Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)

Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006

FACTS:

Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and
Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility
vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.

ISSUES:

(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel?

APPLICABLE LAWS:

• Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution

The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm
and harmony of nature.

• Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition
of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized
and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and
programs and in the decision-making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or
activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be
served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the
atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and
regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against
violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and
public health impact of a project or activity.

RULING:

(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Moreover, as held
previously, a party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court's
discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the
principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly.

(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the
respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order
owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate
branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION,

GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA,
et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General
Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from
other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health
risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and
could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22]
It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable
and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban
on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring
the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao
City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised
its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive
due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the
ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance
must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by
the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among
equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions;
(2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and
the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community
and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose
of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

G.R. No. 164527 15 August 2007

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.
FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by
National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the
Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in
Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain
Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990
declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA
6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan,
respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders,
Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at
the Manila Bay Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling
components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government
shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the
feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both
parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and
construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a
fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to
accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of
temporary housing were decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares,
which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land
as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site
dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in
MO No. 33.
 On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and
subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had
been turned over by RBI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is
vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner

2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands

3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of
man

4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use

5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands

6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding

7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain

8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP

9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

HELD:
1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation
projects for and on behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a valid
and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA
(which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or
by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is
derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain
Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special Patent Orders
were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the
abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is
reposed first in the Philippine President.

3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and
465 by President Ramos.

4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation
No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.” Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as
alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.

5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of
them as it may deem appropriate.

6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey
Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and
Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject
to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In
addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to
sell the same to any qualified person.

8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II,
Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and
rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned.
 The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but
did not do so. The moment to challenge has passed.

WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION,

GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban against aerial
spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members,
namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA,
et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the
equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and
lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the General
Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being based on a valid
classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from
other methods of pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health
risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and
could be invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.[22]
It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable
and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection grounds
for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a) in imposing a ban
on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month
transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring
the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural lands in Davao
City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its corporate powers... the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance
with intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of police power, the
property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
objectives of the Government.[110] A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised
its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2)
the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.[112]Substantive
due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the Government's
action.[113] This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily,
whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the
ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance
must survive a due process challenge.
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes
confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by
the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among
equals determined according to a valid classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by
substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently
from another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions;
(2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and
the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift
causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification,
does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We
answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community
and to the environment.[141] A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the
ordinance seeks to achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive"
because the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law
seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or
end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose
of the law.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;

Case Digest: Social Justice Society v. Atienza

Posted on

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
Facts
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the
area from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses
disallowed to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-
called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron
Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that
“the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.”
In the MOU, the oil companies were required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG
spheres and to commence work for the creation of safety buffer and green zones
surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the DOE will enable
the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Issue
Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order
the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.
Ruling
Yes. The mayor has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 because the
Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to “enforce all
laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city.” One of these is Ordinance No.
8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as
long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.
In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr., it provides that officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the
ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. It might seriously hinder
the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional.