim.
Aggrieved Ramon and Agnes Lim filed with the
land. It will defeat the very purpose of the summary
Court of Appeals a petition for review. In its Decision, the
procedure of an action for forcible entry. Court of Appeals[4]reversed and set aside the Decision of
the RTC.
The underlying philosophy behind ejectment suits is to
prevent breach of the peace and criminal disorder and to Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in failing
compel the party out of possession to respect and resort to to rule that there was no implied admission on the part of
the law alone to obtain what he claims is his. Ejectment petitioners that private respondents had been in prior and
proceedings are summary in nature so the authorities can actual physical possession of subject property since 1975.
speedily settle actions to recover possession because of
the overriding need to quell sociaI disturbances.[44] Held: Petitioners possession of the property has been
sufficiently established by evidence. The title to the property
As to the other requirements of an action for forcible entry, (TCT No. T-47263) is in the name of petitioner Napoleon
the Court agrees with the RTC that petitioner had Gaza. On record is a deed of sale showing that he bought
sufficiently complied with them. Petitioner proved that he the land in 1961 from Angeles Vda. de Urrutia. Petitioner
also presented receipts of payment of realty taxes. A
was deprived of possession of the property by stealth. The
disinterested witness, Barangay Secretary Victorio
complaint was also filed on October 30, 2007, within the Conducto of Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon, in his Affidavit
one year reglementary period counted from the discovery of attached to the instant petition,[16] stated that since 1968,
the stealthy entry by respondent to the property on October spouses Gaza have been in possession of the property and
31, 2006 that respondents never occupied the property even for
business purposes. Upon the closure of their business,
petitioners designated Numeriano Ernesto and Renato Petil
as caretakers of the lot whom acquired the same
possession Article 532 of the CC states that “possession
may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by
his legal representative, by his agent, or by any person
without any power whatever;”. Where a dispute over
[G.R. No. 126863. January 16, 2003] possession arises between two persons, the person first
having actual possession is the one who is entitled to
maintain the action granted by law; otherwise, a mere
usurper without any right whatever, might enter upon the
SPOUSES NAPOLEON L. GAZA and EVELYN GAZA, property of another and, by allowing himself to be ordered
SPOUSES RENATO PETIL and MELY PETIL, off, could acquire the right to maintain the action of forcible
BRGY. SEC. VICTORIO A. CONDUCTO and entry and detainer, however momentary his intrusion might
BRGY. TANOD ARTURO ALAON, petitioners, have been.[22]
In this case, evidence clearly shows that the
LIM, respondents.
petitioners are the true owners and, therefore, the lawful
Facts: On February 20, 1961, Napoleon Gaza purchased a possessors of the land. Verily, respondents allegation of
parcel of land with an area of 5,270 square meters located actual possession and that petitioners deprived them of
in Barangay Sta. Maria, Calauag, Quezon, from Angeles such possession by means of force, intimidation and threat
Vda. de Urrutia. Thereafter, Napoleon Gaza and his wife are clearly untenable.
Evelyn engaged in the lumber and copra business. They
padlocked the gates of the property, leaving it to the care of
Numeriano Ernesto. When he died in 1991, spouses Gaza
designated Renato Petil as the new caretaker of the land.
On the other hand, Ramon and Agnes Lim, both
PUNO, J., Chairman,
half-siblings of Napoleon Gaza, claimed that they have
used the same lot for their lumber and copra business.
They designated Emilio Herrera as caretaker of the
TINGA, and
According to Napoleon Gaza, the siblings Ramon
and Agnes Lim and Emilio Herrera, entered the property by
PEDRO O. ENCISO, Promulgated:
breaking the lock of the main gate. Thereafter, they
occupied a room on the second floor of the warehouse
November 11, 2005
without the consent of Renato Petil who was then outside
the premises. Facts: on April 24, 2000, the respondent, alleging to
For their part, Ramon and Agnes Lim be the owner in fee simple of a parcel of residential land
maintain that on November 28, 1993, spouses Gaza located in Barangay South Poblacion, Masinloc, Zambales,
detained Emilio Herrera and his daughter inside the filed a petition for land registration before the RTC of Iba,
compound and destroyed the padlocks of the gates. On Zambales. Respondent averred the said property is not
December 13, 1993, Ramon and Agnes Lim filed with the tenanted or occupied by any person other than the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calauag, Quezon an action respondent and his family who are in actual physical
for forcible entry against spouses Napoleon and Evelyn possession of the same; and the respondent and his
Gaza. Spouses Gaza filed with the same court their answer predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, peaceful,
open, notorious, uninterrupted and adverse possession of
the land in the concept of an owner for not less than 30
granting the application despite his failure to prove
years immediately preceding the filing of the application.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the registrable title over Lot No. 2278-A.
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the
application on the following grounds: (a) neither the
respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and The CA disposed of the appeal on September 26, 2003 and
occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto; (b) the respondent failed to adduce any muniment affirmed the decision of the trial court.
of title and/or the tax declaration with the application to
prove bona fide acquisition of the land applied for or its Issue: Whether or not CA erred a question of law in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and granting respondents petition for registration sans any
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since June 12, showing that the subject property was previously declared
1945 or prior thereto; (c) the alleged tax declaration alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
adverted to in the application does not appear to be
genuine and the tax declarations indicate such possession
to be of recent vintage; (d) the claim of ownership in fee Held: Applicants for registration of title must
simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no longer
be availed of by the respondent considering that he failed to therefore prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of
file an appropriate application for registration within the
period of six months from February 16, 1976 as required by
P.D. No. 892; and (e) the subject land is a portion of the the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines
which is not subject to private appropriation. and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
The respondent presented tax receipts to show that
the property was declared for taxation purposes in his
name. Took possession of the property and constructed a
house thereon. On March 8, 1969, the Municipality of
and notorious possession and occupation of the same
Masinloc, Zambales passed supplementary Resolution No.
102,[10] which stated that in consideration of the financial
assistance extended by the abutting property owners, and under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
because the government no longer needed the additional
areas for public use, authorizing its mayor to execute a immemorial, or since June 12, 1945. It is not disputed that
deed of sale in favor of Honorato Edao. Immediately
thereafter, the Municipality of Masinloc, Zambales,
represented by its Mayor, P.A. Edao, executed a Deed of the land sought to be registered was originally part of the
Absolute Sale[12] covering a piece of reclaimed land
containing more or less 2,790 square meters in favor of reclamation project undertaken by the Municipality of
Honorato Edao. Respondent further narrated that on
December 9, 1980, the spouses Honorato and Esperanza
Edao happened to be the uncle of the respondent sold the Masinloc, Zambales. The prevailing rule is that reclaimed
lot to Vicente B. Enciso for P2,092.50 via a Deed of
Absolute Sale. disposable lands of the public domain may only be leased

and not sold to private parties. Indeed, there is nothing to

The trial court ruled that the respondent

support the respondents claim that the property was

satisfactorily proved his ownership in fee simple, as well as

reclassified as residential already segregated from the

the identity of the land sought to be titled. Likewise, the trial

public domain and assumed the character of private

court found that the respondent, as well as his

ownership. At the
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, peaceful,

