TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner, vs.FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent. G.R. No.
L-12871 committee, particularly respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that
July 25, 1959
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against
Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with
the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of
Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present
case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by
the parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and
implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo,
Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime
of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal,
in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by
this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found
guilty and his former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The
purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the
Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacañang conducted the investigation for the Chief
Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing
to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel
Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those
who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacañang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor
General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who
decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacañang
investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this
Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons
investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas,
and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new
trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and
confessions and written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva
proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of
himself as chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendañio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo
Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon
oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office
against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz
wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21,
due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga
City. Acting upon said request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on
September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the
the same case involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the
same day filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of
preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent
Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing
him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs.
Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much
less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and
interferring with the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty
and convicted and sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said
investigation.
Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of
the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for
his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva
claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any
objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at
the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made.
Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits
and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but
natural that petitioner should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation
so that he could face and cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection
with their affidavits or confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the
communication, addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September
21, 1957, be postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no
opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the
investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee
began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to
respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the
prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher
court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the
appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would
be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility
for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the
defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was
arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other
accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to
present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent,
at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957.
Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his
course and plan of action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in
the original case and trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions
sent to him by the Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said
evidence by conducting an investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally
responsible for the killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like
Oscar Castelo and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act
accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by
authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction
of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by
such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in
appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they
have already filed the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the
Supreme Court of the United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is
as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is
as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69 United States law Review,
June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the
scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that
investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the
killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent
Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present
at said investigation because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or
legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire
to be given an opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and
renounced his right, and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he
could not be compelled to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as
contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the
evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by
questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly,
unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.
However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted
not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to
accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A
number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy
taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the
respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the
investigation, as shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on
two occasions, the first, after Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing
the newspapermen said, "Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do
so and the question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and
renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the witnesses under
investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to understand, unless he,
respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his investigation as much as possible.
Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such unusual privilege and favor
appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask questions, this according to
the transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the
testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during
the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which
had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and
advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent
place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed
what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory
explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed,
even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole
thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and
called upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary
measure, even a penalty to the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the
imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed
that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.
In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ
of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of
petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to
attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is
hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given
to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court;
and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary
action and penalty. No costs.
ANTERO J. POBRE - versus - Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the
Courts attention to the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on
the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am
suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme
Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of the speaker
towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the Court and constituted
direct contempt of court. Accordingly, Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago, through counsel,
does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered
in the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in governance with a view to
future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust
act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public invitations for nomination to the
soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least
given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for
the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of Article VI, Section
11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for
any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof. Explaining the import of the
underscored portion of the provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as
the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of
that liberty may occasion offense.[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience
and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little
value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation
as to the motives.[2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution
of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and talk
about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of
the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the
voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally
or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last
word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in substance. To
reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to the ensuing
passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to
take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be the
result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed
to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule
8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
 Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements speak for
themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on
constitutional and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the
land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any
other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its
members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice. [7] Senator Santiago should
have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in
the integrity of the courts.
As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the
insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I am
nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in
the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was
to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were
expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a
sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy
the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities
are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual members of
the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people
and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the position of
Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save
perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official duty to
nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to
understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and
her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of
the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. (Emphasis
ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar
with the end in view that the integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it, and
assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we reiterated our
pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that the duty of attorneys to the courts can only
be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are
bound to uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is
the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent
upon lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The
attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x
x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict
Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of
justice. Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member
of the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity, as long
as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor,[15] a good character being an
essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such
privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of conduct or
misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the performance
of lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual
practice of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and trust in the rule of
law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or
personal malice, attempt to obstruct the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts,
and embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We have done it in the case
of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of
Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a
most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the
Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from
doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind
of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive and disrespectful
language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill
in Senator/Atty. Santiago her duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her
anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to protect
them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to
perform the functions of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or other
forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect members of Congress against
government pressure and intimidation aimed at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of
Congress and its members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language
against another Senator or against any public institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos
unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates
under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint, stating that
disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public welfare. We cannot agree with her
more. We cannot overstress that the senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate
the highest court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that she in fact made
the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard that, although she has not categorically denied
making such statements, she has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her
implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.
A.C. No. 10679, March 10, 2015 PO1 JOSE B. CASPE, Complainant, v. ATTY. AQUILINO A.
MEJICA, Respondent.
Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by PO1 Jose B. Caspe against Atty. Aquilino A.
Mejica2 for alleged violation of Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) specifically Rules
1.03,3 1.04,4 and 10.015. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP BOG)
recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three
years.6cralawred
Caspe alleged the controversy started when Atty. Mejica disregarded conflict of interest rules. Caspe
said that when he filed a complaint for attempted murder against Antonio Rodriguez, Jr., Atty. Mejica
served as Caspe’s counsel. When Rodriguez, Jr. filed his counter-affidavit, it was Atty. Mejica who
counseled and represented him.7cralawred
Caspe brought separate suits for damages and disbarment: one for conflict of interest 8 and the present
complaint. Atty. Mejica tried to negotiate a settlement but Caspe refused. Atty. Mejica allegedly then
threatened Caspe that “he will help file cases after cases against the complainant until he kneels before
[him]. He will ‘put down’ complainant so much so that he will be removed from the service.” 9 From then
on, Caspe alleged, Atty. Mejica maliciously encouraged the filing of suits against him.
In the present complaint, Caspe narrated that on December 21, 2007, Romulo Gaduena, 10 a
barangay tanod, harassed Jan Mark Busa and Marcelino Jataas with a gun. Caspe, who was on duty,
together with PO1 Onofre Lopeña responded. They recovered a caliber 0.357 revolver which was
turned over to the Can-avid Police station. The incident was recorded in the police blotter. Gaduena
evaded arrest with the help of barangay captain Prudencio Agda and other barangay tanods11 who
allegedly clobbered Caspe and took his gun. In the interest of peace and harmony, the Chief of
Police12 called and requested that Caspe desist from filing charges against the barangay captain
and tanods, specifically Gaduena. Caspe acceded.
However, Gaduena, with Atty. Mejica as counsel, filed a complaint 13 for serious slander by deed against
Caspe, which was supported by a joint affidavit14 of two barangay tanods. It was alleged that Caspe
kicked, collared and slapped Gaduena’s face. This prompted Caspe to disregard the agreement with
the Chief of Police and he filed cases against the tanods. Suspecting that Atty. Mejica encouraged
Gaduena to file the case against him, Caspe filed the cases for damages 15 and disbarment16 against
Atty. Mejica before the IBP.
In its July 4, 2008 Order,17 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) ordered Atty. Mejica to
submit his answer.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference was issued on September 22, 2008 for a hearing scheduled on
October 21, 2008.18 Atty. Mejica, however, failed to appear. The hearing was rescheduled on
November 18, 2008.
On November 13, 2008, Atty. Mejica filed a manifestation that he never received a copy of the
complaints against him. He asked that the hearing be postponed and rescheduled and that copies of
the complaint be furnished to him.19 The hearing was thus rescheduled to January 13, 200920 and a
copy of the complaint was sent to him via a private courier, LBC. It appeared however that he did not
claim the mail.21cralawred
On December 9, 2008, Atty. Mejica once more manifested that he did not receive any notice from LBC
of any mail to be claimed. He also expressed misgivings on the shift from registered mail to the use of a
private courier to send copies of the complaint. He requested that a copy of the complaint be sent to
him via registered mail.22cralawred
Atty. Mejica failed to appear in the January 13, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD issued an order warning
him that his failure to appear in the next rescheduled hearing would render him in default and the case
would be submitted for decision.23cralawred
Atty. Mejica failed to appear for the February 3, 2009 hearing. The IBP CBD ordered the case
submitted for decision.24cralawred
In its Report and Recommendation,25 the IBP CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.03, 1.04
and 10.01 of the CPR. It stated that Atty. Mejica was corruptly motivated in encouraging the filing of
suits against Caspe making good his threat to file case upon case against the latter until he kneels
before him. Notice was taken that this was Atty. Mejica’s second infraction for a similar offense.
In Baldado v. Mejica,26 he was suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.27 The
IBP CBD thus recommended that Atty. Mejica be suspended from the practice of law for one
year.28cralawred
In its April 15, 2013 Resolution, the IBP BOG adopted the Report and Recommendation of the IBP
CBD.29Atty. Mejica moved for reconsideration.30cralawred
In its May 3, 2014 Resolution, the IBP BOG denied the motion for reconsideration and modified the
penalty by increasing the period of suspension to three years. 31 The resolution noted that Atty. Opinion,
member of the BOG and counsel of Caspe for this case, stepped out of the room when the case came
for discussion and did not participate in the voting.32cralawred
Atty. Mejica maintains that he was not afforded due process. He stated that he received a Notice of
Preliminary Conference for October 21, 2008 but did not appear since he did not receive a copy of the
complaint and was not ordered to answer. For the scheduled February 3, 2009 Conference, Atty.
Mejica reasoned that it was impossible for him to attend the meeting since he received the Notice in the
afternoon of February 3, 2009.33 Furthermore, he was not given the opportunity to answer. Atty. Mejica
also maintained that he never threatened Caspe because he was not present during the preliminary
conference where he allegedly uttered the threatening words.34cralawred
We adopt the findings of the IBP but modify the penalty imposed.
The only question the Court takes up in disbarment proceedings is whether the member of the bar is fit
to be allowed the privileges as such or not.35 This Court has stated that a lawyer may be disciplined or
suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in good moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor as to render him unworthy to
continue as an officer of the Court.36cralawred
In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance of evidence is
required to establish liability. As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial
notice of by the Court is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto, the imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified.37 The Court has required that a complainant
has the onus of proving the charges against respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.38cralawred
Based on the Report and Recommendation, the Court is convinced that there is sufficient evidence to
sanction Atty. Mejica. The following observation by the IBP CBD is well
taken:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x First, when the cases were initiated and filed against PO1 Caspe through the help of [Atty. Mejica],
he was already facing disbarment and civil cases which the former filed against him. Second, these
cases [were] filed after [Atty. Mejica] made [the] threat [to] file cases against PO1 Caspe by reason of
[the] refusal to withdraw the disbarment and civil cases. Third, a gap of more than five months elapsed
between the incident of December 21, 2007 and the filing of the grave slander by deed and that during
this period, the chief of Police who [was] presumed to have regularly performed his job did not
prosecute the criminal cases against [Gaduena] and companions. Fourth, during [the] said period, PO1
Caspe who [was] presumed to have taken ordinary care of his cause did not file the criminal cases
against [Gaduena] and companions. Fifth, the existence of a settlement agreement between PO1
Caspe and Brgy. Captain Agda, Kagawad Sobresida and the other tanods is therefore factual, but
despite such settlement, the case for grave slander by deed was still filed with [Atty. Mejica] as counsel.
Sixth, PO1 Caspe filed this disbarment case only after the grave slander by deed and the multiple
attempted murders were filed against him with the help of [Atty. Mejica]. Seventh, and most importantly,
despite ethical proscription, [Atty. Mejica] served as counsel for the criminal complainants against PO1
Caspe.39cralawlawlibrary
The IBP CBD concluded that there could be no other reason for Atty. Mejica to file the cases against
PO1 Caspe other than to get back at him. We agree that the confluence of circumstances points to Atty.
Mejica’s corrupt motive in helping Gaduena in filing cases against Caspe, in violation of Rules 1.03,
1.04 and 10.01 of the CPR.
With respect to Atty. Mejica’s claim that he was not afforded due process, i.e., he was not able to
receive a copy of a complaint which in turn was the reason for him not to have attended the mandatory
conference, we find this untenable.
Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline Integrated Bar of the
Philippines provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 5. Non-appearance of Parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings. a) Non-appearance at the
mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of right to
participate in the proceeding. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings
submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating
Commissioner.cralawlawlibrary
Atty. Mejica during the course of these proceedings has missed all four scheduled hearings supposedly
since he was not furnished any copy of the complaint. Records suggest however that a copy of the
complaint was sent to him on August 25, 2008, a mail which he did not claim. He submitted two
manifestations in response to notices he received. He was thus placed on notice that there was an
action against him.
It is the Court’s opinion that Atty. Mejica’s attitude toward the proceedings before the IBP indicates a
lack of respect for the IBP’s rules and procedures. In Cabauatan v. Venida,40 we stated that in not
heeding the IBP’s directives:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x Respondent’s refusal to obey the orders of the IBP “is not only irresponsible, but also constitutes
utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for
lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.” Respondent should
be reminded that -
As an officer of the court, [he] is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request
but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of
the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers.
Respondent should strive harder to live up to his duties of observing and maintaining the respect due to
the courts, respect for law and for legal processes, and of upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer effectively. 41
cralawlawlibrary
In Heenan v. Espejo,42 a lawyer’s unjustified refusal to heed the directives of the IBP and to appear at
the scheduled mandatory conference constituted a blatant disrespect for the IBP amounting to conduct
unbecoming a lawyer. We looked back on our ruling in Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit,43 where we
stated that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP
requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory
conference x x x he is justly charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to
uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must observe and maintain
respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including
the IBP. Under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct
proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys. 44cralawlawlibrary
We thus hold that Atty. Mejica further violated Canon 1145 of the CPR which calls for a lawyer to
observe and give due respect to courts and judicial officers.
Given that this is Atty. Mejica’s second infraction, we thus rule it appropriate under the circumstances to
impose a two-year suspension from the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica GUILTY of violation of Rules 1.03, 1.04 and
10.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Aquilino A. Mejica from the practice of law for TWO (2)
YEARS effective upon finality of this Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015 SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA
AMATORIO, Complainants, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-
YAP, Respondents.
This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Rogelio Amatorio and Aida Amatorio
(Aida) (complainants) against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and Whelma Siton-Yap
(respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the respondents employed deceit to obtain favorable
judgments, specifically by failing to inform the trial court that there was already an out-of-court
settlement between them and maliciously manifesting that their counsel, Atty. Justo Paras (Atty. Paras)
was suspended from the practice of law.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection cases, particularly,
Civil Case No. 2000-319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were filed against them by the
respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued the complainants to compel them to pay
their indebtedness of P18,000.00, which was evidenced by a promissory note. After they filed their
answer to the complaint, however, the respondents filed a motion to strike out the same and to declare
them in default on the ground that the said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended from the
practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was however
denied.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents sued the complainants to collect the
amount of P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras was however stricken off the record for the
reason that he was suspended from the practice of law at the time of its
filing.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an out-of-court
settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents’ law office. She appealed for the
respondents’ consideration and asked that they be allowed to pay their obligations by way of
installment. The parties agreed on the terms of payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered her first
payment of P20,000.00, which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a written document
with the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if they should still attend the
pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001 in the civil cases filed against them,
the latter told them they need not attend anymore as they will be moving for the dismissal of the cases.
Relying on the respondents’ assurance, the complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings.
Subsequently, they were surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the two civil
cases filed by the respondents, declaring them in default for non-appearance in the pre-trial conference
and ordering them to pay the amount of their indebtedness and damages. The decision however did not
mention the out-of-court settlement between the parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued
tendering installment payments to the respondents upon the latter’s assurance that they will disregard
the decision of the trial court since they already had an out-of-court settlement before the rendition of
said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the respondents filed a motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2000-319 and were in fact issued said writ.4 This
prompted them to seek legal advice to address their predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V. Carriaga
who, after learning of the factual milieu of their case, told them that they have a good ground to file a
disbarment case against the respondents. He, however, declined to handle the case himself as he
disclosed that his wife is a relative of the respondents. Instead, he referred the complainants to Atty.
Paras, who had just resumed his practice of law after his suspension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their counsel. Initially, Atty.
Paras refused to handle their case as he revealed that the personal animosity between him and the
respondents may invite unwelcome repercussions. Even then, the complainants insisted to retain his
services as their counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case against the
respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which were allegedly
instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and affluent clan. They received threats
of physical harm and Aida’s continued employment as a public school teacher was put in jeopardy.
Also, suspicious-looking individuals were seen loitering around their house. When they refused to yield
to the respondents’ intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of charges against them, to wit: (1) an
administrative case against Aida for failure to pay the same debts subject of this case; and (2) a criminal
case for perjury against the complainants. To alleviate their situation, they filed a Joint-
Affidavit,7 seeking the assistance of this Court to warn the respondents and to stop them from
employing deplorable acts upon them.
In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for Disbarment dated March 14, 2003, the
respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain favorable judgments in Civil Case Nos.
2000-319 and 2000-321. They admitted that they agreed to an out-of-court settlement, through the
intercession of Rosa Yap Paras, estranged wife of Atty. Paras, but denied that the complainants ever
tendered any installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras merely employed cajolery in order to
entice the complainants to file the instant case to retaliate against them. They asseverated that Atty.
Paras resented the fact that the respondents served as counsel for his former wife, who previously filed
the administrative case for immorality, abandonment of family, and falsification and use of falsified
documents which resulted to his suspension.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents asserted that Atty. Paras clearly defied the
authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and filed an answer on their behalf during
the period of his suspension from the practice of law. They alleged that he appeared in several cases
and filed numerous pleadings despite his suspension.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-
Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Report and Recommendation10 dated June 23, 2005, which
pertinently states as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately neglected, at the very
least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate allegations/testimonies to purposely mislead or confuse the civil
courts in Dumaguete City. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and the authenticity of the
Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 21, 2001 which bore his signature and written in a “Yap Law
Office” letterhead. Such documentary evidence supports the theory of the Complainants that there was
indeed an out-of-court settlement prior to the pre-trial hearings and that they were most likely assured
that these cases would be dismissed. Their absence during the pre-trial hearings evidently resulted to
decisions adverse to them. Moreover, the Motions for the Writ of Execution did not fail to mention the
existence of partial payments and the prior agreement which, if disclosed, would have led the court not
to issue such writs. Since Respondent Francisco Yap’s signature appear in all the Acknowledgement
Receipts and in all Motions filed in the civil courts, he alone should be penalized. On the other hand,
Respondent Whelma Siton Yap should not be penalized in the absence of any evidence of her
participation in such conduct. x x x.
All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent Francisco Yap should be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months. At the same time, the Counter Petition for Disbarment filed
by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo Paras, which appears to be VERY meritorious, be given due
course in another proceeding with utmost dispatch.11
Upon review of the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, the IBP Board of
Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December 17, 2005, disposing
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and for deliberately neglecting, offering
inaccurate allegations to purposely mislead or confuse the courts, Atty. Francisco D. Yap is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Atty. Whelma F. Siton-Yap is
exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her participation in such conduct; however Respondents
are Warned for indirectly misleading the Commission.13
On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Petition for
Review.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,15 terminating the services of Atty. Paras
and/or Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the reason that they can no longer afford the
services of a private counsel.
Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial Affidavit, 16 disclaiming knowledge
and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty.
Paras in connection with the disbarment case against the respondents. They claimed that they merely
signed the pleadings but the contents thereof were not explained to them in a dialect which they
understood. They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a disbarment case against the respondents
and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to settle and pay their indebtedness to them.
Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend
the pre-trial conference of the cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them.
They claimed that Atty. Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial conference to settle
matters with the respondents and the court but he did not show up on the scheduled date. They also
asseverated that most of the statements contained in the complaint for disbarment were false and that
they wished to withdraw the said complaint.
On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XIX-2011-172,17 which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent reason to
reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already
been threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, Resolution No. XVII-2005-159 dated 17
December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that the admission of
the complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007 proved that the disbarment case filed
against them was just fabricated by Atty. Paras. They pointed out the complainants’ statement that they
were just made to sign the complaint for disbarment by Atty. Paras to retaliate against them for having
filed a case against him for falsification of documents which sent him to prison for some time.
On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the IBP, expressing disappointment over the
fact that the IBP Board of Governors did not dismiss the disbarment case against Francisco. The letter
pertinently stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the disbarment case against ATTY. FRANCISCO
DY YAP was NOT DISMISSED. The reason is that we have submitted our JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT
relating the facts and circumstances wherein the said disbarment complaint was prepared by
our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO J. PARAS consisting of fabrications and not on facts. It
was upon the machination and instigation of ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, that the simple collection
case of P94,000.00 more or less, became a multifaceted case in several forums.20(Emphasis in the
original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action.
The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the complainants filed a Motion to Admit Judicial Affidavit
with Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint,21 reiterating their claim that the filing of the
disbarment was a product of Atty. Paras’ maneuverings and that the allegations against the
respondents stated therein were false.
After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court finds no compelling reason to deviate
from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors
primarily on the basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007, wherein the complainants cleared
them of the charges of misconduct and turned the blame on their own counsel, Atty. Paras, for allegedly
having made up the allegations in the disbarment complaint. When the IBP Board of Governors
sustained the imposition of suspension to Francisco, the complainants themselves submitted a motion
to admit the said judicial affidavit to this Court, together with a motion to dismiss and withdraw
complaint.
The question now is whether the statements of the complainants, specifically contesting the truthfulness
of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their own complaint for disbarment necessarily
results to Francisco’s absolution. The answer is in the negative.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of the bar by informing
them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their professional and private lives. Primarily, it
aims to protect the integrity and nobility of the legal profession, to breed honest and principled lawyers
and prune the association of the unworthy.
It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants’ change of heart by
refuting their own statements against the respondents and praying that the complaint for disbarment
they filed be dismissed. It bears emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only
hurts the client’s cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession itself. Thus,
for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be disciplined notwithstanding the
complainant’s pardon or withdrawal from the case for as long as there is evidence to support any finding
of culpability. A case for suspension or disbarment may proceed “regardless of interest or lack of
interest of the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.”23 It follows that the withdrawal of the
complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does not conclude the
administrative case against an erring lawyer.
This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to keep sacred the
integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. “The power to discipline lawyers who are
officers of the court may not be cut short by compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as it
should be, especially when we consider that the law profession and its exercise is one impressed with
public interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to protect and
promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of
those who have proven themselves unworthy thereof.”24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against the
respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle matters amicably
after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants’ forgiveness or
even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco.
To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the disbarment case
considering that they had already presented and supported their claims with convincing and credible
evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a resolution on the basis thereof.
To be clear, “[i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the quantum of
proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant.”25In the present case, it was clearly established that Francisco received P20,000.00 as
initial payment from the complainants in compliance with the terms of their out-of-court settlement for
the payment of the latter’s outstanding obligations. The amount was duly received and acknowledged
by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper with the letterhead of his own law office, a fact he did not
deny. While the respondents deny that they told the complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case
anymore and that they will be the one to inform the trial court of the settlement, they did not bring the
said agreement to the attention of the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the settlement of the
parties, rendered a judgment by default against the complainants. The respondents even filed a motion
for execution of the decision but still did not inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement between
them and the complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this supervening event to the trial court,
hence, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
xxxx
CANON 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.cralawred
The complainants’ belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the allegations stated in
the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former counsel cannot stand against the clear
and preponderant evidence they earlier presented. It is inexplicable how the complainants could now
claim that the respondents were blameless when the records tell otherwise. That they were simply
duped by Atty. Paras into signing the numerous pleadings he filed on their behalf is hardly believable
considering that Aida is well-lettered, being a public school teacher. They also do not claim that they
were prevented from reading the contents of the pleadings or that their signatures were simply forged.
At any rate, while it may be true that Atty. Paras fabricated some of the facts stated in the disbarment
complaint, these matters are trivial and do not relate to the facts material to the charge of misconduct
against Francisco. What clearly appears is that the facts material to the violation committed by
Francisco are well-established notwithstanding Atty. Paras’ supposed fabrication of some insignificant
particulars.
WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon receipt of
this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall
be dealt with severely.
Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation
in the Supreme Court. A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
Plagiarism is the act of appropriating the literary composition of another, or parts or passages of his
writings, or the ideas or language of the same, and passing them off as the product of ones own mind. [1]
Allegations of this intellectual offense were hurled by Atty. Harry L. Roque, Jr. and Atty. Romel R.
Bagares against Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo for his ponencia in the case of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010. In said case, the Court denied the petition for certiorari filed
by Filipino comfort women to compel certain officers of the executive department [2] to espouse their
claims for reparation and demand apology from the Japanese government for the abuses committed
against them by the Japanese soldiers during World War II. Attys. Roque and Bagares represent the
comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, which is presently the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles are: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent
from their article, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of
International Law; (2) Christian J. Tams from his book, Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in
International Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and (3) Mark Ellis from his
article, Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western
Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006. The allegations of plagiarism centered on Justice Del
Castillos discussion of the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes.
On August 9, 2010, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin,
Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B.
Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P.
Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O.
Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C.
Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and Dina D. Lucenario,
members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law published a statement on the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation relative to the Courts decision in Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary. Essentially, the faculty of the UP College of Law, headed by its dean, Atty. Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen, calls for the resignation of Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo in the face of allegations of
plagiarism in his work.
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but
a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the
Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. The authors
also not only assumed that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went further by directly
accusing the Court of perpetrating extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the comfort
women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about
the review of the case.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying
the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the
members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect. Paragraph 9 of their
published statement reads,
But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the Court delayed its resolution for
almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the
Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized
materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By doing so, the
Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its power to urge and exhort
the Executive Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous
disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies (sic) [betrays] a more
alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of decency and
respect. (Emphasis supplied).
The publication of a statement by the faculty of the UP College of Law regarding the
allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court was totally unnecessary, uncalled
for and a rash act of misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations. More importantly, the motion for reconsideration of the decision
alleged to contain plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court. We made it clear in the case
of In re Kelly[3] that any publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the jury, the parties, the
officers of the court, the counsel with reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the
controversy, is contempt of court and is punishable.
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and
democratic society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many
types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible
attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the
judiciary.[4] The court must insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice.[5]
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less than objective
comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Courts
honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. [6] Their actions likewise constitute violations of Canons
10, 11, and 13[7] and Rules 1.02 and 11.05[8] of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[9]
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D.
Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen
Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul V. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva, and
Dina D. Lucenario, members of the faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law, are
directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of this Resolution, why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 I will communicate with you from time to time for any future development.
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
My best regards to you and family and to Mrs. Constancia
Further, Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is directed to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days from Mascarinas and all.
receipt of this Resolution, why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting, through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of V
G.R. No. 162230, Vinuya v. Executive Secretary and of the investigation before the Committee on e
Ethics and Ethical Standards, for the consideration of the Court En Banc, a dummy which is not a true r
and faithful reproduction of the purported statement, entitled Restoring Integrity:A Statement by the y
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court. Enclosed are copies of the said dummy and signed statement, t
respectively, attached to the said letter dated August 10, 2010 and to the Compliance dated August 31, r
2010 filed by Roque & Butuyan Law Offices with the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards.Let u
this matter be DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter. l
y
CESAR L. LANTORIA, complainant, vs.ATTY. IRINEO L. BUNYI, respondent. A.M. No. 1769 June 8,
1992 y
o
u
This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action against r
respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent Bunyi s
allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of a member of ,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in connection with
respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the Municipal Court of
Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente Galicia 1 in which respondent (
Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs. Constancia Mascarinas. S
G
D
Respondent Bunyi alleged that Mrs. Constancia M. Mascarinas of Manila was the owner of d farm .
located in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, and that herein complainant Lantoria was the manager and )
supervisor of said farm, receiving as such a monthly allowance. 2 It appears that the complaint in Civil
Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 sought to eject the squatters from the aforementioned farm. 3 These cases C
were assigned to the Municipal Court of Esperanza, Agusan del Bur, the acting municipal judge of E
which was the Honorable Vicente Galicia (who was at the same time the regular judge of the municipal S
court of Bayugan, Agusan del Sur). 4 The defendants in the mentioned civil cases were, in due course, A
declared in default. R

