Republic of the Philippines against Stronghold on the basis of the aforementioned surety bond and prayed for the
SUPREME COURT value thereof plus attorney's fees and litigation costs.
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88050 January 30, 1992
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ADRIANO URTESUELA, respondents.
T.J. Sumawang & Associates for petitioner.
Linsangan Law Office for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner invokes due process to escape liability on a surety bond executed for the
protection of a Filipino seaman. It is a familiar argument that will be denied, in light of the
following findings.
Acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar National Fishing Co., Pan Asian Logistics
and Trading, a domestic recruiting and placement agency, hired Adriano Urtesuela as
captain of the vessel M/V Oryx for the stipulated period of twelve months. The required
surety bond, in the amount of P50,000.00, was submitted by Pan Asian and Stronghold
Insurance Co., Inc., the herein petitioner, to answer for the liabilities of the employer.
Urtesuela assumed his duties on April 18, 1982, but three months later his services were
terminated and he was repatriated to Manila. He thereupon filed a complaint against Pan
Asian and his former employer with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
for breach of contract and damages.
In due time, the POEA rendered a decision in his favor for the amount of P6,374.94,
representing his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract and the cash value of
his unused vacation leave, plus attorney's fees and costs, which the respondents were
required to pay. The judgment eventually became final and executory, not having been
appealed on time. Pursuant thereto, a writ of execution was issued against Pan Asian
but could be enforced only against its cash bond of P10,000.00, the company having
ceased to operate. Urtesuela then filed a complaint with the Insurance Commission
Under the bond, the petitioner and Pan Asian undertook —
To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration may adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection
with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.
It is understood that notice to the Principal is notice to the surety. (Exh. "I-
2").
WHEREAS, the liability of the surety under this Bond shall in no case
exceed the sum of PESOS: FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000.00)
Philippine Currency.
After hearing, the Insurance Commission held that the complaint should be reformed
because the provisions in the surety bond were not stipulations pour autrui to entitle
Urtesuela to bring the suit himself. It held that the proper party was the POEA. 1 This
ruling was reversed on appeal by the respondent court in its decision dated April 20,
1989. 2 It was there declared that, as the actual beneficiary of the surety bond, Urtesuela
was competent to sue Stronghold, which as surety was solidarily liable with Pan Asian
for the judgment rendered against the latter by the POEA.
The petitioner asks for reversal of the Court of Appeals. It submits that the decision of the
POEA is not binding upon it because it was not impleaded in the complaint; it was not
notified thereof nor did it participate in the hearing; and it was not specifically directed to
pay the damages awarded to the complainant.
In support of its posture, the petitioner cites abundant jurisprudence, particularly Aguasin
v. Velasquez, 3 where the Court held:
If the surety is to be bound by his undertaking, it is essential according to
Section 10 of Rule 62 in connection with Section 20 of Rule 59 of the
Rules of Court that the damages be awarded upon application and after
proper hearing and included in the judgment. As a corollary to these
requirements, due notice to the plaintiff and his surety setting forth the
facts showing his right to damages and the amount thereof under the
bond is indispensable. This has to be so if the surety is not to be
condemned or made to pay without due process of law. It is to be kept in
mind that the surety in this case was not a party to the action and had no
notice of or intervention in the trial. It seems elementary that before being
condemned to pay, it was the elementary right of the surety to be heard
 and to be informed that the party seeking indemnity would hold it liable
and was going to prove the grounds and extent of its liability. This case is
different from those in which the surety, by law and/or by the terms of his
contract, has promised to abide by the judgment against the principal and
renounced the right to be sued or cited.
The Court has gone over the decision and finds that the petitioner is "hoist by its own
petard." For as the quoted excerpt itself says, the case is "different from those in which
the surety, by law and/or by the terms of his contract, has promised to abide by the
judgment against the principal and renounced the right to be sued or cited."
In the surety bond, the petitioner unequivocally bound itself:
To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration may adjudge/impose against the Principal in connection
with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.
Strictly interpreted, this would mean that the petitioner agreed to answer for whatever
decision might be rendered against the principal, whether or not the surety was
impleaded in the complaint and had the opportunity to defend itself. There is nothing in
the stipulation calling for a direct judgment against the surety as a co-defendant in an
action against the principal. On the contrary, the petitioner agreed "to answer for all
liabilities" that "might be adjudged or imposed by the POEA against the Principal."
But even if this interpretation were rejected, considering the well-known maxim that "the
surety is a favorite of the law," the petitioner would still have to explain its other
agreement that "notice to the Principal is notice to the surety." This was in fact another
special stipulation typewritten on the printed form of the surety bond prepared by the
petitioner. Under this commitment, the petitioner is deemed, by the implied notice, to
have been given an opportunity to participate in the litigation and to present its side, if it
so chose, to avoid liability. If it did not decide to intervene as a co-defendant (and
perhaps also as cross-claimant against Pan Asian), it cannot be heard now to complain
that it was denied due process.
The petitioner contends, however, that the said stipulation is unconstitutional and
contrary to public policy, because it is "a virtual waiver" of the right to be heard and
"opens wide the door for fraud and collusion between the principal and the bond obligee"
to the prejudice of the surety. Hence, disregarding the stipulation, the petitioner should
be deemed as having received no notice at all of the complaint and therefore deprived of
the opportunity to defend itself.
The Court cannot agree. The argument assumes that the right to a hearing is absolute
and may not be waived in any case under the due process clause. This is not correct. As
a matter of fact, the right to be heard is as often waived as it is invoked, and validly as
long as the party is given an opportunity to be heard on his behalf.4
The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not availed of does not disparage that
opportunity and deprive the person of the right to due process. This Court has
consistently held in cases too numerous to mention that due process is not violated
where a person is not heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be
heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be silent where he has a right to speak, he
cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced.
Neither is public policy offended on the wicked ground of fraud and collusion imagined by
the petitioner. For one thing, the speculation contravenes without proof the presumption
of good faith and unreasonably imputes dishonest motives to the principal and the
obligee. For another, it disregards the fiduciary relationship between the principal and the
surety, which is the legal and also practical reason why the latter is willing to answer for
the liabilities of the former.
In a familiar parallel, notice to the lawyer is considered notice to the client he represents
even if the latter is not actually notified. It has not been suspected that this arrangement
might result in a confabulation between the counsel and the other party to the client's
prejudice.
At any rate, it is too late now for the petitioner to challenge the stipulation. If it believed
then that it was onerous and illegal, what it should have done was object when its
inclusion as a condition in the surety bond was required by the POEA. Even if the POEA
had insisted on the condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the
petitioner from refusing altogether to issue the surety bond. The petitioner did neither of
these. The fact is that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the end filed the surety
bond with the suggested condition. The consequence of its submission is that it cannot
now argue that it is not bound by that condition because it was coerced into accepting it.
This Court has always been receptive to complaints against the denial of the right to be
heard, which is the very foundation of a free society. This right is especially necessary in
the court of justice, where cases are decided after the parties shall have been given an
opportunity to present their respective positions, for evaluation by the impartial judge.
Nevertheless, a party is not compelled to speak if it chooses to be silent. If it avails itself
of the right to be heard, well and good; but if not, that is also its right. In the latter
situation, however, it cannot later complain that, because it was not heard, it was
deprived of due process.
Worthy of consideration also is the private respondent's contention that he sought to
enforce the petitioner's liability not in NSB Case No. 3810-82 as decided by the POEA,
but in another forum. What he did was file an independent action for that purpose with
the Insurance Commission on the basis of the surety bond which bound the petitioner to
answer for whatever liabilities might be adjudged against Qatar National Fishing Co. by
the POEA. In the proceedings before the Commission, the petitioner was given full
opportunity (which it took) to present its side, in its answer with counterclaim to the
complaint, in its testimony at the hearings, in its motion to dismiss the complaint, and in
its 10-page memorandum. There is absolutely no question that in that proceeding, the
petitioner was actually and even extensively heard.