continuous, public, adverse, and under a bona fide claim of

moment, it is not clear as to when the proper authorities

ownership. The Republic of the Philippines appealed the

classified the subject as alienable and disposable. It must

case before the CA, contending that the trial court erred in

be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be

because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and
continuous possession of the land since 1985. The
presented to establish that the land subject of the
petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came
into possession through force and violence, contrary to Art
application is alienable or disposable. The respondents 536 of the Civil Code. We concede that despite their
dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal
possession and that of his predecessors-in-interest will not possession because possession cannot be acquired
through force or violence. To all intents and purposes, a
possessor even if physically ousted, is still deemed the
suffice for purposes of judicial confirmation of title. What is legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove
prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover
categorically required by law is open, continuous, such possession. However, possession by the petitioners
does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by
the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation acquired it before 1985. The records show that the
petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession
of the land. Before 1985, the subject land was occupied
and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who
1945 or earlier. was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as
evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso
died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and
The evidence on record shows that a house was cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time,
respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.
Possession cannot be acquired through force or violence.
constructed on the subject property only in 1991.
Evidently, the respondent failed to prove that (1) PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY, petitioner,
Lot No. 2278-A was classified as part of the disposable and vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SIMEON
alienable land of the public domain; and (2) he and his POLICARPIO SHIPYARD AND SHIPBUILDING
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, COMPANY, respondents.
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
in the concept of owners since time immemorial, or from
Facts: Sometime in 1958, Iluminada Lumen Policarpio,
June 12, 1945.
obtained a loan from Philippine Trust Company (Philtrust,
for short) in the sum of P300,000.00. As security for the
loan, Lumens parents, as sureties, executed a deed of
mortgage to the bank over some parcels of land, including
[G.R. No. 137944. April 6, 2000]
all the improvements thereon. Upon failure of Lumen
Policarpio to pay the loan when it fell due, Philtrust initiated
FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA and RUPERTA foreclosure proceedings before the Court of First Instance
MENDOZA LIRIO, petitioners, vs. HONORATA (CFI) of Manila. On October 10, 1976, Philtrust filed a
MENDOZA BOLANTE, respondent. J l motion for the issuance of a writ of possession of said
properties. Meanwhile, on December 29, 1980, the bank
For all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically sold the properties to the present owner, Alto Industrial
ousted is still deemed to be the legal possessor. Enterprises, Inc. In a resolution dated January 11, 1985,
the Court of Appeals granted Philtrusts motion for issuance
of a writ of partial possession of the properties involved
FACTS: Before 1954, the land in question was originally except the portion of 1,000 square meters wherein Lumen
declared for tax purposes under the name of Sinforoso Policarpios house stood.
Mendoza, father of respondent. Sinforoso died in 1930.
Petitioners were daughters of Margarito Mendoza. The tax
declaration in the name of Sinforoso was cancelled, and It was only on November 14, 1990,that Philtrust
subsequently placed the tax declaration under the name of was finally placed in possession of the foreclosed
Margarito. The respondent was the occupant of that land. properties, and thirty-one (31) years and two (2) months
During the cadastral survey of the land, the brother of from the time the case for foreclosure proceeding was
petitioner and Honorata had a dispute over the ownership instituted in the Court of First Instance on September 29,
of the property. The trial court said that petitioners are the 1959. Thereafter, Simeon Policarpio, Modesta Reyes and
lawful owner of the property. However, in a turn of events, Iluminada Lumen Policarpio filed a petition for prohibition
the appellate court held that the probative value of with preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of
petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
comparison with the respondent's proof of ownership of the the trial court in ordering the premature implementation of
disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous the second alias writ of possession dated October 15,
possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a 1990.
better title under Art. 538 of the Civil Code.
On November 11, 1992, herein private respondent
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent, Honorata had a Simeon Policarpio Shipyard and Shipbuilding Corporation
better right over the property (SPSSC for short) filed a complaint for Damages,
Injunction, and Mandamus against petitioner Philtrust and
RTC Malabon Sheriff Augusto Castro and Deputy Gallardo
HELD: The Court of Appeals ruled that the respondent was C. Tolentino, alleging that on November 14, 1990, by virtue
the preferred possessor under Art. 538 of the Civil Code
of an alias writ of execution and possession. Petitioner G.R. No. L-43345 July 29, 1976
Philtrust filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res
judicata and failure on the part of private respondent JOSEFINA S. DE LAUREANO, petitioner,
SPSSC to state a cause of action. Petitioner alleged that vs.
the issues raised by private respondent involved the same HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, in his capacity as Presiding
parties and the same properties which have already been Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and
passed upon by the courts including the Supreme ONG CU, respondents.
Court. Petitioner further alleged that the complaint states no
cause of action since the property covered by OCT-R-165
is no longer owned by private respondent but by the Land Celso Ed. T. Unson for petitioner.
Bank of the Philippines. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss filed by petitioner Philtrust on the ground that the Rolando Magbanua Antiquiera for private respondent.
doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable. On July 30, 1995,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, Facts: Mrs. Laureano is the registered owner of Lots 996
stating that as far as the parcels of land covered by TCT and 1004-B with a total area of 3,107 square meters
234088 and TCT 24182 are concerned, there is identity of located at the corner of Iznart and Solis Streets, Iloilo City.
subject matter. The lots were leased to Ong Cu for fifteen year period
which allegedly expired on August 31, 1974. In view of Ong
Issue: Whether or not SIMEON POLICARPIO SHIPYARD Cu's failure to vacate the lots and remove his improvements
AND SHIPBUILDING COMPANY was still in possession of thereon. Mrs. Laureano filed against him an ejectment suit
the foreclosed land. in October, 1974 in the city court of Iloilo City.