In relation to the same three (3) civil cases, the records of the present case show that complainant L
Lantoria wrote a letter to respondent Bunyi, dated 23 April 1974, which reads as follows:a
L
A
Atty. Ireneo Bunye
N
928 Rizal Avenue
T
Santa Cruz, Manila
O
R
Dear Atty. Bunye:xxx xxx xxx I
A
Upon informing him of your willingness to prepare the corresponding judgements (sic)
on the 3 defaulted cases he said he has no objection in fact he is happy and M
recommended that you mail the said decisions in due time thru me to be delivered to a
him.xxx xxx xxx j
o
 r Herewith now, you will find enclosed the three (3) Decisions against the (3) defaulted
defendants. I am not sure if they will suit to satisfy Judge Galicia to sign them at once.
I However, it is my request to Judge Galicia, thru your kind mediation, that if the
n preparation of these Decisions do not suit his consideration, then I am ready and
f willing to accept his suggestions or correction to charge or modify them for the better.
And to this effect, kindly relay at once what he is going to say or thinks if he signs
P them readily and please request for each copy for our hold.xxx xxx xxx
C
Please excuse this delay, and thanks for your kind assistance in attending to our
( cases there. Regards to you and family and prayer for your more vigor and success.
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On 01 June 1974, respondent Bunyi wrote to the complainant regarding the said three (3) cases, in this
wise:

Dear Major Lantoria,

At last, I may say that I have tried my best to respond to the call in your several letters
received, which is about the preparation of the three (3) Decisions awaited by Judge
Galicia. The delay is that I have been too much occupied with my cases and other
professional commitments here in Manila and nearby provinces. Not only to Mrs.
Mascarinas I would say that I am so sorry but also to you. Mrs. Mascarinas has been
reminding me but I always find myself at a loss to prepare these Decisions at an early
date sa (sic) possible. So also with my calendar as to the dates for the next hearing of
the remaining cases over there.
 6

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It also appears that respondent Bunyi wrote an earlier letter to complainant Lantoria, dated 04 March Dear Major Lantoria,
1974, the contents of which read as follows:
This is an additional request, strictly personal and confidential. Inside the envelope
9 addressed to Judge Vicente C. Galicia, are the Decisions and Orders, which he told
2 me to prepare and he is going to sign them. If you please, deliver the envelope to him
8 as if you have no knowledge and information and that you have not opened it. Unless,
of course, if the information comes from him. But, you can inquire from him if there is
R a need to wait from his words about them, or copies to be furnished me, after he signs
i them, it could be made thru you personally, to expedite receiving those copies for our
z hold. According to him, this envelope could be delivered to him at his residence at No.
a 345 M. Calo St., Butuan City, during week end. or, at Bayugan if you happen to go
l there, if he is not in Butuan City.

A Thanking You for your kind attention and favor.