The surety bond required of recruitment agencies 5 is intended for the protection of our
citizens who are engaged for overseas employment by foreign companies. The purpose
is to insure that if the rights of these overseas workers are violated by their employers,
recourse would still be available to them against the local companies that recruited them
for the foreign principal. The foreign principal is outside the jurisdiction of our courts and
would probably have no properties in this country against which an adverse judgment
can be enforced. This difficulty is corrected by the bond, which can be proceeded against
to satisfy that judgment.

Given this purpose, and guided by the benign policy of social justice, we reject the
technicalities raised by the petitioner against its established legal and even moral liability
to the private respondent. These technicalities do not impair the rudiments of due
process or the requirements of the law and must be rejected in deference to the
constitutional imperative of justice for the worker.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals AFFIRMED in toto. The respondent court is directed to ENFORCE payment to
the private respondent in full, and with all possible dispatch of the amount awarded to
him by the POEA in its decision dated May 13, 1983. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines The contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by
SUPREME COURT his Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator. On
Manila March 30, 1983, while he was working as a crusher plant operator, private respondent's
right ankle was crushed under the machine he was operating.
THIRD DIVISION
On May 15, 1983, after the expiration of the renewed term, private respondent returned
G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988 to the Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center
for which he incurred expenses.
MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY, petitioners,
vs. On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi Arabia to resume his work. On May
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS 15,1984, he was repatriated.
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES, respondents.
Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.
Demetria Reyes, Merris & Associates for petitioners.
On the basis of the provision in the employment contract that the employer shall
The Solicitor General for public respondents. compensate the employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in the course of
employment, private respondent filed a claim, docketed as POEA Case No. 84-09847,
Bayani G. Diwa for private respondent. against petitioner with respondent Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. On
April 10, 1986, the POEA rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant

CORTES, J.:
and against the respondent, ordering the latter to pay to the complainant:
Petitioner, in this special civil action for certiorari, alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor
Relations Commission in an effort to nullify the latters resolution and thus free petitioner from liability for the disability 1. SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and
suffered by a Filipino worker it recruited to work in Saudi Arabia. This Court, however, is not persuaded that such an abuse
of discretion was committed. This petition must fail.
60/100 (P7,985.60), Philippine currency, representing disability benefits;

The facts of the case are quite simple. 2. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX Philippine pesos and 20/100
(29,096.20) representing reimbursement for medical expenses;
Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi
Group, a Saudi Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to work in Saudi Arabia as a 3. Ten percent (10%) of the abovementioned amounts as and for
steelman. attorney's fees. [NLRC Resolution, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16].

The term of the contract was for one year, from May 15,1981 to May 14, 1982. However, On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA in a resolution dated
the contract provided for its automatic renewal: December 12, 1986.

FIFTH: The validity of this Contract is for ONE YEAR commencing from
the date the SECOND PARTY assumes hill port. This Contract is
renewable automatically if neither of the PARTIES notifies the other
PARTY of his wishes to terminate the Contract by at least ONE MONTH
prior to the expiration of the contractual period. [Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo,
pp. 7-8].
Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA, petitioner instituted the instant special civil
action for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
1. Petitioner claims that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that
petitioner was liable to private respondent for disability benefits since at the time he was
injured his original employment contract, which petitioner facilitated, had already expired.
Further, petitioner disclaims liability on the ground that its agency agreement with the
Saudi principal had already expired when the injury was sustained.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention.
Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14,
1982 as it was automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by
either or both of the parties at least a month before its expiration, as so provided in the
contract itself. Therefore, private respondent's injury was sustained during the lifetime of
the contract.
A private employment agency may be sued jointly and solidarily with its foreign principal
for violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment.— Before recruiting any worker,
the private employment agency shall submit to the Bureau the following
documents:
(a) A formal appointment or agency contract executed by a foreign-based
employer in favor of the license holder to recruit and hire personnel for
the former ...
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued jointly and
solidarily with the principal or foreign-based employer for
any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment. [Section 10(a) (2) Rule V, Book
I, Rules to Implement the Labor Code].
Thus, in the recent case of Ambraque International Placement & Services v. NLRC [G.R.
No. 77970, January 28,1988], the Court ruled that a recruitment agency was solidarily
liable for the unpaid salaries of a worker it recruited for employment in Saudi Arabia.
Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal had already severed their agency
agreement at the time private respondent was injured, petitioner may still be sued for a
violation of the employment contract because no notice of the agency agreement's
termination was given to the private respondent:
Art 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the purpose of contra with
specified persons, its revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they were
not given notice thereof. [Civil Code].
In this connection the NLRC elaborated:
Suffice it to state that albeit local respondent M. S. Catan Agency was at
the time of complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial
disability was (sic) no longer the accredited agent of its foreign principal,
foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibility over the proper
implementation of complainant's employment/service contract and the
welfare of complainant himself in the foreign job site, still existed, the
contract of employment in question not having expired yet. This must be
so, because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement
entered into by and between the local agent and its foreign principal are
not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of
the parties decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such
parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at
all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed
pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render
nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of
workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. [NLRC Resolution, p. 4;
Rollo, p. 18]. (Emphasis supplied).
2. Petitioner contends that even if it is liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it affirmed the award of medical expenses when the said
expenses were the consequence of private respondent's negligence in returning to work
in Saudi Arabia when he knew that he was not yet medically fit to do so.
Again, there is no merit in this contention.
No evidence was introduced to prove that private respondent was not medically fit to
work when he returned to Saudi Arabia. Exhibit "B", a certificate issued by Dr. Shafquat
Niazi, the camp doctor, on November 1, 1983, merely stated that private respondent was
"unable to walk properly, moreover he is still complaining [of] pain during walking and
different lower limbs movement" [Annex "B", Reply; Rollo, p. 51]. Nowhere does it say
that he was not medically fit to work.
Further, since petitioner even assisted private respondent in returning to work in Saudi
Arabia by purchasing his ticket for him [Exhibit "E"; Annex "A", Reply to Respondents'
Comments], it is as if petitioner had certified his fitness to work. Thus, the NLRC found:
Furthermore, it has remained unrefuted by respondent that complainant's
subsequent departure or return to Saudi Arabia on September 9, 1983
was with the full knowledge, consent and assistance of the former. As
 shown in Exhibit "E" of the record, it was respondent who facilitated the
travel papers of complainant. [NLRC Resolution, p. 5; Rollo, p. 19].