Held: The complaint for damages filed by private Ong Cu appealed to the Court of Fist Instance of
respondent SPSSC with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Instead of filing a supersedeas bond based on the
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 170, on November 19, findings of the city court in its decision, Ong Cu asked the
1992, however, was predicated on the alleged improper city court ex parte to approve his supersedeas bond in the
implementation of the alias writ of execution involving two sum of P22,000 and to fix the rental value of the two lots at
parcels of land covered by TCT 234088 and OCT-R- P1,200 a month. On November 13 Josefina De lauriano
165. Respondent Court of Appeals noted that TCT 234088 filed a motion in the lower court praying for a preliminary
is actually a consolidation of lots sold to Simeon Policarpio mandatory injunction to restore her to the possession of the
Shipyard and Shipbuilding Corporation by spouses Simeon said lots. She also asked for immediate execution of the
Policarpio and Modesta Reyes after title to the properties city court's judgment on the ground that Ong Cu's
subject of foreclosure has already been consolidated in the supersedeas bond was inadequate and that he had failed
name of petitioner Philtrust. Private respondent SPSSC to deposit the sum of P12,428 monthly. Ong Cu opposed
does not dispute that the parcel of land covered by OCT R- the two motions. The lower court in its order of December
165 has been mortgaged to the Landbank of the Philippines 9, 1975 upheld the city court's order fixing the supersedeas
to secure a loan in the sum of Four Million Five Hundred bond and the amount to be deposited by Ong Cu.
Twenty Nine Thousand Pesos (P4,529,000.00) on April 30,
1982. The property was foreclosed as early as April 27, Issue: Whether or not the lower court whether the lower
1987 as evidenced by a certificate of sale issued by the ex-
court acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying Mrs.
officio sheriff of Malabon. The certificate of sale was
inscribed in the Register of Deeds on September 21, 1987, Laureano's motions for execution and a mandatory
giving private respondent one year to redeem it. Since injunction.
private respondent was in possession of the aforesaid
parcel of land when the writ of possession was improperly Held:Yes. The immediate possession to be granted to Mrs.
implemented by the sheriff, it is not correct therefore to say Laureano under the writ of mandatory injunction would
that private respondent does not have a cause of action, embrace the portions of the two lots not occupied by Ong
simply because it was no longer the owner of the property Cu's improvements. The Civil Code provides:
in question when the writ of possession was
implemented. It is elementary that a lawful possessor of a
thing has the right to institute an action should he be ART. 1674. In ejectment cases where an
disturbed in its enjoyment. Verily, Article 539 of the Civil appeal is taken the remedy granted in
Code states that article 539, second paragraph, shall also
apply, if the higher court is satisfied that
Every possessor has a right to be respected in his the lessee's appeal is frivolous or dilatory,
possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be or that the lessor's appeal is prima
restored to said possession by the means established by facie meritorious. The period of ten days
the laws and rules of court. x x x referred to in said article shall be counted
from the time the appeal is perfected. (n)
The phrase every possessor in the article indicates
that all kinds of possession, from that of the owner to that of
a mere holder, except that which constitutes a crime, Article 1674 is reproduced in section 9 of Rule 70. Article
should be respected and protected by the means 539 of the Civil Code in its second paragraph grants to the
established and the laws of procedure.[17] Consequently, possessor, who was deprived of the possession of his real
private respondent having been in lawful possession of the property through forcible entry, the right to secure from an
property covered by OCT-R-165 at the time the writ of inferior court in the action for forcible entry a writ of
possession was implemented, may institute an action for preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
having been disturbed in its enjoyment. possession.
There is no question that Mrs. Laureano is the registered o De Leon filed a motion for the dissolution of the
owner of the two lots and that they were leased to Ong Cu injunction. He manifested that he was willing to file
for a fifteen year period counted from September 1, 1959 a counterbond in the same amount.
and expiring on August 31, 1974. Ong Cu in his answer to  Judge Estrella in his order granted the motion for the
dissolution of the injunction provided that De Leon filed
the ejectment complaint unmistakably admitted that the
"a surety bond in the sum of P10,000 to answer for all
lease expired on that date. He alleged that there were damages which the plaintiff (Mara Inc.) may suffer".
negotiations for his purchase of the two lots. The lower  Hence, Mara, Inc. instituted in this Court the instant
court assumed that Ong Cu in constructing his building on special civil action of certiorari for the purpose of
the leased lots is a possessor in good faith entitled to annulling Judge Estrella's order dissolving the
reimbursement of the necessary and useful expenses injunction.
incurred by him and with a right of retention. That  De Leon’s Contention: He had a right to occupy the
four lots because of OCT No. 56 which allegedly was
assumption is erroneous. As a lessee, who constructed a
issued earlier than OCT No. 735.
building on the leased land, Ong Cu cannot be o NOTE that this was the same defense which he
characterized as a builder in good faith. Under article 448 of had pleaded in his answer to the ejectment suit
the Civil Code the owner of the land on which anything has and which was eroded by the SC’s decision in the
been built in good faith may appropriate the building after Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases upholding the
payment of the indemnity provided in articles 546 and 548 validity of TCT No. 735 from which the titles of
of the Civil Code. In filing the ejectment suit Mrs. Laureano Mara, Inc. were derived.
opted not to reimburse Ong Cu for his improvements.
ISSUE: WON Mara, Inc. is entitled to the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to recover possession of the 4 lots
G.R. No. L-40511 July 25, 1975 during the pendency of the ejectment suit? (and thus, the
City Court acted with GAD in dissolving the injunction). –
MARA, INC., petitioner, YES (YES).
HON. JUSTINIANO C. ESTRELLA, City Judge of RATIO: (reasons for the ruling)
LEON, respondents.  This court (the SC) first denied Mara Inc.’s petition for
certiorari on the assumption that De Leon had posted
the surety bond required in Judge Estrella's order. But,
FACTS: it turned out that he did not file any such bond. He
 Mara, Inc. filed in the City Court of QC a complaint for merely submitted a check for that amount. Then he
forcible entry against Jose de Leon. later filed a motion that he be allowed to substitute
o De Leon through force, intimidation, threat, cash for the said check.
strategy and stealth occupied Lots 7, 9, 11 and 13,  Section 8, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that a
located at G. Araneta Avenue, Sta. Mesa Heights copy of the bond for the dissolution of the injunction
Subdivision, Barrio Santol, QC registered in the should be served on the other party. That requirement,
name of Mara, Inc. as shown in TCT Nos. 127719, which is intended to enable the opposing party to
127720, 127721 and 127722 of the QC Registry of object to the sufficiency of the bond, was NOT
Deeds. observed in this case.
o It was further alleged that it had prior possession o Thus, the City Court acted with GAD in dissolving
of the 4 lots. the injunction and in suspending its
 4 days after the filing of the complaint, Mara, Inc. implementation on the basis of De Leon's
asked the City Court to issue a writ of preliminary insufficient bond.
mandatory injunction for the purpose of restoring to it
the possession of the said lots. #2 WRIT OF INJUCTION DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN
 De Leon opposed the motion on the grounds that EJECTMENT SUIT
Mara, Inc. was never in possession of the lots;  Art. 539 of Civil Code provides that “A possessor
o Mara Inc.’s titles were derived from OCT No. 735 deprived of his possession through forcible entry may
which was allegedly void, and that the said lots within ten days from the filing of the complaint
were covered by OCT No. 56 which was being present a motion to secure from the competent
reconstituted in the CFI of Rizal, QC Branch IX court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of
and which is in the name of the Sps. Blas Fajardo preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in
and Pantaleona Santiago. his possession. The court shall decide the motion
 After Judge Estrella's attention was called to the SC’s within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.”
decision in Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason,  Mara, Inc. based its petition for a writ of preliminary
and Pili vs. Tuason, L, which upheld the validity and mandatory injunction on the provision above which was
incontestability of TCT No. 735, to which the titles of incorporated as the Rule 70 Section 3 par. 2 of the
Mara, Inc. to the 4 lots could be traced, he granted the ROC dealing with forcible entry and detainer.
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on condition o The urgency of the remedy of injunction is
that Mara, Inc. should file a bond in the sum of underscored by the fact that the court is given only
P10,000. 30 days within which to decide the motion. It is
 Mara, Inc. filed its bond for P10,000. Thereafter, Judge deplorable that in this case it took the City Court
Estrella issued the writ of preliminary mandatory more than 19 months to decide the motion of
injunction. Mara, Inc.
 The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an
exception to the general rule that the writ of
injunction is not proper where its purpose is to November 17, 2003: HGL had also filed on, a complaint
take property out of the possession or control of against Semirara for Recovery of Possession and
one person and place it in the hands of another Damages with Prayer for TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
whose title has not clearly been established by law. Mandatory Injunction with the Culasi RTC.

