KC08803 ETHICS AND LAWS FOR ENGINEERS

ASSIGNMENT 1: DUE 13 NOV, PRESENTATION 13 NOV

8. Engineers are often entrusted with the responsibility of implementing large-scale projects
involving millions of Ringgits. In view of the large amount of money changing hands, the
integrity and ethical standards of engineers are being put to test. What measures can an
engineer take to prevent corruption and unethical practice of cutting corners in order to
safeguard the good image of the engineering profession?

ASSIGNMENT 2: DUE 11 DEC

21. LATE CONFESSION

In 1968, Norm Lewis was a 51-year-old doctoral candidate in history at the University of
Washington.62 While taking his final exam in the program, he excused himself to go to the
bathroom, where he looked at his notes. For the next 32 years, Lewis told no one. At age 83,
he decided to confess, and he wrote to the president of the university admitting that he had
cheated and that he had regretted it ever since.

Commenting on the case, Jeanne Wilson, president of the Center for Academic
Integrity remarked, ‘‘I think there is an important lesson here for students about the costs of
cheating. He has felt guilty all these years, and has felt burdened by this secret, believing that
he never really earned the degree he was awarded.’’ Wilson’s position is that the University
of Washington should not take action against Lewis, given his confession, his age, and the
fact that, after all, he did complete his coursework and a dissertation.

But, she added, ‘‘On the other hand, I think an institution might feel compelled to
revoke the degree if we were talking about a medical or law degree or license, or some other
professional field such as engineering or education, and the individual were younger and still
employed on the basis of that degree or license.’’ Discuss the ethical issues this case raises,
both for Dr. Lewis and for University of Washington officials. Evaluate Jeanne Wilson’s analysis,
especially as it might apply to engineers.
ASSIGNMENT 3: DUE 4 DEC

CASE STUDY: THE TOKAIMURA NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

Nuclear energy is a very sensitive issue in Japan. The aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki at the end of World War II gave the Japanese people firsthand knowledge of
the devastating effects of exposure to nuclear radiation. So, their concerns about nuclear
safety are perhaps even greater than elsewhere in the world. Although Japan is one of the
most industrialized and richest nations in the world, they are energy-resource poor. Virtually
all of the necessary fuel for conventional power plants must be imported. So the use of nuclear
power plants to generate electricity is very attractive to Japan as a means for diversifying their
electrical energy production and reducing reliance on fossil fuel imports. Japan has a very
active nuclear energy research program.

In 1999, three workers at a Japanese nuclear fuel plant were exposed to high doses
of radiation when an accident occurred while they were preparing nuclear reactor fuel. There
were concerns about exposure of the surrounding neighbourhoods to radiation, leading to the
temporary evacuation of 161 people living near the plant. Eventually, two of the workers died
as result of this accident [World Nuclear Association website].

The fuel preparation plant at Tokaimura was owned by Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion
Company (JCO), a subsidiary of the large Sumitomo family of companies. This small plant was
used to process up to 3,000 kg a year of highly enriched uranium (up to 20% U-235) used in
research and experimental reactors. Of utmost importance in any fuel manufacturing process
involving uranium is to avoid criticality. This means preventing the concentration of uranium
from reaching a critical mass and ensuring that conditions do not allow a nuclear chain reaction
to begin. Achieving criticality is what makes a nuclear reactor operate, but it is to be avoided
during the processing of fuel.

As originally designed and approved, the fuel production process called for dissolving
uranium oxide powder in nitric acid in a dissolution tank, transferring this solution to a storage
column where it was mixed with other components, and finally transferring the mixture to a
precipitation tank. Preventing criticality was designed into the fuel production process and the
equipment. For example, the storage column was designed to prevent a nuclear chain reaction
from occurring, and the process had built-in controls to keep the amount of radioactive
material transferred into the precipitation tank below critical levels. Control of the amount of
uranium in the precipitation tank was essential in preventing a critical mass of material in the
final stage of the process.

After a few years of operation, the company modified the fuel production process
without seeking permission from the government authorities in charge of regulating this type
of plant. The changes included dissolving the uranium oxide in stainless steel buckets instead
of in the dissolution tank, having the workers directly tip the solution from the buckets into
the precipitation tank, and using mechanical stirring in the precipitation tank to mix the
materials rather than having this occur in the criticality-safe storage column. Using this new
process, there was no longer any automated control over the amount of material tipped into
the precipitation tank. These changes were made to simplify and speed up the process.

On September 30, 1999, three workers were using the modified procedure to prepare
a batch of fuel enriched to 18.8%. Previously, the new process had only been used for batches
at 5% enrichment, and so criticality was not an issue. As they tipped material into the
precipitation tank, a critical mass was reached and a self-sustaining nuclear fission chain
reaction began. Once this began, intense gamma and neutron radiation was emitted,
triggering alarms. Within five hours of the start of the intense emission, 161 people in the
nearby neighbourhood were evacuated. The criticality continued for approximately 20 hours
and was finally stopped when workers drained water from a cooling sheath around the
precipitation tank (water reflects neutrons, so draining the sheath allowed neutrons to escape
from the tank so they would no longer contribute to keeping the chain reaction going) and
replaced it with a boric acid solution (this absorbs neutrons and ensured that the chain reaction
would not start back up). Although the emission of neutrons ceased, gamma radiation was
still being emitted.

There was only a slight release of radioactive material outside the tank and outside
the environs of the plant, so the Japanese government classified this as a Level 4 accident,
based on the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) created by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Level 4 means that the event is an irradiation accident rather than a
contamination accident. The IAEA attributed the accident to human error and breaches of
accepted safety procedures. JCO admitted that it had violated normal safety procedures and
had violated laws related to radiation safety. The plant’s operating license was revoked in
2000. Ultimately, all three of the workers originally exposed to the radiation became very ill,
and two of them died. In addition, other workers were exposed to radiation and became sick
as well, although none died.
 It would be easy to simply attribute this accident to “human error.” However, there
are other errors here as well: management, regulatory, and engineering. Management at JCO
was responsible for allowing the changes in the process to take place without proper analysis
and without regard for the potential consequences of these changes. Although the plant
received twice-annual inspections from the Japanese regulatory agency with authority over
nuclear materials processing, evidently these visits were not thorough enough. Indeed, it was
reported that none of these regulatory visits occurred while fuel processing was actually taking
place. Engineering errors occurred through insufficient oversight of changes that had been
made to the enrichment process and failure to foresee the consequences of these changes.
Basically, the corporate safety and corporate ethics culture within JCO was insufficient to
ensure the protection of its workers and the people living near its plant.

What responsibility do engineers have for this accident? Engineers would have been
involved in all aspects of the decision making that led to this accident. JCO employed engineers
both in the design of the fuel production process and in the design of the associated processing
equipment. JCO also had engineers employed in management positions related to this plant.
Finally, engineers worked for the nuclear regulatory agency in Japan that had oversight over
the Tokaimura plant.