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with
costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78085 October 16, 1989
ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSI0N and VIRGILIO P.
NACIONALES, respondents.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
Acosta & Rico Law Offices for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the nullification of a resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed a decision of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) holding it liable to pay, jointly and
severally with Zamel-Turbag Engineering and Architectural Consultant (ZAMEL), private
respondent Virgilio P. Nacionales' salary and vacation pay corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his employment contract with ZAMEL.
In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed
private respondent for employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi
Arabia. On May 25, 1983, a service agreement was executed by private respondent and
ZAMEL whereby the former was to receive per month a salary of US$500.00 plus
US$100.00 as allowance for a period of one (1) year commencing from the date of his
arrival in Saudi Arabia. Private respondent departed for Saudi Arabia on June 28,1983.
On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the
ground that his performance was below par. For three (3) successive days thereafter, he
was detained at his quarters and was not allowed to report to work until his exit papers
were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane bound for the
Philippines.
Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a complaint for illegal termination against
petitioner and ZAMEL with the POEA, docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 84-04-401.
Based on a finding that petitioner and ZAMEL failed to establish that private respondent
was terminated for just and valid cause, the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office
of the POEA issued a decision dated June 23, 1986 signed by Deputy Administrator and
Officer-in-Charge Crescencio M. Siddayao, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant
and against respondents, ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally,
to complainant the following amounts:
1. TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY US DOLLARS
(US$2,640.00) or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of
payment, representing the salaries corresponding to the unexpired
portion of complainant's contract;
2. SIX HUNDRED US DOLLARS (US$ 600.00) less partial payment of
FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT SAUDI RIYALS (SR558), or its
equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of actual payment,
representing the unpaid balance of complainant's vacation pay;
3. THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS (US$350.00) or its
equivalent in Philippine currency at the time of actual payment
representing reimbursement of salary deductions for return travel fund;
4. Ten percent (10%) of the above-stated amounts, as and for attorney's
fees.
Complainant's claim for legal and transportation expenses are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[POEA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34.]
On July 18, 1986, petitioner filed thru its new counsel a motion for reconsideration which
was treated as an appeal to the NLRC by the POEA. Petitioner alleged that the POEA
erred in holding it solidarity liable for ZAMEL's violation of private respondent's service
agreement even if it was not a party to the agreement.
In a resolution promulgated on December 11, 1986, the NLRC affirmed the POEA
decision, holding that, as a duly licensed private employment agency, petitioner is jointly
and severally liable with its foreign principal ZAMEL for all claims and liabilities which
may arise in connection with the implementation of the employment contract or service
agreement [NLRC Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 26-27].
On March 30, 1987, the NLRC denied for lack of merit petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition captioned as "Petition for Review".
At this point, it is not amiss to note that the filing of a "Petition for Review" under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court is not the proper means by which NLRC decisions are appealed to
the Supreme Court. It is only through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 that NLRC
decisions may be reviewed and nullified on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in the
interest of justice, this Court opted to treat the instant petition as if it were a petition
for certiorari. Thus, after the filing of respondents' comments, petitioner's joint reply
thereto, and respondents' rejoinders, the Court resolved to consider the issues joined
and the case submitted for decision.
The case at bar involves two principal issues, to wit:
I. Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held
jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim
which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad;
II. Whether or not sufficient evidence was presented by petitioner to
establish the termination of private respondent's employment for just and
valid cause.
I.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for the "third-party liability" of an
employment agency or recruiting entity for violations of an employment agreement
performed abroad, or designates it as the agent of the foreign-based employer for
purposes of enforcing against the latter claims arising out of an employment agreement.
Therefore, petitioner concludes, it cannot be held jointly and severally liable with ZAMEL
for violations, if any, of private respondent's service agreement.
Petitioner's conclusion is erroneous. Petitioner conveniently overlooks the fact that it had
voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the various contractual undertakings it
submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying for its license to operate a
private employment agency for overseas recruitment and placement, petitioner was
required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it
assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of
the contracts of employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas
employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book 1, Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)].
It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency contract
executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the
former, which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and
solidarily with the foreign principal for any of the violations of the recruitment agreement
and the contracts of employment [Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V, Book I of the Rules to
Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. Petitioner was required as well to post such cash and
surety bonds as determined by the Secretary of Labor to guarantee compliance with
prescribed recruitment procedures, rules and regulations, and terms and conditions of
employment as appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978) amending Article 31 of
the Labor Code].
These contractual undertakings constitute the legal basis for holding petitioner, and other
private employment or recruitment agencies, liable jointly and severally with its principal,
the foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by recruited workers which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the service agreements or employment contracts
[See Ambraque International Placement and Services v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77970,
January 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 431; Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77279, April 15, 1988, 160
SCRA 691; Alga Moher International Placement Services v. Atienza, G.R. No. 74610,
September 30, 1988].
In a belated attempt to bolster its position, petitioner contends in its joint reply that the
omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code are invalid for not having been published in
the Official Gazette pursuant to the Court's pronouncements in the cases of Tanada v.
Tuvera [G.R. No. 63915, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 27; December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA
446]. Petitioner further contends that the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations, in
particular Section 1, Rule I of Book VII** quoted in the NLRC decision, should not have been retroactively
applied to the case at bar.
But these contentions are irrelevant to the issues at bar. They proceed from a
misapprehension of the legal basis of petitioner's liabilities as a duly licensed private
employment agency. It bears repeating that the basis for holding petitioner jointly and
severally liable with the foreign-based employer ZAMEL is the contractual undertakings
described above which it had submitted to the Bureau of Employment Services. The
sections of the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code cited by this Court merely
enumerate the various documents or undertakings which were submitted by petitioner as
applicant for the license to operate a private employment agency for overseas
recruitment and placement. These sections do not create the obligations and liabilities of
a private employment agency to an employee it had recruited and deployed for work
overseas. It must be emphasized again that petitioner assumed the obligations and
liabilities of a private employment agency by contract. Thus, whether or not the omnibus
rules are effective in accordance with Tanada v. Tuvera is an issue the resolution of
which does not at all render nugatory the binding effect upon petitioner of its own
contractual undertakings.
The Court, consequently, finds it unnecessary to pass upon both the implications
of Tanada v. Tuvera on the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code as well as the
applicability of the 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations.
Petitioner further argues that it cannot be held solidarily liable with ZAMEL since public
respondent had not acquired jurisdiction over ZAMEL through extra-territorial service of
summons as mandated by Section 17, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
This argument is untenable. It is well-settled that service upon any agent of a foreign
corporation, whether or not engaged in business in the Philippines, constitutes personal
service upon that corporation, and accordingly, judgment may be rendered against said
foreign corporation [Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa, G.R. No. L-38649,
March 26, 1979, 89 SCRA 131]. In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that petitioner is
an agent of ZAMEL. The service agreement was executed in the Philippines between
private respondent and Milagros G. Fausto, the General Manager of petitioner, for and in
behalf of ZAMEL [Annex "D" of Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 37]. Moreover, one of the
documents presented by petitioner as evidence, i.e., the counter-affidavit of its General
Manager Ms. Fausto, contains an admission that it is the representative and agent of
ZAMEL [See Paragraph No. 1 of Annex "H" of Petition; Rollo. p. 43].
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring petitioner jointly and
severally liable with its foreign principal ZAMEL for all claims which have arisen in
connection with the implementation of private respondent's employment contract.
II.