September 16, 2004: RTC granted the prayer for issuance

G.R. No. 166854 December 6, 2006 of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction. Petitioner did
not move for reconsideration of the order. The Writ of
SEMIRARA COAL CORPORATION (now SEMIRARA Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was accordingly issued by
MINING CORPORATION), petitioner, the trial court on October 6, 2004.The writ restrained
vs. petitioner or its agents from encroaching on the subject
HGL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and HON. land or conducting any activities in it, and commanded
ANTONIO BANTOLO, Presiding Judge, Branch 13, petitioner to restore possession of the subject land to HGL
Regional Trial Court, 6th Judicial Region, Culasi, or its agents.CA: Petition for certiorari DENIED.
Antique, respondents
ISSUE: WON the CA seriously erred or committed GAD in
FACTS: affirming the Antique RTC granting the writ of preliminary
(P) Semirara Mining Corporation is a grantee by the mandatory injunction
Department of Energy (DOE) of a Coal Operating Contract
under PD No. 972over the entire Island of Semirara, HELD:No.
Antique, which contains an area of 5,500 hectares more or
less. NCC 539: “a lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in
his possession and any disturbance of possession is a
(PR) HGL Development Corporation is a grantee of Forest ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
Land Grazing Lease Agreement (FLGLA) No. 184 by the injunction to restore the possession.” ->Thus, P’s claim that
then Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, over the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
367 hectares of land located at the barrios of Bobog and injunction is improper because the instant case is
Pontod, Semirara, Caluya, Antique. The FLGLA No. 184 allegedly one for accion publiciana deserves no
was issued on September 28, 1984for a term of 25 years, consideration.
to end on December 31, 2009. Since its grant, HGL has
been grazing cattle on the subject property. Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al. Prior to the NCC, it
was deemed improper to issue a writ of preliminary
Sometime in 1999: Petitioner requested Private injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken
Respondent to allow their trucks and other equipment to complete material possession of the property involved.
pass through the property covered by the FLGLA. PR said However, with the enactment of Article 539, the plaintiff is
yes as long as P wouldn’t violate the FLGLA in any way. now allowed to avail of a writ of preliminary mandatory
But then they did. P’s violations: injunction to restore him in his possession during the
pendency of his action to recover possession.
1. Erected several buildings for their administrative
offices and employees' residences without HGL's A writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon a showing
permission; that:
2. Conducted blasting and excavation;
3. Constructed an access road to petitioner's minesite in 1. the invasion of the right is material and substantial;
the Panaan Coal Reserve, Semirara; 2. the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable;
4. Maintained a stockyard for the coal it extracted from and
its mines. 3. there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the
writ to prevent serious damage.
***(dahil dito, nasira ung land ni HGL and madaming cows
na namatay.)
Here, it’s obvious that HGL, holding the FLGLA No. 184,
September 22, 1999: HGL wrote Semirara demanding has a clear and unmistakable right to the possession of the
full disclosureof their activities on the subject land and subject property. Thus, being the lawful possessor, HGL is
saying that they can’t contruct/ make improvements entitled to protection of its possession of the subject
without PR’s consent. P: Deadma lang. Continued with property and any disturbance of its possession is a valid
their activities. ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in its favor.-> Semirara even confirmed this right
December 6, 2000: DENR cancelled HGL’s FLGLA and when it sought permission from HGL to use its property
ordered PR to vacate. (Di kasi sila nakabayad ng renta and back in 1999. P’S possession therefore only a mere
surcharges and magbigay ng grazing reports.)MRs to tolerance of PR.
DENR were all denied. November 17, 2003, HGL filed a
complaint against the DENR for specific performance and The issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction is necessary
damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order for HGL stands to suffer material and substantial injury as a
and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Caloocan RTC result of petitioner's continuous intrusion into the subject
enjoining the DENR from enforcing its December 6, 2000 property. Like:
Order of Cancellation.
1) HGL of the use and possession of the subject property;
2) HGL's business operations. (P’s occupation happened Full payment of the purchase price was effected
when HGL still had the right to the use and possession of approximately a year later, on April 6, 1956, when Frando
the property for another 10 years.) At the very least, the paid the balance of P216 as evidenced by OR No. A-
failure of HGL to operate its cattle-grazing business is 2675530. On the same day, an Order/Award was made in
perceived as an inability by HGL to comply with the her favor by Director of Lands Zoilo Castrillo.[8] Apparent
demands of its customers and sows doubts in HGL's from a survey plan executed pursuant to an Order of the
capacity to continue doing business. This damage to HGL's Bureau was the fact that the property awarded to her
business standing is irreparable injury because no fair and covered both Lots 7 and 1855 with an aggregate area of
reasonable redress can be had by HGL insofar as the 4.000 hectares.
damage to its goodwill and business reputation is
concerned. One of her two children, Salvacion Gallanosa who
was married to Abdon Gimpes, continued possession of the
property. Sometime in 1940, the couple constructed their
P’s contention that the FLGLA had already been cancelled house on the southwestern portion thereof.
by the DENR is without merit. The CA correctly held that
the alleged cancellation through a unilateral act of the The other child of Frando, Paciencia Gallanosa-
DENR does not automatically render the FLGLA invalid Fuellas, chose to settle in Manila. The Gimpes spouses
since the unilateral cancellation is subject of a separate helped her in the administration of the land. Their children --
case which is still pending before the Caloocan RTC. particularly Respondents Rodolfo, Neri, Juan and Antonio --
Notably, said court has issued a writ of preliminary were born on the property, where they also grew up. After
injunction enjoining the DENR from enforcing its order of their parents death, they continued possession of the land;
cancellation of FLGLA No. 184. and harvested and received the fruits of the improvements
for themselves and on behalf of their grandmother, Juliana
The CA was correct when it found that PR’s construction Frando, even after her death in 1971.[9]
and activities were done without the consent of HGL, but in Purportedly unknown to private respondents, a
blatant violation of its rights as the lessee of the subject cadastral survey of the Municipality of Sta. Magdalena,
property. Thus, these unauthorized activities were Sorsogon, was conducted in 1958. According to the Bureau
detrimental to the business of HGL and will undeniably of Lands, during the said survey, Lot No. 1855 became the
work injustice to HGL. Thus, the CA correctly upheld the subject of Case No. P1s-611-D, Sta. Magdalena Public
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in Land Subdivision; as a result, Free Patent No.
favor of HGL. 459501[10] dated July 24, 1969 was awarded to Defendant
Cerila Gamos on October 27, 1969. Allegedly, the free
ARTICLE 540 patent became the basis for the issuance of OCT No. P-
10548 in her name.