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Three years after, that is, on 11 April 1977, complainant filed with this Court the present administrative
case against respondent Bunyi, predicated mainly on the above-quoted three (3) letters dated 04
March, 23 April and 01 June, 1974. Complainant contends that respondent won the said three (3) cases
because to (respondent) was the one who unethically prepared the decisions rendered therein, and that
the preparation by respondent of said decisions warranted disciplinary action against him.
By way of answer to the complaint, respondent, in a motion to dismiss 8 the administrative complaint,
admitted the existence of the letter of 01 June 1974, but explained the contents thereof as follows:xxx
xxx xxx
b) In the second place, the said letter of June 1, 1974, is self-explanatory and speaks
for itself, that if ever the same was written by the Respondent, it was due to the
insistence of the Complainant thru his several letters received, that the decisions in
question be drafted or prepared for Judge Galicia, who considered such preparation
as a big help to him, because he was at that time holding two (2) salas — one as
being the regular Municipal Judge of Bayugan and the other, as the acting Judge of
Esperanza, both of Agusan del Sur, with many pending cases and it was to the
benefit of the Complainant that the early disposition of the cases involved would not
suffer inconsiderable delay. But, the intention to draft or prepare the decisions in
question was never spawned by the Respondent. Instead, it came from the under-
standing between the Judge and the complainant who, from his several letters, had
demonstrated so much interest to eject at once the squatters from the farm he was
entrusted to manage. Furthermore, the Complainant's conclusion that the said
decisions were lutong macao is purely non-sense as it is without any factual or legal
basis. He himself knew that Judge Galicia asked for help in the drafting of said
decisions as at any rate they were judgments by default, the defendants lost their
standing in court when they were declared in default for failure to file their answers
and to appear at the place and time set for hearing thereof (See first paragraph, letter
of June 1, 1974)
c) Thirdly, in the same letter, the decisions as prepared were in the form of drafts, as
in fact, the letter mentioned subject to suggestion or correction to change or modify
for the better by Judge Galicia (Second paragraph, Ibid);
d) Fourthly, in the some letter, Responding (sic) even apologized for the delay in
sending the same to the Complainant and expressed his gratitude for his assistance
in attending to the cases involved (Last paragraph, Ibid.)
In its resolution dated 28 November 1977, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 9 On 21 July 1980, the Solicitor General submitted his report
to the Court, with the following averments, to wit: 1) that the case was set for hearing on April 12,
September 29, and December 18, 1978, but in all said scheduled hearings only respondent Bunyi
appeared; 2) that
N in the hearing of 16 January 1979, both respondent and complainant appeared; 3)
Y hearing, the Solicitor General reported the following development —
that at the same
I
7
Atty. Mercado submitted a letter of complainant dated January 16, 1979 sworn to
before the investigating Solicitor, praying that the complaint be considered withdrawn,
dropped or dismissed on the ground that complainant "could hardly substantiate" his
charges and that he is "no longer interested to prosecute" the same. For his part,
respondent manifested that he has no objection to the withdrawal of the complaint
against him. At the same time, he presented complainant Lantoria as a witness are
elicited testimony to the effect that complainant no longer has in his possession the
original of the letters attached to his basic complaint, and hence, he was not prepared
to prove his charges. 10(emphasis supplied)
In his aforesaid report, the Solicitor General found as follows: a) that the letters of respondent Bunyi
(dated 4, March and 1 June 1974), addressed to complainant, showed that respondent had indeed
prepared the draft of the decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 of the Municipal Court of
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, which he submitted to Judge Vicente Galicia thru the complainant; b) that
those letters indicated that respondent had previous communications with Judge Galicia regarding the
preparation of the decisions; c) that the testimony of complainant to the effect that he had lost the
original of said letters, and complainant's withdrawal of the complaint in the case at bar are of no
moment, as respondent Bunyi, and his motion to dismiss filed with the Supreme Court, admitted that he
prepared the draft of the decisions in the said civil cases, and be affirmed the existence of the letters.
Hence, in his report, the Solicitor General found that respondent is guilty of highly unethical and
unprofessional conduct for failure to perform his duty, as an officer of the court, to help promote the
independence of the judiciary and to refrain from engaging in acts which would influence judicial
determination of a litigation in which he is counsel. 11 The Solicitor General recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. He filed with the Court
the corresponding complaint against respondent.
In his answer 12 to the complaint filed by the Solicitor General, respondent manifested that in the future
he would be more careful in observing his duties as a lawyer, and in upholding the provisions of the
canons of professional ethics.
On 10 December 1980, the date set by this Court for the hearing of this case, the hearing was
postponed until further notice. On 9 March 1981, respondent filed a manifestation 13 alleging that no
hearing was as yet set in the case since the last setting on 10 December 1980, and he requested that
the next hearing be not set until after six (6) months when be expected to return from the United States
of America where he would visit his children and at the same time have a medical check-up.
On 28 October 1981, the date set by this Court for bearing in this case, respondent Bunyi and the
Solicitor General appeared, and respondent was directed to submit his memorandum. Respondent
Bunyi filed his memorandum on 16 November 1981. In said memorandum, 14 respondent submitted that
although he prepared the draft of the decisions in the civil cases, he did not offer Judge Galicia any gift
or consideration to influence the Judge in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. 15 He also offered
his apology to the Court for all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the
draft decisions.
We agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the determination of the merits of the instant
case should proceed notwithstanding complainant's withdrawal of his complaint in the case, the
respondent himself having admitted that the letters in question truly exist, and that he even asked for an
apology from the Court, for whatever effects such letters may have had on his duty as a lawyer.
With the admission by respondent of the existence of the letters upon which the present administrative
complaint is based, the remaining issue to be resolved is the effect of the acts complained of on
respondent's duty both as a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
We find merit in the recommendation of the Solicitor General that respondent, by way of disciplinary
action, deserves suspension from the practice of law.
The subject letters indeed indicate that respondent had previous communication with Judge Galicia
regarding the preparation of the draft decisions in Civil Case Nos. 81, 83, and 88, and which he in fact
prepared. Although nothing in the records would show that respondent got the trial court judge's
consent to the said preparation for a favor or consideration, the acts of respondent nevertheless amount
to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the Court.
Clearly, respondent violated Canon No. 3 of the Canons of Professional Ethics (which were enforced at
the time respondent committed the acts admitted by him), which provides as follows:
3. Attempts to exert personal influence on the court
Marked attention and unusual hospitality on the part of a lawyer to a judge, uncalled
for by the personal relations of the parties, subject both the judge and the lawyer to
misconstructions of motive and should be avoided. A lawyer should not communicate
or argue privately with the judge as to the merits of a pending cause and deserves
rebuke and denunciation for any device or attempt to gain from a judge special
personal consideration or favor. A self-respecting independence in the discharge of
professional duty, without denial or diminution of the courtesy and respect due the
judge's station, is the only proper foundation for cordial personal and official relations
between bench and bar.
In the new Code of Professional Responsibility 16 a lawyer's attempt to influence the court is rebuked, as
shown in Canon No. 13 and Rule 13.01, which read:
CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any
impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
Rule 13.01 — A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for, cultivating familiarity with judges.
Therefore, this Court finds respondent guilty of unethical practice in attempting to influence the court
where he had pending civil case. 17
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Irineo L. Bunyi is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one (1) year from the date of notice hereof. Let this decision be entered in the bar records of
the respondent and the Court Administrator is directed to inform the different courts of this suspension.
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as a lawyer
by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals Resolution/Order. [1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate spouse
of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living separately from
each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five years old, and James
Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in complainants custody. Complainant filed a
case for the annulment of her marriage with respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint
for annulment of marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 54235 entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in Tanjay
City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be surrendered to him.
He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by the Court of Appeals which
supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.[2] Complainant called up her lawyer but the
latter informed her that he had not received any motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution closely and
noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001. Sensing something amiss,
she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived and
demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to forcefully take them
away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could be
clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in the Police
Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on complainant the appellate
courts resolution/order.[3]In order to diffuse the tension, complainant agreed to allow the children to
sleep with respondent for one night on condition that he would not take them away from Tanjay City.
This agreement was entered into in the presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI
Investigator Roger Sususco, among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived at
the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City. Complainant
rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed until later in the morning.
 On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, a
verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to custody of the
children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the meantime, complainant verified
the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification dated January 18, 2002 [5] from the Court
of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering complainant to surrender custody of their children to
respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not appear.
Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his attorneys oath
by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution in and outside a court of
law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged granted to him by the Supreme Court
to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on Bar
Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning that another offense of
this nature will result in his disbarment.[6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and recommendation of the Commission with the modification that the penalty of
suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable for
his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the Court
of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is belied by the fact
that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As pointed out by the Investigating
Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in
his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898,[7] which
he filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from
complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have
participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would be
intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be
devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it
must never be at the expense of the truth.[8] Thus, the Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper,
the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic
but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. [9] The
lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court and opposing counsel and
should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. [10] By calling
complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures
to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute gross
misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However, we find that the
period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser period of two years, which
we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
SONIC STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC., COMPLAINANT, vs.ATTY. NONNATUS P.
CHUA, RESPONDENT. A.C. No. 6942 July 17, 2013
Before us is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. against
respondent, Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua.
The facts follow.
Complainant is a corporation doing business as a manufacturer and distributor of zinc and aluminum-
zinc coated metal sheets known in the market as Superzinc and Superlume. On the other hand,
respondent is the Vice-President, Corporate Legal Counsel and Assistant Corporate Secretary of Steel
Corporation (STEELCORP).
The controversy arose when, on September 5, 2005, STEELCORP, with the assistance of the National
Bureau of Investigation, applied for and was granted by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite City,
Branch 17, a Search Warrant directed against complainant.
On the strength of the search warrant, complainant’s factory was searched and, consequently,
properties were seized. A week after, STEELCORP filed before the Department of Justice a complaint
for violation of Section 168, in relation to Section 170, of Republic Act No. 82931 against complainant
and the latter’s officers.
Based on three documents, to wit: (1) the Affidavit of Mr. Antonio Lorenzana (Executive Vice-President
of STEELCORP), in support of the application for the Search Warrant; (2) the exchange between Mr.
Lorenzana and Judge Melchor Sadang of Branch 17, RTC of Cavite, during the searching inquiry
conducted by the latter for the application for warrant, as evidenced by the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes (TSN) dated September 5, 2005 in People v. John Doe a.k.a. Anthony Ong, et al.; and (3) the
Complaint-Affidavit executed by respondent and filed before the Department of Justice, complainant
asserts that respondent performed the ensuing acts:
(a)
In stating that STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of Philippine Patent No. 16269, respondent
deliberately misled the court as well as the Department of Justice, because Letters Patent No. 16269
have already lapsed, making it part of the public domain.
(b)
In refusing to provide the RTC of Cavite City, Branch 17 a copy of the patent, respondent intentionally
deceived said court because even the first page of the patent will clearly show that said patent already
lapsed. It appears that Letters Patent No. 16269 was issued on August 25, 1983 and therefore had
already lapsed rendering it part of the public domain as early as 2000. Had respondent shown a copy of
the patent to the judge, said judge would not have been misled into issuing the search warrant because
any person would know that a patent has a lifetime of 17 years under the old law and 20 years under
R.A. 8293. Either way, it is apparent from the face of the patent that it is already a lapsed patent and
therefore cannot be made basis for a supposed case of infringement more so as basis for the
application for the issuance of a search warrant.
In the affidavit submitted by Mr. Antonio Lorenzana, complainant asserts that the same includes
statements expressing that STEELCORP is the licensee of Philippine Patent No. 16269, to wit:
2. STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of and manufacturer in the Philippines of "GALVALUME"
metal sheet products, which are coated with aluminum-zinc alloy, produced by using the technical
information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands with Patent Registration No. 16269
issued by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office ("IPO"), a process licensed by BIEC International,
Inc. to STEELCORP for the amount of over Two Million Five Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars
($2,500,000.00).x x x x
7. Specifically, the acts committed by RESPONDENTS of storing, selling, retailing, distributing,
importing, dealing with or otherwise disposing of "SUPERLUME" metal sheet products which are
similarly coated with aluminum-zinc alloy and cannot be produced without utilizing the same basic
technical information and the registered patent used by STEELCORP to manufacture "GALVALUME"
metal sheet products, the entire process of which has been lawfully and exclusively licensed to
STEELCORP by BIEC International, Inc., constitute unfair competition in that –x x x x
b. While SUPERLUME metal sheets have the same general appearance as those of GALVALUME
metal sheets which are similarly coated with aluminum-zinc alloy, produced by using the same technical
information and the aforementioned registered patent exclusively licensed to and manufactured in the
Philippines since 1999 by STEELCORP, the machinery and process for the production of SUPERLUME
metal sheet products were not installed and formulated with the technical expertise of BIEC
International, Inc. to enable the SONIC to achieve the optimum results in the production of aluminum-
zinc alloy-coated metal sheets;x x x x
8. On the [bases] of the foregoing analyses of the features and characteristics of RESPONDENTS’
SUPERLUME metal sheet products, the process by which they are manufactured and produced
certainly involves an assembly line that substantially conforms with the technical information and
registered patent licensed to STEELCORP, which should include, but are not limited to, the following
major components and specifications, viz.:x x x x
9. It is plain from the physical appearance and features of the metal sheets which are coated with
aluminum-zinc alloy and produced by using the technical information and the registered patent
exclusively licensed to STEELCORP by BIEC International, Inc.; the mark ending with the identical
syllable "LUME" to emphasize its major component (i.e., aluminum) which is used in Respondents’
"SUPERLUME" metal sheets while having the same general appearance of STEELCORP’s genuine
"GALVALUME" metal sheets, that the intention of RESPONDENTS is to cash in on the goodwill of
STEELCORP by passing off its "SUPERLUME" metal sheet products as those of STEELCORP’s
"GALVALUME" metal sheet products, which increases the inducement of the ordinary customer to buy
the deceptively manufactured and unauthorized production of "SUPERLUME" metal sheet products.x x
xx
11. STEELCORP has lost and will continue to lose substantial revenues and will sustain damages as a
result of the wrongful conduct of RESPONDENTS and their deceptive use of the technical information
and registered patent, exclusively licensed to STEELCORP, as well as the other features of their
SUPERLUME metal sheets, that have the same general appearance as the genuine GALVALUME
metal sheets of STEELCORP. The conduct of RESPONDENTS has also deprived and will continue to
deprive STEELCORP of opportunities to expand its goodwill.2
Also, in the searching questions of Judge Melchor Sadang of the RTC of Cavite City, Branch 17,
complainant asserts that respondent deliberately misled and intentionally deceived the court in refusing
to provide a copy of Philippine Patent No. 16269 during the hearing for the application for a search
warrant, to wit:
[COURT to Mr. Lorenzana]
Q: You stated here in your affidavit that you are the Executive Vice-President of Steel Corporation of the
Philippines. Is that correct?
A: Yes sir.
Q: You also state that Steel Corporation owns a patent exclusively licensed to Steel Corporation by
BIEC International, Inc. Do you have document to show that?
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the presentation of the trademark license, your Honor.
Q: Why are you applying a search warrant against the respondent Sonic Steel Industries?
A: We will know that Sonic is not licensed to produce that product coming from the technology which is
exclusively licensed to our Company, your Honor. We know that from our own knowledge. Also, the
investigation of the NBI confirms further that the product has already been in the market for quite some
time. As a product, it has the same feature and characteristic as that of GALVALUME, your Honor.
Q: In other words, you are not saying that Sonic is using the trademark GALVALUME but only using the
technology of the process which is only licensed to Steel Corporation. Is that correct?
A: Yes, your Honor.x x x x
Court to Lorenzana:
Q: The patent on the Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands, do you have a document regarding that?
A: Yes, your Honor. It is in the office.
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the right to present it, your Honor.
Court:
Q: You stated a while ago that it is the Steel Corporation that has been licensed by the BIEC
International to manufacture sheet products which are coated with aluminum-zinc alloy. Is that correct?
A: Yes, your Honor.3
Subsequently, respondent initiated a complaint for violation of Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293
against complainant, as well as its officers, before the Department of Justice. In his complaint-affidavit,
respondent stated that STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of Philippine Patent No. 16269 on Hot
Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands which was allegedly violated by complainant. Thus:
2. STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee and manufacturer in the Philippines of "GALVALUME" metal
sheet products, which are coated with aluminum-zinc alloy, produced by using the technical information
and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands with Patent Registration No. 16269, issued by the
Philippine Intellectual Property Office ("IPO"), a process licensed by BIEC International, Inc. to
STEELCORP for the amount of over Two Million Five Hundred Thousand U.S. Dollars
($2,500,000.00).x x x x
13. x x x x
b. While SUPERLUME metal sheets have the same general appearance as those of GALVALUME
metal sheets which are similarly coated with aluminum-zinc alloy, produced by using the same technical
information and the aforementioned registered patent exclusively licensed to and manufactured in the
Philippines since 1999 by STEELCORP, the machinery and process for the production of SUPERLUME
metal sheet products were not installed and formulated with the technical expertise of BIEC
International, Inc. to enable SONIC to achieve the optimum results in the production of aluminum-zinc
alloy-coated metal sheets;x x x x
15. The natural, probable and foreseeable result of RESPONDENTS’ conduct is to continue to deprive
STEELCORP of the exclusive benefits of using the technical information and patent for the manufacture
and distribution of aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal sheet products, deprive STEELCORP of sales and
goodwill, and continue to injure STEELCORP’s relations with present and prospective customers.
16. STEELCORP has lost and will continue to lose substantial revenues and will sustain damages as a
result of the wrongful conduct by RESPONDENTS and their deceptive use the technical information and
patent, exclusively licensed by BIEC International, Inc. to STEELCORP, used and/or intended to be
used by RESPONDENTS for the manufacture, retail, dealings with or otherwise disposals of
unauthorized SUPERLUME aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal sheet products, as well as the other
features of its product, having the same general appearance and characteristics as those of the genuine
GALVALUME aluminum-zinc alloy-coated metal sheet products. RESPONDENTS’ conduct has also
deprived STEELCORP and will continue to deprive STEELCORP of opportunities to expand its
goodwill.4
For his part, respondent counters that he never made an allegation or reservation that STEELCORP
owned Philippine Patent No. 16269. He asserts that he merely reserved the right to present the
trademark license exclusively licensed to STEELCORP by BIEC International, Inc. which is composed
of the technical information and the patent used to produce GALVALUME metal sheet products, the
same technology being utilized by complainant without authority from STEELCORP.
Respondent further avers that the Complaint-Affidavit filed before the Department of Justice did not
categorically claim that STEELCORP is the owner of the patent, but simply that STEELCORP is the
exclusive licensee of the process by which GALVALUME is produced.
The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
In its Report and Recommendation dated July 10, 2007, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline
resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law for three (3) months with admonition that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.
On August 17, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2007-76 wherein it
resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Officer of the
Commission on Bar Discipline, with the modification that respondent is suspended from the practice of
law for six (6) months.
Unfazed, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration against said Resolution, but the same was
denied on January 14, 2012.
Accordingly, the Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final
action.
We affirm in toto the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
Pertinent provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility state:
Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal process.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.x x x x
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 – A lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.
Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as
vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to
act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court. Verily, the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins lawyers from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing
the courts to be misled by any artifice. Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and
not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.5
In the present case, it appears that respondent claimed or made to appear that STEELCORP was the
licensee of the technical information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands or Philippine
Patent No. 16269. However, an extensive investigation made by the IBP’s Commission on Bar
Discipline showed that STEELCORP only has rights as a licensee of the technical information and not
the rights as a licensee of the patent, viz.:
x x x In respondent’s words and crafted explanation, he claimed that STEELCORP had rights as a
licensee of the process, consisting of a combination of the Technical Information and the Patent.
Considering, however, that STEELCORP’s rights as a licensee of the process is severable into (a)
rights as licensee of the technical information and (b) rights as a licensee of Patent No. 16269,
respondent was less than candid in asserting that STEELCORP had rights to the entire process during
the relevant periods, as will be explained below.
Under the TECHNICAL INFORMATION AND PATENT LICENSE AGREEMENT between STEELCORP
and BIEC International, Inc., the terms "technical information" and "patent" are separate and distinct.
Thus, technical information is defined under such contract as "Licensor’s existing proprietary data,
know-how and technical information which relates to the subject of Sheet and/or Strip coated with an
aluminum-zinc alloy xxx and to facilities and equipment for the manufacture and use thereof and to
data, know-how and technical information applicable thereto as of the Effective Date xxxx." On the other
hand, Licensed Patent is defined therein as "Patent No. 16269" entitled "Hot dip coating of ferrous
strands." The combination of such proprietary data, know-how and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of
Ferrous Strands is the process over which STEELCORP claims it had proprietary license, and
represents the same process used by STEELCORP in producing GALVALUME products. This is
supposedly the basis upon which STEELCORP (through Mr. Lorenzana in his Affidavit in support of the
application for a search warrant, presumably under the direction of respondent) and respondent (in his
Complaint-Affidavit before the Department of Justice) asserted then that it was the exclusive licensee of
the technical information and registered Patent No. 16269.
However, from the time that STEELCORP applied for a search warrant over SONIC STEEL’s premises
(through the affidavit of Mr. Lorenzana and presumably with respondent’s strategy as counsel), Patent
No. 16269 had long expired. This fact is crucial in that the license STEELCORP had, as claimed by
respondent, was over the entire process and not just the technical information as a component thereof.
Accordingly, when the application for search was filed and when respondent subscribed to his
Complaint-Affidavit before the Department of Justice, STEELCORP had no more exclusive license to
Patent No. 16269. Said patent had already become free for anyone’s use, including SONIC STEEL. All
that STEELCORP possessed during those times was the residual right to use (even if exclusively) just
the technical information defined in its agreement with BIEC International, Inc. STEELCORP had only
an incomplete license over the process. The expiration of the patent effectively negated and rendered
irrelevant respondent’s defense of subsistence of the contract between STEELCORP and BIEC
International, Inc. during the filing of the application for search warrant and filing of respondent’s affidavit
before the Department of justice. There is basis, therefore, to the claim that respondent has not been
"candid enough" in his actuations.
It would also appear that respondent was wanting in candor as regards his dealings with the lower
court.1âwphi1 The interjection made by respondent during Judge Sadang’s (Branch 17, Regional Trial
Court of Cavite) searching examination of Mr. Lorenzana illustrates this, viz.:
Q: You also state here that Steel Corporation owns a patent exclusively licensed to Steel Corporation by
BIEC International, Inc. Do you have a document to show that?
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the presentation of the trademark license, your Honor.x x x x x x x x x
Q: The patent on the Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands, do you have a document regarding that?
A: Yes, your Honor. It is in the office.
ATTY. CHUA: We reserve the right to present it, your Honor.
It is worth underscoring that although Judge Sadang addressed his questions solely to Mr. Lorenzana,
respondent was conveniently quick to interrupt and manifest his client’s reservation to present the
trademark license. Respondent was equally swift to end Judge Sadang’s inquiry over the patent by
reserving the right to present the same at another time. While it is not the Commission’s province to
dwell with suppositions and hypotheses, it is well within its powers to make reasonable inferences from
established facts. Given that Patent No. 16269 had been in expiry for more than five (5) years when
Judge Sadang propounded his questions, it logically appears that respondent, in making such
reservations in open court, was trying to conceal from the former the fact of the patent’s expiration so as
to facilitate the grant of the search warrant in favor of STEELCORP. This is contrary to the exacting
standards of conduct required from a member of the Bar.
Indeed, the practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed upon by the State upon those
who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of those requirements is the observance of honesty and candor.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the legal
profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in
the conduct of litigation and in their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels
and the courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves according to
the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their clients. 6
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent violated his duties as a lawyer to avoid dishonest and
deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01,
Canon 10). Also, respondent desecrated the solemn oath he took before this Court when he sought
admission to the bar, i.e., not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Thus, even
at the risk of jeopardizing the probability of prevailing on STEELCORP’s application for a search
warrant, respondent should have informed the court of the patent’s expiration so as to allow the latter to
make an informed decision given all available and pertinent facts.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months with ADMONITION that a repetition of the same or similar act in
the future will be dealt with more severely.
NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION FELIPE-
DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V. FELIPE, Complainants, vs.ATTY.
CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent. A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013
On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal,
docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution2 dated June 19, 1996, we required respondent to comment.
Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July 16, 1996.3 On August 15, 1996, respondent filed
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension Of Tme To File Comment.4 He requested for additional period
of 30 days within which to file his comment citing numerous professional commitments. We granted said
request in our October 2, 1996 Resolution.5 The extended deadline passed sans respondent’s
comment. Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants file an Urgent Motion To Submit The Administrative
Case For Resolution Without Comment Of Respondent6 claiming the respondent is deemed to have
waived his right to file comment.
On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report, and recommendation.7
The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-Palma who set
the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8
The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The next hearing was set
on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the complainants' counsel. 11
Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last hearing, complainants
moved to calendar the case.12
The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case on January
12, 1999.13
During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their Position
Paper.1âwphi1Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16
It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation.17