Petitioner asserts that the NLRC failed to consider the overwhelming evidence it had
presented before the POEA which establishes the fact that private respondent was
terminated for just and valid cause in accordance with his service agreement with
ZAMEL.
This assertion is without merit. The NLRC upheld the POEA finding that petitioner's
evidence was insufficient to prove termination from employment for just and valid cause.
And a careful study of the evidence thus far presented by petitioner reveals to this Court
that there is legal basis for public respondent's conclusion.
It must be borne in mind that the basic principle in termination cases is that the burden of
proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for just and valid cause, and
failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was not justified and,
therefore, was illegal [Polymedic General Hospital v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64190, January 31,
1985,134 SCRA 420; and also Article 277 of the Labor Code]. And where the termination
cases involve a Filipino worker recruited and deployed for overseas employment, the
burden naturally devolves upon both the foreign-based employer and the employment
agency or recruitment entity which recruited the worker, for the latter is not only the agent
of the former, but is also solidarily liable with its foreign principal for any claims or
liabilities arising from the dismissal of the worker.
In the case at bar, petitioner had indeed failed to discharge the burden of proving that
private respondent was terminated from employment for just and valid cause. Petitioner's
evidence consisted only of the following documents:
(1) A letter dated May l5, 1984 allegedly written by an official of ZAMEL,
stating that a periodic evaluation of the entire staff was conducted; that
the personnel concerned were given a chance to improve; that
complainant's performance was found below par; and that on February
13,1984, at about 8:30 AM, complainant was caught on the way out of
the office to look for another job during office hours without the
permission of his supervisor;
(2) A telex message allegedly sent by employees of ZAMEL, stating that
they have not experienced maltreatment, and that the working conditions
(in ZAMEL) are good;
(3) The signatures of fifteen (15) persons who allegedly sent the telex
message;
(4) A receipt dated February 16, 1984 signed by complainant, stating that
he was paid SR915 representing his salary and SR558, representing
vacation pay for the month of February 1984;
(5) The counter-affidavit of Milagros G. Fausto, the General Manager of
Royal Crown, stating that complainant was dismissed because of poor
performance, acts of dishonesty and misconduct, and denying
complainant's claim that his salary and leave pay were not paid, and that
he was maltreated [See POEA Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 32, See also
Annexes "E", "F", "F-1 ", "G" and "H" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 38-43].
Certainly, the telex message supposedly sent by the employees of ZAMEL is not
relevant in the determination of the legality of private respondent's dismissal. On the
other hand, the receipt signed by private respondent does not prove payment to him of
the salary and vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract.
More importantly, except for its allegation that private respondent was caught on
February 13,1984 on his way out of the office compound without permission, petitioner
had failed to allege and to prove with particularity its charges against private respondent.
The letter dated May 15, 1984 allegedly written by the Actg. Project Architect and the
counter-affidavit of petitoner's General Manager merely stated that the grounds for the
employee's dismissal were his unsatisfactory performance and various acts of
dishonesty, insubordination and misconduct. But the particular acts which would indicate
private respondent's incompetence or constitute the above infractions were neither
specified nor described therein. In the absence of any other evidence to substantiate the
general charges hurled against private respondent, these documents, which comprise
petitioner's evidence in chief, contain empty and self-serving statements insufficient to
establish just and valid cause for the dismissal of private respondent [See Euro-Lines,
Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782, December 1, 1987,156 SCRA 78; Ambraque
International Placement and Services v. NLRC, supra].
jurisprudence dealing with the principle of due process and the basic right of all Filipino
workers to security of tenure, provide the standard by which the legality of the exercise
by management of its prerogative to dismiss incompetent, dishonest or recalcitrant
employees, is to be determined. Whether employed locally or overseas, all Filipino
workers enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor and social legislation, contract
stipulations to the contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is in keeping with the
basic public policy of the State to afford protection to labor, promote full employment,
ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. For the State assures the basic rights of all
workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and
humane conditions of work [Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines; See
also Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is
likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the Civil Code which states that laws "which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determination or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country."
Needless to say, the laws of Saudi Arabia which were, incidentally, neither pleaded nor
proved by petitioner, have absolutely no bearing whatsoever to the case at bar.