Private respondents claimed to be unaware of these

HEIRS OF GAMOS V HEIRS OF FRANDO developments, as neither she nor her heirs had taken
possession of the disputed portion until 1981. In that year,
Ambrocio Guatno and the other petitioners, who had joined
FACTS: him later, entered the property, gathered its produce and
built their houses thereon.
The subject of the present controversy is a parcel
of agricultural land located in Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon. On August 3, 1988, the heirs of Juliana Frando filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint against
Juliana Frando, respondents predecessor-in-interest, Cerila Gamos and the director of the Bureau of Lands. The
was in possession of the above-described property. Since complainants challenged the validity of Free Patent No.
1925, she had planted several trees and other plants 459501 and OCT No. P-10548. As the plaintiffs therein,
thereon, including coconuts, pili,bananas and they alleged that the Bureau of Lands had no authority to
cacao.[6] Sometime in 1946, the property was traversed by award the patent covering an area it had earlier awarded to
a national road that effectively divided it into two portions, Frando. They further alleged that fraud had attended the
denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855, respectively.[7] The issuance of the subject OCT when Miguel Fungo, an
latter, Lot No. 1855, is the subject of the present employee of the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
controversy. Sorsogon, purportedly forged the signature of Cerila
Gamos in all the documents. Those documents were used
Evident from certified copies of existing records of the in the transfer of the Tax Declaration to her name, as well
Bureau of Lands introduced in evidence is the fact that on as in the application for the issuance of Free Patent No.
February 14, 1952, Frando filed Insular Government 459501 and OCT No. P-10548.
Property Sales (IGPS) Application No. 162 for the parcel in
question. Pursuant thereto, a representative of the Bureau In their Answer, Cerila Gamos and her co-defendants
of Lands inspected the area and found it to be inside an alleged that they had been in actual and open possession
agricultural zone, free from private claims and conflicts. of the land as early as 1952; and that the Bureau of Lands
October 27, 1969 issuance in their favor of a free patent
After the secretary of agriculture appraised the title, which subsequently became the basis of OCT No. P-
property at P240, a notice calling for bids was published. At 10548, was valid and lawful. They pointed out that
the auction sale conducted on April 22, 1955, the only respondents suit to contest a title nineteen years after its
bidder was Frando. On even date she deposited P24, issuance was already barred by prescription.
which represented 10 percent of the appraised value, as
evidenced by Official Receipt (OR) No. 9654851 dated April
22, 1955.
Whether or not the order award given to Juliana Frando has any document or witness to prove their bare
been perfected claim. Moreover, Ambrosio Guatno -- one of
herein petitioners -- testified that he had
II entered the property upon the permission of
Ricardo Galag, an heir of Gamos; later, he
admitted that its true owner was Juliana
Whether or not action of the heirs of Juliana Frando has Frando.
already been barred by laches/prescription

I. Given the full payment of the purchase price

II. As testified to by the Gilda Bongais -- one of
as well as the compliance with all the
Juliana Frandos heirs -- when petitioners first
requirements for the grant of a sales patent,
invaded the property in 1979 by constructing
the Bureau had no reason to deny the
a house thereon, her aunt (Paciencia
issuance of such patent to Frando. Her
Gallenosa) filed an action contesting such
compliance with all the requirements
intrusion. The action was later dropped due to
effectively vested in her and her successors-
the financial burdens of the litigation, definitely
in-interest an equitable title to the property
not because of any concession of rights by
applied for.
private respondents. Thus, the legal inaction
on their part was due, not to their lack of
Thus, when the cadastral survey was
vigilance, but merely to their lack of resources
subsequently conducted in Sta. Magdalena in
to defend their property.
1958, the disputed property -- already held in
private ownership -- was no longer part of the
public domain. The director of lands had no
more authority to grant to a third person a On the witness stand, Guatno himself
patent covering the same tract that had recognized Juliana Frando and her heirs as
already passed to private ownership.[21] Thus, the true owners of the property, even as he
the issuance of the free patent to Cerila admitted that it was Galag -- one of herein
Gamos, insofar as it encroached the portion petitioners -- who had given him permission to
already granted to Frando, had no legal basis erect a house on the land in 1980. Petitioners
at all. possession of the disputed property, based as
it was on mere tolerance, could neither ripen
into ownership nor operate to bar any action
by private respondents to recover absolute
The denial of the sales patent possession thereof
notwithstanding, Juliana Frando is deemed to
have acquired equitable title to the property,
because private respondents adequately
proved during trial her open, continuous, SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C.
exclusive and notorious possession and RECTO, represented by their Attorney-in-fact,
occupation of alienable and disposable land GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC
of the public domain. OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip

Recto and Ester C. Recto, filed with the Regional Trial
Introduced in evidence was a Declaration of Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an application for
Real Property covering the same tract of land. registration of title over a 23,209 square meter
The Declaration had been issued to Basilio lot,[4] designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Frando, father of Juliana Frando, sometime in Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485, situated in Barangay San
1906.[22]Witness accounts[23] of long time Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas,
residents of the adjoining properties under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise
confirmed her possession for a period not known as the Property Registration Decree. They also
later than 1925; and her introduction thereon prayed in the alternative that their petition for registration be
of various trees and other plants, including granted pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or
bananas, cacao, pili and coconuts. the Public Land Act.