In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the Petition; he then
narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no discussion was made regarding the
merits of the complaint. However, it was recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for one (1) month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In their Petition,
complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch
216 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while respondent is the counsel for the defendants
therein; that respondent committed dishonesty when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case
No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other despite knowing that the defendants
are half-brothers and half-sisters of complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against
the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before
Branch 36 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent
introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and
that they filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants
averred that respondent knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance with
the rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and
that they filed a Vigorous Opposition to the said pleading. Complainants insisted that by the foregoing
actuations, respondent violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and ordered to pay
complainants the amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered. In fine,
complainants charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when he introduced a
falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and (3) when he
knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that in order to determine
whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the issue of whether the
complainants are indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 being half-brothers and
half-sisters. We would also be tasked to make an assessment on the authenticity of the Certificate of
Marriage which respondent submitted in the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Similarly, we
will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed was indeed baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in
Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these prerequisites cannot be accomplished in this administrative
case. The resolution of whether the parties are related to each other appears to be one of the issues
brought up in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 which is a complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration
of Nullity of Documents and Damages. The complainants claimed that they are the legitimate children of
the late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This was rebutted by the defendants therein, as represented by the
respondent, who denied their filiation with the complainants. Clearly, the issue of filiation must be settled
in those proceedings, and not in this administrative case. The same is true with regard to the issue of
authenticity of the Marriage Certificate which was submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the
Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been filed against the
defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before
Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful" statement that they are strangers to each
other. They had also filed another Perjury charge against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A for allegedly
submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they already filed a Vigorous
Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction filed by
the respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must be threshed out in a judicial
action. We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion18 that -
x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter involves
violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court's disciplinary authority.
However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liablity, and which do not directly
require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper subject of a
judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19
Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain as a
member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance,
however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a
lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual
matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as not
to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court deems
it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending on the final
outcome of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements, the Petition filed by
complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. However, we cannot end our discussion here. It has
not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our directive, respondent did not file his comment. Neither
did he file his Position Paper as ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be sanctioned.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only
irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His conduct is
unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes
and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the
court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a
mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of
the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in administrative cases against lawyers. 22
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the infraction committed
by the respondent.23
ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to give due
respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED that commission of a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November 19,
2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member
of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
AHON. MARIBETH RODRIGUEZ-MANAHAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, San Mateo,
Rizal,Complainant, vs.ATTY. RODOLFO FLORES, Respondent. .C. No. 8954 November 13,
2013
Respondent Atty. Rodolto Flores (Atty. Flores) was counsel for the defendant in Civil Case No. 1863
captioned as Marsha Aranas plaintiff versus Arnold Balmores defendant a suit for damages filed before
the Municipal Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal and presided by herein complainant Judge Maribeth
Rodriguez-Manahan (Judge Manahan). During the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1863, Judge Manahan
issued an Order1 dated January 12, 2011, whereby she voluntarily inhibited from hearing Civil Case No.
1863. The said Order reads in part, viz:
More than mere contempt do his (Atty. Flores) unethical actuations, his traits of dishonesty and
discourtesy not only to his own brethren in the legal profession, but also to the bench and judges, would
amount to grave misconduct, if not a malpractice of law, a serious ground for disciplinary action of a
member of the bar pursuant to Rules 139 a & b.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, furnish a copy of this Order to the Bar Discipline Committee, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, to the Supreme Court en banc, for appropriate investigation and sanction. 2
Upon receipt of the copy of the above Order, the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) deemed the
pronouncements of Judge Manahan as a formal administrative Complaint against Atty. Flores.
Docketed as A.C. No. 8954, the case was referred to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal for investigation, report and recommendation.3
In her Investigation, Report and Recommendation,4 Investigating Judge Josephine Zarate Fernandez
(Investigating Judge) narrated the antecedents of the case as follows:
A complaint for Damages was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Mateo, Rizal
docketed as Civil Case No. 1863, entitled Marsha Aranas vs. Arnold Balmores. The Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) thru Atty. Ferdinand P. Censon represented the complainant while Atty. Rodolfo Flores
appeared as counsel for the defendant.
x x x During the Preliminary Conference x x x, respondent Atty. Flores entered his appearance and was
given time to file a Pre-Trial Brief. x x x On May 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores filed his Pre-Trial
Brief but without proof of MCLE compliance hence it was expunged from the records without prejudice
to the filing of another Pre-Trial Brief containing the required MCLE compliance. x x x Atty. Flores asked
for ten (10) days to submit proof.
The preliminary conference was reset several times (August 11, September 8) for failure of respondent
Atty. Flores to appear and submit his Pre-Trial Brief indicating thereon his MCLE compliance. The court
a quo likewise issued Orders dated September 15 and October 20, 2010 giving respondent Atty. Flores
a last chance to submit his Pre-Trial Brief with stern warning that failure to do so shall be considered a
waiver on his part.
Meanwhile, respondent Atty. Flores filed a Manifestation in Court dated September 14, 2010 stating
among others, the following allegations:x x x x
4. When you took your oath as member of the Bar, you promised to serve truth, justice and fair
play. Do you think you are being truthful, just and fair by serving a cheater?
5. Ignorance of the law excuses no one for which reason even Erap was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan.1âwphi1But even worse is a lawyer who violates the law.
6. Last but not the least, God said Thou shall not lie. Again the Philippine Constitution
commands: Give every Filipino his due. The act of refusal by the plaintiff is violative of the
foregoing divine and human laws.x x x x
Respondent Atty. Flores later filed his Pre-Trial Brief bearing an MCLE number which was merely
superimposed without indicating the date and place of compliance. During the preliminary conference
on November 24, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores manifested that he will submit proof of compliance of
his MCLE on the following day. On December 1, 2010, respondent Atty. Flores again failed to appear
and to submit the said promised proof of MCLE compliance. In its stead, respondent Atty. Flores filed a
Letter of even date stating as follows:
If only to give your Honor another chance to prove your pro plaintiff sentiment, I am hereby filing the
attached Motion which you may once more assign to the waste basket of nonchalance.
With the small respect that still remains, I have asked the defendant to look for another lawyer to
represent him for I am no longer interested in this case because I feel I cannot do anything right in your
sala.5
The Investigating Judge found Atty. Flores to have failed to give due respect to the court by failing to
obey court orders, by failing to submit proof of his compliance with the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) requirement, and for using intemperate language in his pleadings. The Investigating
Judge recommended that Atty. Flores be suspended from the practice of law for one year.6
The OBC adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Judge.7
Our Ruling
There is no doubt that Atty. Flores failed to obey the trial court’s order to submit proof of his MCLE
compliance notwithstanding the several opportunities given him. "Court orders are to be respected not
because the judges who issue them should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration
that should be extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not because of the
incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in them. Disrespect to judicial
incumbents is disrespect to that branc the Government to which they belong, as well as to the State
which has instituted the judicial system."8
Atty. Flores also employed intemperate language in his pleadings. As an officer of the court, Atty. Flores
is expected to be circumspect in his language. Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins all attorneys to abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts. Atty. Flores failed in this respect.
At this juncture, it is well to remind respondent that:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client full devotion to his client's genuine
interest and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, as well as the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of law. A lawyer is entitled to voice
his c1iticism within the context of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech which must be
exercised responsibly. After all, every right carries with it the corresponding obligation. Freedom is not
freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. The lawyer's fidelity to his client must not
be pursued at the expense of truth and orderly administration of justice. It must be done within the
confines of reason and common sense.9
However, we find the recommended penalty too harsh and not commensurate with the infractions
committed by the respondent. It appears that this is the first infraction committed by respondent. Also,
we are not prepared to impose on the respondent the penalty of one-year suspension for humanitarian
reasons. Respondent manifested before this Court that he has been in the practice of law for half a
century.10 Thus, he is already in his twilight years. Considering the foregoing, we deem it proper to fine
respondent in the amount of ₱5,000.00 and to remind him to be more circumspect in his acts and to
obey and respect court processes.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Rodolfo Flores is FINED in the amount of ₱5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
AMADO T. DIZON, Complainant, vs.ATTY. NORLITA DE TAZA, Respondent. A.C. No. 7676
June 10, 2014
This concerns an administrative complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Norlita De Taza (Atty. De Taza)
for the latter's demand for and receipt of exorbitant sums of money from her client purportedly to
expedite the proceedings of their case which was pending before the Court.
The Facts
Amado Dizon (complainant) alleged that sometime in February 2005, he, along with his siblings
engaged the services of Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates to represent them in the case of Eliza T.
Castaneda, et al. v. Heirs of Spouses Martin and Lucia Dizon with G.R. No. 174552. 2 The complainant
claimed that sometime in February 2007, Atty. De Taza demanded the sum of Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (₱75,000.00) from him to expedite the proceedings before the Court. This amount was over and
above the parties’ stipulated retainer fee as evidenced by a contract. 3
According to the complainant, unknown to him at that time was that, a month earlier or in January 2007,
Atty. De Taza had already demanded and received a total of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱800,000.00) from his sibling Aurora Dizon, for the same reason that Atty. De Taza proffered to him,
which was to expedite the proceedings of their case before the Court. Handwritten receipts 4 signed by
one Atty. Norlita De Taza were submitted by the complainant, which state:
15 Jan. 2007
Receipt
That the amount received ₱300,000 shall be used to expedite the case which, in turn shall result in the
following:
1. Decision favorable to plaintiff w/in 2 mos. from receipt of said amount;
2. Back rentals up to present should be returned, if the same should not be included in the
Decision, the 300,000.00 shall be returned.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza518 Jan. 2007
Receipt
The amount of ₱500,000 has been advanced as part of expense [sic] to expedite the process before the
courts. The said amount has been advanced by Ms. Aurora Dizon and the same should be reimbursed
to her by her siblings upon winning the case with finality.
Signed
Atty. Norlita De Taza6
On October 24, 2007, the complainant went to this Court in Padre Faura, Manila and learned that the
Court had already denied the petition on November 20, 2006, contrary to Atty. De Taza’s
representations that the case was still pending. He tried to communicate with Atty. De Taza, but she
could no longer be found.7
Thereafter, on November 6, 2007, the complainant instituted a complaint for disbarment 8 against Atty.
De Taza. He also attached several affidavits and documents9 from other individuals who attested that
Atty. De Taza issued bouncing checks and/or failed to pay off her debts to them. A certain Ana Lynda
Pineda executed an affidavit10which was attached to the complaint, alleging that Atty. De Taza issued
11 checks11 in her favor amounting to ₱481,400.00, which were all dishonored by the bank. Demand
letters sent to her went unheeded.
Likewise, Darwin Tiamzon, a creditor of Atty. De Taza, whose Affidavit 12 was attached to the complaint,
averred that Atty. De Taza issued a check13 for ₱50,000.00 as payment for her loan. Said check was
dishonored by the bank for being drawn against a closed account.
Furthermore, a certain Eleanor Sarmiento submitted an affidavit, 14 stating that Atty. De Taza owes her
₱29,560.39 and failed to pay the said amount despite repeated demands.
On November 14, 2007, the complainant through a letter15 informed the Court that Atty. De Taza is
planning to leave the country as she was joining her husband in the United States of America (U.S.A.).
In a Resolution16 dated December 10, 2007, Atty. De Taza was required by the Court to file a Comment.
However, the copy of the Resolution was returned unserved with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS
(Return to Sender)-Moved". The Court then resolved by virtue of the Resolution 17 dated July 2, 2008, to
send a copy to Atty. De Taza’s office address at Romero De Taza Cruz and Associates. Said copy was
also returned unserved with the notation "RTS-not connected."
It was then required in the Resolution18 dated October 8, 2008 that the complainant inform the Court of
Atty. De Taza’s new address, which the complainant faithfully complied with by giving Atty. De Taza’s
new address in the U.S.A. The Court, in its Resolution19 dated January 26, 2009, directed the Clerk of
Court to resend a copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with a copy of the complaint to Atty.
De Taza using the latter’s U.S.A. address.
Like the previous occasions, the copy of the Resolution dated December 10, 2007 with the complaint
was returned; this time, with the postal carrier’s notation "RTS-Unclaimed". The Court in its
Resolution20 dated September 9, 2009, held that the said copy of the Resolution was deemed served
and resolved to consider Atty. De Taza as having waived the filing of her comment. The case was
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
A Notice of Mandatory Conference21 was sent to the parties, in which they failed to appear. Thus, the
parties were directed to file their respective position papers. The complainant, in a letter 22 addressed to
the IBP, averred that he was already residing abroad and maintained that he had already submitted his
documentary evidence at the time of the filing of his complaint. Atty. De Taza, for her part, did not file
any position paper.
In its Report and Recommendation23 dated January 4,2011, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
recommended that Atty. De Taza be suspended for a period of two years from the practice of law.
The IBP Board of Governors modified the Commission on Bar Discipline’s recommendation in a
Resolution24 dated January 3, 2013, viz:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s demand of
[P]800,000.00 to expedite the case pending in the Supreme Court when, in fact, the case had long been
dismissed, Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.25 (Emphasis supplied)
The Issue
WHETHER ATTY. DE TAZASHOULD BE HELD ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE FOR ISSUING
BOUNCING CHECKS, DEMANDING AND/OR RECEIVING MONEY FROM HER CLIENTS
UNDERTHE GUISE OF HAVING THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT EXPEDITED. Ruling
The Court acknowledges the fact that Atty. De Taza was not able to refute the accusations against her.
Numerous attempts were made to afford her an opportunity to defend herself from the complainant’s
allegations, but all these efforts were only met with silence. Whether her transfer of residence was an
unscrupulous move on her part to evade her creditors, only she would certainly know. But as far as the
Court is concerned, all means were exhausted to give Atty. De Taza an avenue to oppose the
complainant’s charges. Her failure and/or refusal to file a comment will not be a hindrance for the Court
to mete out an appropriate sanction.
The Court has time and again ruled that disciplinary proceedings are investigations by the Court to
ascertain whether a lawyer is fit to be one. There is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. As this
Court held in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,26 citing In the Matter of the
Proceedings for Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Almacen, et al. v. Yaptinchay: 27 "Disciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its
officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court
motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession
and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x. 28 (Italics supplied)
"In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required." 29 Based on the
documentary evidence submitted by the complainant, it appears that Atty. De Taza manifested a
propensity for borrowing money, issuing bouncing checks and incurring debts which she left unpaid
without any reason. The complainant even submitted a document evidencing Atty. De Taza’s
involvement in an estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 22 case filed before the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Angeles City (I.S. 07-J-2815-36) for drawing checks against a closed account,
among other complaint-affidavits executed by her other creditors. Such conduct, while already off-
putting when attributed to an ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when the same is exhibited by a
member of the Bar. As a lawyer, Atty. De Taza must remember that she is not only a symbol but also an
instrument of justice, equity and fairness.
"We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against
a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a
lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence. The
issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful
to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest and public order.1âwphi1 It also manifests a
lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously
and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem."30
Atty. De Taza’s actuations towards the complainant and his siblings were even worse as she had the
gall to make it appear to the complainant that the proceedings before the Court can be expedited and
ruled in their favor in exchange for an exorbitant amount of money. Said scheme was employed by Atty.
De Taza just to milk more money from her clients. Without a doubt, Atty. De Taza’s actions are
reprehensible and her greed more than apparent when she even used the name of the Court to defraud
her client.
When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an
accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for that particular purpose. And if he does
not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to his
client.31 In this case, the purpose for which Atty. De Taza demanded money is baseless and non-
existent. Thus, her demand should not have even been made in the first place.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the disbarment or suspension of a
lawyer for any of the following: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for
a party without authority to do so.32
The Court in Victoria C. Heenan v. Atty. Erlinda Espejo33 suspended the respondent from the practice of
law for two years when the latter issued checks which were dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. In
A-1 Financial Services, Inc. v. Valerio,34 the same penalty was meted out by this Court to the erring
lawyer who issued worthless checks to pay off her loan.
Additionally, in Anacta v. Resurreccion,35 the Court held that suspension from the practice of law for four
years was the appropriate sanction for a lawyer who defrauded his client into paying ₱42,000.00 to him
for the purported filing of a petition for annulment of marriage. The respondent therein presented to his
client a copy of the petition with stamped receipt from the trial court when in reality, no such petition was
filed.
In Celaje v. Atty. Soriano,36 the respondent therein demanded ₱14,000.00 from the complainant to be
put up as injunction bond and asked for additional sums of money on other occasions, supposedly to
pay the judge who was handling the case. When the complainant verified this with the judge, the judge
denied the respondent’s allegations. The complainant later learned that the bond was also unnecessary,
as the application for a writ was already denied by the trial court. Due to the foregoing, the Court
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for two years.
"Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are
competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of
the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings
with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach."37 "The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of corruption and malpractice.
For a member of the legal profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the judicial system with
such irresponsible representations is reprehensible and cannot be tolerated." 38
All told, the Court holds that there is no reason to deviate from the report and recommendation of the
IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which is to suspend Atty. De Taza from the practice of law for two
years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norlita De Taza is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
TWO YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as
well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and guidance, and let it be entered in Atty.
Norlita De Taza's record in this Court.SO ORDERED.
ANASTACIO N. TEODORO III, Complainant, vs.ATTY. ROMEO S. GONZALES, Respondent. A.C.
No. 6760 January 30, 2013
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Romeo S. Gonzales for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for the forum shopping he allegedly committed.
In his complaint,1 Anastacio N. Teodoro Ill related that Atty. Gonzales acted as counsel of Araceli
Teodoro-Marcial in two civil cases that the latter filed against him. The first ccise, Special Proceeding
No. 99-95587,2 involved the settlement of the intestate estate of Manuela Teodoro. While the settlement
proceeding was pending, Atty. Gonzales assisted
Teodord-Marcial in filing Civil Case No. 00-99207,3 for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and
Damages, without indicating the special proceeding earlier tiled. The tiling of the civil cases, according
to Anastacio, was a deliberate act of forum shopping that warrants the disbarment of Atty. Gonzales.
Atty. Gonzales admitted that he assisted Teodoro-Marcial in tiling the two cases. He asserted,
however,, that he did not violate the forum shopping rule as the cases were not identical in terms of
parties, subject matter and remedies. Atty. Gonzales also opined that the complainant only filed the
disbarment case to harass him.4
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In our Resolution5 dated March 13, 2006, we referred the disbarment complaint to the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation6 dated July 5, 2010, Commissioner Caesar R.
Dulay found Atty. Gonzales administratively liable for forum shopping.
According to Commissioner Dulay, both Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207
hinged on the same substantial issue, i.e., on whether Manuela held the Malate property in trust for
Carmen Teodoro-Reyes, Donato T. Teodoro, Jorge I. Teodoro and Teodoro-Marcial.
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, Carmen, Donato, Jorge I. Teodoro, Jorge T. Teodoro and
Teodoro-Marcial claimed that they are the heirs of Manuela. During her lifetime, Manuela was the
registered owner of a parcel of land located in Malate, Manila. According to the heirs, Manuela held the
lot in trust for them, but she sold it to Anastacio and Rogelio Ng. Thus, the heirs prayed for the issuance
of letters of administration so that Manuela’s properties could be inventoried and settled in accordance
with law.
In Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela claimed to be the beneficiaries of a trust held by
Manuela over the same parcel of land contested in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587. They alleged that
during her lifetime, Manuela sold a portion of this land to Anastacio. They asked the trial court to annul
the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Manuela; to cancel the resulting Transfer Certificate of Title in
the name of Anastacio; and to issue a new one in their names.
The commissioner found that a ruling in either case would result in res judicata over the other. Thus,
Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he instituted Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating
that Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending. In committing forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales
disregarded the Supreme Court Circular prohibiting forum shopping and thus violated Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
Commissioner Dulay recommended that Atty. Gonzales be suspended for one month from the practice
of law, with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense would merit a more severe penalty.
The Board of Governors of the IBP reversed the commissioner’s recommendation. In a
resolution7 dated December 10, 2011, the Board of Governors dismissed the case against Atty.
Gonzales for lack of merit.
The Issue
The case directly poses to us the question of whether Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping and
thereby violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings of the commissioner and accordingly reverse the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, but we modify the commissioner’s recommended penalty to censure and a warning that
another violation would merit a more severe penalty.
Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, or in anticipation thereof,
a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. 8
There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of rights or causes of action,
and (c) identity of relief sought.9
Under this test, we find that Atty. Gonzales committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-
99207 while Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 was pending.
Identity of Parties
An identity of parties exists in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587 and Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both
cases, the initiating parties are the same, to wit: Carmen, Donato, Teodoro-Marcial, Jorge I. Teodoro,
Rowena Teodoro, Abigail Teodoro and Jorge T. Teodoro. They represented the same interest in both
cases. All claimed to be the legitimate heirs of Manuela and co-owners of the land that she held in trust
for them.
Meanwhile, Anastacio, the oppositor in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, is also the sole defendant in
Civil Case No. 00-99207. In both cases, he espoused the same interest, as transferee-owner of the lot
allegedly held in trust by Manuela.
Identity of causes of action
The test of identity of causes of action does not depend on the form of an action taken, but on whether
the same evidence would support and establish the former and the present causes of action. 10 The
heirs of Manuela cannot avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of their action or
by adopting a different method of presenting it.11
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction over the case, as
Manuela left no properties at the time of her death. The lot in Malate, Manila, which was the sole
property that the heirs of Manuela claim should be included in her estate, has been sold to Rogelio and
Anastacio when Manuela was still alive. The trial court did not give credence to their claim that Manuela
held the property in trust for them.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the trial court issued an order granting Anastacio’s Motion for
Demurrer to Evidence. It held that the heirs of Manuela had been unable to prove their claim that
Manuela held the lot in trust for their benefit. Neither were they able to prove that the sale of a portion of
the lot to Anastacio was void.
In both cases, the issue of whether Manuela held the lot in Malate, Manila in trust had to be decided by
the trial court. The initiating parties’ claim in the two cases depended on the existence of the trust
Manuela allegedly held in their favor. Thus, the evidence necessary to prove their claim was the same.
Identity of relief sought
In Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, the heirs of Manuela prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration, the liquidation of Manuela’s estate, and its distribution among her legal heirs.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 00-99207, the heirs of Manuela asked for the annulment of the deed of
absolute sale Manuela executed in favor of Anastacio. They likewise asked the court to cancel the
resulting Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of the latter, and to issue a new one in their names.
While the reliefs prayed for in the initiatory pleadings of the two cases are different in form, a ruling in
one case would have resolved the other, and vice versa. To illustrate, had the lot been declared as part
of the estate of Manuela in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, there would have been no need for a
decision annulling the sale in Civil Case No. 00-99207. Conversely, had the sale in Civil Case No. 00-
99207 been annulled, then the property would go back to the hands of the heirs of Manuela. Placing the
property under administration, as prayed for in Special Proceeding No. 99-95587, would have been
unnecessary.
Thus, the relief prayed for, the facts upon which it is based, and the parties are substantially similar in
the two cases. Since the elements of litis pendentia and res judicata are present, Atty. Gonzales
committed forum shopping when he filed Civil Case No. 00-99207 without indicating that Special
Proceeding No. 99-95587 was still pending.
As Commissioner Dulay observed:
Respondent was fully aware, since he was the counsel for both cases, that he raised the issue of trust
with respect to the Malate property in the 1999 Letters of Administration case and that he was raising
the same similar issue of trust in the 2000 annulment case xxx
To advise his client therefore to execute the affidavit of non-forum shopping for the second case
(annulment case) and state that there is no pending case involving the same or similar issue would
constitute misconduct which should be subject to disciplinary action. It was his duty to advise his client
properly, and his failure to do so, in fact his deliberate assertion that there was no falsity in the affidavit
is indicative of a predisposition to take lightly his duty as a lawyer to promote respect and obedience to
the law.12
"Lawyers should be reminded that their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of
justice. Any conduct that tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes
this obligation."13
The Court has repeatedly warned lawyers against resorting to forum shopping since the practice clogs
the Court dockets and can lead to conflicting rulings.14 Willful and deliberate forum shopping has been
made punishable either as direct or indirect contempt of court in SC
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 dated April 1, 1994.15
In engaging in forum shopping, Atty. Gonzales violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which directs lawyers to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes. He also disregarded his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice,16 and the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing court processes. 17
To our mind, however, the supreme penalty of disbarment would be very harsh in light of all the
circumstances of this case. Neither is the commissioner’s recommended penalty of suspension
consistent with prior rulings of the Court.
In Guanzon, Vda. de, etc. v. Judge Yrad, Jr., etc., et al.18 we severely censured Renecio Espiritu, the
