Hegde 1 

Shane Hegde

William Durham

ANTR - 11SC

October 11, 2010

Building Human Capital in Rural Peru:

The Concrete Foundation Below a Scrap Metal Home

State of Peru:

70,000 died, guerrilla warfare plagued the highlands, and democracy was a dream

only realized in the distant north: This was Peru in the 1980’s.

Drugs, debt, and disconnection flourished during this time of political

reconstruction in Peru, and these troubles bore a

nation starving for a savior. Peruvians longed for

a bridge between the dichotomy of freedom and

stability. They longed for a stalwart leader who

would promise change and deliver a future worth

working toward – a martyr who could grab the Alberto Fujimori brought the 

stability Peruvians longed for 
reigns and steer the country to the top of the world

stage. They longed for a leader like Alberto Fujimori. Conservation and development

were distant initiatives in Peru during this time of political strife; however, on July 28,

1990 with the presidential election of Fujimori, a people finally found their footing and

started making long-lasting social changes (Brooke 2).

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“He gave us a tomorrow,” said Gian Carlos, a native Peruvian who now works as

an ecotourism guide in the Tambopata Region. In line with reintegrating Peru into the

global economic system, conserving Peru’s unparalleled natural resources, and attracting

foreign investors, President Fujimori attempted to

revamp the educational structure of Peru. In fact,

some say that the key to Fujimori’s election was

his promise to provide the poor with schools,

teachers, and textbooks (Brooke 3). The world’s

Tour Guides like Gian Carlos are 
able to live a sustainable lifestyle  agenda for Peru during this period was littered
because of their education 

with plans to protect its unique ecosystems. The

Global North was slowly realizing the immediacy of protecting the Amazon, and key to

this would be building a secure Peru. President Fujimori knew that he needed

infrastructure and quick results to turn around his homeland, and he believed that this

would be rooted in a commitment to developing the rural educational structure. If he

could show progress in educating his populace – building a stronger human capital – than

maybe his citizens would leave gold mining, drug trading, and slash and burn farming for

more sustainable lifestyles (“A New” 9). Education was seen as an escape: A means of

taking a starving populace and bringing them to a long-sighted, ecologically conscious

future.

As a conduit for this change, the World Bank provided Peru with the start-up

capital for building infrastructure. Through two separate loans, the Bank adhered to

requests by President Fujimori, and gave hundreds of millions of dollars to build a

stronger rural education system. Sadly, though, this influx of opportunity did not lead to
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much change because of both President Fujimori’s shortsighted, infrastructure-centered

educational goals and the World Bank’s

failure at monitoring the progress of its loan

(Evaluation). There was no agency monitoring

the results of the newly built infrastructure.

There was no organization orchestrating the

newly built schools. In the end, the Peruvian

The World Bank faces heavy 
Ministry of Education did not change its criticism for its half­hearted aid  

monitoring practices, and failed to take advantage of a populace starving for educational

opportunities. If Peru is to develop with a sustainable future, a future that balances both

conservation and community development, educational outcomes must be a requirement,

not an afterthought.

World Bank Loan:

Founded in 1944, the World Bank works to provide leveraged loans to developing

countries for capital programs. Often criticized as an instrument of the United States

political agenda, the World Bank’s stated goal is to end global poverty (Evaluation).

During the late 90’s, the Bank saw the call for building up conservation efforts in Peru to

protect the Amazon, and hoped that it could create such change through building up the

educational system in the Peru.

In 1995, the World Bank gave a $350 million loan to Peru to expand its rural

education system. This loan, reorganized countless times due to President Fujimori’s

requests, focused on improving primary teaching, and developing a rural secondary

school system. It hoped to meet the immediate educational needs of the citizens, and was
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focused on building schools and buying textbooks, rather than establishing an

administrative educational network (Evaluation). Peruvians called for results, and there

was an air of immediacy pushing President Fujimori to provide as many tangible

outcomes as possible.

Following this sizable loan, the Bank gave $350 million to Peru in 2003 for

further rural developments in education. With Fujimori out of office, the loan was able to

focus more on administrative development, but, again, its emphasis was on expanding

access to rural education. Non-formal preschools were built, centralized secondary

education centers were set up, but administrative needs fell to the wayside. By 2003, the

concrete base was finally poured: Peru could build a rural education system unmatched in

South America, but would the outdated Ministry of Education have enough clout and

funding to administrate this change?

To put the loans in further perspective, it is necessary to examine the impact of

the funds on Peru’s educational budget. In the 1970’s politicians in Peru saw the need to

expand access to rural education. During this time

64% of urban youth completed their secondary

education, while only 24% of rural youth reached

secondary education (Toward 5). Homes were

outposts in the wilderness of the Amazon, and

children had no opportunities other than tilling the

Rural Peru longed for the 
educational systems set up in urban 
centers  field alongside their parents. Collectively, the

World Bank loans worked to provide these

children with more opportunities; and, together, the loans accounted for 6% of the entire
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educational budget. In addition, money from the World Bank accounted for 20% of the

primary educational budget by 2003 (Toward 7). The infusion of this principal was

immense for the capabilities of the Ministry of Education in Peru, and the money led to a

definitive growth in educational centers.