The Court is aware of the document attached in petitioner's manifestation and joint reply
which is purportedly a xerox copy of a statement executed on December 13, 1987 in
Saudi Arabia by private respondent claiming that the latter had settled the case with
ZAMEL and had "received all [his] benefits that is salary, vacation pay, severance pay
and all other bonuses before [he] left the kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 13 Feb. 1984 and
hereby indemnify [ZAMEL] from any claims or liabilities, [he] raised in the Philippine
Courts" [Annex "A" of petitioner's Manifestation with Motion to hold in Abeyance; Rollo, p.
82. And also Annex "A" of petitioner's Joint Reply; Rollo, p. 111].
The Court holds, therefore, that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the POEA's finding of
insufficiency of evidence to prove termination for just and valid cause.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition.
SO ORDERED.

But the veracity of the contents of the document is precisely disputed by private
respondent. He claims that he was made to sign the above statement against his will and
under threat of deportation [See Telex of private respondent received by the Supreme
Court of the Philippines on January 14,1988; Rollo, p. 83. And also private respondent's
Rejoinder, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 139-141].

Petitioner finally contends that inasmuch as clause no. 13 of the service agreement
provided that the law under which the agreement shall be regulated was the laws of
Saudi Arabia [Annex "D" of Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 36], public respondent should have
taken into account the laws of Saudi Arabia and the stricter concept of morality availing
in that jurisdiction for the determination of the legality of private respondent's dismissal.

This contention is patently erroneous. The provisions of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, its implementing rules and regulations, and doctrines laid down in
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109583. September 5, 1997]
TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR,
JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG,
VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA
LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN
ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO,NITA BUSTAMANTE,
CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA
PANAGUITON, VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA
ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR,
NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS,
MARJORIE MACATE,RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE
SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO,
LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA
NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL,
SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the
Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or
revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action
Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency,
scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in
Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic
helpers through petitioners employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur
Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement fees
ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy
them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were
constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of
Articles 32 and 34(a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
[1]
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected
from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to
pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were
not authorized to collect fees from the applicants. Accordingly, it
cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner
maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to
unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified
that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from
respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the
payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment
abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of
petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that
she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot
stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants. Manliclic,
however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who
instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to
collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor
rendered the assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and
severally, the following claims:
1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00
4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00
5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00
6. Elma Flores 2,500.00
7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00
8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00
9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00
11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00
12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00
17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00
18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00
19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00
20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00
21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00
22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00
23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00
24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00
27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00
28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00
29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00
30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00
31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00
32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00
33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00
The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo
are hereby dismissed in view of their desistance.
The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to
appear/prosecute:
1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante
2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar
3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe
4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon
5. Virginia Castroverde
The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack
of evidence:
1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso
2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of
Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding
suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months.Considering
however, that under the schedule of penalties, any suspension amounting to
a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of
cancellation, the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS
CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment
of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED. (Underscoring supplied)
[2]
On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting
of Order of Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny it
the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would
jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals,
but also the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers
scheduled to leave for their respective assignments. Finally, it
manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the
claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor
provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioners license pending
resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On
January 30, 1992, however, petitioners motion for reconsideration was
eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order
revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted with grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative
grounds, viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original
jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the
authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order
based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding
its registration with the U.P. Law Center.
Under Executive Order No. 797 (E.O. No. 797) and Executive
[3]
Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247), the POEA was established and
[4]
mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment
Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and
the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment
Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the
powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended,
was rendered ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of
Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended,
which provides:
ART. 35. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. - The
Minister of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or
authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and
rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, viz.: [9]

Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for

violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or
and Letters of Instructions. entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the
Labor, we held that:
[5]
Secretary. (Underscoring supplied)

The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are In view of the Courts disposition on the matter, we rule that the
prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others. And power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the
these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,
As regards petitioners alternative argument that the non-filing of
but also to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and
the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center
implement the provisions governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-
rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for
making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, on its
[6]

penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesors explanation, to

own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for
wit:
investigation by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the
necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties
authority of any agency or entity for certain enumerated offenses including - was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended. The same
merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of
regulations of the POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore
money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed
(sic). Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains only a listing of
by the Administration, and
offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations governing
overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other
imposable by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.
relevant laws, rules and regulations.[7]

Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency

The Administrator was also given the power to order the dismissal
of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on
respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the
Schedule of Penalties. [10]
cancellation thereof. (Underscoring supplied)
[8]
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of
Republic of the Philippines
Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SUPREME COURT
Manila
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Puno Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., EN BANC
concur.
G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:

This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of
arrest and seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

The facts are as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza,

Pasay City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner
Hortencia Salazar, viz:

04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon

ay narito at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.