counsel who filed a petition in the Court of Appeals thirty-three days after a similar petition had been
filed with the Supreme Court. We also found him guilty of direct contempt.
The present case finds favorable comparison with Guanzon. Like Espiritu, Atty. Gonzales misused court
processes in contravention of the express rule against forum shopping. We held then that Espiritu
should be penalized and we imposed the penalty of censure —the penalty usually imposed for an
isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature.19
Lawyers are also censured for minor infractions against the lawyer’s duty to the Court or the client.20 As
earlier stated, Atty. Gonzales’ act of forum shopping disregarded his duty to obey and promote respect
for the law and legal processes, as well as the prohibition against unduly delaying a case by misusing
court processes.21 It also violated his duty as an officer of the court to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.22
WHEREFORE, we find the basis for the complaint meritorious and accordingly CENSURE Atty. Romeo
S. Gonzales for resorting to forum shopping. He is WARNED that any future violation of his duties as a
lawyer will be dealt with more severely. A copy of this reprimand should be attached to Atty. Romeo S.
Gonzales’ personal file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
EUPROCINA I. CRISOSTOMO, MARILYN L. SOLIS, EVELYN MARQUIZO, ROSEMARIE
BALATUCAN, MILDRED BATANG, MARILEN MINERALES, and MELINDA D.
SIOTING, Complainants, vs.ATTY. PHILIP Z. A. NAZARENO, Respondent. A.C. No. 6677
June 10, 2014
For the Court's resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by complainants Euprocina I. Crisostomo
(Crisostomo), Marilyn L. Solis (Solis), Evelyn Marquizo (Marquizo), Rosemarie Balatucan (Balatucan),
Mildred Batang (Batang), Marilen Minerales (Minerales), and Melinda D. Sioting (Sioting) against
respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno (Atty. Nazareno), charging him with making false declarations in
the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case in disregard of Section 5, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court, and malpractice as a notary public in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
The Facts
Sometime in 2001, complainants individually purchased housing units (subject properties) in Patricia
South Villa Subdivision, Anabu-II, Imus, Cavite, from Rudex International Development Corp.
(Rudex).2 In view of several inadequacies and construction defects 3 in the housing units and the
subdivision itself, complainants sought the rescission of their respective contracts to sell before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), seeking the refund of the monthly amortizations
they had paid.4 The first batch of rescission cases was filed by herein complainants Sioting 5 on May 24,
2002, and Crisostomo6 and Marquizo7 on June 10, 2002, while the second batch of rescission cases
was filed by complainants Balatucan8 on March 3, 2003, Solis9 and Ederlinda M.
Villanueva10 (represented by Minerales) on May 12, 2003, and Batang 11 on July 29, 2003. In all the
foregoing rescission cases, Rudex was represented by herein respondent Atty. Nazareno.
Judgments of default were eventually rendered against Rudex in the first batch of rescission
cases.12 Sometime in August 2003, Rudex filed three (3) petitions for review13 before the HLURB
assailing the same. In the certifications against forum shopping attached to the said petitions, Rudex,
through its President Ruben P. Baes, and legal counsel Atty. Nazareno, stated that it has not
commenced or has knowledge of any similar action or proceeding involving the same issues pending
before any court, tribunal or agency14 – this, notwithstanding the fact that Rudex, under the
representation of Atty. Nazareno, previously filed an ejectment case on September 9, 2002 against
Sioting and her husband, Rodrigo Sioting (Sps. Sioting), before the Municipal Trial Court of Imus, Cavite
(MTC).15
On January 29, 2004, Rudex, again represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed another complaint16 against
Sps. Sioting before the HLURB for the rescission of their contract to sell and the latter’s ejectment,
similar to its pending September 9, 2002 ejectment complaint. Yet, in the certification against forum
shopping attached thereto executed by the Head of its Credit and Collection department, Norilyn D.
Unisan,17 Rudex declared that it has not commenced or is not aware of any action or proceeding
involving the same issues pending before any court, tribunal or agency. 18The said certification was
notarized by Atty. Nazareno himself.19
On April 1, 2004, six (6) similar complaints20 for rescission of contracts to sell and ejectment, plus
damages for non-payment of amortizations due, were filed by Atty. Nazareno, on behalf of Rudex,
against the other complainants before the HLURB. The certifications against forum shopping attached
thereto likewise stated that Rudex has not commenced or has any knowledge of any similar pending
action before any court, tribunal or agency.21
On February 21, 2005, complainants jointly filed the present administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Nazareno, claiming that in the certifications against forum shopping attached to the
complaints for rescission and ejectment of Rudex filed while Atty. Nazareno was its counsel, the latter
made false declarations therein that no similar actions or proceedings have been commenced by Rudex
or remained pending before any other court, tribunal or agency when, in fact, similar actions or
proceedings for rescission had been filed by herein complainants before the HLURB against Rudex and
Atty. Nazareno, and an ejectment complaint was filed by Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, against
Sps. Sioting. In addition, complainants asserted that Atty. Nazareno committed malpractice as a notary
public since he only assigned one (1) document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) in all the certifications
against forum shopping that were separately attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for
rescission and ejectment.22
Despite notice, Atty. Nazareno failed to file his comment and refute the administrative charges against
him.23
In the interim, the HLURB, in the Resolutions dated April 14, 2005 24 and May 12, 2005,25 dismissed
Rudex’s complaints for rescission and ejectment26 on the ground that its statements in the certifications
against forum shopping attached thereto were false due to the existence of similar pending cases in
violation of Section 5,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation27 dated March 8, 2012, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero recommended the suspension of Atty. Nazareno for a
period of six (6) months for his administrative violations.
The Investigating Commissioner found, among others, that there were unassailable proofs that the
certification against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s ejectment complaint against Sps. Sioting had
been erroneously declared, considering that at the time Rudex filed the said complaint in September
2002, Sps. Sioting’s rescission complaint against Rudex, filed on May 24, 2002, was already pending.
Hence, it was incumbent upon Rudex to have declared its existence, more so, since both complaints
involve the same transaction and essential facts, and a decision on the rescission complaint would
amount to res judicata on the ejectment complaint.28 In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner
observed that Atty. Nazareno cannot claim innocence of his omission since he was not only Rudex’s
counsel but the notarizing officer as well. Having knowingly made false entries in the subject
certifications against forum shopping, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty.
Nazareno be held administratively liable and thereby penalized with six (6) months suspension.29
In a Resolution30 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation, but modified the recommended penalty
from a suspension of six (6) months to only one (1) month.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Atty. Nazareno should be held administratively liable
and accordingly suspended for a period of one (1) month.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the IBP’s findings with modification as to the penalty imposed.
Separate from the proscription against forum shopping31 is the violation of the certification requirement
against forum shopping, which was distinguished in the case of Sps. Ong v. CA32 as follows:
The distinction between the prohibition against forum shopping and the certification requirement should
by now be too elementary to be misunderstood. To reiterate, compliance with the certification against
forum shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance of the act of forum shopping itself.
There is a difference in the treatment between failure to comply with the certification requirement and
violation of the prohibition against forum shopping not only in terms of imposable sanctions but also in
the manner of enforcing them. The former constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without prejudice
to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and after hearing, while the latter is a
ground for summary dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. x x x. 33
Under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, the submission of false entries in a certification against
forum shopping constitutes indirect or direct contempt of court, and subjects the erring counsel to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions, viz.:
Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath
in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to
the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other
pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or
non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
(Emphases supplied)
In the realm of legal ethics, said infraction may be considered as a violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) which read as follows:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LANDAND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.x x x x
CANON 10 – A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
In this case, it has been established that Atty. Nazareno made false declarations in the certifications
against forum shopping attached to Rudex’s pleadings, for which he should be held administratively
liable.
Records show that Atty. Nazareno, acting as Rudex’s counsel, filed, in August 2003, petitions for review
assailing the judgments of default rendered in the first batch of rescission cases without disclosing in the
certifications against forum shopping the existence of the ejectment case it filed against Sps. Sioting
which involves an issue related to the complainants’ rescission cases. Further, on January 29, 2004,
Rudex, represented by Atty. Nazareno, filed a complaint for rescission and ejectment against Sps.
Sioting without disclosing in the certifications against forum shopping the existence of Sioting’s May 24,
2002 rescission complaint against Rudex as well as Rudex’s own September 9, 2002 ejectment
complaint also against Sps. Sioting. Finally, on April 1, 2004,Atty. Nazareno, once more filed rescission
and ejectment complaints against the other complainants in this case without disclosing in the
certifications against forum shopping the existence of complainants’ own complaints for rescission.
Owing to the evident similarity of the issues involved in each set of cases, Atty. Nazareno – as
mandated by the Rules of Court and more pertinently, the canons of the Code – should have truthfully
declared the existence of the pending related cases in the certifications against forum shopping
attached to the pertinent pleadings. Considering that Atty. Nazareno did not even bother to refute the
charges against him despite due notice, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the IBP’s
resolution on his administrative liability.1âwphi1 However, as for the penalty to be imposed, the Court
deems it proper to modify the IBP’s finding on this score.
In Molina v. Atty. Magat,34 a penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law was imposed
against the lawyer therein who was shown to have deliberately made false and untruthful statements in
one of his pleadings. Given that Atty. Nazareno’s infractions are of a similar nature, but recognizing
further that he, as may be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, had repetitively committed the same,
the Court hereby suspends him from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
Separately, the Court further finds Atty. Nazareno guilty of malpractice as a notary public, considering
that he assigned only one document number (i.e., Doc. No. 1968) to the certifications against forum
shopping attached to the six (6) April 1, 2004 complaints for rescission and ejectment despite the fact
that each of them should have been treated as a separate notarial act. It is a standing rule that for every
notarial act, the notary shall record in the notarial register at the time of the notarization, among others,
the entry and page number of the document notarized, and that he shall give to each instrument or
document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his
register.35 Evidently, Atty. Nazareno did not comply with the foregoing rule.
Worse, Atty. Nazareno notarized the certifications against forum shopping attached to all the
aforementioned complaints, fully aware that they identically asserted a material falsehood, i.e., that
Rudex had not commenced any actions or proceedings or was not aware of any pending actions or
proceedings involving the same issues in any other forum. The administrative liability of an erring notary
public in this respect was clearly delineated as a violation of Rule 1.01,Canon 1 of the Code in the case
of Heirs of the Late Spouses Villanueva v. Atty. Beradio,36 to wit:
Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the Court
must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case may
dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public
confidence on notarial documents diminished. In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the
land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.37 (Emphasis supplied)
In said case, the lawyer who knowingly notarized a document containing false statements had his
notarial commission revoked and was disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of one
(1) year. Thus, for his malpractice as a notary public, the Court is wont to additionally impose the same
penalties of such nature against him. However, due to the multiplicity of his infractions on this front,
coupled with his willful malfeasance in discharging the office, the Court deems it proper to revoke his
existing commission and permanently disqualify him from being commissioned as a notary public.
Indeed, respondent ought to be reminded that:38
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a
private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.
Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon he acknowledgment
executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
 xxxx
When a notary public certifies to the due execution and delivery of the document under his hand and
seal he gives the document the force of evidence. Indeed, one of the purposes of requiring documents
to be acknowledged before a notary public, in addition to the solemnity which should surround the
execution and delivery of documents, is to authorize such documents to be given without further proof of
their execution and delivery. Where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon
him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any. Failing in this, he must accept the consequences of his unwarranted actions.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Philip Z. A. Nazareno is found GUILTY of making false declarations in
the certifications against forum shopping subject of this case, as well as malpractice as a notary public.
Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his
receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. Further, he is PERMANENTLY DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as
a notary public and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent's
personal record as attorney.1âwphi1 Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.SO ORDERED.
Adm. Case No. 8108 July 15, 2014
DANTE LA JIMENEZ & LAURO G. VIZCONDE, Complainants, vs.ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO,
JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
Adm. Case No. 10299
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. FELISBERTO L. VERANO, JR., Respondent.
Before this Court is theResolution1 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) finding respondent Atty. Felisberto Verano liable for improper and inappropriate conduct tending to
influence and/or giving the appearance of influence upon a public official. The Joint Report and
Recommendation submitted by Commissioner Felimon C. Abelita III recommended that respondent
beissued a warning not to repeat the same nor any similar action, otherwise the Commission will
impose a more severe penalty. The Commission adopted the said ruling on 16 April 2013. 2
The complainants in Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8108 are Dante La Jimenez and Lauro G.
Vizconde, while complainant in Adm. Case No. 10299 is Atty. Oliver O. Lozano. At the time of the filing
of the complaints, respondent Atty. Verano was representing his clients Richard S. Brodett and Joseph
R. Tecson.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Brodett and Tecson (identified in media reports attached to the Complaint as the "Alabang Boys")
werethe accused in cases filed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for the illegal sale
and use of dangerous drugs.3In a Joint Inquest Resolution issued on 2 December 2008, the charges
were dropped for lack of probable cause.4
Because of the failure of Prosecutor John R. Resado to ask clarificatory questions during the evaluation
of the case, several media outlets reported on incidents of bribery and "cover-up" allegedly prevalent in
investigations of the drug trade.This prompted the House Committee on Illegal Drugs to conduct its own
congressional hearings. It was revealed during one such hearing that respondenthad prepared the
release order for his three clients using the letterhead ofthe Department of Justice (DOJ) and the
stationery of then Secretary Raul Gonzales.5
Jimenez and Vizconde, in their capacity as founders of Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption
(VACC), sent a letter of complaint to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. They stated that respondent had
admitted to drafting the release order, and had thereby committed a highly irregular and unethical act.
They argued that respondent had no authority to use the DOJ letterhead and should be penalized for
acts unbecoming a member of the bar.6
For his part, Atty. Lozano anchoredhis Complaint on respondent’s alleged violation of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall upholdthe Constitution, obey the
laws of the land, and promote respectfor legal processes. 7 Atty. Lozano contended that respondent
showed disrespect for the law and legal processes in drafting the said order and sending it to a high-
ranking public official, even though the latter was not a government prosecutor.8 Atty. Lozano’s verified
ComplaintAffidavit was filed with the Committee on Bar Discipline of the IBP and docketed as CBD
Case No. 09-2356.9
Officers of the IBP, Cebu CityChapter, issued a Resolution condemning the unethical conduct of
respondent and showing unqualified support for the VACC’s filing of disbarment proceedings.10 On 27
February 2009, Atty. Lozano withdrew his Complaint on the ground that a similar action had been filed
by Dante Jimenez.11 On 2 June 2009, the Court referred both cases to the IBP for consolidation, as well
as for investigation, report and recommendation. RESPONDENT’S VERSION
In his Comment, respondent alludes to the Joint Inquest Resolution dropping the charges against his
clients for lack of probable cause, arguing that the resolution also ordered the immediate release of
Brodett and Tecson. He reasoned that the high hopes of the accused, together with their families, came
crashing down when the PDEA still refused to release his clients.12 Sheer faith in the innocence of his
clients and fidelity to their cause prompted him to prepare and draft the release order. Respondent
admits that perhaps he was overzealous; yet, "if the Secretary of Justice approves it, then everything
may be expedited."13 In any case, respondent continues, the drafted release order was not signed by
the Secretary and therefore remained "a mere scrap of paper with no effect at all." 14
FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSIONER
The Commissioner noted that both complaints remained unsubstantiated, while the letter-complaint of
Jimenez and Vizconde had not been verified. Therefore, no evidence was adduced to prove the
charges.
However, by his own admissions inparagraphs 11 and 12 of his Comment, respondent drafted the
release order specifically for the signature of the DOJ Secretary. This act of "feeding" the draft order to
the latter was found to be highly irregular, as it tended to influence a public official. Hence,
Commissioner Abelita found respondent guilty of violating Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended that he be issued a warning not to repeat the same or any similar
action.15
RULING OF THE COURT
We emphasize at the outset thatthe Court may conduct its own investigation into charges against
members of the bar, irrespective of the form of initiatory complaints brought before it. Thus, a
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party to the case, but a witness who brought the matter
to the attention of the Court.16 By now, it is basic that there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor in
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers. The real question for determination in these proceedings is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges of a member of the bar.17
As to Atty. Lozano’s withdrawal of his verified Complaint, we reiterate our ruling in Rayos-Ombac v.
Rayos:
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant does not, in any
way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest
or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the
record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven x x x. The complainant
or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a
party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended
or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
After a careful review of the records,we agree with the IBP in finding reasonable grounds to hold
respondent administratively liable. Canon 13, the provision applied by the Investigating Commissioner,
states that "a lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends
to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court." We believe that other provisions in the
Code of Professional Responsibility likewise prohibit acts of influence-peddling not limited to the regular
courts, but even in all other venues in the justice sector, where respect for the rule of law is at all times
demanded from a member of the bar.
During the mandatory hearing conducted by the Committee on Bar Discipline, respondent stated that
the PDEA refused to release his clients unless it received a direct order from the DOJ Secretary. This
refusal purportedly impelled him to take more serious action, viz.:
ATTY VERANO: x x x By Monday December 22 I think my only recourse was to see the Secretary
himself personally. The Secretary is the type of a person who opens his [sic] kasihe is very political also
so he opens his office. If I’m not mistaken that day because of the timing we will afraid [sic] that
Christmas time is coming and that baka nga sila maipit sa loob ng Christmas time. So the family was
very sad x x x kung pwede ko raw gawan ng paraan na total na-dismissed na ang kaso. So, what I did
was thinking as a lawyer now…I prepared the staff to make it easy, to make it convenient for signing
authority that if he agrees with our appeal he will just sign it and send it over to PDEA. So hinanda ko ho
yon. And then I sent it first to the Office of the other Secretary si Blancaflor.x x x x
So I think it’s a Tuesday I had to do something and I said I will see the Secretary first with the parents of
Rodette, yong nanay at saka tatay, so we went to see him after 1:00 o’clock or 1:30 in the afternoon. By
then, that draft was still with Blancaflor. Andon ho ang Secretary tinanggap naman kami, so we sat
down with him x x x Pinaliwanag ho namin inexplain x x x Anyway, sabi niya what can I do if I move on
this, they will think that kasama rin ako dyan sa Fifty Million na yan. Sabi ko, Your Honor, wala akong
Fifty Million, hindi naman ho milyonaryo ang mga pamilyang ito. So, sabi ko pwede ho bang maki-
usap…sabi niya okay I will see what I can do. I will study the matter, those particular words, I will study
the matter. Tumuloy pa ho ang kwentuhan, as a matter of fact, 2 oras ho kami ron eh. They were not
pushing us away, he was entertaining us, and we were discussing the case. 19
Respondent likewise stated that his "experience with Secretary Gonzales is, he is very open;" and that
"because of my practice and well, candidly I belong also to a political family, my father was a
Congressman. So, he (Gonzalez) knows of the family and he knows my sister was a Congresswoman
of Pasay and they weretogether in Congress. In other words, I am not a complete stranger to
him."20 Upon questioning by Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco, respondent admitted that he was
personally acquainted with the Secretary; however, they were not that close.21
These statements and others made during the hearing establish respondent’s admission that 1) he
personally approached the DOJ Secretary despite the fact that the case was still pending before the
latter; and 2) respondent caused the preparation of the draft release order on official DOJ stationery
despite being unauthorized to do so, with the end in view of "expediting the case."
The way respondent conducted himself manifested a clear intent to gain special treatment and
consideration from a government agency. This is precisely the type of improper behavior sought to be
regulated by the codified norms for the bar. Respondentis duty-bound to actively avoid any act that
tends to influence, or may be seen to influence, the outcome of an ongoing case, lest the people’s faith
inthe judicial process is diluted.
The primary duty of lawyers is not to their clients but to the administration of justice.1âwphi1 To that
end, their clients’ success is wholly subordinate. The conduct of a member of the bar ought to and must
always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not honorable, fair and honest
which is resorted to bythe lawyer, even inthe pursuit of his devotion to his client’s cause, is
condemnable and unethical.22
Rule 1.02 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system." Further, according to Rule 15.06, "a lawyershall not state or
imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body." The succeeding rule,
Rule 15.07, mandates a lawyer "to impress upon his client compliance with the laws and the principles
of fairness."
Zeal and persistence in advancing a client’s cause must always be within the bounds of the law. 23 A
self-respecting independence in the exercise of the profession is expected if an attorney is to remain a
member of the bar. In the present case, we find that respondent fell short of these exacting standards.
Given the import of the case, a warning is a mere slap on the wrist that would not serve as
commensurate penalty for the offense.
In Sylvia Santos vs. Judge Evelyn S. Arcaya- Chua, the Court saw fit to impose a six-month suspension
against a judge who likewise committed acts of influence peddling whenshe solicited ₱100,000.00 from
complainant Santos when the latter asked for her help in the case of her friend Emerita Muñoz, who had
a pendingcase with the Supreme Court, because respondent judge was a former court attorney of the
high court.24 We find that the same penalty is appropriate in the present case.
WHEREFORE,in view of the foregoing, Atty. Felisberto L. Verano, Jr. is found GUILTYof violating Rules
1.02 and 15.07, in relation to Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he is
SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately. This also serves as an
emphaticWARNING that repetition of any similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 8084, August 24, 2015 PATROCINIA H. SALABAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANDRES C.
VILLARUEL, JR., Respondent.
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Patrocinia H. Salabao (complainant) against Atty. Andres C.
Villaruel, Jr. (respondent) for abuse of court processes in violation of Canons 10 and 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.1 After respondent filed his Answer2 we referred this case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.3redarclaw
Factual Background
The facts pertinent to this complaint are summarized in the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Complainant narrates that in 1995 she filed a case against Elmer Lumberio for his deceitful or fraudulent
conduct of taking her precious real property situated in Taguig City. After hearing, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 162, Pasig City issued its resolution in her favor in 2002.
Respondent then entered the picture as counsel for Lumberio. From then on, Complainant complained
that Respondent had made her suffer because of his abuse of processes and disregard for her rights as
a litigant.
She narrates as follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
In 2002, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 162, Pasig City which tried Civil Case No. 65147 issued its
resolution in her favor. In order to delay the case, Respondent brought the case on appeal to the Court
of Appeals under CA-GR CV No. 76360. The Court of Appeals decided in her favor on January 13,
2004 but Respondent again filed an appeal before the Supreme Court under GR No. 167413. Lumberio
lost and the case became final and executory.
Undeterred, respondent tried to defer the execution of the decision of the RTC, Branch 162, by bringing
to the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment under CA-GR SP No. 97564. When
rebuffed, he again appealed to the Supreme Court under GR No. 181243 sans a clear or new
arguments other than what he had presented before the Court of Appeals.
Still, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul the 29 November 2007 Order of the RTC
before the Court of Appeals under CA-GR SP No. 101992 which was however dismissed. From hereon,
there was not stopping the Respondent. Once again he filed a new complaint before the RTC of
Mauban, Quezon, Branch 64 under Civil Case No. 08-0666-M. Apart from this, Respondent filed several
Motion, Inhibition and Contempt that were meant to delay the resolution of the case. He likewise filed an
administrative case against Judge Briccio Ygaña of RTC Branch 153, Taguig City. Complainant then
complained that Respondent had done more than enough to suppress her rights as a winning litigant
and filed this case for abuse of processes pursuant to Rule 10.03 and Rule 10.02 of Canon 10 and Rule
12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Respondent, for his part, denied the accusation and clarified that the several pleadings he had filed had
centered on the legality of the court's decision ordering the cancellation of the title of Lumberio in such
ordinary proceeding for cancellation of the title. To his mind, the said ordinary proceeding for
cancellation of title before the RTC Branch 153, Taguig City was void because the law vests upon the
government through the Solicitor General the power to initiate a reversion case if there is such a ground
to cancel the title issued by the Land Management Bureau in favor of Lumberio.
With respect to the civil case before the RTC of Ma[u]ban, Branch 64, he explained that the said case
does not show that herein counsel committed any act of dishonesty which may subject him to any
prosecution as he is just exercising his profession to the best of his ability. 4
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found at respondent "relentlessly
filed petitions and appeals in order to exhaust all possible remedies to obtain relief for his client" 5 which
he considered as tantamount to "abusive and a spiteful effort to delay the execution of Judgment."6 He
noted that after the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162 issued a Resolution in Civil
Case No. 65147 adverse to his client, respondent filed a barrage of cases/pleadings such as an appeal
to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the RTC ruling, a petition for review with the Supreme Court
which was denied for having been filed out of time; a petition for annulment of the RTC judgment which
was dismissed by the CA; another petition for review before this Court which was again denied; a
petition for certiorari which was dismissed by the CA; another civil case before the RTC of Mauban,
Quezon which was dismissed for "improper venue, res judicata, and violation of the anti-forum shopping
law"7 and that it involved the same issues as the one filed in Pasig RTC. Moreover, he filed several
inhibitions, motions and an administrative complaint against the presiding judge. The Investigating
Commissioner, stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x [O]ne can immediately appreciate and see the abusive and spiteful conduct of Respondent. He as
a lawyer could have hardly missed knowing that his subsequent actions were merely meant to harass
the opposing litigant as in fact the Supreme Court had already issued its final ruling on the matter. After
the ruling of the High Court, Respondent should have known that the case had been finally adjudicated
and no amount of judicial exercise could turn the decision in his client's favor. From then on, he should
have saved his efforts of filing cases and motions in court, as they are futile anyway, because he has
his duty to the court above that to his client.
Needless to state, the Respondent is found herein to have violated Canon 12, Rule 12.02 and Rule
12.04 of the CPR for which he should be meted with the appropriate administrative penalty.8
He thus recommended that respondent be meted out the penalty of suspension for four months.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-251 dated 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 20, 2013, stating that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
2. x x x he had only exhausted all possible remedies available under the premises;
xxxx
With all candor and honesty, undersigned believes that he was only doing his legal duty as a lawyer to
exhaust all legal remedies taking steps within its framework. He has not done any wrongdoing while
taking such routes. He has never been dishonest;
xxxx
4. Respondent believes that undersigned deserves an acquittal given the fact that it was not shown that
he acted in bad: faith in taking such legal remedies.
5. Respondent cannot also be charged with abuse of judicial process because complainant has other
recourse available to execute the said decision in her favor while there were petitions filed, complainant
also did not allege that respondent has abused the judicial process. The courts to which the said
petitions were filed also did not cite the respondent in contempt of court [nor was a warning] given.
xx x x
6. Moreover, respondent is now suffering from renal failure which requires him to undergo dialysis three
(3) times in a week. To suspend him for four months would mean that he would stop his dialysis for four
moths [sic] which may cause his immediate death. This Honorable Commission would not be too happy
to see one of its members begging for alms from PCSO and government officials to shoulder his dialysis
of about P100,000.00 per month.9
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay
any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest; (Emphasis supplied)
Code of Professional Responsibility:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man's cause.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
Court processes. (Emphasis supplied)
Because a lawyer is an officer of the court called upon to assist in the administration of justice, any act
of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct and
justifies disciplinary action against him.12redarclaw