They also attested to the continued Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they
possession of the property by Frandos purchased Lot 806 from sisters Rosita Medrana Guevarra
daughter, Salvacion Gimpes; and and Maria Medrana Torres for the amount of
subsequently by her children, herein private P6,943,534.40.[6] The two, in turn, inherited the lot from
respondents. Aside from showing the their deceased parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana.
Order/Award, the children bolstered their Maria, born on October 22, 1917, declared that since 1945,
claim by introducing in evidence several Tax her father was already the owner of Lot 806. She became
Declarations, sketch plans, survey returns aware of her fathers possession of the subject lot in the
and the reports of the court-appointed concept of owner in 1930 when she was 13 years of age.
commissioner. The possession of the subject lot by the Medrana family
prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita,[7]who testified
While asserting possession of the property as that in 1935 when she was 13 years of age, she first came
early as 1952, petitioners have not presented to know that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The
sisters added that during the lifetime of Vicente, he planted notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and
rice and corn on the lot with the help of their tenant. After disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through June 12, 1945 or earlier.
hired farmers.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General decision of the trial court granting the petition for
appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that registration on the ground of petitioners failure to submit in
petitioners failed to (1) offer in evidence the original tracing evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806. Indeed,
cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the the submission of the tracing cloth is a mandatory
period required by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption requirement for registration.[29]However, it was held that
that subject property forms part of the public domain. [19] while the best evidence to identify a piece of land for
registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence
the decision of the trial court on the sole ground of failure to could also provide sufficient identification.
offer in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the
land.[20] In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified
by the blue print copy of the plan (Exhibit R)[33] and the
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying technical description (Exhibit S)[34] thereof both approved by
that in view of their compliance with all the substantive and Land Management Services, DENR. Also, per report of the
procedural requirements for registration, save for the Land Management Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806,
submission of the tracing cloth plan, the case be remanded Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of
to the trial court for the presentation of the said tracing cloth San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of
plan. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, interposed Batangas, is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously
no objection to petitioners motion for reconsideration. approved isolated survey.[35] Petitioners also submitted
before the Court of Appeals a certified true copy[36] of the
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied
original tracing cloth plan as well as a certification [37] from
petitioners motion for reconsideration.[22]Hence, the instant
the Land Registration Authority attesting to the fact that the
petition praying for the remand of the case before the trial
original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester film
is on file with their office. Under the circumstances,
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the
predecessors-in-interest of petitioners, categorically decision of the trial court solely on the ground that
testified that they, and prior to them their father, had been petitioners failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.
cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of Having met all the requirements for registration of title
owners. Maria, having been born on October 22, 1917, and including the presentation of sufficient evidence to identify
Rosita on October 29, 1922, were 13 years of age when the land sought to be registered, there is no more need to
they became aware of their familys possession of Lot 806 remand the case before the trial court for the presentation
in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, they were of the tracing cloth plan.
undoubtedly capable and competent to perceive their
fathers possession of Lot 806 in the concept of owner.
Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be
worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge
below is in a better position to pass judgment on the issue,
having personally heard the witnesses testify and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying, her findings ARTICLE 541
deserve the highest respect.[25]
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the TITONG v. CA
subject lot was for the year 1948 will not militate against
petitioners. Note that said 1948 Tax Declaration cancels a For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the
previous Tax Declaration (No. 26472),[26] thus requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be complied with
substantiating petitioners possession of Lot 806 through meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim,
their predecessor-in-interest even prior to said date. At any encumbrance setting forth the cloud or doubt over the title.
rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[27] it was held that the Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be ejectment,
belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not forcible entry, unlawful detainer, accion reivindicatoria or
necessarily mean that possession by the previous owners accion publiciana.
thereof did not commence in 1945 or earlier. As long as the
testimony supporting possession for the required period is
credible, the court will grant the petition for registration.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable FACTS:
land of the public domain having been released and
certified as such on December 31, 1925. As further certified A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being disputed in
Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants,
agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone; however legal title over the property can only be given to
not within a reservation area nor within a forest zone; and one of them.
does not encroach upon an established watershed,
riverbed, and riverbank protection.[28]Petitioners were thus
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed
able to successfully meet the requisite for original
by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate decided in
registration of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and
favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles
Laurio as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares property of
the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by
Verano, on the east by Bernardo Titong, on the south by
Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered the Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and declared Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful
for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate share in the extrajud settlement, Titong’s share bloated to
occasions, private resps, with their hired laborers, forcibly 2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong
entered a portion of the land containing an approximate encroached upon his property and declared it as part of his
area of 2 hectares and began plowing the same under inheritance.
pretext of ownership. On the other hand, private resps
denied the claim and said that the subject land formed part
of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was
purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo bounded on the north by Verano, on the east by B. Titong,
Espinosa. on the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong.
Laurio also denied that Titong diverted course of the B.
river after he had repurchased the land from Verano
Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner because land was immediately sold to Espinosa thereafter.
asserting that no controversy had sprouted between them
for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The
boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what
remained of Titong’s property was the old Bugsayon river.
When Titong employed Lerit as his tenant, he instructed the ISSUE:
latter to change the course of the old river and direct the Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject
flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of property
Titong’s property, thus converting the old river into a

Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titong’s, The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the
saying that the area and boundaries of disputed land circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC wherein it
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or
to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him, Titong first preventive measure. Under 476, a claimant must show that
declared land for taxation purposes which showed that the there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the proceeding which casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
north by the B. River; on the east by property under upon owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground
ownership by Zaragoza, and on the west by property for filing a complaint for quieting title must be “instrument,
owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”
property to Verano. The latter reacquired the property In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an
pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same. instrument, claim etc be clouded over his property. Through
However, the property remained in Titong’s hands only for his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his
4 days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then became a title were Laurio’s alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
part of the estate of Espinosa’s wife, late Segundina purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action
Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed an “Extrajudicial for forcible entry and not quieting title.
Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale” whereby the
5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for 5,000 pesos. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary
remained exactly the same as those appearing in the name dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when Titong
of Titong’s. sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and
possession ceased and were transferred to Laurio upon its
sale to the latter.
The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the
property. First survey was made by Titong, while the
second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract
court. Because of which, certain discrepancies surfaced. transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold.
Contrary to Titong’s allegation, he was actually claiming Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as
5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos 3918, 3918-A ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in
and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosa’s was left good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5
hectares sold by Titong to him.

Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest

before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and filing a
case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, ARTICLE 546
proceedings of which were suspended because of instant

Jose L. Chua v. CA [G.R. No. 109840. January 21, 1999.]

Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of
his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial
Jose L. Chua and Co Sio Eng were lessees of a Juan Valdez and the heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed an
commercial unit at in Baclaran, Parañaque for 5 years. opposition on lots 2 and 3, respectively. On November 17,
Prior to the expiration of the lease, the parties discussed 1965, the land registration court confirmed the registrable
the possibility of renewing it. They exchanged title of the petitioner. On May 9, 1977, the Court of Appeals
proposal and counterproposal, but they failed to reach reversed the decision and dismissed the Vicar’s application.
agreement. On 24 July 1990, Ramon Ibarra filed a The heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the
complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners in the lots be ordered registered under their names. The Court of
MTC Parañaque, Metro Manila, which rendered a decision, Appeals denied the motion for lack of sufficient merit. Both
giving a period of 2 years extension of occupancy to the parties then came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme
petitioner and Sio ordering them to pay Ibarra back rentals Court, in a minute resolution, denied both petitions. The
and a monthly rental of P10,000.00 thereafter until the heirs filed the instant cases for the recovery and
expiration of extension of their occupancy or until the possession of the lots.
subject premises is actually vacated.
Respondents argue that the petitioner is barred from setting
up the defense of ownership or long and continuous
possession by the prior judgment of the Court of Appeals
On appeal by both parties, the RTC Makati ruled that the under the principle of res judicata. Petitioner contends that
lease was for a fixed period of 5 years and that, upon its
the principle is not applicable because the dispositive
Chua’s and Co Sio continued stay in the premises became portion of the judgment merely dismissed the application for
illegal. The court ordered Chua and Co Sio Eng to vacate registration.
the premises and to turn over possession thereof. Chua
and Co Sio Eng appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the petition Issues:
for review on certiorari.
(1) Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals constitute
res judicata and therefore bars the petitioner from alleging
ownership over the lots

Whether the appellate court erred in ruling the case by (2) Whether the petitioner has acquired the lots through
affirming the decision of the lower court? acquisitive prescription


(1) The Court of Appeals did not positively declare private
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of CA. After the respondents as owners of the land, neither was it declared
lease terminated on 1 January 1990 and without the parties that they were not owners of the land, but it held that the
thereafter reaching any agreement for its renewal, Chua predecessors of private respondents were possessors of
and Co Sio Eng became deforciants subject to ejectment Lots 2 and 3, with claim of ownership in good faith from
from the premises. They are not entitled to a reasonable 1906 to 1951. Petitioner was in possession as borrower in
extension of time to occupy the premises on account of the commodatum up to 1951, when it repudiated the trust by
fact that the lease contract between the parties has already declaring the properties in its name for taxation purposes.
expired, as there was no longer any lease to speak of When petitioner applied for registration of Lots 2 and 3 in
which could be extended. 1962, it had been in possession in concept of owner only
for eleven years. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession for ten years, but always with just title.
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires 30 years. On
Moreover, there is no provision of law which grants the the above findings of facts supported by evidence and
lessee a right of retention over the leased premises on the evaluated by the Court of Appeals, affirmed by this Court,
ground that the lessee made repairs and improvements on We see no error in respondent appellate court's ruling that
the premises. Article 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to said findings are res judicata between the parties. They can
Article 546, which provides for full reimbursement of useful no longer be altered by presentation of evidence because
improvements and retention of the premises until those issues were resolved with finality a long time ago. To
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in ignore the principle of res judicata would be to open the
good faith, i.e. one who builds on a land in the belief that he door to endless litigations by continuous determination of
is the owner thereof. issues without end.