S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay

ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. — Horty
Salazar — 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
 05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and
ginawang panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang
pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag
niya ako. Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing
hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako
sa Phils. ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat
ako ng ibang
company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and
PECC Card
ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to
whom said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following
telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE
FERDIE MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA
COR. ORTIGAS AVE. MANDALUYONG MM ON
NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE CASE FILED
AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license
to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas
D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER
NO. 1205 which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal
prosecution under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November,
1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty.
Estelita B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty.
Marquez, Atty. Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a
team tasked to implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing
so, the group assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito
Castillo of the People's Journal and Ernie Baluyot of News Today
proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner was
operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team
served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar
who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar
informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with
Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required to show
credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team
chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and
saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted
costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and
witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her
residence last January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground
that said seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner
thereof. Among our reasons are the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or
hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205
dated November 3, 1987 violates "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine
Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine
Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and
five (5) others (including 2 policemen) are the private
residence of the Salazar family, and the entry, search as
well as the seizure of the personal properties belonging to
our client were without her consent and were done with
unreasonable force and intimidation, together with grave
abuse of the color of authority, and constitute robbery and
violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were
already due for shipment to Japan) are returned within
twenty-four (24) hours from your receipt hereof, we shall
feel free to take all legal action, civil and criminal, to
protect our client's interests.
We trust that you will give due attention to these important
matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner
filed the instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint
against her with the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836.1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought
to be barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider
the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure
(or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the
petitioner for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was
declared that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been
described is the state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law
has since been altered. No longer does the mayor have at this time the
power to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of
arrest. Section 143 of the Local Government Code, conferring this power
on the mayor has been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987
Constitution which took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized." The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that
thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on
the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly
exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the
present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973
Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary
investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises,
or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it
cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a
magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case.
Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to
secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as
the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search
warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and
jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to
that extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an
amendment by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand
Marcos, to Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under
Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor
merely exercised recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have
the power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged
in illegal recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the
avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The
Decree gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause
the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if
after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a
danger to national security and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the closure of
companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in the
recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been
licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving
the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of
such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after investigation it is
determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and
public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister
shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in
illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment
and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for
overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do
so. 8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian
rule in its twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search
or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that
extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of
no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-
taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised
Administrative Code and by Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in
deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his
duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is
valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in
matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco
Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That
power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such
action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation."
Justice Johnson's opinion is that when the Chief Executive finds that
there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to
the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport
them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil. 534, 568, 569;
In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued
presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu
 Chun Hai and Go Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director
of NBI, 104 Phil. 949, 956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously,
exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like
the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920
and Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your
recruitment agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St.,
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and the seizure of the documents and
paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of
committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you have —
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment to recruit and deploy workers for
overseas employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under
Article 34 of the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38
of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under
existing laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is
null and void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general
warrants. The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized
in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/
recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the
like used and/or connected in the printing of the "WE
FORUM" newspaper and any and all
documents/communications, letters and facsimile of prints
related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and
other publications to promote the objectives and purposes
of the subversive organizations known as Movement for
Free Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6
Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the
"WE FORUM" and other subversive materials and
propaganda, more particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV
969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and
5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472
with marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the
search for "books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda,
pictures, recordings and other written instruments concerning the
Communist Parties of Texas, and the operations of the Community Party
in Texas," was declared void by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any evidence in connection
with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant which authorized the
seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to violate Sec. 54-197
of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid. The
description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants
in question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable
chapter in English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were
 given roving commissions to search where they pleased in order to
suppress and destroy the literature of dissent both Catholic and Puritan."
Reference herein to such historical episode would not be relevant for it is
not the policy of our government to suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but poses no
clear and imminent danger to state security. 14

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges,

and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:

2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable

aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may
order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to
return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order
No. 1205.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.