In a subsequent Resolution No. XXI-2014-182 dated March 23, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors In this case, the judgment in favor of complainant had become final and executory by July 27, 2005.
affirmed its earlier Resolution and denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, saying that there Respondent however proceeded to file no less than twelve (12) motions and cases in various courts
was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline. subsequent to the Entry of Judgment:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

The Court's Ruling Regional Trial Court of Taguig City:

While it is true that lawyers owe "entire devotion" to the cause of their clients, 10 it cannot be emphasized 1. Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated April 27,2006
enough that their first and primary duty is "not to the client but to the administration of justice." 11 Canon
12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider
2. Motion to Admit Affidavit of Third-Party Claimant
it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice." Thus, in the use of Court
processes, the lawyer's zeal to win must be tempered by the paramount consideration that justice be
done to all parties involved, and the la|wyer for the losing party should not stand in the way of the 3. Motion for Early Resolution
execution of a valid judgment. This is a fundamental principle in legal ethics and professional
responsibility that has iterations in various forms:LawlibraryofCRAlaw 4. Motion to Observe Judicial Courtesy while the case is pending appeal with the Court of
Appeals
The Lawyer's Oath:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
5. Urgent Motion to Defer/Suspend Execution in view of the Order of the CA
x x x I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer 6. Urgent Motion to Reconsider Order
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my
clients x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Court of Appeals:
Rule 138, Section 20, Rules of Court:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
1. Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals
Duties of attorneys. - It is the duty of an attorney: xxxx