(2) Private respondents were able to prove that their

predecessors' house was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after
the church and the convent were destroyed. They never
asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its
Catholic Vicar Apostolic of the Mountain Province vs. Court free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the
of Appeals, Heirs of Egmidio Octaviano and Juan Valdez
petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the
subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean
Facts: adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee
held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum.
The whole controversy started when the herein petitioner The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it
filed an application for registration of lands 1, 2, 3 and 4 in declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of
La Trinidad, Benguet on September 5, 1962. The heirs of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into
title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of Philippine Realty Corporation (T.C.T. No. 22104) and sold
the absence of just title. by it on 28 November 1956 to plaintiff-appellant John O.
Yu, a Filipino citizen, who obtained T.C.T 11267 in his
Motion for Reconsideration name. In 1945 several persons settled on the property and
constructed houses thereon without mission from, or
Issue: contract with, the Philippine Corporation, then the
registered owner. On various dates thereafter, between
Who is entitled to the possession and ownership of the 1947 and 1952, appellants here brought the houses of
land? those settlers and continued in occupancy thereof without
paying any rents to the owner of the land. In February 1957
Held: plaintiff-appellee advised them in writing to vacate within 30
days, and in view of their refusal filed a complaint of
Pursuant to the said decision in CA-G.R. No. 38830-R, the unlawful detainer within the statutory period of one year.
two lots in question remained part of the public lands. This
is the only logical conclusion when the appellate court
found that neither the petitioner nor private respondents are
entitled to confirmation of imperfect title over said lots. Appellants contend that the Philippine Realty Corporation
Hence, the Court finds the contention of petitioner to be had lost possession of the property by abandonment, under
well taken in that the trial court and the appellate court have
no lawful basis in ordering petitioner to return and surrender Article 555, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code, in failing to take
possession of said lots to private respondents. Said the action against them and showing them lack of interest
property being a public land its disposition is subject to the in said property since they started their occupancy.
provision of the Public Land Act, as amended.

Article 555 of the Civil Code provides as follows:

Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
WON Art.555 is applicable in the case at bar.
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the
provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year.But the real right of possession is not
lost till after the lapse of ten years. HELD:

It is clear that the real right of possession of private No. The circumstances adverted to are insufficient to
respondents over the property was lost or no longer exists constitute abandonment, which requires not only physical
after the lapse of 10 years that petitioner had been in relinquishment of the thing but also a clear intention not to
adverse possession thereof. Thus, the action for recover of
reclaim or reassume ownership or enjoyment thereof. No
possession of said property filed by private respondents
against petitioner must fail. The Court, therefore, finds that possessory rights whatsoever can be recognized in favor of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring appellants, because they are in fact nothing but squatters,
the private respondents to be entitled to the possession who settled on the land without any agreement with the
thereof. Much less can they pretend to be owners thereof. owner paying neither rents to him, nor land taxes to the
Said lots are part of the public domain. government, and who impliedly recognized their squatters'
status by purchasing only the houses built by the original
settlers. Their occupancy of the land was at the owner's
sufference, and their acts were merely tolerated which
JOHN O. YU, plaintiff-appellee, could not affect the owner's possession (Arts. 537 and
vs. 1119, Civil Code).

This is an ejectment case, decided first by the Justice of the

Peace Court of Caloocan and, on appeal, Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch, ordered the defendants "to ARTICLE 559
vacate the premises in petition, to pay the monthly rental of
P115.00 to begin from the time this action was filed up to Ledesma v. CA
the time they the premises, and to pay the costs."
G.R. No. 86051

September 1, 1992.

Lot No. 14, block No. 51-C of the Grace Park subdivision
with an area of 682.5 meters, is the disputed property. It
was originally registered in 1916 (O.C.T. No. 868 of the "ARTICLE 559. The possession of movable property
acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
Registry of Deeds of Rizal), subsequently acquired by the
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully vendee. The subsequent dishonor of the check because of
deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in the alteration merely amounted to a failure of consideration
possession of the same. which does not render the contract of sale void, but merely
allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance
If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner or rescission of the contract, and to prosecute the impostor
has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith for estafa under the RPC.
at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor."

2) NO, article 559 will not apply and Citiwide cannot recover
the car from Ledesma. The petitioner successfully proved
Facts: that he acquired the car in question from his vendor in good
faith and for valuable consideration. Citiwide’s evidence
On September 27, 1977, a person representing himself to was not persuasive enough to establish that petitioner had
be Jojo Consunji, purchased purportedly for his father, knowledge that the car was the object of a fraud and a
Rustico T. Consunji, two brand new motor vehicles (a 1977 swindle and that it did not rebut or contradict petitioner's
Isuzu Gemini and a 1977 Holder Premier) from Citiwide evidence of acquisition for valuable consideration.
Motors, Inc. As payment, Jojo gave Citiwide a Manager's
Check of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank Under article 559, a party who (a) has lost any movable or
dated September 28, 1977 for the amount of P101,000.00. (b) has been unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the
However, upon deposit of the said check, it was dishonored same from the present possessor even if the latter acquired
by the bank on the ground that it was tampered with, the it in good faith. In this case, Citiwide was not unlawfully
correct amount of P101.00 having been raised to deprived of the vehicle and thus, article 559 finds no
P101,000.00. application at all.