Today, Peru is praised for its growth in rural education spending and enrollment

over the last 30 years. Since the introduction of the World Bank loans, enrollment rates

have risen dramatically and primary education is almost uniform. From UNESCO

(United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) research reports to

Wikipedia pages, Peru is heralded as the top educational system in South America

(Wikipeida). The strategy of the

World Bank and President

Fujimori was to invest in projects

that emphasized the successful

delivery of educational inputs

rather than the delivery of

educational outcomes – schools,

 
textbooks, and teacher training programs were a must, but testing and monitoring was

forgotten amidst the construction. Through this scope they were extremely successful in

building a strong school system in Peru; however, when examining the results of this

system, it is evident that the quality of education in Peru became one of the worst in

South America (Alcazar 36). A concrete foundation was built, but President Fujimori,

along with the World Bank, simply threw a shack home on top of this sturdy base.
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Shortcomings:

To gauge the quality of the education system in Peru, one needs to look no further

than the UNESCO international test scores for Central and South America. In a

standardized test focused on language arts proficiency, Peru’s median score was the third

lowest in this region of the world –

150 points (out of a total 400)

away from the highest national

average (Toward 7). Further, in a

similar test focused on mathematic

competency, Peru students had the

 
worst average score in comparison to all other countries in Latin America.

In the searching for the root of this educational gap, one needs to look no further

than the shortsighted focus of President Fujimori. His insistence on school construction

could have been effective if he complimented it with institutional capacity building, but,

sadly, the Ministry of Education was never examined for reconstruction. Its technical

assistance and information systems simply could not keep up with the broader school

system, and the infrastructure put into place had no administration to lead. These missing

support systems led to both an absence of teacher evaluation and student monitoring.

Most shocking, though, was the growth in teacher absence rates. With no one checking

their progress, teachers stopped showing up for class, and absence rates in Peru’s poorest

and remotest communities reached 16-21%. Furthermore, 40% of these absent teachers

did not provide the school with a reason for their absence (Evaluation). How can a class
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be successful if teachers only show up for a fourth of the school year? How can students

be inspired to expect more from life if their own mentors never show up to class?

The facts are in plain sight; The data graphs a definitive trend. The World Banks

funds were centered on infrastructure building – endeavors promoted by President

Fujimori. They built schools; They trained and hired teachers; but, they failed to set up a

network to monitor the progress of this infrastructure. President Fujimori may have

wanted to center his efforts on building an educational base, but not once during his

tenure in office were there efforts to integrate this base, ensure its effectiveness, and

evaluate its results (Alcazar 40).

Lessons:

Teachers were trained, but there was no one checking to see if they utilized these

skills. Textbooks arrived at the schools, but there were no teachers to educate students on

how to use them In the long run, educational

improvements in Peru will hinge on a cocktail of

factors. From the base, the government must be able

to influence management and teacher behaviors.

The jobless often turn to gold  During the 1990’s the nation set up a wide-reaching

mining as a means of income. This 
practice is one of the most 
detrimental to the environment.  arrangement of educational facilities, but during the

current decade, there has been few attempts to

capitalize upon these beacons of opportunity (Cox 11). The only effective solution is a

decentralized effort to embed resources and responsibilities on district levels. At the turn

of the century, educational outcomes sit on the top of Peru’s education agenda. Low
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student expectations have led to low subject knowledge, and, having now achieved

universal access to schools, Peru must achieve universal access to quality education.

If Peru can raise the quality of its labor force through expending its educated

citizenry, it can help ensure a more sustainable future. A stronger human capital can lead

to more professional options for its populace, and

fewer people will be forced to destroy the

environment in the hopes of preserving their

livelihood. The last ten years have shown some

growth in the Peruvian middle class (Evaluation), a

class whose lives does not hinge on tearing down

A new sunrises in Peru, will today  the precious Amazonian region. With a further
bring a change to its education 
system?  
emphasis on education, this group can continue to

expand, and draw people away from the

shortsighted lifestyle of destruction. The foundation is in place and the scrap metal home

that Peru once called its Ministry of Education is beginning to be refurbished. Peru has

come a long way in the last ten years, President Fujimori laid enough concrete to build a

world leader, and now the time is ripe for results.

 
What will be the quality of their education?  
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Bibliography

"Evaluation of World Bank's Support for Primary Education | Peru." The World Bank.
Web. 07 Sept. 2010. <http://www.worldbank.org/oed/education/peru.html>.

Toward High-quality Education in Peru: Standards, Accountability, and Capacity

Building. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. Print.

Cox, Donald and Emmanuel Jimenez (1990). “The Relative Electiveness of Private and
Public Schools: Evidence from two Developing Countries” Journal of
Development Economics, Vol. 34, No. 1-2 (November).

Brooke, By James. "FUJIMORI ELECTED PERU'S PRESIDENT OVER VARGAS

LLOSA - NYTimes.com." The New York Times - Breaking News, World News &
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"Why Are Teachers Absent? Probing Service Delivery in Peruvian Primary
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Publications. Web. 11 Oct. 2010.
<http://publications.worldbank.org/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=
&products_id=22381>.

"Education in Peru." Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia. Web. 11 Oct. 2010.

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Education_in_Peru>.

Image Citations

1. http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/01/enrique_krauze_on_venezuela_an.htm
2. Shane Hegde
3. http://www.usersidea.com/guides/world-bank-issues-warning-that-increase-in-rates-
will-cause-economic.html
4. Shane Hegde
5. "Evaluation of World Bank's Support for Primary Education | Peru." The World Bank.
Web. 07 Sept. 2010. <http://www.worldbank.org/oed/education/peru.html>.
6. Toward High-quality Education in Peru: Standards, Accountability, and Capacity
Building. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007. Print.
7. Shane Hegde
8. Shane Hegde