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such 2. Motion for Reconsideration
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
3. Petition for Certiorari
xxxx
4. Urgent Motion to Reiterate the Issuance of Order for Judicial Courtesy

Supreme Court:
1. Petition for Certiorari
2. Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
From the nature and sheer number of motions and cases filed, it is clear that respondent's intention was
to delay the execution of the final judgment.
But even assuming for the sake of argument that respondent was only doing his duty as a lawyer to
exhaust all legal remedies to protect the interest of his client, his other actions belie his claim of good
faith. Respondent filed a civil case for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Mauban, Quezon in
what was clearly a case of forum-shopping. Moreover, respondent filed three Motions to Inhibit against
the three judges hearing these cases, and even a motion to cite the sheriff in contempt of court who was
simply carrying out his duty to execute the decision.
In his defense, respondent argued that the Courts did not call attention to his improper behavior and
dilatory tactics. This is not true. In her Order inhibiting herself from the case, Judge Homena-Valencia
stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This presiding judge would like to emphasize that, having assumed her position as acting presiding
judge of this branch only last September 2005, she does not know any of the parties from Adam. As
such, she could not be inclined to show bias in favor of one of them. She refuses, however, to be drawn
into a discussion, to put it mildly, with respondent's counsel as to her knowledge of the law.
However, to obviate any suspicion as to her objectivity, she inhibits herself from further hearing this
case although the reasons stated by the defendant are not one of those provided for in the Rules for the
voluntary inhibition of a judge.
Respondent's counsel is hereby advised to be more professional in his language, he, being a lawyer, is
first and foremost an officer of the court.13
In the October 23, 2007 Decision14 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 97564, respondent was rebuked for
the misuse of court processes, thus:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This Petition for Annulment of Judgment is petitioner's last-ditch effort to defer the execution of the 31
July 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 162, which has long attained
finality.
xxxx
In epitome, to sustain petitioner's insinuation of extrinsic fraud is to make a mockery of Our judicial
system. We take exception to the unjustified delay in the enforcement of the RTC Decision dated 31
July 2002 which has long become final and executory. This is obviously a spiteful ploy to deprive
respondent of the fruits of her victory.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.15
Moreover, in his Omnibus Order16 dated September 18, 2008, Judge Briccio C.
Ygaña17 stated:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
This case is a clear example of how a party, aided by a smart lawyer, could unduly delay a case,
impede the execution of judgment or misuse court processes. Defendant and counsel are very lucky
that the herein plaintiff has the patience of Job. Should this case reach the attention of the Supreme
Court, where the whole story will be known, they will have a lot of explaining to do. 18
It is quite clear that respondent has made a mockery of the judicial process by abusing Court
processes, employing dilatory tactics to frustrate the execution of a final judgment, and feigning
ignorance of Ms duties as an officer of the court. He has breached his sworn duty to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice, and violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Rule 138, Sec. 20 (c) and (g) of the Rules of Court. In so
doing, he is administratively liable for his actions.
Rule 138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court provides the penalties of disbarment and suspension as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice,
or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly
or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do x x x.
In previous decisions involving abuse of court processes, 19 this Court has imposed the penalty of
suspension ranging from six months to two years. In light of the following aggravating circumstances -
multiplicity of motions and cases filed by respondent, the malice evinced by his filing of various motions
to prevent the judges and sheriff from fulfilling their legal duties, feigned ignorance of his duties as an
officer of the court, and his lack of remorse for his actions - the Court finds that a penalty of suspension
for 18 months would be commensurate to the damage and prejudice that respondent has inflicted on
complainant Salabao for his actions.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Andres C. Villaruel, Jr. is hereby
found GUILTY of violation of the Lawyer's Oath and Rules 10.03 and 12.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of eighteen (18) months.
CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL, Complainant vs.ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, Respondent A.C. No. 11836
This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig (Atty. Bassig) for violation of
Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer's Oath.
The Facts
In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Carlina Robiñol (Robiñol) alleged that respondent rented a
house from her in Brgy. Tanong, Marikina City, for a monthly rental of ₱8,500.00. Said lease, without
any written contract, was for a period of two years, or from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. Upon the
start of the lease agreement, it was agreed that Atty. Bassig will pay a one month advance and another
one month deposit, both of which are equivalent of one month rental payment. However, he did not
comply with the same. Atty. Bassig instead paid the monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13,
2010.1
Atty. Bassig then paid his rents belatedly from July 2010 to January 2012. However, after said period, expunged the answer filed by Atty. Bassig for lack of verification. In view thereof, the parties were
he stopped making any payment, to wit2 : directed to file their respective position paper.

Amount In a Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 201513 , the IBP-CBD recommended the
Month/s covered Payment date suspension of Atty. Bassig from the practice of law for a period of two years. The IBP Commissioner
paid
ruled that Atty. Bassig's failure to file his answer despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled
July 13, 2010 to August August 12, PhP hearings showed his resistance to lawful orders and illustrated his despiciency for his oath of office as a
13, 2010 2010 8,500.00 lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction. The fallothereof reads:
August 13, 2010 to November 24, PhP
October 13, 2010 2010 17,000.00 IN VIEW THEREOF, we respectfully recommend that respondent, ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, be
SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS from receipt hereof, from the practice of law and as
October 13, 2010 to October 13, PhP
member of the Bar.
November 13, 2010 2010 8,500.00
November 13, 2011 to January 4, PhP RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14
December 13, 2011 2012 8,500.00
December 13, 2011 to March13, PhP In a Resolution No. XXII-2016-165,15 CBD Case No. 14-4447, entitled Carlina P. Robiñol v. Atty.
January 13, 2012 2012 8,500.00 Edilberto P. Bassig, dated February 25, 2016, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the
recommendation of the IBPCBD and disposed thus:
Robiñol alleged that the last payment in the amount of ₱l7,000.00, for two months' rent was made in
July 2012, but no receipt was issued upon Atty. Bassig's instruction. Atty. Bassig told Robiñol that he RESOLVED to ADOPT the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner imposing a penalty of
will be receiving a big amount from his client and that he will thereafter pay the remaining unpaid rent. 3 suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years considering that there was a previous sanction of
suspension of two (2) years against the same Respondent in another disbarment case.
Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him to stay in the
premises. However, when Typhoon Habagat struck Marikina City, Atty. Bassig left the house because of As this Court has disciplinary authority over members of the bar, We are tasked to resolve the instant
the heavy flood. When he left, he neither informed Robiñol of his intended destination nor satisfied his case against Atty. Bassig.
unsettled obligation.4
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant 16 and the proper evidentiary
When the situation in Marikina City got better, Atty. Bassig still failed to return to his rented house. 5 threshold is substantial evidence.17

Later on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig's daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig was living with
her. Robiñol then went to the said house and demanded payment from Atty. Bassig. As a consequence,
he executed a promissory note6 dated August 18, 2012, undertaking to pay the amount of ₱127,500.00
on installment basis. The promissory note indicates that half of the amount due would be paid on
August 31, 2012 and the other half on September 30, 2012. However, Atty. Bassig reneged on his
obligation.7
Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence submitted were
inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing payment of Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the
promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig were photocopies of the original.
A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is
unavailable.18 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:

Because of the foregoing incidents, Robiñol was constrained to hire a counsel to protect her
interest.1âwphi1 Thus, a demand letter8 was sent to Atty. Bassig on December 8, 2012.
In an unverified answer, Atty. Bassig acknowledged his obligation to Robiñol and promised to pay the
same within the next two months after the answer was filed. He maintained that he had difficulty in
managing his finances as· he was paying for his son's medical expenses and his car's monthly
amortizations.9
A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing10 dated January 21, 2015 was issued by the IBP
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala. However, the Orders dated February 25, 201511 and March
25, 201512 issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
reveals that only Robiñol appeared in the scheduled mandatory conferences. The latter Order also
SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has been lost or destroyed,
or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman 19 , the Court held that:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror
must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction
of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx 20
In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for the admission of said
photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare allegations in her complaint, Robiñol was not able to present
any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased a house from
Robiñol.
Moreover, We cannot deem Atty. Bassig's failure to file his verified answer and to attend in the
scheduled mandatory conferences as an admission of the allegations in the complaint. The
consequences of such omission are clearly laid down in Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, to wit:
Section 5. Non-appearance of parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings.- a) Non-appearance at the
mandatory conference or at the clarificatory questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of the right to
participate in the proceedings. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted. Pleadings
submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis-neither purely civil nor purely criminal. They do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its
officers.21 While these proceedings are sui generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence may
not be altogether dispensed with. More so, in this case when the evidence in consideration fails to
comply with basic rules on admissibility.
Nevertheless, Atty. Bassig is not completely exculpated from any administrative liability.
It must be noted that Atty. Bassig, despite due notice, repeatedly failed to abide by the orders of the
IBP, i.e. filing a verified answer, appearing in two mandatory conferences and filing of position paper. In
fact, when the IBP ordered him to file a position paper, it is in view of the expunction of his answer.
Notwithstanding, Atty. Bassig still ignored the directive.
For his behavior, Atty. Bassig committed an act in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.
His attitude of refusing to obey the orders of the IBP indicates his lack of respect for the IBP's rules and
regulations22 , but also towards the IBP as an institution. Remarkably, the IBP is empowered by this
Court to conduct proceedings regarding the discipline of lawyers. 23 Hence, it is but proper for Atty.
Bassig to be mindful of his duty as a member of the bar to maintain his respect towards a duly
constituted authority.
Verily, Atty. Bassig's conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey
court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court.24 In disregarding the orders of the IBP, he exhibited a conduct which
runs contrary to his sworn duty as an officer of the court.
As a final note, We commiserate with Robiñol, a nonagenarian, on her unfortunate circumstances as
she should no longer be dealing with this kind of anxiety. Nevertheless, We sanction Atty. Bassig to pay
a fine in the amount of ₱l0,000.00 for his arrant neglect to maintain acceptable deportment as member
of the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig is hereby ORDERED to pay
a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱l0,000.00) with the STERN WARNING that
commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.
JOY T. SAMONTE, Complainant vs.ATTY. VIVENCIO V. JUMAMIL, Respondent A.C. No. 11668
For the Court's resolution is a Complaint1 dated March 15, 2013, filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), by complainant Joy T. Samonte (complainant) against respondent Atty. Vivencio V.
Jumamil (respondent), praying that the latter be disbarred for acts unbecoming of a lawyer and betrayal
of trust.
The Facts
Complainant alleged that sometime in October 2012, she received summons from the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch Xl, Davao City, relative to an illegal
dismissal case, i.e., NLRC Case RAB-XI-10-00586-12, filed by four (4) persons claiming to be workers
in her small banana plantation.2Consequently, complainant engaged the services of respondent to
prepare her position paper, and paid him the amount of ₱8,000.00 3 as attorney's fees.4 Despite
constantly reminding respondent of the deadline for the submission of her position paper, complainant
discovered that he still failed to file the same.5 As such, on January 25, 2013, the Labor Arbiter
rendered a Decision6 based on the evidence on record, whereby complainant was held liable to the
workers in the total amount of ₱633,143.68.7 When complainant confronted respondent about the said
ruling, the latter casually told her to just sell her farm to pay the farm workers.8 Because of respondent's
neglect, complainant claimed that she was left defenseless and without any remedy to protect her
interests against the execution of the foregoing judgment; 9 hence, she filed the instant complaint.
In an Order10 dated March 26, 2013, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) directed
respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint.
In his Answer11 dated April 19, 2013, respondent admitted that he indeed failed to file a position paper
on behalf of complainant. However, he maintained that said omission was due to complainant's failure
to adduce credible witnesses to testify in her favor. In this relation, respondent averred that complainant
instructed her to prepare an Affidavit12 for one Romeo P. Baol (Romeo), who was intended to be her
witness; nevertheless, respondent was instructed that the contents of Romeo's affidavit were not to be
interpreted in the Visayan dialect so that the latter would not know what he would be testifying on.
Respondent added that complainant's uncle, Nicasio Ticong, who was also an intended witness,
refused to execute an affidavit and testify to her lies. Thus, it was complainant who was deceitful in her
conduct and that the complaint against him should be dismissed for lack of merit. 13
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In its Report and Recommendation14 dated March 14, 2014, the IBPCBD found respondent
administratively liable and, accordingly, recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for
a period of one (1) year. Essentially, the IBP-CBD found respondent guilty of violating Rule 10.01,
Canon 10, and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), as well as the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.15
In a Resolution16 dated December 13, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
aforesaid Report and Recommendation, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.
The Court's Ruling
The Court concurs with and affirms the findings of the IBP, with modification, however, as to the penalty
in order to account for his breach of the rules on notarial practice.
The relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this
regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their cause, and accordingly,
exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Accordingly, lawyers are required to
maintain, at all times, a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote their full attention, skill, and
competence to their cases, regardless of their importance, and whether they accept them for a fee or for
free.17 To this end, lawyers are enjoined to employ only fair and honest means to attain lawful
objectives.18 These principles are embodied in Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of
the CPR, which respectively read as follows:
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.1âwphi1
CANON 18 -A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.
In this case, it is undisputed that a lawyer-client relationship was forged between complainant and
respondent when the latter agreed to file a position paper on her behalf before the NLRC and, in
connection therewith, received the amount of ₱8,000.00 from complainant as payment for his services.
Case law instructs that a lawyer-client relationship commences when a lawyer signifies his agreement
to handle a client's case and accepts money representing legal fees from the latter, 19 as in this case.
From then on, as the CPR provides, a lawyer is duty-bound to "serve his client with competence and
diligence," and in such regard, "not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
However, it is fairly apparent that respondent breached this duty when he admittedly failed to file the
necessary position paper before the NLRC, which had, in fact, resulted into an adverse ruling against
his client, i.e., herein complainant. To be sure, it is of no moment that complainant purportedly failed to
produce any credible witnesses in support of her position paper; clearly, this is not a valid justification
for respondent to completely abandon his client's cause. By voluntarily taking up complainant's case,
respondent gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend the latter's interest therein. Verily,
he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 20 In A
bay v. Montesino,21 it was explained that regardless of a lawyer's personal view, the latter must still
present every remedy or defense within the authority of the law to support his client's cause:
Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must
always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence
and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Otherwise
stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense
of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken
or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is
entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and
he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an
attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only
to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with
diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does
honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. 22 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
In light of the foregoing, the Court therefore agrees with the IBP that respondent should be held
administratively liable for violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.
Likewise, the IBP correctly found that respondent violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR. Records
show that he indeed indulged in deliberate falsehood when he admittedly prepared 23 and notarized24 the
affidavit of complainant's intended witness, Romeo, despite his belief that Romeo was a perjured
witness. In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,25the Court highlighted the oath undertaken by every lawyer
to not only obey the laws of the land, but also to refrain from doing any falsehood, viz. :
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well
as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as
well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." 26 (Emphases supplied)
Notably, the notarization of a perjured affidavit also constituted a violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. Section 4 (a), Rule IV thereof pertinently provides:
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in these Rules
for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or
immoral[.] (Emphasis supplied)
On this score, it is well to stress that "notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest. It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into a public document, making that document admissible in evidence
without further proof of authenticity thereof. A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. For this reason, a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties; otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of this form of
conveyance would be undermined."27
Having established respondent's administrative liability, the Court now determines the proper penalty.
The appropriate penalty to be meted against an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. In Del Mundo v. Capistrano,28 the Court suspended the
lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership
agreement with his client. Similarly, in Conlu v. Aredonia, Jr.,29 the same penalty was imposed on a
lawyer for his inexcusable negligence in failing to file the required pleading to the prejudice of his client.
Hence, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the Court adopts the penalty recommended by the IBP
and accordingly suspends respondent from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year. Moreover, as
in the case of Dela Cruz v. Zabala,30 where the notary public therein notarized an irregular document,
the Court hereby revokes respondent's notarial commission and further disqualifies him from being
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2) years.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vivencio V. Jumamil is found GUILY of violating Rule 10.01, Canon 10
and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution.
Moreover, in view of his violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, his notarial commission, if still
existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public
for a period of two (2) years. Finally, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant vs.ATTY. RONALDO ANTONIO V. CALAYAN,
Respondent January 10, 2018 A.C. No. 8208
Before the Court is a Counter-Complaint1 filed by complainant (Ret.) Judge Virgilio
Alpajora (Complainant) against respondent Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V. Calayan (Respondent), which
originated from an administrative complaint filed by the latter against the former before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) for ignorance of the law and/or issuance of undue order. The administrative
complaint against Judge Alpajora was dismissed by the Court in a Resolution, 2 dated March 2, 2009, on
the ground that the matters raised therein were judicial in nature.
In his Comment/Opposition with Counter-Complaint to Discipline Complainant,3 complainant charged
respondent with (a) filing a malicious and harassment administrative case, (b) propensity for dishonesty
in the allegations in his pleadings, (c) misquoting provisions of law, and (d) misrepresentation of facts.
Complainant prayed for respondent's disbarment and cancellation of his license as a lawyer.
The Antecedents
Prior to this case, an intra-corporate case docketed as Civil Case No. 2007-10 and entitled "Calayan
Educational Foundation Inc. (CEFI), Dr. Arminda Calayan, Dr. Bernardita Calayan-Brion and Dr. Manuel
Calayan vs. Atty. Ronalda A.V. Calayan, Susan S. Calayan and Deanna Rachelle S. Calayan, " was
filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City designated as commercial court and presided
by Judge Adolfo Encomienda. Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
CEFI. He signed and filed pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for himself. Court proceedings ensued
despite several inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to
complainant. Thereafter, complainant issued an Omnibus Order, 4dated July 11, 2008 for the creation of
a management committee and the appointment of its members. That Order prompted the filing of the
administrative case against the Judge Alpajora.
The administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however, referred the
comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in the administrative case against him
to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.
The OBC deemed it proper to re-docket the counter-complaint as a regular administrative case against
respondent. Thus, in a Resolution,5 dated June 3, 2009, upon recommendation of the OBC, the Court
resolved to require respondent to submit his comment on the counter-complaint.
In its Resolution,6 dated September 9, 2009, the Court noted respondent's comment and referred the
administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
After a mandatory conference before the IBP, both parties were directed to submit their respective
verified position papers.
Position of complainant
Complainant alleged that he partially tried and heard Civil Case No. 2007-10, an intra-corporate case
filed against respondent, when he later voluntarily inhibited himself from it on account of the latter's filing
of the administrative case against him.
The intra-corporate case was previously tried by Presiding Judge Adolfo Encomienda (Presiding Judge
Encomienda) until he voluntarily inhibited after respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Recuse and a
Supplement to Defendant's Urgent Motion to Recuse on the grounds of undue delay in disposing
pending incidents, gross ignorance of the law and gross inefficiency. 7 The motions came after Presiding
Judge Encomienda issued an order appointing one Atty. Antonio Acyatan (Atty. Acyatan) as receiver,
who was directed to immediately take over the subject corporation.
After Presiding Judge Encomienda inhibited himself, the case was re-raffled to the sala of Executive
Judge Norma Chionglo-Sia, who also inhibited herself because she was about to retire. The case was
referred to Executive Judge Eloida R. de Leon-Diaz for proper disposition and re-raffle.8 The case was
finally raffled to complainant.9
Complainant averred that the administrative case against him by respondent was brought about by his
issuance of the omnibus order, dated July 11, 2008, where he ordered the creation of a management
committee and appointment of its members. Meanwhile, the RTC resolved that Atty. Acyatan continue
to discharge his duties and responsibilities with such powers and authority as the court-appointed
receiver. The trial court also authorized the foundation to pay Atty. Acyatan reimbursement expenses
and professional charges. Complainant claimed that his order was not acceptable to respondent
because he knew the import and effect of the said order - that he, together with his wife and daughter,
would lose their positions as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary, respectively, and as members of the
Board of Trustees of the CEFI.10
Complainant further claimed that before the records of Civil Case 2007-10 was transmitted to his sala
and after he had inhibited from said case, respondent filed thirteen (13) civil and special actions before
the RTC of Lucena City.11Atty. Calayan also filed two (2) related intra-corporate controversy cases -
violating the rule on splitting causes of actions - involving the management and operation of the
foundation. According to complainant, these showed the propensity and penchant of respondent in filing
cases, whether or not they are baseless, frivolous or unfounded, with no other intention but to harass,
malign and molest his opposing parties, including the lawyers and the handling judges. Complainant
also revealed that respondent filed two (2) other administrative cases against a judge and an assisting
judge in the RTC of Lucena City, which were dismissed because the issues raised were judicial in
nature.12
Complainant also disclosed that before his sala, respondent filed eighteen (18) repetitious and
prohibited pleadings.13 Respondent continuously filed pleadings after pleadings as if to impress upon
the court to finish the main intra-corporate case with such speed. To complainant's mind, the ultimate
and ulterior objective of respondent in filing the numerous pleadings, motions, manifestation and
explanations was to prevent the takeover of the management of CEFI and to finally dismiss the case at
the pre-trial stage.
Complainant further revealed that due to the series of motions for recusation or inhibition of judges,
there is no presiding judge in Lucena City available to try and hear the Calayan cases. Moreover,
respondent filed nine (9) criminal charges against opposing lawyers and their respective clients before
the City Prosecutor of Lucena City. In addition, there were four (4) administrative cases filed against
opposing counsels pending before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline. 14
Based on the foregoing, complainant asserted that respondent committed the following: (1) serious and
gross misconduct in his duties as counsel for himself; (2) violated his oath as lawyer for [a] his failure to
observe and maintain respect to the courts (Section 20(b), Rule 138, Rules of Court); [b] by his abuse of
judicial process thru maintaining actions or proceedings inconsistent with truth and honor and his acts to
mislead the judge by false statements (Section 20(d), Rule 138); (3) repeatedly violated the rules of
procedures governing intra-corporate cases and maliciously misused the same to defeat the ends of
justice; and (4) knowingly violated the rule against the filing of multiple actions arising from the same
cause of action.
Position of respondent
In his Position Paper,15 respondent countered that the subject case is barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
According to him, the counter-complaint was integrated with the Comment/Opposition of complainant in
the administrative case docketed as A.M. OCA LP.I. No. 08-2968-RTJ filed by respondent against the
latter. He stressed that because no disciplinary measures were levelled on him by the OCA as an
outcome of his complaint, charges for malpractice, malice or bad faith were entirely ruled out; moreso,
his disbarment was decidedly eliminated.16Respondent argued that the doctrine of res judicata was
embedded in the OCA's finding that his complaint was judicial in nature. 17 He likewise averred that the
conversion of the administrative complaint against a judge into a disbarment complaint against him, the
complaining witness, was hideously adopted to deflect the charges away from complainant. Respondent
insisted that the counter-complaint was not sanctioned by the Rules of Court on disbarment and the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline.18
Respondent also claimed that the counter-complaint was unverified and thus, without complainant's
own personal knowledge; instead, it is incontrovertible proof of his lack of courtesy and obedience
toward proper authorities and fairness to a fellow lawyer. 19
Further, respondent maintained that complainant committed the following: (1) grossly unethical and
immoral conduct by his impleading a non-party;20 (2) betrayal of his lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR);21 (3) malicious and intentional delay in not terminating the pre-
trial,22 in violation of the Interim Rules because he ignored the special summary nature of the
case;23 and (4) misquoted provisions of law and misrepresented the facts. 24
Lastly, it was respondent's submission that the counter-complaint failed to adduce the requisite
quantum of evidence to disbar him, even less, to cite him in contempt of court assuming ex gratia the
regularity of the referral of the case.25
Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
In its Report and Recommendation,26 the Investigating Commissioner noted that, instead of refuting the
allegations and evidence against him, respondent merely reiterated his charges against complainant.
Instead of asserting his defense against complainant's charges, the position paper for the respondent
appeared more to be a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated March 2, 2009 rendered by
the Supreme Court, dismissing the administrative case against complainant. 27
In any case, based on the parties' position papers, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that
respondent violated Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, 28 Rules 8.01, 10.01 to 10.03, 11.03,
11.04, 12.02 and 12.04 of the CPR29 and, thus, recommended his suspension from the practice of law
for two (2) years,30 for the following reasons:
First, respondent did not deny having filed four (4) cases against the counsel involved in the intra-
corporate case from which the subject administrative cases stemmed, and nine (9) criminal cases
against the opposing parties, their lawyers, and the receiver before the Office of the Prosecutor of
Lucena City - all of which were subject of judicial notice. The Investigating Commissioner opined that
such act manifested respondent's malice in paralyzing these lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in
protecting their client's interest.31
Second, respondent committed misrepresentation when he cited a quote from former Chief Justice
Hilario Davide, Jr. as a thesis when, in fact, it was a dissenting opinion. The Investigating Commissioner
further opined that describing the supposed discussions by the judge with respondent's adverse
counsels as contemplated crimes and frauds is not only grave but also unfounded and irrelevant to the
present case.32
Third, respondent grossly abused his right of recourse to the courts by the filing of multiple actions
concerning the same subject matter or seeking substantially identical relief. 33 He admitted filing
pleadings indiscriminately, but argued that it was within his right to do so and it was merely for the
purpose of saving CEFI from imminent downfall.34 The Investigating Commissioner opined that the filing
of multiple actions not only was contemptuous, but also a blatant violation of the lawyer's oath. 35
Fourth, respondent violated Canon 11 of the CPR by attributing to complainant ill-motives that were not
supported by the record or had no materiality to the case. 36 He charged complainant with coaching
adverse counsel on account of their alleged close ties, inefficiency in dealing with his pleadings, acting
with dispatch on the adverse party's motions, partiality to the plaintiffs because he was a townmate of
Presiding Judge Encomienda, and arriving at an order without predicating the same on legal bases
under the principle of stare decisis.37 According to the Investigating Commissioner, these charges are
manifestly without any basis and also established respondent's disrespect for the complainant. 38
Based on the findings, the Investigating Commissioner ultimately concluded:
As a party directly involved in the subject intra-corporate controversy, it is duly noted that Respondent
was emotionally affected by the ongoing case. His direct interest in the proceedings apparently clouded
his judgment, on account of which he failed to act with circumspect in his choice of words and legal
remedies. Such facts and circumstances mitigate Respondent's liability. Hence, it is hereby
recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. 39
Consequently, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 40 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. It recommended the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
Aggrieved, respondent moved for reconsideration.
In a Resolution,41 dated May 4, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration as there was no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the
motion was a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out.
Hence, pursuant to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,42 the Resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, together with the whole record of the case, was transmitted to the Court for final action.
Ruling of the Court
The Court adopts the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors.
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
order to promote the public's faith in the legal profession. 43
When lawyers, in the performance of their duties, act in a manner that prejudices not only the rights of
their client, but also of their colleagues and offends due administration of justice, appropriate disciplinary
measures and proceedings are available such as reprimand, suspension or even disbarment to rectify
their wrongful acts.
The Court, however, emphasizes that a case for disbarment or suspension is not meant to grant relief to
a complainant as in a civil case, but is intended to cleanse the ranks of the legal profession of its
undesirable members in order to protect the public and the courts.44 Proceedings to discipline erring
members of the bar are not instituted to protect and promote the public good only, but also to maintain
the dignity of the profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.45
In this case, perusal of the records reveals that Atty. Calayan has displayed conduct unbecoming of a
worthy lawyer.
Harassing tactics against opposing counsel
As noted by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent did not deny filing several cases, both civil
and criminal, against opposing parties and their counsels. In his motion for reconsideration of the IBP
Board of Governors' Resolution, he again admitted such acts but expressed that it was not ill-willed. He
explained that the placing of CEFI under receivership and directing the creation of a management
committee and the continuation of the receiver's duties and responsibilities by virtue of the Omnibus
Order spurred his filing of various pleadings and/or motions.46 It was in his desperation and earnest
desire to save CEFI from further damage that he implored the aid of the courts. 47
The Court is mindful of the lawyer's duty to defend his client's cause with utmost zeal. However,
professional rules impose limits on a lawyer's zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions and
qualifications.48 The filing of cases by respondent against the adverse parties and their counsels, as
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the lawyers
from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client's interest. 49 Even assuming arguendo that such
acts were done without malice, it showed respondent's gross indiscretion as a colleague in the legal
profession.
Unsupported ill-motives attributed to a judge
As officers of the court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
court and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.50
Here, respondent has consistently attributed unsupported imputations against the complainant in his
pleadings. He insisted that complainant antedated the order, dated August 15, 2008, because the
envelopes where the order came from were rubber stamped as having been mailed only on August 26,
2008.51 He also accused the complainant judge of being in cahoots and of having deplorable close
ties with the adverse counsels;52 and that complainant irrefutably coached said adverse
counsels.53 However, these bare allegations are absolutely unsupported by any piece of evidence.
Respondent did not present any proof to establish complainant's alleged partiality or the antedating. The
date of mailing indicated on the envelope is not the date of issue of the said order.
Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the CPR state that:
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the Courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxx
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no
materiality to the case.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of attributing unsupported ill-motives to
complainant. It must be remembered that all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the
courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.54
Hence, no matter how passionate a lawyer is towards defending his client's cause, he must not forget to
display the appropriate decorum expected of him, being a member of the legal profession, and to
continue to afford proper and utmost respect due to the courts.
Failure to observe candor, fairness and good faith before the court; failure to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice
It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious
administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to
satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it could
proceed at all.55
In his Motion for Reconsideration56 of the Resolution dated February 10, 2014 of the IBP Board of
Governors, respondent wrote:
Anent, the Respondent's alleged commission of falsehood in his pleadings, suffice it to state that if
certain pleadings prepared by the Respondent contained some allegations that turned out to be
inaccurate, the same were nevertheless unintentional and only arose out of the Respondent's honest
misappreciation of certain facts;57
The records, however, showed that respondent's allegations were not brought about by mere
inaccuracy. For one of his arguments against the complainant, respondent relied on Rule 9 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which provides:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Management Committee. - As an incident to any of the cases filed under
these Rules or the Interim Rules on Corporate Rehabilitation, A PARTY MAY APPLY for the
appointment of a management committee for the corporation, partnership or association, when there is
imminent danger of: xxx [Emphasis supplied]
He stressed that the courts cannot motu proprio legally direct the appointment of a management
committee when the Interim Rules predicate such appointment exclusively upon the application of a
party in the complaint a quo.58
By employing the term "exclusively" to describe the class of persons who can apply for the appointment
of a management committee,59 respondent tried to mislead the Court. Lawyers are well aware of the
tenor of a provision of law when "may" is used. "May" is construed as permissive and operating to
confer discretion.60 Thus, when the Interim Rules stated that "a party may apply x x x, " it did not
connote exclusivity to a certain class. It simply meant that should a party opt for the appointment of
such, it may do so. It does not, however, exclude the courts from ordering the appointment of a
management committee should the surrounding circumstances of the case warrant such.
Further, as regards his alleged misquotation, respondent argues that he should have been cited in
contempt.1âwphi1 He found justification in Cortes vs. Bangalan,61 to wit:
xxx. The alleged offensive and contemptuous language contained in the letter-complaint was not
directed to the respondent court. As observed by the Court Administrator, "what respondent should
have done in this particular case is that he should have given the Court (Supreme Court) the opportunity
to rule on the complaint and not simply acted precipitately in citing complainant in contempt of court in a
manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than the upholding of a court's honor."
A judge may not hold a party in contempt of court for expressing concern on his impartiality even if the
judge may have been insulted therein. While the power to punish in contempt is inherent in all courts so
as to preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the due administration of justice, judges,
however, should exercise their contempt powers judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end in view of utilizing their contempt powers for correction and preservation not for retaliation
or vindication.62
As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the jurisprudence quoted precisely cautions
a judge against citing a party in contempt, which is totally contradictory to the position of respondent. He
misrepresented the text of a decision, in violation of the CPR.
Moreover, in defense of the multiple pleadings he filed, respondent avers that there is no law or rule that
limits the number of motions, pleadings and even cases as long as they are sufficient in form and
substance and not violative of the prohibition against forum shopping. 63 He maintains that his pleadings
were filed in utmost good faith and for noble causes, and that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally protected rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases. 64
Ironically, Atty. Calayan's indiscriminate filing of pleadings, motions, civil and criminal cases, and even
administrative cases against different trial court judges relating to controversies involving CEFI, in fact,
runs counter to the speedy disposition of cases. It frustrates the administration of justice. It degrades the
dignity and integrity of the courts.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases.
Limitations can be inferred from the following rules:
1. Rules of Court
a. Rule 71, Section 3. Indirect Contempt to be Punished After Charge and Hearing. - After charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the For having violated the CPR and the Lawyer's Oath, respondent's conduct should be meted with a
administration of justice; commensurate penalty.

xxx WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and APPROVES the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines - Board of Governors dated September 28, 2013. Accordingly, Atty. Ronaldo Antonio V.
2. Code of Professional Responsibility Calayan is found GUILTY of violating The Lawyer's Oath and The Code of Professional Responsibility
and he is hereby ordered SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for two (2) years, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will warrant the imposition of a more severe
a. Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote penalty.
respect for law and for legal processes.

b. Canon 10, Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.

c. Canon 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.

d. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 -A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
Judgment or misuse Court processes.

Respondent justifies his filing of administrative cases against certain judges, including complainant, by
relying on In Re: Almacen (Almacen).65 He claims that the mandate of the ruling laid down
in Almacen was to encourage lawyers' criticism of erring magistrates.66

In Almacen, however, it did not mandate but merely recognized the right of a lawyer, both as an officer
of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the
acts of courts and judges.67 In addition, the Court therein emphasized that these criticisms are subject
to a condition, to wit:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.68 [Emphasis supplied.]

Indubitably, the acts of respondent were in violation of his duty to observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts of justice and judicial officers and his duty to never seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer.69

In his last ditch attempt to escape liability, respondent apologized for not being more circumspect with
his remedies and choice of words. He admitted losing objectivity and becoming emotional while
pursuing the cases involving him and the CEFI. The Court, however, reiterates that a lawyer's duty, is
not to his client but primarily to the administration of justice. To that end, his client's success is wholly
subordinate. His conduct ought to, and must always, be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics.
Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his
devotion to his client's cause, is condemnable and unethical.70