Citiwide reported what happened to the police and upon EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP v.
investigation it was learned that the real identity of the SANTOS
wrongdoer/impostor (Jojo Consunji) is Armando Suarez G.R. No. 80298, 26 April 1990
who has a long line of criminal cases against him for estafa
using this similar modus operandi. Eventually, the Holder FACTS:
premier was found abandoned in QC but the Isuzu Gemini Jose Cruz ordered 406 books from EDCA through
was found in the possession of a third party, Jaime telephone, payable on delivery. Cruz issued a
Ledesma. In his defense, Jaime Ledesma claims that he personal
purchased the subject vehicle in good faith from its check covering the purchase price for the books.
registered owner, one Pedro Neyra. Cruz
sold 120 books to Santos who, upon verifying the seller’s
ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him the
purchase price. Upon investigation, EDCA confirmed that
Citiwide then filed a case to recover the vehicle from
Cruz was an impostor and had no intention of paying the
Ledesma. The Trial court ruled in favor of Ledesma, while
books ordered (the check issued bounced). Thus,
the CA ruled in favor of Citiwide, under the pretext of article
559. The respondent court applied 559 on the ground that
the assistance of police, EDCA forcibly seized the books
the car was unlawfully obtained by Suarez since there was
from Santos and threatened her with prosecution
no sale at all because of the alterations on the check.
buying stolen property.
Santos sued for the recovery of the books after demand
for their return was rejected by EDCA. EDCA argued that
pursuant to Article 559 of the Civil Code, it has the right
1) W/N Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of the subject to recover the books since it was unlawfully
vehicles. deprived
2) W/N article 559 shall apply, allowing Citiwide to recover
the car from the the present possessor, Ledesma.
Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books
because the check issued by the impostor in
Held: payment
therefor was dishonored?
1) NO, Citiwide was not unlawfully deprived of the vehicles
and thus, article 559 will NOT apply. There was a perfected
unconditional contract of sale between private respondent RULING:
and the original vendee. The former voluntarily caused the NO. There was no unlawful deprivation of
transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the property, which would entitle the petitioner to recover a
name of the first vendee — even if the said vendee was property from the person possessing it in good
represented by someone who used a fictitious name — and faith.
likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the Actual delivery of the books having been made,
certificate of registration to the vendee's alleged Cruz
representative. Title thereto was forthwith transferred to the acquired ownership over the books, which he could then
validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that
Issue: WON the bank has a better right to the deposits in
he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a
matter Franco’s account.
between him and EDCA and did not impair the
title Held: No. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner
acquired by the private respondents to the books. Non- who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable
payment only creates a right to demand payment or
to to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor,
rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in BPI simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of
case of bouncing checks. But absent the money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly
debited from FMIC’s account and credited to Tevesteco’s,
above noted, delivery of the thing sold will
effectively and subsequently traced to Franco’s account.
transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it
Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
to another
characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case
which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry.
Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand as a

BPI vs Court of Appeals, 538 SCRA 184, GR No. 123498, medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title.
Money, which had been passed through various
November 23, 2007
transactions in the general course of banking business,
Posted by Pius Morados on January 12, 2012 even if of traceable origin, is no exception.

(Negotiable Instruments – Money as a medium of

Aznar Vs. Yapdiangco
Facts: Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI with the total
amount of P2,000,000.00. The said amount used to open
these accounts is traceable to a check issued by
Tevesteco. The funding for the P2,000,000.00 check was
part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI from FMIC’s  Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the
sale of his Ford Fairlane 500.
account (with a deposit of P100,000,000.00) and credited to  After the advertisement, a certain de Dios, claiming
to be the nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the
Tevesteco’s account pursuant to an Authority to Debit
residence of Santos and expressed his uncle’s
which was allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC. intent to purchase the car.
 Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo (son of
Tevesteco effected several withdrawals already from its
Theodoro) who talked with de Dios. On being
account amounting to P37,455,410.54 including the informed, Santos advised his son to see Marella,
which the son did.
P2,000,000.00 paid to Franco.
 Marella expressed his intention to purchase the car.
A deed of sale was prepared and Irineo was
Franco issued two checks which were dishonoured upon instructed by his father not to part with the deed and
the car without receiving the purchase price from
presentment for payment due to garnishment of his account Marella.
filed by BPI.  Upon arriving at the house of Vicente Marella, he
said that his money was short and that he had to
borrow from his sister.
BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which  Marella then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the
supposed house of the sister to obtain the money
consisted of part of the money allegedly fraudulently with an unidentified person.
withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Franco’s  He also asked Irineo to leave the deed to have his
lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella,
account. BPI urges us that the legal consequence of Irineo did as requested.
FMIC’s forgery claim is that the money transferred by BPI  Upon arriving at the house of Marella’s supposed to
be sister, de Dios and the unidentified person then
to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was able to disappeared together with the car. Santos reported
recover possession of the same when the money was the incident to the authorities.
 Thereafter, Marella was able to sell the land to
redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up its Aznar. While in possession of the car, police
ownership thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts. authorities confiscated the same from him.
 Aznar filed an action for replevin (to recover the contemplated by Article 712 of the Civil Code. For then, it
car). Claiming ownership of the vehicle, he prayed would be indisputable that he turned it over to the
for its delivery to him. unidentified companion only so that he may drive Irineo
 In the course of the litigation, however, Teodoro Santos and De Dios to the said place on Azcarraga and not
Santos moved and was allowed to intervene by the to vest the title to the said vehicle to him as agent of
lower court. Vicente Marella. Article 712 above contemplates that the
 Lower court ruled in favor of Teodoro Santos saying act be coupled with the intent of delivering the thing.
that he has been unlawfully deprived of his car and
he retains ownership of the same. Article 559 was applicable in this case (Doctrine of
The lower court was correct in applying Article 559 of the
Issue: Between Teodoro Santos and the plaintiff-appellant, Civil Code to the case at bar, for under it, the rule is to the
Jose B. Aznar, who has a better right to the possession of effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been
unlawfully deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not
the disputed automobile? only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from third
persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such
Held: Teodoro Santos finder, thief or robber.
Article 559 is applicable in this case and not Article The said article establishes two exceptions to the general
1506 which was cited by petitioner Aznar rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the owner (1) has lost
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods has a voidable title the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In
thereto, but his, title has not been voided at the time of the these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as
sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided against the owner, who may recover it without paying any
he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of indemnity, except when the possessor acquired it in a
the seller's defect of title. public sale.
The contention is clearly unmeritorious. Under the Aznar shall suffer the consequences
aforequoted provision, it is essential that the seller should The common law principle that where one of two innocent
have a voidable title at least. It is very clearly inapplicable persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by another, the
where, as in this case, the seller (Marella) had no title at all. law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot
Marella did not have a title over the car because it was be applied in a case which is covered by an express
never delivered to him provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
Vicente Marella sought ownership or acquisition of it by Between a common law principle and a statutory provision,
virtue of the contract. Vicente Marella could have acquired the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction.
ownership or title to the subject matter thereof only by the
delivery or tradition of the car to him.

Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership and other

real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by
law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, and
in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." As
interpreted by this Court in a host of cases, by this
provision, ownership is not transferred by contract merely
but by tradition or delivery. Contracts only constitute titles or
rights to the transfer or acquisition of ownership, while
delivery or tradition is the mode of accomplishing the same.

Delivery vs. Tradition

So long as property is not delivered, the ownership over it is
not transferred by contract merely but by delivery.
Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the transfer or
acquisition of ownership, while delivery or tradition is the
method of accomplishing the same, the title and the method
of acquiring it being different in our law.

The car in question was never delivered to the vendee

by the vendor as to complete or consummate the
transfer of ownership by virtue of the contract
It should be recalled that while there was indeed a contract
of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro Santos, the
former, as vendee, took possession of the subject matter
thereof by stealing the same while it was in the custody of
the latter's son.

There is no adequate evidence on record as to whether

Irineo Santos voluntarily delivered the key to the car to the
unidentified person who went with him and L. De Dios to
the place on Azcarraga where a sister of Marella allegedly
lived. But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the delivery